Emergency preparedness in Romania: Dynamics, shortcomings and policy proposals

Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2012) xxx–xxx

TFS-17683; No of Pages 11

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Technological Forecasting & Social Change

Emergency preparedness in Romania: Dynamics, shortcomings andpolicy proposals

Marian Zulean a,⁎, Gabriela Prelipcean b

a University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romaniab University “Stefan cel Mare” of Suceava, Suceava, Romania

a r t i c l e i n f o

⁎ Corresponding author at: Bd Elisabeta 4-12, Buchare723696813; fax: +40 21 3104920.

E-mail addresses: [email protected], marian.zulean@[email protected], [email protected] (G. Prelip

0040-1625/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Inc. Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.11.004

Please cite this article as: M. Zulean, G. Prepolicy proposals, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Ch

a b s t r a c t

Article history:Received 4 April 2012Received in revised form 5 November 2012Accepted 12 November 2012Available online xxxx

Romanians were exposed in the last century to a range of natural or man-made disasters,mainly earthquakes and floods. The transition of the country from a Communist authoritarianpattern of emergency preparedness to a democratically civilian emergency system challengesthe assessment of emergency preparedness and adds more complexity in designing a betterand efficient system. The aim of this paper is to briefly describe the risks and institutions dealingwith disasters, to assess the emergency preparedness, the uses of Knowledge ManagementSystems and Foresight Methodology approaches and to discover the shortcomings of theRomanian Emergency System. The empirical study designed as a reality check focuses on theperception of the local leaders of the emergency system regarding the most probable risks, andthe uses and utility of long term strategic planning and foresightmethodologies, using the Delphitechnique. Lessons drawn from the Romanian transition could provide an interesting case studyfor other emerging democracies.

© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Strategic planningForesightDelphiRomanian Emergency SystemKnowledge Management

1. Introduction

In our global society, the emergency community faces acomplex environment and decreasing predictability. How-ever, the grand challenges of globalization also brought aboutnew opportunities that can help the emergency communityto tackle risks if one looks forward, anticipates and buildsscenarios to cope with them. Among the opportunities,Knowledge Management Systems could help the process ofcrisis or disaster management.

Romania is a country that was exposed to a range of naturaldisasters in the last century, particularly to earthquakes andfloods, causing economic distress and civilian casualties acrossthe country. The transformation of the Romanian EmergencySystem and the use of strategic planning and foresight

st, Romania. Tel.: +40

uefiscdi.ro (M. Zulean),cean).

ll rights reserved.

lipcean, Emergency prepange (2012), http://dx.d

methodologies in Emergency Preparedness (EP) is a verychallenging task for a couple of reasons. Firstly, because theRomanian strategic culture has been a rather reactive andpassive one; the twoWorldWars, the “Revolution” of 1989 andnatural catastrophes all took decision-makers by surprise. So itis interesting to see how the foresight approach as well asInformation and Communication Technology (ICT) used at theglobal level as state of the art techniques could improve theRomanian strategic culture.

Secondly, the transition to democracy and the condition-ality of the Western institutions required an institutionaltransformation towards decentralized decision-making, in-cluding the transformation of the defense and emergencysystems (ES). However, there has been no assessment of theoverall functionality of the emergency system after twodecades of transition or an evaluation of how risk analysis,mitigation and response are correlated.

Therefore, themain goals of our study are to briefly describethe most important risks in Romania and institutions fordealing with them; to assess its emergency preparedness anddiscover the shortcomings of the Romanian Emergency System

aredness in Romania: Dynamics, shortcomings andoi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.11.004

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.11.004

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2 M. Zulean, G. Prelipcean / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2012) xxx–xxx

(RES)1 through a Delphi study as well as a literature review,and to offer some policy recommendations.

The first part of the present paper briefly presents the grandchallenges faced by the Romanian ES, one regarding the insti-tutional transformations undergone by the emergency systemand the other regarding the use of a Romanian KnowledgeManagement System and the foresight process. The secondpart of the paper does a reality check by analyzing the processof strategic planning based on a Delphi study conducted withexperts and the local leaders of the emergency system. Theextended Conclusionswill not only summarize the findings butalso discuss the shortcomings of the Romanian EmergencyPreparedness system and make policy proposals for the futureimprovement of Emergency Management in Romania.

2. Grand challenges for the Romanian EmergencySystem (RES)

In the recent literature, Grand Challenges are consideredto be current and future events or states of affairs expected tohave a major impact on society and to require wide-ranging,ambitious but feasible structural transformations.2 For theEuropean Union, the concept of a Grand Challenge providedcommon objectives in the recent formulation of policy in-struments at the European level, such as the new Horizon2020 Framework Program. Starting from the European ap-proach,we defineGrand Challenges in a looserway as themostimportant trends and problems faced by the system. Basedon our knowledge and on the literature on post-communisttransition, the two most important grand challenges faced bythe Romanian Emergency System have been: 1) transitionof the Emergency System from an authoritarian regime todemocratic one and 2) the governance of risk in the knowledgesociety. This part of the paperwill describe and explain how theRES adapted to and confronted these two grand challenges.

2.1. Transition of the Romanian Emergency System (RES)

During the Communist regime, the emergency systemwas highly centralized andmilitarized, mainly addressing thesocial catastrophes generated by war and – secondarily –

natural or man-made disasters. In the last two decades, a newsystem has been built, based on civilian protection rulesand civilian emergency planning. A World Bank Report forthe project on Hazard and Risk Mitigation assessed thatthe institutions assigned to handle disaster management andresponse lacked both awareness and the necessary legislative,technical and financial capacities to respond effectively. In

1 In this paper the term “system” is used in two different circumstances. TheRomanian Emergency System (RES) refers to a holistic system, consisting ofelements/institutions, boundary, input, output, process, policy, hierarchy, goal-directedness, and information. We talk later in this paper about KnowledgeManagement Systems in terms of Alavi and Leidner as the “InformationTechnology based systems developed to support and enhance the organiza-tional process of knowledge creation, storage, transfer and application.” [1].

