Bloody Friday In Belfast

Student ID-Michael Torney 8439254Assignment 2 - EMG 206

Subject coordinator-Lewis Winter

BLOODY FRIDAY IN BELFAST

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TABLE OF CONTENTSTable of contents …………………………………………………………2Aim ……………………………………………………………………...3Objective ………………………………………………………………….3Authority …………………………………………………………………4Scope ……………………………………………………………………...4Context …………………………………………………………………...4Relevant History …………………………………………………………5Pre-Impact Phase ………………………………………………………..7 Legislation

Introductio ……………………………………………………….7 Identification and Explanation ………………………………. .8 Strengths and Weaknesses …………………………………….16

Preventative and Mitigating Actions Introduction ……………………………………………………16 Identification and explanation ………………………………..17 Strengths and Weaknesses ……………………………………22

Impact PhaseRoles and Responsibilities

Introduction ……………………………………………………22 Identification and Explanation ……………………………….23 Strengths and Weaknesses ……………………………………24

External Aid Introduction ……………………………………………………25 Management ……………………………………………………26 Strengths and weaknesses …………………………………….27

Summary Conclusion and Recommendations……………………………28 Bibliography…………………………………………………….29 Appendix ………………………………………………………34

Self-Assessment………………………………………………………….35

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Provided by CAIN, University of Ulster.(Below: picture of the provincial flag of Ulster)

AIMTo critically analyse legislation, contributing preventative measures and mitigation techniques during the pre-impact phase and identify the roles and responsibilities of emergency services and external aid agencies during the impact phase of Bloody Friday.

OBJECTIVETo identify strengths and weaknesses in the preventative measures, mitigation techniques and implemented legislation then make suggestions on what could have been improved on or implemented in terms of Emergency Management during the pre-impact phases of bloody Friday.

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Secondly critically assess the clarity of the roles and responsibilities of all emergency services and external aid agencies whom attended during the impact phase and identify the strengths and weakness of their response so future civil unrest and public safety initiatives have a quicker and more positive outcome in the future.

AUTHORITYCSU. Charles Sturt University, NSW, Australia.Subject coordinator, Lewis WinterCourse coordinator, Ian Manock

SCOPEPre-impact Phase- NICRA civil rights March in Londonderry to the first hoax bomb threat5th October 1968 until 1:30pm on 21st of July 1972

Impact phase- time of the first hoax bomb threat until the last IED found on Bloody Friday.1:30pm until 4:00pm on the 21st July 1972

CONTEXTBloody Friday occurred in Belfast, Northern Ireland and therefore is of great historical importance to its people, politicians, ex British Army and RUC members due to the achievement of the peace process and there part in it. Any reports on the disaster especially on the lost children, mothers, and fathers, the political implications prior to and during the bombings on that day, Preventative and mitigation techniques of agencies surrounding the disaster will be of great interest.Emergency services and governments should also take interest in the lessons to be learnt during home rule implementation in civil unrest and their attempts in prevention of terrorism.Politically when dealing in terrorist bombing campaigns in first world countries the very nature and purpose of the terrorist is to cause unspeakable actions of violence whilst Government is trying to assume normality for the large percentage of the community. The decision to take questionable decisions on Human rights and how many lives can be lost without causing uproar is a tricky one .The British Army, The RUC, Fire Authorities and medical authorities were all endeavoring to

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do the best they could with what they could and in hindsight other decisions could have been made but on those days the best options were taken by the best people to make them.

Picture provided by CAIN. University of Ulster(Below: picture of a paramilitary member with Automatic weapon as children walk to school)

RELEVANT HISTORYIreland in 1300AD was a Norman controlled Island which was gradually taken over by the Gaelic Lords until the English King Henry VIII in the 15th century initiated the Tudor conquest of Ireland. The nine year war from 1594 – 1603 seen the land confiscated and saw English Anglicans and Scottish take over the ruling and plantations of Ulster. Nationalists families moved south in an attempt to start fresh elsewhere with people of their religious beliefs and values. Until the extreme Nationalists in 1919 and 1969 the only other attempts to gain control of Ireland were in 1690 The Battle of The Boyne and the Second World War.From the early 1900s the Nationalists in Ireland had two political strands. The first was the Redmond Home Rule Party which wanted Ireland to remain part of Great Britain. The latter was a more radical group led by Eamon De Valera called Sinn Fein and they wanted a unified Ireland and independence from Great Britain. Under Sinn Fein was a secret military wing called The Irish Republican Brotherhood (later to become the Provisional Irish Republican Army) led by Michael Collins)

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From 1919 until 1921 the IRA ran an undercover war against the Police and British soldiers which led to a split in Ireland. In1949 Northern and Southern Ireland were created. Until recently the PIRA has fought for a unified Ireland of which their attempts were most notable in the 1970s. A bombing campaign in Ireland, England and Europe started would lead to many disastrous days in Irish History.Northern Ireland measures roughly 80 miles north to South and 120 miles East to West. In 1969 it had a population of about 1.8 million people, it had become the Centre of the longest military campaign in the history of the British Army. This included a campaign called Operation Motorman in 1972 which was the largest deployment of infantry and infantry roled troops since the Second World War. Over 3,600 people died in ‘The Troubles’ which started in the late summer of 1969. The Army and operations in Northern Ireland came under the name Operation Banner.Violence was centred mostly in the areas of West Belfast, the Bogside and the Creggan in Londonderry, East Tyrone, Fermanagh and South Armagh. Four phases can be identified in Operation Banner. My focus shall be on the first two which cover the pre-impact and impact phase of Bloody Friday.The first phase, from August 1969 until the summer of 1971, was seen as widespread public disorder. Marches, protests and rioting.The second phase however from the summer of 1971 until late1972, is described as insurgency. Both the Official and Provisional Irish Republican Army (OIRA and PIRA) fought the security forces. They also had a structure of companies, battalions and brigades, with headquarters staff. Firefights were a common theme. The Army responded with operations at brigade and divisional level. The largest of these as mentioned Operation Motorman was from 31st of July to the 1st of December 1972. It marked the end of the insurgency phase. The OIRA declared a ceasefire in 1972 which it has never broken and PIRA began to transform itself into a terrorist organization based on a cell structure.PIRA started secret talks with the British Government to find resolution in early March but these failed. On the 22nd of March 1972 the bombing campaign by the Provisional Irish Republic Army started.On 22nd of March Aldershot Army Base the home of the British Paras in England was bombed in retaliation for Bloody Sunday.On the 4th of April 1972 the Abercorn Restaurant in Belfast and just prior to Bloody Friday.On the 14th of April 1972, 24 bombs in 20 locations rocked mostly large towns and cities across Northern Ireland which in hindsight seemed to be a logistical practice run for Bloody Friday only days away.References; Arthur, Paul. (1986). 'Policing and Crisis Politics - Northern Ireland as a Case Study,' Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp.341-353.

