Paper delivered to SAIS, Washington DC, June 2001

Bobbing for Rotten Apples:

Geopolitical agendas in Ukraine and the Western NIS

By Anatol Lieven

[Anatol Lieven is a Senior Associate in the Russia and Eurasia Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. From 1990 to 1996 he was a correspondent for The Times (London) in the former Soviet Union and Russia. His latest book, Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry was published in 1999 by the United States Institute of Peace.]

The territory covered by the former Soviet republics lying between the

Baltic and the Black Sea constitutes one of the more stable areas of the world today, and

this relative stability may well last for decades to come. It may however be threatened in

future by four factors: the geopolitical ambitions of Russia; the geopolitical ambitions

and misapplied policies of Western states and organisations; economic change; and the

spread of democracy, civil society, and mass political mobilisation. For while the present

order looks quite stable, it certainly does not look either just or economically and socially

progressive. It is founded on the rule of corrupt and malign elites, and the acceptance of

that rule by atomised, demoralised, cynical and apathetic populations.

If there is a serious threat to stability in this region over the next decade or

so, it is likely to come from some combination of internal discontent with external

pressure. This general failure of state-building and westernisation, not Russian

imperialism as such, is the greatest threat to the region and to western interests there. In

fact, if Russian hegemony is established in a limited way and through the exercise of

“soft” – or at least softish – power rather than military coercion, there is no reason why it

should be particularly harmful either for the region or for Western interests.

This is not true for the Baltic States, which like the Central Europeans

have already proceeded far down the path to full westernisation. For them, to be drawn

back into the Russian sphere of influence would indeed be an economic, cultural and

political disaster. Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova however are not proceeding towards the

West. On the contrary, the gap between them and the Central Europeans is growing wider

and wider, and if the Balts, Poles and others join the European Union, this gap will

become a yawning gulf, unbridgeable for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, a

measure of economic re-integration with Russia and other former Soviet states may be

not only a rational path – it may be the only one available.

These statements are calculated to cause howls of outrage among a large

part of the academic and policy-making community dealing with this region. But then, a

large part of this community has been so comprehensively wrong about developments in

this region over the past decade that its opinions need not concern us overmuch. Much of

Western analysis has resembled an elderly cold-war carthorse whose fading eyesight has

been additionally hampered by two enormous blinkers.

One of these is an obsession with the alleged threat from Russia, so that all

developments in the region are judged by their relationship to this one standard. Those

Westerners who look out of this eye have tended vastly to exaggerate the malignance, the

intelligence, the cohesion and most importantly the power of Russia and Russian regimes,

while grossly neglecting both the critical importance of internal political and economic

factors and the importance of Western actions in determining Russian policy.

One aspect of this has been a persistent and pernicious confusion between

the terms “empire” and “sphere of influence”.i A full-scale Russian “empire” in the pre-

1917 sense, or the recreation of a unified federal state like the Soviet Union, is almost

certainly impossible, and is not even desired by the Russian economic elites. Not merely

is it far beyond Russia’s power, but it would be resisted by the mass of the population in

the other former Soviet republics. If there is one thing on which the overwhelming

majority even of “pro-Russian” Ukrainians agree, it is their utter unwillingness to see

their sons sent off to die in Russian wars in the Caucasus or Central Asia, and their

happiness that Ukrainian statehood makes this impossible. To judge by my own

researches, that is also true of most Belarusians. So the warnings of Zbigniew Brzezinski,

William Odom and others of Moscow being able to mobilise the populations of these

states behind some policy of imperial expansion threatening to the Central Europeans and

the West are almost certainly fantasies. A sphere of influence is not an empire.

Furthermore, for the moment at least the kind of sphere of influence

desired by the dominant forces in Moscow is itself of a rather limited kind. Above all, the

focus of recent Russian governments has been on limiting the spread of Western – and

especially US – military influence and ties, while defending and expanding Russian

economic interests. This latter strategy is often conducted by means of political pressure

– but then, that is also true of the ways in which Western governments operate on behalf

of their coporporations.

The second blinker which has obstructed Western vision concerning the

former Communist bloc is the quasi-theological doctrine of “Transition”, whereby states

and societies are seen as proceeding along a linear path towards (or away from) “free-

market democracy”. As Alexander Motyl has pointed out, this Western discourse recalls

in all its essential points the dominant language of modernisation and development

adopted by the US and the West in general in the 1950s. At that time, this was a response

to the end of the Western colonial empires, and an attempt to give a conceptual and

ideological framework to policies of developing the former colonies in a pro-Western,

anti-Communist direction.ii

Today, the ideology of transition has been formulated in response to the

collapse of the Soviet Empire. Almost half a century on, it should should now be obvious

that the modernising programme of the 1950s and 60s was only partially and patchily

successful. It had tremendous results in the Far East, stagnated in South Asia, and failed

altogether in most of Africa, with disastrous consequences. In South East Asia and Latin

America, it has lurched forward in a highly uneven and unstable way, with periods of

high growth interspersed with shattering reverses. Across most of the former empires,

from the Philippines to Peru, the characteristic regime has been some form of “parasitic

semi-authoritarianism”.