2 Originally, “Grand Challenges” referred to the US policy terms set asgoals in the late 1980s for funding high-performance computing andcommunications research, in part in response to the Japanese 5thGeneration of 10-year project. More recently, the European Union definedgrand challenges more loosely in the Lund Declaration, issued in 2009.

Please cite this article as: M. Zulean, G. Prelipcean, Emergency preppolicy proposals, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2012), http://dx.d

order to check the harsh statement of the Report, it is necessaryto have a brief presentation of the characteristics of extremeevents and a presentation of the transition process itself.

Another report generated by CRED International DisasterDatabase for years 1974–2006 shows that natural hazards –

particularly earthquake, floods and extreme temperatures –

have taken a toll of 1940 lives in Romania [2]. Between1992 and 2001 there were floods every year in some parts ofthe country resulting in civilian casualties (123 people died).Total material losses of US$528.9 million were documentedbetween 1997 and 2001. In 1999, the losses were estimatedat US$132 million and in 2000 at US$98.3 million.

The 1977 earthquake, measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale,resulted in economic losses exceeding US$2 billion, whilethe July 1991 flood caused damages estimated at $0.5 billion,affecting a large area of about 1400 km2, and damaged morethan 12,000 buildings, 990 km of roads, 14 km of railroads,and 150 bridges.

One of the lessons learned was the need for a specialprofessional civil emergency body addressing disasters andnatural catastrophes both on a national and a local level. Thesolution was to establish the norms and missions for a newstructure, one year after the 1977 earthquake. Therefore, the“Law no.2/1978 regarding civilian defense” set up the norms,rules and institutions both on a national and a local level totake measures in the case of natural and man-made disasterswithin the system of national defense. It should be said thatthe unexpected earthquake of 1977 triggered a long lastingprocess of organizing a civilian defense system designed tobetter prepare the citizens and the society in the preventionor management of disasters. The Ministry of Defense was stillin charge of coordinating the protection of the population,but a special Commandment of Civilian Defense was set upfor the regional and local civilian management of disasters,consisting of people aged 20–60 and not enrolled in militarydefense.

The “revolution of 1989” disrupted and dismantled theauthoritarian defense sector, including the civilian emer-gency system. A new Law of civilian protection was set up in1996 to organize the civil emergency system as a Departmentwithin the Ministry of Interior on a local level as well. Itis interesting to point out that the domestic crisis of 1999(the social unrest of the coal miners that marched about200 km to Bucharest in order to violently overthrow theGovernment) surprised the Romanian Government whichissued an overnight “Emergency Ordinance no.1/1999 ondeclaring the state of siege and emergency” on the Romanianterritory and created a new institution, the National Systemfor the Management of Emergency Situations.

The NATO Prague Summit (Prague, 2002), where Romaniawas invited to join the organization, was a turning pointfor transformation of national defense and civilian emer-gency systems. That invitation allowed the decision-makersto pursue an accelerated path of reform. The 9/11 events inthe US, as well as the new status of Romania as a full memberof NATO (2004) and the EU (2007) brought about a newapproach — the systematic transformation of the securitysector. Thus, several bills of law, meant to make sense of andto reform the whole security sector were controversial andhighly debated. The National Security Strategy, issued in April2006, introduced not only a pro-active approach, a new role for



3 For practical purposes, in our paper we choose a more comprehensiveconcept of “risk and disasters governance” instead of risk and disastersmanagement. According to Renn [4] the new term encompasses a muchbroader scope than individual actors' actions, and uses knowledge manage-ment and foresight as methodologies to cope with risks and disasters. It ispromoted by United Nations Development Program and the International RiskGovernance Council, Geneva.

3M. Zulean, G. Prelipcean / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2012) xxx–xxx

Romania as a global actor and provisions for the participationto the Global War on Terror (GWOT), but also clear proposalsfor security sector transformation and good governance.

Several legislative and strategic provisions regarding thelong term strategic planning are presented below to supportthe claim regarding the systemic transformation and pro-active approach. The “Government Emergency Ordinanceno. 21/2004” set up the National System for EmergencySituations Management, whose first principle stated “preven-tion and anticipation” as a core approach, while the newlyestablished National Committee for Emergency suggests to theGovernment a National Plan for providing resources in case ofemergency situations.

A new “Law no.481/2004 regarding civilian protection”clearly provided that the Ministry of Interior, through itsGeneral Inspectorate for Emergency Situations as well as itscounty units, is responsible for the coordination, control andmanagement of the civilian protection of citizens. In anotherprovision, the Fire Brigades and civilian protection wereunified to act together in case of emergency.

At present, a set of norms and strategies addresses theemergency preparedness, among them the National Strategyfor the Prevention of Emergency Situations, which was passedas “Government Decree no 762/2008”. It states, in article IV,that “…it has an anticipative character, foreseeing gradualmeasures for the prevention of extreme events and catastro-phes” and “…has as general objective the prevention ofemergency situations through the organization of an earlywarning system and the communication of data and informa-tion”. The last chapter discusses themultiple plans that show aclear mapping of the emergency preparedness system; how-ever, none of them directly mention the uses of foresight orlong term methodologies.

