Comparing forecast models of Radical Right voting in four European countries (1973–2008)

International Journal of Forecasting 26 (2010) 82–97www.elsevier.com/locate/ijforecast

Comparing forecast models of Radical Right voting in fourEuropean countries (1973–2008)

Jocelyn Evansa,∗, Gilles Ivaldib

a University of Salford, Salford, United Kingdomb University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis (CNRS-URMIS), France

Abstract

Radical Right Parties (RRPs) have traditionally been seen as ‘hard cases’ to forecast, with unstable voter bases affectedby short-term influences. Building upon our previous work on forecasting the French Front National’s vote across time, weconstruct a comparable model for three other European countries – Austria, Denmark and Norway – with significant RRPs,using economic, cultural and political predictors. We find that the model performs surprisingly well, with the partial exceptionof Norway, and provides an accurate forecast of RRP electoral performance which improves upon naive endogenous models and,significantly, upon polling estimates. Moreover, the model is firmly rooted in existing explanations of RRP success, allowinga robust explanation not only of variation in these parties’ votes, but also of less successful estimates in a small number ofcountry-specific contexts. Overall, we find that standard approaches to electoral forecasting in fact offer a useful tool in theanalysis of RRPs.Crown Copyright c© 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of International Institute of Forecasters. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Electoral forecast; Radical Right; Evaluating forecasts; Regression; Time series

y

‘In conquering without danger we triumph withoutglory’ (Le Cid, P. Corneille).

1. Introduction

Political forecasting models which take on ‘hardcases’ provide one of the more challenging aspects

∗ Corresponding author.E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Evans).

0169-2070/$ - see front matter Crown Copyright c© 2009 Published brights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2009.04.001

of broader predictive modelling in political science.The bulk of the work carried out in the area ofpolitical forecasting, under the general label of vote-popularity (VP) function models, concentrates onincumbent parties and candidates, and looks to predictthe popularity or actual vote at a forthcoming electionas a function of underlying economic conditions—changes in GDP, unemployment, inflation and the like(Campbell and Lewis-Beck, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 1988;Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Whiteley, 2008). Well-

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J. Evans, G. Ivaldi / International Journal of Forecasting 26 (2010) 82–97 83

specified forecast models will equally include politicalindicators such as incumbency, crisis events such asforeign conflicts or other international ‘incidents’,contextual variables such as presidential coat-tailing(in the US Congressional or French semi-presidentialcases) and honeymoon effects (Kramer, 1971; Lafay,1981; Mueller, 1970).

Radical Right parties (RRPs) constitute a groupof cases for which it is hard to successfully forecastelection results. Firstly, the number of cases in anyone country is usually tiny, and often non-existent,even for a discipline such as political forecasting,which is notorious for small-n constraints. Evenfor countries such as Denmark or Norway, whereRadical Right parties or their precursors can beidentified since 1973, only a handful of cases areavailable for a national-level model with no meso-level differentiation. Secondly, from a theoreticalperspective, macro-level variables associated withsuccess are relatively under-theorised. The majority ofwork looking at variation in support for Radical Rightparties has, with the notable exceptions consideredbelow, been based upon micro-level, survey-basedexplanatory modelling rather than predictive–analyseshave attempted to explain why Radical Right partiesenjoy relative success/failure, rather than predictingwhether they will succeed or not.

This paper extends our previous work on fore-casting the Front National vote in France (Evans &Ivaldi, 2008), extending the proposed model to takeinto account the political contexts in three diversecases, Austria, Denmark and Norway, over the period1973–2008. We first consider research into the varia-tion in Radical Right vote support comparatively, andthe context in which such parties compete. We thenmove on to considering the specific contexts of thefour countries in question in this paper, looking athow we can model ex post forecasts of the respectiveRadical Right parties – the FN in France, the Free-dom Party in Austria, the Progress Party in Norwayand the Danish People’s Party in Denmark – to pro-vide predictions of future electoral performance. Fi-nally, we assess the results of the ex post models,and discuss the implications for our understanding ofRRP support in these countries, as well as prospectsfor successful future ex ante forecasts from thesemodels.

2. Radical Right voting in a comparative context

Macro models of RRP support, whether explana-tory or predictive, are relatively rare and tend to becomparative. Principal amongst these are works relat-ing varying levels of RRP success to social and eco-nomic conditions (Golder, 2003a; Jackman & Volpert,1996; Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002), politi-cal opportunity structures (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006;Hakhverdiana & Koopb, 2007), or supply-side fac-tors (van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005). Equally,meso-level models and mixed models combine sur-vey data with aggregate socio-economic data to es-tablish explanatory models for such parties’ votes(Knigge, 1998). Micro-level models investigate theexplanatory value of individuals’ socio-demographicand attitudinal profiles in accounting for Radical Rightsupport, both in country-studies and in comparativemodels (Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Evans, 2001; Lub-bers, 2001; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992). In all these ex-amples, the aim of the models is explanatory, and as aconsequence, they are normally inefficient in provid-ing predictive accuracy for individual electoral cases.Relatively large errors, particularly with survey data,are common and unproblematic in models looking totest competing explanatory theories of electoral sup-port. However, for forecasting models, additional em-phasis is firmly on reducing error as much as possiblein an attempt to provide as accurate a vote predictionas possible.

For any forecasting model, the small number ofcases which form the population of election resultsis always an issue in terms of the limits it placeson model specification. In work forecasting ExtremeRight voting, for example, in the French case onesuccessful approach to getting around the small-nissue has been to employ meso-level regional datato look at the structural determinants of support forthe FN and Jean-Marie Le Pen (Jerome & Jerome-Speziari, 2003, 2004). Yet, comparatively speaking,the relative stability of a number of these parties,including the French, Austrian, Danish and Norwegiancases tested in this paper, now provide sufficientmacro-level cases for a parsimonious forecastingmodel. This coincides with a continued view thatthey represent a pathology within ostensibly liberaldemocratic systems. The original view of RadicalRight parties, and extremist parties more generally,

84 J. Evans, G. Ivaldi / International Journal of Forecasting 26 (2010) 82–97

as ‘flash’ phenomena, or at most part of short-lived‘waves’ of Right-wing extremist development (vonBeyme, 1988), had initially prompted analyses ofwhy people turn to such political movements (Ignazi,1992; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992), but their longevityand progressive implantation has increasingly posedthe question—to what extent do such partiesform a coherent and therefore predictable part ofcontemporary political systems?