In other words, not just the decisions of particular governments, but

historical, social and cultural factors, and the characters of particular national elites, have

all been of critical importance in determining outcomes in different countries and regions.

So too has been the level of Western aid available, and how it was used. On the basis of

all the evidence so far, I can see no reason why this very mixed picture will not also be

true of the former Soviet bloc, with westernisation succeeding brilliantly in some cases,

unevenly in others, and elsewhere failing altogether.

When – as all too often - combined with a comprehensive ignorance of

history, the Transition doctrine has led its proponents to ignore the possibility of multiple

outcomes for different states – which is after all the pattern of most of the world. For a

whole set of historical reasons (including of course the fact that they spent a much shorter

time under full-scale Soviet totalitarianism) the “transition” model works for the Central

Europeans and the Balts; but in the words of Professor Jim Millar (quoted in the

introduction to my book: Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power), “The default mode in

today’s world is not a market economy. It is stagnation, corruption, and great inequalities

of income”. Nor of course is there anything at all “abnormal” about semi-authoritarian

states in the world today. The belief that because they share a geographical continent with

Western Europe (or that their populations are white) the former western Soviet republics

are destined to follow West European paths is an act of faith, not analysis, and one which

so far has few underpinnings in actual developments. The “transition” approach also

misses absolutely critical ambiguities in the field of modernising development: most

notably, the ways in which economic growth can increase, rather than diminish social and

ethnic tensions; and in which mass democracy can not only itself contribute to these

tensions, but act against economic progress. The briefest glance at European history in

the first half of the 20th Century, or that of parts of Asia in the second half, should make

this all too clear. For example, one of the bloodiest secessionist rebellions in India

erupted in Punjab, the richest and most economically progressive Indian state – because

economic growth had disrupted hitherto stable socio-political relationships, and its

unequal distribution had increased the resentment of the poor and excluded.

i For an entire book based on the failure to make this distinction, see William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus” (Hudson Institute, 1995).ii Lecture at the National Defence University, Fort McNair, October 25th 2000.

A third mistaken tendency is perhaps natural to any regional field of study: this is

the tendency of those engaged in any field to exaggerate both its importance to their own

societies, and the enormous dangers lurking in the region should their advice not be

taken. Those westerners who are obsessed with restricting the power and influence of

Russia are particularly guilty in this regard. In fact, however, these former Soviet

republics are not in the short term a great geopolitical prize for the West, and would be an

unsupportable burden for Russia, above all because of their tiny and thoroughly rotten

economies – and this goes a long way to explain why neither the West nor Russia has

made the economic sacrifices, or taken the geopolitical risks necessary to bring these

states firmly into a western or a Russian sphere of influence.

US geopoliticians high on too much Mackinder may continuously declare that this

area is a “vital US interest” – but when it comes to paying or fighting, the Treasury and

the Pentagon know better. These states are of course much more important to Russia –

but so are several other areas, and Russia has neither the men nor the money to deal with

them all, or even some of them. As far as the West is concerned, our truly vital interest in

this region is to avoid conflicts which could indirectly destabilise areas where we really

do have vital interests: Central and even Western Europe, and the Middle East. At

present, however, such conflicts look very remote, especially when compared to other

regions of importance to the West.

A quick tour of the world makes this very obvious. Unlike in South Asia, the

region embracing the Baltic States, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and western Russia

contains no simmering military conflict between nuclear-armed states. There are no

religious or national terrorist movements. With the very brief exception of Transdniestria

in 1992, there have in fact been no military conflicts in the region since the end of Soviet

rule. Once again with the exception of Transdniestria, there are no armed secessionist

groups. This region lacks the violent ethnic, ethno-religious, and ethnic-social hatreds of

South and South-East Asia, the Balkans, and parts of Latin America.

There is no threat that a revolutionary and criminal organisation might take

control of a major state, as in Colombia; nor that states themselves might wholly fail and

collapse into violent anarchy, as in much of Africa. The region presents certain “broad

security threats” to Central and Western Europe in terms of illegal immigration and

organised crime – but nothing like those stemming from North Africa or Central America

(in the case of the US) - one key reason being that this region is in steep demographic

decline, so there is much less pressure from unemployed young men seeking work or

engaging in radical politics. Finally, of course, on all these scores the western NIS look

vastly safer and more encouraging than the former Soviet regions of the Caucasus and

Central Asia.

If the region retains these characteristics in the years to come, there is no

particular reason why it should generate any really critical problems for Western policy.

Insofar as these problems exist, it is partly as a result of choices we ourselves have made.

