Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1165904

R E G - M A R K E T S C E N T E RAEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies

Clean Water Act Brief

Kenneth J. Arrow, William J. Baumol, Jagdish Bhagwati,Michael J. Boskin, Robert Crandall, Maureen L. Cropper,

Michael Greenstone, Robert W. Hahn, David Harrison,R. Glenn Hubbard, Alfred E. Kahn, Lester B. Lave, Robert Litan,

Paul MacAvoy, James C. Miller III, Albert L. Nichols,William A. Niskanen, Roger G. Noll, Wallace E. Oates, Peter Passell,

Sam Peltzman, Paul R. Portney, Harvey S. Rosen, Milton Russell,Thomas C. Schelling, Richard Schmalensee, Charles L. Schultze,

V. Kerry Smith, Vernon L. Smith, Robert N. Stavins, W. Kip Viscusi,Murray Weidenbaum, Lawrence J. White, and Richard Zeckhauser

Brief 08-03

July 2008

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1165904

R E G - M A R K E T S C E N T E RAEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies

The Reg-Markets Center focuses on understanding and improving regulation,market performance, and government policy. The Center provides analyses of keyissues aimed at improving decisions in the public, private and not-for-profitsectors. It builds on the success of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center. The viewsexpressed in this publication are those of the authors.

ROBERT HAHNExecutive Director

COUNCIL OF ACADEMIC ADVISERS

ROBERT E. LITAN, Co-ChairmanBrookings Institution

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Co-ChairmanUniversity of Chicago

KENNETH J. ARROWStanford University

ROBERT CRANDALLBrookings Institution

MAUREEN CROPPERUniversity of Maryland

JOHN D. GRAHAMPardee RANDGraduate School

PAUL L. JOSKOWMassachusetts Instituteof Technology

DONALD KENNEDYStanford University

MARK MCCLELLANBrookings Institution

ROGER G. NOLLStanford University

RICHARD SCHMALENSEEMassachusetts Instituteof Technology

ROBERT N. STAVINSHarvard University

W. KIP VISCUSIVanderbilt University

CLIFFORD WINSTONBrookings Institution

Publications can be found at: www.reg-markets.org

© 2008 by the authors. All rights reserved.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1165904

Executive Summary

As economists, we believe that the Second Circuit’s ruling, by not allowing theconsideration of important information about the relationships between the benefits andcosts of alternatives, is economically unsound. In particular, we believe that, as a generalprinciple, regulators cannot make rational decisions unless they are allowed to comparecosts and benefits and to use the results, along with other factors as appropriate, to chooseamong alternatives.

To the extent permissible under the statute and case law, EPA should be allowedto consider benefits and costs in establishing rules for implementing §316(b). The Court’sallowing EPA to consider benefits and costs would improve both the decision makingprocess—by making it more transparent—and the regulatory decisions by allowingimportant relevant information to be considered explicitly.

Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597 (Consolidated)

In the

ENTERGY CORP.,

PSEG FOSSIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,

AND

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP,PETITIONERS,

V.

RIVERKEEPER INC, ET AL.RESPONDENTS.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATESCOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF OFAMICI CURIAE THE AEI CENTERFOR REGULATORY AND MARKET STUDIES

AND 33 INDIVIDUAL ECONOMISTS IN SUPPORTOF PETITIONERS

ROBERT E. LITANCounsel of Record

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, NWWASHINGTON, DC 20036202 797 6120

Full Names of Individual Amici Listed on InsideCover

JULY 21, 2008

AMICI CURIAE

KENNETH J. ARROW, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,JAGDISH BHAGWATI, MICHAEL J. BOSKIN,

ROBERT CRANDALL, MAUREEN L. CROPPER,MICHAEL GREENSTONE, ROBERT W. HAHN,DAVID HARRISON, JR., R. GLENN HUBBARD,

ALFRED E. KAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, ROBERT LITAN,PAUL MACAVOY, JAMES C. MILLER, III,

ALBERT L. NICHOLS, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,ROGER G. NOLL, WALLACE E. OATES, PETER PASSELL,SAM PELTZMAN, PAUL R. PORTNEY, HARVEY S. ROSEN,

