Equal investments, different rewards: gender inequalities among Israeli lawyers

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Equal investments, different rewards: genderinequalities among Israeli lawyers

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Equal investments, different rewards:

gender inequalities among Israeli lawyers

DALIA RACHMAN-MOORE, TAMAR ALMOR & MEIR KOGMAN

School of Business Administration, College of Management, Israel

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically whether women in the

legal profession in Israel experience discrimination in terms of earnings and career

opportunities. The contribution of this study is threefold. On the theoretical level, we added

psychological capital and career expectations to the commonly used variables. Second, we

focused on an immigrant country in transition towards Westernization that presents an

interesting mix of legal equality and traditional family values. Third, our analyses are

based on a national mail survey of full-time lawyers in Israel.

The findings of this study show that male lawyers are rewarded better than female lawyers

for the number of hours worked per week as well as for their married status. We also found that

female lawyers who expected more regarding economic reward earn less, while no relationship

was found for male lawyers. Furthermore, the likelihood to attain partnership is much lower

for female than for male lawyers after controlling for all relevant variables. The results

indicate existence of discrimination.

Gender studies show that earning gaps between men and women exist in every

country both across and within professions, and this phenomenon has been documen-

ted extensively (i.e., Bayard et al., 2003; Efroni, 1980; Haberfeld & Cohen, 1998;

Hakim, 1996; Reskin & Padavic, 1994; Treiman & Roos, 1983; Yaish & Kraus,

2003). Most studies focusing on the wage gap employ the human capital approach

and the occupational segmentation theory and can only explain about half of the

wage gap in earnings in terms of human capital and structure of the labor market

(Firestone et al., 1999). Researchers have suggested that the residual or unexplained

earnings gap can be attributed to market discrimination (Haberfeld, 1992; Firestone

et al., 1999; Stanley & Jarrell, 1998; Kraus, 2002). Recent research has focused on

additional psychological and sociological factors that may play a role in explaining

the wage gap, i.e., socialization, pay-expectations, valence of pay, work structure

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,VOL. 13, NO. 3, NOVEMBER 2006

Address for correspondence: Dalia Rachman-Moore, School of Bussiness Administration, College ofManagement, 7 Yitzhak Rabin Blvd., PO Box 25073, Rishon Lezion 75910, Israel, Tel.: þ972 3 9634246;Fax: þ972 3 9634117; E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 0969-5958 print=ISSN 1469-9257 online/06=030189-28 # 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080=09695950701192152

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and roles (Darity et al., 1996; England & McCreary, 1987; Firestone et al., 1999;

Haberfeld, 1992).

Studies conducted in the Western world show that during the past two decades

the gross economic standing of women has improved and that the wage gap has nar-

rowed (Blau & Beller, 1988; Even & Macpherson, 1993; Hakim, 1996; Stanley &

Jarrell, 1998). Moreover, various recent studies in these countries were not able to

provide clear evidence that discriminatory practices, i.e., different rewards for equal

investments in human capital, still exist especially when focusing on the professional

sectors such as the legal profession (Dixon & Seron, 1995; Huang, 1997). However,

researchers did question whether latent discrimination could explain wage differ-

ences. Although no clear evidence of wage discrimination between genders has

been found in the US and in Canada in the legal profession, the question remains

whether this change in the legal profession is occurring in other countries as well.

In order to examine this question we decided to focus on the same professional

segment, i.e., the legal profession.

This study contributes to the existing literature in a number of aspects. First, in

the current study we address the determinants of wage differences by developing an

exhaustive set of variables and relating it to the Israeli context. This set of determi-

nants includes infrequently researched variables that address psychological capital

as well as human and social capital and occupational segmentation. The types of

determinants employed in this research are based on previous studies that focused

on human capital theory and/or occupational segmentation theory in order to

examine wage disparities among lawyers (Hagan, 1990; Huang, 1997; Laband &

Lentz, 1995; Robson & Wallace, 2001). The additional determinants are based on

less frequently studied variables that we labeled as psychological capital, namely,

organizational commitment and expected economic reward. In addition, when pre-

dicting partnership attainment we included infrequently employed variables that

measure expected career development and expected balance between work-family

in addition to the more commonly used variables.

Second, the study is conducted in Israel, which is a country in transition. It is a

young country, populated by immigrants from all over the world, of which about a

third originate from non-Western countries. It is a Western, industrializing demo-

cracy, in many ways similar to the US and Canada but distinct in its traditional

cultural and family values (Kraus, 2002). So far, no comprehensive studies have

been conducted regarding inequality in wages among lawyers in Israel.

Third,we tested ourhypotheses empiricallyon a sample of Israeli lawyers who work

full-time. A strong belief prevalent in the legal profession holds that the time invested in

work is an indication of commitment of the lawyer to the firm and has considerable effect

on salary and bonuses (Epstein, 1993). In order to refine the analysis of the differences

in the determinants of the earnings of male and female lawyers, this study focuses solely

on male and female lawyers who work full-time (at least 40 hours per week).

Fourth, in order to examine for discrimination, i.e., different rewards for equal

investments, we examined the main and interaction effects in regression models.

We tested the statistical significance of the differences of the effects of the variables

on earnings. This is important especially when the sample size of men is significantly

190 DALIA RACHMAN-MOORE ET AL.

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larger than that of women, creating significant results in one group and not in the

other, which can create spurious conclusions.

Focusing on the legal profession

In this study, we focus solely on the legal profession for a number of reasons. Focusing

on single segments of the occupational market allows researchers to partly neutralize

the effect of occupational segmentation. Indeed, Treiman and Hartmann (1981) as

well as Marini (1989) found that the wage gap between the genders becomes smaller

and results become more meaningful as researchers focus on a single occupation.

Although the legal profession is considered very prestigious and well paid in the

Western world, it is undergoing a process of feminization (Harrington, 1995; Menkel-

Meadow, 1988); for instance, in 2003 in the US about half of the law graduates from

leading law schools were women (Belkin, 2003). It seems reasonable to expect that

women’s entrance into legal practice is accompanied by the professional guarantee

that expertise serves as effective protection from the tradition of stratification and

inequality existing in society (Chiu & Leicht, 1999; Elias & Shitrai, 1998). Indeed,

some of the studies on gender differences in the earnings of lawyers in the US did

not find that discrimination played a major role (Laband & Lentz, 1995; Robson &

Wallace, 2001). It is interesting to see if this phenomenon exists in other countries

as well.

The societal context in Israel

Israel is a modern, democratic, industrializing society, where, at the time of the study,

46% of the women participated in the workforce, but which, at the same time,

retained a strong family orientation. Israel has the reputation of being more egalitarian

than most societies (Plaut & Plaut, 2002), particularly regarding women’s employ-

ment. Indeed, over the years legislators have introduced the Women’s Equal Rights

Law (enacted in 1951), the Equal Payment Law (enacted in 1964) and the Equal

Opportunity Law (enacted in 1981). In addition, Israel’s social policy enables

women to partake in the paid economy by providing subsidized daycare facilities,

by granting three months’ paid maternity leave for all working mothers and by treating

part-time employment as full-time employment in terms of employment rights and

benefits (Yaish & Kraus, 2003).