By presenting NATO not as a Western defensive military alliance but as the premier

European security organisation and a reward for and guarantee for democratic state-

building, we have made it very difficult to reject Baltic membership, and thereby laid the

basis for a potential crisis in relations with Russia. As argued by Michael Mandelbaum,

by defining or “fetishising” “Europe” as the European Union, we have increased already

massive feelings of inferiority among non-members, and generated a movement to join

the Union on the part of states which have no realistic chance whatsoever of doing so.iii

The effects of this kind of statement on the sensibilities of Russians – and indeed

Ukrainians - is not hard to imagine. By drawing these clear lines we have in fact probably

contributed in the long run to isoalting Ukraine and other states in what may increasingly

become a loose form of Russian “camp”.

When it comes to overall Russian strategies towards the region, the most marked

change in recent years has been the comprehensive abandonment of attempts to turn the

CIS into an instrument for re-integration of the former Soviet space. The downgrading of

the CIS was symbolised in 1997 by Yeltsin’s decision to make Boris Berezovsky the

organisation’s Secretary (a post he held until 1999, without it appears ever taking a single

decision, launching a policy, or even occupying his office) – as a reward for his services

to Yeltsin, and a way of expanding his business influence in the region.

The appearance of GUUAM – the loose American-backed anti-Russian bloc of

Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova – made the emptiness of the CIS

as a vessel for common policies entirely obvious. GUUAM itself is not an organisation of

any great significance in terms of the real threats facing its members – in fact it recalls

the old gibe about the Non-Aligned Movement, “ten drowning men holding onto each

other”. There is nothing that Ukraine and the other GUUAM states can do to help

Uzbekistan against the islamist insurgency it is facing; nor is it likely in the near future

that Ukrainian peacekeepers will balance Russian ones in the southern Caucasus, given

iii Personal Communication.

the implacable opposition of Armenians and Abkhaz to their presence. Ukraine has

provided some modest help to Georgia in strengthening its armed forces – but the

Ukrainian armed forces themselves are not exactly models of modernity. Above all, there

is little that either GUUAM or the CIS can do to promote economic co-operation between

their members – especially in GUUAM’s case since so much of the trade between its

members continues to flow through Russia. Economic links between them are iof very

great importance, but they are negotiated bilaterally. As a result of all these factors, in the

course of 2000 GUUAM effectively shrank to GUA, with Uzbekistan and Moldova both

fading from most of the bloc’s (in any case embryonic) common programmes. At a

meeting in New York in September 2000, the leaders of the GUUAM states made various

pledges to revive the organisation, but given its record so far there are grounds for

considerable scepticism as to whether these will amount to much.iv

As for the CIS, its final death knell as a vehicle even for pragmatic co-operation

in limited fields has probably been sounded by Russia’s decision in 2000 to abandon the

CIS regime of common visa-free travel in favour of bilateral agreements. One motive for

this move may have been to exercise greater control over the movement of islamist

extremists, especially of course in the direction of Chechnya. Another, however, was

undoubtedly to acquire a new means of rewarding Russia’s friends and punishing her

opponents in the region – for two members of GUUAM in particular (Georgia and

Ukraine) are heavily dependent on remittances from their citizens working temporarily in

Russia.

iv See The Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Volume 6, issue 168, September 12th 2000. For the bloc’s previous decline, see the Monotor of March 10th 2000, Volume 6 issue 50, and the RFE/RL news release of May 17 2000, GUUAM Countries to Expand Cooperation. For attempts by representatives of the GUUAM states to advertise the importance of their bloc to the US Congress, see the RFE/RL report on the hearings of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 17th 2000.

Russia’s entire strategy in what Russians call the “Near Abroad” is now

based essentially on bilateral links with other former Soviet republics. These fall into four

main categories. First there are the close Russian allies: Belarus, Armenia, Kirghizstan

and Tajikistan. In all four cases, these are allies not in the first instance because of

Russian pressure, but because these countries (or at least their rulers) see their interest as

lying in a Russian alliance.

In the case of Belarus, this is because of the Lukashenko regime’s fear of

Western influence and its own internal opposition, and because of Belarus’s dependence

on subsidised energy and bartered goods from Russia. In the case of Armenia, it is

because of the role of Russian troops (and consequently, the Russian nuclear deterrent) as

the ultimate guarantee against a military intervention by Turkey on the side of Azerbaijan

(in the case of Armenia and Belarus, historical ties to Russia also of course play an

important role). For Kirghizstan, economic weakness makes the Akayev regime desperate

to retain close economic ties to Russia; and a security link to Russia is also seen as a

counter-balance to Uzbek hegemonic ambitions (and in the long run to the perceived

long-term demographic threat from China).

At the opposite end of the spectrum of Russian attitudes and policies, there

are the Baltic States, which are seen as fundamentally and implacably hostile to Russia

(though less so in the case of Lithuania, at least under left-leaning governments).v There

is no hope of turning them into allies or client states, unless – a distant possibility at

present - the Russian-speaking population of Latvia acquires citizenship and uses this to

turn Latvia into a bi-national state with close ties to Russia. On the whole, the Balts are

recognised to be in a different historical, cultural and geopolitical category from the

former Soviet republics proper.

