‘Radicalisation’:

The Transformation of Modern Understanding of Terrorist Origins, Psychology and

Motivation

Andrew Silke and Katherine Brown1

Post 9/11, understanding how people become terrorists has come to be discussed in terms

of “radicalisation”. Today, radicalisation is typically seen to refer to a complex and dynamic

process which results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a

political or religious cause. Without doubt, the issue of radicalisation has become a core

fixture of contemporary efforts to understand and combat terrorism. Yet, clearly, terrorism

has an extraordinarily long history and what is called radicalisation today, in the past was

referred to do much more mundanely as “becoming” a terrorist, “joining” a terrorist group,

or of being “recruited”.1 No one talked of the IRA being radicalised, or Shining Path, or Black

September or the Red Brigades. Though all of these older groups certainly were by our

modern understanding.

Ultimately, the emergence of the term “radicalisation” to describe this process of deepening

involvement in radical violent causes and activism, is a very recent phenomenon. It

effectively began in the aftermath of 9/11, when a shift started to move away from talking

about people “becoming” terrorists, “joining” terrorist groups, or being “recruited”. As an

alternative, the term “radicalisation” first started to appear in documents discussing how

people became involved with terrorist causes or movements in 2002, but by 2007 it had

effectively taken over policy and research discourse on this subject. Exactly what

“radicalisation” meant, however, was open to some interpretation.2 Compared to the

previous terminology, it was certainly a more exotic term which presumably described a

more exotic process.

1 This paper has been published as: Silke, A. and Brown, K. (2016). ‘‘Radicalisation’: The Transformation of Modern Understanding of Terrorist Origins, Psychology and Motivation.’ In Shashi Jayakumar (Ed.), State, Society, and National Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century, pp.129-150. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.

1

It did not help that, like terrorism itself, radicalisation as a term arrived already mired with

some political baggage, and was quickly shackled with even more, all of which has hindered,

rather than helped its scientific development. One of the most straightforward of the recent

scientific definitions of radicalisation, for example, comes from Horgan and Braddock, who

defined it as: “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced

commitment to extremist political or religious ideology”.3 Taken at face value, such a

perspective offers plenty of scope to develop our understanding, but as Peter Neumann

highlighted, the politicisation of the term created a multitude of obstacles:

Unfortunately the concept of radicalisation, as used in many government-linked

quarters, suffers from politicisation, is fuzzy, applied one-sidedly (only non-state

actors are assumed to radicalise, not governments), often lacks a clear benchmark

(adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law, abstaining from the use of

violence for political ends), and is linked too readily with terrorism (broadly defined)

as outcome. Its broader application to political activism of individuals and

movements in societies where social development is blocked by non-democratic

extremist regimes is problematical.4

Terrorism as a term has also been mired with similar difficulties in how it has been defined,

though this has not restricted the enormous growth in terrorism studies in recent years, or

research on a bewildering range of topics linked to the area.5 Similarly, the development of

theoretical models and research on radicalisation has been enormous in recent years, and

the focus of this chapter is to attempt to review some of the major developments in our

understanding of radicalisation and the significant issues connected to the phenomenon.

Theoretical Models of Radicalisation

The past decade has been an exceptionally vibrant period for the development of models of

radicalisation.6 New research has fuelled a plethora of theories around what factors and

processes drive radicalisation, and provided a range of sometimes very different

2

perspectives on the issue. There is not enough space in this chapter to review all of these

models, but we can focus attention on some of the major ones, bearing in mind that it is

likely that new models will continue to emerge and many of the current ones will be refined

further.

Moghaddam’s Staircase Model of Radicalisation

Fathali Moghaddam’s staircase model was one of the first detailed models and since its

publication in 2005 it has become one of the most influential of the theoretical models.7 In a

recent review it was identified as among the 100 most cited articles on terrorism.8 The

model presents radicalisation as a phased process, involving six stages in total. Figure 1

provides an outline of the model.

Figure 1: Moghaddam’s Staircase Model of Radicalisation

FIFTH FLOOR The Terrorist Act and Side-stepping

Inhibitory Mechanisms

FOURTH FLOOR Solidification of Categorical Thinking & the

Perceived Legitimacy of the Terrorist Group

THIRD FLOOR Moral Engagement

SECOND FLOOR Displacement of Aggression

FIRST FLOOR Perceived Options to Fight Unfair Conditions

GROUND FLOOR Psychological Interpretation of Material

Conditions 3

There are six stages in total and each stage is represented by a different step in the

staircase. The higher you progress in the model, the fewer the number of people who reach

each level, and the step metaphor is designed to reflect that progress through the different

phases is not automatic or inevitable. The ground level of the model starts with perceptions

of discontent and a desire by individuals to improve their situation. If they are unsuccessful

in doing this, feelings of frustration and anger develop towards any entity individuals believe

are responsible for these setbacks. Moral disengagement from standard social norms occurs

as the individual increasingly begins to adopt the moral framework of the terrorist group or

cause. This deepens as the individual progresses up the staircase, to the point where in the

final stage they are incorporated within the terrorist movement and are willing to carry out

acts of violence on behalf of the cause.