The principle of equal rights for men and women is contained in the State

Declaration of Independence, which was declared in 1948. Since the establishment

of the State of Israel, women have been serving in the Israeli Defense Forces. Most

Israeli women work in white-collar jobs (Yaish & Kraus, 2003). Therefore, we

would expect that income disparity between the genders would be smaller than in

other developed societies. However, Israeli women earn less than Israeli men

(Efroni, 1980; Kraus, 1992; Plaut & Plaut, 2002) even after human capital and occu-

pational segmentation are held constant. During the 1990s the gross gender earning

ratio was about 60% of men (Plaut & Plaut, 2002). This gap can be explained partially

through the traditional family values that still exist in Israeli society, as is reflected in

GENDER INEQUALITIES AMONG ISRAELI LAWYERS 191

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pressure to marry early and in a relatively low divorce rate compared to other indus-

trialized countries (Kraus, 2002). Family values and needs are central to the Israeli

woman’s life as is the pressure to have children. Israeli women are responsible for

most housekeeping tasks regardless of whether they are employed outside the home

or not (Izraeli, 1988). Women in Israeli society are expected to fulfill the role of

wife and mother and to derive a feeling of accomplishment out of these roles.

Research reported that married women in Israel spend more time at housework

than at outside work, while their husbands spend more time at their jobs than at

housework (Nadiv-Avraham, 1998). Even among professional women with successful

careers, Israeli women conformed to the family-oriented values, while their counter-

parts in the US had an individualistic, competitive orientation (Izraeli, 1988; Lieblich,

1987).

This notion of Israeli women as secondary breadwinners has limited their pro-

gress and equality (Kraus, 2002). Nevertheless, since the 1950s, when only 5% of

all lawyers in Israel were women, the influx of women into the legal profession has

been massive. About 45% of all law graduates were women in the year 2000 when

the study was conducted (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001, Tables 8–55, 8–65).

This is similar to the trend reported in the US. The creation of a mixed occupation

in this prestigious, professional area (Kraus & Hartman, 1994) allows us to

examine closely whether we can find evidence of different rewards for equal invest-

ments among the genders in a society that is simultaneously family oriented and

egalitarian.

Very few studies in Israel have addressed issues regarding lawyers and gender

(Bechar, 1999) and our literature survey shows that only one working paper was pub-

lished that was based on a small scale, non-anonymous, sample from 1995, examining

wage discrepancies among the genders (Elias & Shitrai, 1998).

Determinants of the gender wage gap

Below, a theoretical discussion is presented of the major theories and variables related

to gender discrimination, including psychological capital, human capital, marital status

and occupational segmentation.

Psychological capital

Psychological capital, measured in terms of economic reward expectations and

organizational commitment, has received less attention in studies focusing on the

gender wage gap, but some interesting findings have been reported.

Economic reward expectations are found tobedifferent among thegenders.Major et al.

(1984) reported that job applicants who communicated lower pay expectations were

actually offered less pay than identically qualified applicants with higher pay expec-

tations. Others reported that women, because of socialization, had lower economic

reward expectations than men (Firestone et al., 1999; Jackson et al., 1992; Martin,

1989), while Barron (2003) showed that differences in expectations led to differences

in salary negotiations. One can argue that women with high pay expectations may


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impact their earnings negatively in a society where a woman’s promotional opportu-

nities and salary are decided upon by a male who believes a woman’s place is in the

home (Firestone et al., 1999). Therefore it can be expected that in Israel, with its tra-

ditional family values, female lawyers will be rewarded less then their male counterparts

for high expectations.

Organizational commitment, which is generally referred to as “loyalty and care for

the organization” is considered desirable by employers because employees with com-

mitment to the organization are expected to be high performers; thus, it is rewarded

with higher earnings (Bartlett & Miller, 1988; Goldsmith et al., 1997). Studies focusing

on organizational commitment posited that women, regardless of employment status

and occupation, carry more responsibilities for their family than men (Bolger et al.

1989; Kirchmeyer, 1993; Yogev, 1981). This leads to the commonly held belief that

if a woman thinks she should be at home more, she is less committed to the workplace.

Evidence in support of this statement, however, is not conclusive (Robson & Wallace,

2001), especially not in countries such as Canada and the United States, where women

during the past two decades have increased their work commitment. Studies found that

women in these countries were less likely to work part-time than before and had

increased their job experience (Hakim, 1996; O’Neil & Polachek, 1993).

Research regarding organizational commitment among lawyers found no diffe-

rence between Canadian female and male lawyers nor did they impact commitment

on income after controlling for human capital and occupational segmentation

(Robson & Wallace, 2001). Female lawyers in Israel have also increased their work

commitment and their job experience by working less in part-time jobs (Bechar,

1999). Although no empirical research among Israeli lawyers has examined the

relationship between organizational commitment and earnings, we expect to find

difference between the genders. It can be argued that in Israel, because of its social

values, committed male lawyers will earn more than committed female lawyers.

Human capital

Gender-based earning gaps are frequently analyzed from the perspective of human

capital theory. This theory focuses on the individual’s investment in education and

work experience (Becker, 1971, 1985; Hakim, 1996; Kraus, 2002). It propounds

that employees invest in themselves in ways that employers will reward, and assumes

that similar choices of human capital investment should lead to comparable earnings,

notwithstanding gender differences. However, many studies report that women have

less human capital than men. Frequently, men choose to invest in their human

capital and to prioritize their careers more than women, who make may make different

choices, for instance, to balance between work and family (Budig & England, 2001;

Becker, 1991; Crosby, 1991; Hagan & Kay, 1995; Hull & Nelson, 2000; Noonan &

Corcoran, 2004; Polachek, 1981; Robson & Wallace, 2001; Warren et al., 2001).

Research focusing on female lawyers found that they scored significantly lower on

measures of human capital, including experience and number of hours worked.

Inasmuch as women entered the legal profession more recently, female lawyers

have, on the average, less experience than male lawyers, which in turn leads to


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249960855_The_Impact_of_Psychological_Capital_on_Wages?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-c8ba0c92-11c5-4f06-8dca-b1dda50307ed&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzI0MDUyNTMyMTtBUzoyMTQ2MTA5ODk4NTA2MjRAMTQyODE3ODY1NTkxOQ==

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lower average earnings among female lawyers (Dixon & Seron, 1995; Hagan, 1990;

Kay & Hagan, 1993; Robson & Wallace, 2001). More experience also implies

longer tenure at the firm; indeed, it has been found that male lawyers have longer

tenure than female lawyers on average (Robson & Wallace, 2001).

It was also found that, on the average, female lawyers worked fewer hours than

male lawyers, which in turn yielded less income (Kay & Hagan, 1993; Robson &

Wallace, 2001; Wallace, 1997). Studies further report that longer work hours increase

earnings significantly (Hagan & Kay, 1995; Kay & Hagan, 1993; Robson & Wallace,

2001). This in turn explained part of the wage gap between male and female lawyers

in different countries, such as the US (Huang, 1997), Canada (Robson & Wallace,

2001), and Israel (Bechar, 1999; Elias & Shitrai, 1998).

Several studies show that return-on-investment on human capital for males is

higher than for females (Dixon & Seron, 1995; Hagan, 1990; Kraus, 2002;

Melamed, 1995; Peck, 1996; Semyonov & Kraus, 1983; Wood et al., 1993). For

instance, in Israel it was found that the return on investment for each hour of work

in the legal profession was higher for males than for females when human capital

and occupational segmentation were kept constant (Elias & Shitrai, 1998), which

may indicate that patterns of discrimination exist because of the traditional family

values prevalent in Israel. However, empirical results of studies focusing on lawyers

in the US and Canada were inconclusive. While Huang (1997) and Dixon and

Seron (1995) found differences in the return on investment after controlling for occu-

pational segmentation, others did not (Laband & Lentz, 1995; Robson & Wallace,

2001), which has lead researchers to conclude that pay discrimination may be opera-

ting in more subtle ways.

Marital status

Studies focusing on marital and parental status showed that female lawyers are less

likely to be married than male lawyers (Hagan & Kay, 1995; Kay, 1997). Studies

further suggest that once a woman is married, juggling between a legal career and

family does not seem attractive to many (Pollock & Ramirez, 1995; Noonan &

Corcoran, 2004). Thus, married female lawyers who have children may work fewer

hours, which in turn leads to lower earnings (Wallace, 1997). Similar patterns of

behavior have been reported for Israeli lawyers (Bechar, 1999; Elias & Shitrai, 1998).