MILTON RUSSELL, THOMAS C. SCHELLING,RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CHARLES L. SCHULTZE,

V. KERRY SMITH, VERNON L. SMITH,ROBERT N. STAVINS, W. KIP VISCUSI,

MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, LAWRENCE J. WHITE, ANDRICHARD ZECKHAUSER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Interest of Amici Curiae............................................... 1

Background................................................................... 2

A. Issue Presented to the Court....................... 2

B. Comparisons of Benefits and Costsunder Section 316(b) of the CleanWater Act...................................................... 3

Summary of Argument................................................. 5

Argument ...................................................................... 6

A. Benefit-Cost Comparisons Are aWell-Established Tool to FosterRational Decision Making ........................... 6

B. A Group of Economists HasDeveloped Consensus on the Use ofBenefit-Cost Assessments forEnvironmental Regulation ........................ 10

Conclusion................................................................... 13

List of Amici Curiae ................................................... 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESPage

Cases:

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States EPA, 475F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007)........................................ 4

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,597 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1979)............................ 3,4

Statutes and Regulations:

Executive Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg.12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978)....................................... 7

Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg.13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) ................................... 7,8

Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg.51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) ................................... 7,8,9

Executive Order 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763(Jan. 23, 2007) ................................................... 8

Miscellaneous:

Brief for the Federal Respondents inOpposition ......................................................... 2

Brief Amici Curiae for AEI-Brookings JointCenter for Regulatory Studies et al. inWhitman v. American TruckingAssociations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................... 11

Cass Sunstein. Cost-Benefit DefaultPrinciples, AEI-Brookings Joint Center

for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper00-7 (2000) ......................................................... 9

EPA, Guidelines for Preparing EconomicAnalyses, (2000) ............................................... 10

“Letter to Joseph Priestly” in BenjaminFranklin: Representative Selections,with Introduction, Bibliography andNotes, Frank Luther Mott and ChesterE. Jorgenson, eds., (New York:American Book Company, 1936,pp. 348-349), as cited in Boardman etal., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts andPractice, Second Edition, (New Jersey:Prentice Hall, 2001, pp. 1-2) .......................... 6,7

Office of Water, EPA, Economic andBenefits Analysis for the Final Section316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule(2004).................................................................. 4

Office of Management and Budget.Circular A-4 to the Heads of ExecutiveAgencies and Establishments.(September 17 2003)........................................ 10

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper,George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.Portney, Milton Russell, RichardSchmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, andRobert N. Stavins. Benefit-CostAnalysis in Environmental, Health, andSafety Regulation: A Statement ofPrinciples. American EnterpriseInstitute, The Annapolis Center, andResources for the Future (1996) ..................... 11

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper,George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.Portney, Milton Russell, RichardSchmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, andRobert N. Stavins. Is There a Role forBenefit-Cost Analysis inEnvironmental, Health, and SafetyRegulation?. Science (Apr. 12, 1996).pp. 221-222....................................................... 11

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This brief is being submitted on behalf of a groupof economists.1 The purpose of this brief is to provideinformation to the Court related to theappropriateness of using benefit-cost comparisons inthe context of § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, asection regulating the cooling water intaketechnology—in the interest of protecting fish andshellfish—of electricity generating units and certainother facilities that require large quantities of waterto cool equipment for operational and safety reasons.We emphasize that the brief does not address thelegal question of whether the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (“EPA”) has statutory authority toconsider the benefits and costs of alternatives insetting requirements for facilities covered under§316(b). Nor does our brief discuss specifics of howbenefit-cost comparisons should be used under thatsection or under the Clean Water Act moregenerally. Rather, we provide an overview of theextensive historical precedent for comparing benefitsand costs in evaluating environmental regulationsand the general principles regarding suchcomparisons that are widely accepted by economists.

As practicing economists and citizens, we have asubstantial interest in seeing that EPA is allowed tocompare benefits and costs to help it identify the

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intendedto fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No personother than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made amonetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Theparties have consented to the filing of Amicus briefs.