McCauley and Moskalenko’s 12 mechanism model

Published in 2008, the McCauley and Moskalenko model argues that radicalisation can

happen at three different levels: individual, group and mass.9 Within this framework, each

level might best be considered as comprising a set of different pathways leading to

radicalisation, and 12 different mechanisms as to how this can happen are described. Table

1 below outlines the model and the mechanisms.

At the level of the individual, radicalisation is caused primarily by grievances, either

experienced directly or else experienced by the group the individual identifies with. Group

and mass radicalisation can be the result of competition and conflict with other groups or

states. With the model, radicalisation is defined as a “change in beliefs, feelings, and

behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in

defense of the ingroup.”10

4

Table 1: McCauley and Moskalenko’s 12 mechanism model

Level of radicalization Mechanism Individual 1. Personal victimization 2. Political grievance 3. Joining a radical group—the slippery slope 4. Joining a radical group—the power of love 5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups Group 6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat 7. Competition for the same base of support 8. Competition with state power—condensation 9. Within-group competition—fissioning Mass 10. Jujitsu politics 11. Hate

12. Martyrdom

Importantly the model stresses the reactive nature of radicalisation. For ten out of the

twelve mechanisms, radicalisation is occurring in response to events and forces in the

environment, and particularly to threats to the individual and to the group. The model

overall stresses the importance of environmental context in understanding how and why

radicalisation happens. A further important element is that ideology is not a key causal

factor of radicalisation in this model. Indeed, in the original article describing the model,

ideology is not mentioned at all. It does receive attention in later accounts, but overall

within this framework, ideology is not the key driving force. As McCauley and Moskalenko

noted in 2010, radicalisation can occur without an ideology:

“there are many paths to radicalisation that do not involve ideology. Some join a

radical group for thrills and status, some for love, some for connection and

comradeship. Personal and group grievances can move individuals toward violence,

with ideology serving only to rationalise the violence.”11

A final noteworthy element of the model is McCauley and Moskalenko’s conclusion that

“Radicalization emerges in a relationship of intergroup competition and conflict in which

5

both sides are radicalized” [emphasis added]. Thus, it is not just terrorists who are

radicalised, but also those who are fighting against them. Radicalisation, then, is not a

process that only produces terrorists, but rather affects all sides in violent conflicts.

Kruglanski et al.’s Quest for Significance Model of Radicalisation

A more recent model on radicalisation has been offered by Kruglanski et al., and this looks

as if it will become a quite influential theory.12 The model effectively emerged from research

studies exploring the role of significance quest in terrorist motivation. Studies in the area

suggest that the move towards an extremist ideology is for many a way of dealing with

perceived inadequacy and failure in their own lives, and of attempting to increase their own

self-esteem and sense of significance.13 How the model works is outlined in figure 2.

Figure 2: Kruglanski et al.’s Quest for Significance Model of Radicalisation

6

Unlike McCauley and Moskalenko’s model, ideology plays a much more central role in this

framework. For Kruglanski et al. there are three major elements in the radicalisation

process: (1) an individual motivation for personal significance (often a reaction to perceived

failures, threats and setbacks in life); (2) an ideology which identifies appropriate ways to

achieve personal significance; and then (3) social processes which bring the individual into

contact with this ideology.

There is empirical support for some elements of the model. For example, a loss or drop in

personal significance is likely to cause a “collectivistic shift” in an individual’s sense of

identity.14 This effectively means that the individual’s identity shifts towards a more group-

based identity, with greater priority and meaning given to the group’s norms and values.

Studies suggest that this is further linked with both a greater willingness to sacrifice and to

support violence on behalf of the group and its values.15

Key Factors Associated With the Radicalisation Process

While there may be considerable variation in emphases, inevitably the various models of

radicalisation also have significant overlaps. Where there is general agreement between

them is usually around the view that radicalisation is a complex and dynamic process which

results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a political or

religious cause. The process is not inevitable nor does it follow a single route. Instead, most

of the models highlight that there are multiple pathways to violent extremism and that the

process of getting there can often be an often erratic experience capable of going in a

variety of directions.

As even the brief review of theoretical models in the previous section illustrates, there is no

single root cause of radicalisation. Indeed, more than 200 different factors have been

identified by research which could play a role in the radicalisation process.16 Not all of these

factors feature in every case, and there is often very considerable variation. Ultimately,

radicalisation is not simply the sum of different factors, but rather that the different factors

seem to play a role at different stages in the process.17 Key events can motivate individuals

7

to radicalise further or to de-radicalise, and overall radicalisation is best seen as a complex,

non-linear and dynamic process.