To judge by Putin’s latest statements, Moscow has accomodated itself in

principle to them joining the European Union, which would mean a really radical turn

away from Russia’s sphere. However, Moscow remains determined if possible to prevent

them from joining NATO.vi It will also go on attacking the Latvians and Estonians over

the civil rights of their non-citizen Russian-speaking minorities – in part because this

issue is genuinely infuriating for many Russians, but also as a means of trying to drive a

wedge between the Balts and the West.

v The Russians have some reason for this perception of the Balts, though of course in the past decade they have of course contributed to Baltic hostility by their own actions. For a particularly strong anti-Russian speech by a Baltic see Associated Press, “Latvian President warns Against a more aggressive Russia”, Riga 1st May 2000. For continued Baltic pressure to join NATO, see The Jamestown Monitor, vol.6 issue 103, 25th May 2000.vi See Paul Starobin, “Is NATO About to Make a Bad Move in the Baltics?, Business Week, 13th November 2000.

If the next US administration pushes hard for NATO enlargement to the

Baltic, and succeeds in enlisting the other leading NATO members behind this, a crisis

with Russia will result, and Moscow will seek to retaliate against US interests. However,

this will not be in the Baltic, or at least not directly and not in the short term. Russia does

not have the military means to invade and hold the Baltic States, nor would the Russian

elites contemplate provoking the worldwide outrage which would result from an open

attack on a member of the United nations – quite apart from the certainty of massive

Western economic retaliation.

Moreover, at present, the national solidity of the Balts, and the political

apathy of the Russian-speaking populations of the Baltic States, give Russia very few

opportunities to exploit internal political or ethnic dissent (a very different picture from

the Southern caucasus in the early 1990s, for example). No, Russian retaliation would

come elsewhere: in the abandonment of arms control treaties and limits on the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in attempts to hit western interests,

allies and even soldiers in genuinely unstable areas like the Balkans, the Caucasus and

the Middle East. The Baltic States as such however would have “got away”.

A third category of former Soviet states should perhaps not be called a category at

all, since it contains only two very different members: Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

These are states with which Russia has no serious geopolitical differences, but which

cannot be regarded as true Russian allies. Kazakhstan, for example, is compelled to

pursue close relations with Russia both because of its dependence on Russian transport

links and because of the presence of a huge Russian minority. However, in this case an

element of de facto compulsion is present which is lacking in the cases of Armenia,

Belarus and Kirghizstan. Kazakhstan has of course not only successfully sought massive

western investments in oil and gas extraction, but also actively pursued military co-

operation with NATO through its membership of Partnership for Peace. This has been

very irritating to Russia, though on the other hand the co-operation is so limited, and

Kazakhstan so far from NATO’s borders, that this has not produced the allergic reaction

caused by NATO activities in Ukraine or the Baltic.

Finally, there is the GUUAM groups of former Soviet republics – states which

have explicitly rejected a Russian military alliance, while continuing pragmatic policies

of seeking good relations with Russia where possible. With these states, Russia is

conducting an elaborate dance, in which the steps, movements, and partners differ

according to local circumstances, events on the ground, the needs of the states concerned,

the varying influence of different elites in Moscow and the other capitals, and the

fluctuating power of Russia to apply pressure or offer benefits. As has been very well

said, this dance is “not a tango, but a minuet”.

Thus over the past year, the latest Chechen war has led Russia to increase its use

of both sticks and carrots with regard to Georgia and Azerbaijan. In a (partly successful)

effort to get these states to help cut off supply lines to the Chechen fighters, Russia has

agreed to close two of its four bases in Georgia and even begun to withdraw some of its

troops. On the other hand, it is digging in its heels over the other two, and is also trying to

put pressure on Georgia both by intermittently threatening to launch cross-border raids if

Chechen bases are established in Georgia, and via the above-mentioned threat to

intriduce a visa system for Georgians who wish to visit Russia. With regard to

Azerbaijan, there have been hints that Russia might tilt to Baku’s side over the details of

a Karabakh peace settlement (not ones I would take very seriously, but enough to alarm

the Armenians). Perhaps more importantly, Moscow can hang over the Aliev regime the

question of Russia’s hostile interference, neutrality, or support in the event of Heidar

Aliev’s death and moves to block the succession of his son, Ilham.

But while developments in the Caucasus have generated most drama, tragedy, and

rhetorical expressions of Western concern and interest, the only really important

GUUAM state has far as the West is concerned is Ukraine. As the past decade has

demonstrated again and again, the Caucasus can fall into war and anarchy without any

serious effect whatsoever on the economies or basic security interests of the West – and

the only way that this could change would be if Turkey were to become involved

militarily against Russia. It is quite otherwise with Ukraine, a vastly larger state which

now borders directly on NATO and may soon be a neighbour of the EU. As a banker put

it, in the event of a war between Ukraine and Russia, or within Ukraine, “you wouldn’t

be able to catch outside investment in Europe in a fishnet stocking, it would run away so

fast.” This would have been a disaster on a world scale, with consequences for the whole

world. Fortunatel, it was avoided, and given a modicum of restraint on the part of both

Russia and the West, it is unlikely to recur.