The evolution of such parties across time hasbeen pivotal to the contemporary view of RadicalRight and populist parties as established parties withinliberal democracies, to some extent even forming anidentifiable ‘party family’, although there has beenand continues to be a great deal of academic disputeabout how to best specify the third wave of RadicalRight parties in Europe.1 The roots of such partieshave been identified as being nationally specific,drawing together a number of radical and populistissues within a political context defined historically bycountry; however, over time a convergence in socialpressures across European countries and decreaseddifferentiation in nationally specific issues has meantthat such diversity has evaporated (Evans, 2005;Rydgren, 2005).

One commonly accepted definition of the con-verged RRP agenda is the two-dimensional map pro-posed by Kitschelt and McGann (1995). Applying it topolitical space in toto, an economic dimension cross-cuts a libertarian–authoritarian divide, with RadicalRight parties finding themselves firmly towards theauthoritarian extreme, but arrayed in economic posi-tions from right to centre-right. Other authors haveconfirmed and amended this quadrant approach to thepolitical space in which RRPs are located (Cole, 2005;van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2000). These stud-ies have pointed to the need to encompass the stronganti-establishment rhetoric and populist appeal to dis-illusioned voters by those parties (Betz, 2004), as wellas the issue-core formed by immigration and by eco-nomic and social national preference, as well as, to alesser extent, law-and-order.

Moreover, the position which a party occupieswithin the party system and competitive space is notsimply a product of the party’s own strategy, but

1 See Mudde (2007) for a comprehensive review.

Table 1Possible variables tapping competitive issue dimensions of RadicalRight parties’ support.

Economic Cultural Political

Unemployment Immigration Support to ruling coalitionGDP Asylum IncumbencyInflation Crime Election type

equally of the constraints the system places on theparty given its electoral size and relationship withother parties. In simple terms, we need to not just allowfor the historical institutional context of a politicalsystem, which applies to all parties within a system,but also control for the role of the party within thatsystem, which is specific to each party. Evidently,in a forecasting model, there must be diachronicvariation of that role within the system for it to bemeasurable.2 As parties first enter a political systemand win votes, and potentially seats, dependent uponthe proportionality of vote-seat allocations, therebyentering competitive coalitions and eventually takingexecutive power within a government, a series ofthresholds are crossed which alter a party’s status androle within the system (Art, 2007, on Austria; vanSpanje & van der Brug, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007).

Table 1 presents a number of operational possi-bilities for tapping the context within our forecastingmodels. Evidently, the political dimension is specificto each country, and the party’s position within itscompetitive space at a given point in time. The eco-nomic and cultural categories present the main issueslinked in empirical studies of competitive space andelections.

3. Heterogeneity in the Radical Right appeal

Through the homogenisation of Radical Rightparties in Europe across time, there has been anidentification of three key issues from the above arraywhich motivate support for RRPs: unemployment,crime, and immigration (Ignazi, 2003; Mayer, 2002;Mudde, 2007). However, the extent to which socialdemands on those particular issues are structuredin the national electorates varies between countries

2 Synchronic variation would be possible in a meso-level model,looking at a party’s different roles by constituency or region.


(Oesch, 2008). On the supply side of RadicalRight politics, there are also significant discrepanciesbetween how these parties respond to voters’ concernsand choose (or not) to emphasise particular elementsfrom within the broad authoritarian neo-liberal andethnocentric agenda that links these parties together.

This was acknowledged by Kitschelt and McGann(1995) in their initial attempt to derive sub-categories of Radical Right parties: the French FNwas then proposed as an ideal type of the newRadical Right (NRR) ‘winning formula’, combiningeconomic right-wing policies (appealing to traditionalright-wing electorates such as entrepreneurs andthe petty bourgeoisie) and authoritarian stances onimmigration and law-and-order/crime, which hascross-class appeal. Scandinavian Progress Partieswere defined as a ‘diluted version’ of the NRR mastercase, whereas the Austrian FPO was considered atypical instance of a populist anti-statist party.

Other authors have seen the Scandinavian ProgressParties as distinct from the French case, to thesame extent as in Austria (Andersen & Bjørklund,1990). Stemming from anti-tax movements in the1970s, the Norwegian party evolved into a right-libertarian party which has played down much anti-immigrants rhetoric, whilst the Danish People’s Partyhas developed into far more of a single-issue racistparty along the lines of traditional Radical Rightmodels. Such developments have also been heavilyinfluenced by the politico-institutional frameworkwithin which the parties compete. The four cases wehave chosen, then, provide archetypes of the differentevolutions in Radical Right parties in West Europeandemocracies since the 1980s, as well as providingsufficient datapoints to reasonably test in a forecastmodel. Other countries were excluded because ofinsufficient consistency or indeed complete absence ofRadical Right party success to date—UK, Netherlandsand Germany, for example. The countries of the CEEhave not been included due to the lack of stablesystems prior to the late 1990s, as well as a relativeabsence of immigration, at least as a meaningfulindicator related to political support.

This heterogeneity is of particular relevance to thepresent attempt to construct stable forecast modelsof Radical Right voting across four nations sincethe 1970s. Indeed, such heterogeneity and instabilityis a key obstacle to using cross-national data and

groupings, such as European Parliament groups, inidentifying cases for comparative forecast models.3

The subsequent trajectories of these parties in theirrespective systems show some important alterations intheir strategic positioning in competitive space, mostnotably with regard to the dampening of the originalfree-market liberal appeal of the late 1970s and early1980s (De Lange, 2007; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005),or the more recent transformation of some of thoseparties into advocates of anti-globalisation (Zaslove,2008).