The general trend in research findings though is that radicalisation is the result of the

interaction of both personal factors (e.g. individual susceptibility) and environmental factors

(e.g. social relationships, community attitudes).18 Studies have also highlighted that static

and dynamic factors both play significant roles in radicalisation. Static elements include, for

example, demographic factors such that young people aged 15-24 are most at risk, and

males are usually more affected than females.19 Dynamic factors can include social

relationships, which in most cases are probably one of key elements in the radicalisation

process. Camaraderie, social support and a sense of belonging can all be powerful incentives

for becoming and staying involved with a radical group.20

In his analysis of the life histories of hundreds of jihadi terrorists, Edwin Bakker for example

found that these individuals tended to become involved in terrorism through networks of

friends or relatives and that generally there were no formal ties with terrorist networks.21

More recent research suggests that in up to 20% of cases family members played a key role

in introducing and initiating to an extremist movement. In contrast, friends played the key

role in almost 50% of cases.22

Psychological vulnerability can also play a significant role, though this should not be

confused with mental illness or serious psychological problems, which overall are present in

relatively few cases of serious radicalisation.23 The presence of an extremist ideology is a

further factor, though the key element here is probably around how an individual latches

onto the ideology and incorporates elements of it within their own identity. The

transformation of the individual’s identity is an important dimension, rather than, for

example, nuances within the ideology. Indeed, radicalised individuals can often have a

surprisingly simplistic and shallow understanding of the ideology.24

In the following section we will explore in more detail a selection of these different factors

which have been linked with the radicalisation process.

8

Psychological Vulnerability to Radicalisation

The issue of psychological vulnerability to radicalisation has attracted growing attention,

though there is variation in how this is interpreted and assessed.25 A range of psychological

factors have been identified as important to radicalisation including: issues of grievance,

perceived injustice, identity, anger, revenge and a quest for significance. Certainly, most

extremists believe at the time of their offending that their actions are morally justified, and

various psychological processes (such as deindividuation, mortality salience, moral

disengagement and risky shift) appear to play an important role in facilitating their

involvement.26 We can now consider some of these issues in more detail.

Quest for Significance

Quest for significance has already been discussed in relation to Kruglanski et al.’s model of

radicalisation.27 One of the key findings in this regard is that perceived success in life

appears to be a factor in radicalisation. Individuals who perceive themselves as less

successful identify more with their religion or nationality. Kruglanski et al. explained this in

terms of a collectivistic shift. Of concern here are studies that show that people who see

their identity primarily in these terms are more likely to express support for extremist

violence. Other research shows that feelings of shame or insignificance correlate with

support for extremism and political violence. 28 Linked to this, recent research in the UK has

found that Muslim individuals with symptoms of mild depression were more likely to

express support for terrorism and political protest.29

Thus, the gravitation towards an extremist ideology is for many a way of dealing with

perceived inadequacy and failure in their own lives, and of attempting to increase their own

self-esteem and sense of significance.

Identity

9

How someone sees their identity appears to be an important factor.30 People who see their

identity as individuals first, are less likely to support or feel positive about an extremist

ideology. In contrast, people who have a collectivistic identity (i.e. they see their identity

first in terms of their religion or nation) are more supportive of extremist violence. Past life

events can play an important role in an individual’s sense of identity. Studies show that

there is a strong relationship between self-reported life failure (or lack of success), and

greater identification as a member of a collective (nation or religion). Those who experience

a loss of significance are more likely to then adopt collective ideologies that will provide

them with significance. Once someone has adopted a group-centred identity, studies show

they are more likely to engage in activity in support of that group.

Self-Esteem

Linked with the quest for significance, many theories have assumed that individuals with

lower levels of self-esteem can be more vulnerable to radicalisation. 31 In this framework,

the extremist ideology can offer people a way to enhance their self-esteem. Recent research

results, however, suggest a more complex picture with self-esteem effects. Low self-esteem

is associated with increased vulnerability to radicalisation, but so too, is high self-esteem.

Found that individuals with moderate levels of self-esteem seemed to be the most resilient

to violent radicalisation.32

Added to this, is the related finding from other research studies that people at early stages

of radicalisation can show low self-esteem, but individuals at later stages (who have been

heavily radicalised) actually report high self-esteem (a result of embracing the ideology and

the message that the individual is an active member of a valued in-group).33

Mortality Salience

10

When people are exposed to death-related thoughts or imagery this results in what

psychologists refer to as a ‘mortality salience’ effect. Psychological research has shown that

even very subtle cues relating to death can create mortality salience effect – even when the

cues are not consciously recognised by the person involved.34

Mortality salience has a number of psychological effects. After exposure to such images

people will usually feel an increasing pride in and identification with their country, religion,

gender, race, etc. They experience exaggerated tendencies to stereotype and reject those

who are different from themselves. The group you belong to is even better than it was

before, even more worthy of your support. Your rivals though are diminished, less deserving

of sympathy or compassion. People feel greater hostility toward those who are perceived as

different others or as a threat.