2

relevant tradeoffs and make sound decisions under§316(b). The societal resources at stake aresubstantial with regard both to §316(b) of the CleanWater Act and environmental, health and safetyregulation more generally. Indeed, it is notuncommon for permitting decisions concerningindividual plants under §316(b) to include fish-protection measures that may cost hundreds ofmillions of dollars. The economists who aresignatories to this brief have identified generalprinciples that we believe are appropriate in makingdecisions regarding fish protection under §316(b)and other environmental measures. We submit thisbrief in the interest of improving environmentaldecision-making.

BACKGROUND

A. Issue Presented to the Court

We understand that the issue before the Court is,in the words of the Government’s brief responding tothe petition for a writ of certiorari,

Whether Section 316(b) of the CleanWater Act, 33 U.S.C. 1326(b),authorizes the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) to comparecosts with benefits in determining the“best technology available forminimizing adverse environmentalimpact” at cooling water intakestructures.2

2 Br. for Federal Resp’ts in Opp’n at (I)

3

We further understand that the issue is notwhether EPA is required to base its decisionsregarding “best technology available” (or “BTA”) on abenefit-cost test, but only whether the Agency isallowed to weigh costs and benefits, among otherfactors, in deciding what controls must be installedto reduce fish and shellfish losses at the waterintake structures of affected facilities.

We further understand that this issue is beforethe Court in part because of a difference amongcircuit courts, with the current Second Circuitdecision in conflict with a prior First Circuitinterpretation of the legality of comparing benefitsand costs.3

As economists, we are not qualified to opine onhow to interpret the statutory language of §316(b) oron how prior case law applies in this area. Rather,we respectfully offer our observations on theeconomic issues presented in this case in the hopethat the comments will prove useful to the Court.

B. Comparisons of Benefits and Costsunder Section 316(b) of the CleanWater Act

Our understanding is that for several decades,EPA (and the state agencies that have assumedpermitting authority in some states) implemented§316(b) on a case-by-case basis that includedweighing costs and benefits and declining to requiretechnology “whose cost is wholly disproportionate tothe environmental benefit to be gained,” as affirmed

3 Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306 (1st Cir.1979)

4

in a 1979 decision by the First Circuit.4 Weunderstand that under the terms of a consent decreerequiring the issuance of regulations implementing§316(b) on a national basis, in 2004 EPA issued its“Phase II” rules (applying to about 550 existingpower plants) that are at issue in this case. EPA’sPhase II rules set national performance standardsfor BTA and also allowed facilities to request site-specific standards for BTA where they could provideinformation on costs and benefits and, if appropriate,demonstrate that the costs of meeting the nationalstandards would be “significantly greater” than thebenefits.5 The technology selected by the permittingauthority under the site-specific provision has toachieve an efficacy level that comes as close aspracticable to the national performance standardswithout resulting in costs that are “significantlygreater” than the benefits.

As we understand it, Riverkeeper II 6 found thatEPA is prohibited from comparing costs and benefitsin setting requirements under §316(b) or authorizingsite-specific determinations. EPA may consider costsbut only in determining whether a technology can be“reasonably borne” by the industry as a whole or inchoosing among equally protective alternatives(what Riverkeeper II calls a “cost-effectiveness”analysis). EPA is not allowed under Riverkeeper II toconsider costs in relation to benefits—to consider, for

4 Id.

5 Office of Water, EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for theFinal Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule (2004)

6 Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2007)

5

example, whether the costs of a slight improvementin fish protection are disproportionate to thebenefits.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As economists, we believe that the SecondCircuit’s ruling, by not allowing the consideration ofimportant information about the relationshipsbetween the benefits and costs of alternatives, iseconomically unsound. In particular, we believe that,as a general principle, regulators cannot makerational decisions unless they are allowed tocompare costs and benefits and to use the results,along with other factors as appropriate, to chooseamong alternatives.

To the extent permissible under the statute andcase law, EPA should be allowed to consider benefitsand costs in establishing rules for implementing§316(b). We believe it would not be sensible topreclude the comparison of benefits and costs insetting §316(b) requirements. The potential costs ofsetting technology-based requirements for coolingwater intakes can be very large, on the order ofhundreds of millions of dollars for a single facility.

The Court’s allowing EPA to consider benefitsand costs would improve both the decision makingprocess—by making it more transparent—and theregulatory decisions by allowing important relevantinformation to be considered explicitly.