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Subject coordinator-Lewis WinterFaul, Fr. Denis. And Murray, Fr. Raymond. (n.d.1976?), The RUC: The Black and Blue Book Dungannon: Published by the authors.

Picture provided by CAIN, University of Belfast(Below) picture of IEDs that detonated on Bloody Friday

PRE IMPACTIntroduction to Legislation,

From 1964 until 1972 NICRA civil rights marches exposed the two tier social classes which had a direct correlation to religious preference. Catholic denominations were mistreated and unrepresented with issues such as, Segregation, intimidation, voting rights, unemployment, mistreatment by the RUC and B Specials, education and housing which in turn seen a rise in support for the PIRA.Segregation in Northern Ireland has for generations been a self-imposed segregation. Catholics and Protestants lived separately in areas together where people thought, spoke, acted, worked and prayed for the same things in the same place of worship. This was due to safety concerns as the religious based fighting for land and people’s identity as Irish or British had been around for hundreds of years. Political, religious and social differences combined with intercommunal

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tensions and violence are not only a cause for the troubles but an effect of such an environment.Education even now in Ulster is a 90% single faith system with Catholic schools ran by the church. During the troubles this figure was 95%. This would almost ensure that 4 – 18yr old children would not engage in friendship or conversation With the other religious party and ensured endogamy and no understanding of the others ideals.Employment in a small business sense was 95-100% Protestant or Catholic never mixed and in larger internationally known businesses an evenly mixed workforce existed but generally higher positions were held by Protestants.Public Housing allocation was of an uneven nature as like all local government agencies in Northern Ireland they were ran by Protestant and Unionist supporters. 98% of public housing as we spoke about prior was not only split into areas of religious preferences but split by the British Soldiers with the use of 30 foot concrete walls in an attempt to reduce escalating violence called Peace lines.The RUC, B Specials especially, UDR and the British Army had all been accused of collusion against Catholics and trust was at an all-time low. Even though upon the arrival of the British Troops the Catholics welcomed them in as they were seen to be protecting their families. This turned into hatred with the rumours of mistrust and collusion with the other security agencies and made a hard job even harder for the brave soldiers who were part of the internal war in Ulster that not many will ever forget.References;Hamilton, Andrew, Moore, Linda and Trimble, Tim. (1995). Policing a Divided Society: Issues and Perceptions in Northern Ireland. Centre for the Study of Conflict. McVeigh, Robbie (1994). "It's part of life here." The Security Forces and Harassment in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Committee on the Administration of Justice. Mulcahy, Aogán. (2006). Policing Northern Ireland: Conflict, legitimacy and reform. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

INTRODUCED LEGISLATION By Stormont and Westminster

From the 5th of October 1968 the civil rights marches were typically ending in riots and Heavy handed policing. Unionist Ulster was a Province which misused legislation to ensure that Ulster would remain a protestant stronghold. Westminster acknowledged the one sided political process and mistreatment of Catholics that was verging on human rights violations. They knew that if something was not done the long and bloody history of Ireland would continue. So throughout the pre-impact phase of Bloody Friday a great deal of legislation

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and bills for new legislation were being passsed to the Northern Ireland Office under pressure from Westminster in the attempts to bring ordinary citizens trust into the political process and away from paramilitary support. Political initiatives throughout the pre-impact phase were as follows;

Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1968

An Act to abolish the university constituency for the purposes of elections to the Parliament of Northern Ireland; To create four new constituencies and alter the areas of other constituencies; to abolish the occupation of business premises as a qualification for electors at such elections;

To enable the age at which persons qualify to be registered as parliamentary electors to be altered;To establish a permanent Boundary Commission and to provide for the review of the distribution of seats at such elections; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid or any of them. [28th November 1968]

Protection of the Person and Property Act (Northern Ireland) 1969)

1. Intimidation.

A person shall be guilty of an offence under this section if he unlawfully causes, by force, threats or menaces, or in any way what so ever, any other person

(a)To leave any place where that other person is for the time being resident or in occupation; or

(b)To leave his employment; or

(c)To terminate the service or employment of any person; or

(d)To do or refrain from doing any act.

2Making or possessing petrol bombs, etc.

Any person who makes, or has in his possession, any apparatus, instrument, article or thing which9 | P a g e



(a)Contains any inflammable liquid or substances

(b)Is constructed or adapted for use in conjunction with any such liquid or substance so as to cause injury or loss of life to any person or damage to any property

Under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his possession for a lawful object shall, unless

He can show that he made it or had it in his possession for a lawful object, be guilty of an offence under this section.

3Use of petrol bombs, etc.

Any person who, with intent to cause the destruction of or damage to property of another or in which another has an interest, or to cause personal injury to another, or

to give another reasonable cause to fear any destruction of property or personal injury, or, being reckless in regard to causing any such destruction, damage, injury or fear, throws, places, attaches or otherwise makes use of any such apparatus, instrument, article or thing as is mentioned in section 2 shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

Parliamentary Commissioner Act (Northern Ireland) 1969

An Act to make provision for the appointment and functions of a Parliamentary Commissioner for the investigation of administrative action taken on behalf of the Crown in right of Her Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland.[24th June 1969]

Emergency Relief Packages for the Homeless and Displaced Persons after Riots in Belfast.

Northern Ireland’s towns exploded in killings, burnings, and displacement of residents, leaving 2,000 Protestants and 7,000 Catholics homeless. Refugee camps south of the border accommodated some 2,500 fleeing Catholics. There were over 100 fatalities and several hundred injured

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Community Relations Act (Northern Ireland) 1969

An Act to provide for the appointment and functions of a Commission to foster harmonious relations throughout the community and for purposes connected therewith. [11th November 1969]

1. (1) There shall be established a Commission to be known as the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission (in this Act referred to as "the Commission") which shall consist of a Chairman and not fewer than five or more than nine other members appointed by the

2. Governor, of which other members one shall be the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints and 3. One shall be the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Establishment of the Commission.