For non-Scandinavian parties, the immigrationissue has held the status of primus inter pares,to the extent of becoming a meta-issue to whichall other political issues and problems have beenlinked amongst these parties. A low immigrationrate in Scandinavia led to low saliency for thisissue amongst their Progress Parties, but as thisrate has risen, particularly amongst non-Europeans,the issue has become salient to a similar extentas in non-Scandinavian cases (Rydgren, 2004).Similarly, with regard to unemployment, ProgressParties, and, to a lesser extent, the Austrian FPO,mobilised less on this issue, given their rootsas free-market and/or anti-tax movements4—greatermobilisation was achieved around the concernsof small businessmen and entrepreneurs. Again,however, the issue of unemployment has become moregenerally salient since the first cracks began appearingin the Nordic corporatist economic system and theAustrian Proporz model of social prosperity.

Lastly, the political position of the RRPs in thefour countries is variable. Since its implantation asa significant actor at the national level, the FN hashad no coalition potential and has been deprived ofparliamentary representation by France’s majoritariantwo-ballot electoral system. The Progress Parties inScandinavia have achieved a significant parliamentaryrepresentation, and perhaps more importantly inthe Norwegian case, have provided support for thegovernmental majority in the Parliament. Finally, the

3 European Parliament groups are also based upon pragmaticrather than programmatic rationales, with RRPs often being splitacross groups, for instance the Danish People’s Party in the UENgrouping and FN, FPO and VB in the ITS group (which itself fellapart soon after its formation in 2007).

4 Indeed, the FPO evolved from a liberal party in the 1980ssubsequent to a leadership challenge.


Table 2Dependent variable party codings.

Austria Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) 1986–2008Norway Anders Lange Party (ALP) 1973

Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) 1977–2005Denmark Fremskridtspartiet (FrP) 1973–1994

Dansk Folkeparti (DF) 1998–2007France Front National (FN) 1974–2007

FPO in Austria has formed part of the governmentalcoalition, surpassing the final threshold of legitimationfor a political party in a proportional system. It isimportant to note, however, that differing roles andheightened access to power do not always correspondto higher levels of electoral support. The levelof political legitimation often affects the electoralperformances of those parties (Ellinas, 2007), withinclusion often leading to an electoral debacle – forinstance, the decline of the FPO vote subsequentto governmental participation in Austria, and similardynamics for the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlandsand the Lega Nord in Italy. The political variablewe include, then, looks at step-changes in electoralsupport – both positive and negative – which derivefrom the changed legitimation status within theirrespective systems, or, in the French case, the differentelectoral race and candidate/party differentiation.

In the models which follow, then, we look tooperationalise these three factors – economic issues,cultural issues, and the political role of the party – as abasis for constructing broadly comparable forecastingmodels for the four countries in question.

4. Data and models

In all four cases, we use the national election score,since the party has competed in national elections,with the proportion of valid votes as the dependentvariable. All parties considered in the analysis arelong-established actors in their respective systems,which provides the data necessary for buildingforecasting equations. Looking at the development ofthese actors helps to identify significant variations inthe electoral support for the Radical Right across timeand space. In Norway, the support for the ProgressParty rose significantly in the mid-1990s, a trendsimilar to that of the Danish People’s party from

the late 1990s onwards. In France, the 2007 nationalelections saw a sharp decline of the FN. In Austria,the Radical Right experienced a severe setback in the2002 general election after it had become the largestpopulist party in Western Europe three years earlier;then in 2008, the FPO made a spectacular comebackon the national scene, winning 17.5% of the vote.

The inclusion of other levels of elections wouldprovide a larger number of cases; however, across thethree countries it is difficult to identify a consistent setof non-national ballots. Because of its federal system,Austria has no local elections in the manner of Franceand Norway; Norway, for self-evident reasons, has noEuropean election results, and data for local elections(municipal/county) would be subject to importantvariations in the actual number of FrP candidatesrunning across the country’s municipalities. A similarsituation at the local level applies in the Danish case.Consequently, in the Austrian, Danish and Norwegiancases, the scores are derived solely from legislativeelections, from 1986 to 2008 (n = 8), 1973 to 2007(n = 14) and 1973 to 2005 (n = 9) respectively.In the French case, we include both legislative andpresidential election scores from 1974 to 2007 (n =13), using a control dummy coded 1 for presidentialballots. The presidential election of 1981 is excluded,due to Le Pen’s absence from this ballot.

Despite the stability of the Radical Right in terms oftheir electoral presence across the four countries, theseparties have not remained immutable across the timeseries. Across all cases, we look at the main RadicalRight party, as in general any splintering of parties(such as the 1999 split between the FN and MNR priorto the 2002 election) results in a predominant party anda politically irrelevant splinter, which moreover tendsto re-aggregate, or at least cooperate with the originalparty in due course, if not simply die. Our dependentvote variable is coded as is shown in Table 2.


Our data are all drawn from national sources,which, with very few exceptions, provide the mostcomprehensive series (see the Appendix).

In the following models, we employ a number ofvariables which are relevant to the examination ofthe economic, cultural and political factors behindthe electoral performances of the Radical Right.Firstly, to tap economic variation, we include a simplemeasurement of the unemployment rate six months inadvance of the election. Existing empirical researchinto unemployment and radical right voting shows thatthe link varies in both intensity and direction, as wellas significance (Golder, 2003b; Jackman & Volpert,1996; Swank & Betz, 2003; Dulmer & Klein, 2005).Given the broader relationship between economicdownturns and opposition party votes, we expect risesin unemployment to be associated with increases insupport for RRPs.