This is not because Ukraine has made great economic and political progress in the

direction of the West. In the case of the Baltic States, this progress has been critical in

securing their independence and stability: it has seriously engaged Western support,

reconfirmed their separate identity in the eyes of Russia, and most importantly of all,

greatly reduced the internal ethnic discontent which might otherwise have resulted from

the citizenship and language policies of Latvia and Estonia.

Instead, part of the reason for the lack of serious tension between Ukraine and

Russia in recent years has stemmed precisely from the fact that both countries have been

unsuccessful in their half-hearted attempts at westernisation. As a result, on the one hand

Ukraine shows no signs of joining the West in a really meaningful way, so that Russia is

under no pressure to take radical action to prevent this. On the other hand (unlike in

1992-93), because the situation in Russia is so miserable for the mass of the population,

and because of Russia’s wars in the Caucasus, the Russian-speaking populations of

eastern and Southern Ukraine have for the moment at least lost much of their active

desire for reunion with Russia, so that the threat of an internal conflict (whether or not

encouraged from Moscow) has greatly receded..

The lack of effective economic reform in Ukraine, combined with the extreme

level of corruption and the failure to institutionalise democracy, make it extremely

unlikely that in the foreseeable future Ukraine will join either the European Union or

NATO. For example, in a recent report, Transparency International ranked Ukraine as the

third most corrupt country in the world – a position by no means easy to achieve.vii Given

the great difficulty faced by the EU in incorporating even the relatively advanced Central

European states, the chances of Brussels looking seriously at Ukraine for many years to

come are zero.

As already demonstrated, NATO’s criteria for membership are not nearly so

strict or complex; but here too, Ukraine’s poor reputation for reform and democracy are

vii See Reuters, 13th September 2000.

strong disincentives, as are the decrepitude of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the

vehement opposition of Russia. In any case, desire both in the US and western Europe for

a further round of NATO expansion is at present very low; and if the enlargement process

resumes, for a considerable number of years the alliance’s attention will be focused on

the extremely vexed question of Baltic membership, and how to deal with Russia’s

objections to this without completely destroying co-operation with Russia in other fields.

The West has sought to soften this rejection of Ukraine in a number of ways,

with the USA and NATO taking the lead: statements from Washington of Ukraine’s

importance as a strategic partner; the NATO-Ukraine Charter of 1997; joint exercises as

part of Partnership for Peace. The EU signed a “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”

with Ukraine in 1994, which provides for various forms of limited cooperation, but these

have not developed very far, while trade with the EU is hampered both by Ukrainian

economic weakness and EU anti-dumping legislation, which in part is really crypto-

protectionist.

NATO’s moves with regard to Ukraine have been enough to irritate both the

Russian government and local Russians in Crimea. Cooler Russian heads however

understand very well that they fall very short indeed of either any kind of promise of

future NATO membership or of a real security guarantee; and while NATO troops may

come to Ukraine on exercises, Russia retains a strong and permanent (at least in Russian

eyes) military base on Ukrainian soil, at Sevastopol. As far as economic influence is

concerned, while the West seeks (mostly in vain) to influence Ukrainian economic policy

in a Western direction, Western direct investment has remained pitifully small. In the ten

years to 1999, this amounted to a mere $3.2 billion – one third the per capita rate of

Russia, and barely a quarter even of that of Romania, one of Eastern Europe’s worst

economic laggards. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s chronic indebtedness to Russia for gas

supplies is increasing the opportunities for Russia to use pressure to increase the stake of

Russian corporations in the Ukrainian economy. Over the past year, Ukraine’s economy

has begun to grow – but this growth in itself is not nearly enough to set it on the path

towards Western Europe. For this – and indeed to make that growth stable – an immense

number of detailed changes would have to be made to the Ukrainian state, legal order,

political system social fabric – of the kind which the Central Europeans and Balts have

taken, but the Ukrainians, Russians and others have barely begun.viii

Above all, the anger of West Europeans over Ukraine’s theft of Russian gas

exports to the EU across its territory, and the general mood of disillusionment with

Ukraine, has created a real possibility that a new gas export pipeline to the West will be

constructed through Belarus and Poland, bypassing Ukraine altogether.ix The EU is

actively interested in this, and at present it seems to be mainly the opposition of Poland

which is preventing it from being put into effect. The Poles of course fear that to build

this new pipeline would deprive Ukraine of its only means of extracting what is in fact

subsidised (or rather partially free) gas from Russia. Moscow would then be able to

threaten Ukraine with a complete shut-off of gas supplies, bringing the Ukrainian

economy to a halt, badly damaging the economic interests of key Ukrainian magnates,

and quite possibly stirring up mass discontent from a hungry and freezing population.x