(2) The provisions of the Schedule shall have effect with respect to the Commission.

(3) It shall be the duty of the Commission-

(a) To encourage the establishment of, and assist others to take steps to secure the establishment of, harmonious community relations and to co-ordinate the measures adopted for that purpose by others; (b) To advise any Minister of Northern Ireland on any matter referred to the Commission by him and to make recommendations to him on any matter which the Commission consider should be brought to his attention; (c) To promote the understanding of, and acceptance of, any recommendation made by the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints which appears to the Commission to be of importance in improving community relations; (d) To develop, and secure the adoption of, educational programmes intended to eliminate or discourage discriminatory practices; and (e) To carry out any functions conferred on them by or under any other transferred provision (including subsection (4)) within the meaning of section 1 (g) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954.

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Commissioner for Complaints Act (Northern Ireland) 1969

An Act to make provision for the appointment and functions of a Commissioner to investigate complaints alleged to arise from administrative acts for which certain local or public bodies are responsible and for purposes connected therewith. [25th November 1969]

Public Order (Amendment) Act (Northern Ireland) 1970

An Act to make further provision for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of disturbance of lawful public processions and public meetings; to Prohibit the wearing of uniforms in connection with political objects and the maintenance by private persons of associations of a military or similar character; to prohibit the carrying of offensive weapons in public places without lawful authority or reasonable excuse; and for purposes connected with those matters.

Prohibition of quasi-military organisations.

(1)If the members or adherents of any association of persons, whether incorporated or not, are—.(A) Organised or trained or equipped for the purpose of enabling them to be employed in usurping the functions of the Royal Ulster Constabulary or the armed forces of the Crown;(b)organised and trained or organised and equipped either for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of physical force in promoting any political object, or in such manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organised and either trained or equipped for that purpose;.Then any person who is a member or adherent of the association or who takes part in the control or management of the association, or in so organising or training as aforesaid any members or adherents thereof, shall be guilty of an offence under this section: Provision that no woman shall, in pursuance of a warrant issued under this subsection, be searched except by a woman.

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Explosive Act (Northern Ireland) 1970

An Act to make further provision with respect to the regulation of explosives and fireworks and for related purposes.[19th May 1970]1. Making and dealing with explosives.A person shall not carry out, or undertake to carry out, any of the following transactions, that is to say, making, selling, purchasing, acquiring, transferring or disposing of, any explosive unless—(a)there have been furnished in writing to an officer of police full and accurate particulars of the proposed transaction and the consent in writing of such an officer has been obtained to its being carried out; and(b) in the case of a sale, acquisition, transfer or disposal, he keeps a permanent record of all such transactions entered into by him and has entered in that record the name, address and occupation of every person from whom he has purchased or acquired any explosive and of every person to whom he has sold,transferred or disposed of, any explosive together with the dates of each such transaction and particulars of the quantity and nature of the explosive to which it related.(2)Any person carrying out any transaction mentioned in subsection (1) shall—(a)produce for inspection by, and make immediately available to, a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary or Government Inspector, on demand:—(I) the permanent record required to be kept under paragraph (b) of that subsection; and(ii) Any explosive in his possession or under his control;(b)retain, for a period of at least two years after first coming into his possession, and, at any time during that period, produce and make available as aforesaid, all invoices, consignment notes, receipts and consents respecting every sale, purchase, acquisition, transfer or disposal of explosives to which he is a party.

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Stormont Disbands The B-Specials And Introduce The Ulster Defense Regiment.

Under pressure from NICRA the government tried to reinvent the reserve policing units by bringing in Army commanders to organise and rename the force to gain public support for peaceful engagement to gain positive results rather than supporting the PIRA and its use of violence to gain political leverage.

Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act Northern Ireland) 1970

An Act to impose penalties for incitement to hatred and for the circulation of certain false statements or reports.1. A person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act if, with intent to stir up hatred against, or arouse fear of any section of the public in Northern Ireland-

(a) he publishes or distributes written or other matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or

(b) he uses in any public place or at any public meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting;

Being matter or words likely to stir up hatred against, or arouse fear of, any section of the public in Northern Ireland on grounds of religious belief, colour, race or ethnic or national origins.

2. A person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act if, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace whether immediately or at any time thereafter, if he publishes or circulates in any way whatsoever any statement or report which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, being a statement or report likely to stir up hatred against, or arouse fear of, any section of the public in Northern Ireland on grounds of religious belief, colour, race or ethnic or national origins.

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Housing Executive Act (Northern Ireland) 1971

An Act to establish a Northern Ireland Housing Executive and Northern Ireland Housing Council, and to make further provisions with respect to housing.[25th February 1971

The Northern Ireland Housing Executive and Council(1) There shall be established as a body corporate a public authority to be called the Northern Ireland.

(2) The Executive shall exercise such functions as are conferred on it by this Act. (3) Schedule 1 shall have effect with respect to the members and proceedings of the Executive and the other matters there dealt with.(1) There shall be established a council, to be called the Northern Ireland Housing Council (in this Act referred to as "the Council") which- (a) shall consider any matter affecting housing-

(I) which is referred to the Council by the Executive; or

(ii) which appears to the Council to be a matter to which consideration ought to be given; and (b) May consider any matter affecting housing which is referred to the Council by any person who has a bona-fide interest.

Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions Act) March 1972 (which included Home Rule from Westminster)

The most important of these was the Temporary Provisions Act 30th March 1972 which included Home Rule from Westminster which dissolved the Stormont Government and introduced the Northern Ireland Commission to advise of the

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situation in Northern Ireland including continuation of security arrangements from 1969 onwards which were led by the British Army. References; www.CAINlegislaton.edu.uk, 2005). Human Rights Annual Report 2005: Monitoring the Compliance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland with the Human Rights Act 1998, (7 March 2005), [PDF; 1262KB]. Belfast: NIPB. Recommendations, [PDF; 66KB].Appendix 1: PSNI Code of Ethics, [PDF; 1206KB].Appendix 2: Human Rights Index, [PDF; 104KB].