From the cultural dimension, we look primarilyat immigrant-related variables. As we have noted,immigration is central to RRPs’ programmes anda core feature of their electoral appeal. However,it is often difficult to demonstrate a clear causallink between levels of immigration and RRP votingwithout relying upon the analysis of voter perceptions.Immigration levels measure a heterogeneous set ofexternal influxes into a country, and the ramificationsof the phenomenon are by no means limited tothe cultural dimension and fears over nationalidentity exclusively: a fear of immigrant workforceschallenging autochthonous workers for scarce jobs inunstable job-markets links the immigration issue tothe economic dimension. Additionally, a change inthe total number of new immigrants admitted intoa country every year not only provides informationabout flows, but can also be regarded as an appropriateproxy for the ‘restrictiveness’ of governments,immigration policies. However, in a parsimoniouspredictive model such considerations are difficult tocontrol for. Consequently, for the purpose of buildingour equations, we tap the change in the total numbersof immigrants in the year immediately preceding theelection in the case of France, Denmark and Norway.For Austria, a lack of available data for immigrationprior to 1996 means that we instead employ a similarmeasure relating to the change in the number ofasylum-seekers.

Finally, we operationalise the political variableacross the four countries. In the French case,because no threshold has been crossed with regardto executive participation or coalition support, novariable is included beyond a presidential/legislativedummy.5 In the other three countries, we include adummy variable for the periods of the Radical Rightparty supporting the ruling coalition. Through theproportional representation system in Denmark andNorway, the Progress Parties and Danish People’sparty have had a significant number of seats. Althoughthey have never been a formal member of agoverning coalition, they have occasionally providedvoting support for the Moderate Right majoritiesin parliament. In Austria, support for the rulingcoalition by the FPO took the form of actual executiveparticipation as junior partner of the conservative OVPbetween 2000 and 2006. We expect that governmentalincumbency will result in a drop in support for theFreedom Party. In the Danish and Norwegian cases,the situation is more nuanced, as support for the‘bourgeois’ camp by the FrP or DF also formed partof the process of de-radicalisation by those parties.

The models are all simple OLS regressions – onefor each country – presenting the parameter estimatesand robust standard errors.6 No evidence of strongcross-correlation between predictors was found.7 Datawere not pooled, due to the disparity in the predictorsemployed for the political dimension and for theimmigration indicator in Austria.

5. Findings

Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for therespective OLS models for Austria, Denmark, France

5 We could potentially have included a variable tappingParliamentary seats, but in reality the FN has only held multipleseats over a two-year period in the 1986–88 legislature, subsequentto the introduction of proportional representation. At other times, asingle seat has been held, but not for the entirety of the legislature.Consequently, we are unconvinced of the explanatory strength ofsuch a variable in the French case.

6 We use Huber–White sandwich estimators to correct forheteroskedasticity.

7 The correlations between unemployment and immigration wereas follows: Austria (R = 0.11), Denmark (R = 0.31), France(R = −0.27) and Norway (R = 0.29). None of those correlationswas statistically significant.


Table 3Regression models of Radical Right voting (1973–2008).

France Norway Austria DenmarkB s.e. B s.e B s.e. B s.e.

Constant −11.74 1.61 2.42 2.43 −19.44 5.21 16.82 1.58PresidentialFR 4.56 0.59Support coalition 11.09 2.60 −13.55 0.52 1.89 1.25∆ Immigration 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.07Unemployment 2.15 0.14 1.33 0.94 6.36 0.80 −1.04 0.19R2 0.96 0.67 0.95 0.77SE 1.35 4.96 1.72 2.12MAE 1.34 6.55 2.09 1.87N 13 9 8 14

For Austria, ‘immigration’ is unavailable before 1996. The change in the annual number of asylum-seekers has been used instead.

Table 4Individual Radical Right vote prediction error (ε) and MAE by country.

France Norway Austria DenmarkYear ε MAE Year ε MAE Year ε MAE Year ε MAE

1974p 0.17 0.43 1973 0.97 1.42 1986 −2.24 4.34 1973 −0.22 0.391978 2.04 3.23 1977 −2.60 3.78 1990 1.80 3.28 1975 −0.24 0.461981 −2.08 2.64 1981 −1.09 1.85 1994 1.05 3.37 1977 3.48 4.451986 1.05 1.30 1985 −2.50 3.03 1995 −1.16 1.56 1979 0.54 0.591988p −1.09 1.44 1989 4.42 7.35 1999 −0.40 1.56 1981 0.45 0.541988 −1.04 1.22 1993 −5.97 15.55 2002 0.30 0.71 1984 −2.46 3.031993 0.98 1.17 1997 6.78 8.35 2006 −0.30 0.71 1987 −3.66 4.601995 0.34 0.72 2001 −1.85 8.85 2008 0.96 1.22 1988 0.78 0.911997 0.80 1.05 2005 1.85 8.85 1990 −0.15 0.202002p 0.87 1.67 1994 2.56 3.962002 −0.30 0.53 1998 −1.88 2.152007p −0.29 0.38 2001 0.79 1.062007 −1.44 1.71 2005 0.877 1.96

2007 −0.877 1.96

All elections are legislative elections, except p in France, which are presidential races.

and Norway based on the simple set of three predictorsdescribed above.

Looking first at the overall model fit, we can seethat the French and Austrian cases are much betterthan their Scandinavian counterparts. Moreover, inaverage forecasting terms, the standard error (SE) andmean absolute error (MAE)8 for Denmark indicatethat this model is also a relatively good fit. OnlyNorway has overall forecast errors well above ±2%.If we look at the individual election scores (Table 4) itbecomes apparent that there is an interesting variation

8 The MAE (mean absolute error) gives the mean error from theout-of-sample forecasts, i.e. how well each election case is predictedby the other cases in the set.

in the accuracy of forecasts, to which we will returnshortly.

We turn now to the individual country models. Inthe French case, the model works extremely well,and indeed is a significant improvement on our previ-ous model (Evans & Ivaldi, 2008) for national elec-tions, which included short-term popularity data.9

The direction of effect for our individual parameterscorresponds to the theoretical expectation, with FNsupport growing with unemployment and immigra-tion. Equally, the presidential boost is confirmed, withstronger performances for Le Pen than for his party.