As one can see, the role of Western assistance wasimportant either indirectly, through the conditionality re-quired by NATO and the EU, or directly through the financialaid provided. An important guidance and financial assistancein the last decade was provided by the World Bank projecton Hazard Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness. Itsoverall objective was to assist the Government of Romania inreducing the environmental, social, and economic vulnerabilityto natural disasters and catastrophic mining accidental spillsthrough: “(i) strengthening the institutional and technicalcapacity for disaster management and emergency response;(ii) implementing risk reduction measures for floods, land-slides and earthquakes; (iii) improving the safety of water-retention dams; and (iv) improving the management andsafety of tailings dams and waste dump facilities” [3].

The Implementation Assessment one year before closingthe project (2011) noted that: “…the Project DevelopmentObjectives associated with flood and landslides risk, andreduction of risk of mining accidents would be fully met byproject closing, while meeting the objectives associatedwith strengthening the emergency management and riskfinancing capacity is at risk because of the delay in theimplementation of the Emergency Management InformationSystem. Unfortunately, the objectives associated with thereduction of seismic risk would be only partially met”.

As the World Bank assessed in the Report, the system ofemergency is still under development, fragmented, having aleading institution responsible to mitigate or manage each


type of catastrophe or event, all under the umbrella of theSupreme Council of National Defense. However, there isno estimation of the overall functionality of the emergencysystem, the planning mechanisms or an evaluation of howrisk analysis, mitigation and response are correlated.

To sum up, after two decades of transition the RomanianEmergency System consists of a network of organizations,agencies and other structures organized in different levels andareas of competence, having the specific infrastructure andresources to fulfill its duties. The structure of the nationalsystem includes: emergency committees, the General Inspec-torate for Emergency Situations, professional public commu-nity services for emergency situations, emergency operationalcenters and commander of the action. The long lasting processsucceeded in setting up a new, de-centralized system, to dealwith the risks faced by Romania. The next part will present theway in which the new system adapted to the global challenge/trend of incorporating ICT to better respond to crises and anti-cipation and foresight into strategic planning.

2.2. Risk and disaster governance in the knowledge society3

The information and communication technologies (ICT)have created new conditions for the emergence of knowledgesocieties, where the values of innovation and creativity play amajor role. On the other hand, ICT is regarded by academicsand practitioners such as Turoff [5] or Jennex [6] as an enablerof emergency systems. In their view, ICT can support all phasesof emergency/disaster management, meaning pre-disasterstage (with mitigation, risk reduction, prevention and pre-paredness phases), disaster stage (with the response phase),and post-disaster stage (with the recovery phase).

Aubrecht et al. define risk governance as a cyclic multi-stage concept consisting of: risk analysis (identification ofrisks and assessment of vulnerability and hazards), mitiga-tion stage (reduction of risk, prevention, and preparedness —including early warning), response and recovery (assessmentof the impact of disasters and recovery after disasters) [7],which can include different approaches adapted to the char-acteristics of different hazards (earthquakes, floods andextreme temperatures). In a disaster situation, coordinationplay an important role, because there are many actors involvedat different levels.

The impact of extreme events and the complexity ofinterventions in such situations need new and comprehen-sive approaches and efficient solutions for decision making.The disaster governance caused by extreme events (natural orman-made) involves coordination between actors, decisionsmaking under stress and time pressure, in the sense that itplans to save human lives and minimize losses of any kind [8].

McEntire suggested that the differences between emergency/disaster and calamity/catastrophe consist in the number ofpeople affected and the necessary recovery period. Additionally,the risks and the measures associated are also different. As




showed before, the author considers that the types of riskassociated with emergencies, on the one hand, and disasters, onthe other hand, are relatively similar [9].

In recent years, several extreme events have led to aredirection of research to study Knowledge Management(KM). Knowledge Management (KM) refers to the accumula-tion, storage, and use of knowledge created within an orga-nization or about a certain phenomenon (e.g., natural disaster)to help the decision making process in that organization or inthe case of an extreme event. Thus, KM in emergency situationsis a system used for identifying, sharing, retrieving, and usingthe knowledge of the knowledge users [10] in order to developsupport and enhance the processes of creation, storage,transfer, and application of knowledge [1,11]. The potential ofKnowledge Management System (KMS) was recognized bydisaster managers for faster and more organized response toextreme events. The population affected by a disaster needsquick access to a wide variety of information in real time andcoordination. Moreover, those involved in restoring the orderand reducing the loss require coordination as well.

The KMS critical success factors applicable to natural disas-ters are the following: correct identification of key elements(users, sources, processes storage strategy, knowledge neededin the decision making process) [11]; integrated logistics (net-works, databases, hardware components and associated soft-ware, KMS experts); a common, comprehensive structure ofknowledge base, easy to use and understand; clearly definedKMS goal and purpose; friendly interface and facile knowledgeuse. The proper functioning of a KMS requires good commu-nication and cooperation between emergency response partic-ipants [5].

The creative approach is to integrate andmix different typesofmodels, methods, techniques, technologies anddecision toolsin order to obtain a flexible, accurate and efficient informationmanagement system [12]. Decision Support Systems (DSS)should be one of the most efficient technologies for disastermanagement system, because it offers adaptability, robustness,modularity and high flexibility.