Strengths and Weaknesses

As we know the group NICRA had a number of issues on their list of objectives which strongly represented the nationalist members of Ulster and to their credit Westminster pushed Stormont along to pass the bills in an attempt to appease the general population. Unfortunately many other parts of legislation did not happen prior to the rise of OIRA and PIRA and the insurgency phase of the trouble PIRA .Had support been kept to a minimum, there would not have been enough members to carry out a struggle of that magnitude especially in operations such as Bloody Friday. In recommendations for future conflicts of this nature lines of communication should be kept open at all times with the ordinary citizens and potential fractional groups so an understanding of the peoples requirements and expectations are paramount to a successful integration of differing religious groups. Local MPs play a large part in this and when votes are lost to historically motivated individuals not future minded individuals it’s a back to the future legacy that will be left.The use of British forces was an unquestionable requirement due to the level at which Stormont let the situation go to but the use of the troops in a conflict which no end goal was set or parameters to reach so the home security forces could retain control is a lack of planning on the part of both Stormont and Westminster.With the troops at hand I would recommend that future governments should allow stronger tactics in the early phases to stop the insurgency prior to it occurring and have measures and legislation in times of civil unrest so legal and ethical issues do not hold back successful campaigns.

Preventative and Mitigation TechniquesThe British Army

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http://www.CAINlegislaton.edu.uk/



The British Army still used the RUC, B-Specials and UDR after the changeover of Security roles but a changing of the guard created a mistrust and a concern over sharing of information from the RUC.It’s hard to believe but prior to landing on Ulster turf the British Army had no objectives other than to support in the fight against civil unrest. Even though no

specific direct orders were given to Commanders on the ground there was an initiative to ensure the lives of the majority could continue without intimidation and violence. Catholic communities fearful for their lives and intimidation from violence. PIRA also had a tarnished reputation from the Unionists, RUC, B-Specials the OIRA/ PIRA tactics and lack of government support for the ordinary catholic citizen.Throughout the early seventies Headquarters were set up in Londonderry and Belfast which received, disseminated information and processed this as accurate intelligence which was lacking from the RUC. Experienced senior police officers were brought into oversea intelligence and operations which seen an increase in valuable Human intelligence and operational intelligence on the PIRA. Peace walls were erected, watchtowers or Sangers built in towns, permanent VCPS, border checkpoints and night time raids on houses and businesses occurred. In 1972 statistics show that more pressure was put on the catholic people of Belfast and Londonderry in an attempt to flush out the terrorists from homes and businesses. Below are statistics of terrorist activities and policing activities.Picture provided by CAIN; University of Ulster(Below) picture of B-Specials at Victoria Barracks

Year1971 1972 1973

Civilian Deaths 115 322 17117 | P a g e



Army, RUC & UDR Deaths 59 146 66Civilian Injuries 1838 3813 1812Army, RUC &UDR Injuries 705 1058 837Houses Searched 17262 36617 74556Firearms Found 717 1264 1595Ammunition Rounds Found 157,994 183,410 187399 Specialist units during Operation Banner were involved in a number of operations such as,

Operation Demetrius

This was a mass arrest and internment without trial exercise of people suspected of being terrorists. Thousands of Catholics were captured in the attempt to capture 450 known terrorists, 350 escaped capture and 100 were held in Long Kesh Prison and a prison boat at the Belfast docks. Fourteen of these would go onto receive the five techniques. Five techniquesAn illegal style of interrogation designed by British Security Forces in the Troubles of Northern Ireland during Operation Demetrius. This included,

1. Wall standing( stress positions)2. Hooding3. Subjection to noise(hissing, white noise)4. Sleep Deprivation5. Food and fluid deprivation.

Along with the five techniques physical torture including kicking to the genitals, banging of heads on to walls and threat of injections in the cold cells of the secret interrogation centre.

Force Research Unit

Whilst working for the (FRU) The Force Research Unit methods of gaining creditable evidence was the priority task along with undercover members of Human Intelligence in unmarked vehicles to capture known terrorists. This however has led to accusations of a murder squad which killed at least sixteen individuals believed to be PIRA members.

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The Four Square Laundry was created to provide a cheap laundry service which doubled as a forensic testing unit who could identify which homes the likely terrorists were in by sampling of their clothing for gunfire residue and explosive ingredients such as fertiliser. Once found out the Operation ceased and other methods were used. No accurate figures have been released on the arrests that have led from their operations.

Stakeknife was the name of the British Spy who infiltrated the PIRA whilst working for the Top Secret FRU at the meaty end of the troubles. He work for twenty five years in MI5 and had his own office with handlers and agents. It is suggested that up to forty four lives were lost via the IRAs Internal Security Unit or Nutting Squad as they were known in attempts to secure stakeknifes identify.

Preparation of Operation Motorman

By the end of 1971, twenty nine barricades had been erected to stop the British forces, members of the opposite religion and RUC from entering Londonderry. The same tactics were being used in Belfast. Armoured vehicles had tried to break through but to no avail. Plans were set in motion for the largest Operation so far in Ulster. 22000 troops would enter the so called No-Go Areas in an attempt to swamp catholic areas of Belfast, Londonderry and major towns. As Logistical and movement preparations were taking place the communities knew what to expect.

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The Royal Victoria Hospital

The Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast was in west Belfast just half a mile from the city centre which meant it had a war zone on its doorstep for almost four decades. Recovery of injured persons back to the hospital was alarmingly quick with 50% within 15 minutes and 85% within 30 minutes. From the late sixties until 1998 the Royal seen just over half of the 3600 people killed, 47500 injured in 36900 shootings and 16200 bombings. This in turn gave rise to a number of ground breaking techniques in surgery which saved many lives during but many more in conflicts all around the globe such as Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the most influential medical minds in the Royal as it was known was Dr William Rutherford OBE, a consultant surgeon who had spent the previous 20 years in India as a medical missionary were he witnessed the violent partition with Pakistan were thousands died. From experience Dr Rutherford was a battle hardened surgeon who had introduced the Royals first Disaster plan which would be adopted as a template for the rest of the UK. This included Bullet Proof secure units were suspected terrorists were treated as they were often found to be going missing in the middle of the night or found dead if nursing staff could not hide them from paramilitary forces. The Royals concentration of charismatic and talented experts and an endless amount of patients seen necessity driven innovation and world famous techniques and procedures invented under the intense pressure cooker of Belfast.