9 This improves the time-lead on our forecast from one month tosix months.


Looking at the individual forecasts, the fit is consis-tently good across all years, with the exception of the1978 and 1981 legislative elections, where the partywas not competing nationally, having fielded only asmall number of candidates. In particular, we shouldalso note the capacity of the model to forecast the 2002and 2007 presidential ballots, which represent tworecords – high and low, respectively – for the party,both considered ‘surprise’ results at the time. Overall,this model confirms Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995)view of the FN as the ideal type of RRP, tapping bothunemployment and immigration issues for electoralsupport, as well as enjoying an apparent protest ‘sur-plus’ through personality-based presidential support—for presidential races, Le Pen receives roughly a 4.5%bonus above his party’s support. More broadly, it in-dicates an inherent structural stability in the FrenchRRP’s vote which is not inherently stochastic.

Similarly, in the Austrian case the parametersare also in the expected direction, not least for thecoalition variable where a high electoral penaltyis paid in elections subsequent to governmentalparticipations —the party loses over 13% of its supporton average after it has served in government. A greaterdegree of variability of the forecasts over time is anindication of the progressive transformation of theFPO from an anti-statist populist party into a NRR.Country-specific appeals of the party on free-marketorientation and the rejection of Austria’s traditionalProporz democracy dominated by the OVP and SPOhave given way to the converged issues of immigration(from the mid-1990s) and the muting of the neo-liberalstance and a move towards a more social-protectionistagenda (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005).10 Consequently,our model based on the core predictors of the NRRideal type performs better in the post-1995 period: theMAE for the period 1986–1994 is 3.6, but it drops to1.1 between 1995 and 2008. Lastly, at the individualforecast level, the model anticipates well the electoraldemise of 2002 and 2006, and then the re-birth of theparty in 2008. Again, electoral surprises are in factconsistent with the key structural indicators.

The results are not as good in the two Scandinaviancountries, which is partly consistent with the

10 This was associated with a substantial growth in the working-class electoral support for the party, most notably in the 1996European and 1999 legislative elections (Plasser & Ulram, 2000).

traditional assessment of right-wing populism inNordic countries as intrinsically different from thecontinental expression embodied by the FN or theFPO. The overall fit is particularly disappointing inthe Norwegian case, with a MAE of 6.55, in line withearlier attempts at modelling populist party supportin Norway (Anderson, 1996). One important pointto be made here is that of the contribution of the1993 election to the overall instability of the model(individual out-of-sample error of 15.6). The Stortingelection of 1993 saw an unexpected and sharp declinein the support for the FrP over Eurosceptic positionson the 1994 EU referendum, to the benefit of the moreclearly anti-European Agrarian SP (Senterpartiet).Including an additional dummy coded 1 for the‘referendum effect’ in the 1993 election would help re-adjust the whole model, with the overall MAE beingdown to 2.4, a significant improvement over the initialdistortion caused by the singularity of the 1993 ballot.

In Denmark the better overall MAE (1.87) concealssignificant disparities across elections, with no clearcyclical pattern emerging with regard to either a periodeffect or the political orientation of the incumbent.It must be noted that much of the variation inthe predictive power of the model arises from the1977–1994 period dominated by the FrP, which ischaracterised by a higher level of instability acrosselections. Conversely, subsequent to the formationof the DF in 1995, the stabilisation of the electoralsupport for the party is mirrored in our model bynarrower individual out-of-sample forecasting errors.As will be discussed, this tends to corroborate the viewof the anti-immigration propaganda of the DF as beingmore similar to the classic ethno-nationalist agenda ofthe Radical Right (see below).

In both of these countries, the equation revealsthe positive electoral impact of the political ‘nor-malisation’ of the FrP and DF: unlike the Austriancase, parliamentary support for the ruling centre-rightcoalition tends to increase the electoral score of theScandinavian parties—very strongly in Norway, withan average markup of 11% in opposition years. InDenmark, the trend began in the 1994 election, inwhich newly elected FrP leader Pia Kjaersgaard insti-gated the process of re-centring the old party by seek-ing a coalition agreement with both the conservativesand the liberals. In Denmark, unlike Norway, unem-ployment appears to be a ‘protective’ factor against


Radical Right voting: as unemployment grows, vot-ers seem to turn away from a protest actor and prefermainstream parties with a higher level of economiccompetence and well established records of soundeconomic governance. This again represents one im-portant difference from the ‘continental’ model dis-cussed above. It is also consistent with other studiesusing aggregate data which reveal that Scandinavianpopulist parties are more prosperous in times of lowunemployment (Bjørklund, 2007).

Lastly, immigration does not seem to play aconsistent role in structuring the electoral performanceof the Radical Right across the two Nordic countries.The coefficient fits the general model in the Norwegiancase, despite a relatively large standard error, but not inDenmark. As discussed earlier, this is consistent withthe evolving role and unstable status of immigrationissues in the development of those parties, as opposedto their French counterpart. It was not until themid-1980s that the Progress parties in Norway andDenmark began to politicise immigration issues ontop of their more traditional anti-tax and welfare-cutprogramme. In the Norwegian case, immigration waslater occasionally de-emphasised in the FrP agenda, aswas the case in 1997 and again in 2005, with the partyachieving better performance by a strong protectioniststance over the allocation of Norway’s growing oilrevenue and immigration staying in the background ofthe party’s campaign communication (Valen & Narud,2007). In the Danish case, immigration issues onlygained permanent political salience during the 1990s,most evidently in 1998 and 2001 (Goul Andersen,2003). As suggested by Rydgren (2006), the Danishpopulist Right did not entirely endorse the ethno-nationalist agenda typical of the Radical Right untilthe formation of the DF in 1995.

6. Evaluating model accuracy

Following Campbell (2008), we use differentbenchmarks to evaluate the accuracy of our forecastingmodels. Firstly we compare the results of themodel predictions with a simple random walk(Ft+k = Yt ) and random mean (Ft+k = average of(Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt )) model for each country. Crucially, ifmore accurate, such models would also surpass the fulleconomic and political equations in both parsimonyand the time-lead. The first election in each country

has to be excluded because of the lack of an actualmeasure of the Radical Right’s score in the previousballot. In the French case, the strategy is to look atlegislative and presidential elections in reference tothe previous election of the same type, which directlyaddresses the issue of the specificity of Le Pen’s votein presidential contests. Therefore, neither the 1974presidential nor the 1978 legislative period-baselineelections can be included in the forecast. Outcomesfor all countries are summarised in Table 5.