There is a growing body of literature and experiencesshared by such academics as Murray Turoff, who contributedto the development of knowledge management principleswith OEP in the early 1970s by building the EMISARI systemand continuing the work – over decades – to build specify thefunctionality of a DERMIS (Dynamic Emergency Response)system [5]. As Turoff et al. explained for the American case,there were major shortcomings related to the “lack of com-monality with respect to interface design, visualizationand decision support…the separation of threats by source(terrorism, natural disasters and manmade disasters; lack ofmajor integration requirements across organizations)” [13].Turoff and Hiltz suggested that a community of practice shouldbe consulted in designing KMS for any phase of emergency.Such an idea leads us to support the idea of coupling foresightwith Knowledge Management Systems into the more compre-hensive approach of Risk Governance, as mentioned earlier.4

However, the mainstream literature on KMS focusedmore on ICT and the benefits of knowledge-based emergency

4 As Ortwin Renn put it: “Risk governance refers to the actions, processes,laws, traditions and institutions by which decisions about risk handling areprepared, taken and implemented” [4].


management information systems for bettering emergencypreparedness [14] and less on humans–computer interface orhuman insight regarding the use of KMS. Carver and Turoff[15] recently proposed a different approach focusing on user-centered systemic approach, considering human as part of thesystem, the computer as part of the team. That led us to considerthe human–ICT interaction and propose a more comprehensivedefinition of risk governance anddevelop aDelphimethodologyas a first step in discovering the shortcomings of the RES.

In Fig. 1 Ortwin Renn shows that good risk governanceintegrates traditional risk analysis with the thorough under-standing of how different stakeholders perceive the risk, andtherefore needs foresight.

As governance implies a broader scope of riskmanagement,Renn proposes a definition of the concept of risk governanceas a framework capable to integrate four components — riskidentification, assessment, management, and communicationand to involve the main stakeholders in modern societies:governments, economic actors, academics, and civil society.The risk governance approach appears to be a good frameworkto integrate the foresight and prediction processes as Europeanresearchers proposed recently [7]. Foresight appears to be ofinterest mainly in the assessment stage (risk perception, socialconcern and social impacts and also future risks), but mighthelp to prepare the other stages too.

Foresight is expected to bring several important contribu-tions to the field, amongwhich to inform policy (by improvingthe knowledge base and supplying anticipatory intelligence);to facilitate policy implementation (by developing strategyand policy through reflexive learning processes and systemicinstruments); to embed participation in policy-making andthus enhance transparency and legitimacy; to support policydefinition; and to reconfigure the policy system [16].

A team of researchers from Finland published in Techno-logical Forecasting and Social Change a study on integratingfuture-oriented technology analysis (FTA) and risk assessmentmethodology [17]. They started from the assumption that thepractices of foresight, technology assessment and risk assess-ment are parallel ways to explore the plausible forthcomingdevelopments, evaluate their desirability, importance andacceptability and consider the risks involved. They discoveredthat both Future-oriented Technology Assessment (FTA) andRisk Assessment have common grounds in seeking to managethe uncertainty of potential futures and to create knowledgefor decisionmaking. The conclusion was that riskmanagementneeds a more holistic approach to respond to continuouschange and, thus, it needs FTA. That is, in our view, the RiskGovernance approach to better integrate the future orientedapproach and/into the classical approach of emergency/disastermanagement.

By the same token, at the ISCRAM 2011 conference, a groupof Austrian researchers suggested the integration of theconcepts of foresight in the planning for disaster management.As Aubercht et al. put it “…by fostering participation, foresightactivities strengthen public awareness and risk perceptionamong relevant stakeholders” [7]. In the same venue, Aedoet al. presented a Spanish project (TIPex) meant to study dif-ferent IT techniques that can be used in the elaboration ofEmergency Plans, based on scenarios [18].

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) wasconfronted with similar constraints, failures and complexities



Management Sphere:

Decision on & Implementation of Actions

Assessment Sphere:

Generation of Knowledge

Pre-Assessment

Implementation• Option Realisation• Monitoring & Control• Feedback from Risk Mgmt. Practice Decision Making• Option Identification & Generation• Option Assessment• Option Evaluation & Selection

Risk Management

Communication

Tolerability & Acceptability Judgment

Risk Assessment• Hazard Identification & Estimation• Exposure & Vulnerability Assessment• Risk EstimationConcern Assessment• Risk Perceptions• Social Concerns• Socio-Economic Impacts

Risk Appraisal

Risk Evaluation

• Judging the Tolerability& Acceptability

• Need for Risk Reduction Measures

Source: Ortwin Renn, Risk governance. Towards in integrative approach, White paper no.1, IGRC, Geneva, September 2005.

Risk Characterization

• Risk Profile• Judgment of the

Seriousness of Risk• Conclusions & Risk

Reduction Options

• Problem Framing• Early Warning• Screening• Determination of Scientific

Conventions

Fig. 1. Risk Governance Framework. Source: Ortwin Renn, Risk governance. Towards in integrative approach, White paper no.1, IGRC, Geneva, September 2005.


in dealing with disasters (particularly after Katrina) andlaunched the Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI). SFI has broughttogether a wide cross-section of the emergency managementcommunity to explore key future issues, trends and otherfactors, and to work through their implications. It alreadylaunched a Progress Report in January, 2012. The Reportpresents the findings from foresight efforts during the year2011, including: uncertainties that define and drive the futureenvironment; strategic needs and gaps the American com-munity will have to address; a look into the emergency man-agement community of 2030, and suggested next steps for thecommunity to prepare for the future [19]. The outputs of thisforesight initiative are offered as a starting point for dialogand active consideration throughout the emergency manage-ment community.

The introductory part of this paper presented the majortransformation of the RES, while the second part reviewedthe state-of-the-art literature on knowledge managementsystems and creatively developed the concept of risk gover-nance suitable to the Romanian situation. The next step wasto carry out a benchmarking analysis and see how Romanianinstitutions foresee the implementation of a KMS and fore-sight into emergency preparedness process.

As seen in the World Bank Report, the implementation ofthe National Management Information System for EmergencySituations has been in delay for two years. The S&T company,one of the providers, justified the delay by “…the necessary


time for clarification of all operational aspects required bythe end-user and the complexity of scenarios” [20].