These changes in attitude and perceptions are also linked to changes in behaviour. Some of

these are relatively subtle, such as sitting closer to a person who shares your own culture,

while moving further away from foreigners. Others are starker, including increased physical

aggression toward anyone critical of cherished beliefs.

Crucially, mortality salience has also been found to lead to an increase in support for

extremism when it is linked to group identity. For example, one study found that under

mortality salience conditions white Americans expressed more sympathy and support for

other Whites who expressed racist views. In the Middle East, researchers found that Muslim

students under mortality salience conditions expressed more support and sympathy for

suicide bombers, and also expressed a greater willingness to carry out suicide attacks

themselves.35

The more that important cultural icons and beliefs (e.g. in the context of militant jihadi

terrorism, reference to the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed, and other vital aspects of

Islam) are involved, then the more pronounced that the effect is likely to be. Mortality

salience leads to an increased attachment and protectiveness towards such beliefs and also

produces increased hostility and aggression to others who appear to be denigrating or

insulting such icons and beliefs.

11

Altruism and Self-Sacrifice

Perhaps strangely, many people see their involvement with an extremist movement as a

pro-social activity, and altruism has been identified as a potential factor in radicalisation.36

Altruistic tendencies can be increased by stressing similarities with others. The stronger a

person can identify with others the more they care about what happens to them. In

contrast, stressing the differences weakens such bonds and interest and concern declines.

Altruism is likely to have an impact on support for extremism when it is considered within

the context of identity. Individuals who feel their identity is closer to the militant group, and

who score higher on altruistic measures, are arguably the ones who will express and feel the

strongest support for the group including the group’s use of extreme measures. Potentially,

they will also be more likely to act on these sentiments.

Importantly, studies show that measures of altruism correlate closely with measures of the

psychological willingness to self-sacrifice.37 Both of these factors also match closely

measures of having a commitment to higher causes - causes which provide meaning in

people’s lives. Self-sacrifice is also linked to an increased willingness to engage in extreme

actions, to endure personal suffering and hardship on behalf of a cause, and feeling angry

towards people who do not respect that cause.

Radicalisation and Children and Teenagers

Many individuals can become engaged with violent extremist movements at very young age

and adolescence, in particular, seems to be a critical period. Why adolescence is so

important appears to relate to issues around identity and negative emotions. Establishing a

clear sense of identity is a normal part of adolescence. The concern with radicalisation is

when identity gravitates towards an ideology-based violence and is shaped by this.

12

This is more likely to happen in cases where the young person has a strong identification

with an (ethnic and religious) in-group; where they perceive this in-group as superior; yet,

where they also perceive that this in-group has been humiliated by others.38 The

psychological background can be marked by negative emotions and a quest for significance.

Self-esteem may be low at the start of the process, but can rise as the individual embrace’s

the radical ideology and incorporates this more and more into their own sense of identity.

Young people with high personal uncertainty (e.g. who experience higher levels of anxiety

and confusion) can be more inclined to support ideology-based violence. Researchers argue

that uncertainty is a distressing feeling, and that people are fundamentally motivated to

achieve a sense of certainty about themselves and their social worth. This can make

extremist ideologies which provide a clear “black and white” worldview that minimizes

ambiguity and uncertainty very attractive, and indeed, studies show that people gravitate

towards radical beliefs when they experience high levels of uncertainty. Also, young people

who have a higher sense of agency (i.e. feel that they understand themselves and their

roles) appear more willing to actually act on violent intentions. Important background

environmental factors which contribute to all this, can be negative situations at home, the

presence and endorsement of the ideology among their peers and family, and negative key

events in their personal lives.39

Gender and Radicalization

Recent research shows that the recruitment of young men and women to terrorist causes

can be highly gendered and operates on two levels.40 How this happens can be well

illustrated by examining recent developments with regard to militant jihadist radicalization,

particularly with regard to Islamic State (IS). At the first level, recruitment focuses on

critiquing gendered globalized societal patterns and norms, and second, targeting individual

lives. These two layers of propaganda and recruitment reinforce each other, and provide a

broad alignment of public values with private aspirations.

13

The first globalized narratives are produced on a mass scale and distributed via a range of

media and platforms, from ask.fm, Instagram, Facebook, and twitter, to online video

channels and dedicated websites. Klaussen’s in-depth analysis of IS online material reveals

that less than 10% of material is concerned with violence.41 Although different communities

are targeted in unique ways there are common trends. Generally, the material focuses on

the failings of western states to allow Muslims to live according to their faith, points to the

violence of Western governments and state agencies against Muslims, and emphasizes the

faults of Muslims who adopt alternative understandings of an Islamic way of life and -

particularly targeting Shia and Sufis. These claims are highly gendered and declare it an

obligation on Muslim men to defend ‘rightly believing’ women from such attacks.