Marital status was further found to be related differently to earnings: while posi-

tively associated with earnings of men, the opposite was true for women (Cohen &

Haberfeld, 1991; Koernman & Neumark, 1992; Melamed, 1995). It may be that divi-

sion of labor allows married males to invest more time in work than non-married

males or it may be that marriage itself drives men to invest more effort in their

work as they perceive themselves as the main breadwinner (Koernman & Neumark,

1992). Marini & Fan (1997) in turn suggest that marriage may be perceived as an

indicator of responsibility and stability for men. Married women, on the other

hand, are suspected of being less committed than non-married women, due to their

domestic household obligations.


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Thisdifferent effect is also found among lawyers (Adam &Baer,1984;Hagan &Kay,

1995). Kay and Hagan (1998) as well as Hull and Nelson (2000) reported that married

lawyers who were fathers were viewed as having a commitment to upward mobility, while

married mothers were viewed as having reduced their commitment to work. Married

women in Israel are perceived as secondary breadwinners (Kraus, 2002), therefore

we expect that findings will be similar for the Israeli population of lawyers.

The theoretical discussion presented so far leads us to expect that also within the

group of lawyers who work full-time, the effect of human and psychological capital as

well as marital status on wages between the genders will be different. The strong family

values prevalent in Israel as well as the fact that women in Israel are considered second-

ary breadwinners lead us to expect that the difference will be in favor of male lawyers.

Occupational segmentation theory

The assumption that the subordinate position of women in the workplace is mainly a

result of their voluntary choice has been found to be an insufficient explanation

(Bielby & Bielby, 1988; Kraus, 2002; Marsden et al., 1993). The occupational seg-

mentation theory posits that earnings are determined by industry and occupation-

level characteristics (Auster, 1989; Blau & Ferber, 1986; Cain, 1986; Treiman &

Hartmann, 1981, Yaish & Kraus, 2003). As men and women can be found in different

occupational markets, gender-based occupational segmentation is seen as one of the

determinants of differences in earnings between genders (Albelda, 1986; Bayard et al.,

2003; Boraas & Rodgers, 2003; Fields & Wolff, 1991; Goldin, 1990). Studies show

that occupations filled primarily by women are rewarded less in terms of job authority

(Jaffee, 1989; Kraus, 2002; Wolf & Fligstein, 1979), in terms of job promotion

(Kalleberg & Reskin, 1995; Mitra, 2003; Rosenfeld et al., 1998), as well as in terms

of earnings (England, 1981; Huffman, 2004; Sorensen, 1989; Tomaskovic-Devey &

Skaggs, 2002; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981) and prestige (Kraus, 2002).

In this study we focus on the legal occupational segment, which should allow

closer examination of the existence of occupational segregation within the segment

and neutralize part of the effects reported across occupations; we focus specifically

on job status, core and peripheral organizations and occupational prestige.

Job status. Hagan (1990) argued that lawyers who have no managerial responsibilities

or have no autonomy over the design of their work have a low job status within the legal

profession; low job status in turn is related to lower earnings. One example of such a

position is what has been referred to as the “mommy track”, which allows women to

balance work and family, taking time out to raise children or work fewer hours

(Crosby, 1991; Futter, 1989). However, many women who choose or are forced to

follow this track find that it results in career paths that are less lucrative and less

likely to lead to job advancement such as partnership in law firms (Bender, 1989;

England et al., 1994; Huang, 1997; Spurr & Sueyoshi, 1994). Indeed, Elias and

Shitrai (1998) found that after controlling for human capital and occupational

segmentation, male lawyers in Israel still earned more that female lawyers when occu-

pying the same job status. Moreover, Belkin (2003) found that only 16% of all partners


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/246292582_Gender_Inequality_in_Workplace_Autonomy_and_Authority?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-c8ba0c92-11c5-4f06-8dca-b1dda50307ed&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzI0MDUyNTMyMTtBUzoyMTQ2MTA5ODk4NTA2MjRAMTQyODE3ODY1NTkxOQ==

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in firms in the US were women. In addition, a different effect was found: when men

achieved partnership it resulted in higher rewards compared to the female partners

(Hagan, 1990; Huang, 1997; Noonan & Corcoran, 2004).

Organizational type—core vs. periphery. Various researchers have suggested that

the legal profession can be examined in terms of core and periphery (Hagan,

1990; Hodson & Kaufman, 1982; Robson & Wallace, 2001; Smith, 1983). Private

practice, especially in large law firms, offers the highest earnings, good working

conditions and chances of advancement and is therefore defined here as located at

the core of the legal profession (Dixon & Seron, 1995; Heinz & Lautmann, 1978;

Robson & Wallace, 2001). Previous studies indicate that women lawyers in the

US, Canada as well as in Israel are found less frequently at the core of the legal

profession, while they are overrepresented in peripheral jobs and peripheral organiz-

ations (Adam & Baer, 1984; Hagan & Kay, 1995; Huang, 1997; Hull & Nelson,

2000; Robson & Wallace, 2001; Elias and Shitrai, 1998), which are characterized

by lower wages, worse working conditions and lower chances of advancement.

Furthermore, a different effect seems to exist as male lawyers gain more than

female lawyers from working for firms located at the core of the legal occupation

(Hagan, 1990).

Occupational prestige. Studies show that female lawyers tend to specialize in areas

that are less prestigious and are associated with lower pay, such as family law and

divorce law (Huang, 1997; Kay & Hagan, 1993; Robson & Wallace, 2001). Also in

Israel it was found that male lawyers, compared to female lawyers, tend to special-

ize more frequently in more prestigious areas such as finance and commercial law

(Bechar, 1999). Hagan (1990) found a disparity in wages between male and female

lawyers specializing in similar areas: male lawyers who specialized in certain areas

of law earned higher wages, while female lawyers were not able to capitalize on

similar specializations. Also in Israel, Elias and Shitrai (1998) found that

occupations in the private sector and in prestigious specializations had a higher

positive effect on earnings for males than for females after controlling for human

capital.

Summarizing the results, some of the studies found that occupational segmenta-

tion in the legal profession benefits men more than women: males earn more than

females when they are located in high status jobs, when they specialize in prestigious

occupations or when working in core occupations. However, Laband and Lentz

(1991) and Robson and Wallace (2001) found no evidence of discrimination against

female lawyers when they took into account variables pertaining to human capital

investments and occupational segmentation variables.

Our literature survey shows that only one gender study was conducted in Israel

that focused on lawyers and income (Elias & Shitrai, 1998). Kraus (2002, p. 202),

addressing the general situation in Israel, concluded that “even if all women

worked in the same labor segments and invested the same amount of effort in the

labor market as men, they would still not attain earnings equality with men because

they also suffer from direct discrimination”.


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Hypothesis 1: Return-on-investment on human capital will be higher for male

than for female lawyers after controlling for psychological capital, marital

status and occupational segmentation.

Hypothesis 2: Male lawyers with the same level of psychological capital as female

lawyers will earn more after controlling for human capital, marital status and

occupational segmentation. More specifically, female lawyers will be rewarded

less for high economic reward expectations than male lawyers and female

lawyers will earn less than male lawyers with the same level of commitment

to organization.

Hypothesis 3: Married female lawyers will earn less than married male lawyers,

after controlling for human and psychological capital and occupational

segmentation.

Hypothesis 4: Occupational segmentation benefits male lawyers more than female

lawyers after controlling for human capital, psychological capital and marital

status; males will earn more than females when both work in the same type

of organization, have the same job status and specialize in prestigious

occupations.