The proposed National Management Information Systemfor Emergency Situations (SNMISU/NMISES) is defined as anintegrated system that manages and coordinates the responsein case of disaster, a system that integrates the key elementsneeded for the decision making process and for the completemanagement in emergency situations, namely: informationon all types of emergency situations, institutional integrationof all stakeholders at national, regional, and local levels. Theimplementation of the SNMISU/NMISES implies the existenceof the National Centre for Intervention Management andCoordination (CNCCI/NCIMC) in case of emergencies.

The system centralizes data, performs processing, andsupports the decision making process. Besides these essentialcomponents, a communication platform will be initiated. Themost important aspects for Romania refer to the time neededto insert all the required information into databases, toestablish a single standard for databases in order to incorpo-rate data in a proper manner to store and use for decisionsupport in emergency situations, and better coordinationbecause the information owners (public/private organiza-tions) are geographically distributed.

The integrated system will incorporate a component ofknowledge management (KM) in the sense that, besides thegeneral characteristics of an emergency response system,it will facilitate communication, the coordination of actions



Fig. 2. EMIS Application Modular Structure. Source: Romanian Emergency Management Information System Architecture.

5 Part of this study has been presented at the ISCRAM 2012 conference inVancouver under the title “Risk Perception, Strategic Planning and ForesightMethodologies within the Romanian Emergency System”.


(including the deployment of human and material resourceswhere appropriate). The result will be a specific KMS thatprovides a centralized knowledge base about disasters (collect-ed from various sources) in order to obtain information aboutan extreme event and to make new assessments and otherstatistical analysis. In this case, knowledge and past experience/lessons learned are used to facilitate decision making [21].The result of using KMS could have also indirect effects atnational, regional or local levels, such as the creation of newskills and new jobs, more efficient, competitive, and adaptableto emergency/critical situations.

Also, the main purpose of achieving such a KMS in Romaniais to improve the speed and quality of response actions and toreduce costs, time, and efforts in creating and implementingsuch a system as portrayed in the Fig. 2 [22]. However, thefeasibility of the system needs to be determined and an impactstudy has to be initiated.

The assessments above showed the difficult task of trans-forming the emergency system in the last two decades, thenorms and institutions, as well as the re-conceptualizationof the civilian emergency system. A claim that the RES wouldhave performed better but lacked the knowledge and thenecessary legislative, technical and financial capacities torespond effectively was partially demonstrated by the reviewof the secondary sources presented above. The system wasrebuilt to respond to the “known unknowns” of earthquakes,floods and extreme temperatures, because historically theywere the natural hazards with high frequency, but there is nocertain information about anticipation and preparedness for“black swans”, despite the fact that prevention is the principalobjective of ES. Beyond the “office assessment”, there is nofieldwork to estimate the functionality of the general principleof anticipation and strategic planning based on foresight.


On the other hand, the second part demonstrated thestate of the art development of KMS in theWestern countries,as well as the struggle of RES to build a KMS with the foreignassistance of the World Bank and private companies. With allthe delays, the system is about to be fully operational in 2012from a technological point of view. However, Murray Turoffet al. warned us about the fallacy of 9/11 and the requirementto develop an integrated communication capability that canreact as a distributed virtual system “when the authorities,decision and reporting responsibilities…are explicitly repre-sented and present in the supporting communicationssoftware” [5]. Consequently, there are missing gaps from theliterature and secondary sources to understand the function-ality of RES, to find out the shortcomings of the functionalityof SNMISU and the policy gaps of strategic planning toanticipate the extreme events and be prepared to managethem. We designed a Delphi study meant to fill the gap,presented in the next section.

3. Perceptions of Romanian Emergency Systemleaders on risks and on the preparedness toaddress them: A Delphi study5

3.1. Methodology

A three-round classical Delphi was designed to addressthe issues of emergency preparedness related to risks assess-ment, strategic planning and foresight methodologies usedby the Romanian emergency system on a local level (42



Table 1Degree of impact of threats (1=very low impact to 4=very high impact).

Probability of occurrence Round 2 Round 3

Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation

1. Earthquakes 3.45 0.759 3.47 1.0072. Large scale forest fires 2.47 0.772 3.00 0.0003. Other natural disasters 2.83 0.618 3.00 0.0004. Catastrophic floods 3.43 0.507 2.94 0.2435. Industrial disaster 2.78 0.647 2.88 0.332

(Central Tendency and Standard Deviation for Rounds II and III).


counties). For practical reasons (anonymity and expert basedinvestigation), we decided to use the online Delphi to pursuethe investigation. The task of pursuing an online Delphiinvestigation was facilitated by the implementation of KMSand communication tools and routines by RES local leaders,which are in themselves relevant for our study.

The main goal of the Delphi was a “reality check” andexploration regarding the shortcomings in emergency pre-paredness and uses of long-term and foresight techniquesin the process of RES strategic planning and training. Thesecondary goal of the Delphi was the estimation of futurerisks by the leaders of emergency system, the probability toproduce and the preparedness of the emergency system todeal with them.

The design of the Delphi started from the classicalHandbook by Linstone and Turoff [23] that considered theDelphi technique “a method for structuring a group commu-nication process” rather than necessarily for consensusbuilding. It is important to mention that our approach wasthe first Delphi exercise ever for the Romanian EmergencySystem leaders. It is worth noting that we started a literaturereview to discover the theoretical and practical underpinningsto guide our instrumentation of the process in concordancewith our research goals. Thus, we consulted the journalTechnological Forecasting and Social Change, particularly thespecial issue no. 78 (2011). Moreover we based our Delphidesign process on practical skills we developed during theforesight exercise in Romania that employed a large RT Delphi;the design of Delphi and the team received consultancy andtraining from professors Murray Turoff and Roxanne Hiltz[13,23,24].