Reinforcing this perception of threat, they allege that European men are emasculated by

European state agencies, and are not ‘real men’ because of their failures to defend the

‘appropriate’ gender order. For example, the French language magazine, Dar Al-Islam, which

supports ISIS, in the edition entitled “Qu’Allah Maudisse La France”, argued that:

"the laws banning the hijab, [and] the anti-terrorist laws which allow the

imprisonment of any Muslim without any serious evidence are all slapping the face

of every Muslim who still believes that it is possible to live with the disbelievers or

worse to live Islam under the authority of the disbelievers …”

They highlight perceived discrimination in stop and searches by police that appear to

disproportionately target Asian/Muslim men, as well as different sentencing and

prosecution outcomes for Muslims compared to Caucasians.42 Female supporters of ISIS talk

about ‘jihadi-hotties’, or ‘hipster jihadis’, that fighters are more manly, and therefore better

Muslims, and more attractive than Western Muslim men.43 Correspondingly, they contend

that women in the west are not respected, and the roles of wife and mother are not

valued44. They present Islamic State as an opportunity for young men to demonstrate their

‘manhood’, by becoming a fighter/hero, by supporting and defending women, and by

following God’s requirement that they live under Islamic law. Avatars of ISIS men and their

online personas emphasize their commitment to fitness, to guns, and to having sufficient

income to provide for a family as the primary breadwinner. Fatherhood is also emphasized;

for example, there is an online video from ISIS made in summer of 2015 showing men

14

playing with children in a well-equipped playground, and fathers training young boys in

combat and shooting45. The young boys are called ‘Little cubs’’ or ‘little bears’.46

Correspondingly, they ask women to demonstrate their commitment to God and Islamic law

by being a ‘support’ to their (future/current) husbands in Islamic State and by bringing up

the next generation of Muslims in the ‘correct’ manner.47 Women are told to expect a

‘protected’ but ‘purposeful’ life in Iraq and Syria under ISIS, and are encouraged to think

about life as part of the ‘sisterhood’, facilitating belonging and commitment to the new

cause. The interview with the girlfriend of one of the Charlie Hebdo attackers emphasized

the need for women to be the ‘base’ and ‘rocks’ for men in ISIS.48 Online material uses

particular gendered motifs to exalt individual behaviours and traits. For women, modesty,

piety and complementarity with men is emphasized through images of a lion and lioness, or

a ‘green bird’; images of romantic love do emerge, but these are presented as the

‘beginning’ of a new life rather than an end in itself. Notions of ‘purity’ therefore become

important - purity meaning of femininity/masculinity tied to morality and of faith.

The Online Environment and Social Media

The past decade has seen enormous attention focused on questions around the role that

the online environment and social media play in radicalization.49 While the online

environment is hugely diverse and public platforms are used for propagating messages,

recruitment of members (rather than merely sympathizers) requires more personalized

forms of communication. They often use closed forum and messaging platforms, such as

Telegram and WhatsApp. Islamic state ‘groups’ is increasingly suspicious of unsolicited

requests, and some reports suggest they require a ‘recommendation’ from a

‘known’/‘trusted’ individual. This became evident in the Channel 4 Dispatches programmes

aired in November 2015, where the undercover reporter had considerable difficulty

accessing groups that ‘met in real life’ and she was finally ousted from a meeting because

she couldn’t allay the lead woman’s fears that she wasn’t carrying a camera in her bag50.

Closest links seem to be with siblings51. Recruiters exploit their extensive knowledge of an

individual by targeting any existing vulnerabilities in the young person’s identity and life

15

experiences. Peer-to-Peer recruiters also encourage young women to distrust friends and

family or ‘traditional’ authority figures, arguing ‘they don’t understand’. Moreover they

argue that those in the West follow an Islam that has been ‘perverted’ by culture and

traditions that are not Islamic, or that those in authority have become corrupted by working

for European authorities. This process of isolating young people from those around them

and generating thick bonds of trust between them is essential to convincing them to make

the move from belief to action (moving to IS territories). NGOs working in de-radicalisation

anticipate spikes in recruitment during summer holidays, winter and Easter breaks.52 This is

because the intensity and volume of interaction is higher, as young people have fewer

‘distractions’, but also because travel is less suspect. Further, we see a spike in travel over

the summer as young women seek to avoid ‘holidays’ to Pakistan or India. There are reports

of some young couples where families have denied their union as travelling to Islamic State

together during this time.

They target individual lives in specific recruitment, and offer ‘hope’ through direct material

reward, status and privilege53. Additionally they tap into disappointment with life in the

West; women’s experiences, opinions and lives are shown ‘not to matter’ to the ‘outside

world’ (whether that is Western politicians, state agencies or Muslim communities) and

recruiters point to the failure of others to take potential recruits actions or words seriously.