The Belfast Fire Authority

Effective from the 1st of January 1948 the Belfast Fire Authority was governed by The Fire Services Act (Northern Ireland) 1947.There were five stations in a total of forty nine throughout the small province of Ulster. Each Area was ran separately and had a portion of the province to cover. The North, West, South and Belfast being East. In comparison The Northern Fire Authority had fourteen stations and an area of 5215 square miles to cover whilst Belfast had five stations and 23 square miles to cover. This seems very disproportionate although in terms of population and infrastructure it would be an even share. In 1950 the North, West and Southern Fire Authorities combined as the Northern Ireland Fire Authority, leaving Belfast Fire Authority as a Municipal Brigade until effected in 1973 The Belfast Fire Brigade and The Northern Ireland Fire Authority Amalgamated. This was done under the Fire Service (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 and rebranded as the Northern Ireland Fire Brigade (known now as the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue).

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From the handover of security and governing of Northern Ireland in 1969 the Belfast Fire Authority was mostly unchanged except for the workload which inevitably increased due to the petrol bombings, arson attacks, IEDs and pipe bombs on those either of differing religion, known locally to be trouble makers or businesses who paid for security from a paramilitary organization therefore supporting the cause.The firemen of the day were known to the locals in the areas and were placed in high regard in the social standings in an era of simple respect for those unsung heroes who worked tirelessly for the communities. This did give a certain amount of protection to the firemen of the day as an unwritten code although once things started to heat up even they and their firetrucks were fair game in terms of targets for youths and local gangs. This would give rise to new SOPs when going into paramilitary run estates especially Nationalist enclaves of the city. RUC and British Troops would often have to provide security for both Ambulance crews and firefighters. Paramilitaries would burn family homes of those thought either to be a “Tout” (person whom was believed to be a sympathizer or believed to be giving information to the police of local members of paramilitary organisations) or have a differing of religious beliefs. Through these experiences the Army, RUC, Ambulance, Firemen and even local clergy would work together effectively often breaking through barricades and staring gunmen in the face to protect those in need, save lives and provide a service to all of the community without bias or opinion.

Royal Ulster Constabulary

From the 1st of January disbandment of the RUCs part time force was in its early stages. The disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary or B-Specials as they

were commonly referred to was planned by Westminster to address NICRA demands and was effected on 1st of April 1970. They were replaced by the Ulster Defense Force (UDA) due to violent ill-disciplined clashes during their resulted

call ups to riotous behaviour in 1969. Even though being untrained the majority of members performed admirably. The use of B-Specials was seen as a necessity as

Support from British troops would not occur until all available home forces were used resulting in excessive force of Catholic protesters. Mistrust and a history of reprisal killings and often violence combined with a democratically ran force that was not representative of the Catholic community sealed the end of an era. Although a very capable force which provided an important role in protection of Catholics in general, vital assets, manning VCPs in an attempt to stop cross border training and movements of PIRA members the new force would provide these services with an emphasis on going “by the book”.

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With older members seen as invaluable in local knowledge the breaking of the rules of engagement and excessive violence in riot control the old had to make way for new commander appointments to the 4000 strong force under the Armies command not the RUC. With new command came a revamp of public perception and manning in regional areas allowing 24hrs protection which was a large improvement on previous protection for the minorities.The RUC was now in a combined role, with the Army supporting them in everyday activities. This provided a more physical stance or presence in the community and showed a large increase in tasking’s including search, capture or seizure of arms, explosives and suspects whilst continually gaining evidence and recording movements of known threats. Almost one in 10 soldiers were linked with an intelligence agency after every days mission or whilst on patrol relay information to HQ for processing.

References;Ellison, Graham and Smyth, Jim. (2000). The Crowned Harp: Policing in Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press. Hamilton, Andrew, Moore, Linda and Trimble, Tim. (1995). Policing a Divided Society: Issues and Perceptions in Northern Ireland. Centre for the Study of Conflict. The Police Federation for Northern IrelandPolice Superintendents' Association of Northern Ireland

Strengths and Weaknesses

In the majority of the conflict a great degree of patience and restraint by all agencies in times that were unimaginable to put yourself in was spoke of by many witnesses and reports. Although in the case of the B-Specials the decision to change the organisational command and name was too late as trust was a very hard gain in a country with so much history and personal stories of loss and people of a very unforgiving nature. An understanding of the previous 100yrs through the Easter rising which was a smaller version of the troubles (1969 onwards) and the deaths from WW2 had left many unsure of what was to come if the British Army and violence used by the B-Specials was combined. The use of media therefore should have been a medium used more frequently and information centre with educational reform being a high on agenda. Unless people hear from their trusted local community advisors whether protestant or catholic in this instant it’s very hard to gain support and retrieve trust at a national level.

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IMPACT PHASERoles and Responsibilities

Stormont, situated in Belfast was the home of the Ulster Unionist Government which had majority control of Ulster until Home Rule on 24th of March 1972 except for any Security matters which where the General Officer in Charge (GOC) of the British troops Responsibility. From 1969 until Home Rule

Westminster would successfully pressurise Stormont to introduce new legislation, Acts, amendments and Orders to in theory evenly distribute the civil rights, allocation of housing, the right to vote, right to education, protection and working rights of all citizens in Ulster.

The Northern Ireland Office which held the Northern Ireland Committee would advise Westminster on the problems within Ulster and Bills or Amendments would flow through to Westminster in a very busy couple of years for the sitting members in London.Due to clarification and legal loop holes barriers were in the way of the RUC and British Army to arrest and prosecute and shoot suspected or known terrorists when in threatening situations or seen in the street. This took considerable time to get clear and eventually The Emergency Powers Act and The Prevention of Terrorism Act would prevail. This would ultimately include powers to assist in the methods of surveillance, Interrogation, internment continuation, extra resources such as navy helicopters and searching of persons or property.

GovernmentDuring the impact phase of Bloody Friday the Government was on hand with the Minister of Defence as he was the only person who in any situation give authority for other means of force apart from those already given to security forces. These extra measures would include CS Gas, rubber bullets and shoot to kill or maim. (Eventually the yellow card system would be introduced giving clear instruction).

From 1:30pm on Bloody Friday the Impact Phase would start with the first call from the PIRA Area Commander to British Army Headquarters Belfast with the first of the Bomb hoaxes in the City of Belfast in an attempt to congest the city up for responding emergency services and security forces and trapping ordinary citizens in the city.