This threat is a real one, and it embodies a real threat of crisis within Ukraine,

between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West. Whether such a crisis viii See for example the letter to President Kuchma by the US and Canadian ambassadors criticising the failure to press ahead with budgetary reform, and the attack on it in Fakty I Kommentarii (Kiev) 29th September 2000; and Mikhailo Grishchenko, “Willing Accomplices: Can Ukraine break free of its deeply-rooted culture of corruption?”, Transitions Online, 2nd October 2000.

does in fact occur will depend not just on whether the pipeline is built, but what Russia

seeks to gain from its resulting grip on Ukraine. Essentially, the question is whether

Russia will extract economic concessions, increasing its “soft power” over Ukraine; or

whether it will seek to lock Ukraine into a full-scale military alliance, as with Armenia

and Belarus. Or to extend the dance analogy used above, is Russia prepared to continue a

minuet with Ukraine, with the music altered somewhat to Russia’s taste, or is it

determined to lock Ukraine in a tango?

A military alliance a la Belarus is precisely the sort of highly symbolic issue not

only to bring tens of thousands of Ukrainian nationalists onto the streets, but to gain them

much wider sympathy in the Ukrainian population - even if such a treaty were in fact of

limited real significance. For if one characteristic of Ukraine since independence has

been the political apathy of most of the population (as in Russia too, for that matter)

another has been the considerable mobilising capacity of the radical nationalists when

key issues of Ukrainian statehood and independence have been at stake. This mobilising

capacity has helped offset the superiority in numbers of the more “pro-Russian” East and

South. In the wake of the elections of 1994, it played a key part in leading the new

President, Leonid Kuchma, to abandon his campaign promises to make Russian a second

official language in Ukraine. I am not even sure that when push came to shove, a majority

of Russians in Ukraine would retain their enthusiasm for closer links with Russia, if a

military alliance were presented as threatening to draw Ukraine into Russia’s wars.

ix See Tammy Lynch, “Ukraine: A New Territorial Pact for Europe?”, The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Vol.V, no.15, 25th October 2000; Michael Lelyveld, “Russia: Plans for Alternative Energy Routes gain Momentum, RFE/RL Weekday Digest, 25th October 2000; Reuters, 20 October 2000: “Gazprom Sets New Pipe Plan, Neighbours Guarded”.x The position of ordinary Ukrainians as regards fuel supplies is quite bad enough as it is. See Viktor Luhovyk, “Running on Empty”, Transitions Online March 2000.

If on the other hand Russia used its greater influence in a more subtle way, this

might not provoke any great public reaction in Ukraine – and Ukraine itself appears to be

edging in this direction as the threat of a gas bypass hardens.xi Ordinary Ukrainians may

vote for the magnate (or “oligarch”) political parties because they have no real choice,

but that does not mean that they feel a strong commitment to preventing oligarch-

controlled property from being ceded to Russia in return for gas debts. Other private

Russian demands might be for a diminution of joint activities with NATO under PfP, and

possibly a renegotiation and extention of the Sevastopol lease. The latter was a

potentially explosive issue in the mid-1990s, but in the years since then the two fleets

seem to have settled down to a reasonably amicable co-existence, and the presence of the

Russian navy in Crimea has not proved destabilising for Ukraine. I doubt that this issue

will provoke a major nationalist upsurge in Ukraine in future.

Finally, Russia might seek concessions from the Ukrainian government in the

field of Russian language education and public use. Once again, this would depend on

what precisely Russia demanded, and how crude and overt the pressure was. A demand

that Ukraine be turned into a formally bi-national state in linguistic terms, with Russian

as a second official language (as in Belarus) would cause utter outrage and really

dangerous protests from the more radical nationalists. If however the demand involved

something more like freezing and institutionalising the existing unofficial regional status

quo in eastern and southern Ukraine, with Russian made an official language at oblast

level in these areas – once again, this might pass without too much protest. It would also

xi See Stefan Wagstyl and Charles Clover, “Ukraine May Offer Gas Deals”, The Financial Times, 23rd October 2000.

by the way be a perfectly legitimate move given the repeatedly expressed wishes of a

majority of the population in these regions.

While the ukrainianisation of many Russian-language schools in Ukraine is a

source of considerable irritation and worry in Moscow, outside the schools and state

institutions, Russian remains the dominant language of the economy and everyday life

even in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev; nor are there any barriers whatsoever to the progress

of Russians (and Russian-speakers from other ethnic groups) within the Ukrainian elites.

Similarly, there are no barriers to the advancement of ethnic Ukrainians in Russia.

Beneath a certain amount of hostile rhetoric, relations between these two peoples remain

very good, and intermarriage is so high that in many Ukrainian cities it is almost

impossible to find a family which is not mixed. This means that in the end, Russian fear

and resentment of ukrainianisation has been limited, both in Russia itself and among the

Russians of Ukraine.