Determinants of partnership attainment

Partnership attainment is a factor that explains gender differences in earnings. For

example, Dixon and Seron (1995) found that only 8% of partners in leading law

firms in the US were women in the late 1980s. Similarly, Hagan and Kay (1995),

Hull and Nelson (2000), Kay (1997), Kay and Hagan (1998, 1999), Noonan and

Corcoran (2004), Spurr (1990), Spurr and Sueyoshi (1994) found, after controlling

for productivity, academic distinction, and rank of law school work experience,

marital status, current work hours and other measures of social capital, that women

were less likely to achieve partnership. Spurr (1990) found that male lawyers were

twice as likely to attain partnership. Similarly, Noonan and Corcoran (2004) in their

study on graduates of University of Michigan Law found that male lawyers were

1.6 times more likely to be promoted to partner (among those who remained for

four more years). They argued that about one-quarter to one-third of this difference

can be attributed to labor supply, marriage and children. While some found that bal-

ancing between family and work affects the chances of becoming a female partner

(Donovan, 1990; Epstein et al., 1995), others reported that both female and male

lawyers identify sex discrimination as one of the main factors for women’s lower rate

of promotion to partnership (Chambers, 1989) and that the prospect of becoming a

partner is the same for mothers and childless women (Hagan & Kay, 1995; Hull &

Nelson, 2000).

A studyby Petersen and Saporta (2004) showed that when discrimination took place

at initial hiring and assignment (allocative discrimination), it had an impact on further

career development. Once men and women were channeled into different types of

entry jobs, for example, women lawyers into “mommy tracks”, the everyday operations

of the firm virtually ensured differences between the genders (Petersen & Saporta,

2004). Thus, different treatment in the hiring process will ensure that even though


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potential employees have similar human capital, they will be presented with different

job opportunities, which will result in occupational segregation. Indeed, Rosenberg

et al. (1993) noted that women lawyers reported a lower level of discrimination at the

hiring stage than during subsequent stages (in terms of salary, promotions and

assignment).

The low probability of partnership attainment among female lawyers after

controlling for human capital investment may be due either to their individual

choice to balance work and family or to a discriminatory mechanism in the

private market. However, Epstein et al. (1995) argued that “choice” is a relative

concept in that the “mommy track” choice may be conditioned by cultural

expectations. Indeed, Brockman (1994) found that male lawyers noted less

frequently that conflict between work and family was a reason to leave work as a

lawyer. Moreover, Hull and Nelson (2000) in a study among Chicago lawyers

found that work-family constraints lowered women’s but not men’s chances of

partnership. Therefore, we can argue that career expectations regarding

balancing work-family and career development can affect partnership attainment.

In order to examine effects of discrimination, we need to control for career

expectations.

Discriminatory mechanisms preventing women from attaining partnership may

be the employer’s stereotypical expectation that women will leave their jobs once

they have children or will invest less effort than men (e.g., Menkel-Meadow, 1988;

Podmore & Spencer, 1982; Scott, 1987). Epstein et al. (1995) as well as Rhode

(2001) argue that the “mommy track” can stigmatize female lawyers as “not

serious” and permanently damage their chances of becoming partners. In addition,

Epstein et al. (1995), Kay and Hagan (1999), Noonan and Corcoran (2004) and

Rhode (2001) asserted that at each stage of the progression to partnership female

lawyers are disproportionately discouraged at each step. Therefore, female lawyers

are faced with “multiple glass ceilings” which male lawyers do not encounter at

many stages of their career development. It is further argued that female associates

have fewer opportunities to develop human capital within the law firm than male

associates do. Institutional factors may reduce the ability to create human capital

such as generating new clients, sexual harassment and discrimination, lack of

mentors and part-time work tracks (Epstein et al., 1995; Kay & Hagan, 1999;

Noonan & Corcoran, 2004),

In order to examine the determinants of partnership attainment we focused only

on lawyers who worked full-time and we included, in addition to the variables pre-

sented before, career development expectations and the decision of female lawyers

to opt for the “mommy track” in order to balance work and family. As family

values are strong in Israel and women feel that they have to fulfill their roles as

wives and mothers, it may very well be that career expectations affect partnership

attainment.

Hypothesis 5: The likelihood to attain partnership in a law firm is higher for male

lawyers than for female lawyers, after controlling for marital status, human

capital, career expectations, and prestige of specialization.


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Data and method

During the year 2000, a national mail survey was conducted of the whole population

of lawyers in Israel who were members of the Israel Bar Association. Israeli lawyers are

notoriously uncooperative when requested to fill out questionnaires that are not

directly related to their cases or their work (Israel Bar Association, 2002); thus we

have made every effort to ensure that we received maximum cooperation and that

the final group of respondents was representative of the population (see Appendix 1

for further details regarding the sampling procedure). The sample employed in this

study consisted of 1096 respondents who were active lawyers at the time of the

study and who worked a full workweek (at least 40 hours per week). Of these,

62.7% were male and 37.3% were female.

Measures

The questionnaire used in this study was written in Hebrew and its responses were

anonymous. The questionnaire consisted of items on work-related issues such as atti-

tudes towards the job, work place, and the legal profession. Below we present a list of

measures and their definitions; for additional definitions, see Appendix 2.

(1) Earnings were defined as the log of the respondent’s reported monthly earnings

from the current job (New Israeli Shekel—NIS—before tax). In the questionnaire,

respondents were requested to indicate to which category in the income range they

belong. The categories ranged from “less than 5000 NIS” to “30,000 and over NIS”

and were formulated to reduce missing data (full description of the categories is pro-

vided in Appendix 2). New Israeli Shekel amounts were calculated by assigning

category midpoints. The midpoint of the open-ended category was based on the distri-

bution of income reported by Yarhon Heshev (2000).

(2) Gender was coded 1 for male and 0 for female.

(3) Marital status was coded 1 for married and 0 for all the other responses.

(4) Human capital included previous job experience, current tenure, and hours

worked per week. Previous job experience was calculated by subtracting the year the

lawyer was called to the bar from the year the lawyer began working at his or her

current organization. Current tenure in the organization related to the number of

years the respondent was employed in the current organization. Hours worked

measured the usual number of hours per week the respondent worked at the current job.

(5) Psychological capital included organizational commitment and economic

reward expectations. “Organizational commitment” was measured as an average of 6

items on a Likert-type scale (see Appendix 2) which ranged from “not at all “ (coded

1) to “very much” (coded 4), measuring loyalty, care and feelings toward the organiz-

ation (alpha ¼ .76). “Economic reward expectations” from the legal profession was

measured as a response to the following question: “What expectations did you have

from the legal profession regarding economic reward?”. The respondents were asked

to choose from Likert responses ranging from “low” (coded 1) to “high” (coded 5).

(6) Occupational segmentation was measured by prestige of a specific specialization

within the legal profession, type and size of firm where the lawyer worked, and job


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status within the firm. Prestigious area of specialization refers to lawyer’s area of prac-

tice, for which taxation, commerce, finance, and intellectual property were coded 1

and the rest were coded 0.

A variable labeled “organizational type and job status” was constructed, combin-

ing type of organization in which the lawyer worked (law firm or other), size of the law

firm in which the lawyer worked (number of lawyers in the firm), and job status in the

firm—salaried or partner. In Israeli terms, a law firm with fewer than 5 lawyers is con-

sidered small; a law firm with 5–12 lawyers is considered medium in size; and a law

firm with 13 or more lawyers is considered large. The seven categories in the con-

structed variable were:

Category 1: lawyers in a non-law firm—those who work in government offices,

businesses, etc.