In all cases but Norway, the full three-predictormodel outperforms random models constructed usingpast performances, either at t − 1 or by averagingall preceding electoral ballots. That the predictorsprovide significant additional value to the averageability of the model to predict the electoral outcomesis particularly evident in the Austrian and Frenchcases, where ‘naıve’ endogenous models would failto accurately predict the variation in the supportfor the FPO and FN respectively. In Austria, takinginto account the strong effect of FPO incumbencydoes improve the endogenous models’ capacity toforecast changes in the party’s electoral showings,but across the whole time-period the model doesnot approach the efficacy of the full model. In theFrench case, the alternation between presidential andlegislative races undoubtedly explains a part of thisinstability—the Le Pen personality effect, plus theconditioning of legislative results by the presidentialwinner, will ensure that significant shifts in votewill occur between elections. Equally, however, theview of these parties’ performances as being largelyunpredictable may come from this instability, withindividuals’ expectations of electoral performancebeing influenced by the last race.

Conversely, the Scandinavian cases see a betterprediction of the following election by the laggedendogenous variables. A more consistent and stableperformance of these parties across certain periods oftime means that one may regard them as possessing abaseline vote share which is then moderated by macro-conditions. In the Danish case, it is worth notingthat a random walk model would provide a relativelyaccurate prediction of the FrP/DF performances inthe long run (SE = 2.70, MAE = 2.34), but wouldfail to outperform the political economic forecastingmodel that we propose. In Norway, the endogenousmodel using elections lagged by t − 1 as the predictor


Table 5Naıve endogenous random walk (RW) and random mean (RM) models predicting the Radical Right vote.

Austriaa DenmarkRW RM RW RM

Constant 15.39 (5.55) 24.97 (9.18) 3.05 (1.55) 5.45 (4.30)Vote 0.16 (0.39) −0.44 (0.62) 0.67 (0.13) 0.36 (0.35)R2 0.03 0.05 0.51 0.05SE 6.66 6.58 2.70 3.75MAE 6.83 7.57 2.34 3.47

Franceb Norwayc

RW RM RW RM

Constant 7.77 (3.22) 8.62 (2.90) 4.08 (3.07) −6.73 (5.13)Vote 0.32 (0.25) 0.39 (0.40) 0.76 (0.35) 3.18 (0.83)R2 0.16 0.09 0.33 0.53SE 4.72 4.91 6.29 5.24MAE 4.56 4.47 6.38 4.94

Random walk model: Vote = electoral score at previous election.Random mean model: Vote = mean electoral score from preceding elections.

a For Austria, adding INCUMBENT to Random Walk: SE = 3.48, MAE = 5.57; adding INCUMBENT to Random Mean: SE = 3.50,MAE = 3.71.

b For France, elections are contrasted with preceding ballots of the same type (presidential/legislative).c For Norway, adding REFERENDUM to Random Walk: SE = 5.66, MAE = 5.26; adding REFERENDUM to Random Mean: SE = 5.26,

MAE = 4.96.

does not significantly improve the forecast. In contrast,a better prediction is obtained by using the randommean approach (SE = 5.24, MAE = 4.94), althoughsuch a model would not meet other relevant accuracycriteria such as voting intention polls or popularity-based predictors, for instance.

Another customary benchmark against whichto compare model forecasts is that of the trial-heat polls conducted in all countries prior to theelection (Campbell, 1996; Pickup & Johnston, 2008).In Table 6, we assess the accuracy of our model’sex-post adjusted predicted values (out-of-sample),compared with the average of voting intention pollsreleased for the last general election in each country.Regrettably, the difficulty of collecting poll results forall elections across the four countries makes it difficultto provide a more systematic and comprehensiveevaluation. We look at a time lead of four weeksbefore election day and focus primarily on final-weekpolls, which are usually regarded as more accurate. Nodamping factor is used.

Across all recent national elections, votes for theRadical Right were underestimated by polls in allcountries but France. In this last case, this was largelydue to post-2002 adjustments by pollsters motivated

by the fear of replicating the low prediction of LePen’s vote in the 2002 presidential election. In 2007this led to overestimating Le Pen’s vote by an averageof 3.6% in the final week before the runoff. However,this contrasted with the more consistent trend ofunderestimating the FN vote which had prevailed inthe mid-1980s.

Looking at how well our full model performsagainst averaged trial-heat polls in the final weekbefore the election, the situation is again contrasted.As was anticipated, the outcome proves verydisappointing in the Norwegian case, as our forecastfor the 2005 Storting election missed the targetby −8.8 (13.2%). Applying the ‘1993 referendum’adjustment significantly improves the out-of-sampleprediction (23.2%), but this happens largely bychance, as all other forecasts for previous electionsstill suffer from substantial errors.

In Austria, our ex-post forecast of the recent2008 parliamentary election is 16.3 – an out-of-sample error of −1.2. Although fairly accurate, thisprediction is further away from the average estimatesderived from all polls as early as four weeks priorto the election, and most notably from the very closeoutcome predicted by the final-week trial-heat surveys


Table 6Trial-heat poll predictions of Radical Right votes in the last legislative elections in Austria, Norway, Denmark and France (no damping factor).