At the individual level, they appear to focus on the lack of control and voice young women

have in their lives - whether in the home, the community or at school. They then link these

personal experiences of disappointment back to a worldwide phenomenon of victimisation

and oppression, for their global narrative that Muslims can’t live side by side with non-

Muslims.

They offer a ‘new life’ belonging to IS young women, in which are given ‘choices’ (Islamic

State allege) regarding marriage, work, and education - providing they abide by the strict

rules of gender segregation. Recruiters emphasise how ‘meaningful’ life is, and that

hardships (in terms of electrical or medical shortages) are the burden they must endure in

order to become better Muslims. Importantly young women are presented with illusion of

‘choice’ in future husbands, providing their ‘wali’ (guardian) approves of the match. In

marrying a fighter, women are given status and prestige, something recruiters allege they

16

will not get while living in the West.54 Furthermore Western women are ‘prized’ potential

wives (over local women) because they have shown their commitment to the cause by

undertaking the journey, and because they have higher levels of education, and maybe

linguistically closer to their future husbands. The material is replete with decontextualised

verses from the Quran and the Hadith (stories of the Prophet Mohammed’s life). They aim

to show how men can emulate the life of the prophet if they live in their Caliphate.

However in contrast to carrying out these domestic roles in the UK, in Islamic State it is

alleged women can unite their private faith and life with their public/political goals. Islamic

State make it clear they do not anticipate women contributing to the ‘battlefield’, rather

they are to provide supporting and domestic roles but this is a ‘political choice’ as much as a

personal one.55 Images of women with weapons or dressed as a suicide bomber are signaled

as a sign of defence but also to signify their support of violent ‘jihad’ and to show off the

capability and weaponry available to fighters of Islamic state. Women are ‘trained’ in the

use of light weaponry but only to defend themselves or their children, or to serve in two

female-only moral police forces in IS territory – such as the Al-Khansaa Brigade56.

As the discussions show, the material offers a utopian vision57 of itself - it identifies a

problem with the world and living in the West, it presents an awe-inspiring and grand

solution (itself), argues that young Muslims are responsible for its realization, and offers

‘hope’ for a future. There is an underlying tension with this approach where it emphasises a

new ‘good life’ for potential recruits while simultaneously highlighting their belief in an

imminent apocalypse. However this does not render IS a ‘death cult’: rather, death and

violence is for a purpose - the protection of the new proto-state, and its ‘citizens’. They link

these global narratives of masculinity, politics and femininity to ideas about individuals’

behaviours, by bridging the individual, or private world, with public global narratives. Islamic

State has been more successful in that than other groups.

Conclusions

17

Our understanding of how people become involved in terrorism and violent extremism has

transformed since the turn of the century. That transformation occurred at the same time

that ‘radicalisation’ took over as the dominant framework for considering questions around

terrorist psychology, motivation and recruitment. Yet, is it a case that the major

breakthroughs in understanding have happened because ‘radicalisation’ is a genuinely

useful concept that has facilitated this progress? Or is it simply the inevitable result of the

massive amount of research which has been focused on terrorism and terrorists in the wake

of 9/11?

While radicalisation as a concept has troublesome baggage, it has nevertheless worked as

an overarching theme for research on questions looking at support for and involvement in

violent extremism. In this regard, it has arguably proven both more flexible and more

cohesive than the previous frameworks. It has almost certainly made it easier to connect

together disparate research findings across a range of academic disciplines. Combined then

with the huge and sustained increase in scientific research across the area, significant

progress seems almost inevitable.

Yet, while progress has been made, there are still very significant gaps in our understanding.

Much of the evidence base remains seriously weak. Good quality studies have trickled in,

but more are still needed. At this stage, it is clearly critical to remember that radicalisation is

the result of many factors, some of which are about the individual involved, and some of

which relate to their environment (including family and community). The range of factors

involved is extensive, and the result is that radicalisation processes are complex and varied.

Radicalisation itself is not a fixed state, but is dynamic, and changing events and factors can

either deepen radicalisation or bring about de-radicalisation.

We also need to be careful in terms of how we think about the broader role of

radicalisation. A subtle assumption has spread that ‘radicalisation’ as a phenomenon is the

major root cause of terrorism. Yet, it is surely more accurate to see radicalisation as the

recruitment processes. Other causes drive these processes, and it is these causes which

merit attention and intervention. Added to this, many models of radicalisation seem weakly

linked to the evidence we have regarding the structural causes of terrorism.58 When

18

different models are used to design or justify a variety of counter-terrorism policies and

programmes, care is needed to look beyond the headline banner of radicalisation and pay

attention to the causes identified within that model as key factors. Failing to do that, risks

leading counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism down false roads.