Category 2: salaried lawyers working in a small law firm

Category 3: salaried lawyers working in a medium-sized law firm

Category 4: salaried lawyers working in a large law firm

Category 5: lawyers with a solo practice

Category 6: partner in a small law firm

Category 7: partner in a medium-sized or large law firm

In the regression analyses, this constructed variable was transformed into 6

dummy variables for each respondent (coded 1 for the applicable category and 0

for the others) where the last category (partner in a medium or large law firm) is

set to zero.

(7) Career expectation was measured by expected career development in the legal

profession and expected balance between family and work in the legal profession.

Expected career development in the legal profession was measured as follows:

“What were your expectations from the legal profession regarding career develop-

ment?”. Expected balance between family and work in the legal profession was

measured as follows: “What were your expectations from the legal profession regard-

ing the balance between work and family?”. Both of the questions were rated on a

Likert-type scale ranging from “low” (coded 1) to “high” (coded 5).

Findings

Table 1 shows that, on the average, female lawyers earn significantly less than male

lawyers (p ¼ .000). Male lawyers earn an average of NIS 17,496.02 while female

lawyers earn an average of NIS 11,469.47. Thus, female lawyers earn 65% of what

male lawyers earn.

Table 1 also presents the mean differences between female and male lawyers

regarding marital status, human, and psychological capital. In terms of marital

status, the results show that women are less likely to get married (78% of male

lawyers are married compared to 67% of the female lawyers). Male lawyers have

higher investment in human capital in terms of tenure in the current organization

(average of 8.26 years of tenure for male lawyers compared to an average of 4.47


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years for female lawyers) and in terms of working hours per week (male lawyers work

on the average 53.19 hours compared to 49.02 for female lawyers).

In terms of psychological capital, males are more committed to the organization

(an average of 2.52 for male lawyers compared to 2.38 for female lawyers) and have

higher reward expectations (an average of 4.05 for expected economic reward for

males compared to an average of 3.90 for females). All these differences are statisti-

cally significant; the actual differences, however, between female and male lawyers

regarding psychological capital (organizational commitment and expected economic

rewards) are not large. The only variable that is not statistically significant as predicted

is the number of years of previous experience. Generally, these results show that the

investment in human and psychological capital will be higher for male lawyers than for

female lawyers: male lawyers have longer tenure in the current organization, they work

more hours per week, they are more committed to the organization, and they expect

higher economic rewards.

We compared type of occupation and job status as well as prestige of specializa-

tion for male and female lawyers. Table 2 shows that the differences between the

genders are significant. Only 14.8% of male lawyers work in non-law firms compared

to 31.8% of the female lawyers, while 45.5% of the female lawyers working in law

firms are salaried employees compared to 24% of male lawyers. Furthermore,

37.7% of the male lawyers have solo practices compared to 15.5% of female

lawyers, and while 23.5% of male lawyers occupy high positions as partners in law

firms, only 7.2% of female lawyers occupy similar positions. Among all sizes of law

firms more salaried female lawyers than salaried male lawyers are found, and there

are more male partners than female partners. In addition, more male lawyers than

female lawyers work in prestigious specializations (35.4% compared to 29.5%).

These results show that female lawyers are found more frequently in peripheral cat-

egories (non-law firms and small law firms).

In order to test H1, H2, H3 and H4, we used OLS regressions with the log

income as the dependent variable. We compared the results of the OLS regressions

Table 1. Mean differences in income, social, human, and psychological capital (st. deviation is presented in

parentheses)

Male lawyers Female lawyersMean

differencesN Mean N Mean

Actual income 628 17496.02 (11890.23) 393 11469.47�� (7514.04) 6026.53��

Log income 628 4.14 (.31) 393 3.99�� (.25) .15��

Marital status (married) 651 .78 (.41) 394 .67�� (.47) .11��

Previous experience 627 2.13 (4.44) 372 1.89 (4.03) .24

Current org. tenure 657 8.26 (8.86) 390 4.47�� (5.26) 3.79��

Hours worked per week 666 53.19 (8.96) 396 49.02�� (7.95) 4.17��

Organizational commitment 624 2.52 (0.58) 380 2.38�� (0.56) .14��

Expected economic reward 644 4.05 (0.84) 390 3.90� (0.87) .15�

� p , .01; �� p ¼ .000.


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with ordinal regressions. When using the ordinal dependent variable of income,

results do not differ significantly from the OLS regressions on the continuous log

income variable. Therefore, we report only the latter for simplicity and ease of

interpretation. We present in Table 3 the regression results that we performed separ-

ately for male and female lawyers with the following independent variables on earn-

ings: marital status, human and psychological capital, the constructed

organizational type and job status variable, and prestige of specialization. In order

to test the hypotheses, we needed to examine the differences of the regression coeffi-

cients from the two separate regressions. In order to test the statistical significance of

the differences, we performed a full regression model that included gender, the inde-

pendent variables that appear in the separate regressions and the interaction terms of

gender with each of the independent variables. The statistical significance of the

differences between the coefficients for male and female lawyers that are presented

in Table 3 is the statistical significance of the interaction terms taken from the

regression analysis of the full model.

The results of the regression analysis for male lawyers show that the proportion of

variance explained by all the independent variables is .436 and that the equation is

statistically significant (F ¼ 30.783, p ¼ .000). The results show that when all the

other variables are controlled, married male lawyers are likely to earn more than

unmarried male lawyers (b̂M ¼ .090, p ¼ 0.000) and those lawyers with longer pre-

vious experience (b̂M ¼ .007 ,p , 0.05) and with longer tenure in the current organi-

zation (b̂M ¼ .014, p ¼ .000) and with more hours worked per week (b̂M ¼ .004,

p ¼ 0.000) and with more commitment to the organization (b̂M ¼ .066, p ¼ 0.000)

are likely to earn more. The coefficient of “expected economic reward” (psychological

capital) is statistically insignificant. Generally, we can conclude that the investments

Table 2. Differences in occupational segmentation variables for male and female lawyers

Occupational segmentation Male lawyers Female lawyers

Organizational type & Job status

Non-law firm 14.8% 31.8%

Law firm: Salaried 1–4 lawyers 10.1% 18.9%

Law firm: Salaried 5–12 lawyers 9.3% 16.3%

Law firm: Salaried 13 and more lawyers 4.6% 10.3%

Solo practice 37.7% 15.5%

Law firm: Partner 2–4 lawyers 13.7% 4.9%

Law firm: Partner 5 and more lawyers 9.8% 2.3%

Total 100% 100%

(655) (387)

x2 ¼ 147.291; df ¼ 6; p ¼ 0.000

Prestigious specialization

Prestigious 35.4% 29.5%

Non-prestigious 64.6% 70.5%

Total 100% 100%

(666) (396)

x2 ¼ 3.882; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0.049


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in human and psychological capital are significant determinants of earnings after con-

trolling for marital status and occupational segmentation. The results further show

that when marital status and human and psychological capital are controlled, occu-

pational segmentation is also statistically significant. The statistically significant

regression coefficients of the organizational type and job status variables (p ¼ .000)

show that male salaried lawyers who work in small law firms are likely to earn the

lowest income b̂M ¼ 2.394), while male lawyers occupying high job status (partners)

in medium or large law firms are likely to earn the highest income. In between, in

ascending order of earnings, are the male salaried lawyers from medium-sized law

firms (b̂M ¼ 2.323), solo practitioners (b̂M ¼ 2.293), salaried lawyers in large-sized

law firms (b̂M ¼ 2.250), lawyers in peripheral jobs (non-law firm, b̂M ¼ 2.241) and

partners in small law firms (b̂M ¼ 2.241). There is also some indication that male

lawyers who work in prestigious specializations (b̂M ¼ .042, p , 0.1) are likely to

earn more than lawyers who work on non-prestigious specializations.