Sampling strategy was determined by the goals (realitycheck and foresight) and the hypotheses we assumed duringthe literature review. One of the hypotheses was that theRES was decentralized but no one has estimations on riskgovernance and on the knowledge gaps between the informa-tion in the literature and the official strategies and knowledgeof the local leaders. Moreover, we noticed diverging points ofview expressed in the media by such leaders.

Starting from the goals and hypotheses presented abovewe anchored the design of the questionnaire within theLockean and Kantian systems of inquiry as described byMurray Turoff [25]. Thus the questions on reality check werebased on the classical Delphi as pioneered by Dalkey, Helmerand Rescher that verified the empirical data provided bysecondary sources while the questions regarding the antic-ipation of the future risks as well as strategies to deal withthem were based on the Kantian system of inquiry.6

The invitations and questionnaires were addressed to all42 leaders of the local emergency systems by e-mail; 30 ofthem responded to a semi-structured questionnaire withsome open ended questions in the first round. For the second

6 For a more detailed discussion on linking theory with instrumentation of aDelphi see Ian Mitroff and Murray Turoff, “Philosophical and MethodologicalFoundations of Delphi” available online at: http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/ch2b.html while for the recent trend on using Delphi as a foresight meth-odology for improving emergency preparedness see Kimmo Laasko, “OnImproving Emergency Preparedness and Management with Delphi”, Pro-ceedings of the 9th International ISCRAM Conference — Vancouver, Canada,April 2012 L. Rothkrantz, J. Ristvej and Z. Franco, eds. available at: http://www.iscramlive.org/ISCRAM2012/proceedings/250.pdf.


and third rounds, only 23 and 18 leaders answered, respec-tively, all of them men in their mid-forties.

The questionnaires from Rounds 2 and 3 differed from thesemi-structured and open-ended questionnaires: they weremostly based on Likert scales to assess the agreement ordisagreement with the statements and an evaluation of theimpact on scales with 4 points, an option of “don't know”

being separate. The option for a scale of 4 points was basedon research experience in the Romanian culture of conform-ism, which biases respondents to select the mean of 3 on aclassical 5-point Likert scale. The 4-point scale would forcethe experts to make a clear option and not select the mean ofthe scale. In addition, some of the findings that appeared“strange”, unclear or divergent in the second round wereadded for investigation in the third round.

3.2. Research findings

The first research question assessed the main risks thatcan lead to disasters and extreme events in the area of therespective leader's responsibility and also estimated theirprobability. In the first round, the estimation was based on aset of estimated risks by the National Security Strategy 2006(10 risks were provided upfront), giving the option to addmore relevant risks and then to rank their probability. For thesecond round, only the most probable five risks were selected(“large scale forest fires” being one risk added by therespondents). The experts were asked to assess the impactof the respective risks on their region, on a Likert scale from 1to 4 and to agree or disagree with the ranking. All agreedwith the ranking but a new risk of nuclear disaster was addedto the five risks. The third round gave the opportunity toexpress disagreement with the calculated central tendency orto argue or motivate agreement. None of the respondentspresented new arguments, despite the fact that they changedtheir estimation towards the central tendency. The scale oftheir estimation was similar to the second round. Table 1summarizes the results:

A decrease in the standard deviations can be seenbetween the second and third rounds, moving towards con-sensus with the exception of the probability of earthquakes,which increased. Our interpretation of the results is thatearthquakes and catastrophic floods are considered the mostprobable risks by the local emergency leaders, while thelarge-scale forest fires aswell as other natural disasters showedup unexpectedly due to recent events in Romania and Russia.However, the 0.00 standard deviation was explained by com-munication and talks among the leaders, to show that they


http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/ch2b.html

http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/ch2b.html

http://www.iscramlive.org/ISCRAM2012/proceedings/250.pdf

http://www.iscramlive.org/ISCRAM2012/proceedings/250.pdf


Table 3Need for long-term approach or scenarios (1=to a very small extent and4=to a very much extent).

Need for long-termscenario

R2 R3



have a different perception from the national agenda of NSS2006.

The second question assessed how the ES is prepared todeal with such risks, in terms of scenarios, action plans ordrills. The results are presented in Table 2:

Table 2Preparation for disaster (1=to a very small extent and 4=to a very muchextent).

Risks/preparation fordisaster

R2 R3


1. Large scale forest fires 2.78 0.671 2.94 0.2432. Catastrophic floods 2.70 0.559 2.88 0.3323. Industrial disaster 2.41 0.666 2.88 0.3324. Other natural disasters 2.43 0.598 2.18 0.5295. Earthquakes 2.13 0.548 2.12 0.4856. Nuclear accident 1.71 0.845 1.00 0.000


1. Private insurance 3.20 0.834 3.82 0.5292. Preparing populationfor risks

3.43 0.598 3.24 0.437

3. Risk mitigation 3.33 0.577 3.18 0.3934. Risk assessment 2.90 0.700 3.18 0.3935. Response/crisismanagement

3.10 0.889 3.18 0.393

6. Community resilience 3.00 0.775 2.82 0.7287. Reconstruction ofthe region

2.90 0.852 2.82 0.529


From Table 2 it can be estimated that the leaders believethat they are better prepared in terms of scenarios, plans anddrills for large scale fires, while they are least prepared for anuclear accident. It is interesting to notice that earthquake isa very probable risk but the ES preparation is not very good(mean 2.12 in the third round).

The third question addressed the need for a long-termapproach or scenario (at least 10 years) in the main phases ofEmergency Management.

As shown in Table 3, despite the fact that the standarddeviations decreased, there is the largest change in percep-tion regarding the need for a long term approach. In the firstround, the reconstruction of the region was considered to bethe least important; the preparation of the population wasthe most important issue that needs a long term approach,while in the third round private insurance has moved tosecond place.