1 See for example A. Silke, ‘Becoming a Terrorist’, in A. Silke, (ed.), Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences (Chichester: Wiley, 2003), pp.29-53. 2 M. Sedgwick, “The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.22, No.4, (2010), pp.479-494. 3 J. Horgan and K. Braddock, "Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization programs", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2010), pp.267-291. 4 A. Schmid, "Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: A conceptual discussion and literature review", ICCT Research Paper 97 (2013), p.22. 5 See, for example, A. Richards, Conceptualizing Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 6 For some good reviews of some of the most relevant models see: R. Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research", Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, (2011), pp.7-62; M. King and D. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, No. 4, (2011), pp.602-622; and, H. Allan, A. Glazzard, S. Jesperson, S. Reddy-Tumu and E. Winterbotham, Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015). 7 F. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration", American Psychologist Vol. 60, No. 2 (2005): 161. 8 A. Silke & J. Schmidt-Petersen, ‘The Golden Age? What the 100 most cited articles in Terrorism Studies tell us’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2015) DOI:10.1080/09546553.2015.1064397 9 The model was first outlined in: C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.20, No.3 (2008), pp.415-433; with an expanded description provided later in C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, Friction: How radicalization happens to them and us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 10 C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.20, No.3 (2008), p.416. 11 C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, ‘Individual and group mechanisms of radicalization.’ Protecting the homeland from international and domestic terrorism threats: Current multi-disciplinary perspectives on root causes, the role of ideology, and programs for counter-radicalization and disengagement (2010), pp.82-91. 12 A. Kruglanski, M. Gelfand, J. Bélanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hetiarachchi and R. Gunaratna, ‘The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism’, Political Psychology, Vol.35, No.1 (2014), pp.69-93. 13 M. Dugas and A. Kruglanski, ‘The quest for significance model of radicalization: implications for the management of terrorist detainees’, Behavioral Sciences & the Law, Vol.32, No.3 (2014), pp.423-39. 14 A. Kruglanski, M. Gelfand and R. Gunaratna, ‘Terrorism as means to an end: How political violence bestows significance’, in P. R. Shaver & M. Mikulincer (Eds.), Meaning, mortality, and choice: The social psychology of existential concerns (pp. 203–212), (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2012). 15 A. Kruglanski, M. Gelfand, J. Bélanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hetiarachchi and R. Gunaratna, ‘The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism’, Political Psychology, Vol.35, No.1 (2014), pp.69-93. 16 University of Amsterdam, Empirical Study (revised). SAFIRE: Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators for & Responses to Radicalisation (2013) http://www.safire-project-results.eu/deliverables.html

19

17 J. Marret, A. Feddes, L. Mann, B. Doosje, and H. Griffioen-Young, ‘An overview of the SAFIRE project: a scientific approach to finding indicators of and responses to radicalisation’, EXIT-Deutschland: Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur, Vol.1 (2013), pp.123-148. 18 H. Allan, A. Glazzard, S. Jesperson, S. Reddy-Tumu and E. Winterbotham, Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015). 19 A. Silke, ‘Holy warriors exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi radicalization’, European Journal of Criminology, Vol.5, No.1 (2008), pp.99-123. 20 M. Sageman, Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 21 E. Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe. Clingendael Security Paper No. 2. (Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006). 22 A. Kule and Z. Gül, ‘How indiviudals join terrorist organizations in Turkey: An empirical study on DHKP-C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah’, The Global: A Journal of Policy and Strategy, Vol.1, No.1 (2015). 23 R. Borum, ‘Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in violent extremism’, Behavioral Sciences & the Law, Vol.32, No.3 (2014), pp.286-305. 24 A. Silke, The Psychology of Counter-terrorism (Oxon: Routledge 2010). 25 See for example, J. Horgan, ‘From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.618, No.1 (2008), pp.80-94; and, R. Borum, ‘Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in violent extremism’, Behavioral Sciences & the Law, Vol.32, No.3 (2014), pp.286-305. 26 See, for example, A. Bandura, ‘Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism’, in W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, states of mind, pp. 161-191, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990); T. Pyszczynski, A. Abdollahi, S. Solomon, J. Greenberg, F. Cohen and D. Weise, ‘Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: The great Satan versus the axis of evil’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol.32, No.4 (2006), pp.525-37; and, A. Silke, Terrorism: All That Matters (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2014). 27 A. Kruglanski, M. Gelfand, J. Bélanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hetiarachchi and R. Gunaratna, ‘The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism’, Political Psychology, Vol.35, No.1 (2014), pp.69-93. 28 A. Kruglanski, M. Gelfand, J. Bélanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hetiarachchi and R. Gunaratna, ‘The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism’, Political Psychology, Vol.35, No.1 (2014), pp.69-93. 29 K. Bhui, B. Everitt and E. Jones, ‘Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social Assets Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance against Violent Radicalisation?’ PLoS ONE Vol.9, No.9 (2014), e105918. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918 30 See for example: C. Dean, ‘The Healthy Identity Intervention: The UK’s Development of a Psychologically Informed Intervention to address Extremist Offending’, in A. Silke (ed.) Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform, pp. (Oxon: Routledge, 2014); J. Liht and J. Savage, ‘Identifying young Muslims susceptible to violent radicalisation: Psychological theory and recommendations’, in M. Sharpe (ed.) Suicide bombers: The psychological, religious and other imperatives, pp5-25, (Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2008); and, S. Schwartz, C. Dunkel and A. Waterman, ‘Terrorism: An identity Theory Perspective’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol.32 (2009), pp.537-559. 31 V. Lub, ‘Polarisation, radicalization and social policy. Evaluating the theories of change’, Evidence and Policy, Vol.9, (2013), pp.165–183. 32 A. Feddes, L. Mann and B. Doosje, ‘Increasing self-esteem and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: a longitudinal quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on adolescents with a dual identity’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol.45, (2015), pp.400–411. doi: 10.1111/jasp.12307 33 University of Amsterdam, Empirical Study (revised). SAFIRE: Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators for & Responses to Radicalisation (2013) http://www.safire-project-results.eu/deliverables.html 34 T. Pyszczynski, S. Solomon and J. Greenberg, In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002). 35 T. Pyszczynski, A. Abdollahi, S. Solomon, J. Greenberg, F. Cohen and D. Weise, ‘Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: The great Satan versus the axis of evil’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol.32, No.4 (2006), pp.525-37 36 See for example: R. O’Gorman and A. Silke, ‘Terrorism as altruism: An evolutionary model for understanding terrorist psychology’, in M. Taylor, J. Roach and K. Pease (eds.) Evolutionary Psychology and Terrorism, PP.149-