The results for female lawyers show that the proportion of variance explained is

.406, which is smaller than the proportion found for male lawyers. The equation is stat-

istically significant (F ¼ 17.329, df ¼ 13,516, p ¼ .000). When all the other variables

are controlled, female lawyers with longer previous experience (b̂F ¼ .015, p ¼ .000)

and with longer tenure in the current organization (b̂F ¼ .017, p ¼ 0.000) are likely

Table 3. Regression analysis of the log income for male (n ¼ 530) and female (n ¼ 343) lawyers

Male lawyersa Female lawyersa b̂ M – b̂Fb

Independent variables b̂ , M S.E. b̂ , F S.E.

Married (1) .090�� .025 .027 .023 .063�

Previous experience .007� .003 .015�� .003 2.008

Current org. tenure .014�� .001 .017�� .002 2 .003

Hours worked per week .004�� .001 .0002 .001 .0038�

Organizational commitment .066�� .018 .032 .022 .034

Expected economic reward .010 .012 2.021† .013 .030�

Prestigious occupation (1) .042þ .022 .054� .024 2.012

Non-law firm (1) 2.241�� .043 2.407�� .081 .166�

Salaried; firm size: 1–4 lawyers (2) 2.394�� .048 2.500�� .083 .106

Salaried; firm size: 5–12 lawyers (3) 2.323�� .047 2.415�� .084 .092

Salaried; firm size: 13 and more lawyers (4) 2.250�� .055 2.387�� .086 .137

Solo practice (5) 2.293�� .038 2.378�� .081 .085

Partner; firm size: 2–4 lawyers (6) 2.235�� .043 2.375�� .091 .140

Partner; firm size: 5 and more lawyers (7) 0c

Cumulative R2 .436 .406

Adjusted R2 .423 .383

Df 13, 516 13, 329

Model F 30.783�� 17.329��

s.e. .230 .196

a two-tailed test of the coefficients for the separate regression of male and female lawyers.b one-tail test for differences of the coefficients of male and female.c this parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.� p , .05; �� p ¼ .000; † p , .10.


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to earn more. However, the coefficient of hours worked per week is insignificant. It

seems also that psychological capital is not a significant determinant of female earnings.

The coefficient of commitment to the organization is insignificant. There is some indi-

cation that female lawyers with lower expectations regarding economic rewards are

likely to earn more (b̂F ¼ 2.021, p , 0.1). The results show also that when marital

status and human and psychological capital are controlled, occupational segmentation

is statistically significant. Female lawyers who work in prestigious specializations

(b̂F ¼ .054, p , 0.05) are likely to earn more than lawyers who work on non-presti-

gious specializations. The statistically significant regression coefficients of the organiz-

ational type and job status variables (p ¼ .000) show that salaried female lawyers who

work in small law firms are likely to earn the lowest income (b̂F ¼ 2.500), while female

lawyers occupying a high job status (partners) in medium or large law firms are likely to

earn the highest income. In between, in ascending order of earnings, are the salaried

female lawyers from medium-sized law firms (b̂F ¼ 2.415), lawyers in peripheral

jobs (non-law firm, b̂F ¼ 2.407), salaried lawyers in large-sized law firms

(b̂F ¼ 2.387), solo practitioners (b̂F ¼ 2.378), and partners in small law firms

(b̂F ¼ 2.375). As was found for male lawyers, female salaried lawyers in small and

medium-sized law firms are likely to have the lowest earnings, while female partners

in large law firms are likely to have the highest earnings.

In order to test H1 which stated that return-on-investment on human capital will

be higher for male than for female lawyers after controlling for psychological capital,

marital status and occupational segmentation, we examined if there are positive signifi-

cant differences of effects (i.e., the difference in the regression coefficients between male

and female lawyers) of number hours worked per week, previous experience and

current organizational tenure on earnings after controlling for psychological capital,

occupational segmentation and marital status. The results presented in Table 3 show

that a positive significant difference exists between male and female lawyers regarding

the number of hours worked per week (.0038, p , 0.05, one-tailed test). As expected,

this difference shows that the return on investment for male lawyers in terms of hours

worked per week is higher than for female lawyers. The difference of .008 in the effect of

previous experience is insignificant and the direction of the difference is opposite to

what we expected, although there is some indication that previous experience benefits

female lawyers more than male lawyers. Moreover, no statistical significant difference

was found in the effect of current organizational tenure. Therefore, we conclude that

H1 is partly confirmed; when all other variables (i.e., psychological capital, occu-

pational segmentation and marital status) are controlled, working longer hours is

likely to yield higher earnings for male but not for female lawyers.

H2 stated that male lawyers with the same level of psychological capital as female

lawyers will earn more after controlling for human capital, marital status and occu-

pational segmentation. More specifically, female lawyers will be rewarded less for

high economic reward expectations, while male lawyers will be rewarded more and

female lawyers will earn less than male lawyers with the same level of commitment

to organization. We examined whether there are positive significant differences in

the effects of “expected economic rewards” and organizational commitment on earn-

ings after controlling for human capital, occupational segmentation and marital


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status. As expected in H2, the positive significant difference of .03 (p , 0.05, one-

tailed test) in the coefficients of “expected economic rewards” indicates that males

are likely to earn more than female lawyers for the same level of expected economic

reward. For male lawyers the coefficient of expected economic reward is positive

(.01) but insignificant, while for female lawyers the coefficient is negative (2.02,

p , .1) and close to significant. These findings lead to the conclusion that when

female lawyers expect a higher reward, they earn less. However, no significance differ-

ence was found for organizational commitment. Therefore, we can argue that H2 is

partly confirmed: higher economic reward expectations are likely to yield less earnings

for females than for male lawyers.

In order to test H3, that married female lawyers will earn less than married male

lawyers after controlling for human and psychological capital and occupational seg-

mentation, we examined if there is a positive significant difference between the

effects of married male and married female lawyers on earnings after controlling for

human and psychological capital and occupational segmentation. As expected in

H3, the difference of .063 is positive and significant (p , 0.05) and shows that

male lawyers are likely to earn more than females because of being married,

thereby confirming H3.

H4 stated that occupational segmentation benefits male lawyers more than

female lawyers after controlling for human capital, psychological capital and marital

status: males will earn more than females when both work in the same type of

organization, have the same job status and specialize in prestigious occupations. We

examined whether there are positive significant differences in the effects of organiz-

ational type and job status and prestige of the specialization on earnings after control-

ling for human and psychological capital and marital status. The difference between

male and female lawyers working in non-law firms was found to be significant (.166,

p , 0.05), leading us to conclude that male lawyers who work in non-law firms are

likely to earn more than female lawyers do. However, no other positive significant

differences were found in the effects of the organizational type and job status and pres-

tige specialization on earnings. Therefore, we can conclude that hypothesis H4 is not

confirmed with the exception that male lawyers who work in non-law firms are likely

to earn more than female lawyers. For both male and female lawyers, we can conclude

that lawyers who work in large “core” firms and have a high job status (partner) will

earn more than lawyers in peripheral jobs (non-law firms and small law firms) and

more than lawyers who have high job status in small law firms.

In order to examine H5, which posited that the likelihood to attain partnership

for male lawyers is higher than for female lawyers, we focused only on lawyers who

worked in a law firm (consisting of 464 lawyers in the sample). We constructed a

new, binary, dependent variable that allowed the measurement of partner status

(coded 1) vs. non-partner status (salaried, coded 0). We performed a logistic

regression employing the following independent variables: gender, marital status,

human capital (previous work experience, current job tenure, hours worked per

week) and career expectations (expected career development and expected balance

between work and family), as well as occupational segmentation (prestige of

specialization).


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Before examining the main effect model, we first determined whether a non-

additive model was appropriate. The interaction terms with gender did not improve

the fit of the model, and the individual interaction terms were significant at the .10

level. Therefore, we conclude that the main effects model reported in Table 4 is

appropriate.