The next question springs from the open-ended questionof the first round that assessed the need for an integratedmanagement. Therefore, the second round collected the maindefinitions for integrated management of a crisis and tried tofind out the agreement/disagreement with such statementson a scale from 1 to 4. A majority of the statements reachedthe level of agreement “to a great extent”, explaining a multi-dimensional approach to define integrated management aspresented in Table 4.

The last question/issue was also determined by thefindings that, despite the fact that the risk of a terroristattack is highly ranked in the national security strategy, thelocal leaders of ES estimate it as very low. Therefore, weasked the following question “In previous rounds, the risk of aterrorist attack was estimated as unlikely; also, the preparationto face such a risk at the local level is rather poor. On the otherhand, in the National Security Strategy 2006, this risk appearsto be very important. How do you explain this?” For thisfundamental question, we selected a visual scale of ten pointsin order to determine the degree of agreement or disagree-ment as portrayed in Table 5.

In our interpretation, the last statement that “terrorism isa matter of intelligence” not of the Emergency System, is the


one that is the most agreed with. That is based on a Romanianreality, as the legislation and military doctrines stated thatthe SRI (the Romanian Intelligence Service) is the leadinginstitution in combating terrorism. However, it is a wrongapproach for ES, a lack of vision and responsibility, not con-sistent with the security sector and integrated managementapproach, or with what has happened in the US, Spain or theUK.

Thus, from a methodological point of view, the Delphitechnique has been a very useful instrument to pursue theinvestigation, being quite flexible, while its goal has beenchanged in the second and third round to serve the generalobjective of the research. Another change in applying theinstrument was suggested in Round 2, when we distributed asimilar questionnaire to another sample of national leadersand experts for “triangulation”, to find out if there is a biasregarding the issues on terrorist risk perception and on thedefinition of integrated management. Our methodologicalconclusion was in line with the argument of Linstone andTuroff that “the future of Delphi will be in collaborativeorganizational and community planning systems that arecontinuous, dispersed and asynchronous” [24]. A new roundof Delphi could address the gap between the perception of aterrorist threat on a national level and that of the local ESleaders, as well as the gap between the expected threatsof earthquakes and floods and the actual preparation inoperational terms.

4. Conclusions and policy proposals

The Romanian Emergency System has undergone dra-matic changes, from a highly militarized and centralizedsystem going through a process of de-centralization and asystemic reconstruction of civilian emergency based on rulesand regulations compatible with those of NATO and the EU.The grand challenges referred to the institutional transfor-mation of RES and the way it adapted to the knowledgesociety. From the description of the facts as well as fromthe Delphi study, the conclusion can be drawn that there aresome institutional, planning and knowledge managementsystem shortcomings.



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Table 4Definition of Integrated Management (1=agreement “to a very small extent” and 4=agreement “to a great extent”).

Statement Mean Std. deviation

1. “I believe that the integrated approach is based on what can be done with a resource and then to allocate it to the need.Starting with the resource, I can plan an effective response according to the affected areas.”

3.29 0.849

2. “Effective management of a regional crisis requires a single command, allowing a unitary coordination of forces andmobilized means. This includes unique plans, clear and distinct tasks, integrated communications, interoperable means,a single voice in relation to the mass-media”

3.28 1.018

3. “Development of a legal act/regulation enforcing mandatory measures for all policy makers (both on a national andalso on a regional and local level) to participate with resources for risk prevention, intervention to removethe effects and rehabilitation of the affected areas”

3.22 0.732

4. “First it involves joint legislative measures, taken by the institutions that are part of this system. Then, sector specificcapabilities must be developed to respond to crisis and a unique operational management”

3.17 0.857

5. “Developing a more restrictive legislation, appropriate provisions/facilities to provide such management” 2.94 0.748


On the institutional level it can be noticed that the longroad of transformation from an authoritarian system ofemergency to a well-developed civilian emergency systemof NATO type generated some gaps. As a World Bank andUNDSR report put it: “Romania is in the process of developingand strengthening legislative and organizational frameworksfor disaster mitigation and preparedness…” but “… thecoordination between the central ministry and the localbodies, and the involvement of other departments in disasterpreparedness and prevention, all need to be strengthened”[26].

The ES local leaders suggested that an integratedmanagement should be the solution to overcome theinstitutional gap and improve communication. Among thedefinitions provided, integrated management was seen as“effective management of a regional crisis that requires asingle command, allowing a unitary coordination of forcesand mobilized means”; this seems to show the need forcoordination and knowledge management. They expressedan interest in developing an integrated framework underthe National Management Information System for Emer-gency Situations, capable of supporting emergency de-cisions and ensuring a better interoperability betweenemergency agencies (emergency unit, police, health sector,and civil protection) in order to provide better support fordecision makers.

Table 5Why terrorist threat is considered unlikely? (1=“total disagreement” and10=“total agreement”).

Statement Mean Std.deviation

5. “Terrorism is not addressed by the ES, butby the Internal Intelligence Service—SRI”

7.38 2.680

3. “The security system and the intelligenceservices discourage any terrorist attack”

6.38 2.187

4. “The weak preparation for a terrorist attackis due to a weak preparation of the population”

5.56 2.449

2. “Romania is a peaceful country and neverattacked another country, thus is unlikelythat we will face terrorist attacks”

5.50 2.794

1. “There is a wrong estimation of theterrorist risk in the National SecurityStrategy”

4.94 2.235


By the same token, the last issue under investigation,regarding the probability of a terrorist attack on Romanianterritory, revealed that the RES doesn't cover the matter, as itis believed to be the responsibility of the intelligence services.That is another policy gap of the system that needs to beaddressed. Who is in charge of consequence management ifintelligence services fail to prevent a terrorist attack? What isthe stake for RES's participation in a major disaster caused byterrorism?