20

163, (Oxon: Routledge, 2015); and, Z. Reeve, ‘Terrorism as Parochial Altruism.’ Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 3-5 September 2015. 37 J. Bélanger, J. Caouette, K. Sharvit and M. Dugas, ‘The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.107, No.3 (2014), pp.494-515. 38 University of Amsterdam, Empirical Study (revised). SAFIRE: Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators for & Responses to Radicalisation (2013) http://www.safire-project-results.eu/deliverables.html 39 Ibid. 40 For example, see: M. Bloom, ‘Death Becomes Her: The Changing Nature of Women's Role in Terror’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, (2010), pp.91-98. 41 J. Klausen, ‘Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol.38, No.1 (2015), pp.1-22. 42 “The Return of Khilafah" Dabiq. No.1. http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf 43 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/11011634/Islamic-States-new-icon-is-a-hipster-jihadi.html 44 Melanie Smith and Erin M. Saltman, ‘Til Martyrdom do us part: gender and the ISIS phenomenon’, Strategic Dialogue, (2015). Available at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf 45 See for example: http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/overview/ 46 For example https://v.storyful.com/production/44/62/85/9f/syfl-27656-e43ecf78.mp4 47 “From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions. Dabiq. No. 11 http://www.clarionproject.org/docs/Issue%2011%20-%20From%20the%20battle%20of%20Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20war%20of%20coalitions.pdf 48 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/new-issue-of-dabiq-features-interview-with-widow-of-paris-gunmen-2.php 49 See for example: M. Conway, ‘From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence of the Internet as a new form of violent radical milieu’, CTX: Combatting Terrorism Exchange, Vol.2, No.4 (2012), pp.12-22; and A. Silke, ‘The Internet & Terrorist Radicalisation: The Psychological Dimension’, in H. Dienel, Y. Sharan, C. Rapp and N. Ahituv (eds.) Terrorism and the Internet: Threats, Target groups, Deradicalisation strategies, pp.27-40, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010). 50 http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/new-undercover-investigation-into-british-women-supporting-isis 51 RAN "Briefing Notes: Gender and Islamic State”, Women and Radicalisation Conference Proceedings, Copenhagen, 2nd November 2015. 52 Research private correspondence with de-radicalisation workers with Dr K. E. Brown 53 Sarah El Deeb, “For an IS fighter, a paid honeymoon in the Caliphate’s heart”, Associate Press 26 May 2015. Availabe at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/56445f3cc1ca4f51af716c71d54ed483/fighter-paid-honeymoon-caliphates-heart 54 Smith and Saltman (2015) op.cit. See also K. Brown, ‘Utopian Vision in Jihadi Gender Politics’. Durnstein Symposium, Austria, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/11637582/Utopian_Visions_in_Jihadi_Gender_Politics 55http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11429118/What-is-luring-Western-women-to-Syria-to-join-Isil.html 56 “Women’s Manifesto of the Al-Khansaa Brigade’ Translated by the Quilliam Foundation January 2015 57 K. Brown, ‘Utopian Vision in Jihadi Gender Politics’. Durnstein Symposium, Austria, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/11637582/Utopian_Visions_in_Jihadi_Gender_Politics 58 See for example, B. Lia and K. Skjolberg, Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature. (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004).

21