6

ARGUMENT

A. Benefit-Cost Comparisons Are aWell-Established Tool to FosterRational Decision Making

The general concept of comparing benefits andcosts is familiar and long standing. Indeed, in 1772,Benjamin Franklin wrote in a letter about a methodfor making private decisions (which Franklin called“Moral or Prudential Algebra”) that illustrates thebasic features of benefit-cost assessments.7 Herecommended carefully listing pros (i.e., benefits)and cons (i.e., costs), estimating weights (i.e., valuingthem in some common unit, such as dollars), andthen determining their balance (calculating netbenefits equal to benefits minus costs). Franklin’sletter emphasizes the crucial importance of followinga systematic process in complex situations in whichthere are a host of factors pointing one way or theother for a given decision. Specifically, Franklinwrites:

When those difficult cases occur, theyare difficult chiefly because while wehave them under Consideration, all theReasons pro and con are not present tothe Mind at the same time; but

7 “Letter to Joseph Priestly” in Benjamin Franklin:Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography andNotes, Frank Luther Mott and Chester E. Jorgenson, eds.,(New York: American Book Company, 1936 pp. 348-349), ascited in Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts andPractice, Second Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001,pp. 1-2).

7

sometimes one Set present themselves,and at other times another, the firstbeing out of sight. Hence the variousPurposes or Inclinations thatalternatively prevail, and theUncertainty that perplexes us.8

The basic logic of Franklin’s advice—that prosand cons should be described and compared to oneanother in making decisions—applies in the case ofimportant environmental and other governmentregulatory decisions. Indeed, this basic logic and theincrease in the importance of environmental, healthand safety regulation over the past three decadeshas led all presidents since President Carter in 1978to establish formal procedures requiring thepreparation of benefit-cost assessments for variousfederal regulations.9 President Carter issuedExecutive Order 12044 in 1978 to require federalagencies to conduct detailed regulatory analyses ofcertain proposed rules. President Reagan’s 1981Executive Order 12291 required agencies to evaluatethe costs and benefits of all major future rules.10 Thefirst President Bush continued Executive Order12291 when he took office in 1989.

In 1993, President Clinton issued ExecutiveOrder 12866, which also required that agenciescompare the benefits and costs of major rulemakingsand set guidelines for using the results of theseassessments in regulatory decision making.11 The

8 Id.

9 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978)

10 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)

11 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)

8

current President Bush continued Executive Order12866 with relatively minor changes although in2007 he issued Executive Order 13422 that requiredagencies to consider the need for and consequencesof regulatory “guidance” (i.e., agency interpretationor policy on a regulatory issue that is generally non-binding).12

These executive orders have emphasized theimportance of balancing costs and benefits andmaximizing the net benefits (i.e., benefits minuscosts) in setting regulations. Executive Order 12866requires that agencies “propose or adopt a regulationonly upon a reasoned determination that thebenefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”13

The similarity in the language of these executiveorders across decades indicates the bipartisansupport for comparing benefits and costs in makingregulatory decisions. President Reagan’s ExecutiveOrder 12291 stated that,

Regulatory action should not beundertaken unless the potentialbenefits to society for the regulationoutweigh the potential costs to society… Regulatory objectives shall be chosento maximize the net benefits tosociety.14

In a similar vein, President Clinton’s ExecutiveOrder 12866 notes that,

12 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (2007)

13 58 Fed. Reg. 51,736 (1993)

14 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)

9

In deciding whether and how toregulate, agencies should assess allcosts and benefits of availableregulatory alternatives, including thealternative of not regulating … Further,in choosing among alternativeregulatory approaches, agencies shouldselect those approaches that maximizenet benefits . . . unless a statuterequires another regulatory approach.15

All presidents since Jimmy Carter haveemphasized the importance of weighing benefits andcosts in making regulatory decisions concerning theenvironment and other areas. Indeed, a prominentlegal scholar writing in 2000 concluded that thenation was nearing the end of a “first generation”debate about balancing benefits and costs throughthe development of benefit-cost “default principles”.16

In this context, he argued, the issue of whetherbenefit-cost analysis should be allowed to assist insound decision making has been resolved, with“second generation” issues including details of howto implement the benefit-cost methodologies.