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Two EOD and ATO units based in the city got the first call to respond and their role was to locate the device and be responsible for implementing safety zones in an attempt to protect as many lives as possible. Disarmament of such devices was done with either a primer to have a controlled detonation or through removal of the arming device. Once cleared or detonated a clearance of the immediate area occurred in case of other devices. As technical ability of the PIRA advanced radio controlled arming device became popular and therefore jamming devices were developed by specialist ATO teams who would reverse engineer devices found and try to pick the next advancements and stay ahead of the PIRA Engineers. This lead to the first remote control robotic arms seen today used by forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

RUC and British Infantry Units would clear a path and continue in armoured Landrovers as a convoy to the area of operations with The EOD and ATO Units. The Infantry Units would gain high ground advantage if not already gained through the watchtowers or Sangers throughout the city, identify any threating behaviour within the immediate vicinity and protect all services on the ground. Once the area was cleared and devices detonated the soldiers would aid in packaging of the injured of removal of causalities into ambulances waiting at a safe distance.The RUC were in place to clear houses or businesses in the immediate area with the aid of soldiers, note the number plate or address where devices were hidden, advise the public of alternate routes and redirect traffic clear of the danger zone. Once cleared questioning of locals to identify the owners of the vehicles or property as most housing did not have a garage so therefore parked cars where a normal occurrence in high density areas in the city. The Belfast Fire Authority firemen and Royal Victoria Ambulances would arrive generally in tandem to the scene. Firemen would locate the Belfast round Hydrants, roll their hoses and prepare for the Fire and explosion of car fuel tanks and Home-made explosive (HME) or heating oil in large 250 litre containers which fuelled the heaters in the often cold brick homes of the city. Upon detonation or clearance of the device either a rescue of EOD and ATO members would occur or ensuring protection of adjacent exposures ensuring as little damage was caused in the affected area. Making sure the fire was extinguished was their last role unless clearing rubble for body parts to be placed in bags for the Royal to examine for identification.Ambulance crews were tasked with the incredibly difficult job of retrieving or collecting injured or deceased persons whilst triaging and returning them to the Royal for treatment. Often in the larger scale bombings calling to the Royal for more Ambulances was required. The Royal Victoria Hospitals role was often the most important making lifesaving decisions and lifesaving surgery whilst being bombarded with injured and dead on arrival. The triage systems implemented by Dr Rutherford was so

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important were the head surgeon would triage all incoming patients to identify priority cases. If any soldiers were injured they would be directed to a secure unit of the Royal in an attempt to safeguard their lives from terrorist seeking revenge.

Now that the B-Special were disbanded the (UDR) Ulster Defence Regiment with any Bombing were tasked with snap (VCPs) Vehicle Checkpoints to try and catch the PIRA members from escaping the area or across the border to safety. This was hard due to traffic congestion and often the persons responsible were away almost 20 minutes prior.References; Weitzer, Ronald (1985). 'Policing a Divided Society - Obstacles to Normalization in Northern Ireland,' Journal of Social Problems, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp.41-55. (1994). 'Policing Northern Ireland,' The Economist, Vol. 332, No. 7881, p.62, September 17.Policing Structures in Northern Ireland. Belfast: HMSO. Great Britain. Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (2001). Alternatives to the Baton Round, Phase 2 Report, (A Research Programme into Alternatives Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict), (December 2001), [PDF; 892KB]. Belfast: NIO. Great Britain. Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (2002). Alternatives to the Baton Round, Phase 3 Report, (A Research Programme into Alternatives Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict), (19 December 2002), [PDF; 716KB]. Belfast: NIO. Great Britain. Parliament. (1969). Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, (Cmnd. 535), [Hunt Report]. Belfast: HMSO. Great Britain. Parliament. (1979). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland, (Cmnd. 7497), [Bennett Report]. London: HMSO.

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External aid

Men Of The Cloth;These were an influential part of the community often providing guidance, relationship advice, and hope in a hopeless place or someone to confide in. Even influential in bringing PIRA to the negotiating table at Whitehall earlier in the month.Their role however on Bloody Friday was one of a more professional one giving last rights and guiding others in a time of need on the streets were their relatives lay dead in one or many pieces. Relationships between security forces and religious leaders as they seen the efforts and risks taken to protect all members of the community especially in times like Bloody Friday. Picture provided by CAIN; University of Ulster(Below)The giving of last rights to victim of Bloody Friday.

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NICRA

The constitution of NICRA was based on that of the British National Council for Civil Liberties. NICRA's name was expressed in English only. The constitution emphasised the association's character as non-party and non-denominational, and as a body would make representations on the issues of civil liberties and take up individual cases of discrimination and ill-treatment and stated NICRA's aims "to assist in the maintenance of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, propaganda and assembly" .NICRA's aims were:1. To defend the basic freedoms of all citizens.2. To protect the rights of the individual.3. To highlight all possible abuses of power.4. To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association.5. To inform the public of their lawful rights.

It had six main demands:1. "One man, one vote" which would allow all people over the age of 18 to vote in local council elections and remove the multiple votes held by business owners - known as the "business vote".2. An end to gerrymandering electoral wards to produce an artificial unionist majority.3. Prevention of discrimination in the allocation of government jobs.4. Prevention of discrimination in the allocation of council housing.5. The removal of the Special Powers Act.6. The disbandment of the almost entirely Protestant Ulster Special Constabulary (B Specials).In an imitation of the philosophy of, the American Civil Rights Movement, and modelled on the National Council for Civil Liberties, the organisation held marches, pickets, sit-ins and protests to pressure the Government of Northern Ireland to grant these demands. Internationally, given the attention, particularly in the United States in the 1960s relating to civil and minority rights, NICRA secured much wider international and internal support than traditional nationalist protests had done.

NICRA's innovation was to seek vindication of civil rights, for example rights for all citizens of Northern Ireland as British under the constitution and not just demands on the nationalist goal of a republic but for the whole island of Ireland. For many supporters of NICRA, that did not mean accepting the constitutional

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laws of loyalty to the UK: Assertion of those rights was a device by which the condition of the Catholic minority could be improved. From the start there were often tensions within NICRA between those wanting to use militant and confrontational methods, in particular the socialist and republican elements of the movement.