So I could be wrong, but I think that on balance, even if Russia does build a

pipeline to bypass Ukraine, the resulting pressure will be more towards the minuet than

the tango end of the spectrum. In the words of Dr Taras Kuzio (a member of the

Ukrainian diaspora who is in general extremely suspicious of Russian behaviour and

motives):

‘Russia is perhaps at last ready to accept that Ukraine is not Belarus and must be

treated in a more equal, conciliatory manner than has been the case until now. It was,

after all, Russia's poor treatment of Ukraine after Kuchma's election in 1994 that pushed

Ukraine toward NATO. Russia's new attitude might yield better results in wooing

Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told his visiting counterpart, Zlenko, at

the end of last month that Russia will develop "equal, mutually advantageous and

friendly relations with Ukraine taking into account the interests of both countries."

Relations with Ukraine will therefore be built "on the principles of respect for Ukraine's

sovereignty and independence," he added.’ xii

As already argued, overall Russian weakness means that at present its conception

of a sphere of influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union is not so much a

positive as a defensive or negative one. It is focused chiefly on the exclusion of rival

sources of geopolitical influence and power, above all the United States. Unlike in the

case of the Baltic States, Ukraine’s lack of progress towards the West means that there is

little pressure on Russia at present – and probably for a long time to come – to take really

vigorous and dangerous counter-measures in order to keep Ukraine in its sphere.

This closeness and intermingling on the ground between Russians and Ukrainians

suggests that if Russia does exert its influence in Ukraine in a restrained way, it seems

quite possible that it may regain elements of a hegemonic position without this setting off

a massive reaction from within Ukraine, or triggering a strong response from the West.

On the one hand, support in Ukraine for independent Ukrainian statehood is quite strong;

but on the other, mass cynicism about Ukrainian elite politics, and the intertwining of

politics and business interests is also very high. In the East and South of the country, even

people who are by now strongly committed to the idea of an independent Ukrainian state

also want to see close and amicable relations with Russia, and are very hostile to radical

Ukrainian nationalism. If Moscow uses its influence quietly to accumulate a dominant

position for Russian firms in the Ukrainian economy, this seems unlikely to create a

major public backlash – especially if the Russian financial-industrial groups are careful to xii Taras Kuzio, “Giving Substance to the Ukrainian-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’, RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 216, Part I, 7 November 2000.

seek alliances with Ukrainian magnates. Not even more hardline nationalists in Galicia

are liable to be very agitated by this.

We should use our influence and strength to make sure Russia pursues a

restrained policy of extending soft influence, not a ruthless and illegitimate extention of

hard influence. And there are good grounds to think that such a policy might work. We

pursued a not dissimilar policy with some success in the early and mid-1990s with regard

to the Black Sea Fleet issue, when we made it clear to Russia that the West was not

backing radical Ukrainian demands for the fleet’s expulsion from Crimea, but that we did

expect Russia to respect Ukrainian sovereignty and refrain from any military action – or

Mowscow would pay a heavy price in its relations with the West.

Today, given Russia’s economic weakness and preoccupation with the Chechen

War, we are in a strong position to pressure Russia to observe certain limits. But on the

other hand, given the weakness not only of the NIS, but of the West’s underlying stake in

this region, we would be highly unwise to base our policy on a blanket opposition to

Russian influence. That would risk bringing about precisely the kind of crisis which it is

in our fundamental interest to avoid.

If on the other hand Russia were to miscalculate and try to force Ukraine into a

formal alliance, this might well lead to crisis – but in my view, given Russia’s lack of

both military power and real political will, the most likely result of such a crisis would in

my view be an abandonment of plans for closer formal ties with Russia, and a reversion

to informal, “soft” ways of exerting pressure.

In the early-to-mid 1990s, a crisis along these lines could have had dangerous

consequences on the ground. The question of a Russian naval presence in the Crimea

remained in dispute, and there were fears that Ukrainian-Russian tension over this issue

could become mixed up both with the pressure of ethnic Russians in Crimea for reunion

with Russia, and with severe tensions between those Russians and the Crimean Tatars

returning from their Soviet-era exile in Central Asia.

The agreement in 1997 to lease most of the Sevastopol base to Russia for 20 years

however has shelved this question. It could of course resurface in a dangerous fashion in

2017, when the lease comes up for cancellation or renewal – but if Ukrainian-Russian

relations are still in anything like their present form, and if Ukraine’s position (above all

with regard to energy) remains so weak, the most likely outcome will be a renewal of the

lease in return for certain Russian economic concessions – and this is certainly the

outcome at which the West should be aiming.