The null hypothesis that the model fits adequately was not rejected by the

Hosmer and Leme goodness of fit test (x 2 ¼ 10.245, df ¼ 8, p ¼ 0.248). The

equation with the eight independent variables was significant (x 2 ¼ 211.246,

df ¼ 8, p ¼ 0.000). To assess the overall goodness of fit of the model, the

Nagelkerke R2 was calculated and .505 of the “variation” in the logistic regression

was explained. The partial regression coefficient (B) presented in Table 4 can be inter-

preted as the change of the log (odd) associated with a one-unit change in the inde-

pendent variable and a change of exp(B) in the odds. The odd is defined as the

ratio of the probability that a lawyer will attain partnership to the probability that

the lawyer will not. Therefore, when B is positive and exp(B) is greater than 1, the

probability of attaining partnership increases, and when B is negative and exp(B) is

less than 1, the probability of attaining partnership decreases. Table IV presents the

regression coefficients. The regression coefficient of gender is significant (p ¼ .000)

and positive and the exp(B) is 4.145; in other words, being a male (1) increases the

ratio of the probability of being a partner after controlling for all the other indepen-

dent variable by a factor of 4.145 (4.145/1).

Thus, male lawyers are four times as likely to become partners as female lawyers

after controlling for all the other independent variables, i.e., marital status, human

capital, career expectations as well as occupational segregation variables. Therefore,

we can conclude the results confirm H5.

Table 4. Logistic model for predicting the likelihood of attaining partnership in law firms (n ¼ 464)

Independent variables Ba S.E. Exp(B)b

Male (1) 1.422�� .303 4.145

Married (1) .151 .288 1.163

Previous experience .296�� .053 1.344

Current org. tenure .270�� .044 1.309

Hours worked per week .039� .017 1.039

Career development .108 .174 1.114

Balance between work and family .142 .143 1.153

Prestigious occupation(1) 2.026 .264 .974

Number of cases 524

df 8

Chi-square 211.246��

Nagelkerke R2 .505

a B is a logistic regression coefficient that describes the change in the log of the ratio of the probability that

an event will occur to the probability that it will not by changing one unit in the independent variable.b Exp(B) is a coefficient that describes the change in the ratio of the probability that an event will occur to

the probability that it will not by changing one unit in the independent variable.� p , .05; �� p ¼ .000.


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Further results from the logistic regression show that the partial regression coef-

ficients (B) of human capital (previous work experience, current job tenure, hours

worked per week) are positive and significant. The results show that when the other

variables are controlled, increasing the value of previous experience by 1 will increase

the odds of attaining partnership by factor of 1.344; increasing the value of the current

organizational tenure by 1 will increase the odds of attaining partnership by a factor of

1.309; increasing the value of hours worked per week by 1 will increase the odds of

attaining partnership by a factor of 1.039. Therefore, we can conclude that human

capital has a positive effect on the likelihood of attaining partnership. The partial

regression coefficients of career expectations (career development and balance

between work and family) and of prestige of specialization are insignificant.

Summary and discussion

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically whether women in the legal pro-

fession still experience discrimination in terms of wages and career opportunities. The

study focused specifically on lawyers in Israel, a Western democracy that is character-

ized by both egalitarian aspects and traditional family values. In this paper, we put

forth an exhaustive set of variables that is related to differences in earnings between

the genders. The set included psychological and human capital, marital status as

well as occupational segmentation.

We tested our hypotheses empirically on male and female lawyers who work full-

time within the legal profession in Israel and examined main and interaction effects.

We employed the interaction effects to determine if differences exist in the effect on

earnings of human and psychological capital, of marital status as well as of occu-

pational segregation.

Our results showed a significant wage difference between the genders: female

lawyers earned about two-thirds of what male lawyers earned. The disparity in earn-

ings was, at least partly, the result of different investments in human and psychological

capital as well as in differences in occupational segmentation; more male lawyers were

married, male lawyers had longer tenure in the current organization, they worked

more hours per week, they were more committed to the organization, and expected

higher economic rewards. Furthermore, female lawyers tended to work more fre-

quently as salaried employees among all sizes of law firms and tended to be less fre-

quently specialized in prestigious fields, thus females were found repeatedly in

peripheral categories. These results are consistent with the findings of studies con-

ducted in the US and in Canada (e.g., Adam & Baer, 1984; Hagan & Kay, 1995;

Huang, 1997; Hull & Nelson, 2000; Robson & Wallace, 2001; Wallace, 1997), and

in Israel (Bechar, 1999; Elias & Shitrai, 1998).

Previous findings in the US and Canada (Hagan, 1990; Huang, 1997; Laband &

Lentz, 1995; Robson & Wallace, 2001) and in Israel (Elias & Shitrai, 1998) were

inconclusive regarding the existence of discrimination against women when taking

into account marital status, human and psychological capital and occupational seg-

mentation. In this study we attempt to tackle the issue of gender discrimination by

arguing that discrimination exists if the return on investment on human and


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psychological capital is higher for male than for female lawyers and if male lawyers

benefit more from job status and the prestige of their specialization.

The hypotheses posed in this paper which addressed the issue of different

rewards were partly confirmed. Our findings regarding psychological capital show

that women who have the same reward expectations as male lawyers earn less than

their male counterparts; moreover, we also found that women who expect more,

earn less, while no relationship was found for men. This finding may be the result

of the relatively traditional values that still exist in Israeli society, which view a

woman primarily as the homemaker and as a secondary breadwinner, whose needs

are therefore less than those of men (Kraus, 2002). It may further be that men who

decide upon the earnings of women and who believe a woman’s place is in the

home view her high expectations for rewards in a negative way (Firestone et al., 1999).

Regarding the second variable measuring psychological capital—commitment to

the organization—we did not find a different effect of this variable for the genders.

One explanation may be that all the lawyers in our sample were committed relatively

highly to their work at least in terms of hours of work.

Differences in return–on-investment were significant for the number of hours

worked per week: return-on-investment was higher for male lawyers than for female

lawyers regarding this variable. While marital status had a positive effect for both

genders, the effect was higher for male than for female lawyers. These results are

similar to previous reported findings (Adam & Baer, 1984; Dixon & Seron, 1995;

Elias & Shitrai, 1998; Hagen, 1990; Hagen & Kay, 1995).

Contrary to our expectations, we found indications that female lawyers are

rewarded better for previous experience than male lawyers. This differs from findings

in the US which showed that return on investment for years of experience is higher for

male than for female lawyers (Hagan, 1990; Huang, 1997) and from the Canadian

findings which were insignificant in that aspect (Laband & Lentz, 1995; Robson &

Wallace, 2001).

Differences in the findings between Israel and the other countries may indicate

that discrimination exists against female lawyers in Israel. High salaries are withheld

from young women lawyers with little previous experience because the employer

expects them conform to social and family values and to choose a mommy track,

leave their job or put less effort in it in order to give birth and raise children

(e.g., Menkel-Meadow, 1988; Podmore & Spencer, 1982; Scott, 1987). The find-

ings indicate that the burden of proof falls on women: while women need to

prove their ability to commit to their job before they are rewarded for that commit-

ment (Rachman-Moore & Danziger, 2000), men receive higher rewards for number

of working hours and also for aspects not necessarily related to the job, such as

being married.

The data did not show different effects for organizational tenure. One expla-

nation may be that rewards for tenure in salaried positions are well protected by

Israeli law.

Our study showed that occupational segmentation variables such as type of

organization and job status are significant determinants of earnings for both female

and male lawyers after controlling for marital status, human and psychological


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capital. Differences between the genders in occupational prestige, however, were not

significant with the exception of lawyers who work in non-law firms. As we did not

measure job status in non-law firms, it may be that the male lawyers who work in

these firms had more or higher managerial positions than the female lawyers, which

may have affected the difference in return on investment.