American GovernmentIn 1969, as TV images of Catholics being attacked were beamed back to Irish Catholic enclaves in Boston and New York, hats were passed around pubs in Queens. Fundraising for the IRA, at least for IRA prisoners, peaked whenever the British were seen to do something outrageous, so when British soldiers shot 14 civil rights marchers dead on Bloody Sunday in 1972 . But the fundraising was dwarfed by the millions that was raised by the Irish charities, especially the American Ireland Fund. Contrary to popular belief, the IRA didn't rely on American money or weapons. And they couldn't rely on American political support, which was limited at the beginning of the Troubles and continued to shrink as the IRA campaign dragged on and most influential Irish-Americans, especially politicians, distanced themselves from the IRA. More sophisticated and unwilling to be named as IRA sympathizers, they challenged the British and Irish governments to do something and challenged the paramilitaries to put down their weapons. Many millions of dollars would be distributed around Ireland, and until the British government could advise the Americans of the actual spending’s on Arms from Gadhafi’s Libya the moneys would flow into the paramilitary hand of the OIRA and PIRA to fund operations for the future as war was not cheap.Managing the funds and charities or other nation’s interest in The Troubles would be a full time role and would have save many lives on Bloody Friday due to the transport limitations on explosive and vehicles to be used.

Summary and Recommendations

Since this was the most devastating day of violence in Belfast up to that time, and many of the injured suffered serious mutilation, the impact on public opinion was enormous, and many observers regarded it as a point at which the Provisional Irish Republican Army left itself outside in the dark in terms of political negotiation. Many watching the television news reports were reduced to tears by horrifying pictures of firemen and rescue workers scraping up the remains of

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human beings into plastic bags. This vision stays etched in so many minds today and explains the hate and unwillingness of many to forgive and forget.

Minority groups are and should have opinions and be able to express them openly, but actioning their ideals by force on others is against the law in any land so when terrorism overcomes appreciation of others a line has been crossed that requires decisive action and at all costs nullified for the benefit of all. No matter how many acts, bills, legislative amendments that are introduced in a country that’s held so much history in comparison to our own in Australia. The thought of being the generation that simply gives it up and would rather die trying shows the difference in cultural mindset in the youth of the world today can appreciation of the new European boundaries where anyone can live, work and play in any country they choose.A greater emphasis on civil and human rights for all in a conservative environment is essential to ongoing peace were less fortunate are welcomed, helped and willing to integrate successfully without asking for their history and culture to be lost upon entry. At the end of the day it’s only a footstep from most countries to another.

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Bibliography

Books

Brewer, John and Magee, Kathleen. (1991). Inside the RUC: Routine Policing in a Divided Society. London: Oxford University Press.Ellison, Graham and Smyth, Jim. (2000). The Crowned Harp: Policing in Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press. Hamilton, Andrew, Moore, Linda and Trimble, Tim. (1995). Policing a Divided Society: Issues and Perceptions in Northern Ireland. Centre for the Study of Conflict. McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (1999). Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a new start. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. McVeigh, Robbie (1994). "It's part of life here ." The Security Forces and Harassment in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Committee on the Adminstration of Justice. Mulcahy, Aogán. (2006). Policing Northern Ireland: Conflict, legitimacy and reform. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Ryder, C. (1992). The RUC: A Force Under Fire. London: Mandarin.

Diary Articles

Annesley, Hugh. (1994). 'The Complex Role of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,' The Police Chief, Vol. LXI, No. 8 (August), p. 14.Arthur, Paul. (1986). 'Policing and Crisis Politics - Northern Ireland as a Case Study,' Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp.341-353. Brogden, M. (1995). 'An Agenda for Post-Troubles Policing in Northern Ireland - The South African Precedent,' The Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, p.3. Connolly,Michael, Law, Jennifer and Ivan Topping. (1996). 'Policing Structures and Public Accountability in Northern Ireland,.' Local Government Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 229.

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Dickson, B. and N. O'Loan. (1994). 'Visiting Police Stations in Northern Ireland,' The Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2, p.210. Hadden, T. (1983). 'Northern Ireland. 1: Police on Sectarian Divide,' New Society, Vol. 66, No. 1101, p.506.

Hadfield, Brigid. (1993). 'Public Order, Public Powers and Judicial Review,' Criminal Law Review, pp.915-925Murray, R.(1983). 'Police Officer Deaths in Northern Ireland - 1969-1982,' Police Chief, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp.41-47. Weitzer, Ronald (1996)'Police Reform in Northern Ireland,' Police Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp.27. Weitzer, Ronald (1985). 'Policing a Divided Society - Obstacles to Normalization in Northern Ireland,' Journal of Social Problems, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp.41-55. (1994). 'Policing Northern Ireland,' The Economist, Vol. 332, No. 7881, p.62, September 17.

Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland

Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJINI). (2011). An inspection into the independence of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, (9 September 2011), [PDF; 1001KB]. Belfast: CJINI.

Government Reports

Great Britain. Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (1985). Police Complaints and Discipline: A Consultative Paper. London: HMSO. Great Britain. Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (1994). Policing in the Community: Policing Structures in Northern Ireland. Belfast: HMSO. Great Britain. Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (2001). Alternatives to the Baton Round, Phase 2 Report, (A Research Programme into Alternatives Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict), (December 2001), [PDF; 892KB]. Belfast: NIO. Great Britain. Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (2002). Alternatives to the Baton Round, Phase 3 Report, (A Research Programme into Alternatives Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict), (19 December 2002), [PDF; 716KB]. Belfast: NIO. Great Britain. Parliament. (1969). Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, (Cmnd. 535), [Hunt Report]. Belfast: HMSO.

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Great Britain. Parliament. (1979). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland, (Cmnd. 7497), [Bennett Report]. London: HMSO.

Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB)

Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). (2002). Northern Ireland Policing Board Press Release: Policing Board to Take Lead on Omagh Report, (20 December 2001). Belfast: NIPB.Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). (2002). Northern Ireland Policing Board Press Release: Northern Ireland Policing Board to Consider Police Ombudsman Report on Omagh Investigation, (12 December 2001). Belfast: NIPB.