Austria % FPO 2008

Time t − 4 weeks t − 3 weeks t − 2 weeks t − 1 week Final week Election outcome Forecasting modelAverage 17.8 18.3 16.5 18.3 17.3 17.5 16.3N (polls) 6 4 7 4 3+/− 0.3 0.7 −1.0 0.7 −0.2 −1.2

Norway % FrP 2005

Time t − 4 weeks t − 3 weeks t − 2 weeks t − 1 week Final week Election outcome Forecasting modelAverage 18.7 19.1 19.6 18.3 20.0 22.1 13.2N (polls) 4 5 3 7 12+/− −3.4 −3.0 −2.5 −3.8 −2.1 −8.8

Denmark % DF 2007

Time t − 2 weeks t − 1 week Final week Election outcome Forecasting modelAverage 12.4 11.7 11.6 13.9 15.9N (polls) 23 28 27+/− −1.4 −2.2 −2.3 2.0

France Le Pen (presidential) 2007

Time t − 4 weeks t − 3 weeks t − 2 weeks t − 1 week Final week Election outcome Forecasting modelAverage 12.9 12.9 13.7 13.6 14.0 10.4 10.8N (polls) 12 11 10 8 13+/− 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.6 0.4

Averaged voting intention polls (for all polling companies, N = number of polls) during the final week before the general election; comparableweekly measures up to one month before the election; no damping factor.SourcesNorway: Source: www.aardal.info & national media.Denmark: Source: http://politiken.dk/politik/article380531.ece.Austria and France: our data collection.

(17.3%, diff = −0.2).11 Another important parameterto take into account is of course that of the lead time inour full model, which would have allowed forecastingof the outcome six months before the election.

In contrast, our full model prediction outperformspolls in both Denmark and France. With respect to theDanish case, the model anticipation of 15.9% of thevote cast for the DF in the 2007 general election is2% above the actual result, as opposed to an averageunderestimation of −2.3% in the 27 polls conductedduring the final 7 days of the campaign. Combinedwith the time lead, this gives a significant advantage tothe model. The contrast in performances is even moreevident in the French case, due to the combination of

11 It should be noted that comparable poll predictions were lessreliable with regard to Haider’s BZO in 2008, with an average final-week forecast of 7.7%, short of the actual election result by 3%.

small forecast errors in the model and larger averageerrors in poll predictions. In the 2007 presidentialelection, the model would have forecast 10.8% of thevote for Le Pen, which is an overestimation of lessthan half a percentage point, compared with a 3.6%error on average by pollsters. Looking at comparabledata for the 2002 presidential contest reveals a similargap: in the final week of the campaign, average pollprediction was 13.3% (n = 7 surveys), whereas LePen received a total of 16.9%. Bearing in mind thelimitations inherent in the ex-post design in the presentpaper, our model predicts 16.1% (diff = −0.8) sixmonths before the so-called ‘earthquake’ election.

7. Discussion

In this paper, we have attempted to identify aforecasting equation for four Radical Right parties,

http://www.aardal.info

http://politiken.dk/politik/article380531.ece


a party family whose electoral fortunes are oftenregarded as precarious and unstable. Such a perceptionhas been particularly widespread when looking at theperformances of parties, some of which emerged ontheir respective political scenes over three decadesago. Beyond an apparent instability above even thatinherent in VP-function models, another challengewas to identify, even theoretically, a single modelwhich was comparable across four countries andwhich would give any semblance of an accurateforecast, given the small number of degrees offreedom available. Would it be necessary to tapthe various specificities of Radical Right parties– entrepreneurialism, charismatic leadership, short-termist issue pragmatism – which have all been seenas affecting these parties’ electoral performance ina significant fashion? When considering a priorithe diversity of this heterogeneous cluster of partiesunder the Radical Right label, and the reality oftheir different political anthropology and divergingtrajectories within their own party systems, one couldbe excused for being pessimistic about the likelysuccess in finding such a model.

With these reservations in mind, our attempt wasmore successful than might have been anticipated.One lesson from this paper is that Radical Rightparties are not an unpredictable protest phenomenon,but rather the expression of structured social demandsacross significant segments of the Western Europeanelectorates. Beside temporal, institutional and politicalheterogeneity, it is possible to build a model that worksat least across three of the four selected countries,and helps us to better understand the deep structuraldynamics behind Radical Right voting. It is importanthere to underline once more the lead time of themodel being six months, discarding the notion thatthose parties are only fuelled by short-term, volatile(and therefore unpredictable), popular discontent, andare prey to the vagaries of the campaign. Moreover,the model was successful in combining three relevantdimensions: economic, cultural and political, whichare central to the understanding of the electoraldynamics of RRPs.

In that respect, we have striven to comply withthe ‘golden rules’ of electoral forecasting. Firstly,our model is rooted in political theory: there is asound theoretical background to building the model,as well as a robust theoretical justification of the

attempt to use any particular indicator to measurethe underlying concepts. Secondly, the model’s abilityto account for the sign of parameter estimates andpossible mis-forecasts by the model corresponds tosubstantive but to date usually qualitatively derivedknowledge of these parties. Globally, it relates tothe well-established psephology of the Radical Rightwith regard to immigration, but there were morenuanced findings, most notably in terms of thevarying impact of unemployment and the effect ofcrossing the threshold of political legitimation, aseither coalition partner (Austria) or provider of adhoc parliamentary support (Scandinavia). Lastly, wehave tried to evaluate model accuracy and its addedvalue when contrasted with other available forecastingmethods (mostly polls or naıve endogenous models).Despite variation across the four national contexts,the models generally provide a much better estimateof electoral outcomes than models based aroundregression to the mean. In the Scandinavian cases,there was a more apparent baseline vote, but even herethe three indicators improve upon this.

As with all useful forecasts, the RRP modelsgive broader information about the parties underconsideration. The French FN is the Radical Rightideal type, as Kitschelt and McGann insisted, with avery good fit to the model combining the economicand cultural axes of political competition since 1974.There has been greater cyclical variability in theAustrian FPO and Danish FrP, but with a process ofconvergence towards a more traditional Radical Rightpattern in the mid- to late-1990s and 2000s—again,consistent with the literature on the transformation ofright-wing populism in both countries. The better fitof the model in the two countries in the post-1995period corresponded in both cases to a significantreorientation of those parties’ competitive positionsin the most recent period. The failure of the modelin Norway underlines the specificity of right-wingpopulism in this country – the transformation of theProgress party from anti-tax to anti-immigration, and,more recently, a re-centering of the party on theeconomic dimension and the toning down of its anti-immigrant message.