No clear discrimination in earnings was found when we compared men and

women who occupy the same job status in the same type of organization. Men and

women who worked in the “core” of the profession (in terms of size of the law firm

and prestige of specialization) and had become partners were rewarded similarly.

However, disparity was found when we examined allocative processes such as pro-

motions, which are also less well protected by the law. Our results showed that

male lawyers in Israel are four times as likely to become partners in law firms as

women when they have the same expected career development and expected

balance between work and family, the same marital status and the same human and

psychological capital. Our findings show that even among a relatively committed

population of those who work full-time, where both male and female lawyers per-

ceived themselves with the same level of commitment to their careers, the likelihood

of attaining partnership for males is four times that of female lawyers. As discussed

previously, these results are consistent with other findings (Hagan & Kay, 1995;

Hull & Nelson, 2000; Kay, 1997; Kay & Hagan, 1998, 1999; Noonan & Corcoran,

2004; Spurr, 1990; Spurr & Sueyosh, 1994). These findings show that occupational

segmentation should be examined in tandem with allocative processes such as chances

for promotion (Petersen & Saporta, 2004).

In sum, the findings of this study show that male lawyers are rewarded better than

female lawyers for married status and for various types of human and psychological

capital and for working in non-law firms, and have much better chances to become

partners, indicating a presence of latent discrimination within the legal profession

in Israel, which may be based on the relatively traditional values still prevalent in

society, despite its egalitarian aspects.

Conclusions

Part of the explanation for the propensity of female lawyers to work fewer hours and to

have less experience, or to opt for a career in a government institution, or to work as a

salaried lawyer in a law office, lies in the fact that women look for ways to balance work

and family (Crosby, 1991; White et al., 1992), especially in a society where traditional

family values still are considered important.

While more women than men graduate from law schools in Israel nowadays, the

position of females within the legal profession is still far from equal to that of men in

terms of earnings and promotions. It may be that part of this inequality is out of

choice; however, our results show that females in the legal profession in Israel are

still rewarded differently than males for the same attributes, even though it is expected

that women’s entrance to legal practice is accompanied by the professional guarantee

that expertise will serve as an efficient protection from the tradition of stratification

and inequality existing in society. The findings in this study lead us to conclude that


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a female lawyer in Israel does not have the same career options as a male lawyer; further-

more, even if she makes a similar investment in human and psychological capital as does

her male colleague when occupying the same job, she will be rewarded differently in

terms of earnings or in terms of promotion. Therefore, it can be inferred that discrimi-

nation still exists between genders within the legal profession in Israel, despite the

various attempts by legislators to create equal opportunities for the genders.

The findings in this study further suggest that careers of male and female lawyers

should be managed differently and that females should be encouraged actively to opt

for jobs in the “core” of the profession. Moreover, HR managers should be aware of

the facts and make sure that females are rewarded similarly to males in term of earn-

ings and promotion for marital status, human and psychological capital. It may also be

worthwhile to invest in the mentoring of female lawyers at the beginning of their

careers and help them to get promoted throughout their careers.

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Appendix 1: Sample of Lawyers in Israel that were members of the

Israeli Bar Association

Data for this study were collected during the year 2000 using a national mail survey

of the whole population of lawyers in Israel that were members of the Israel Bar

Association.

Sampling of the population was conducted in two waves. In the first wave, 1,422

questionnaires were completed and returned after 22,325 members of the Bar

Association in Israel received an envelope as an insert to the Bar Association Journal

which included two questionnaires. One addressed lawyers who worked at the time

as professionals in legal occupations; the other addressed those who were not active

in the field of law. The questionnaires were anonymous and included a self-addressed

return envelope. Out of this population, a 6.4% response rate was received.

In the second wave, 2,000 envelopes were sent out randomly directly to the work-

places (not as an insert to the journal) which included questionnaires, a self-addressed

envelope, and a letter requesting a response from those who had not yet responded.

Out of the 2,000 letters sent, 600 were selected randomly and phone calls were

made to encourage them respond to the questionnaires. In response, 72 question-

naires were returned (3.6% response rate). Therefore, the total response rate is

6.7% from the total population of lawyers.

The 600 targeted lawyers were also asked if they read the journal published by the

Bar Association; only 40% of them gave a positive answer. Because only 40% read the

journal the potential population is about 11,000 implying that in fact, the response

rate is about 17%. In Israel, the response rate to mail surveys that include an incentive

is about 20% (Zemach & Beyth-Marom, 1986, p. 78). The response rate in market


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research among different segments in the population is even lower and ranges between

10%–15% (Izraeli, 1994, p. 304). According to Dillman (1978) the response rate

without methods to encourage the respondents and without incentives, is lower by

half. Therefore the effective response rate of 17% in a mail survey without encourage-

ment is acceptable in Israel.

Given the relatively low response rate, we examined if the sample is representa-

tive and not biased.

The respondents from the two waves were compared regarding relevant variables

and no significant statistical differences were found between them: gender

(x2 , (1) ¼ .152, p ¼ .697), marital status (married vs. non married,

x2 , (1) ¼ .047, p ¼ .829) organizational type (law vs. non-law

firm,x2 , (1) ¼ .295, p ¼ .587), job status in law firm (salaried, solo practice

partner, x2 , (2) ¼ 3.169, p ¼ .205), age (t ¼ 2.598 ,df ¼ 1439, p ¼ .550), hours

worked per week(t ¼ .597, df ¼ 1230, p ¼ .551), current organizational tenure

(t ¼ 2.113, df ¼ 1264, p ¼ .910) and salary (t ¼ 1.039, df ¼ 1376, df ¼ .299).

Thus, we concluded that no evidence existed that the sample was biased. As a

result, the two groups were unified and the final sample included 1496 respondents.

In order to assess if the sample represented the population, the Israel Bar

Association provided data only on the distribution of the population of lawyers

according to district and gender. Sample distribution was compared to the whole

population of lawyers, and no significant differences were found for the districts

(x2 , (3) ¼ 1.942, p ¼ .585) and for gender (x2 , (1) ¼ 3.412, p ¼ .065). The

sample included 60.7% males and 39.3% females, whereas the distribution of the

general population of lawyers in Israel was 62.4% and 37.6% respectively.

Therefore, we concluded that the effective response rate is 17% and that there is no

evidence to suggest that the sample is not representative of the population. Given

the comparative analysis of the samples and the large sample size, our confidence

of the validity of the results of this study increased.

In this study, we focused solely on lawyers who were active in the field of law at

the time and worked at least 40 hours per week (full-time lawyers). Thus, the final

sample for this study included 1096 lawyers of which 62.7% were males and 37.3%

were females.

Appendix 2: Operational measures

Salary was measured as a categorical variable and was based on the following ques-

tion: “Please indicate your monthly earnings (in New Israeli Shekels—NIS—before

tax) from your current job”.

1. Less than NIS 5000

2. NIS 5,000–9,999

3. NIS 10,000–14,999

4. NIS 15,000–19,999

5. NIS 20,000–29,999

6. NIS 30,000 and over


Dow

nloa

ded

By: [

Alm

or, T

amar

] At:

09:0

1 1

April

200

7

Organizational commitment—items

1. I feel strongly that I belong to my place of work.

2. I would feel guilty if I quit my current job.

3. If I receive job offers, I will reject them in order to stay at my current job.

4. I do not feel “part of the family” in my current job (reversed).

5. I am willing to work harder in order to contribute to the success of the

organization.

6. I feel that I share common values with my place of work.

The respondents answered by indicating their agreement with each of the items on a

four-point Likert scale that ranged from 1—“not at all” to 4—“very much”.


Documents

Equal investments, different rewards: gender inequalities among Israeli lawyers