The practical assessment of benefits and costshas been furthered by detailed guidance on how itcan be applied in environmental regulatory settings.EPA has provided important guidelines for assessingbenefits and costs, first in 1983 and more recently in

15 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)

16 Cass Sunstein. Cost-Benefit Default Principles, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper00-7 (2000).

10

2000.17 These guidelines provide detailed guidanceon the key concepts involved in implementing suchassessments. The EPA Guidelines were thoroughlyreviewed by the Environmental Economics AdvisoryCommittee of EPA’s Science Advisory Board,comprised of thirteen well-recognized economists.The Office of Management and Budget hasdeveloped similar guidelines.18

In summary, carefully considering the socialbenefits and social costs of a given regulatorydecision makes good sense, as presidents over thelast three decades have recognized. Economists andother analysts have developed methods for makingthese assessments that fall under the general labelof benefit-cost analysis. Benefit-cost assessments donot provide “answer machines” but rather provide auseful framework for evaluation of regulatoryalternatives. As Franklin’s early example makesclear, this framework is particularly important whenthe factors involved are complicated and numerous.

B. A Group of Economists HasDeveloped Consensus on the Use ofBenefit-Cost Assessments forEnvironmental Regulation

There is a wide consensus among economists onvarious fundamental principles regarding theassessment of benefits and costs. In 1996, a group ofdistinguished economists assembled to developprinciples for assessing benefits and costs in

17 EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2000).

18 Office of Management and Budget. Circular A-4 to the Headsof Executive Agencies and Establishments. (Sept. 17 2003).

11

environmental, health and safety regulation. Theresulting Statement of Principles was publishedjointly by the American Enterprise Institute, theAnnapolis Center, and Resources for the Future.19

These same principles can inform what webelieve to be the appropriate use of benefit-costcomparisons in making decisions under Section316(b). The following is a summary of principles thatwe believe underlie the appropriate use of benefit-cost comparisons in making decisions under thissection.20

Benefit-cost assessments provide a usefulmeans of organizing a comparison of thefavorable and unfavorable effects of proposedpolicies. Systematic comparisons of benefits andcosts can help decision makers better understandthe implications of various decisions. Suchcomparisons can provide useful estimates of the

19 Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads,Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith,and Robert N. Stavins. Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,Health, and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles.American Enterprise Institute, The Annapolis Center, andResources for the Future (1996). A similar statement was publishedin Science magazine, Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C.Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney,Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert N.Stavins. Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,Health, and Safety Regulation?. Science (Apr. 12, 1996). pp. 221-222.

20 These principles also draw on similar ideas put forth in anAmicus brief filed with this court in 2000. Brief Amici Curiaefor AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies inWhitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457(2001).

12

overall benefits and costs of proposed decisions. Inmany cases, these comparisons cannot be used toprove that the economic benefits of a particulardecision will exceed or fall short of the costs becauseof uncertainties involved. But comparisons ofbenefits and costs can play an important role ininforming the decision process even when the resultsare not conclusive.

Agencies should not be bound by a strictbenefit-cost test, but should be allowed toconsider available estimates of benefits andcosts. There may be factors other than economicbenefits and costs that agencies will want to weighin decisions, such as equity within and acrossgenerations.

It is important to compare the benefits andcosts of a proposed regulatory requirement notonly to the status quo but also to alternativeregulatory approaches and levels of stringencythat could be adopted. Systematic review ofbenefits and costs can often identify opportunities tomodify proposed requirements in ways that increasebenefits at relatively low cost or reduce costssubstantially with little loss in benefits.

The scale of the benefit-cost assessmentshould be related to the importance of thedecision. The scale of the assessment shoulddepend on both the stakes involved and thelikelihood that the resulting information will affectthe ultimate decision.

Not all impacts of a decision can bequantified or expressed in dollar terms. Careshould be taken to ensure that quantitative

13

factors do not dominate qualitative factors indecision making. A common critique of benefit-costcomparisons is that they do not emphasize factorsthat are not easily quantified or monetized. Thatcritique has merit. There are two principal ways toaddress it: first, quantify as many factors asreasonable and quantify or characterize the relevantuncertainties; and second, give due consideration tofactors that defy quantification but are thought to beimportant.