There are of course limitations to this endeavour.Evidently, the ex-post design is always problematic.Not only might there be a greater tendency tolook for the best possible model that successfully


predicts elections, but there is also no guarantee ofaccuracy in future forecasts and the risk of largevariations (Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1992). Moreover,despite its performance, the model is based on asmall number of cases in each nation, and could stillsuffer from instability in future ex-ante forecastingattempts using our equation. Until those data-pointsare available, however, it is a moot point how thatmay be anticipated. At least two out of the fourcountries considered in this study will be undergoingmajor changes in the near future, with Le Pen steppingdown from the FN leadership in the forthcoming partycongress of 2009, and similar uncertainty over thefuture of the Austrian BZO – a rising component ofthe Radical Right – after the sudden death in October2008 of the historical leader of right-wing populism inthe country, Jorg Haider.

Indeed, this points to another notable limitationof the model, namely that it focuses on the mainRadical Right party in each country. This is not amajor source of bias in countries such as France orDenmark, where the splinter party (French MNR) orthe original organisation (Danish FrP, after the DF wascreated in 1995) never achieved electoral relevanceafter the split. The ‘leading party’ approach, however,could prove more problematic in the light of the recentBZO performance in the 2008 parliamentary election(10.7%)—six and a half points up on its previousshowing two years earlier.

How could the model be improved? The workover the previous two decades on the pitfalls andtraps of electoral forecasting is essentially irrefutablein its criticisms of low reliability, over-sensitivity ofmodels to small changes and reliance on (over-) fitting(Greene, 1993). In these respects, such criticisms aredifficult to address. Most models in the disciplineare nation-based, and debates often take place amongthe proponents of rival equations destined eventuallyto account for a similar phenomenon in differentfashions. Here the issue is more complex, as additionalconstraints include the need to ensure some level ofcomparability across varying national contexts, as wellas practical limitations imposed by the availability ofcomparable indicators in the long run: for instance, thelack of comprehensive immigration data in Austria, or,more generally, the absence of popularity data in the1970s and 1980s, as opposed to the long-term seriesemployed by forecasting models in the US.

If the long time series is absent, one obviousanswer would be to try export the model to otherWestern European countries with a strong RadicalRight party: Belgium immediately springs to mind,as the Vlaams Blok/Belang has competed in ninegeneral elections since its formation in 1978. Inmost studies, the topography of the Flemish partyis placed close to that of the French FN, whichwould offer the opportunity to test the validity ofour forecasting equation synchronically. Another wayforward is of course to further explore the range ofpredictors that might help to structure the model betteracross all countries. Forecasting experts rightly pointto the risk of a strict doctrine of interchangeableindicators, substituting one variable for another, evenwhen they are equivalent – or, perhaps, equally adhoc – from a theoretical perspective. In the presentcase, alternatives such as multi-indicator predictors(Stambough & Thorson, 1999) are ruled out by small-n restrictions.

However, there is still scope for a more in-depthanalysis of other possible predictors on our mainoperational dimensions while preserving the lead time,which contributes a great deal to the overall qualityof the model proposed here. This could entail a re-assessment of our immigration-factor measurementand the opportunity for using alternative variablessuch as the number of naturalisations or acquisitionsof citizenship, or a generalised measure of asylumseekers coming into the countries every year. Topursue this further, another experiment could be totest the central hypothesis of a quasi-functional linkbetween immigration and criminality in the RadicalRight rhetoric, and the extent to which predictorsbased on criminality data would be interchangeable orcomplementary to those relating to immigration.

Similarly, and most notably in Scandinavia wherethe issue of coalition building constantly tops bothpoliticians’ and voters’ agendas, one should consider‘refining’ the political variable to take into accountnot only actual support to the governing coalition,but also the extent of inter-party co-operation withthe Radical Right prior to the election, as well asfactoring in existing political cycles and leadershipeffects. One avenue for future research is that oflooking more closely at endogeneity in conjunctionwith our socio-economic indicators. In particular,there are promising prospects in building models


based upon the parties’ performances in local by-elections (Rallings & Thrasher, 1999), which couldhypothetically be applied to our cluster of cases,particularly with a view to deriving a comparablemeasure for the FPO impact at the Land level.

Lastly, the use of different levels of data wouldbe a useful extension to our national-level models.Previous research using regional determinants hasproved very successful in illustrating heterogeneityby areas in Radical Right party support (Jerome& Jerome-Speziari, 2003, 2004). Such an approachwould undoubtedly prove useful in nuancing forecastsby region in Norway, for example, where historicallydifferent cleavage bases have strongly influencedparty competition (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990), orAustria, where Lander enjoy differential support forthe Radical Right.

In conclusion, then, the ‘hard cases’ of RadicalRight parties may no longer be quite as obdurateto electoral forecasting as they have been perceivedto be. Whether such parties will continue to occupya political space which promotes analyses separatefrom those of the political mainstream, or willconverge into that mainstream over time, as hasalready occurred in countries such as Italy, remainsto be seen. Undoubtedly the ideological profileof such parties has lent them an outsider qualityfrom an academic perspective, which has demandedexplanations based upon deviation, rather than thenorm. Such an approach has perhaps over-emphasisedthe exceptional nature of such parties, and the needto identify how they differ. At the level of electoralcompetition, however, that difference should not beexaggerated.

Appendix

Electoral resultsAustria: Bundesministerium fur Inneres (BMI)Denmark: FolketingetFrance: Ministere de l’Interieur (MI)Norway: Stortinget

Socio-economic dataAustria: Statistics Austria; additional unemploy-

ment figures from Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich(WKO); asylum trends from Osterreichischen Institutfur Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO)

Denmark: Danmarks StatistikbankFrance: INSEE; immigration data from various

sources: INED, Chroniques de l’immigration, OMI-OFPRA, and Comite Interministeriel de Controle del’immigration (2006–2007).

Norway: Statistisk sentralbyra (SSB)

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Documents

Comparing forecast models of Radical Right voting in four European countries (1973–2008)