However, it is possible that by 2017, or at least over the coming decades, various

developments will upset this relatively stable picture. These have little to do with planned

strategies by Moscow, the West or even Kiev. Instead, they would stem from braod

internal developments in Ukraine, independent of the will of any of the main geopolitical

players; and hereby lies their danger. As long as governments retain control over events

on the ground in Ukraine, it is extremely unlikely that any of them will aim to create a

serious conflict there – for all would have far too much to lose, and too little to gain, from

such a conflict. The risk would come if the situation on the ground escaped from the

hands of governments into those of forces on the ground – as occurred in the southern

Caucasus in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In Ukraine, the really serious threat of this kind comes from the Russian-speaking

regions of the South and especially the East. Contrary to some gloomy predictions in the

early 1990s, up to now these have been remarkably passive, and even the independence

movement in Crimea fizzled out without violence, not just because of lack of support

from Moscow but also because of its inability to bring the Russians of Crimea onto the

streets in really large numbers.

To activate a movement for independence from Ukraine and/or union with Russia,

various immense changes in the existing economic balance would be needed. One of

these could be a return to the situation of 1992-94, when a serious gap opened up

between living standards in Ukraine and Russia as the Ukrainian economy declined at a

much steeper rate than the Russian. If this were to recur, or if the Russian economy were

to grow at a much steeper rate than the Ukrainian, then sooner or later a movement for

union with Russia would be bound to re-emerge. Another cause of this would be if the

Ukrainian economy were itself to grow, but with the eastern oblasts seeing none of the

fruits of this. Resentment would be especially strong if under Western pressure the

government in Kiev had slashed subsidies to eastern industries and social services.

In these circumstances, socio-economic resentment could easily become mixed

up with regionalist demands for greater autonomy from Kiev, closer links to Russia, and

official status for the Russian language. However, such demands would only become

dangerous for Kiev and for regional stability if they were set forth by a really powerful

political movement with the capacity to mobilise large numbers of people on the streets

and in the polling booths. At present, there are very few signs indeed of such a movement

emerging in the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine. Ukrainian politics are dominated by

the parties of various economic magnates, which in turn depend on favours from the state

and from the clan of President Kuchma. The Communist Party, excluded from this circle

of wealth and influence, appears to be declining into a local pressure group with little

influence even at the local level. Its calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union look

increasingly empty and foolish to younger Ukrainians, even those who have little basic

affection for the independent Ukrainian state, let alone its present rulers.

However, this picture of complete apathy and lack of mass participation in

politics is unlikely to last forever. It is already unusual by international standards,

especially given the combination of the presence of outward forms of democracy and the

wrenching social and economic transformations of the past 10 years, and the extreme

suffering this has inflicted on the mass of the Ukrainian people. It must be seen as above

all a legacy of the atomisation and depoliticisation inculcated by Communist totalitarian

rule; and it is bound sooner or later to change under the influence of contacts with the

West. This will be especially true of course if Poland and Hungary, Ukraine’s western

neighbours, succeed in joining the European Union.

For the growth of mass politics in Ukraine to strengthen the existing Ukrainian

state and contribute to regional security, that state would have to make serious progress

not only with economic growth, but with the equitable distribution of the fruits of that

growth to the Ukrainian population. At present, such a development looks extremely

unlikely, given the utter lack of public ethics and responsibility on the part of the

Ukrainian ruling elites.

On the other hand, the Russian elites are hardly better; and a real pro-Russian

threat within Ukraine will only emerge if Russia is seen by large numbers of Ukrainians

to be clearly superior. The chance to be fleeced by Russia’s Berezovsky and Abramovich

rather than Ukraine’s Brodsky and Pinchuk is hardly the kind of slogan to bring millions

of inhabitants of Kharkov and Donetsk onto the streets to call for union with Russia –

especially if in the meantime Berezovsky and Abramovich have in any case taken control

of much of the Ukrainian economy with the help of the Russian state and in alliance with

those same Ukrainian magnates.

If this portrait of Ukraine and the Western NIS, and Russian policy

towards them, is broadly correct, then it follows that the most common Western

geopolitical concerns about the region are largely misplaced; and not just that, but it may

be the West itself which could destabilise the region by pushing NATO enlargement, and

provoking various Russian responses against the weaker states of the region.

On the other hand, it should also be clear that with the exception of the Baltic

States, the future of these countries does not look a bright one as far as the mass of their

populations are concerned. For the foreseeable future, they stand no chance of joining the

European Union, and will therefore be doomed whatever happens to retain close

economic links with Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, as

Western rejections accumulate, this may provoke a political reaction which will push

these countries further towards authoritarianism, Russian hegemony, or both.

In the short-to-medium-terms, this is by no means the bleakest scenario one can

imagine (it will lead neither to civil or regional wars, nor to the outright collapse of

economies and states). A Ukraine under a limited and decently veiled form of Russian

hegemony is not an outcome which is truly dire for the West, Ukraine, or Ukraine’s

people, especially if no other geopolitical and economic choice is really practicable. In

the long run, of course, no regional order based on so much gross social and economic

injustice, corruption, and iniquity can ever be truly stable – but that is true of a great

many regions, whose basic geopolitical and domestic orders have nonetheless lasted for

many decades, and may indeed last for this age of the world.