On the strategic planning level, the local emergencymanagers suggested that, despite the provision of the lawsregarding the anticipation and prevention of extreme events,there are quite a few scenarios or training exercises based onlong term-planning in practice. The Delphi study confirmedthe perception that earthquakes and floods are the mostexpected catastrophes but – surprisingly – a consensus hasbeen reached on the probability and preparedness for theforest fires and other natural catastrophes of great concernfor the local leaders, but not covered by the current NationalSecurity Strategy. Another surprising finding was the con-sensus on the fact that the RES is the least prepared in termsof scenarios and plans for a nuclear disaster and earthquakes(quite unexpectedly, in light of the Chernobyl hazard thathappened in 1986 just 500 km away from the Romanianborder, and of the fact that now Romania has a large nuclearplant).

As for the knowledge management system, the WB Reportand the delay in implementation of the EMIS suggested theunfinished business regarding the functionality of SNMISU.Even if the system provided by the S&P and paid for by theWB is implemented successfully by the end of 2012, thatstill doesn't solve the problem. Not only infrastructure, ICTand DSS should be implemented, but people should also beconsulted and trained. In order to overcome these short-comings of emergency preparedness and to improve theRomanian ES, we should further study the best practicesresulting from similar experiences. Our assumption is that asystemic approach to a Knowledge Management System aspart of ES and the use of participatory foresight are the linesto be further investigated.

4.1. Integrating foresight in the Romanian Emergency System

Then comes the question if Romania has the capabilityand interest to pursue such a foresight approach. The answeris “Yes”! Romania has experienced two nation-wide foresight




exercises on R&D and Education Reform with internationalexperts as consultants and building a foresight community ofpractice. The project “Quality and Leadership for RomanianHigher Education” (QLHE), undertaken between 2008 and2011 by the Executive Agency for Higher Education andResearch Funding (UEFISCDI) deployed a systemic foresightto appreciate Romanian HE, build a vision of Romanianhigher education in 2025, understand the main challengesand propose a systemic transformation in the hope that acomprehensive approach would ensure both the necessarysystemic perspective and the desired freedom to rethinkhigher education [27].

This is a work in progress, a further investigation willfollow, together with policy proposals to improve the strategicplanning of ES and build a community of practice by incor-porating foresight methodology. On the other hand, theresearch will continue to investigate how Romania shouldbuild a community of practice to include academic researchand professionals and to integrate foresight as a tool for long-term planning.

4.2. Limitations

Given the scope of research, the context and the researchtimeframe the authors are aware of shortcomings of thestudy that should be seen as a first step for a more complexresearch, maybe in a comparative context for transition froman authoritarian system of emergency to a democratic one.

A limitation of this study is related to the limited foresightprovided by the Delphi instrument that has an objectiveexplanation in practice: the Romanian emergency system haslimitations in long term strategic planning and foresight,training, and resource allocation. However, the findingspresented in this study in terms of using Delphi methodologyto determine the functionality of the institutions dealing withdisasters, to assess the emergency preparedness, the uses ofKnowledge Management System and Foresight Methodologyapproaches are evident in the study. The limitations should becorrected by the continuation of this study in a comparativeway.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the encourage-ment and support provided by professor emeritus MurrayTuroff, professor emerita Starr Roxanne Hiltz and Victor Banuls.Also, we would like to thank two anonymous reviewers whohelped streamline the subject and improve consistently thevalue of the paper. Marian Zulean would like to acknowledgethe financial support from strategic grant POSDRU89/1.5/S/62259 project “Applied social, human and political science”.

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http://www.intechopen.com/books/efficient-decision-support-systems-practice-and-challenges-in-multidisciplinary-domains/emerging-applications-of-decision-support-systems-dss-in-crisis-management




http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=4995

http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=4995

http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-telecom-11532818-banca-mondiala-despre-intarzierea-implementarii-soft-ului-7-5-milioane-euro-menit-ajute-gestionarea-unitara-situatiilor-urgenta-din-romania-cel-mai-important-factor-fost-numarul-mare-cerinte-supliment.htm





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http://www.monitor2.org/downloads/MONITORII_WP4_Partner%20specific%20module_EMIS_PP6.pdf




Disasters, Crisis Management in Natural Disasters and Terrorism.

M. Zulean, G. Prelipcean / Technological Forecas

Marian Zulean is a vice-dean for research and international cooperation atthe Faculty of Public Administration and Business, University of Bucharest.He holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Bucharest, a Master inInternational Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh and a postdoctoralFulbright Scholarship at the University of Maryland. He teaches Public PolicyAnalysis, National Security Policy Formulation and Military Sociology at theUniversity of Bucharest. He is a member of the Inter-University Seminaron Armed Forces and Society (IUS), Brzezinski Scholar Program, RC01 ofInternational Sociological Association and ERGOMAS.


Gabriela Prelipcean is professor and PhD coordinator at the University Stefancel Mare of Suceava. She holds a PhD in Management from the Academy ofEconomic Studies of Bucharest, a NEC Fellowships,financed by the NewEuropeCollege (NEC), Institute for Advanced Study, Bucharest, Romania and apostdoctoral Fulbright Scholarship in Economic Sciences at ElizabethtownCollege, Pennsylvania. She teaches several courses and she has a wide ex-perience as researchers, on the topics of Extreme Events (assessing, managingand financing extreme events), Financial and Economic Crisis, Economics of

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Documents

Emergency preparedness in Romania: Dynamics, shortcomings and policy proposals