Human Rights

Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). (2010). Human Rights, Annual Report 2009: Monitoring the compliance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland with the Human Rights Act 1998, (January 2010), [PDF; 1748KB]. Belfast: NIPB.Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). (2008). Police Service of Northern Ireland Code of Ethics 2008, [PDF; 300KB]. Belfast: NIPB(2005). Human Rights Annual Report 2005: Monitoring the Compliance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland with the Human Rights Act 1998, (7 March 2005), [PDF; 1262KB]. Belfast: NIPB. Recommendations, [PDF; 66KB]. Appendix 1: PSNI Colde of Ethnics, [PDF; 1206KB]. Appendix 2: Human Rights Index, [PDF; 104KB]. Appendix 3: PSNI Human Rights Programme of Action, [PDF; 5639KB]. Appendix 4: Human Rights Questionnaire, [PDF; 279KB]. Appendix 5: MORI Ireland Summary Report, [PDF; 316KB].

Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF)

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Goldstock, Ronald. (2004). Organised Crime in Northern Ireland: A Report for the Secretary of State, (published 22 July 2004), [PDF; 622KB]. Belfast: Northern Ireland Office (NIO).

Police StatisticsPolice Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). (2005). Hate Incidents and Crimes, [PDF; 48KB]. Belfast: PSNI.

Parade Statistics

Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). (1970). Parade Statistics Belfast: RUC.

Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI)

McGurk's Bar Bombing; Incident: 4 December 1971 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI). (2011). Public statement by the Police Ombudsman under Section 62 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 Relating to the complaint by the relatives of the victims of The Bombing of McGurk's Bar, Belfast on 4 December 1971, (Monday 21 February 2011), [PDF; 1073KB]. Belfast: PONI.Claudy Bombing; Incident: 31 July 1972 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI). (2010). Public statement by the Police Ombudsman under Section 62 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 Relating to the RUC investigation of the alleged involvement of the late Father James Chesney in the bombing of Claudy on 31 July 1972, (Tuesday 24 August 2010), [PDF; 2154KB]. Belfast: PONI.Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI). (2009). Statement on the Police Ombudsman's Investigation into matters arising from police evidence given during a trial at Belfast Crown Court between September 2006 and January 2007, (Friday 20 February 2009), [PDF; 653KB]. Belfast: PONIA Study of Complaints Involving the Use of Batons by the Police in Northern Ireland, (Research Branch, PONI; March 2003), [PDF; 916KB] Belfast:PONI.Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI). (2002). Baton Rounds Report, (Research Report 1/2002), [PDF; 592KB]. Belfast: PONI.

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Dickson, Brice. (1997). 'Powers of the Police', in Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland: The CAJ Handbook, Edited by Brice Dickson. Belfast: CAJ.PDunn, Seamus., Murray, Dominic., and Walsh, Dermot. (2002). 'Cross Border Police Co-operation in Ireland'. Limerick: University of Limerick, and Coleraine: University of Ulster. Faul, Fr. Denis. and Murray, Fr. Raymond. (n.d.1976?), The RUC: The Black and Blue Book Dungannon: Published by the authors.

Police Authority for Northern Ireland (PANI). (1988). Working Together to Police Northern Ireland: the Work of the Police Authority for Northern Ireland and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Belfast: PANI

Web Sites

Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) formerly the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB)formerly Northern Ireland Police Authority (NIPA)District Policing Partnerships (DPP)Office of the Oversight Commissioner (Remit ended 31 May 2007)Police Ombudsman for Northern IrelandCriminal Justice Inspection Northern IrelandDepartment of Justice Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland Crime Prevention Panel Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF)Victim Support Web SiteNorthern Ireland Prison ServiceCriminal Injuries Compensation Appeals

Police Officer Associations

The Police Federation for Northern IrelandThe Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland Police Superintendents' Association of Northern Ireland

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Appendices

AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle. AOR Area of Responsibility. APV Armoured Patrol Vehicle.ASU Active Service Unit. AT Ammunition Technician.ATO Ammunition Technical Officer. AVRE Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers. BAOR British Army of the Rhine. ‘B’ Specials The Ulster Special Constabulary. CIRA Continuity Irish Republican Army. CIVREP Civil Representative. CLF Commander, Land Forces. CNR Combat Net Radio. CONCO Continuity Non-Commissioned Officer.COP Close Observation Platoon. CWIED Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device. DAC District/Divisional Action Committee. EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal. GOC General Officer Commanding (all Service personnel in Northern Ireland). HME Home Made Explosive. HSF (Royal Irish Regiment) Home Service Force. HUMINT Human Intelligence. IAAG Improvised Anti-Armour Grenade.IED Improvised Explosive Device. INIBA Improved Northern Ireland Body Armour. INLA Irish National Liberation Army. IRA Irish Republican Army. IRSP Irish Republican Socialist Party. 35 | P a g e



NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. NIO Northern Ireland Office. NIRTT Northern Ireland Reinforcement Training Team. NITAT Northern Ireland Training Advisory Team. OA Operational Analysis. OIRA Official Irish Republican Army.

OP Observation Post. OPTAG Operational Training Advisory Group. PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army. PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland. PVCP Permanent Vehicle Check Point. RCIED Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device. REST Royal Engineer Search Team. RIC Reconnaissance and Intelligence Centre. RIRA Real Irish Republican Army. RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary. SB Special Branch. CIAD Scientific Adviser. SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party. SLR Self-Loading Rifle. SSNI Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. SUIT Sight, Unit, Infantry, TRILUX (3 times magnification). TAOR Tactical Area of Responsibility. UDA Ulster Defence Association. UDR Ulster Defence Regiment. UVF Ulster Volunteer Force. UWC Ulster Workers Council. VCP Vehicle Check Point. VOIED Victim Operated Improvised explosive device.

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SELF ASSESSMENTIdentifying difficulties I encountered throughout my first subject in my first degree was not a hard thing to do. Firstly Time management even though my thoughts prior were “I’ve got this” I was clearly less organised than I thought when being a stay at home dad and attending physio every day after back surgery. Many late nights have been had.After selecting an event I googled the obvious governmental and agency sites for a base knowledge but finding conflicting evidence and reports from inquests or newspapers was a more difficult than in thought. I was lucky to pick a well-documented event in time and find a university that specialised in the history of Northern Ireland, although reading all the criteria to be assessed on would have made life easier and not deleting large section 3 days prior to handing in my first assignment.Skills and areas of development are referencing, and heeding advice on not making the phases covered too large. I believe I had to many events to cover and legislation over time.After reading some fairly graphic details on events I found it very hard to be unbiased in my opinions and thoughts on what had happened especially in identifying strengths and weaknesses of preventative measures.

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Documents

Bloody Friday In Belfast