CONCLUSION

We believe that this case provides the Court withan important opportunity to provide for sounddecision making in environmental matters.Systematic comparisons of benefits and costs havebeen important elements of government decisionmaking in environmental matters—including§316(b) of the Clean Water Act—for many decades.We believe that decisions on environmental mattersshould be based upon a full assessment of benefitsand costs, taking into account elements that cannotbe quantified as well as uncertainties regardingvarious costs and benefits. This information willpermit the appropriate balancing of benefits andcosts in key environmental decisions.

Respectfully Submitted,

Robert E. LitanCounsel of Record

Brookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Ave, NWWashington, DC 20036202 797 6120

14

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE

Kenneth J. ArrowProfessor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford

University

William J. BaumolProfessor of Economics Emeritus, Princeton

UniversityAcademic Director, Berkley Center for

Entrepreneurial Studies, New York University

Jagdish BhagwatiUniversity Professor, Economics and Law, Columbia

University

Michael J. BoskinT.M. Friedman Professor of Economics and Hoover

Institution Senior Fellow, Stanford UniversityFormer Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

Robert CrandallSenior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Maureen L. CropperProfessor of Economics, University of Maryland

Michael Greenstone3M Professor of Environmental Economics,

Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyNonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Robert W. HahnExecutive Director, Center for Regulatory and

Market Studies and Senior Fellow, AEI

15

David Harrison, Jr.Senior Vice President, National Economic Research

AssociatesFormer Senior Staff, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

R. Glenn HubbardDean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance

and Economics, Graduate School of Business,Columbia University

Former Chairman, President’s Council of EconomicAdvisers

Alfred E. KahnRobert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy

Emeritus, Cornell UniversityFormer Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

Lester B. LaveUniversity Professor and Higgins Professor of

Economics, Carnegie Mellon UniversityFormer Member, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air

Compliance Analysis

Robert LitanSenior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Paul MacAvoyWilliams Brothers Professor of Management Studies

Emeritus, Yale School of Management, YaleUniversity

Former Member, President's Council of EconomicAdvisers

16

James C. Miller, IIIFormer Director, Office of Management and BudgetFirst Administrator, Office of Information and

Regulatory Affairs

Albert L. NicholsVice President, National Economic Research

AssociatesFormer Director, Economic Analysis Division, EPA

William A. NiskanenChairman, Cato InstituteFormer Member, President’s Council of Economic

Advisers

Roger G. NollProfessor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford

University

Wallace E. OatesProfessor of Economics, University of MarylandUniversity Fellow, Resources for the Future

Peter PassellSenior Fellow, Milken Institute

Sam PeltzmanRalph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service

Professor Emeritus of Economics, GraduateSchool of Business, University of Chicago

Paul R. PortneyDean, Eller College of Management, University of

ArizonaFormer Chief Economist, President’s Council on

Environmental Quality

17

Harvey S. RosenJohn L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and

Business Policy, Princeton UniversityFormer Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

Milton RussellSenior Fellow, Institute for a Secure and Sustainable

EnvironmentProfessor Emeritus, Department of Economics,

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Thomas C. SchellingDistinguished University Professor Emeritus,

University of MarylandNobel Laureate in Economics

Richard SchmalenseeHoward W. Johnson Professor of Management and

Economics, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology

Former Member, President’s Council of EconomicAdvisers

Charles L. SchultzeSenior Fellow Emeritus, Brookings InstitutionFormer Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

V. Kerry SmithW.P. Carey Professor of Economics, W.P. Carey

School of Business, Arizona State University

18

Vernon L. SmithProfessor of Economics and Law, Chapman

UniversityNobel Laureate in Economics

Robert N. StavinsAlbert Pratt Professor of Business and Government,

John F. Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity

Former Chairman, EPA Environmental EconomicsAdvisory Committee

W. Kip ViscusiUniversity Distinguished Professor of Law,

Economics and Management, VanderbiltUniversity

Murray WeidenbaumEdward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University

Professor, Washington University, St. LouisFormer Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

Lawrence J. WhiteProfessor of Economics, Stern School of Business,

New York University

Richard ZeckhauserFrank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy,

John F. Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity