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UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL FLUMINENSE
ANTHROPOLOGY GRADUATE PROGRAM
TIAGO DUARTE DIAS
BIJÎ KURDISTAN/BEVAR KURDISTAN: POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
PROCESSES AMONG KURDISH IMMIGRANTS IN DENMARK
Niterói
2015
2
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL FLUMINENSE
ANTHROPOLOGY GRADUATE PROGRAM
TIAGO DUARTE DIAS
BIJÎ KURDISTAN/BEVAR KURDISTAN: POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
PROCESSES AMONG KURDISH IMMIGRANTS IN DENMARK
Dissertation presented for the Anthropology
Graduate Program at Universidade Federal
Fluminense as a partial requirement for the
Master’s degree (Translated from Portuguese as
a requirement form the PhD candidacy process
at Stockholm University)
Niterói
2015
3
Examining board
___________________________________________________
Professor Dr. Paulo Gabriel Hilu da Rocha Pinto
___________________________________________________
Professora Dra. Gisele Chagas Fonseca
___________________________________________________
Professora Dra. Monique Goldfeld
____________________________________________________
Professor Dr. Antonio Rafael Barbosa
____________________________________________________
Professor. Dr. Fernando Rabossi
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (The author acknowledges and thanks people who
have helped him on his journey)
Primeiramente, eu gostaria de agradecer aos meus pais, Gilson e Jane e a
minha irmã, Camila, por todo o amor, carinho, suporte, e atenção que os três tem me
proporcionado. Sem os mesmos eu não seria quem sou, nem chegaria aonde cheguei.
Não há palavras que possam definir a minha gratidão aos mesmos. Em segundo lugar,
eu gostaria de agradecer a Kamilla, minha namorada, minha companheira e minha
melhor amiga há mais de quatro anos por todo amor que compartilhamos, e também a
seus pais e a sua família por toda atenção e carinho que me concedem todas as vezes
que eu visito a Dinamarca.
Também fundamentais por todo o apoio e por toda a amizade que tem me
desprendido, agradeço também a meus melhores amigos, e fieis companheiros desde
o tempo do Instituto Abel. Igor, Marcelo, João Carlos, Alcysio suas amizades são uma
das coisas mais preciosas em minha vida, e sou grato pelas mesmas. Também
agradeço a Eric, Arthur, Caio, Luiz Monteiro, Igor Soares, Mariana, Amanda
Pimentel, Amanda Vitoriano, Aline, Giovanna, Yaya, Luísa, Carol Esposito, Carol
Calderón, Rennan, Bruno, Bárbara, Daniel, Marcos Lucas por suas amizades, e por
tudo que temos compartilhado e por tudo que eu possa ter aprendido com vocês. Além
disso, faz-se impossível não citar todos os amigos que fiz durante o meu curso de
graduação em Relações Internacionais. Colegas de classe, professores, monitores que
com o tempo se tornaram amigos e pessoas com as quais eu nutro o maior respeito e
carinho.
Minha jornada até aqui não seria possível se não fosse o que eu pude aprender,
e compartilhar com meus diversos colegas de turma no meu mestrado. Larissa, André,
Ana Beatriz, Letícia, Marcus, Natalia, Vitor, Patrícia, Gabriel, Fábio, Rodrigo, Dani,
Leandro, Sara e todos os outros colegas, meu mais sincero agradecimento por todas as
conversas, as aulas, as idas ao Laury e as quintas-feiras na Cantareira. Além dos
mesmos, devo citar especialmente Thaís Ferraz, que além da amizade, pude também
dividir o orientador, e grande parte das disciplinas, além de temas de pesquisa
semelhantes.
5
Um especial agradecimento também se faz necessário a todos da turma de
2013.1 em Relações Internacionais, que tive o prazer de lecionar a disciplina de
Antropologia I e com os quais pude aprender enormemente. Ter lecionado para vocês
toda terça-feira por 1 semestre foi uma das experiências mais edificantes e prazerosas
em minha carreira acadêmica.
Agradeço também a todos os meus professores com os quais eu pude,
efetivamente, virar um antropólogo. Em primeiro lugar, Paulo Gabriel, meu
orientador, e alguém que me espelho academicamente, e com o qual eu pude aprender
enormemente no curso desses dois anos, e cujo os ensinamentos foram de extrema
importância na minha formação como antropólogo. Além dele, agradeço
especialmente a Gisele Fonseca, que ministrou junto com o Paulo todas as disciplinas,
e cuja a ajuda também foi extremamente essencial na escrita de tal trabalho. Simoni
Lahud, Lênin Pires, Lucía Elbaum, Alessandra Barreto, Antonio Rafael, Carolina
Grillo muito obrigado por tudo o que pude aprender, e por todas as lições. Por último,
agradeço a Fernando Rabossi pela sua ajuda em minha qualificação e a Monique
Goldfeld por sua participação em minha banca de defesa. E é claro, um
agradecimento espacial ao Marcelo, responsável pela secretaria do PPGA por sua
paciência, prontidão e eficiência.
Agradeço também a todos os meus interlocutores dentro da comunidade
curdo-dinamarquesa. Se hoje eu sou um antropólogo, eu não o seria se não fosse por
toda a paciência, o carinho, a compreensão e o apoio que tive dentro da mesma. A
experiência que tive ao estudar com vocês foi e eternamente será um dos momentos
mais especiais e importantes em minha vida. A vocês, dedico todo o meu apoio, e
todo o meu carinho, pois sem vocês, tal trabalho não seria possível, além de dedica-
los tal trabalho.
Por último, gostaria de agradecer a CAPES pelo apoio financeiro fornecido
através da minha bolsa pro aproximadamente dois anos.
6
ABSTRACT
This work aims to comprehend the distinct ways in which the Kurdish
community in Denmark, especially in Copenhagen and its metropolitan area, build
their identity and their sociability inside a diaspora context. This work is the result of
fieldwork that lasted for four months in the central area of Copenhagen, during which,
interviews were conducted, as for a participant-observation in events related to the
Kurdish identity, such as demonstrations, movie festivals, and less formal social
events, besides the participation in online groups related to the Kurdish cause and
identity.
This research has as a goal to analyse the distinct ways in which Kurdish
identity is constructed and reaffirmed in a diaspora context in Denmark, besides
comprehending how such identity construction articulates with Danish culture and
society in the search of both practical and symbolical gains related to the Kurdish
cause. Also, it will be analysed through an ethnographic approach the role that a
Kurdish youth organization called FOKUS-A has, both, in the political and in the
identity articulation of this youth inside of the Kurdish-Danish community, and in the
Danish population in general.
Besides that, the many articulations between the Kurdish-Danish community
and the transnational Kurdish community will be analysed and studied. Visual
symbols, the role that public manifestations have, the use of the many languages will
also be analysed throughout an anthropological perspective, just like the many diverse
articulations that those elements have in the cultural and political expressions in the
Kurdish-Danish community, also in a way to understand how those factors influence
the Kurdish sociability have inside Danish territory.
KEYWORDS:
Ethnicity, Kurdish identity, Kurdistan, Diaspora in Denmark
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RESUMO
Tal trabalho busca compreender as distintas formas nas quais a comunidade
curda na Dinamarca, especialmente em Copenhague e sua região metropolitana,
constrói a sua identidade e a sua sociabilidade em um contexto de diáspora. O mesmo
é o resultado de um trabalho de campo de duração de quatro meses na região central
de Copenhague, no qual foram conduzidas entrevistas, além da participação em
eventos relacionados a identidade curda, como manifestações, festivais de cinema e
eventos sociais menos formais, além da participação de grupos online relacionados a
identidade e a causa curda.
Tal pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar as distintas formas de construção e
reafirmação da identidade curda num contexto de diáspora na Dinamarca, além de
buscar compreender como tal construção identitária se articula com a cultura e a
sociedade dinamarquesas em busca de ganhos, tanto práticos, quanto simbólicos em
relação a causa curda. Além disso, será analisado etnograficamente o papel que uma
organização focada na população curda jovem, a FOKUS-A, tem, tanto na articulação
política e identitária desses jovens dentro da comunidade curdo-dinamarquesa, quanto
em relação a população dinamarquesa em geral.
Além de tudo isso, será também analisado e estudado as diversas articulações
entre a comunidade curdo-dinamarquesa e a comunidade curda transnacional.
Símbolos visuais, o papel das manifestações públicas, e o uso de diversos idiomas
também serão analisados através de uma perspectiva antropológica, assim como as
diversas articulações que tais elementos tem nas manifestações culturais e políticas da
comunidade curdo-dinamarquesa, além de buscar entender como tais fatores
influenciam a sociabilidade curda em território dinamarquês.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE:
Etnicidade, identidade curda, Curdistão, diáspora na Dinamarca
8
MAPS
9
10
GLOSSARY
Dansk Folkeparti - "Danish People's Party." An extremely popular right-wing party
in the country, especially due to its extremely stance against immigration and
nationalistic undertones. In the last election in 2015, it became the second most voted
party with about 20% of the vote.
Enhedeslisten - "Party of Green and Red list" Danish far-left party with strong
connections to the Kurdish-Danish community.
FOKUS-A - "Organization for Scholars and Kurdish Students' Kurdish-Danish
organization founded in 2008 and formed especially for young people from 18 to 35.
FEY-KURD DANMARK - "Federation of Kurdish Associations in Denmark".
Kurdish organization heavily influenced by the PKK
PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party. A political group of Marxist origin and that
organizes a guerrilla army in Turkish Kurdistan. Considered a terrorist organization
by the European Union and the United States. Such classification still generates
controversy within the Kurdish community.
11
SUMMARY
BIJÎ KURDISTAN/BEVAR KURDISTAN: POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES AMONG KURDISH
IMMIGRANTS IN DENMARK
ABSTRACT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6
MAPS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
GLOSSARY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
INTRODUCTION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Chapter II – Immigration in Denmark: an Ethnographical analysis -------------------- 45
Chapter III - Being a Kurd in Denmark: a constant construction ---------------------- 62
Chapter IV - FOKUS-A: Kurdish students and their identities ------------------------- 85
Chapter V - Articulations of Kurdish identity across borders: an ethnographic analysis
of the Kurdish movement in Denmark. --------------------------------------------------- 119
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 136
BIBLIOGRAPHY --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152
12
I) INTRODUCTION
I believe that, before any topic being deepened in my dissertation, it is
necessary, before introduction the themes, the field and my insertion on it, the use of
theory and established authors, to begin by explaining to the future readers of my
humble ethnography, the reasons that lead me to choose such a theme. Before talking
about anthropology, let us board the reasons that lead the anthropologist to choose
such a path. Before talking about ethnography, we shall briefly look at the
ethnographer.
The first time I had contact with something related to the Kurdish ethnic
identity was during Easter in 2011 in the Danish capital. Back then, I was just an
undergraduate student at UFF (Universidade Federal Fluminense), studying
International Relations, and taking advantage of a week without classes during my
exchange semester in Denmark, (but in Aarhus, the second largest city in the country,
which is 3 hours from the capital). The occasion, as I remember clearly, was that,
taking advantage of my week without classes, I decided to visit the capital. I stayed at
a hostel near the main railway station, and decided that I would explore the city on my
own way, without bothering to follow a fixed script, just visiting the attractions that I
felt like. During one of those days, while I decided to visit the main tourist sights to
take pictures, I came across a demonstration in the central square in front of the City
Hall of Copenhagen, which in Danish is called Rådhuspladsen.
For those who are not familiar with the Danish capital, Rådhuspladsen is
located in front of the local government, across the main street city shopping as well
as well as being close to the local train station and the famous Tivoli amusement park.
A little further away (but still less than 1 km) are Denmark's history museum in
addition to the building with the National Congress, besides the famous district of
Nyhavn, which is widely visited both by tourists and locals. One could say, without
any hesitation or doubt, that such a demonstration had taken place in a central location
as well as being one of the most popular places and most widely seen in the city of
Copenhagen.
And it was in that place, and during a beautiful, sunny spring afternoon, that I
spot a demonstration that caught my attention, and also called the attention of other
passers-by, whose curiosity and lack of hurry converged and resulted in at least a
13
decrease in their pace of walking, and in rare cases, in a dialogue with the protesters.
Myself being a good tourist with a latent anthropological curiosity (that time it was
not, I confess, a very comprehensive one), decided to interrupt my day to learn a bit
more about this demonstration that occurred in circumstances that showed peculiar
enough in order of me to notice it.
The first thing I could notice was a lot of flags with four colors (green, white
and red), plus a yellow sun in its center. When I saw this flag, I failed to identify any
meaning in it. I ask the reader to forgive the ignorance of a young man who was only
twenty years at the time and had lived abroad for the first time in his life. However,
this ignorance was offset by a curiosity, a feature that in my opinion serves very well
for anthropologists. And such ignorance coupled with the curiosity that drove me to
question the participants about who they were and what was the reason that they were
organizing themselves in a public setting. And the answers to those questions did not
come from someone who lived in Denmark, but a young Frenchman who was in
Denmark for tourism.
As I got closer to the demonstration, as some others passing by also, I stood
still for a while, until one of those present, came close, and smiled at me. I questioned
him about the motives that led to the organization of such an event; moreover, asked
him about who the demonstrators were; about who the banners, the posters, the
various costumes (that eventually I would learn they were the attire worn by
peshmergas, Kurdish soldiers), and the music represented. I asked him, therefore,
which culture was being represented in all those elements present in the
demonstration. Jean-Paul, in a mixture of French and English, explained to me, why
such a demonstration was happening, as who the demonstrators were. Both issues are
closely related; however, the second question needs to be exposed before the first one
for things to be understood more clearly, although when I talked to Jean Paul in 2011,
they were answered almost simultaneously with various information having to be
reconstructed retrospectively on their own.
As it is already somewhat obvious, individuals of Kurdish ethnicity had
organized that demonstration, and that the banners and flags with their four colors,
plus all the other elements present, should be symbolical representation of such
ethnicity. At the time, my knowledge of the Kurds was relatively shallow, and fruit of
some subjects taken during my graduate studies in International Relations. I knew that
the Kurds were "the largest ethnic group without a nation state" in the world, and
14
whose territory was present within the states of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq, a result
of which at the time seemed like endless colonial and post-colonial disputed with the
presence of both Western and Middle-Eastern political groups, which in the end,
ultimately deprived a large population of a state representation they believed to be in
their rights.
Jean-Paul told me, among other things, that he and his family were from
Turkey, but as he himself emphasized he did not identify as being Turkish, but as
Kurdish, since his parents and his grandparents were Kurds, so was he, and that was
how he self-defined. We talked a bit more about the political situation both in France
and in Brazil, as he also informed me a little more about issues related to the situation
of the Kurdish population in Turkey and explain to me the reasons for that
demonstration he was attending. According to him, the participants were there as a
form of solidarity with Abdullah Ocälan, a figure that at that moment was unknown to
me, but that, over time I would learn more and more about, especially about his role
in the Kurdish community, Kurdish activists and PKK guerrillas. After this
conversation, we said goodbye and exchanged contacts on Facebook, and to this day,
at times we talk about several issues.
Such experience was, in my view, extremely important to get me out of a state
of a virtual ignorance of who the Kurds were. By seeing this demonstration and
talking with Jean-Paul, I could observe that the Kurds were more than "the largest
ethnic group without a nation state in the world," but rather, a population which I had
been able to observe express its ethnicity in a public sphere. The difference of
knowledge from a book about a situation, to real life knowledge of it, is always
something that impacts, and helps develop different analysis on the fact to the
individuals that experience it.
After returning to Brazil after the end of my semester, I started to have a better
understanding of ethnic Kurds and about their history in a more academic manner,
mostly thanks to a course taught by a professor, who would become my advisor in
writing this dissertation, on the Middle East, in which he talked during one of the
classes about the situation of Kurds and the territory considered by Kurdish
nationalists as the rightful homeland of Kurdistan. That event ended up motivating me
to study issues related to ethnicity and Kurdish identity, and also, it was fundamental
for my decision to pursue the study of anthropology for two years on my master's
degree. Such an explanation, however, does not address why I choose to do so in
15
Denmark. If it was already spoken, in general brushes, of course, about my choosing
of my subject matter, now, I would need to address where this object is studied, this
distinction becomes especially relevant when one considers that this is a diaspora
community.
Regarding Denmark, as the narration above took place in Copenhagen, and as
it was mentioned before, the author resided there for a period of six months due to his
exchange program. However, there are other issues that also contributed to this
choice, both of personal and political nature. The personal nature can be observed by
the fact that during my time living in the Scandinavian country, I can list the fact that
I have gotten into a personal relationship with my girlfriend that lasts to this day as
one of the reasons that led me to want to research about that location. Although this
factor is secondary to my choice, I consider being necessary to note it. Specially
because within this, there is a question logistics of moving to do fieldwork in a
country in which I would be with a person with whom I have a relationship with.
The other factor arises from an observation, which, at first, was much more
intuitive than essentially empirical or ethnographical, steaming from the place and the
size that the population of immigrant origin occupies Denmark. As of now, I have no
desire to elucidate the social, cultural or political relations involving the various
immigrant communities in Denmark, or even provide statistics on them; firstly I'd
only like to inform the reader about ethnographer's wishes to study this subject in
Denmark, and how this wish came with several intangible factors (such as the
affective question quoted above), and from my personal experiences in the second
largest city in Denmark. Much of the anthropological knowledge comes from the
anthropologist's curiosity to clarify any questions or still, his/her desires in
deconstructing stereotypes.
If at first, I created some sort of stereotype about immigrants in Denmark, or
about the social relations between the Danish ethnic population and the various non-
Danish ethnic communities, such stereotypes played a key role in creating an interest
inside me of deepening my knowledge of this subject, so that I could effectively better
understand those relationships. Stereotypes are, therefore, important as they incited a
desire and a curiosity to undo them, and a desire of understanding the diverse social
realities in a more holistic way, and besides that, of understanding how they arise
(Goffman, 1979).
16
My first impressions of Denmark, during the six months I lived there in 2011,
was one of a country that, despite being an extremely tolerant, and there is common
perceived notion among many Danes, that each should go his/her way over his/her
own private lives, as long as it does not harm others, there was also a great difficulty
on integrating and accepting differences that are beyond that Alghasi, Eriksen and
Ghorashi (2009) treat as the different levels of otherness. The number of students
coming from the European Union, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan
and Brazil1 as exchange students are seen particularly positively by students and the
local people in Aarhus, because, as I heard a few times they are "capable individuals
who could add something to Danish society. " This sentence expresses, through its
opposite, the existence of individuals who are able to subtract from the Danish
society. This explains both the existence at the same time, of sectors in Danish society
that are extremely tolerant and the influence that far-right parties have had in politics
within the country in the last decade or so.
With a political platform that both constantly flirts with xenophobia, and at
other times is openly xenophobic, besides anti-integration positions within the
European Union, and with a speech that constantly calls for a decrease in the number
of immigrants and refugees in Danish territory, Dansk Folkeparti - the party of the
Danish people - is a growing force in the Danish society, generating passionate
positions both supporting and rejecting them. DF, as it is known in Denmark, in the
last parliamentary elections held in 2015, became the second largest party in the
country, behind the Socialist Party, and ahead of the conservative Liberal Party
(Venstre), which historically has been the main right-wing force in the country.
Thus, it was possible to realize that in the Danish society, two opposing yet
concurrent narratives, shared the same space within the public opinion regarding the
role of immigrants (especially the non-Westerners, who do not come to the country
because of some relationship with some ethnic-Dane through family reunion) within
the country. There are people who see the positive side of the presence of the
immigrants, as well as seeing it as a moral imperative in that a country so rich should 1Neither I, nor any of the Brazilians that I've met while in Denmark had reported me never any
complaints over the way they were treated by the Danes; on the contrary, there is a genuine curiosity,
and a fairly extensive knowledge of what happens in Brazil. From subjects ranging from Brazilian
music, through political affairs, and sports (not just football), the views and the knowledge that the
Danish population have of Brazil are generally positive.
17
be helping people in a hard situation and who seek help within Danish territory. And
there are people who see an insurmountable Danish cultural incompatibility with non-
Western immigrants, as well as seeing the inability of the country to help those in
need who appear in their territories.
The fact that my interaction was primarily with college students within a
major urban center, as well as my own personal convictions, may help explain the fact
that I more often than not met people who believed in the first narrative than with the
second one (at least with people that would defend the latter position openly). As for
the growth of the second narrative, it can be explained by the growing importance of
the aforementioned Dansk Folkeparti, which was already influent in 2011,
demonstrating that there was (and now more than ever) an issue that is very
controversial within the Danish society in relation to immigration.
It is within such a question I would like to dwell on; keeping in mind the role
that such a question - be an immigrant in Denmark - relates to the identity
construction within the Kurdish community in diaspora. By linking the two, my study
will seek, therefore, to understand what is the meaning of being Kurdish in Denmark,
and the various connections between those two identities, and between those two
communities and the politics of both of them; in short, the articulations between those
two cultures within the Danish territory.
i) Object construction and theoretical framework
As it was already mentioned above, my ethnography was held with Kurdish
immigrants and their descendants living in the Danish capital. It is, therefore,
necessary to address, first of all, who are such individual, that is, who are the Kurds as
an ethnic identity, and how such individuals became part of Danish society, and even
more so, how do such individuals articulate their identities as Kurds within a Danish
context and/or a Danish identity. Also, issues related to immigration in general in
Denmark will also be addressed, to better grasp both what are the social and cultural
relations that the Kurds, as immigrants, maintain within Denmark, what are the
political and economic dynamics as the cultural factors that led to such immigrants
and their descendants deciding to build their lives in Danish territory, and how, within
18
those dynamics, they, as an ethnic community in diaspora, relate to identity, culture
and political causes related to Kurdish ethnicity and the territory of Kurdistan.
It is estimated that there are between 20,000 to 40,000 individuals of Kurdish origin in
Denmark. Such numbers are difficult to determine due the absence of a Kurdish state,
even though local statistics on the number of expatriates tend to be quite accurate,
they specify nationality, not ethnic belonging. Some reliable statistics are provided by
two Kurdish publications (Kurder.dk, 2009; Jyian.dk, 2012) and they state that the
number would be around 25,000 individuals, of which 20,000 would be from the
Turkish Kurdistan, and the other 5000 divided between Iran, Iraq and Syria (with Iran
having a larger number). However, these statistics do not take into account the fairly
recent immigration of Kurds fleeing the civil war in Syria.
Firstly, it will be discussed who the Kurds are, in a brief analysis of their
ethnic identity, and after it will analyzed whether the Danish situation regarding
immigration, and finally, the two issues will be dealt together, focusing on the
articulations between these two factors.
The phenomenon known within anthropological knowledge as ethnicity offers
a myriad of possibilities for understanding such an object, which in general is
understood as an important part of the Kurdish population. The "Kurds" - that is, to
define oneself as Kurdish, is a composition of different forms of identification, both
domestic (there are Kurds of Turkish origin, Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian), and religious
(there are Alevi Kurdish minorities, Shiites, Sunnis and yazedis, and Jews Kurds, and
a Sunni), there are political issues at play as well (there are Kurds who identify with
the different strands of nationalist Marxism and are organized within several present
parties in the four countries that understand Kurdistan, while there are Kurds in which
the national project is no longer a political objective), and social (there are Kurds who
are groups who hold a political elite, and there are Kurds who come from workers
environments; there are Kurds who emigrated to work as laborers and there are Kurds
who are political refugees) (MARTIN VAN BRUINESSEN, 2000), examples of the
various forms of expression of Kurdish identity were found during my research.
These different forms of identity form, however, a basic element of cohesion within
the Kurdish ethnicity.
That is, a cultural and social definition of being a Kurd and of a Kurdish
identity is defined by several variables already mentioned, and among others such as
gender, age, and education. So, trying to understand my subject matter (namely, the
19
Kurds in Denmark) assumes greater complexity from a cultural vision that covers
both their identities as Kurds, and their identities and/or sociability in Denmark.
However, as complex and plural this view can be, in any case, they come to
depend on two main factors. The first is that being a Kurd is something he or she has
a claim of being. That is, a Kurd is every individual who is self-identified as such. It is
necessary, however, to question this statement. The identification as Kurdish occurs in
many ways, as I observed during my fieldwork, and such identification has a different
effect on different individuals; both personal issues and issues related to the
community that he or she is a part of (both the Danish community and the Kurdish
community in Denmark, especially in Copenhagen and its metropolitan area), an issue
that will be explored throughout my dissertation.
The second factor is that to be seen as a Kurd, there is a need for such an
individual also to be seen by other Kurdish individuals, as a Kurd. Such identification
is subtle, however, it permeates the various relationships that the Kurds have, both
among other Kurds, as with the Danish society, and also with a broader, global form
(OLIVEIRA, 2000). There are individuals of the same family who have their
identities as Kurdish viewed in different ways by other Kurds, and there are
individuals who despite not being Kurds, have a different status within the Kurdish-
Danish community, both positively and negatively. Often some of my interlocutors
called me "kurdernes ven", or "friend of the Kurds." Others constantly had this
nickname, especially some politicians from the Danish far-left party, Enhedlisten
(Party of the Green and Red Alliance) for leading discussions on the role of the
Danish and the main Kurdish issues in the Folketinget (parliament), as well as
researchers and journalists who portrayed the situation in Kobanî and Shingal, and
also soldiers of various nationalities who joined the Kurdish guerrillas. There is,
therefore, an importance on being from a family of Kurdish origin, or have some
family relationship, either by descent or by marriage to someone who identifies as
Kurdish, for the individual to be seen as a Kurd within the Kurdish community in
Copenhagen, even though those factors are not decisive in the construction of a
Kurdish identity, they do constantly serve as prerequisites for it.
Therefore, being a "Kurd" is a recurring identity, built both socially and by
self-identification (but not arbitrarily) with some aspects of similarity between some
of its individuals, and which activates different speeches (in many cases, completely
20
different) and which are guided by a mythology and a tradition that is assumed as
common, and spite of, rarely being so, as explained by Martin Van Bruinessen.
Most Kurds in Turkey have a strong sense of belonging to a
separate and distinguished ethnic group, especially in relation
to the Turks and the Christian minorities with which they
coexist. There isn't, however, in some way, a form of
consensus among them about what is their ethnic identity and
what are the boundaries of their ethnic group. It is necessary
to start by saying precisely about whom I mean, when I use
the "Kurdish" categorization. For pragmatic reasons, I will use
a definition somewhat broad, including all native speakers of
dialects belonging to the Iranian languages Kurmanji or Zaza
in addition to those Turkish speakers who claim descent from
Kurmanji and Zaza speakers and still (or again) are considered
as Kurds. Most Kurdish nationalists would agree with such a
definition (a minority would find it still very close); in
practice, many Kurds still use narrower definitions, as I will
show below. Even this simple definition brings some obvious
questions, such as should, for example, people who grew up as
Kurdish, but later voluntarily assimilated into the Turkish
majority, still be called Kurdish or not? (MARTIN VAN
BRUINESSEN, 2000)
That is, Bruinessen (2000) proposes indirectly an issue that appeared
constantly during my ethnography, the fact that being Kurdish isn't an identity in
which and individual is born imbued with, but an identity that requires action in order
to activate it. Being Kurdish is an identity which canm therefore, according to the
condition being lost, recovered or rediscovered. Moreover, the idea of nationality is
relevant, after all, despite the Kurds not constituing a cohesive group, from which one
could symbolically understand all their interactions, but a myriad of many different
groups that keeps in common with one sense of an imagined community (Anderson,
2008), there is also a speech with nationalist content that links these individuals, and
21
that in the specific case of my research defined political actions of various actors in
the Kurdish community in Copenhagen.
The idea of creating a nation-state for the Kurds (Kurdistan) is a factor that
determines various alliances, alongside the presence of several individuals in Kurdish
political parties operating in various countries across Europe and North America,
including Denmark . There are parties and individuals who aspire to independence for
a specific Kurdistan region, while others crave independence for the entire Kurdistan
region, while other, for example, the PKK now and some of its sympathizers only
want to have a greater freedom of self-determination for the Kurds, while wishing a
profound change in capitalist political system, after a long period in which it sought a
Marxist revolution and a Kurdish state.2
During my research, I observed that the PKK and its roots are the main
catalyst element of Kurdish political expression in Denmark, with a strong
participation in the Dansk Kurdisk Kulturcenter (Kurdish-Danish Cultural Center),
located in Valby, a city in the suburbs of Copenhagen, plus a strong influence within
the FOKUS-A (Organization of Students and Academic Kurds), an organization in
which I began my ethnographic research. Such political influence of both the PKK
and its ramifications, as of the present parties in Kurdistan, influence the social and
political organization of the Kurds in Denmark.
Studying Kurds in Danish society, therefore means studying the phenomenon
defined as Kurdish identity (in all its practical and theoretical complexity), inserted
into the culture of Denmark and in the Danish state; in relation to individuals in which
the Kurds (be they Kurds, Danish citizens or not) relate, their positions and the
political groups that use the discourse of Kurdish identity in opposition, or in a
complementary way to the nation-states in which such individuals or their parents and
grandparents were born; it means studying how the imagined community (Anderson,
2008) that defines the Kurdish identity influences the daily experiences of such
individuals in Denmark; plus the nationalist question (the search for the construction
of a Kurdish state) that in certain respects fuses with the ethnic aspect within the 2The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) is a political party founded in 1978 in Turkish Kurdistan, and
that between 1984 and 2013 was in an open military conflict with the Turkish government and is
considered by the same, as well as by the European Union and the United States as a terrorist
organization. Recently, due to an ideological change of its leader's perspective, it would start to seek a
society that would forgo the nation-state.
22
Kurdish identity. It also means understanding the context in which individuals who
identify themselves as Kurds relate to aspects that and to cultural elements that are
shared by both Danes and Kurds. In addition to that, factors such as learning the local
language, sports, movies, TV shows, literature, among others, which are not
traditionally included as part of the Kurdish identity, but which also must be
understood as elements that shape as well as represent symbolic ways in which the
Kurdish identities are expressed.
Therefore, to work with notions such as a "Kurdish immigrant culture" or
"Kurdish immigrant society" becomes extremely complex. Not because individuals
who identify themselves as "Kurds" do not organize, nor create symbols and
interpretations for all that concerns life inserted into a reality that is comprehended by
them inside a Kurdish culture, but because, when using such a concept (Kurdish
culture), it creates a homogenization of them that does not happen in practice, after
all, we are dealing with individuals who share different identities, which are, in
certain situations more relevant than others, just like the Pakistani studied in Norway
by Fredrik Barth (2005).
Thus, the study of Kurdish immigration is inserted into various theoretical
perspectives within the field of sociocultural anthropology - especially in relation to
studies of ethnicity and nationalism. These subjects will be expanded and studied
upon during the course of this work, and they will be articulated with ethnographic
research. Building up from a knowledge that is already well solidified in the history of
the anthropological discipline, the author hopes that it can contribute to an
ethnography that dialogues with such themes as the issue of nationalism, as discussed
by Benedict Anderson (2008), and issues of ethnicity, as studied by Fredrik Barth
(1969), Eric Wolf (1982), Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira (2000), Thomas Hylland
Eriksen (2002).
Another relevant aspect in the construction of an object of study or even, in
the analysis of my study object, is the immigration and identity issue within Denmark
as it is in this background that the Kurdish community will be inserted in, as an
example of that, is that political demonstrations (where the motto mentioned in the
title of that work "Biji Kurdistan / Bevar Kurdistan" which means "keep Kurdistan" or
"Protecting the existence of Kurdistan" in Kurmanji and in Danish appeared
constantly) organized by the Kurdish community, both aimed at members of the
23
Kurdish community, as the Danish general population; that aspect will be addressed
throughout my work.
The cultural, political and economic integration of Western Europe (and parts
of Eastern Europe) is a movement that begins to influence virtually every country of
the continent, including obviously the members, the countries that aspire on someday
becoming members, and the countries which are not members but maintain a very
close relations with the EU, such as Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. In other words,
the European Union develops as an institution in which the countries of the European
continent are undeniably influenced.
And it is within this context that Denmark, a country that after the defeat to
Germany in the Scwhesleig-Hoslein war in the second half of the XIX century
(Korsgaard, 2006) which represented the end of a process of territorial reduction of
the that Danish empire, a process that has dragged on since the XVII century with the
loss to Sweden of the province of Skåne, and that as a result, remained relatively
closed to outside influence; such history has harbored a narrative based on Denmark
being a society that advocates values such as homogeneity, security, closeness and
community, but that is forced to be a part of an international political order which is
itself cosmopolitan.
Denmark is, therefore, a member of the European Union that has
approximately 5.5 million inhabitants, of which, 89.6% are descendants of ethnic
Danish citizens; while the remaining percentage (10.4%), or are immigrants born in
other countries, or are descendants of those immigrants. Within that percentage of
approximately 10%, which is equivalent in absolute numbers to 590,000 inhabitants, a
percentage of 34% are immigrants from countries considered as Western3, and the
remaining 66% - about 390,000 people - are immigrants from countries categorized as
"non-Western "(STATBANK.DK, 2013)4, those categorizations are native, either
3 For statistical purposes, the Western countries are: the ones in the European Union, the Nordic
countries outside the EU (Iceland and Norway), Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino,
Switzerland, Vatican, Canada, United States, New Zealand and Australia. And non-Western, all other
countries, encompassing therefore, countries as diverse as Japan, Brazil and Somalia, for instance. 4 There are also a number of ethnic minorities, but with a more ancient past in relation to Denmark, or
with a different political history. First, there is a historical German minority, dating back to the German
territory that until the XIX century was a part of Denmark. There are about 15,000 individuals who
identify themselves as Germans (not to be confused with other German individuals who immigrated to
24
used on day-to-day interactions by the locals, as well as used by the Danish
government. This definition evokes Fredrik Barth's work (2005) in which he
compares the different forms of otherness. Within the Danish population, there are
varying degrees of the construction of otherness, in which ethnic boundaries are
drawn, being some more distant than the others. A Norwegian and an Afghan are both
non-Danes, but an ethnic-Danish individual would recognize in the Norwegian
someone much closer than the Afghani. If the concept is based on ethnicity symbolic
boundaries, some boundaries are more permeable than others. So the idea of what
would be a "ethnically Danish citizen", however, is not given a priori, but rather a
constant social construction, and a fruit also of a nationalistic construction. The same
historical processes that created what is now regarded as Danish territory, also serve
to build what is an ethnic-Dane, and in such construction are the affinity between
them and other national and ethnic identities as well.
Based on those figures, one could say that the Danish population is, according
to the native speech (KVAALE, 2005) fairly homogenous from an ethnic point of
view, especially compared to other European countries (such as France, England and
Germany), and Sweden, its Scandinavian neighbor, the European country that
receives more refugees in the world per capita, (LIEBIG, 2007). The fact that, within
the number of immigrants in Denmark, a large part came from countries with a
cultural, social and religious affinity (countries that belong to a "Western
civilization", to quote the influential distinction created by Huntington (2011), and
appropriate widely by everyday and media discourse in ways often quite thoughtless).
Therefore, this generates a society in which the idea and the realization that most
individuals would be, or should be inserted into a number of identified values and
customs as "Western."
Denmark for different reasons) but are born in Denmark and therefore have a Danish passport. This
minority is known as "hjemmetyskere", or "house Germans". There are also citizens who are Faroese
and Greenlanders who do not identify as Danes, and have their own language, but possess Danish
citizenship, as the Faroe Islands and Greenland are part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Their numbers
tare, respectively, 23,000 and 19,000 - quite a large number - considering the population of both
locations. In addition, there are Danes with Jewish or Roma identities that also consider themselves to
be Danes, and at the same time have a distinct ethnic identity.
Available at: http://www.nordschleswig.dk/SEEEMS/417.asp, http://www.dnag.dk/get.file?ID=2783, e
http://www.dnag.dk/get.file?ID=2699
25
It is noteworthy to point that on Denmark's insertion into a Western logic,
which would see Denmark, a nation with its own peculiarities, but also, Firstly a
Scandinavian nation, secondly, a European country and third, a Western country,
therefore, there is a gradation of proximity and cultural affinity clearly perceived by
much of the population. And immigrants that would be farther from this cultural
proximity to the Danes, would be immigrants who would have the greatest difficulty
(or in the perception of some Danes, an impossibility) of using the native term, "at
integrere", that is, to integrate. So, Danish society has a series of gradations in ethnic
classifications, and it is inside of it that the Kurdish-Danish community is perceived.
The current discourse, which includes both media, political, in addition to
everyday speech, deals with the issue of integration in different ways. The ways in
which the term comes to be used and interpreted should be reviewed; after all, the
very word assumes that the immigrant to become a member of another society should
become an integral part of it. Therefore, the immigrant should meet a number of
prerequisites if he intends to be a part of it, as shown by Mikkel Rytter (2010), to
discuss the issue of immigration from non-European individuals through marriage.
This perception of immigration and integration of the elements necessary to
influences any non-Danish individual who goes on to live in Denmark, regardless of
where he/she comes from. The most important aspect of my research, however, is to
understand how such experiences relates to the immigration of individuals of Kurdish
origin, and how it influences their sociability within the country they moved to, and
how does this sociability and those aspects of integration affect the perception of
themselves as Kurds.
Another important indicator that demonstrates a social homogeneity within the
Danish state is the high percentage of members of the official Church of Denmark,
which has approximately 80% of the population5. Such an importance given to
5 Although the number of members of the Danish church (Protestant, Lutheran and Evangelical) have
steadily decreased, the majority of the population are still members of it, by paying part of their taxes
(approximately 1%) for the church of Denmark. According to interviews and informal conversations I
had at the various periods I lived there, I large number of those who pay those taxes (those taxes are
optional), do it so they have a place to marry, to baptize their children, and eventually be buried, not
necessarily relating to what they understand as religious practices (which in many cases makes
practices with religious origin, such as baptisms and weddings not necessarily be seen as such), or even
26
Christianity as a supposed formative element of national identity around Europe
increasingly becomes relevant within the discourse of the extreme-right against a
possible "Islamization" of Europe (BANGSTAD, 2014).
If the conversion to the new monotheistic cult meant an insertion within the
European politics from the time that it had been adopted in the eleventh century,
Christianity as a social and cultural practice, before being seen as a religion, it is also
a strong civilizing element of a Denmark that is inserted within a European and
Western context; while it also starts to serve as a Danish differentiator to other non-
European countries (and some European), which can be exemplified by a fairly
common narrative in which several Danes say that Denmark is a Christian country yet
"pagan" past that is quite unique compared to the rest of Europe (except Sweden,
Norway and Iceland).
Something that should also noticed, however, is that both today and when in
1104 had been established the first archdiocese in the country, in Lund (now part of
Sweden), Christianity was not a religion that included the whole country as much as
the current narratives seem to assume. A part of the local population kept their pagan
practices, and Christian missionaries acquired many of the same practices; today,
even being a nominally Christian country, with an official church, Denmark is one of
the countries in the World with the highest percentage of people who define
themselves as not belonging to any religion (Korsgaard, 2008). The fact remains that
the narrative that reaffirms the nation's Christian roots find increasing resonance in
Denmark as well as in other European countries, as shown in the recent elections to
the European Parliament, in which, conservative and far-right parties, which often
enough agree with this narrative, have grown plenty. In the Danish case, it
concentrated 25% of the vote in the Dansk Folkeparti, a party as mentioned before
with a strong anti-immigrant and Islamophobic rhetoric.
That is an extremely high number, especially when considering that the Danish
state is, culturally, a secular state (one of the first countries to decriminalize
pornography, abortion and to recognize same-sex marriages). There is even a certain
discomfort in a considerable part of the Danes to talk about religious matters, as that
topic is considered to be an intimate question (Jenkins, 2012). Religion, therefore,
with a belief in Christianity. I also heard as a reason to pay the taxes was to maintain the churches as
historical monuments, since most of them are from the medieval period.
27
assumes a role that Emile Durkheim (2008) describes as a "social fact", and that,
despite the large non-religiosity of most of the ethnically Danish population, such
non-religiosity is expressed through a Christian symbology, also, the religiosity which
is considered as part of a Danish ethos is one encompassed by the Danish Church.
Symbolically, such a narrative, as comprising a number of practices considered as
traditional - and exclusive from practices that differ from them - into the Danish
culture, is echoed within the monolithic view that politicians (e.g. Pia Kjærsgaard)
and commentators (Lars Hedegaard), and of course, a percentage of the local
population, has of what being Danish means. With that in mind, it is necessary to
think about the present immigrant population in the country, even more, the
immigrant population whose otherness is seen in a more pronounced way by local
people, both physically and culturally.
Individuals coming from the Middle East and Somalia are seen as individuals,
who do not eat pork, and most Danish traditional meals are made with pork; they are
seen as people who do not drink alcohol, with alcohol being an integral part of Danish
sociability. Such immigrants would be intolerant of women's rights, while in
Denmark, women would be free and with equal rights; they would be against the
liberal gains of Danish society and against LGBT causes, as Denmark respond
positively to those gains, among other examples. More modern elements (women and
LGBT rights) would join more traditional elements (eating pork, drinking alcohol) in
a narrative that would expose the inability of such immigrants and their descendants
in becoming part of what is Denmark.6 In other words, there is a generalization of
immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority from which members of the
Kurdish community, for example, continually seek to define themselves as being
distinct culturally in a lot of aspects. Such a generalization, besides being used
constantly by conservative and right wing speech, also happens to be sometimes
adopted by historically left-wing parties such as the Socialist Party, which in recent
elections claimed that immigrants and refugees in Denmark SHOULD work, implying
that many of them do not.
6This narrative is even adopted by the Danish state, which in its family reunification policy, analyzes if
the individual with Danish nationality has a connection to Denmark which is greater than with other
countries. This policy discriminates quite openly individuals who are not descendants of Danish-Danes.
28
Obviously those discourses incur in both the generalization of Islam and its
different currents, as they generalize the ways in which individuals view their own
religion (or lack thereof), and create a list of characteristics and factors that compose
what is to be Dane, which often exclude the ethnic Danes themselves. Does being
vegetarian exclude someone from being Danish? Therefore, a discourse that proposes
itself self-evident ends up falling flat against fairly simple yet conclusive arguments.
The attempt to generalize both the Middle Eastern immigrants and Denmark does not
survive a deeper analysis.
There is also an apparent contradiction, one in which two competing
discourses converge on the same goal: a vision in which Denmark would be a country
of Christian traditions and at the same time, also a secular country. Can a country
where much of its population does not attend any church or religious congregation be
seen as a Christian country? Can a country that has an official state religion be seen as
an essentially secular nation? The construction of such discourses and conventions
between being a secular country and a nation of Christian tradition is not exclusive to
Denmark; it is present in many other Western Latin American countries. Even though
Denmark has an official state religion, and also an optional tax for the Church of
Denmark, the role of religion in the public and the political life of the country, is
much less significant than in the US, or even in Brazil, which are both Republicans
countries and constitutionally secular nations.
There is in Denmark a Christian background, whose practices are more related
to traditions that blend with nationalistic elements than strictly to religious practices.
For example, at Christmas, where traditions and practices that shape the Danish
sociability can be easily observed, traditions without any direct link to the celebration
of Christ's birth can be found at most Danish households, such as the habit of
decorating the Christmas tree with Danish flags; a practice that comes from the
prohibition of the use of national symbols during the Nazi occupation, and that is still
practiced today in several homes.
It is within those complex forms of interaction and sociability that are in some
cases inspired by symbolically Christian traditions and practices, and at other times,
deny any form of religious influence in the public domain, (and oftentimes both
aspects are present at the same time) and which is also reflected in the great
strangeness and discomfort that much of the local population has with addressing
topics related to religion, that the arrival of an immigrant population, with habits,
29
religious or not, have to live and socialize in arenas, whose practices are largely
understood within a Danish sociability. That is, there are a number of factors (such as
language skills) that will be discussed more extensively in the following chapters, in
which these immigrants and their descendants, need to master in order to be able to
life in Danish soil.
Such conditions are also introduced to ethnically Danish citizens, however, in
those cases, they are socialized almost always in Danish environments, and they begin
this socialization from a very early age, while all my interviewees, either came to
Denmark with a certain age and/or had a Kurdish sociability at home, and another
one, considered to be culturally Danish, in public places, such as kindergartens,
schools, universities, and their place of employment.
Another relevant factor that helps explaining the relationship Denmark has
with immigration, it is the social equality found in the country that has, according to
the GINI index, the lowest economic and social disparities in the world. One can be
said that, in fact, Denmark is, and has historically been, at least from its political
change into a representative monarchy, a territory with a fairly homogeneous
population (Korsgaard, 2006).
Therefore, we have the Danish case: a country in which an everyday narrative
states that Denmark is a Christian nation - or a country with social practices inspired
by Christianity, a religion present in the country for almost a millennium, such as
baptisms, weddings, funerals, religious holidays - but also proud of its Viking past;
besides being a secular nation with freedom of worship: a nation that had been shaped
throughout its history in a rather closed, equal and homogenous manner being
confronted by political and demographic changes that begin to challenge this
narrative, which for many is an immemorial fact about the country they belong to.
Such concepts and narratives are articulated with each other to create an ethnic-
national idealization that, in Danish, is called "danskhed" which in English can be
translated as "danishness".
The concept of "Danishness" as a guiding of interactions and of Danish
culture, is to be noticed as a series of social relations, kinship-related issues, language
skills, knowledge of certain cultural and artistic elements of Denmark. In addition to
that, ideas related to safety, solidarity and confidence both in other Danish
individuals, but also in the state and in Danish society. These characteristics are found
in Denmark, and are seen by many to be responsible for maintaining the welfare state
30
in this country since the 1950s. Regarding personal relationships, the "Danishness"
comes from an idea that emphasizes characteristics such as peacefulness, comfort and
happiness, which leads to a metaphor of seeing Denmark as a family (Rytter, 2010); a
metaphor which becomes a constant narrative within the country. And it is within this
"Danish family" that non-Danish individuals who immigrate see themselves living
amongst; and if there is a Danish family, there are close relatives, distant relatives and
non-relatives, all those categories defined by the different levels of otherness. So,
Danishness happens to be built on a series of values, which the local narrative claim
to be "traditional" or "defining" what is "being Danish." And it is in opposition to this
narrative that the majority of immigrants are analyzed, and for many of those
immigrants there's an idea that the capability of integrating and adopting such values
are completely impossible and incompatible with Danish values. And it is in such a
way that Middle Eastern immigrants, like the Kurds are seen by various sectors of
society (increasingly more so, judging from the national elections of 2015).
And it is within this narrative that the vision of immigration, and the reaction
that this phenomenon causes in Danish society that should be understood, so that we
can better comprehend how immigrants, in the context of this research, of Kurdish
origin, have their experiences, and how the interpret them symbolically, while
becoming a part of said society. Such historical and social context, in the Danish case,
generates two consequences for the discourse on immigration, especially in the case
of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, which historically have been
represented and perceived by Europeans as completely different (SAID, 2008).
We can identify two different poles regarding political stances, in which much
of the local population would be situated (KVAALE, 2005). The first is an idea that
politically, has been more taken over by most left-leaning political parties, which is a
position that follows on the footsteps of authors like Hall and Du Gay (1996), and
which brings forth was an idea of multiculturalism, highlighting both the cultural
benefits of immigration and the possibility of coexistence between individuals
identified with distinct cultural backgrounds and the possibility of a change in local
cultural practices based on foreign elements. Within the multiculturalist perspective
that guides much of the local left, the Danish isolationist speech is something to be
constantly fought and relegated, after all, such a stance would be inconsistent with a
postcolonial and post-Cold War reality; the present should be a time of tolerance and
mutual respect.
31
And, as it was already mentioned, the second narrative would be the
immigrant's inability - meaning in this case the non-Western immigrant, which is, in
turn, often understood and seen as an immigrant who is either/bot Muslim or from the
Middle East or still, more broadly, from some non-Western country (excepting
perhaps, and in some cases only, Latin America, and Japan) - to adapt to the Danish
way of life, and an impossibility of said individual to understand and successfully
reproduce the social relations which shape Danish society. Thus, such immigrants
would be a symbolic threat (and a constant to) to "danskhed", the idea of being
Danish, and the whole historical process leading to the construction of this identity,
that is, an idea of "Danishness", in addition to being seen as a steady economic weight
to the state Social Welfare site.
Both the media and the political discourse often occur (in different ways and at
different levels) in error. First, to assume that immigrants are a homogeneous group,
after all, the perception of those individuals as culturally cohesive and identified as
immigrants arises a priori, as the perception comes from individuals who are seen as
non-migrant, or "native". Secondly, both discourses incur in a lack of agency, which
is usually assigned to them. If the former, the discourse most associated with the left,
immigrants are seen as a way to transform the Danish society into a multicultural
society, in the second case - the speech most identified with the right - the non-
Western immigrant, is seen as the likely ruin it.
Understanding the beginning of immigration to Denmark, as a recent
phenomenon, after all, it starts as a larger phenomenon during the 60s/70s, with the
arrival of the first guest workers, and later their families, this context which appears
constantly as a starting point of many of my interlocutors family history in the
country, and the impact that such a phenomenon has, both socially and culturally
within the Danish society, we find different groups with different ethnic identities that
move to Denmark, and start to live within a society with habits, customs, religion, that
is, with a distinct culture of their place of origin (Barth, 2005, p.16-19) and at the
same time those different cultures become influenced by everything that shapes
Danish culture (values, habits, legislation, cooking, sociability, etc.) and at the same
time also influence them.
Within the context of anthropological research, this is another work regarding
immigration. The study (among many other possible ones) of Kurdish immigrants and
their descendants within a European context, but precisely within Denmark, a country
32
where the idea of hosting immigrants is often compared to the idea of having a guest
in one's home, something which is offered due to kindness and is constantly
reinforced as part of the constant discourse regarding immigration (Hervik, 2005), and
therefore, an influence in both the sociability and the learning processes of those
immigrants and their descendants, a constant in which such individuals would have to
constantly adapt in order to and live in their new home.
The construction of an object of study, in my case, Kurdish individuals living
in Denmark, is a first step towards the construction of a dissertation. However, there
is an obvious need to have a theoretical framework by which I can analyze the data I
obtained during my ethnography, and within which, my dissertation will be discussed
and inserted. Concepts such as nationalism and ethnicity will be extremely useful in
understanding my object of analysis.
An in-depth analysis of the concept of nationalism, will be of great help in
understanding the aspirations of a national project claimed by a considerable number
of Kurds living in Denmark at the same time that they are part of a modern nation-
state, subject to all the implications and privileges that such a position promotes. If the
dynamic that helped shape the Danish state also helps understanding the current
history in which my interlocutors need to dialogue with, it also helps to understand
how the Danish is related to the Kurdish question, as well as helping understanding
how Kurds seek the support of civil society in Denmark and the Danish state
motivated by a goal in which Kurdistan is as an independent nation, or that Kurds are
a people who are able to express themselves culturally within the state dynamics that
are inserted with no persecution.
The different formulations regarding nationalism as a form of organization,
not only political, but also related to identity and discourse (Anderson, 2008, p. 14-
20) alongside the idea of ethnicity and the concepts that relate to it, are helpful in the
understanding of both the idea of a possible Kurdish nation-state (and the
characteristics that individuals who identify so see themselves as part of it), as to
understand the relationship of the Danish ethnic nationals and immigrants and their
descendants, especially, in the case of this work, from Kurdish origin.
The idea of a nation as an imagined community, as taken from the classic
quote by Benedict Anderson (2008) is a powerful tool in the search for understanding
of Kurdish nationalism, as there is a shared ethnic identity among a population in all
the states in which Kurdistan is contained as in the many diaspora communities, and
33
within such an imagined community in various historical moments for various
Kurdish actors, there was an attempt to create a Kurdish national state. Such attempts
are also part of a Kurdish identity narrative, and that despite the in Kurdish case, it
starts as a nationalism inspired by Sunni, something that according to Anderson
(2008) would be lost in the nation state as a unifying element, this nationalism
eventually overcomes an identity attached to a religious group and it encompasses
other religious minorities within a national narrative. In an interview with a politician
of Kurdish origin and a member of the Socialist People's Party, and councilman in his
hometown in the city of Lyngby, in metropolitan region of Copenhagen, he told me,
while we were discussing the lack of freedom that afflicts Kurds within Turkey today:
Of course, the important is that you find a solution where
Kurds can have their own rights, they will institutionalize their
language and culture, develop it, and it would have relations
with all the 3 parts. Which will create a huge Kurdish
imagined community, which would be strong enough in the
future, both politically and economically. That’s the most
important thing for me right now. (INTERVIEW WITH
SERDAL BENLI)
After such a statement, I asked him if that imagined community no longer
existed, in which he told me that he would like for that community to be stronger, and
with a stronger political representation. Meaning that, within the Kurdish community,
there is a feeling that the Kurdish community is something that exists and can be
quantified (for Kurdish people, that are, people who define themselves as Kurds, and
those who don't), besides existing a goal among many political groups that try to
influence such a formulation.
As formulated by Benedict Anderson (2008), the construction of an imagined
community, as opposed to a "real" community, occurs not because of a daily or a
visual contact among its members, as it would within a smaller community, as a
family or a group of people who meet in a church or for a reading club, but by the
sense of belonging that several individuals that might never come, in contact with
each other. In the words of British author:
34
In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following
definition of a nation: it is an imagined political community -
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is
imagined because even the smallest nation will never know
most members of its, other members will know who they are
or even hear about them, however, in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion. (BENEDICT ANDERSON,
2008)
Therefore, Benedict Anderson (2008) defines, in his study of nationalism, that
a nation would be an imagined community in which its members would assume they
have an identity in common. Such ontological perception gives us a lot of factors to
be considered in relation to the Kurds, who make up a nation without a state, despite
the various historical attempts of creating a Kurdish state for them.
And it is within this context, in which the Kurds are organized politically in an
attempt to create their own nation-state, and also in which the states in where the
territory of Kurdistan is contained mobilize in order to prevent the construction of it.
However, what such states and their rulers could never control is the ability of
the Kurdish population to build its own common identity, and articulate this identity
within the various contexts in which they are inserted. If in the various imagined
communities that are represented politically within a nation-state, around the world,
the process of forming a national consciousness went and still goes through several
distinct elements, such as the use of the press, the establishment of publishers with a
reach across the country, the mass media, the media, museums, universities, literature,
sports, the use of national symbols, among others, in the case of individuals who
identify themselves as Kurds, the same processes take place, despite the repression
that occurs in countries such as Turkey and Iran.
The Kurds, however, due to both the repression found in countries occupying
the disputed territory as Kurdistan, and migration in search of jobs and better living
conditions now constitute representative communities in several countries, especially
in Western Europe and North America. In these countries, where they have greater
freedom of expression, one can see many of the factors mentioned above. The use of
Kurdish flags or various Kurdish political parties, the media consisting of several TV
channels, radio, news sites, newspapers, language use (both Kurmanji, as the Sorani),
35
the use of costumes, the use of arts such as dance, music, poetry, cinema, are powerful
tools in creating a shared identity for such individuals, despite being far from the
territory considered by them as their homeland.
So, the Kurds also make use of the various factors that helped shape the
construction of several nation-states around the world, despite not having a nation-
state that represents them. Such a process that is, according to Benedict Anderson
(2008), the fruit of capitalism and the industrial revolution, and most of the processes
that enable the creation of these (press, media and others); nations do not arise in a
vacuum, as would suggest Anthony D. Smith (1986), but in a previous identity of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. To Anthony D. Smith (1986), there
would necessarily be an narrative that would unite such individuals, and such
narrative comes before the phenomenon of nationalism itself, being reinterpreted
during and after the appearance of it.
Therefore, in the work Anthony D. Smith (1986), there is what he calls
"ethnosymbolism" in which nationalism despite modern phenomenon is based on
dominant ethnic ideas, and therefore, arises via several affinity relations, kinship,
religion, that existed before the Industrial Revolution.
My object of analysis - Kurds living in Denmark - are not in the territory
considered to be Kurdistan by Kurdish nationalists, and many immigrated from cities
and towns outside of Kurdistan, mainly due to migration (both forced due to
attempted assimilation processes, as voluntary for better economic conditions,
although those two can be concomitant), however, they carry a sense of belonging to a
Kurdish community, regardless of where such people live, and regardless of the
attempts to erase their ethnic identity. That idea of a shared Kurdish identity, in the
Kurdish narrative and in historical accounts, appears prior to the industrial revolution.
It is this idea of belonging to a Kurdish identity, an idea that stretches beyond any
national boundary, that support the claim of my interlocutors that there would be a
Kurdish nation, even in the Diaspora and even without a state to represent it.
The concept of ethnicity also helps to better understand my subject of study
and their social relations, both between themselves and also with other Danish
nationals or even so, other ethnic groups. Martin van Bruinessen (2000) argues that
the concepts of nationality and ethnicity in the Kurdish context, begins its articulation
36
inserted into a narrative that seeks to build7 of a nation-state for the people who self-
identify as being of Kurdish origin. The idea, therefore, of a Kurdistan, organizes in
various locations, both inside where according to a nationalistic narrative as belonging
to the Kurdish population, and within the countries in which a large Kurdish
population inhabit, as a form of political organization and cultural that unites the
various Kurdish individuals. So if there is actually a Kurdish nation-state, there is not
only a single thought of what is Kurdistan, as there are competing narratives within
such a concept.
This form of political organization (the idea of creating a Kurdish national-
state) is linked to other identity forms within the various individuals of Kurdish origin
in shaping a sociability that is related to the social phenomenon understood as
ethnicity. The concept of ethnicity has a long history within the social anthropology.
So for a better understanding, in general, of my object of study, it is necessary to
address more clearly and precisely the theoretical discussion of the concept.
First, it is necessary to emphasize to understand the concept of ethnicity as a
social construct, that seeks first to achieve an identity that is presented, factually, as
more recent than the discourse itself; and secondly, as a way of construction of
otherness - an ontological definition of various social actors as belonging or not to
certain groups (ERIKSEN, 2002, p.42-75).
Therefore, the idea of ethnicity is not necessarily linked to a geographic
location, or is it a something that is natural (throughout human history, this idea of
"natural" that begins with an idea of race, and nowadays finds itself linked to a
genetic idea), or to a cultural issue, including cultural as anything that is shared
among a group of individuals.
An ethnic group, and I now follow the analysis of the anthropologist Frederik
Barth (1969), comes across cultural differences, which would be socially organized.
There are, of course, within any group that identifies itself as belonging to a certain
ethnic group several differences on various issues; however, there are a number of
7 Not always, however, the attempt to create a Kurdish nation-state is a goal in itself. Some of Abdullah
Ocälan' defenders preach a belief in a political system called democratic confederalism, a system which
would precede the political organization through the nation-states. However, I realized that not all
proponents of this form of political organization take such precepts in practice, since many of them
celebrated and discussed with optimism the prospect of a Kurdish state, at least in Iraq, after Kurdish
combatants had the capacity to resist the attacks from ISIS.
37
cultural elements that function as boundary demarcating the differences that are
critical in building a sense of "us" and a sense of "other." These limits are extremely
fluid and highly variable over time, and capable of the most different forms of
external or internal influence, however, such changes are very noticeable to members
of an ethnic group; therefore, it relies on the context in which such interactions are
located, and the relational character of the various individuals who belong to both the
"we" and the "other". Therefore, the formation of ethnic groups follows two factors
above all else: self-identification within such a group, and identification of individuals
by others who are such ethnic group.
Therefore, ethnicity according to Fredrik Barth (1969, 1995) is the manner in
which any cultural difference is organized in a comprehensible manner, thus
reflecting the social relations of belonging or to a particular group of individuals.
Such groups do not arise because of a shared cultural issue, instead arising from
cultural differences that may have an important symbolic value within that ethnic
group, also those values have several possible interpretations within that group.
If ethnicity is an attribute that is constantly being built both by external
attribution and by internal self-identification (Barth, 1969). That is, ethnicity, for
Fredrik Barth, is a factor that arises by two movements, one that comes from an
external way, so ethnicity occurs through a constant negotiation within it and with
members who do not share such ethnicity, and another in which the individual
identifies as a members of that ethnic group through various factors that can act as
aggregators, such as religion, nationality, history, ideology, a former myth, rituals,
among others. Fredrik Barth himself provides an accurate and concise description of
his concept of ethnicity.
Firstly, it is clear that the boundaries persist despite a flow of
people through them. In other words, categorical ethnic
distinctions do not depend on the absence of mobility, contact
or information, but its cause is social processes of exclusion
and incorporation where discrete categories are maintained
despite changes in participation and membership through the
course of the stories of the individual lives. Secondly, it is
clear that stable social relations, persistent, constantly
important and vital relationships are maintained through these
38
same borders, which are often based precisely on these
dichotomous ethnic states. In other words, ethnic distinctions
do not depend on the lack of social acceptance and relations,
but in the opposite way, are constantly the same foundations
on which such comprehensive systems are founded.
(FREDRIK BARTH, 1969, p.9-10)
In the case of the Kurds, a simple, yet enlightening, case of the proposition put
forward by Frederik Barth (1969) can be found among Kurds who live in Turkey, and
it is also reflected in the Kurdish-Danish community is the persecution by use of letter
X in Turkey, because of its presency in the Kurmanji alphabet, but not in the Turkish
one. This usage becomes an important social marker in the construction of Kurdish
identity, at least within a Turkish context, in both the construction of Kurdish and
non-Kurdish identity altogether.
The following speach relates to this question, and was developed, based on
several reports I heard from several interlocutors during my fieldwork:
"We, Kurds, have the letter X in our language and we can not
use it within the Kurdish territory in possession of Turkey.
Even I, being a Kurd who does not live in Turkey, I feel
compelled to register, fight and protest the fact that this is
inherently wrong, and I know that my family and I would also
be persecuted if we were not in Denmark, for the same
reason."
Thus, by exemplifying the concept of ethnicity proposed by Barth, the case of
the Kurds is quite enlightening. The boundaries of the territory that defines what
would be theoretically Kurdistan are not enough to account solely for what is to be
Kurdish; nor have the various acculturation and assimilation policies of the states that
exist within that territory have succeeded in turning the Kurdish population in Turkey,
Iranians, Iraqis or Syrians. Similarly, being an immigrant or descendants of
immigrants in a European country did not prevent them from bringing what they
would call as aspects of their culture and interpret it within Denmark. The constant
interaction with Danish individuals (or other ethnic groups) does not work as a form
39
of abandonment of a Kurdish identity, but rather a restatement of the same, or an
interpretation of society and Danish culture through a Kurdish perspective, or vice
versa.
Other perspectives related to the concept of ethnicity that can be applied in
relation to my subject of study include the idea of Clifford Geertz (1973) in which
ethnicity, despite being a social construction, is based on a foundational myth based
on the past and as such constantly being perceived as something inherent. Also
noteworthy, it is the critique put forward by Eric Wolf (1982) to a presumed universal
concept ethnicity, and that it emerges through certain conditions related to interaction
of several groups.
In addition to that, the same Fredrik Barth (1962) worked with social and
political organization in a Kurdish context, one of the first authors to work with that
ethnicity. The power relations and family relations within the various Kurdish
communities located in two Iraqi provinces show the way in which such a community
differs from ethnic groups that surrounds them, and through that, it allows them to
shape their unique identities. Such work becomes extremely useful in the
understanding of my subject matter through a historical bias, both to address the
social and political relations of Kurds in that region of Iraq, as to show historically
how these relations have developed . Also relevant to my understanding is the work
undertaken by Paulo Pinto (2012), in dealing with Sufism among the Kurds in Syria,
as well as how such religious practices are articulated within Shiite practices as it also
analyzes the different forms of integration of rural migrants into urban communities,
mainly in the city Aleppo, furthermore, it also debates how local religious language
can be used by them as a way of inserting themselves within the Muslim community
of Aleppo.
All those authors serve as a way for the author to place its object of study
within a theoretical perspective within the anthropological discipline. Thus they serve
as a way of understanding the relationships of my interlocutors - Kurds in Denmark -
in a more organized and grounded way.
ii) Methodology:
40
My ethnographic work takes place at two different times. The first, in 2014,
occured between the beginning of June until the beginning of September; the second
one occurs between the months of January and February 2015. During this period, I
conducted my observant participation, in several different ways, including, going to
organizational meetings at FOKUS-A (Organization for Kurdish Academics and
Students), attending the Danish-Kurdish Cultural Center, participating in Kurdish
demonstrations across Copenhagen, plus formal interviews with my interlocutors, as
well as informal conversations with them, which happened in different contexts, such
as lunches and conversations after demonstrations, an conversations via Facebook, in
addition to reading texts, articles and speeches used by Kurdish protesters during the
demonstrations that I have attended. Also important to note that those interactions
occured in different linguistic backgrounds, a point to be addressed in the future.
The interviews were recorded and then transcribed for further analysis. Such a
device was used to allow my interlocutors to engage better with their own memories
and their experiences, while they can reinterpret them in a more reflected way.
Participation in activities related to culture and politics, or in moments in which the
two intertwined helped me in that I was able to observe and analyze how they were
organized, the use of symbols, which languages would be used, and how their social
relations took place. Such articulations will be analyzed in a more extensive way
during my dissertation.
One should also discuss the question of the language used during the research.
My Danish knowledge is intermediate; therefore English was the preferred language
as a way to communicate with my interlocutors. A large part of them was fluent in
English, while others had a command of the language not as advanced as the others.
Such individuals generally had moved to Denmark at a later time in their lives or they
have not worked or studied in a situation that required a constant use of English. In
such cases, the use of the Danish language became extremely helpful. Regarding the
mother tongue, as will be spoken throughout the work, many are fluent from a small
age in a Kurdish language, while others learn after a certain age (both by their own
desires and as a family wish), there are also those who do not speak any Kurdish
language, but speak some ohter Middle Eastern language (Arabic, Persian or Turkish),
and there are also others who only speak Danish.
Another important moment during my research was my presence in several
public events related to the Kurdish question, and it was, during them, that I could see
41
a noticeable change their tones which was caused by the tragedy with the Yazidi
minority in in the moutains of Shingâl (Sinjar) due to the attack made by the extremist
group called ISIS. Such a change will be discussed in more detail during the course of
my work; I can state that there were two fundamental changes in the objective and the
presence of individuals in them.
If at first, the demonstrations were either related to both Kurdish culture
and/or political action of a Kurdish party, and the numbers of attendants varied (but
always less than a second moment), there was a presence of only the Kurdish media,
as they were mostly oseeking a dialogue with Kurdish people, in another moment
significant changes did occur. The various Danish parties (mainly representatives of
leftist parties, but not exclusively) start to be a presence in the same events, the
speeches are in Danish, there is a presence of Danish politicians, as well as support of
the Danish population of non-Kurdish origin, as well as presence of several local
media and even a local researcher on the Yazidi religion. If the first cries of "Bevar
Kurdistan / Biji Kurdistan" were a celebration, in the second case, it came to signify
an order, a plea or a moral obligation that should be made explicit to all. As one of my
interlocutors had told me, the defense of Kurdish identity should be relevant for all
who know about the injustices suffered by them.
Informal conversations gave me a larger dimension of the interactions of
various individuals in an environment in which the discussion of Kurdish identity was
not in the foreground (though always present, after all, they are Kurds individuals),
and in which they could talk about everyday topics, and at the same time if comments
on the Kurdistan political situation appear, they would appear in a more organic way
and less committed to an official speech.
Those moments would also be an arena where social relationships of
friendship, rivalry, romantic relationships, and others would be more exposed,
allowing, therefore, that information obtained through other ways to be analyzed in a
more critical way. Furthermore, such interactions were a celebration of locus or
manifestation of Kurdish culture; or one in which the relationship between
anthropologist and native is not being placed in such an obvious way that contributes
to both the researcher as the research participants create greater trust, thus
contributing to the insertion of the ethnographer among the community with whom he
wished to study.
42
My presence at FOKUS-A meetings and at the Kurdish-Danish Cultural
Center helped me to notice some goals related to the Kurdish cause and the ways in
which they organized themselves politically and culturally, both in order to have a
dialogue both with the Kurds living in Denmark, as with Danish citizens of several
ethnicities. On one hand there is a bureaucratic organization of both organizations vis-
a-vis the Danish state, in relation to official recognition of them, as in one case, a
cultural entity, and in another as a student organization; such official issues need to be
decided and handled in an organized and official way, there are also discussions of
plans and guidelines for their action e throughout the year. Among those discussions,
are the ones centered around organizing trips to Kurdistan, demonstrations together
with other groups, discussion forums, typical dance classes and the teaching of the
Kurdish language, besides creating a bridge with other organizations and the civil
society, all of these activities and action plans are discussed by board members.
Before my first trip and after I came back to Brazil, I kept in touch with my
informants, and with groups of Kurdish interests on the Internet through both
Facebook and Twitter (and less so through Instagram). Before traveling, which started
at the beginning of the year, I started researching the existence of groups related to a
Kurdish identity on Facebook, as well as Web pages with the same content. After
mapping some of them, I contacted through their page on Facebook, about the
possibility of doing a field study that involved interviews, participation in events,
participation at a meeting, which was readily accepted enthusiastically by them.
Esmer, the person who was responsible for FOKUS-A Facebook page, was
added on Facebook, and after the first meeting I had, which I could attend thanks in
large part because of her disposition, I managed to contact several other members of
FOKUS-A, former members, and people who knew the organization but were not
members of it, which included some students, a journalist and a local politician who
would campaign for the National Parliament in 2015. I also met some Danish
politicians who came to get acquainted with the Kurdish question after the tragedy of
the Yazidis in Shingal, and others who have constantly dialogued with the Kurdish
community in Denmark.
After returning to Brazil in September 2014, I continued to keep in touch with
my interlocutors, primarily through Facebook, as was mentioned earlier, and kept
interacting with them online, commenting on posts, reading their posts, talking to
43
them through the Facebook chat, and to a lesser extent, via Twitter with comments
and retweets.
In a second moment, in which I came back to Denmark in late January, and
returned to Brazil in late February, I could, in addition to conducting further
interviews, asking questions related to my research, interact with my interlocutors
both within manifestations linked to the Kurdish question, as the issues related to
other various topics, from the most commonplace such as football, music, to more
political issues, such as the situation in Palestine, and what was then, the upcoming
election in Turkey, among others. I was also able to participate and watch several
movies at the Kurdish Film Festival, organized by FOKUS-A, which is one of the
most talked about cultural events within the Kurdish community in Denmark, and one
in which the members of FOKUS-A seem specially proud of, both by seeing the
artistic creativity of Kurdish filmmakers, or by seeing the Kurdish way of life being
portrayed on the big screen, as the opportunity it presents to create a dialogue through
art, between the cause and the Kurdish culture and the Danish society.
It is based on those two moments, plus a virtual interaction with my
interlocutors, that I write my ethnographic work. Using the various research tools
mentioned above, that helped me to supplement my participant observation, I build
my dissertation, using data that had obtained, as well, from different theoretical
frameworks that have been discussed throughout the history of the anthropological
discipline.
iii) Dissertation plan
My dissertation is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter there will be
an in depth discussion of the issue of immigration in a Danish context, considering
how culture and the Danish society deal with the influx of people from other cultures,
and more specifically, on the Kurdish immigration to Denmark.
During the the second chapter, there will be discussed the construction of a
Kurdish identity within Danish society. The manifestations of this identity, its cultural
form (dance, language, music, film) and also the political way, in which both forms
44
are articulated in the constant construction of the phenomenon of "Kurdishness" in
Danish territory.
The third chapter will deal specifically with individuals who make up the
FOKUS-A, an organization focused on young students and scholars of Kurdish origin.
How it started, its history, its organization, its objectives and its role in the Kurdish
community in Copenhagen; as well as how it effectively articulates with other
Kurdish organizations, and their role in shaping a Kurdish identity to individuals who
have just started their adult lives.
The fourth and final chapter will address the various articulations of Kurdish
nationalism, both within the Danish territory, and how the various currents Kurdish
policies are articulated with the policies of a Danish state, and it will also address how
such individuals articulate their goals vis-a-vis Kurdistan, not limited only to the
Danish and Kurdish territory but within organizations and political parties present in
several European Union countries and North America, and, of course, in the countries
where Kurdistan is located.
45
Chapter II – Immigration in Denmark: an ethnographical analysis
Denmark, as was already mentioned in the introduction, is a country with a
population of around 5,5 million people. Within this population, just over 89.6%,
according to data collected by STATBANK, a state organization with statistical
information free of charge to any individual with access to the internet, are ethnically
defined people as Danes and of Danish descent, while the remaining percentage
(10.4%), are either immigrants born in other countries, or are descendants of those
immigrants. Within this percentage of approximately 10%, which is equivalent in
absolute numbers to 590,000 inhabitants, a percentage of 34% are immigrants from
countries regarded as Western, and the remaining 66% - about 390,000 people - are
immigrants from countries known as " non-Western "(STATBANK, 2014).
That a Danish official agency has such information regarding the ethnicity of
its citizens and inhabitants is something that differs from other European Union
countries - admittedly France - and demonstrates the importance attached within the
country to such ethnic issues; furthermore, that Denmark differentiates between
immigrants from countries said to be "Western" and countries that are "non-Western"
shows that within the Danish ethnic identity there is also a definite distinction which
is sanctioned by the state, and that such a distinction is merely a bureaucratic
reflection of the various ethnic boundaries established between the Danish identity
and other identities.
With that in mind, this chapter aims to analyze through an anthropological
perspective, and based on the author's ethnographic work, the different dynamics
related to immigration in Denmark, with special attention to the Kurdish population
living in that country. This dynamic - of immigration - and all the symbolic processes
that are inserted into it are of paramount importance in building a Kurdish ethnic
identity in Denmark, because all individuals inserted into this community are either
immigrants or descendants of them, and therefore, in one way or another, they are
subject to state paperwork regarding their status (or are familiar with it from people
who they are close with), and live with the symbolic status of being ethnically non-
Danish, which largely influences their interactions within Denmark. Afterwards, an
analysis of the experiences of many Kurds living in Danish territory will be done, in
46
order to understand how such position influences the construction of a Kurdish
identity in Denmark.
i) Identity and belonging in Denmark: what it is, and what makes someone
Danish
The first important aspect to analyzed is the term known as "Janteloven"
originating from a novel called "En Flyktining Krysser Sitt Spor" written by a
Norwegian-Danish author called Aksel Sandemose in 1933, in which there is a series
of informal rules arising from Mr. Sandemose's experience during his youth living in
a small Danish town, the best known rule being, and the "law" in which most Danes
(plus Norwegian and Swedish too) recognizes when one mentions such a term is that
"you should not think that you are better than us, or special in any way".
This formulation, which is quite common in the daily life of Danish citizens
which also includes Kurdish-Danish individuals, is at once an ideal of equality on the
individual status vis-a-vis Danish society, and also within the communities in which
these individuals are inserted, be it family, a workplace, universties, among others. At
the same time, such custom becomes a form of an expected sociability by anyone who
is to live within Danish society, being him/her Danish or not, subject to a tacit
disapproval of his/her community if they're not fulfilling such a social requirement
(JENKINS, 2012).
A result not expected was that a determination, parochial and
rural, that no one should be above the other - and that, despite
their Danish incarnation in the book written by Sandemose in
1933, as "Jantenloven", is recognized as a peasant theme
around the world - mixed with the egalitarian socialism of
urban struggles for decent working conditions for the working
class. The resulting ideology that insists "We should all be
equal," has become more powerful as much as it has been
more taken for granted, into the background of everyday life
and influencing the political spectrum both in the left and in
47
the right, so that even today, most, if not all Danish political
parties offer variations of social democratic themes. Such
egalitarianism had been encouraged by a modern nation-
building process that emphasized the supposed cultural
homogeneity, social as well as economic of a "small country"
(JENKINS, 2012, p.45)
The second important aspect is the sense in which Danish society would be a
society that in its very essence was homogeneous, at least until the presence of a wave
of invited immigrants, mainly from the Middle East, in the seventies and part of the
eighties. This speech on several occasions happens to be naturalized through media,
political, economic and cultural elements.
The naturalization or primordialization (ERIKSEN, 2002) of an ethnic
discourse on and/or within any society or culture also serves a political and a cultural
agenda inserted into the power relations inside that society (Barth, 2007); therefore, to
understand why Denmark is seen - by Danes and non-Danes - as a "homogenous"
country, and why such discourse is used in various ways within Danish society is
essential to the understanding of the vision that the various individuals within
Denmark have on immigration and how immigrants coming to Denmark, as well as
their descendants, come to interpret the country in which they live.
First, one must understand that, despite the political and social use of the
discourse that claims that "Denmark is a homogeneous country," the same discourse
finds some elements that help understanding, why such narrative would not occur if
there weren't a number of factors that would sustain it. The fact that in Denmark a
common language, which is largely understandable in the entire land mass of the
country, in which the dialects of different regions are very similar, or at least not so
different from each other (except for the "bornholmsk", this dialect on the island of
Bornholm, which is a part of Denmark, but geographically is closer to Sweden, a
situation which greatly influences the local language) especially if we take into
account countries with greater linguistic variety, such as the neighboring Sweden and
Germany.
In international standards, the standard of living is high, and
the gap between the rich and the poor are smaller than in many
48
countries in which Denmark is compared to... The language
throughout the country is Danish, and a huge part of the
population has been baptized at the national Protestant church.
Denmark is therefore nationally and culturally very
homogeneous. (ENCYCLOPEDIA NATIONAL DANISH
1996 APUD JENKINS, 1997, p.47)
The fact that a huge majority of the population has been baptized in the church
of Denmark, which has existed for nearly half a millennium; the existence of a Danish
royal family for the same period of time, and of course, as it was mentioned before,
the idea that all individuals in the Danish society must be equal or at least treated
equally. Something can be seen, for example, written in the own Danish national
encyclopaedia, as seen on the previous quote.8
That the quote from can be found at encyclopaedia, which is relatively recent,
written less than two decades ago, is a perfect exemplification of the discourse behind
the national homogeneity idea. However, the fact that such narrative resonates in
much of the local population does not mean that it is in itself completely right (or that
has no basis of truth within it). This discourse becomes an important part, so for one
to better understand the society in which immigrants, both of Kurdish origin, as other
ethnic groups, and therefore it should be analyzed in a more critical way.
Another important factor in the discourse of equality can be found at the Gini
coefficient, which as a methodology used for determining a nation's income
distribution index. Denmark, historically, out of all nations within the UN has the
8The Christianization process of Denmark (and Scandinavia in general) occured between the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, in which, due to the Viking explorations in Europe, those who participated on
them would come into contact with the Christian doctrines already present in parts of Europe. The first
Danish king (and who actually returned to Denmark during his lifetime) to convert to Christianity was
Harald Blåtand (Bluetooth) in 960, and who allowed the Christian faith to be practiced since 935. In
1086, he is murdered by his people and by nobles, and king Knud IV (Canute IV of Denmark), who
would become the first Danish saint, and wbo tried to expand Christianity the territories under its
control. The first diocese in Danish soil (which is in Lund, currently a part of Sweden), and which
reported directly to the Pope, had been erected in 1105, by Eric I, half-brother of Canute. Another
significant moment for Christianity in Denmark takes place in 1536, during the reign of Christian III,
with the conversion of the country to Protestantism, and the creation of the Danish Church, of Lutheran
theology, and whose leader would be the head of state, therefore, the King or Queen of Denmark.
49
number (from the registered countries) that is closest to 0, with a number of 24.0,
which would indicate, therefore, a more equal distribution of income compared to
every other country. Such statistics can be seen as a reworking of the "law of Janten"
in which people should not be richer or poorer than their similar, since they are not
better nor worse than everyone, at least as far as possible in a capitalist society.
In the previous paragraphs the idea that Denmark would be a homogeneous
country was addressed, and that such a narrative would work as a guide to much of
the political, economic and social questions in the country, in addition, to have a
strong importance to its history. However, this narrative should be deconstructed so
that one can analyze to what extent it still holds true; and to what extent it can be seen
as merely incomplete. In what aspects the idea of homogeneity is used as a discursive
way to build up a wall in order to protect the country from foreign influence,
represented by the immigrant figure, and in which aspects can Denmark, in fact, be
seen as a homogeneous country, or, at least, more homogeneous that the majority of
other nation-states present in the world.
First, there should be discussed how plausible, from a historical point of view,
is the idea of an ethnically homogeneous nation in Danish territory. Since the days of
the first Viking voyages that would spread across Europe, ranging from the Baltic Sea
to the Mediterranean Sea, to the territories that now belong to France, Spain, the
British Isles, also passing through Iceland, Greenland, Faroe Islands and even
stretching as far as the American continent, reaching the territory which now belongs
to Canada, being therefore the first Europeans to reach the Americas. Such contacts
with various regions of the world were not limited trips predicated only on looting and
piracy, but they also served other purposes. The Vikings were a society that kept
slaves, and colonial stations in various locations far from Scandinavia. On such trips,
they established themselves in new locations while leading individuals from other
cultures to live in their midst. It would be extremely naive on the part of current
Danes to think that such contacts were purely "professional", with no type of social
exchange, in from weddings, alliances, ties of friendship, language exchange, rivalries
among others. Ethnically and culturally, there was, during the Middle Ages, a
constant contact between Scandinavians and several other people. The main event,
and still very present, of such cultural exchange processes is the Christianization
process in the Nordic countries. One should also note the historical presence of
Greenlanders and Faeroese, both Danish citizens in legal and political terms, but part
50
of a quite different ethnic groups, and with completely different native languages. In
addition, there is also the presence of so-called "hjemmetyskere" who are Danish
citizens, originating in the southern part of Jutland, but are of German descent, and
who often have German as their first language. Besides the presence of a historic
Jewish community.9.
There are linguistic differences between the different regions of the country,
although they are very small, as well as differences in class or status (Jenkins, 2012).
The fact that the differences are less pronounced than in most countries of the world,
does not mean that they are not important. Not every country in the world has the
ethnic complexity that Brazil, the United States or the United Kingdom have, in the
same way, the absence of such an ethnic complexity equal to that found in those
countries does not mean that it is not relevant to relations social of these individuals,
and that countries in which the differences are more subtle, that those differences are
not important.
Finally, there is the factor that has most challenged the notion of Denmark as a
homogeneous country, especially after the seventies, which is the increasing presence
of immigrants and descendants of immigrants, especially from the Middle East, and
later, the former Yugoslavia, in Danish society, and it is on this factor there is a need
of a deeper the analysis.
According to Richard Jenkins (2012) in his ethnography of Danish identity:
Finally, there is the recent immigration being considered. A
substantial number and noticeably different from "guest
workers", refugees and their descendants - the so-called 'new
Danes' (nydanskere) or "Danish-with-hyphen'
(bindestregsdanskere) - are permanently accommodated in
Denmark. (JENKINS, 2012 p. 48-49)
Therefore, in practice, currently, there is a fairly significant number of non-
Danish living in Denmark and/or who are Danish citizens (non-Danish in an ethnic
9Jews are seen as a part of Danish society, and have been for much of the local history, however,
despite being seen as Danes, they are Danes with a different culture from the rest of the Danish
population. With eating habits, religious, social, distinct from the rest of the Danish-Dane population.
51
way because a great part of them have Danish citizenship) - and this distinction is
made clear by the Danes themselves - so that more and more, this definition of a
Denmark that is a historically homogenous country is being challenged on a day-to-
day throughout much of the country. Therefore, through the hyphenation, an ethnic
differentiation between the "new Danes", or the "hyphenated danes" and "Danish-
Danes". In terms of citizenship, both have the same rights, however, in ethnic terms,
there are not equivalent, while the Danish-Danes would be the purest Danes; more
related to the idea of a homogeneous nation, the hyphenated danes would be Danes
with something more. If, throughout history, this reality was never one hundred
percent reliable,it was enough that it created a discourse in which the otherness levels
among many Danes were not large enough so that they could be separated so
effectively among non-Danes and Danes. This otherness, however, happens to be
sustained after the massive arrival of immigrants and after the facilitation of the free
circulation of individuals with citizenship of any EU member state.
However, even if that speech has been analyzed coldly, and in my opinion, it
proved that this is a generalization, to say the least, the fact that it has influenced and
continues to influence the way in which society Danish is structured is an extremely
important factor in policy formation, and of social and cultural self-understanding
within Denmark. If Denmark has historically not been an homogeneous territory as it
is stated by most Danes in a more superficial analysis, it is thought that at some point
Denmark was homogeneous enough that such talk arose, and such narrative arises due
to a favorable cultural climate to it.
One could argue that this discourse would have an usefulness for the social
cohesion of the country, especially after the nineteenth century, a period in which the
country lost the war against Germany, and in which its own existence as an
independent nation was put to the test, in what would be the culmination of a process
in which the colonial and imperial aspirations of Denmark would collapse one by one,
being expelled (and integrated) gradually from the United Kingdom in the medieval
period, losing part of its territory to Sweden, losing Norway, and finally losing much
of its territory that is now part of Germany, besides having had much of Jutland
invaded by German troops. This process, which occurs precisely in the wake of the
industrial revolution, and along with the late emergence of states such as Germany
and Italy, is when there is clear beginning of the thought of the Danish nation for the
Danish people. Finally, this is also heleped by the peripheral position of Denmark
52
within Europe (ANDREASSEN, 2014), in which the country through various social
and cultural elements, began to conform to Western standards, in which it would be
included the idea of a state representative for each European people.
This historical process would lead to the idea that what was left of the Danish
mainland would be home to an ethnic population with common elements. Despite the
many historical elements that contradict this, for example, recent research indicating
the considerable number of Swedish workers who lived in Copenhagen at the end of
the nineteenth century (Schmidt, 2015), this was when the narrative of Danish ethnic
homogeneity, and its characteristics begin to take shape in a more significant manner,
while it contained some aspects, such as the equality of the status of all individuals
(later recognized as the aforementioned "Jantenloven"), the majority presence of the
official Protestant Christian, this narrative, at the same time, conveniently ignores
characteristics that disagree with such discourse, as regional differences, the presence
of religious and ethnic minorities, and class divisions to form a foundational myth of
the Danish nation.
Therefore there is, clearly, the creation of an ethnic discourse that comes to
define who is and who is not Danish, through different historical, cultural and
religious elements, and which now affect the daily sociability of Denmark. Such a
discourse becomes increasingly relevant as the number of immigrants and their
descendants increase demographically in Denmark. Identification with the group
happens to occur in a more simple and and a more obvious way for individuals, as
well as in a more dramatized way, with the contact that the Danes start having with a
more obvious "other" (Barth 1969; ERIKSEN, 2002).
The "other" reveals, strengthens and identifies more clearly which would be
the "we" within a community, whether it is imagined or not. If the differences
between what is proposed by many Danes of what would "be Danish," or in their own
word "danskhed" ("danishness"), can be quite different, when they come into contact
with immigrants, mostly non-Christian, non-white, which often enough come from
countries constantly marked by bloody conflicts are common elements that are able to
base the discourse of a common ethnicity by the Danes. There is, therefore, as defined
by Michael Herzfeld (2004), a structural nostalgia for days in which Denmark, for
many Danish-Dane subjects, would be easier to understand and that allegedly
correspond to what their ancestors experienced.
53
As much as the Danes (here one should read both ethnic Danes, and those who
are Danish citizens yet who aren't Danish-Danes) have their differences, they have the
perception that the majority of them are Christian, even if the Christian practice is
mostly limited to holidays, baptisms, confirmations, weddings and funerals; or even
that the number of individuals who actually believe in God diminishes more each day,
there is a knowledge of a historical Christian presence in the country, and probably
the main thing: they know they are not Muslims, nor a Muslim nation. And however
great are the differences between the Danes, there is a view that, in principle,
everyone, or most of them, would be whites, those who are not, it comes from having
at least one of their parents with non-Danish descent. However great their differences
might be, most people in Denmark can safely say (with statistics proving such claims)
that Denmark is a very peaceful country, and with a very low number of violent
deaths, and that the reality of ethnic conflict, religious, political and economic reality
is far removed from day-to-day life of a large part of the population that identifies
itself as ethnically Danish.
As Richard Jenkins (2012) states in his ethnography of the city of Skive in
Jutland, and that is echoed both in Copenhagen and in Aarhus, despite differences in
size (Skive had 20,000 inhabitants in 1997, during the author's fieldwork; Aarhus has
about 500,000 inhabitants in its metropolitan area, and Copenhagen about 1,6
million), and the distance between the two citie of about 3 hours and a half drive from
the first, and 30 minutes to the second), you can find similar reactions in the three
cities, as the author reports on several occasions, and which I could identify during
my ethnographic work:
In a longer historical perspective, however, a feeling of shared
'danishness' is much more than a reaction to the recent arrival
of immigrants who are culturally and visuably different. (....)
The question is not whether this homogeneity is real. As with
any national or ethnic group, the Danes are a complicated mix
of similarities and differences; homogeneous, they are not.
Instead, what we should think about is the implications of that
image of Danish similarity for al,l ethnic immigrants or Danes
equally. Such an image can be imagined, but it is real and has
everyday consequences. (JENKINS, 2012, p. 280-281)
54
Therefore, it is necessary to understand in general what is "an immigrant", and
more specifically, what it means to be a Kurdish immigrant, young and highly
educated, in a Danish context. Another extremely important factor which will be
analyzed more deeply throughout my dissertation is the narratives in which the
immigrants and refugees who come to live in Denmark, would be like guests, and
therefore, as guests, they should be responsible for being accepted in society that
would house them.
ii) Experiences and sociability: Kurds and their insertion into Danish society
In an article published by anthropologist Peter Hervik (2006), this idea is
exposed in a very clear way, within a context in which racism, not only in Denmark,
but in much of the Western world shifts its focus from issues that propose "organic"
or "natural", or even so, a more ideological racism begins to be relegated to extremely
borderline elements within the various Western societies, and so, it starts to be treated
in a less acceptable way in a post-colonial and post-nazifascist context. Racism,
therefore, starts being expressed through "culture" or "cultural elements" (STOLCKE,
1995). In practice, this change meant that racism, as an important element in society,
had not become less relevant it, but that it would take a more subtle approach, taking
advantage of more subtle ways and less offensive ways to be expressed (VAN DIJK,
1991), as outlined here:
The popular Danish consciousness as seen in our interviews
differs from the public political discourse in an important way.
While the political discourse repeatedly discredits any claim
that it is racist, the figurative world of guest and host does not
include any direct association with racism. Instead,
discrimination and racism are naturalized and reduced as
something that happens to the host when he or she is provoked
or abused by guests who refuse to act in accordance with the
correct etiquette. (HERVIK, 2006)
55
It is within this perspective that often enough my interlocutors are constantly
judged, and is within the same perspective that they often judge other immigrants -
whether Kurds or not - besides themselves; plus it is how they often see Denmark,
seeing the Danish-Danes as hosts for which they should nourish feelings ranging (and
often blending) from gratitude to, in some cases, coldness. The coldness can often
express itself through the Danish bureaucracy during the immigration process, the
recognition of refugee status and the naturalization process of individuals who, in
many cases, have more experiences immersed in Danish culture than inside a
specifically Kurdish culture.
During my ethnography with Kurds in Copenhagen, which for the most part
(but not all), had between with people aged 18 through 35 years, and with at least
secondary education, and in most cases, were enrolled in higher education, if not, a
master's degree or a doctorate; it was possible to note a clear differentiation between
individuals who were either born in Denmark or came to Denmark early enough, or
whose parents or grandparents immigrated for some time, and among those who came
to Denmark in its infancy (which meant already knowing how to speak, read and
write) or during their teenage years. In the first case, the individuals who came to
Denmark after already being socialized for years in their country of origin, and the
territory historically considered by Kurdish nationalists as Kurdistan, or coming from
Turkish cities where their families immigrated soon, or in some cases, centuries ago
due to economic conditions, or as an attempt by the Turkish state to try to acculturate
the Kurdish people through a supposed integration into Turkish culture, they had to
learn the Danish language after already being fluent in one language, and almost
always, two languages.10
This first contact with the language and the Danish culture, in the case of these
individuals, occured through classes offered by the Danish government to many
immigrant students coming from different locations. Such classes were under the
responsibility of the various municipalities (called "kommune" in Danish). The fact
that they are the responsibility of several cities across the country makes the teaching
10His parents also had to go through this learning process. There is a noticeable difference between the
Danish language skills level of individuals who have come during childhood or adolescence and the
level of fluency of their parents and grandparents who have came to Denmark in adulthood.
56
offers of the Danish language to be non-standard. According to my informants, in
some cases, they would be assigned tutors, as in others, they participated in classes
with more than 10 students, and in some other cases, especially when dealing with
older individuals, there would not be a specific school for immigrant students, and
they would be inserted in a Danish school with Danish students, from the start, while
not having completely mastered the language. In some cases, teachers were not
always the same, in others, there would be a rotation among them.
In some cases, the weekly hourly load was much higher than in others, with
reports of students who had daily lessons and in other cases, classes only twice a
week, with the second case being more recurrent. After a period only learning the
language, ranging from 6 months to 1 year, they began to study at the equivalent of
elementary school or high school, being placed in classes almost always consistent
with their ages. In these cases, despite the language skills not being complete, the
learning would expected to occur through living with Danes or they would already be
fluent in Danish.
The degree in which my interlocutors could master the local language varied,
and that is due to the various factors mentioned above, such as workload,
methodology, student interest in learning; however, all individuals that I interviewed,
that had come to Denmark after having already been literate in another language,
became fluent in Danish, a fact proven by their educational level, since the vast
majority of them attained higher education, which requires that students have high
grades in the local language, and a considerable part of them had finished their
university degrees or even attained masters and PhDs. Some said that in about six
months, they could already communicate even if it was in rudimentary Danish, and
from there, their learning and language skills increased exponentially. Many said that
their classmates, both Danish as those of foreign descent, often helped them with the
language, while others said that after a few semesters, they were already able to help
some students (including Danish students) when it came to grammar issues.
During the course of the language learning period, it was coupled with the
most rudimentary factors regarding Danish sociability, there would be a process in
which immigrants would exposed to two ethnic identification processes, the first in
which they are seen as individuals who are in a socializing process, and a constant
learning, in which they would exposed to the various ways in which they should be
57
"Danish", or in other words, in which they must learn how to "integrate" in Danish
society.
At the same time in which they are subject to such learning and socialization,
Kurdish immigrants begin to interact with other immigrants from diverse
backgrounds, and as that time passes, at the same time they build a common identity -
as immigrants in a Danish context - while they also build one as Kurdish immigrants
in a Danish context, where there are also other immigrants of diverse cultures within
the Danish society.
As I heard during some interviews with my Kurdish interviewees on aspects of
their sociability with other immigrants. In the first case, we see one talking about how
was his first contact with the local student system, in which he is inserted into a
specific class for foreign born students, while in the second case, my interlocutor goes
on to study with Danish students directly, without having an education, even if
rudimentary, the local language:
I had Danish classes; it’s a class where they accept kids from
foreign countries for half a year or an year, to introduce you to
the school system. All your friends are foreigners, immigrants.
All your schoolmates are immigrants. You get to learn the
basics and then you start at Danish school. Then you go to
study with ethnic Danes, which I started in 2nd grade.
(INTERVIEW WITH NECATI)11
Yeah, we get placed in an ordinary school. In a normal class,
with Danish students. (…) It was very difficult, because you
understand nothing, and it was very hard to create dialogues
and connections with other people in the classroom, the first
six months, they were really hard. Because you have no skills
to handle the situations, after six months it gets better, as a
11Necati is between 30-35 years, and currently lives in Gothenburg, Sweden, where he finished his
doctorate in chemistry.
58
youngster at my age (10/11), it becomes far more easy.”
(INTERVIEW WITH SERDAL BENLI)12
Therefore, in the first case, we have two distinct types of experience among
new immigrants to Denmark, in a similar age (8 years in one case, 10 in the other), in
which both individuals could already communicate fluently in their native languages
(in addition to Turkish) and were already literate.
In the first case we see an attempt to facilitate the socialization of immigrant
individuals from diverse backgrounds within the Danish culture, as in the second,
socialization is done in a more abrupt way, in which the child is inserted into a local
school with Danish peers without having the slightest knowledge of their culture and
local language, due to their age, their abilities to, even if gradually, understand the
local language comes in quite fast. One should also note that Serdal, in the same
interview remarked to me that, at first, much of his childhood friends, were formed by
immigrants, especially of Kurdish origin, given that the place (5km away from the
capital, in the region metropolitan thereof) in which he and his family settled, was,
and still is, home to a large Kurdish community.
There is another form of common experience that could also be noticed, that is
the experience that individuals who came to Denmark as babies or small children, or
who were born in Denmark, as children or grandchildren of Kurdish immigrants. In
such cases, the socialization into the local language occurs concomitantly to the native
language of the parents, which often times is not any Kurdish language (I refer in this
case primarily the Kurmanji and Sorani), but to languages such as Turkish, Arabic
and Persian, for example.
Such individuals, however, participate in the Danish educational system, from
kindergarten through the university level. Being so, they rarely have some kind of
accent when speaking the local language, and they rarely need to navigate the
complicated and increasingly restrictive legislation on immigration, asylum and
naturalization.
12 Serdal Benelli is currently a member of SF (Social Democratic Party) in his town and is undertaking
a campaign to try to get elected to the national parliament. At the age of 40, he is one of the most
recognized figures in the Kurdish-Danish community, due to his political career.
59
Denmark, as well as most nations in the world (and Brazilians know this
especially well) has to rely on bureaucracy on several issues, but the fact that these
individuals are fluent in the local language, and their working knowledge of the local
institutions, makes those individuals helpful within their communities, as they end up
helping family members, and other individuals who have problems with it, and in the
case of individuals who have not yet acquired the local nationality or a permanent
visa, or who are in this process, this difference can mean the right to remain or not,
legally in Denmark.
Another important factor in the sociability of such individuals is that there is a
constant feeling that they must always engage in a search for a Kurdish identity,
which in immigrants who have come to Denmark after being inserted into a Kurdish
culture, is not a factor that is so present. By stating this, it's not saying that individuals
who lived (and who have a significant memory) within the Kurdish community, both
in the territory they consider as Kurdistan, as in diaspora communities within the
nation-states in which Kurdistan lies, do not constantly build their identity as Kurdsw
while being away from such contexts; or to claim that their ethnic identity as Kurds is
complete when they leave such contexts.
Just like for Fredrik Barth (1969) the concept of ethnicity is a constant
construction that is reinforced by differentiating elements, Kurds, who for various
reasons immigrate to Denmark, still remain as Kurds and they still build their Kurdish
identity in several ways. However, such individuals have, in relation to Kurdish
immigrants who came at an early age or the descendants of these immigrants born in
Danish territory, often have significant differences about how such ethnic identity
manifests itself.
Individuals who came to Denmark early or were born in Danish territory, for
example, did not, and most likely will not go through systematic violence that several
regimes, such as Turkey and Iran have towards its Kurdish minority, and such a lack
of an overwhelming experience is a common comment from them. In one of the most
extreme cases, a brother of one of my interlocutors had for that reason - the repression
suffered by the Kurdish people - as she told me, decided to leave Denmark in order to
enlist in the guerilla forces fighting in Turkish territory. However, more commonly,
such an absence tends to be compared with the daily experience that such individuals
have with the freedom of this expression in Danish territory, and values that are
commom the in the narrative of Danish identity carries on values that they would like
60
to be able to insert into a future Kurdish state, or even within a nation-state in which
the Kurds can have the freedom to express themselves ethnically. There is also a
strong desire on them of acquiring knowledge of the originating oppression narratives
within the Kurdistan territory, by Kurdish people, in order to maintain a transnational
contact with ethnic disputes and frictions of which they are not exposed in Denmark,
at least not in the way, for example that Kurds are in Turkey. This need is not as
consistently or as common as the feeling of other individuals who have been
socialized in such experiences.
Another important differentiating factor between the two previously presented
forms of sociability related to Kurdish identity is the language issue. In most cases of
individuals who have lived for a longer time in a Kurdish context, the use of a
Kurdish language, be it the Kurmanji and Sorani, were a more common practice, even
among Kurds who were living in Turkish territory, and especially among those who
are more than 30 years old, as the teaching of it was restrained by local authorities.
Besides a Kurdish language, most older immigrants are also fluent in Turkish, Persian
or Arabic, depending on where they immigrated from. However, those Kurds born in
Danish territory constantly do not have that socialization in the local language in the
same way that individuals who immigrated have.
Such differentiation, therefore, makes learning Kurmanji, Sorani or another
Kurdish language ways in which such persons born or raised in Denmark reaffirm
their ethnic identity, compared to other immigrant communities (especially since in
many cases, these individuals are bilingual, speaking Danish, and often Turkish, like
their parents), as they seek to reaffirm their identities as Kurds vis-a-vis the local
Kurdish community, adding to that is a possible pressure from their parents to learn
the language of their ancestors. Such learning occurs in two ways, either individually
with the help of the internet or through Kurmanji and Sorani lessons offered by
Kurdish-Danish associations.
Another way that individuals find to reassert themselves ethnically as Kurds is
through traveling to the territory of Kurdistan. Due to political issues, only the
Kurdish areas in Turkey and Iraq are likely to be visited, and the cities of Diyarbakir
and Erbil are the main places within that trip. This inability, however, does not
prevent a Kurdish native of Rojava (Syria) from feeling that he is in Kurdistan when
61
he is in Erbil, Iraq, because both locations are seen as ethnic Kurds territories, despite
their differences.13
Organized by senior members of FOKUS-A, every year, a group of Kurdish
students, in which the majority are not more than 21 years old, travels to Kurdistan,
during the Newroz period, visiting various locations, and knowing the reality of Kurds
within what is considered by them as a territory of their people, immersed in their
cultural reality, and having the opportunity to speak with several local and political
leaders at the same time it reinforces a transnational Kurdish ethnic identity, also they
return to Denmark with an experience that although short, is symbolically comparable
to what their fathers and grandfathers had, in addition to immigrants who might have
a childhood or part of it in Kurdistan. This trip, and the symbolic importance of it,
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.
Therefore, learning the local language, in addition to observing the realities of
Kurdistan, organizing trips to Kurdish places - which in the words of one of my
interlocutors is - "where he "feels at home", are ways in which such individuals
whose experiences happens prevalently (or completely) in Danish territory seek to
position themselves towards other Kurdish individuals (mostly older) than them that
they are also Kurds, and are proud of their Kurdish identities and their Kurdish
culture, and, being so, they would, like their ancestors, keep their local traditions and
would maintain a political position regarding the realities of Kurdistan.
13The political persecution in Iran is still very large for Kurdish activists, while traveling to Syria
becomes too complicated due to the conflict with ISIS and the civil war that ravages the country.
62
Chapter III - Being a Kurd in Denmark: a constant construction
In this chapter, several issues related to "being Kurdish" in Denmark will be
discussed through an anthropological perspective. The political and cultural
organizations built by Kurds in Denmark serve as one of the ways in which it is
possible to understand the interactions of Kurds with each other and also with the
non-Kurdish population of Denmark, in particular the Danish-Danes.
There will also be an analysis of how the constant political and cultural events
in public places serve both to establish a dialogue with the Danish society, and to
continue the constant process of ethnic reification vis-a-vis other individuals (both
Kurdish and non-Kurdish) of what means to be a Kurd. Such events serve also for old
friends to reunite and tell old stories about the guerrillas in the mountains of Turkish
Kurdistan, to talk about the situation of relatives scattered both in what is considered
the Kurdistan within a nationalist project, as in Denmark; besides it serves also as a
form of socialization of children and adolescents on how to be Kurdish, despite them
being in a diasporic context.
Therefore, in this chapter, the various forms related to ethnic construction of a
Kurdish identity in Danish territory will be analyzed in addition to the ways in which
such identity is linked to the various aspects of Danish culture and society.
i) Stories of persecution and freedom narratives: dialogues between Kurdish
identity and Danish identity
On June 21st, after already having had the opportunity to conduct a series of
interviews with some of my Kurdish interlocutors, who were, both members and
former members of FOKUS-A, I went to a pro-Kurdish demonstration in front of
Rådhuspladsen. Firstly, it is necessary to specify the meaning of "Kurdistan" in this
demonstration. To my interlocutors, the concept of Kurdistan that was being shown
publicly, is the one that it related to a Kurdish identity that manifests itself both
within what Kurdish nationalists call "Kurdistan", and outside of that territory;
namely, it was the idea of what Kurdistan represented; it was an idea related to
63
Kurdish identity. As one of my interlocutors, Zana, told me: "this demonstration today
was organized not to have the presence of any political party or anything, just to show
that we are Kurds." The context of such a demonstration would change dramatically
in the coming weeks.
Organized by various Kurdish political and cultural groups and organizations,
especially those linked, or that nourish some sympathy towards KDP (Democratic
Party of Kurdistan), the demonstration appears as a way to celebrate the possible
emergence of a Kurdish state, or even the increased autonomy of the Kurdish territory
(who is officially known also as Kurdistan, not to be confused with Kurdistan as the
Kurdish idea of a national state) in the north of current Iraq, a location that within a
Kurdish national narrative, is also known as South Kurdistan, or in Kurmanji, Basûrê
Kurdistanê. After the representative collapse of the Iraqi official government due to
(among other things) the appearance of the fundamentalist group called ISIS, in which
it had succeeded in capturing the cities of Mosul and Tirkuk without much resistance
from local Iraqi forces, which in many cases withdrew without coming into direct
confrontation with the fighters, leaving much of their war equipment, which came
from the US, in the hands of ISIS supporters. However, when ISIS tried to enter
Kurdish territory, they found a strong Kurdish resistance, the peshmerga ( "those who
are with death").
Therefore, when facing an external threat, the Kurdish regional government
defensive forces based in Erbil (Hêwler in Kurmanji), in a first moment, proved
sufficient. Such military self-sufficiency of the Kurdish defense forces, coupled with a
relatively high level of self-government, made the idea of a Kurdish nation-state at
Iraq to be realistically contemplated by both the local government of Mahmoud
Barzani, from KDP who ruled over the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), who
commented on the possibility of a referendum, as did members of several Kurdish
communities scattered around the world, as well as academics and journalists from
various publications on foreign policy and international relations.
That is, with the possible dissolution of the Iraqi state coupled with ability of
the Kurdish territory to govern itself independently of Baghdad, the Kurdish-Danish
community decided to celebrate this capacity. As an older interlocutor from Hêwler
(Erbil) told me: "We can take care of ourselves, we never needed what came from
Baghdad, we just need to leave us alone, not only there but also in Turkey, Syria and
Iran. " At first, as I heard from many participants of different ages and origins, the
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creation of a Kurdish national state (in Iraqi region) seemed only a matter of time; and
the resistance to another external enemy (ISIS) had created a positive outlook in
which the various political differences were left in the background in favor of a
greater common good, at least for several individuals within the Kurdish community
that were present, including those whose sympathy with the PKK and Mr Öcalan's
ideas were not so great as to prevent even from attending a demonstration without
their flags, or even their ideology being represented. One of those individuals present
in this event, which I was able to interview later, told me that he believed the political
theory of Ocalan, however, that he was, above all, Kurdish, and that his presence was
a way to express this position.
If the optimism of some of my interlocutors made it impossible for them to
have a more impartial analysis of the complex political situation in the Iraqi
Kurdistan, at the same time, however, it had been able to organize a demonstration to
celebrate the victory of the Peshmerga over the Islamic State, in which the various
groups that organized agreed not carry any symbol or flag related to any Kurdish
political party. Instead, participants were instructed to carry flags of Kurdistan and
Denmark.
The speeches were only two, and both were in Kurmanji, and both focused, as
one of my interlocutors told me, in praising aspects of Kurdish culture and they also
commented on the heroic resistance of the peshmerga soldiers in the battle against the
militants of the Islamic State. After the same, typical Kurdish music was played
through a speaker. Meanwhile, children with Kurdish flags ran and played football,
young adults talked with their friends, and several people took photos in front of a
huge Kurdish flag that was displayed in front of City Hall, while old ladies talked
among themselves, in both Kurmanji and Danish, and old guerrilla fighters of the
PKK, wearing their typical costumes talked to each other. A local politician of
Kurdish origin talked with several people while several bystanders came and went in
one of the areas with the largest circulation of pedestrians in the capital, and
occasionally stopped and looked with curiositya demonstration attracted between 250
and 300 people on a sunny Sunday in the Danish spring.
My initial approach generated a mixture of curiosity and pride in most of my
interviewees at that time. There was some genuine curiousity on them for the fact that
there would be someone willing to, according to some of them, "study and learn about
us" and they were proud to be the target of such a study, especially by someone who
65
had come from a country as far away as Brazil. As the day of the demonstration was
near the end of the World Cup 2014, one of the most talked about subjects by several
atendees was the defeat of the Brazilian team against Germany. The fact that we have
talked about amenities such as football, gave a dimension about the climate in the
demonstration, more so when one compares it with other demonstrations that occured
after it, especially given the emotional issues of most demonstrators, given the
brutality of the attacks committed by supporters of the Islamic State, especially
regarding the Yazidi community, which was openly shown in photos and posters, as
well as media coverage, which gave the speeches a more tragic tone.
The mood, therefore, in that first demonstration, was a celebration of Kurdish
culture, while demonstrators occupied an important public space in the city in an
attempt to demonstrate to the Danish society that the Kurds, according with the
account of one of my interlocutors:
Such events are important to us because they show to Danish
society that we are not all equal. We are not Turks, we are not
Iranings, we are not Iraqis, We are not Iranians, and we are
not Arabs. We are Kurds. We have our music, our flag, our
language. This here is also important for the younger ones
(while speaking it, he points to two children running) also to
know this. This is important so they do not forget who they
are. And if it depends on events such as this, Kurds will never
forget that they are Kurds, even living outside Kurdistan.
It is, therefore, possible to draw two ethnographic analysis of such an event
occurred in early July. The first is a self-affirmation of Kurdish identity, made
through ethnic and national symbols themselves, and thus distinct both from the rest
of the immigrant population in Denmark, and the Danish-Danes themselves. The
second is the importance of such events in Copenhagen as a mean of strengthening
social ties within the various Kurdish communities scattered throughout the country
that gather in the capital.
ii) Flags and their symbology: Construction of a Kurdish identity in Denmark.
66
The square in front of the town hall in the Danish capital is a public place with
a large number of political demonstrations (although most of them prefer to
demonstrate on other places, especially in front of Christiansborg, the national
parliament), and also ethnic and artistic demonstrations as well. As it was mentioned
before, the privileged location, right in the center of the city, with a high
concentration of pedestrians, both locals as well as tourists, makes the visibility of any
event that occurs there to be quite high. And it is this prime location, from the point of
view of the urban geography of Copenhagen, in which the first demonstration that I
could attend had occurred.
One of the main representations in the manifestation was the use of flags, both
of Kurdistan and of the Danish flags. The symbology expressed by the use of flags,
reflects at the same time an attempt to communicate with Danish society, while it
recalls and re-signifies a shared historical desire of the Kurdish people to be able to
have their own nation-state, or still, a desire to have the right of self-determination, as
expressed in a country that gives them the freedom to express themselves ethnically.
Flags and national symbols have an extremely obvious connotation. They are
the visual representations of political entities in various instances, ranging from the
United Nations, to sports competitions like the World Cup or the Olympics, as well as
being constantly present in government buildings, embassies and consulates around
the world. Sergei Matjunin (2001) states that national flags can represent many
historical elements, political, geographical or in some cases, even religious, dealing
with factors that are commonly used in ethnic settings (BARTH, 1969). Flags are
powerful symbols, as they are commonly and widely recognized by members and
non-members of a particular group, as clear visual representations of the same group.
In the case of the Kurdish community, specifically the Kurdish community in
diaspora in Denmark, the use of flags indicates the number of individual loyalties,
both Kurdish ethnicity as the various political positions, which are constantly different
and in some cases opposites. Therefore, the use of flags during such demonstrations
brings a symbolic representation; flags are one of the elements, to paraphrase Clifford
Geertz (1973) when he famously cited Weber, are used to create the web of meanings
that makes up human life, and that gives meaning to it. That is, to interpret why the
particular use of them, we have another possible way to understand more deeply the
culture and the sociability of certain individuals. The flags are, therefore, symbols that
67
are understandable, but also a visual way to demarcate symbolic borders, and which
happens to be used in different ways in different contexts.
The use of the Danish flag is one of the most easily noticeable features to any
foreigner who happens to live for a while in the Scandinavian country. A lot of the
houses have a pole on which the flag (or a triangular bastion with its colors) is
customarily flown. At birthday parties, regardless of the age of the person celebrating
birthday, flags are used to decorate the cake and birthday cards. In December, it is
common in some homes, to use flags to decorate the Christmas tree, a custom that had
emerged during the Nazi occupation and the prohibition of the use of national
symbols. Shops and businesses often use the national colors as identification. Besides
that, there is the legend, which if fairly widespread, of how the Danish flag was (the
Danish flag is alson known as the first flag from the various nation-states) Godsend to
the Danish king during a battle in the Baltic. And of course, as well as in Brazil and in
other nations, the Danish flag is also used and hoisted on official buildings around the
country.
In Denmark, the local flag is seen as a symbol which capable of evoking not
only inherently patriotic values, but also what Richard Jenkins (2006) would define it
as a symbol of "happiness" and "reciprocity", the Kurdish flag, inside Denmark is
replaced by a similar symbology. There is a symbolic confluence, where the Kurdish
community in Denmark starts to develop a relationship with the Kurdish flag, which
typically Danish, while also using the Danish flag in the same way, therefore, there is
a confluence of symbolic elements as both flags begin to share the same
interpretations and uses. Thus, a considerable part of the Kurdish-Danish community
which is sometimes still seen as an "immigrant community" distinguished from other
diverse immigrant groups present in Denmark, while they also assert themselves as a
Danish community, albeit one which is also different from the Danish-Dane
community, seeing that they are still Kurds. Therefore, the use of flags as an ethnic
and national symbol are very important elements in the Kurdish-Danish community
because, while emerging as a way in which the Kurdish community is articulated, it
also symbolizes a link between the community Kurdish and the Danish community.
Therefore, it is undeniable that in such a context, in which the Danish flag is
of great importance in the Danish day-to-day life, while being present on many
occasions, both in public spaces and in private spaces. The use of Danish flag
becomes a common practice to any individual raised on Danish soil. Besides, of
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course, that local importance for the use of the national flag, there is also the political
issue regarding its use. Flags, as well as all national symbol, are symbolic of a
membership representation. So, the Kurdish flag to the Kurdish-Danish community
ends up being adopted as a convergent symbol vis-a-vis the Danish flag, because there
are in several narratives a desire to have an influence within the Danish state and the
Danish society, on behalf of the Kurdish cause, while there is also a cultural Danish
influence within the Kurdish-Danish community.
In the case use of the Danish flag, there is an attempt to reconcile the Kurdish
identity and the Danish identity, which was seen through individuals during the
demonstration, who expressed a number of positive feelings towards the Danish state
such as gratitude, pride, alliance, belonging, and how they use the Danish flag as a
way to demonstrate to non-participants of the demonstration that such an event, as
well as Kurdish, it was also a Danish event, and that such a community, sought
anything in relation to the Danish state a desire to be a relevant part within the local
society. There is, therefore, a clear demarcation that such event, held in Copenhagen,
was an event that would seek also integrate multiple Danish identities in which such
individuals of Kurdish origin, are also a part of, plus, there is a clear attempt to
demarcate one belonging to the Kurdish community, as well as a its moral
recognition.
Besides the use of the Danish flag, therefore, there was also the use of the
Kurdish flag with its red, white, and green colours with a golden sun in the center.
Such use of an ethnic-national symbol, even related to a nation-state that does not yet
exist, is a way to, as my interlocutor had told me a few pages ago, in which they could
claim that they are not "Turks, Arabs or Iranians" but they are Kurds. The use of the
Kurdistan flag is, therefore, both a way to demonstrate that such immigrants and their
descendants are different from other immigrants and their descendants in Danish
territory, as well as serving as an ethnic self-identification symbol among the many
Kurdish people present.
The different narratives, both the first and the second-hand one, that have been
reported to me, on the experiences of Kurdish individuals, in contexts in which their
identity as Kurds are liable for them to suffer oppression, tell us that many symbols
identifiable as being Kurdish are constantly banned and/or criminalized by many
governments. Among these symbols is the use of the Kurdish flag, both in a public
context, and times, even in a private context. One of my interlocutors told me, that his
69
father, when he came as a refugee to Denmark, on his official document, in the part
where he stated his country, he chose it to write the name of his hometown, not
wanting to have any identification with the Turkish state, which he regarded as
illegitimate. This story illustrates the importance of national symbols in the
construction of a Kurdish narrative that simultaneously contains elements related to
the injustice suffered by the Kurds in the hands of different nation-states (after all, we
speak here of a refugee who was a refugee because of his role in the guerrilla in
Turkish territory), and a desire from the Kurdish community, both in diaspora, and as
those found in what is seen by Kurdish nationalists as Kurdistan, that they can
maintain a nation-state of their own, or even a desire to be able to be express
themselves freely as Kurds, using their own nation symbols for this purpose.14
The history of the symbolic meaning of the elements present in the Kurdistan
flag (the three stripes, red, white and green, and the yellow sun with 21 points present
in the center of it) dates from the various attempts to create a Kurdish national state
over the years, recalling characteristics used by flags used in separative movements
that led to the creation of the now defunct republic of Ararat in 1927, whilst it was
created for the emergence of the Mahabad republic in 1946 on the current state of
Iran, as reported by Kurdish Institute of Paris (2015). After the demise of such a
separatist movement, however, the use of the flag used by this republic would be
recognized among the different Kurdish communities as a symbol of Kurdish union,
and evoke the desire of creating a Kurdish state.15
Like most flags related to political structures (or in this case the desire to have
one), nothing in the composition of it arises by chance, instead, its symbolic
importance is attached to a particular national narrative. In the case of the Kurdish
flag, as I had told by various interlocutors, and also discovered after my own research,
the color red represent blood relations and brotherhood, and the blood of the many
Kurds who died for their identites; the color green would represent life; the white
color would represent equality and freedom, and the yellow of the sun present in the
center of the flag represent the hope. The sun itself with twenty-one points, makes
reference to various historical religious cults in Kurdish territory, such as the Yazedis
14According to the Kurdish Institute in Paris, the flag is banned both in Syria and Iran. 15 Accessed on the 2/02/2015. Source:
http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/the_national_flag_of_kurdistan.php
70
and Alevis. In other words, the colors and symbols used in it have a shared meaning
by individuals who identify themselves as Kurds, and they are easily recognized by
the Kurdish population, as an extremely important cultural element.
Thus, the Kurdish flag has a significant symbolic representation for the
Kurdish diaspora community around Europe. While it references a history of
resistance and conflict, it also points to a future in which the existence of a Kurdish
state, or at least the possibility that the Kurds will have the freedom to express
themselves culturally, is an achievable fact. This fact is narrated by Jaffer
Sheyholismani (2007) on a book called "Kurdish Identity, Discourse and New
Media."
Besides being hoisted and constantly displayed, the Kurdish
flag is also reconstructed by KTV (Kurdish TV, a Kurdish
channel present in Iraq) through images that are solely or
predominantly built with the four colors of the Kurdish flag:
red, white, green and yellow. (...) Colors that are known by
people as being associated with specific concepts and events
can evoke emotions and reactions. (...) These colors, however,
are used by KTV to reinforce the image of the Kurdish flag.
This is significant for two reasons. First by enhancing the
image of the Kurdish flag without using it in an exaggerated
way. And second, this implied reconstruction of the Kurdish
flag expands the semantic field of the Kurdish flag; many
things in Kurdistan are similar to the Kurdish flag, and vice
versa. It naturalizes, and soon, nationalizes the colors of the
flag and the flag itself. Part of being Kurdish is to be
associated with such a flag. (SHEYHOLISMANI, 2007,
p.116-117)
Therefore, we see that the use of the flag and the colors of the Kurdish flag
assumes an important meaning in the construction of a Kurdish identity, being an
element that turns out also being an element that unites the Kurds from different
regions and different political currents within a common denominator which is
cultural, and can be understood as a feeling of belonging to a transnational community
71
of Kurdish people with a historical origin in common, which, among other things, is
represented through the use of the flag and its colors.
Such an use becomes, therefore, within the Danish context, a way to
demonstrate to both the individuals participating on the event and also for several
bystanders a manifestation of individuals with common characteristics that can be
summarized in everyone's self-identification to a large Kurdish community, above
anything else.
Besides the presence of several Kurdish flags, another element that had caught
my attention during this demonstration (a feature present only on this one, out of the
four I could observe and participate) was the absence of other flags identified with the
Kurdish cause. This point had been agreed between the various organizations and
individuals who promoted such a demonstration. Several different political groups,
therefore, decided that in such event, what should be noticed would be a common
Kurdish identity, above all other political disagreement, occurring, therefore, in the
context of this demonstration, a negotiation of different ethnic identities within the
Kurdish-Danish community. Flags related to the PKK, banners with a picture of
Ocalan or the other PKK martyrs, references to Massoud Barzani and his father, the
red, green and yellow flag of the PYD adopted as the flag of Rôjava were not present
during such manifestation. That is, such a manifestation would be, as Zana, one of my
main informants, and one of its organizerst, to "celebrate the fact that we are all Kurds
and proud of it."
This suggests two important things, the first is that the flag of Kurdistan flag
is widely recognized by Kurds as an ethnic symbol common to all of them (or
virtually all of them), and the second is that, despite political disagreements among
the various political currents in Kurdistan and the Kurdish community in diaspora, the
ethnic factor which unites the various Kurds, at least in Denmark, and in the context
of that demonstration was more important than their political disagreements. Many
individuals that I would eventually see carrying banners and posters related to
different political positions, especially related to the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan, in
other manifestations, could be found during that sunny afternoon in front of
Rådhuspladsen.
Thus, it is possible to see that, at this moment, in which the optimism for the
future of Kurdistan, at least in the Iraqi, which withstood successive strikes from ISIS
had created a climate condutive to a demonstration whose dominant theme was the
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celebration of a Kurdish ethnic identity, expressed in Danish soil and its various
manifestations.
The second factor that was mentioned is the question of Kurdish sociability
and how it is shaped. Such a demonstration was a perfect locus for observing it in its
different ways. The various relations between the Kurdish people are constantly
modified through various ways, either by Facebook, for Kurdish typical dance classes
and meetings at the homes of Kurdish individuals, in addition to political and
bureaucratic meetings within the various groups and associations related to the
Kurdish question, and also during demonstrations, which are more open and more
accessible all, in which the culture and the Kurdish identity end up being the main
relevant factors, regardless of political position, gender, age, even though those are
also present and are important as well. Therefore, such demonstrations in public
places have a different symbolic importance than other forms of Kurdish sociability,
for various reasons, which are discussed below.
iii) Sociability, Kurdish identity and the public space
During this demonstration, as previously stated, the mood was quite festive
and very positive. This condition had made it easier for me to talk to participants
about various topics. At one point, I found myself in a circle in which three
individuals, one 40 and the other two between 20 and 25 questioned me about the
defeat that Brazil suffered during the World Cup against Germany, seeing that many
of my interlocutors could not understand what has happened (neither could I). Some
even expressed sympathy for Brazil. They would like to hear, how I, a Brazilian, felt
while watching the fateful World Cup semifinal, and if I could offer any explanation
to what happened. One of them told me he had been sad, since he always supported
Brazil, and wondered if one day a Kurdish team could play in the World Cup. I gave
them my opinion on why such a defeat had happened, in which they were attentive.
After this conversation, we talked about the manifestation of the day, and I
commented that there were many women, children and adolescents. Then one of
them, the oldest one, told me:
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It's good for women to be able to see their friends and family.
I, for example, came here to be able to express myself in favor
of Kurds, but I ended up seeing an aunt that I had not seen for
few months since she moved to Jutland, also here are my two
nephews and several friends and relatives that I always see.
My wife is there talking to two friends of hers. Only my son
could not come today, since he was working.
Thus, such a report, and the observation of many Kurds talking to each other
at times when there were no speeches; also from seeing children playing and groups
of young men talking with equally young girls show that such public organizations
were not only ethnic construction of platforms and politics, but also opportunities for
such individuals to organize private events and talk to each other, and serve as a locus
in which alliances, affinities, rivalries are constantly resignified and reinterpreted,
besides being arenas in which the youth are inserted in the social relations of the
Kurdish-Danish community. In short, those events appear as an opportunity for
individuals within the Kurdish-Danish community to re-establish new networks, or
even to maintain and shape the networks that already exist; such meetings also serve
to bring to reality a Kurdish imagined community, which becomes quite essential in a
diasporic context which includes many individuals who had never experienced a large
amount of time in a Kurdish cultural reality (as in, a place where Kurds are a
majority). Besides, as it was already exemplified, those meetins also reaffirmed
friendships and social alliances that also relate to gender, since, for example, in all
other situations in which I could attend, whenever there had been food, it had been
prepared by women.
Other spaces essential to Kurdish sociability are meeting in the Kurdish-
Danish Culture Centre, the annual festival of Kurdish Cinema organized by FOKUS-
A, other demonstrations that occur throughout the year, in addition to meetings at
various Kurdish organizations. The use of online tools such as Facebook, Twitter,
Internet forums are also quite important. All the examples given are some of the
forms of political and cultural organization linked to Kurdish identity, in some cases
with clear political objectives; however, in all cases, there is a potential area for
interaction among the individuals present. Plus there are certain groups in which
74
participation is limited by gender and age, and others in which the Kurdish
community in general is invited to attend.
Zana, one of my key informants, (and who later would also become a friend of
mine), and also one of the organizers of the first demonstration, besides being one of
the most recognizable figures within the Kurdish community, due to his political
activities, both online and through other various other online platforms, and all of this
despite his young age (25 years), once told me that the Kurds around the world were
very disorganized politically, a narrative that was also repeated by a politician that
was already mentioned, and who I also interviewed; Zana also had something
remarkable to tell me about Kurdish sociability.
We, Kurds, are different from them (Danish-Danes) in some
aspects. One of the most striking one to me is that we are
more united, and we have a closer relationship with our elders.
Our grandfathers and grandmothers, as they age, do not go to
a nursing home as they (Danish-Danes) do, but, often go live
with their children or grandchildren; always staying on family
care. Kurdish children do not abandon their parents...
(INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH ZANA)
This narrative came from an individual who can differentiate between the "us"
and "them", because, even though he is the son of a veteran guerilla fighter, he's also
the son of an Danish-Dane, and was born and raised in Danish territory, a city in the
metropolitan area of Copenhagen. Thus, the "us" that he assumes is the Kurdish "us",
while "them" in this case is a "them" that refers to the Danes, specially if we
understand that Danish citizenship is attributed via jus sanguinis, it is a "them" of
which he lawfully belongs, it is possible to observe that Kurdish sociability has a
distinct symbolic value of the concept of Danish sociability in which he had spent
(learning the language in school, at work, on a day-to-day) most of his life immersed
into.
Thus, the sociability exercised by these individuals vis-a-vis the local Kurdish
community, besides having a role of aggregating individuals (after all, these
individuals are known within the Kurdish community, because they are Kurds, serve
as a way to reinforce that Kurdish identity) also has a role of concentrating political
75
engagement, and so they help shape new forms of interactions, as well as new forms
of cultural capital, which become constant social constructions, being influenced by
events related to the Kurdish population politics around the world.
The sociability understood as a Kurdish sociability is thus a sociability
practiced within the various spaces for Kurdish identity and culture, as opposed to a
sociability that is mainly understood as being Danish. If the day-to-day of such
individuals is composed of living amid the Danish society in which factors related to
Danish sociability - which itself is predominantly composed of a Danish-Dane
sociability with influences from other cultures - are these public spaces in which
Kurdish sociability is explained to the wider Danish society (and also for individuals
who are in Denmark). Thus, we can think of two essential factors within Kurdish
social perspective.
First, there are the private environments such as meetings between few
individuals inside their homes or in organizations such as the Danish-Kurdish Culture
Center, Facebook groups, private meetings from various organizations such as
FOKUS-A, and other Kurdish-Danish organization whose goals are related to Kurdish
identity; as in, they are arenas in which social networks are activated and that the
Kurdish culture is constantly being shaped through dialogue between them. Zana, for
example, claimed that he and many others have sought to talk to each other using
Kurds languages only, especially Kurmanji, (and to a lesser extent the Sorani), which
causes the effect of having words from the same language but who are specific to
regions where such individuals originate (either by birth or by parentage) are
incorporated into the vocabulary of people who have their roots in other locations, and
that some words of Turkish, Arabic or Persian are replaced by words of Kurdish
origin, because they are seen as more "legitimate", according to him. And even when
Danish is used, because it is the "lingua franca" of the Kurdish-Danish community,
other factors are in constant dialogue within this community, especially factors related
to politics of what is understood as Kurdistan within a nationalist perspective. Thus,
such events are locus of cultural exchanges, as well as debates and political
discussions on various events related to the Kurdish population, as they also serve as a
way to strenghten the ties among that community.
Secondly, there are also meetings in public places, which relate both to
political and cultural demonstrations in several places in different cities, ranging from
demonstrations recalling significant cases within the Kurdish narrative of state
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oppression, for support, to raise awareness of the Kurdish plight by the Danish
government and Danish population, festivals, movie screenings, academic meetins,
and Newroz celebrations. Such events also reinforce links between the Kurdish-
Danish community, seeing that they are also places where there are many interactions
between the various individuals present, as they also serve as way to, within the
Kurdish-Danish community, activate the cultural capital of several individuals within
it while being a public proof of their involvement in what can be seen as a Kurdish
cause, while it also fulfills the role of transfering to reality of the Kurdish imagined
community, and at the same time, it acts as a way of showing to the Danish society
the the Kurdish community in Danish territory is a palpable reality, and that it seeks to
articulate through various ways their cultural practices vis-a-vis the Danish cultural
practices. The discursive similarity, for example, that social theory of Abdullah
Ocalan has with left-wing ideas makes political parties of left, anarchists and anti-
capitalist colours seek a rapprochement and cooperation with such individuals of the
Kurdish community, in addition, the presence of a community that articulates itself
politically in Denmark ultimately attract media outlets, and also the presence of
several Danish politicians and political parties.
iv) Cultural capital and the Kurdish-Danish community
Another extremely important concept for understanding the social and
cultural dynamics within the Kurdish-Danish community is the concept of cultural
capital. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1970) defined cultural capital as
the diverse knowledge that an individual possessed within a community and that gives
him/her a plethora of advantages. Such knowledge, according to the French
sociologists, may be specific skills, an education, or any advantage that the individual
may have. As Bourdieu and Passeron (1970) wrote specifically about education, they
also cite the knowledge that parents pass on to their children about the education
system, in order for them to succeed within it. That is, Bourdieu' cultural capital deals
with the knowledge of one's particular community and its culture, a resource which is
not divided equally, therefore, some individuals possess an advantage over others, and
this advantage relates directly to the position that such individual has or may have on
77
his/her group. In the context of my dissertation, it is necessary to understand what
kind of knowledge is valued within the Kurdish-Danish community context, and
furthermore, to understand how this knowledge affects the relationships within that
community as well as being an important factor for the understanding of it.
The cultural capital (or the cultural capitals) within the Kurdish-Danish
community can be seen in some individuals, in various situations, from the knowledge
that such an individual has on his/her community and the ties that he/she have with
each other, that is, the cultural capital that he or she has regarding the history of such
a group; the bureaucratic knowledge he or she may have about the bureaucracy in
Denmark, in matters relating to acquisition of local citizenship, which is admittedly
(and often times designedly) more difficult to navigate for immigrants from outside
the Western world, and it also includes the actions that she/he may have within the
various communities and Kurdish organizations, the prominent role he/she might
have, and also the command that he/se can have of politics, history, cuisine, Kurdish
history, of one or more Kurdish language - that is, anything that might be perceived as
Kurdish culture. Being an extremely large Kurdish community (it is estimated that
approximately 25,000 to 40,000 people in Denmark are of Kurdish origin), few
individuals are able to become known to a large part of such a population. Those are
usually politicians (both involved in Danish politics and those involved in Kurdish
politics), as well as writers, journalists, athletes, and others. Such individuals carry a
large cultural capital in the Kurdish-Danish society (and sometimes in the Danish
population as well) as do some individuals who know them at various levels and to
various degrees.
Moreover, the concept of cultural capital within the Kurdish-Danish
community presumes both a series of "symbolic exchange or materials", and also a
number of factors which are "socially instituted and guaranteed" and that are
constantly reinterpreted through the "number of exchanges" among the individuals
who make up that group. Again, the factors that guarantee such them pass through the
cultural capital of individuals, which are constantly changing and being articulated
through their constant sociability. In addition, there is an intangible factor, however
observable, and that is present not only in the Kurdish communities, but in any human
interaction, which is the individual personality. Individuals who express themselves
better, who are more extroverted, which are more eloquent, more charismatic, tend to
have a broader social network. Even though it is impossible to measure these
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characteristics, it is necessary to note their importance within the concept of cultural
capital which is being used in order to understand Kurdish sociability.
Such relations, for relying on symbolic exchanges, but also in exchanges of
"indissoluble materials" in which, the geographical proximity is necessary due to a
factor that Pierre Bourdieu (1983) calls "mutual recognition of proximity", and for
him, such relationships are "partially irreducible to objective relations of proximity in
geographical space (physical) or economic and social." However, I see this statement
as being able to be subject to further problematization, especially in relation to my
object of analysis, as the cultural capital also becomes an element that becomes
visible outside the Kurdish-Danish community and which extends to the Kurdish
diaspora in various countries, and also relates to the Kurdish population in general.
For if, to the Kurdish-Danish community, this sociability is an inextricable factor for
the understanding of it, it is necessary to briefly observe the external factors of
everyday Kurdish sociability, but that influences them, through cultural capital that
such individuals acquire through contacts outside of it.
First, in terms of technology, geographical proximity is no longer an issue
which impedes enduring and serious relationships among diverse individuals, and it
also does not constitute a barrier to the creation of a Kurdish community in several
places which also influences the Kurdish-Danish community. The discussions taking
place within the Kurdish-Danish community often also occur on online forums and
social networks which allows them to make contact with people from other places
with whom they share things in common. Facebook allows people to learn about the
day-to-day life of distant friends and family. In other words, Bourdieu's statement
becomes increasingly away from the everyday context of a considerable part of the
population as technology becomes an intrinsic part of contemporenean life. Secondly,
much of the Kurdish sociability comes from online interactions, especially through
pages and groups within Facebook. In addressing an identity that is itself
transnational, and which is shared by a high number of individuals around the world
(especially in Western Europe and North America). Several groups and organizations
maintain pages on Facebook, as the aforementioned FOKUS-A, Dansk Kurdisk
Kulturcenter, and groups such as the Dansk Kurdisk Kvindeforening (Danish-Kurdish
Women's Union), Feykurd Danmark, which is linked to the PKK ideology, as well as
pages with journalistic content, as Jyian.dk and Nûdem.dk, adding to this, the official
pages of all Kurdish politicians, and the various groups, both closed as open, which
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talk about political and social issues related to Kurdish identity, and this is to mention
the Kurdish-Danish groups. There is also a remarkable sharing of information, content
and discussions among the various Kurdish groups in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
Geographical proximity coupled with linguistic and cultural proximity of the three
countries favors such exchange in several ways, including around the relationship
between immigrants Kurdish communities in the three countries. Also notable are the
groups and sites based in different countries, the content of which is produced in other
languages such as English, French, German, and, of course, sites and groups both in
Kurmanji and in Sorani, even those are more related to Kurdish community in
general, not the Kurdish-Danish community, they are still famous for some Kurdish-
Danish individuals.
Therefore, the Kurdish sociability and the relationships that shape the cultural
capital that sustain it, do not need, necessarily, of a geographic proximity so it can
thrive, specially with the internet as a great facilitator of social relations of Kurdish
individuals scattered throughout Denmark so they can engage with each other, and be
able to maintain contact with family and friends in Kurdistan or in other places. The
popularization of the Internet has helped maintain contact and closeness despite the
distance, and the same goes for the Kurdish community in Denmark. Demonstrations,
cultural performances, fundraising campaigns come with the support of the internet,
so this tool becomes a great facilitator of Kurdish sociability and culture, and so the
individuals who possess the ability to understand languages other than Danish, have a
knowledge of the language used in academic life, people who have access to internet
forums, social network profiles, blogs, websites, and scholars of issues related to
Kurdish identity, have the chance of possessing an important cultural capital which
happens to be used and shared within the Kurdish-Danish community both on
occasions in which they are physically together, or over the internet. Therefore, the
Internet turns out to be a means to facilitate both the sharing of knowledge, as a way
for people to acquire it, and individuals who are able to navigate through this
knowledge and are able to filter, translate, debate on such knowledge are individuals
who have a extremely relevant cultural capital within the Kurdish-Danish community,
and especially within the younger community.
When talking to an interlocutor, who had already retired, the same confided to
me, half in English and half in Danish, that one learns a lot from the younger
generation, and that the younger generation learn a great deal on the internet,
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something which he said was not part of his world, but that was really something
relevant to today's youth. Thus one can see that the knowledge that comes from the
Internet ends up being a territory mostly navegated by the younger generations, and
that part of the older generation, that is, often enough, the first Kurds who came in the
1970s and 1980s see the internet as a differential between them and their children and
grandchildren, and as the same individual tol me, that it was important because it
shows that the most recent generations continue to seek ways of "being Kurds", as in,
ways to meet and reproduce the Kurdish culture, even if those ways are more
accessible to some than to others, demonstrating that both 2nd or 3rd generation
Kurds in Denmark were also active inside the Kurdish-Danish community, and in
maintaining what they would call Kurdish traditions.
Bourdieu (1983) traces the importance of certain subjects, cultural capital
holders, have within the community in which they form. Within the Kurdish
community in Denmark, there are many subjects that hold a prominent position within
it. Therefore, it is necessary to know how such knowledge and such subjects affect
sociability within the Kurdish-Danish community. There is a clear example of
politicians of Kurdish origin, both in the local parliament, and in the municipalities
and regions. Such individuals are known both within the Kurdish population and in
the Danish population. The presence of them on Kurdish demonstrations is both a
form of them showing for a considerable part of his constituency an involvement in
political and cultural issues relevant to the Kurdish population and to the Kurdish-
Danish community, given the fact that they are part of the Danish political structure;
often such politicians are responsible for bringing a position on issues important to the
Kurdish-Danish community, such a immigration and the rights of immigrants and
their descendants in general, as also foreign policy regarding what is usually called
the Kurdish question to their parties and also to the Danish parliament.
In the various events that I could participate (including the Kurdish film
festival in Copenhagen, and the various demonstrations), their presence - in the case,
Serdal Benli and Ozlem Cekic - both members of the Danish Social Democratic Party
were held in high regards by individuals present, and they found themselves
constantly surrounded by individuals that constantly approached them, besides they
both met a very broad base of support among them, with individuals of the Kurdish-
Danish community engaging in their political campaigns. Thus, the cultural capital
that these individuals possess, due to political capacity that they have, in addition to
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the access to resources that they have, due to their political activity, causes them to be
fairly requested figures, recognized and admired within the Kurdish community .16
An example of such a sociability and how cultural capital is distributed
differently among members of the Kurdish-Danish community could be seee when
the aforementioned Serdal Benli's brother tragically died due to cancer, which led to
several tributes, both inside Facebook with texts, videos, people changing ther profile
pictures with the photo of the young man, and the massive presence of the Kurdish
community on his funeral served to show that he had been a very beloved figure
within the local Kurdish community, and that the support shown to his brother and his
family in this time of loss, would be unconditional. The loss of a young Kurd, who
was politically engaged, and brother of one of the best know Kurdish politicians
served for this community, as a way for them to strengthen their ties with such
political representative and his family. After the his death, his brother decided to
create a football league with the name of his brother to raise funds for the population
of Shingâl (Sinjar). Therefore, the dedication that an individual had in life to what can
be understood as the Kurdish cause is reflected through the network of contacts that
he/she has acquired through the cultural capital that he/she has within the Kurdish-
Danish community. Such a network could be clearly seen during the period in which
he was ill and after his death.
Also, individuals engaged in various Kurdish organizations are also popular
figures within the Kurdish community. The people responsible for organizing
lectures, cultural events, demonstrations and celebrations of Newroz (New Year
celebration in the Iranian calendar, but for the Kurdish community it means the
deliverance from the hands of a tyrant, referring to a myth known since 1000 BC) are
individuals known for much of the Kurdish community. The leaders of FOKUS-A, for
example, are extremely active figure within the Kurdish communities on Facebook, as
well as often being responsible for engaging with the participants of the
demonstrations through speeches, or even of being responsible for contact with the
press and the Danish public, and therefore having a prominent public position.
One of the events that I participated, inserted between the speech of Danish
politicians from different political parties such as the Conservative Party, the Social
16Um dos meus principais interlocutores, o já citado Zana, foi, por exemplo, uma figura bastante ativa
na campanha do também citado Serdal Benli para o parlamento dinamarquês durante o ano de 2015.
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Democrats and the Party of the Red List and Green (Enhedeslisten), the leader of the
FOKUS-A, Esmer spoke on behalf of her organization, which had been one of the
leaders within this manifestation. This speech, given by a young woman and with a
leading position within the organization also demonstrates the role that cultural capital
has in the Kurdish sociability also in relation to gender and age.
Such recognition, therefore, of individuals who do not have the same political
activities, for various reasons, from individuals who have it, shows that the
detachment that such individuals, with respect to the Kurdish issue and its various
political and cultural events, have an extremely important cultural capital in the
Kurdish-Danish community. This cultural capital serves as a factor to the Kurds as it
represents a series of knowledges that some individuals have of both the Kurdish
culture and the Danish culture, and at the same timme, also a capacity of some
individuals to reconcile such knowledges.
For instance, the involvement of many individuals within the FOKUS-A, and
the role that it has in the dialogue among the Kurdish community and the Danish
population caused a raise in the number of members that the organization has, which
could be observed during my ethnography, both by recognizing some of my
interlocutors in the summer 2014 who were not members, but in the winter of 2015,
had role in the organization of the Kurdish film festival which happened in the center
of Copenhagen, and by the surge in the demand of inscriptions to FOKUS-A during
the festival.
For, if the ethnic identity does not depend on experience in a certain territory
(BARTH, 1969), in the case of the Kurdish identity, which is, especially in the last
two centuries, linked to Kurdish nationalism, which, in some cases does not manifest
as a desire of building an ethnic-Kurdish national state - the federalism proposed by
Abdulan Ocälan, after all, is closer to a communalist society than of a classic nation-
state - it is still invariably linked to cultural factors and a sense of oppression bt other
nation-states, dictators and political regimes. Knowledge of such forms of oppression,
and the constant struggle against it causes individuals that live in Denmark, and
maintain a political, social and cultural activities regarding it to have a relevant
position within such community.
Considering that the Kurdish socialization in Denmark is invariably filled,by
narratives of injustice and oppression at the hands of more powerful groups, or
individuals who are able to transform and to encode these events into forms of
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practical engagement opposite it, end up, therefore, being agents capable of
benefitting all Kurds (at least it is such how such engagement is often comprehended),
being it a form of extremely relevant cultural capital that can be observed in the
dynamics within the Kurdish-Danish community.
Such coding is reflected in the various political demonstrations in public
places in the Danish capital (and after what happened in Kôbane and Shingal, in other
smaller cities). If during the first manifestation, flags and banners with political
representation were not present, in other demonstrations, they had a prominent role.
Among them, one organized by PKK sympathizers in Danish soil, and with a
presence of at least fifty participants, was attended by the aforementioned Kurdish-
Danish politician Serdal Benli, dealt with Ocalan being in prison, a date which had
completed 15 years. There was also the presence of flags of the different parties
linked to the PKK, as well as pictures of Abdullah Ocalan. An analysis of the number
of participants reveals that the small number of participants would, most likely, not
bring a sizeable political return for him. However, as he confided to me, the absence
of a large number of people does not mean that such a statement in public space does
not "extend" through the Kurdish social networks (both virtual and personal).
Therefore, a constant engagement is a prerequisite for the maintenance of such a
cultural capital, as had been quoted by Bourdieu (1983). This formulation can also be
found also in the FOKUS-A, in which the more engaged and more involved
individuals were those who assumed leadership positions, in addition to being
recognized by less active and older non-members as engaged individuals within the
Kurdish-Danish community.
The public space in Denmark is therefore used by various ethnic, cultural,
political, artistic and religious as a way to express themselves. In the case of the
Kurdish-Danish community, the privilege of living in a democratic society, is
expressed through the various demonstrations that have been mentioned above. And it
is through them that the Kurdish community stands and is being perceived within
Denmark, and in addition, positions itself towards the issues of what is known as
Kurdistan within a nationalist perspective, and the Kurdish community situation in the
Middle East. Within these events, the different forms of Kurdish sociability are put
into practice, as well as relationships, alliances, are being exposed in both open or
subtle ways.
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Another important factor of these events (and not only them) is that they are
ways among which the capital of many individuals is constantly reinterpreted,
accumulated or lost. It is through them that part of the Kurdish population creates an
idea of being a community, which is shown to Denmark, and to the Danish state, that
they are a significant immigrant population. Individuals who, as Zana, give up on
personal plans in order to dedicate themselves to the advancement of the Kurdish
issue become increasingly popular within the it while a misunderstood interview, as
had been granted by a known Kurdish-Danish journalist to a tabloid, and that
resonated poorly among various groups and individuals make him lose some
credibility among sectors of the Kurdish-Danish community.
Therefore, understanding the factors that make up the so-called cultural
capital, as well as the sociability within the Kurdish-Danish community become
extremely relevant for understanding the structures and social dynamics within such a
community. If the Kurdish-Danish sociability reveals extremely important elements of
the Kurdish-Danish culture, as it presents a concreteness to the Kurdish-Danish
population, while it also has an indispensable cultural exchange essential for its
survival, it is also able to reveal the processes that such individuals use to build a
shared Kurdish identity. The concept of cultural capital is extremely useful to make it
possible to see which cultural elements are seen more importantly in the social
dynamics of the Kurdish-Danish community. The knowledge of which skills are
needed to establish which individuals have a prominence in this community, and also,
to structure such knowledge regarding the dynamics of Kurdish-Danish community.
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Chapter IV - FOKUS-A: Kurdish students and their identities
FOKUS-A (Forbundet for Kurdiske Studerende og Akademikere), an acronym
in Danish which means "Organization for Kurdish Students and Academics" is a
political and cultural Kurdish-Danish organization founded in 2008 by university
students in the metropolitan area of Copenhagen. The target audience of this
organization both at the time, and now, are young Kurds who had just started their
higher education, or who were already enrolled on it. The vast majority of its
contributing members are between eighteen and thirty-five years and all members of
the decision council are in this age group.
In this chapter, FOKUS-A and its articulations within the Kurdish-Danish
community, besides its history and the motivations of its members will be described
and analyzed. My ethnographic experience that was comprised of being a listener in
some meetings organized by the group, as well as participating in demonstrations and
of the Kurdish film festival, organized by them, as well as interviews with older active
members as well as with newer and founding members of the organization, all of it
will assist me in building an anthropological analysis of the role that it has both in the
socialization of young Kurds in relation to the Kurdish culture, and the role that it has
in articulating several individuals within the Kurdish community, and the importance
that it It has in building channels of contact and coordination between Kurds and non-
Kurds in the Danish society in general.
i) FOKUS-A: history, activities and its role in the Kurdish-Danish community.
First, before approaching any activities or the relationship that FOKUS-A
develops within the Kurdish-Danish community, it is necessary to explain how it
arised, in addition to addressing what the goals of its founders were when they created
it. What was the context in which a number of individuals thought that it would be
important to create an organization focused on youth, Kurdish-Danish students, both
in relation to Kurdish-Danish community, and also in relation to Danish society, and
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even further, what were the social relations that enabled such organization after being
established in 2008, to remain active over the years.
During my interviews, a recurring question which I asked my interlocutors
was related to the possible practical difficulties of building a social, non-profit
organization related to Kurdish identity in Denmark. The initial difficulty was related
to the creation and the structure of such an organization, and this was one of the main
issues that, according to one of the three founders which I interviewed, had taken
more time to be solved, requiring according to him, "about six months of constant
meetings to ensure everything was structured perfectly". Other Kurdish organizations
were thought of, or even founded, to eventually fail to keep its existence and ended up
being forgotten due to the emptying of it. Therefore, within the narrative of its
founders, those six months become extremely necessary so they could ensure that
FOKUS-A did not meet the same fate as many of other initiatives before them. And it
was during this period that established the role that FOKUS-A would have was
defined. And its three university student from the Copenhagen who founded it,
decided that the organization should therefore focus on young students and
individuals who just left university. Also, it was decided that the organization, as it
was already said before, would not be linked to any religious belief or political party,
and, so, it would be open the Kurds, regardless of any ideological difference or
religion. Thus, in 2008, after much deliberation, FOKUS-A came into existence.
If FOKUS-A appeared with the aim of reading two intersecting groups with
the Kurdish-Danish population, namely, the young community, and people who are
studying, or will study, at high education (and such demographic groups end up often
coinciding). Considering that there is already a tradition of the Kurdish community in
diaspora to organize themselves into various groups as noted by Bahar Baser (2013),
Martin Van Bruinessen (2015), and that the Kurdish diaspora population in extremely
well-organized, considering the various groups bound to the Kurdish cause in several
countries in Europe and in North America, and which arise in different historical
contexts, and responding to various situations, and yet, despite their differences, while
still able to maintain a sense of being a part of a Kurdish-transnational community. It
is within this context that FOKUS-A appears as a way for this segment of the
population to be organized, both in relation to the Kurdish-Danish community, in
relation to Danish society, and both those two vectors that one must understand the
activities organized by FOKUS-A; both as a way for the youth population to organize
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politically and culturally, as a form of such young people to their cultural capital as
college students to articulate their goals with the Danish society and the Danish state.
As I had been confided by one of its founders, FOKUS-A would appear in order for
both the older generations of Kurds could see that they were also Kurds as they were,
and that the Danish-Danes could learn a little about what means to be Kurdish.
Before addressing the activities of FOKUS-A, it is necessary to analyze the
visual identity of FOKUS-A, as wel, since it is the most obvious symbolism that the
organization can offer for anyone who sees it, since it is represented at posters, at
pennants, and online, plus, its visual identity can aid explaining a lot about the goals
and the philosophy behind it. The organization's symbol is formed by a green circle
with a white border. Around the green circle, there's the organization's name in
Danish and its founding year (2008). Within it, there is a yellow circle with a sun with
21 points in a darker shade of yellow and within the same territory of Kurdistan
within the nationalistic narrative, besides the representation of some books. This
represented symbolism resonates strongly within the Kurdish identity narrative, while
others relate only to the organization's goals in the Kurdish-Danish community.
The colors represented (green, red, yellow and white) are present in several
representations of Kurdish identity, as well as political and cultural representations.
The same colors are present in the Kurdistan flag that is widely used by Kurds present
in the four countries which Kurdistan is located at (in some cases illegally) and also
by the Kurdish community in diaspora. The flag of the PKK has the three colors (plus
the circle) as well as political parties (such as the PJAK, the YPG) of Kurdish identity
at the other three countries (Iran, Syria and Iraq, in addition to Turkey, PKK home) .
Such colors which historically have a meaning based in the fight for a Kurdish nation-
state, and that according to the Kurdish narrative the red represents the blood of
Kurdish martyrs throughout history; white would represent peace and hope for a
future with freedom; green would symbolize the Kurdish landscapes, and the yellow
of the sun on the with its 21 points are a reference both to Yazidi religion and to a pre-
Islam religion of Kurdistan called yasdanism), religions in which the number 21 hold
a sacred value. Therefore, the use of these colors make reference to a shared Kurdish
culture of all Kurds, and they are widely known, being the color themselves a social
fact.
The symbols used also clarify a number of factors linked to such an
organization. The use of the organization's name in Danish indicates both a dialogue
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with the Danish society, and also shows that the target Kurds are also individuals who
may not speak any Kurdish language (as well as its meetings and activities that tend
to be in Danish). Books are a reminder that this is an organization focused on
academics and students, and also the map of Kurdistan (within a nationalist
perspective) reinforces a shared Kurdish identity within the four states of Kurdistan,
and still evokes a historical resistance which is common within the four Kurdish
areas, and which evoke ideals such as freedom, cultural self-affirmation, or even a
desire to create a Kurdish national state.
Some activities organized by FOKUS-A are known and widely received by
the Kurdish-Danish community and also the Danish society. The Kurdish film festival
which is now in its fourth edition was held in February of 2015, and occurs in a
theater near the central station of Nørreport, in Copenhagen, attracting many
spectators from different age groups, and individuals who are not Kurds and seek to
know more about them, and also people who seek to know more about the forms of
artistic expression by the Kurds. Documentaries portraying the situation of Kurdish
refugees and feature films about relationships are shown, and in the case of some
films, discussions and lectures after their display are organized.
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This festival has quickly entered the calendar of activities of the Kurdish
community in the Copenhagen metropolitan area. The fact that, at the same place, for
four days during a weekend (between Thursday and Sunday) made a large number of
people that could adapt to the screening times and watch at least one of the films
shown. Before the screening of the film, members of FOKUS-A distribute
membership cards to several people who are interested in becoming members, which
occurs on an ongoing basis.
Demonstrations and protests in front of the local parliament in the City of
Copenhagen, or in front of Iranian embassy are also organized by FOKUS-A,
although they are not always the sole organizes, in many cases those are organized
with the support of other groups, in some cases, with groups only linked to Kurdish
identity, and in others, Danish political groups, often enough the Danish political
party called Enhedslisten which was already mentioned in the previous chapter.
Such demonstrations occur both to remember - or for not allowing the memory
to disappear - massacres suffered by Kurds both inside and outside of Kurdistan. The
Roborski massacre, the genocide in Halabja, the three dead Kurdish activists in Paris,
the Yazidi refugees in Shîngal, the resistance in Kôbane, Kurdish militants
condemned to death by the Iranian government, Ocalan's imprisonment are all
contexts that provide demonstrations by the Kurdish diaspora around the world,
including the Danish capital. Such events reinforce the collective memory within the
Kurdish community of a common history of persecution. Such demonstrations, which
are organized by FOKUS-A (in conjunction with other groups), who publicly takes
the role of spokesperson for a part of the Kurdish-Danish community, namely, the
youth, specially the ones with higher education, and by assuming such a role, they
demonstrate to the rest of the Kurdish-Danish community that they are involved with
the history, the politics and Kurdish culture, while also representing a generational cut
in the Kurdish-Danish community.17 18
17The massacre of Roborski, which took place in December 28th of 2011, also know as the Sirnak
massacre makes reference to an air raid by the Turkish armed forces to a group of civilians in the
border between of Turkey and Iraq in which the Turkish government believed to be PKK militants. 34
civilians were killed. 18The genocide of Halabja refers to an attack on the town of Halabja which occurred on March 16th of
1988, which is in the autonomous region of Kurdistan in Iraq, and 9km away from Iran. During the war
between Iran and Iraq, after the city was released by Kurdish Peshmerga with support of Iranian forces,
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Another important role that FOKUS-A has is of organizing, or participating in
the organization, alongside other organizations, groups, political parties of debates,
lectures, and seminars related to the Kurdish question. In February of 2015, a series of
lectures on the role of women on the battlefield against ISIS in the Kôbane resistance
was organized by FOKUS-A, among other Kurdish and non-Kurdish organizations,
such as the University of Copenhagen, with the participation of speakers from several
European universities.
Therefore, FOKUS-A also serves as a bridge between the academic world and
the world outside of academia, both for the Kurdish community, and for the Danish
society. By organizing events of academic nature on issues related to the Kurdish
culture, FOKUS-A is reaffirmed symbolically as one of the organizations that has the
cultural capital (BORDIEU, 1973) sufficient for such an undertaking, attracting to
their sphere of influence Kurds who would like to own or possess such capital, in
addition to position themselves as one of the organizations that have the ability to
serve as a channel for dialogue between the Kurdish academia and non-Kurdish
academics in Denmark, dealing with issues such as feminism, ethnicity, international
politics, human rights, history, among others. FOKUS-A also organizes Kurmanji
classes for beginners and at a low cost (200 DKK/month) which is open to the general
public, not only for its members. Whereas the Kurdish-Danish community consists of
individuals rather heterogeneous on linguistic terms, with individuals whose
experience with the Kurdish language before emigrating were hampered by
government harassment, or of Kurds whose contact with a Kurdsh language is not as
strong (or even present), and also individuals who migrated to Denmark already in
their adulthood.
Thus, the domain of a Kurdish language in the Kurdish-Danish community is
not a constant, despite the desire explained by most of my interlocutors who were not
fluent in learning it. The organization of instrumental lessons of a Kurdish language
is, therefore, a way in which FOKUS-A has to take a stand vis-a-vis the Kurdish-
Danish community as an organization that also values the preservation of the
linguistic traditions of the Kurdish community.
Saddam Hussein made an attack on the city, using conventional weapons, and chemical weapons,
leaving about 5,000 dead and 7,000 wounded and with sequelae.
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Being FOKUS-A an organization whose target audience is the youth, there is a
mentoring program dedicated to helping young Kurds who just came out of school in
their transition to higher education. Such activity, which consists of a senior member
of the organization help a younger member with various issues related to the
beginning of his/her academic life. This program aims both at integrating these young
people with the most experienced and older members of FOKUS-A, as it also serves
as a way for them to advice young people who were starting a new stage in their lives,
as it strengthen the ties among the younger members of the Kurdish-Danish
community.
Added to these initiatives, FOKUS-A also organizes camps and retreats that
are attended by members, whose goal is both academic and political, since they rely
on the presence of speakers who have knowledge on subjects related to Kurdish
identity, there is also the relevance of the issue of sociability, as they spend three days
together, being able to strenghten their ties of friendship, while eating typical foods,
and listen to Kurdish music, and also have the opportunity to socialize in an
environment in which speakers of some Kurdish language are encouraged to practice
them, and those who are still learning are encouraged to use their knowledge. That is,
they are spaces in which the Kurdish identity is stimulated, and an exchange of
cultural elements from the different perspectives of such individuals while Kurds
occur.
Another important role that FOKUS-A has towards the Kurdish-Danish
community lies in the role of organizing excursions with young Kurds toTurkish
Kurdistan, especially to Diyabakir (Amed in Kurmanji). Those annual trips organized
by the leadership of FOKUS-A, and with the presence of many young people who on
average are between 18 and 21 is the main form that FOKUS-A has to maintain a
symbolic connection betwee the Kurdish identity in Denmark and the Kurdish
population and its territory, which to reinforce a historical and emotional link with the
territory seen by them as the being Kurdish. For a large part of the members who
participate in such trips, it is the first opportunity they have to experience and learn
about the day-to-day lives of predominantly Kurdish towns.
As noted in several interviews, both formal and informal, the vast majority of
youth participating in this trip are Kurds of 2nd or 3rd generation, whose families are
already well established in Denmark. Those are young people who were most likely
born in Denmark and have a Danish passport since birth; unlike their grandparents or
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parents, they did not have to go through any process of naturalization. Those are
young people, whose knowledge of some Kurdish language is often superficial, and
whose first form of political participation in the Kurdish-Danish community has
recently begun.
A large part had just left high school, and is on track to start some form of
higher or vocational education. One of them had told me that he only recently had
sought to find out more about "being Kurdish," and hoped that "during college, I can
learn more about my culture and my country." To understand such movements of
identity redefinition, it is necessary to understand the trajectory of these individuals.
Among the many individuals who I could interview one of them, Esmer, one of
FOKUS-A' leaders has a brother who is part of the guerrilla in the mountains of
Turkish Kurdistan, while Zana is the son of a former guerrilla fighter and war refugee.
Necati, a founder of FOKUS-A, came to Denmark in his childhood because his father
immigrated for not wanting to serve in the Turkish army. Bear came with his family
during the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. These are just a few narratives present
in the FOKUS-A. Although there is a related narrative oppression inside the Kurdish-
Danish community, there is also a nostalgia for the Kurdish identity, which is
reinforced by various elements related to it in Danish soil, a narrative which FOKUS-
A also takes part in reinforcing.
This trip is for many of these individuals the first contact with a reality that is
different from the day-to-day experiences they have in Denmark, and also the first
direct contact that they have with the cultural situation and politics in Kurdistan.
While being present during the Newroz festival, in the largest city in Turkish
Kurdistan (the trips tend to be for Turkish Kurdistan due to an ease of access, and the
knowledge that some of the organizers have of the region), they have a contact one of
the festivities that despite being already celebrated in Denmark with their families and
Kurdish friends, do not have the massive participation that this celebration has is in
the city of Diyabakir, where it counts with the participation of about one million
people, according to the numbers repeated by different speakers who have
participated in this trip.
This celebration, which for the Kurdish community, both in the Diaspora, as in
Kurdistan takes on a political significance as it is experienced first hand, in a context
in which the political persecution of Kurdish people, like themselves, as reported in
the various narratives that constitutes the Kurdish-Danish community, gives a more
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tangible meaning the to community in itself. Among other things, the trip to the
Turkish Kurdistan also includes conversations and interviews with local Kurdish
politicians, besides the possibility for those young Kurds who have lived most of their
lives in Kurdistan to start learning or using more often a Kurdish language, in addition
to being immersed in a locality of Kurdish majority.
As one of his oldest intelocutors from FOKUS-A, and who had participated in
the same trip two years ago, confided to me that the "celebration of Newroz, the
Kurdish food, the day-to-day, the music, everything is more authentic in Kurdistan.
Not that we are not Kurds in here, but there (in the territory of the Turkish Kurdistan)
is where they are in touch with our place, our country." Those trips also fulfill the role
of materializing the social relations that are based only in a concept, in this case, the
idea of a shared Kurdish identity within a territory understood as Kurdish; or also as a
way to appease a nostalgia or/and desire of having a nation. Soon, it serves for many
young people who were born and raised in Danish territory in which they may have a
practical sense and experiences with individuals who also identify themselves as
Kurds, on a site which for many is part of their nation, or their cultural expression.
Thus, the trip serves as a rite of passage, to use an expression used by Arnold
Van Gennep (1960), for these young people who have recently started to treat their
identity as Kurds in articulation with a participation in politics related to the Kurdish
question around the planet. Besides the French author, another anthropologist, Victor
Turner (1969) brings interesting thoughts on the subject, in treating the rite of passage
as a moment of liminality, in which the initiates would no longer be members of the
society of which they were, as they were not reintegrated into society that they would
become a part of, being therefore in a transitional state, as the author famously quoted
'betwixt and between'. Using such a concept, we can see that such a trip is a practical
demonstration as I was told "of life and day-to-day experiences of Kurdistan, with all
the difficulties that we do not have in Denmark, not to mention that in other places of
Kurdistan, it is even worse". Young people who have already made such a trip, or
who have some experiences within what is imagined as Kurdistan tend to have stories
that are seen within the Kurdish community as more legitimate, and which would
demonstrate to the Kurdish-Danish community, especially for older people, their
involvement with their Kurdish identity. One of the youth, in a casual conversation,
told me, for example, that to know Kurdistan was very pleasing to his family. So the
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trip that FOKUS-A organizes fulfills the role of legitimizing the identity of such
younger individuals, towards the Kurdish-Danish community.
Young Kurds born and/or raised in Denmark, and are interested in such tours
or on being members of FOKUS-A (which might or not be equivalent propositions),
see this trip as their first contact with the Kurdish cause in situ, and treat that time as
the first concrete attempt to articulate themselves politically in favor of the Kurdish
cuse; such political participation is based on an experience, no matter how short it is,
after all, they now have a cultural capital comparable (not necessarily similar) to that
of other Kurdish individuals who lived within a Kurdish context, both in Kurdistan, as
in countries where the Kurdish minority was historically oppressed. Soon after
returning from the tour to Kurdistan, they see themselves, and are seen by the local
community, as adults who are politically conscious of the Kurdish cause (or
beginning to), which would show a hierarchy (that is somewhat diluted yet present),
between different generations of Kurds in Denmark. It must be noted, however, that
this process is not necessarily similar for all Kurds in Denmark.
However, this trip is not the only way in which the political and the cultural
engagement in relation to the Kurdish question, however, it is an event that demands a
larger organization, according to the members of the presiding board, which makes it
one of the events that they consider most relevant for the political Kurdish cause in
Denmark, and is also, along with the Kurdish film festival, the most identified activity
that FOKUS-A organizes within the Kurdish-Danish community.
In short, FOKUS-A is an organization that brings together Kurdish-Danish
and Kurdish students and academics (or individuals who sympathize with such
groups) who aims to represent that sector of the Kurdish-Danish community, in
addition to representing the Kurdish youth vis-a-vis the Danish community in general
through the organization of demonstrations and events related to the Kurdish question,
the organization of lectures, and which also organizes the Kurdish film festival, with
the addition of being responsible for annual visits to Turkish Kurdistan. It is necessary
to also mention that the members of FOKUS-A participate in social gatherings
amongst themselves, in which they begin to create friendships which arise in a context
related to the Kurdish question, but also extends to other situations. Such interactions,
besides the dedication of its members, are also an extremely relevant part to explain
the growth of FOKUS-A within the Kurdish-Danish younger community. There also
should be noticed something relevant in relation to Denmark, which is the presence of
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several youth groups linked to political issues. All relevant parties (regardless of the
ideology) on the national scene have a sector focused on young people, since Danish
sociability encourages greater political participation of individuals who are now
entering adulthood. The possibility of a Kurdish sociability among individuals
politically engaged within the Kurdish question, with the same age group, is also a
considerable way to attract members within the local political participation. It is
therefore a way form them to also establish themselves as a group with social
objectives among their age peers; groups in which relationships are created and
maintained. I heard from some interlocutors that within a few members of the
Kurdish-Danish community, FOKUS-A had a certain reputation as a political group in
which young people know "to date".
This accusation made by some older individuals, albeit being truth, it would
have been appliable to the vast majority of political groups formed by young people in
Denmark. An organization whose target audience are young people, who just left high
school, or even newcomers to higher education, and whose easeness in living alone at
early ages compared to most European countries is extremely high due to government
financial support, the emotional relationships between these young people with
common ideas should come as no surprise. And that such relationships are viewed
with some suspicion by older members of the Kurdish-Danish community also
demonstrates more the existence of generation gap than a more accurate analysis of
the situation. The fact that those realitionships might occur or not on those social
events does not exclude the possibility of a political engagement within any
organization, especially one as FOKUS-A whose constant presence in several events
related to the Kurdish question, in which a large part of its activities also has a focus
on developing social networks for the younger members of the Kurdish-Danish
community and aims to make such sociability develop towards articulating resources
in favor of the Kurdish population, both in Denmark and abroad. So, these are some
of the activities performed by FOKUS-A, regarding the Kurdish question, whether
alongside or not with other Kurdish-Danish organizations, political parties, local
theaters or universities.
ii) Political inspiration and institutional organization: the Kurdish cause and
FOKUS-A
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As was described above, FOKUS-A is an organization that seeks to bring
together students and academics of Kurdish origin in Denmark, and which aims to be
a representative of aspects of the Kurdish cause in Denmark. Formed mostly by
people between 18 and 35 years, and that is responsible for various events, both
internal (with members only), and towards the Kurdish-Danish community and
Danish society in general, FOKUS-A is one of the most active institutions related to
the Kurdish issue within the Danish capital region, with some groups outside of
Copenhagen. Being the Kurdish community in Europe, one of the communities in
diaspora which is better organized politically, and therefore, the Kurdish issue is not
solely a matter related to Middle East politics, but also related to European politics
(MARTIN VAN BRUINESSEN , 2002). One of my interlocutors stated to me that
one of the objectives of the various Kurdish demonstrations taking place in Denmark
and other European countries was for "Denmark, as well as the countries in Europe
(namely in the EU) to do something over the massacre that Kurds have been
suffering. We, in several countries, we unite to force governments to do something for
our people." Such narratives makes it clear that not only in Denmark, but also in many
other countries, there is a transnational coordination between the various Kurdish
communities in the Diaspora. With the overwhelming presence of the internet, it is
possible that a young Kurd to know about events occurring in London, Stockholm,
Paris or Hamburg. Such knowledge, in addition to reinforcing identity ties that they
share (they are clear manifestations of the Kurdish imagined community), also serve
to influence the specific articulations of several countries.
The Kurdish question is an important political issue for the international
relation of most European countries, due to the presence of a considerable number of
immigrants of Kurdish origin and their descendants on those countries. However,
despite the Kurdish population being of considerable size within Europe, there needs
to be observed that in many cases such a community has an heterogeneous profile, as
well as Bahar Baser (2013) observes:
Kurdish communities can be found through various countries
in Europe today (...). Their collective experiences include
stories and memories of oppression, labor migration,
earthquakes, exile, poverty, torture, forced relocation,
conscious objectification, discrimination and xenophobia; in
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essence, a constant struggle for survival and preservation and
identity reformulation. (...) Today it is no surprise that many
Kurds in Europe adopt strategies to increase their collective
voices in Europe, in order to attract attention of governments,
politicians and groups in the European civil society to their
cause, and as a part of their bid to be recognized ethnically
and culturally as "Kurds" - first in Europe and then in Turkey.
(BASER, 2013)
With that in mind, it is necessary to think, therefore, that the FOKUS-A is a group
related to the Kurdish question, in a country with different groups who the same goal.
And that Denmark is just another European country, which has a Kurdish population
in diaspora, and in which such population is organized in different ways, aiming to
affect the politics of their country and of the European Union towards the Kurdish
cause. With this context in mind, FOKUS-A is not only a Kurdish movement, but
Danish and also European, or even more, it is international. This is what makes
possible to understand their political goals, their inspiration, their ideological ties to
Abdullah Ocalan, as well as being able to understand how it is organized
institutionally, especially regarding the division of power between genders.
Such strategies, as had been previously cited by Bahar Baser (2013) in order to
"amplify their collective voice in Europe" and which have been exemplified above,
serve to also amplify an ideology or a set of ideologies that is shared by its members
with different intensities, and whose role is constantly reinforced and reinterpreted
through the various events that are organized or supported by FOKUS-A. The own
institutional organization FOKUS-A reflects this policy, as will be discussed in this
chapter.
First, we need to examine more deeply the meaning of the simple expression:
"the Kurdish cause." What is, therefore, to FOKUS-A the symbolic meaning of the
"Kurdish question" and supporting such a cause In my work, as mentioned in the
introduction, I consider to be Kurdish every one who is seen as such, so the Kurdish
cause is the cause of all that see themselves as belonging to the Kurdish community
and are seen and recognized by such a community as Kurds. The question of what
would be the "cause" is the word that should be analyzed in this chapter in a more
detailed manner.
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First, it is necessary to emphasize the different opinions within the Kurdish
populations around the world. And that population, as Bahar Baser (2013) notes, is
very large and therefore broad within their social characteristics. There are Kurds, to
use a Marxist expression, from different social classes; there Kurds with different
religious affiliations (or that have no religious affiliation whatsoever); there are Kurds
with different political views, if we consider the classic distinction between right x
left. There are Kurds who left Kurdistan due to political persecution as refugees, and
others who have immigrated in search of better wages in Europe (the so-called
movement of "guest workers" from the 60s and 70s) and in North America. There are
Kurdish communities in the traditional regions of Kurdistan, and the older Kurdish
communities in several countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan,
and significant communities in diaspora in Western Europe and in North America
countries, all with different dynamics and different influences local politics.
Thus, for a community with very different experiences, the idea of a Kurdish
question must be problematized and interpreted as a power struggle, or a series of
power struggles within the various Kurdish communities (FOUCAULT, 1979). As the
French philosopher and sociologist claim in "Microphysics of Power:
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of
truth, that is, the types of discourse which accepts and
function as truth (...), the means by which each is sanctioned,
the techniques and procedures valued at the acquisition of
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what
counts as true. (FOUCAULT, 2009, p.13)
Therefore, Foucault's proposition deals with power struggles also at a
discursive level. This theoretical formulation can be applied in relation to the political
discourses that unites the entire Kurdish population around the world, and more
specifically, the Kurdish-Danish community, as has been observed during my
ethnographic work. Even though some narratives and their ramifications, at times
work for some individuals as an aggregating factor, and at others as it works as a
divisive factor, nevertheless, the Kurdish-Danish community is united through
keeping an opinion on a lot of topics, regardless of agreements.
Within the Kurdish community in diaspora, a cultural reference - considering
99
that it is an element in which most people keep an opinion on - is the issue related to
the PKK and its charismatic leader, kept in prison since 1999 in Turkey, Abdullah
Ocälan. The position, therefore, that FOKUS-A has regarding the teachings of Ocälan
and the PKK, besides the opinions of its members on such issues are relevant to the
role that it has and will have inside the Kurdish-Danish.
During my ethnographic work, I interviewed a Kurdish-Danish journalist who
maintained one of the largest sites/Facebook pages in Denmark for news and
information related to the Kurdish community and Kurdistan, and whose presence in
the Danish media, as an expert in everything related to Kurdistan and Kurdish issue,
had become, since my first visit to Denmark in May, increasingly frequent. When I
asked his opinion regarding FOKUS-A, he told me that he was not and has never been
a member of it, due to a supposed influence that such an organization, and its
members would have from PKK and their ideology, and that he, as a journalist, would
not feel comfortable being the member of a group that constantly hampered the
freedom of expression of journalists. Therefore, even while acknowledging the role
that FOKUS-A had within the Kurdish-Danish community, and even though he would
regard PKK's role in relation to defense of Kurdish rights with some deference, in
addition to the efforts of that members of FOKUS-A had, including some of his
personal friends, he kept an ideological distance, since, in his opinion it would be
impossible to reconcile their ideology (of FOKUS-A, which according to him was an
offshot of PKK for the youth with his profession). Thus, this reflects the perception
within members of the Kurdish-Danish community that FOKUS-A would be only an
ideologically linked group with PKK (even without the occurrence of a direct
financing and of groups linking PKK and FOKUS-A, nor the existence of an obvious
statement from the FOKUS-A that linked it to PKK).
This example serves to demonstrate that the relationship FOKUS-A has with
the PKK and its offshoots; or even, the influence that the identity shaped by PKK and
their ideas have on FOKUS-A and the organization's actions within the Kurdish-
Danish community, and the role that it holds in relation to the political position of its
members. Thus, the role of PKK in the Kurdish population in diaspora in Europe is
the starting point for any analysis of the role that the FOKUS-A has in Denmark. The
various forms of action, in addition to political and strategic positioning of changes
that arise within the PKK, and especially by its leader Abdullah Ocalan has been key
in understanding the vicissitudes of Kurdish politics, especially in Turkey, but also
100
spreading to the Kurdish diaspora populations in Europe, and are also essential for
understanding the ideology that sustains FOKUS-a within the Kurdish-Danish
community even if a link does not exist in any official matter.
As Nezvat Soğuk (2008) analyzes on his article in the Kurdish diaspora in
Europe:
PKK has become the dominant force behind the proliferation
of diaspora organizations, therefore, eclipsing so many other
influential movements and assets within the Kurdish
community in diaspora. (SOGUK, 2008)
The presence of European groups linked to PKK in Europe comes in the late
'70s and early '80s, notably with the creation of the "European Bureau" (Khayati,
2008). Thus, along with the increase in the size of the Kurdish diaspora population in
Europe, arising especially from Turkish Kurdistan, the position of the Kurdish
political organization with a greater power of influence in relation to what is
conventionally called the "Kurdish question" is also transplanted to Europe. And as
Martin van Bruinessen (2000, 2000) noted on several occasions, the Kurdish issue has
also become an European issue, and it happened due to a growing number of the
Kurdish population in several European countries, as the role that the various Kurdish
political organizations has in same countries.
However, as was noted during my fieldwork, to label FOKUS-A merely as an
organization that exists only to fulfill the role of being a subservient and ideological
group which is politically dependent on PKK would be a simplistic characterization of
both the ideals of FOKUS-A, as the positioning of several of their active members
which I could interview, during both informal and formal conversations, or just by
observing the interaction between them through social networks, especially on
Facebook. PKK, and its ideology and its modulations, besides the books and the
writings of Abdullah Ocalan are key in understanding the political and cultural
activity of the Kurdish community in diaspora, however, an ethnographic work must
necessarily know how to evaluate the present nuances in both the discourse and the
practice of such groups and their members, and with that in mind, to treat FOKUS-A
as a group formed exclusively for the purpose of advancing the ideas of tPKK and
Abdullah Ocälan would be a too simplistic approach, even considering the great
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sympathy that the PKK and Abdullah Ocälan has within members of FOKUS-A, or
the sympathy that a considerable part of its members have with respect to such
ideology.
The various changes in the political and ideological position of PKK, and
especially of its spiritual leader Abdullah Ocalan, over the years are also relevant to
assessing the role that the various Kurdish organizations have around Europe, along
with their ideology and course of action. After the capture of Abdullah Ocälan, there
had been a change from the methods used by PKK, as well as a change in relation to
the final objectives of the organization. In the last years, Abdullah Ocälan have been
preaching something that he would name as "democratic confederacionalism", a
political and ideological position in which he defends the end of national borders, and
that the Kurdish dispute (at least in Turkey) should be about ethnic, linguistic and
cultural ways of self-expression, instead of a struggle for the formation of a national
state (OCÄLAN, 2012), that also reflects PKK's changes regarding their insurgency
strategy of its guerrilla movements towards political participation. As Eccarius-Kelly
(2010) states:
As the militants shifted towards Kurdish political activism and
placed their dispute as a dispute over minority rights and
human rights, they gained important support of many left-
wing political organizations, activist groups and political
parties in Europe. (ECCARIUS-KELLY, 2010)
This change, therefore, has a very clear effect within FOKUS-A, whose main
banner is the struggle for the rights of the Kurdish people in Kurdistan. And this
struggle, which also includes a fight for rights, and against cultural assimilation
historically imposed by the Turkish government (and the governments of Iran, Iraq
and Syria), which PKK, since its beginning, has always opposed. This is not to say,
however, that support for the PKK is an unconditional support, and that there is not
act any criticism of the methods used by them, especially to the terrorist attacks which
happened in the '80s. However, PKK's position as a defender of Kurdish rights front
an what they would call "oppressive state politics" as one of my interlocutors told me,
is part of the transnational struggle of the Kurdish community around the world.
An example of this can be found in the demonstrations in Copenhagen over
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the situation in Shingâl and Kôbane, in which the PKK guerrillas were treated as
heroes by moving from Turkey to Iraq and Syria in order to participate in the
resistance to attacks from ISIS. FOKUS-Am who had been present at such a
demonstration, both through the presence of several members, such as through a
speech by its co-leader, a female student of Administration and Business in one of the
most prestigious universities in the country. Her speech, which was punctuated by
emotional issues in relation to the brutal attacks by the Islamic State, also praised the
guerrillas who have moved from Turkish Kurdistan to Iraqi Kurdistan to defend the
Yazidi community, along with the Peshmerga fighters from the autonomous region of
Kurdistan in Iraq. During those demonstrations, PKK flags and pictures of martyrs, in
addition to banners of Abdullah Ocälan were a constant presence. With the situation
of Yazidis in Shingâl and the attacks on their population, a support to the military
actions of the PKK demonstrated the cultural capital that this organization still
maintains in the Kurdish population.
The constant articulation among various Kurdish organizations, including
FOKUS-A, to remove PKK from the list of terrorist organizations by the European
Union, shows that the change in perspective of both the PKK activities in Turkish
territory, as the opinion of Abdullah Ocälan in relation to the methods used in their
objective also affects the various Kurdish organizations in diaspora, including in
Denmark, and mobilizes a number of individuals who despite disagreeing with PKK,
believes that the Turkish government is worse, and among these individuals, some of
them are affiliated with FOKUS-A. Within FOKUS-A, a considerable part of its most
active members - and also board members - maintain some sympathy towards the
directions that PKK has taken towards a ceasefire. However, it is necessary to analyze
more deeply what it means to be friendly to the positions of PKK and Ocälan's ideas.
Firstly, we must say that there are several ways in which a Kurd can claim to
be favorable towards PKK, and one of them relates to what members more influenced
by the PKK would claim as "the martyrdom of Abdullah Ocalan in the hands of the
Turkish government." There is a very significant sense, within the members of
FOKUS-A, that even without agreeing with the historical role or the ideological role
of PKK, it has constantly been one of the main actors in relation to fighting
oppression suffered by the Kurdish community in Turkey. There is also a feeling that,
if the PKK is treated as a terrorist organization, the Turkish state should also share the
same distinction, which would consider the attacks suffered by Kurds from the
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Turkish army (or against Turkish citizens in other situations, such as the police action
in Gezi in 2014), this feeling is very present in FOKUS-A by a generational issue,
given that most of its members began having a political concern related to their
Kurdish identity after Ocälan's change of ideological perspective.
The narrative in which the Turkish government, for decades, has prevented
Kurds to express themselves ethnically as Kurds, the forms of resistance to this
question, if they are not always justified in their methodology, at least theu are
expected, and interpreted as a just political reaction to Ankara. And it is within this
context that the support for PKK in the Kurdish diaspora communities ishould be
comprehended. There are individuals who are staunch defenders of it, and others who
strongly opposes their goals, tactics, and ideals (and who haven't changed their
opposition even after PKK's change) there are still individuals whose support to PKK
is constantly relativized in regards to the complex narrative of Kurdish identity within
the Turkish state. If I had not met any member of FOKUS-A that would maintain a
position that would stauchily anti-PKK and Abdullah Ocalan, the same can not be
said of individuals that relativize their roles, and even the presence of such individuals
within FOKUS-A this middle ground view might be very common.
Secondly, there must also be examine the role that Ocälan and his set of ideas,
which since 1999 are transmitted from a prison on an island off the coast of Turkey,
maintains on both the PKK, as on the Kurdish politics, and also as an interlocutor of
the Kurdish cause in Turkish territory. Ocälan is still seen symbolically as the leader
of the Kurdish community (Baser, 2012), for a large part of them, which could be
seen through my fieldwork, in which the influence and the importance of Abdullah
Ocälan often were often reiterated as essential for the political and the cultural
understanding of the Kurdish community, both located in Turkey and in Turkish
Kurdistan, and also the Kurdish community in diaspora. Abdullah Ocälan, both as a
political leader and as a Kurdish cultural and social fact, is the most influential
Kurdish figure today. This factor is, therefore, essential to the understanding of the
political and cultural articulations of Kurdish people which also includes the activities
of FOKUS-A.
Within FOKUS-A, there are two aspects that deserves to be analyzed. The
first, is the importance of Ocälan to the Kurdish community, and the second is the
practical relevance of his ideal for the liberation and for the ethnic identity of the
Kurdish people. The importance of Ocälan is a fact that is largely in agreed upon by
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members and former members of FOKUS-A I had the opportunity to interview both
formal and informally. In all the narratives that I have been told about the Kurds and
their situation in Kurdistan, the role of Ocälan is quite significant (regardless of their
agreement or not in relation to his ideology and the PKK methodology over the
years). The arrest of Ocalan since 1999 is seen in a consensually as a disproportionate
and an unjust way to attack Kurdish expression, not to mention as a way in which
Turkey acts differently towards their non-Turkish minorities, which includes the
Kurds as well. One of my interlocutors, for example, disagreed with Abdullah Ocälan
ideology known as democratic confederentialism and the abolition of the state's role,
and he also did not agree with his Stalinist positioning even before his arrest in 1999,
however, he saw that his presence was beneficial to the Kurdish question, and it was
also a proof of the dictatorial excesses commited by the Turkish government. And
there is also a current idea that the suffering and imprisionment of Abdullah Ocälan
symbolically represents all oppression and attempted denial of identity expression
suffered by the Kurdish people over the years, as it also represents an attempt to rebel
against such situation. In addition, however, to the representative figure of Abdullah
Ocälan, there is also his political persona along with his treatises, books and articles,
which circulate and are commented by the Kurdish-Danish community, which also
includes members of FOKUS-A. It is within such a political position that there is
some ideological differences among the members of FOKUS-A.
There is within FOKUS-A, especially among the most active members, that is,
members who have some role in the organization's board, or who helped organize the
various activities, a strong sympathy for the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan, in his
approach of the "democratic confederationalism", and the form of political and social
organization present in Rojava through the PYD "Partyia Yekîtiya Democrat" - Party
of the Democratic Union - which is the affiliate of the PKK in Western Kurdistan (in
Syria). The PYD and its political organization in Rojava have been the subject of
growing interest by the Western media, due to their resistance in Kobanê against ISIS
attacks, besides being an object of scrutiny by media vehicles and leftist activists
around the world due the form of its social organization, which is inspired by the
teachings of Abdullah Ocälan, and promoting, for example, an empowerment of the
role of women in relation to political and social organization in the cantons of Rojava,
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plus conceils in which different ethnicities and groups religious are represented.19
That is, in Rojava, there is a political organization who strongly influenced by
the ideology of Öcalan, and which at the same time that relates to a Kurdish reality in
Kurdistan while also providing a libertarian alternative, being inserted as a way of
being politically organized, which now extend its influence to leftist parties around
the world. The form of government in Rojava, which arises due to a state vacuum of
power that came within the civil war in Syria, thus allowing a greater political
autonomy of the Kurdish community, is seen as many members of FOKUS-A as an
ideal organization to the Kurdish community in general, and explain the sympathy of
most of its members by lef and extreme left-wing, especially the party of the Green
and Red List, the aforementioned Enhedslisten.
However, not all members of FOKUS-A see the alternative proposed by
Ocalan, or even any left-wing project, or even disagree with PKK's giving up its
desire to establish a Kurdish nation-state, as the ideal form of organization for the
Kurdish community and for Kurdistan. The change of PKK's perspective on the
creation of a future Kurdish nation-state is, for example, a position that a considerable
part of FOKUS-A members - who were raised in Denmark and possessing the
knowledge of all the benefits that being citizens of a consolidated country - disagree
with, seeing this as a fundamental prerequisite for the construction of the freedom of
the Kurdish people. There are also some members who understand that a more liberal
option, disagreeing with the democratic confederationalism of Ocälan, with its
opposition of industrial capitalism. For its members, the idea of a social and economic
organization of socialist inspiration is not the correct ideological option for a future
Kurdish nation-state or for the future of Kurds; or even to provide Kurds with a form
of cultural freedom. That is, while a considerable part of FOKUS-A is identified with
left-wing positions, some members adopt more centrist and more liberal positions,
wishing a future Kurdish state which would resemble a liberal democracy in the
standards of the US. There is, therefore, a two-way route in conceptual terms about
the future imagined by them to the Kurdish population and their everyday lives in
19The role women had in Kobanî would be represented by the guerrilla fighters of YPJ, a military
organization which employs only women in their ranks and is connected to the YPG. The various
battles and confrontations between them and ISIS are a recurring presence in reports from several
media outlets, as well as in the profiles of Kurdish-Danish activists, both on Facebook and Twitter.
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Denmark and everything it entails.
Being FOKUS-A an organization formed by young people who mostly are
Kurds who were born as 2nd or even 3rd generation of their families being in
Denmark; or who often enough lived virtually all their lives in Denmark, or still, who
came into the Denmark under the condition of refugees, the sociability of such
individuals within Denmark is a key issue for understanding their Kurdish identity.
Such individuals who identify themselves as Kurds have experiences in relation to a
state that tends to be peaceful, adding to the fact that Denmark is a country with a
well-established welfare state, high-income, and low rates of violence not only
compared with states in which Kurdistan lies within a nationalist perspective, but
even compared with developed countries in the world. Thus, there is an exchange of
experiences for these individuals, while they are Kurds, they are also (or have
experiences) Danes, either by birth or by naturalization (or on the path to
naturalization). Life in Denmark, therefore, ends up being a normative experience for
many individuals of what should be a state and its role, as well as issues related to
gender equality, political and cultural freedom. Thus, the experiences, and concepts
that are experienced by them in Denmark also influence the perception that they have
of their identity as Kurds.
As an example of that, the aforementioned Zana expressed doubts about the
need for political disputes between PKK and its affiliated parties and the KDP, which
currently rules Iraq. In his opinion, there should be a greater political unity among the
different Kurdish parties in the different areas of Kurdistan, and that they should focus
on building a Kurdish state able to ensure security and free cultural expression for the
Kurdish population, rather than worrying about a dissent that would only be harmful.
Despite the fact that FOKUS-A is composed primarily of members who harbored
some sympathy towars PKK and Ocälan, he still saw the role of the organization as
important for the Kurdish political representation in Denmark, and saw that it
possessed the ability to be an important tool to influence Danish politics towards
helping Kurdish communities, especially regarding the humanitarian crisis in Kôbane
and Rojava. In another situation, another speaker expressed his skepticism regarding
the economic and social organization of socialist nature as a solution to the Kurdish
oppression, or as a viable economical solution for a future Kurdish state. In his
opinion, a state that would guarantee individual and economic freedoms, as well as
providing a support network for their citizens would, in his view, be the ideal solution
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for a future Kurdish state; that is, as he told me, "more or less what we have here in
Denmark would be ideal, neither socialist nor capitalist, but both at the same time."
Thus, as it has been noted, there is a strong sympathy for the ideals of the PKK
and the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan, there is also, within the FOKUS-A, room for
disagreement about the future of Kurdistan. The disagreement of some members
regarding the majority opinion did not prevent either of the two groups to cooperate
with each other in different situations in which the FOKUS-A had been involved.
Such disagreements, when discussed, were made in private moments - as in, they
were not public moments in which such individuals were representing the FOKUS-A
- and, for both sides, it would serve as a way to create a debate on a relevant situation
for the Kurdish-Danish community, and more broadly, to the Kurdish community.
Thus, FOKUS-A manages to maintain itself as an organization for students
and Kurdish academics first, in order to avoid positioning itself officially as an
organization linked directly to PKK and its off-shoots, although most of its members
nourish a strong sympathy for them. So there is a common denominator that runs
through all the external actions of FOKUS-A, whether the Kurdish film festival,
demonstrations and debates, the sponsorship program and Kurmanji classes, which is
an unconditional defense of what is seeng as the Kurdish cause in Denmark. And this
question can be summed up as a defense of human rights of citizens who identify
themselves ethnically as Kurds around the world, and especially in Kurdistan.
The main cause for which the existence of FOKUS-A is justified is to serve as
a political and cultural platform for a certain sector of the Kurdish-Danish
community, and serve as a way to expose to the Danish community the Kurdish
question. And it is through this principle that the FOKUS-A acts primarily, although
at times the influence of PKK becomes a predominant factor in some situations,
FOKUS-A is not simply a stepping stone to the PKK and its activities within a
demographic Kurdish-Danish community. However, if the criticism of the PKK are
veiled and internal, it is also rarely open and explicitly pro-PKK positions, despite its
influence being quite obvious to anyone who is fluent in the Kurdish cultural
language.
There is an attempt to maintain an impartial position to any political party,
either Kurdish or Danish regarding FOKUS-A activities and manifestos; and despite
this attempt not always being successful, the fact that it exists demonstrates the
interests of FOKUS-A on being primarily a Kurdish organization, rather than
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officially and ideologically connected to PKK and Abdullah Ocälan.
As described on their website in the part called "About Us" which deals with
the most general information about the organization as well as showing more
succinctly their objectives:
The organization is directed primarily to Danish individuals
with Kurdish descent, who are students or who have finished
their education. (...) The organization is independent both
religiously and politically, however, it respects all political
views and all religious beliefs. (...) Our goal is to become the
largest Kurdish youth organization in Denmark, as well as act
as a common platform where all Kurdish students and
academics in Denmark can come together and create a
network in order to strengthen their professional, academic,
social and cultural skills. (FOKUS-A, 2013)
There is no official announcement on their website showing any affiliation to
any political group, however, to deny that there exists an influence of the belief of its
members on how the organization should be run would be ethnographically naïve. As
an example, I quote an answer that FOKUS-A gave to a piece produced by a Danish
media vehicle of left-wing inclination called "Information" on the political and
Kurdish cultural mobilization in the country in recent months.
After the publication of this report, FOKUS-A published on its official
Facebook page a manifesto in relation to this article, and to the fact that it had not
been consulted officially as an organization for its production of the same (although
more than one member were interviewed). In this manifesto, those parts are
highlighted:
We fight for the maintenance of a Kurdish identity.
Information (a left wing political magazine) on Saturday
published an article about our organization and our members.
As the magazine's reporter did not contact us directly for an
official position for the article, we respond with this press
release. We are an organization working for the spread of
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knowledge about the Kurdish cause so we can build a
conscious Kurdish youth. We have place for all who find our
purpose and our work important. The Kurdish issue is about
the right of Kurds to exist, because the Kurdish identity is, and
has been long suppressed and prohibited by state power. (...)
The Turkish national state has for years banned the Kurdish
languages and identity. In their efforts to suppress the Kurdish
identity, the Turkish soldiers have persecuted Kurds, holding
them under torture at the infamous prison at Diyabakir, and
burnt Kurdish villages. What led to an armed conflict, in
which the Kurds have fought for their right of existence.
Abdullah Ocälan is the figurehead, leader and role model in
this fight. (...) There is a ceasefire since 2013 between the
Turkish government and PKK and a peace process that is
under negotiation. (FOKUS-A , 2015, via Facebook)
Thus, we see in this passage that FOKUS-A first positioning itself in relation
to the Kurdish question in general, and afterward defining what positioning itself in
favor of the Kurdish cause means, by stating it is a defense of the right to cultural
existence of the Kurdish people against state oppression. At the same time in which
being Kurdish is a cultural identity in which the individual is a Kurd if they recognize
themselves as such, there is a tacit recognition by FOKUS-A as an entity, and for
much of the politically committed Kurdish community, which such self-recognition
brings some responsibilities, equaling therefore the Kurdish identity at a constant
identity of resistance, and that the Kurdish community in the diaspora have a
responsibility to continue to fight for the rights of Kurds of being Kurds, resist and
fight against state oppression.
Another item worth mentioning is that in spite of FOKUS-A not explicitly
identifying itself as being affiliated to the PKK and Abdullan Ocälan, and also having
members who disagree with their ideals, Ocälan also is a figure that largely
symbolizes (agreeing with his ideas or not) Kurdish resistance to the attempts of
erasure of their shared identity.
Although, the FOKUS-A claiming to be an "independent political
organization," the fact that a large part of its members and board members nurture
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sympathy for Abdullah Ocälan and his theoretical body can not be seen without a
critical analysis. The fact that this press release dealing with Ocälan as a "leader and a
model" in the Kurdish cause shows that neutrality and equality are more ideal values
than practical. However, it can be stated that there is no explicit and total control by
PKK supporters (and other parties and organizations affiliated with the same political)
within FOKUS-A.
There is, beyond the explicit attempt to be an organization for young Kurds,
above any other attribute, a neutral speech, that even though it is impossible to be
sustained in practice, has a key symbolic importance, because it demonstrates a
desired attribute both by the organization as their various members. Then, just as the
FOKUS-A and its leadership, currently fail to maintain a practical neutrality, they do
wish to maintain an appearance of neutrality discourse.
The influence of PKK and Abdullah Ocälan can be analyzed as reflections of
the political and cultural structure of the Kurdish diaspora population in Europe, and
more specifically, the Danish on. As described by many scholars (BESAR, VAN
BRUINESSEN, SOGUK), the role that the PKK has within the Kurdish community,
both in the historic Kurdistan, and in the diaspora population, is extremely relevant in
the political, social and cultural organization in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.
Within this perspective, therefore, it is necessary to contextualize the absence
of criticism (or the veiled criticism of PKK); or the position in which PKK and its
main leader Abdullah Ocälan are seen as a political and ideological dominant force
over the Kurdish population, which means that there is a risk for a group would
openly stand in opposition to it, of being alienated within the Kurdish community.
The press release in which Abdullah Öcalan is defended is a part of an ideological
defense for most members of FOKUS-A, even though it is a non-partisan organization
for the Kurdish-Danish community.
Such a stance towards the Kurdish-Danish population and the Danish
population can be seen, in addition, of course, with the fact that the Danish language
has been used, also another relevant factor is the use of an example of Danish history
as a comparative method over the oppression suffered by the Kurds within the
Turkish state.
The text, that quoted before, and taken from the page of the Facebook
organization makes reference to the period of the Nazi occupation of the Danish state
and the Danish resistance groups against this occupation, and name the symbolic
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value of the use of statues and monuments as a form of nationalist construction. In
citing the strength of the people and the Danish monarch before the German invasion,
the statement tries to draw a parallel between the Danish resistance to Hitler's
invasion and the Kurdish resistance against the totalitarian methods of the Turkish
state.
It is, therefore, possible to realize that FOKUS-A seeks to articulate the
Kurdish resistance which, according to them, would be the Turkish oppression of
imperialistic nature, while the activities of PKK and Abdullah Ocälan are treated as
resistance, just as there had been a resistance against the Nazi occupation in Denmark.
FOKUS-A translates the Kurdish narrative to a common context for the Danish
population. This translation aims to facilitate the understanding of the Kurdish cause
for the Danes, while it aims to enlist the support of the local population. Thus, the
press release by FOKUS-A, as well as the manifestations which happened after the
tragedy at Shingal/Kôbane would seek to bring the narrative about the Kurdish
question, from a Kurdish point of view, for the Danish population in general.
Such political coordination is perceived more clearly with the alliances that
FOKUS-A and Enhedeslisten have in some activities. Several members of FOKUS-A
are affiliated, or at least sympathetic to the party ideas, and the presence of non-
affiliated Kurdish members to Enhedesliten in activities related to the Kurdish
question and culture are extremely common; while that for the national elections that
will take place this year (2015), some members of FOKUS-A are pre-candidates for
the party.
That is, at the same time that FOKUS-A looks for articulating political, social
and cultural movements targeted at the Kurdish-Danish community, it also seeks to
position itself towards the Kurdish transnational community when it organizes or
helps organizes events with the presence of members of the Kurdish communities
from several countries, such as lectures attended by researchers from foreign
universities, while in addition, it also seeks to occupy a space in the Danish
community in seeking to translate elements of the Kurdish cause for a Danish
audience, assuming therefore a triple role: focusing its activities at the same time for
transnational Kurdish community, the Kurdish-Danish community and the wider
Danish society.
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iii) Institutional organization and the Danish state: Bureaucratic processes of
construction of FOKUS-A.
To understand the relevance of FOKUS-A and the role that non-governmental
organizations have within the Kurdish-Danish community and the Danish community,
it is necessary to analyze a Danish tradition of membership in various groups
dedicated to different goals and causes. Fishing organizations, football, chess,
fencing, dance, literature, are a common factor in the Danish society, therefore, the
dynamics of social organization becomes extremely important to understand why
FOKUS-A and its founders see on it a institutional framework for the advancement of
the Kurdish cause in Danish soil. So when we see a Kurdish-Danish organization, one
should note that the "Kurdish" in this equation is the cultural identity that defines the
reasons of its existence, and that the "Danish" side defines issues relevant to its
existence, plus the relationship that such an organization would maintain with the
Danish society and the Danish state, and also, the bureaucratic processes required for
the establishment of such an organization in Danish soil.
Martin Bak Jørgensen on his work on Turkish, Kurd and Alevi organizations
in Denmark claims that:
Participation in civic organizations through associations and
voluntary organizations can therefore be considered a key
factor for the functioning of civil society. Moreover,
organizational engagement can be a vehicle for active
citizenship and can also lead to resistance to reductive notions
of national identity, integration and structures that excludes,
and at the same time can provide a platform for new types
claims and identity positions. (MARTIN BAK JØRGENSEN,
2010, p.163-164)
Thus, it is possible to think that the politics and the culture of the country in
which the community in diaspora have migrated to would also be a deciding factor for
said community's civic engagement alongside the culture of such groups, and it can
also propose an analysis in which both factors are analyzed in understanding the role
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of FOKUS-A in Denmark, being that the ethnic and cultural identity of the Kurds
would defining the goals that their activist groups to achieve, while the political and
social structure would define the bureaucratic and organizational ways in which said
ethnic identity would achieve their political goals. Therefore, FOKUS-A would not
exist if it were not for a political engagement within the Kurdish community in the
diaspora; and the institutional and bureaucratic organization that FOKUS-A is based
on, would not be the way it is, if not for the bureaucracy and the local reality of the
Danish society.
A key concept for understanding the activities of FOKUS-A and the
relationship that it has with the Danish state, is the concept of civil society. In John
Locke (2002) we see what is probably the first attempt to theoretically define the
concept of civil society and seek to explain what are the motivations and its role. For
the British author, civil society would emerge as a way to stand between the
dictatorial potential of the state and the individual; to serve as a defense of property,
which in the context in which Locke writes, does not refer only to private property,
but also the right to life and liberty. Another author who deals with the issue of civil
society in a more contemporary way is Robert D. Puttnam (1994), which argues that
civil society organizations (including the non-political ones) contribute to the
maintenance of democracy due to the political, social and cultura capital, they
accumulate and eventually transfer them to the political sphere.
Another important analysis for one to understand the role of a social
organization formed by immigrants in a Scandinavian context is the one put forward
by Fernando Rabossi (1999) within a Chilean Association in Stockholm. Social
organizations in a Swedish context would not be just one way that many groups of
Chileans would find ito maintain and strengthen their cultural reproduction, but also
"especially a particular way of organizing social groups that is parallel to a way
standard structure and interests groups are in Sweden "(Rabossi, 1999). Therefore,
there is a cultural component of the Chilean community in such groups which is
concomitant to a Swedish component in their formation. In parallel, FOKUS-A as a
Kurdish group in Denmark also has a similar dynamic of being a Kurdish
organization with Danish cultural elements in its structure.
FOKUS-A, within this perspective, can also be seen as a form of coordination
between several individuals with common characteristics (they are Kurds, and even
more, Kurds within a certain age and with a certain degree of education). As a
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member of civil societ, it ends up transfering the political capital of individuals
seeking how to have some influence within Danish society, and is thus, effectively
inserted into the huge network of political and cultural relations that underpin the
Danish state, and which has a multitude of political and cultural organizations.
Therefore, it is possible to observe the use of political and cultural organizations
within a Danish sociability, which is seen as one of the basic underpinnings of the
liberal democracy in that country, and being that FOKUS-A is an institution whose
members are largely also Danish citizens (or even individuals living in Denmark, and
that eventually hope to be able to gain Danish citizenship) and whose main form of
communication is in Danish. Within such propositions, FOKUS-A also becomes part
of a multitude of political and cultural organizations that serve as one of the bases of
support of the Danish democracy, and in doing so, it also seeks to achieve the
advantages proposed by the Danish government to such organizations. So from now
on will be addressed the most bureaucratic and practical issues regarding the existence
of FOKUS-A.
To ensure its survival and the organization of its annual activities, which have
already been mentioned, the organization charges an annual membership of 125
DKK, an extremely low value, specially if one consideres the average income of the
Danish population, and the fact that all college or technical courses students with
citizenship or a residence permit in Denmark are entitled to a monthly stipend of
approximately 5,500 DKK.
If, for the monthly finance an average student, the weight of this contribution
is negligible, the political and social gain is significant, specially because it opens up
the opportunity of him/her to have access to a network that had around June of 2014
about 400 members. During the 4th Kurdish Film Festival, there was a possibility to
join the FOKUS-A, and the demand was very high, and I could observe a high
number of individuals (approximately around 50 individuals, according to a member
of the same I could ask) had become affiliated from June 2014 and February 2015,
including, among them, some which had been interviewed and/or which I talked
informally and that had expressed a desire to be affiliate to FOKUS-A in order to
have a higher responsibility in relation to the Kurdish cause in Denmark.
However, not all members of FOKUS-A participate in the elections or in the
activities organized by them. There are contributing members who are older than the
average age, and that keep up with the contribution as a way of supporting the
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institution that is formed by their children, grandchildren, nieces and nephews. There
are also members who for a while were active but which, for various reasons, can no
longer participate in the organization or in the meetings or in the deliberations, or
even, because they feel older than average, they decide to leave the organization for
younger people to lead, without, however, ceasing to contribute annually. In both
cases, the value of 125 DKK creates a possibility to keep a contribution that is not as
detrimental to the economy of each individual. There are members who contribute
monthly, without, however, having a constant participation in the activities and
decisions within the organization. There are a number of individuals who maintain an
active participation in decisions, without, however, craving to have a position of
prominence or a large decision power within the same.
And there is, at last, a number of individuals responsible for the fact that the
organization and which holds positions on the board and therefore have the power to
take decisions in relation to the direction of FOKUS-A. Such individuals are more
engaged within the organization, and were, those with whom I have had more contact
and with whom I could do a large part of my interviews, and it would also be the ones
who made possible my presence in my fieldwork amongst themselves.
Bureaucratically, FOKUS-A is formed by a board consisting of 10 individuals,
in which half is necessarily formed by women, according to its constitution. The equal
participation of women in decision-making has been a recent narrative in Kurdish
culture, but rather one who is held and celebrates by individuals who identify
themselves favourably towards the government in Rojava. With the change of
Ocalan's speech, there also arise a theory of power and gender's role in its political
construction. Abdullah Ocälan (2011) defines patriarchy, for instance, in such
manner:
Without the repression of women, the repression of society is
inconceivable. The mysoginy in society, in a nation-state,
while on the one hand gives maximum power to the man, on
the other, makes the woman the worst colony of all. Thus,
women are the colonial nation's historical society which has
reached its worst position within the nation-state. All power
and state ideology comes from attitudes and sexist behavior.
The enslavement of women is the social area is deeper and
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more disguised, where all kinds of slavery, oppression and
colonialism are held. Capitalism and the nation-state act in full
knowledge of such facts. No female slavery, none of the other
types of slavery can exist, or even, develop. Capitalism and
the nation-state denote the more institutionalized dominant
male. (ABDULLAH OCÄLAN, 2011, p.16-17)
Therefore, considering the influence that the writings and the political and
symbolic figure of Abdullah Ocälan have towards the Kurdish community, and in
places where supporters of his ideology could govern itself (in the cantons of Cizîrê,
Kobanî and Efrînê, in the current Syrian territory) and could build a system of
government based on aspects of the political theory put forward by Abdullah Ocälan,
women have a prominent representative role, where, for example, there is the
mandatory presence of a woman on all boards that are made up of three people. There
is also the presence of women fighters of the YPJ, a unit formed exclusively by them
and with the clash at Kobanî, began to gain prominence in the international media
narrative of the conflict. Thus, even within the official speech in which the FOKUS-A
affirms itself as not linked to a political party and to an ideology, it becomes clear, as
previously mentioned, the influence of the ideas of Abdullah Ocälan.
Thus, there is a narrative in which the Kurdish identity is merged with political
elements in which the role of women are considered as important as the men's. Added
to this, the fact that Denmark is also one of the countries with the greatest gender
equality in the world, according to World Economic Forum report. We,, therefore
have a Kurdish narrative and another Danish one who symbolically are seen as
equivalent within sectors of the Kurdish-Danish community, namely, the discourse on
gender equality. Furthermore, these narratives become extremely popular among
women who were raised in Denmark, and which shaped their Kurdish identities
within a Danish background. Thus, the equivalence of both Danish narratives as
Kurdish ones in relation to the role of women inspire FOKUS-A to seek to establish
itself as an organization that aims to have both men and women in their decision-
making council. Thus, FOKUS-A can also be seen as a group with strong ties to other
groups and left-wing parties, and at the same time it becomes relevant in the Kurdish-
Danish community.
Another relevant factor regarding FOKUS-A is the implicit factor that it an
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organization with a high change of members on its council, precisely because it is an
organization whose target audience are college students. That is, the search for new
members to continue their activities is an essential condition for the existence of
FOKUS-A in its current form; therefore, making sure that FOKUS-A is known to the
Kurdish-Danish community is also one of the most important factors within the
organization.
As was already mentioned before, when speaking about FOKUS-A activities,
one should also consider that a large part of their activities are related to maintaining
it as a relevant organization for the Kurdish-Danish community, and also there is a
need demonstrate to young Kurds that the organization would have a social role with
a political and cultural relevance, and also that the participation of such youth at
FOKUS-A is relevant within the Kurdish-Danish community, and also to the Kurdish
question. Therefore, the accession of new members becomes a constant agenda in the
meetings of the organization, and strategies to increase the participation of members
is a key factor for its existence. Members are elected to the board for a period of two
years, therefore, there is a constant change that makes new members estimulated at
being involved in it, if they wish to do so, and in the process of decision-making
position on the board the FOKUS-A.
Another important factor in the meetings and FOKUS-A's activities is the
language issue. The meetings and events that FOKUS-A organizes are in Danish.
Firstly, for a matter of necessity, since not all members of FOKUS-A are fluent in the
same Kurdish language, and some are not fluent in any Kurdish language at all, so
Danish ends up being the common language between them. A considerable part of
FOKUS-A members were born and grew up in Denmark being on the second or third
generation at Denmark, and whose knowledge of the language is not as prevalent as
that of their parents and grandparents. It must be noted that other Kurdish
organizations in Denmark communicate to the public in Kurmanji or Sorani, such as
the Fey-KURD, which is an organization explicitly pro-PKK (in the specific case of
such an organization, it often communicates in Kurmanji). Also, FOKUS-A has a
focus on activities which not only target the Kurdish-Danish community, but also the
Danish community in general, so the use of Danish allows for this articulation to
occur with ease.
Finally, there is an old FOKUS-A desire to keep groups in five regions of
Denmark. Currently, they have groups at Hillerød and Copenhagen at the Capital
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Region and one in the Central Region, at Horsens in Jylland.20Such a desire is
explained by the support that the FOKUS-A could claim from the Danish
government, as an youth organization with representation across the country.
Attempts to form branches of FOKUS-A at Aarhus, Odense and Aalborg were not the
fruitful, however, the desire still exists, as board members have confided to me. The
Kurdish community is very significant in cities such as Aarhus, Odense and Viborg,
and now there are several individuals on these cities who immigrate to Copenhagen to
study, and being so, have more contact with the political and activist center of the
Kurdish community in Denmark.
Therefore, at FOKUS-A there are many bureaucratic and institutional
instruments that allow it, at the same time, to position itself as a Kurdish organization
in a Danish bureaucratic context, while seeking to be located in relation to the Danish
population in an engaged manner, with regards to facts related to Kurdistan and the
Kurdish population, both culturally and politically. In addition, FOKUS-A strives to
be an organization focused on the younger Kurdish community, and thus, it seeks a
recognition within the Kurdish community as an organization whose actions are
relevant to the Kurdish cause and the political expression of a youth who almost
always have been raised in Danish soil, and which starts to build its identity as Kurds,
in a self-concious manner more recently.
20Since 2007, due to administrative reasons, Denmark was divided into 5 regions.
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Chapter V - Articulations of Kurdish identity across borders: an ethnographic
analysis of the Kurdish movement in Denmark.
The Kurdish community in Denmark has approximately 25,000 to 40,000
individuals. The exact number of individuals is difficult to be determined by the
official statistics, which shows the complexity of the political situation of Kurdistan
and of the Kurdish people. When they did immigrate or were accepted as refugees, the
Kurds were categorized by the Danish national state as coming from four distinct
nation-states: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and it is such state-affiliation that they are
seen within the local official statistics, this it is difficult to have a more accurate
picture of the Kurdish population living in Danish territory, unlike other ethnic groups
and nationalities. Regardless of the exact total, there exists a community which is
relatively large, especially when considering the size of the local population and the
number of non-Western immigrants living in the Nordic country, adding to that is the
fact that the Kurds are a community rather well-organized and well-articulated
politically, both in relation to Danish politics, and in relation to the Kurdish
population in diaspora within Europe.
This chapter will focus on the performative and symbolic elements of such
groups and individuals towards the local politics and the politics related to the
Kurdish question, both in Europe and in Kurdistan, focusing specially on the role that
the various flags and posters used by many activists and Kurdish protesters, in
addition to the objectives of the various groups to manifest themselves in various
locations in the Danish capital, and the role that these factors have on ethnic Kurds
and on the construction in Denmark.
i) Flags, ethnicity and the Kurdish identity construction: an analysis of the
Kurdish-Danish community.
During my fieldwork I could follow several Kurdish demonstrations in various
locations in the Danish capital. They have been organized by members of cultural
centers, local organizations, collectives, members of local political parties and
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Kurdish political parties, religious groups and they marked their presence through
audible and visual symbols, and by the presence of speeches, both by known figures
in the Kurdish local community as by non-Kurdish Danes, such as politicians,
academics, and militants.
If, anthropology can be understood as an interpretative discipline, in which, to
quote Clifford Geertz (1973), in one of his seminal works in the discipline, while he
shared his semiotic interpretation of social relations, like Max Weber before him for
whom "man is a beast suspended in webs of meaning that he himself wove", it is
necessary to understand these meanings and symbolism used by the Kurdish-Danish
community in order to deeply understand it. Therefore, to understand the various
ways in which the Kurdish community in Denmark is articulated and its performances
vis-a-vis both its members and its various organizations, and also vis-a-vis Danish
politics and its population, one should also understand the symbols used in various
forms and how they relate to the Kurdish cause, in order to understand the
performative role of such demonstrations. One of the issues that are rather obvious is
visual representation, through banners, posters, and flags.
First, it is necessary to understand the role that such a symbol - flags and the
its uses- carries both for the demarcation of ethnic boundaries, as in the construction
ethnic identities. Flags can be used both to represent nations (recognized by the
international community or not), political causes, religious causes, social causes,
affiliations sports entities, organizations both local and international, among others. In
addition, flags may also represent a code in order to signal actions or precautions to be
taken, such as the use of flags in railways, navigation or even advertising that an
specific beach is not safe
In addition, in many situations, flags represent more than a symbolic role.
Majundar, D.N. and Madan, T.N (1957) recount, for example, how villages in India
aused flags as a way to indicate a belonging to a certain group, and by extension, the
exclusion of individuals from other villages. Thus, if an individual, in this case, is part
of a certain village, he or she, therefore identify themselves as part of the group
represented by a flag, and therefore also identified as not belonging to any other group
represented by other flags.
For instance, the flag of a nation-state, such as the Brazilian flag represents a
people, a country and a community that identifies itself as belonging to such, and by
extension, it also symbolizes those who are not Brazilian, because they have another
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nationality or another ethnicity. Thus, the flag also becomes a visual symbol of an
imagined community, as defined by Benedict Anderson (2008) and, is therefore a
more discretionary symbol of a population that sees itself as a community. However,
there are cases that should be analyzed and problematized within a more complex
identity analysis. If, for Fredrik Barth (1969), ethnicity presupposes primarily a
membership related to ethnic boundaries rather than cultural elements, one has to
conclude that there are ethnic boundaries that are more likely to be symbolically
frictious than others. The use of a Brazilian flag, a Kurdish flag or an Armenian flag
in Turkish territory, for example, would be a symbolic element of three nationalities
or ethnic groups that do not see themselves as Turkish, however, there is a very big
difference between the 'not being Turkish' and 'being Brazilian', and the 'not being
Turkish' and being Armenian or Kurdish. If there are still various ethnic issues that
result in frictional elements between them, there are ethnic groups with ethnic
differences that do not cause them. The use of the Kurdish flag, or flags identified
with Kurdish ethnicity, have a very important symbolic role in the construction of the
Kurdish identity, and also in the Kurdish struggle for self-determination; as in, the use
of such a symbol (or symbols) are extremely important elements in understanding the
various manifestations of ethnic Kurds.
If, as, it was previously stated, the use of flags has many symbolic roles linked
to various forms of identity, through ethnic alliances to football clubs and gender
identities, countries are the element most commonly related to such a form of visual
expression. If there is one element that unites the various nations (recognized or not
by other nations) of the world, it is the virtually unanimous fact of them having their
own flags, and that becomes the visual element more easily identified with both the
political and bureaucratic apparatus of those countries as with the identity constructed
in relation to belonging to a nation. Within this context, an important analysis, is the
use of the national flag by Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Norway).
Despite the differences between the three nations, and a history of wars and
colonization of each other, the three nations have very similar elements together. The
three speak languages that are mutually comprehensible, the three are considered to
be descendants of the ancient Vikings, the three have very similar state structures,
through the welfare state this since the end of World War II. In any case, within the
three countries, the use of national flags assume very similar roles.
In Norway, Denmark and Sweden, the use of the national flag takes on a quite
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unique symbolic value, being constantly used as a decorative item in many homes
(JENKINS; ERIKSEN, 2007), and is used in many contexts which does not
necessarily would appeal to an ingrained nationalism, but with practices related to
family and social proximity. However, it is necessary to examine this further, in the
light of more recent historical events, especially regarding the increase of the number
of non-ethnic Scandinavian, specially those who are 'non-Western' to those countries
whose population customarily claims to be small and ethnically homogeneous. To
learn the relation of the use of flags within Scandinavia, and the sense implied by its
use, shall be, among others, a test used by the native members of these countries
towards the immigrant population regarding an attempt to "integrate" with the local
society (HERVIK, 2007). Thus, as exemplified by Orvar Löfgren (2007), the use of
the Swedish flag is as a way of demarcating identities between non-Swedes and
Swedes as well, non-ethnic Swedish groups also would use it as a way to assert
themselves as members of the local society. In the case of Denmark, in which the
"Dannebrog" is also treated as the flag of the people (JENKINS, 2006), and is used in
various public and private contexts, the use of the flag in such events related to the
Kurdish issue must be comprehended critically, in which there are individuals who
come to see themselves not only as Kurds or as Danes but at the same time as Kurdish
and Danish. 21
It is possible to extend this concept to other flags representing ethnic or
national groups. Flags, in certain contexts, have different meanings for different
groups. In the case of the Kurds, it is necessary to note two factors on the use of flags
by them. The first, is a historical desire to organize themselves as an independent
nation, a fact that has been frustrated several times throughout history, in which the
Kurds were seen as an ethnic group that had come to be a part of four national states
that did contemplate them. Thus, the Kurdish flag - whose story will still be discussed
and exposed - is for Kurds who use it not only an ethnic visual symbol, but also a
desire for power, as well as other nations and ethnic groups around the world have, to
21Peter Hervik (2007) analyzes the perception that the Danish society has of immigrants through a
dichotomy between "guest" and "host", in which a good "guest" is responsible to adapt the rules of the
house and its host, and so does not cause any inconvenience. Within this analysis it is possible to see
two detachable things. The first is 'family' as a core concept and as a guide to the relationships within
the Danish society, in which there is an expectation in which life should be comfortable and reliable;
and second, the idea that there will always incovenient guest who can not adapt to the local rules.
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organize within a nation state model. So when the Kurdish flag appears, it reflects the
past and present in a population, as well as symbolize a future goal for some of them
to organize into a Kurdish state.
To represent such ideas, the Kurdish flag is seen as an affront in the four states
containing Kurdistan (to various degrees). Thus, to the Turkish state, for example, the
use of the Kurdish flag (as well as other symbols related to Kurdish culture, such as
language) is a disagreement to an ideology that favors the Kurdish identity in relation
to a pan-Turkish identity, so its use becomes criminalized and persecuted in the same
way that the use of it by Kurds becomes a way to challenge such official persecution.
As well as the use of the Confederate flag in the US, the Kurdish flag is a cause of
friction among two populations present within the same political entity - the state of
Turkey - and due to such friction, the flag becomes a symbol with two different
meanings, but directly related.
There is also, within the Kurdish community in Denmark, the use of the
Kurdish flag in similar ways that the Danish-Danes use the Danish flag. The use of
the Kurdish flag (and the colors related to it), in Denmark, takes on a new perspective.
In photos of wedding, parties and anniversaries celebrated by Kurdish individuals,
one can see the Kurdish flag adorning cakes and often by the side of the Danish flag,
in a very similar way to what happens with the Danish flag for the Danish-Dane
population. That is, the use of the Kurdish flag (or other visual elements with its
colors) is used also within a sociability that is typically Danish-Dane and which also
reflects the fact that these individuals feel part of the local society, even if in many
cases this feeling is recent, and it is often a reflection of an attempt to bring the
Kurdish cause with the politics of Denmark, seen that Denmark is considered by
many Kurdish-Dane as a model state and society that could be adapted to the Kurdish
reality. Thus, the use of the Kurdish flag with the Danish flag, in the same way that
the Danish flag would be used, is a symbolic issue relevant to understand of the
meaning that the Kurdish flag has in a Kurdish-Danish context.
ii) Demonstrations and Danish politics between Denmark and Kurdistan:
banners, posters, flags and their symbolic roles.
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The various flags present at demonstrations had distinct roles. Let's start by
analysing the Danish national flag. Before interpreting the symbolic role of it at a
Kurdish protest, it is necessary to understand the role that the Danish flag has within
the general Danish society, as much as the most widely used national symbol, and the
most recognized one, as the expression of a Danish cultural, and that local people
recognize as being strictly local (or at best reflected in the other Scandinavian
countries).
The "Dannebrog", according to Richard Jenkins (2008), has a symbolism that
represents values shared by the Danes (and Scandinavians in general) and do not
necessarily relate to a patriotism, but with a typically local sociability, focused in an
egalitarian and communalist narrative that comes to symbolize "celebration and joy"
(Jenkins, 2007; 2008). The author identifies the flag being used at several occasions,
such as weddings, funerals, due to visits from someone from the royal family,
wedding cakes, a cascade of flags inside a shopping mall. My experience of
approximately one year in total living in Denmark for several periods of time I could
also see other uses of the national flag, as for birthdays, sporting events (especially
football games and handball), at Christmas trees in front of stores, supermarkets ads,
and of course, the official uses such as in the parliament, in the government buldings,
at state-owned castles, in official ceremonies related to the royal family.
Therefore, the Danish flag, at a Kurdish protest is a clear attempt to articulate
the Kurdish cause to the Danish society and Danish culture, while evoking the loyalty
from a non-Danish-Dane community to a state whose immigration policies tend to be
repressive, and where are an increasingly growing number of anti-immigration
narratives, both through an economistic discourse (in which the country would not be
able to absorb so many immigrants in their labor market), as within a culturalist
discourse, in which immigrants (read primarily immigrants from the Middle East and
Africa) would not be able to integrate into the way of life and to the Danish society as
both cultures (the Danish and immigrant culture, regardless of where he has
immigrated) would be inherently incompatible.
The use of the Danish flag is a symbolic act easily recognizable by the Danish
population, whose goal for the Kurdish-Danish community is to establish a bond
between them and Danish society at the same time the Kurdish-Danish community
maintains its ties with Kurdish culture and Kurdistan. Thus, there is an attempt to
articulate the actions in favor of a Kurdish identity with elements that are particular to
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Danish society. So, the protests are not only a Kurdish protest, but a Kurdish protest
in Denmark, with elements and factors unique to Danish culture, and which are
exclusive to the Kurdish population who lives or was born in Denmark.
The other flag that symbolizing an ethnicity, or even, a nationality, (even one
that does not have a nation-state) is the Kurdistan flag, or a flag that is considered by
the Kurdish population as symbolizing the territories of Kurdistan and Kurdish
identity, despite the many differences between the Kurdish regions. Formed by three
horizontal and parallel tracks, one red, one white, one green, with a sun with 21
points, such a flag, which is widely used and recognized as the flag of Kurdistan and
the Kurdish people, is forbidden in several contexts, such as in Turkey, Iran and also
inside Syria. This flag is also used as the official flag of the autonomous Kurdish
region in Iraq, which is governed by the Regional Government of Kurdistan.22
The first appearances of the current Kurdish flag occured in the 20s, being
markedly used at the peace conference in Paris, which, among other things, also
discussed a possible independence of Kurdistan (KURDISTANICA, 2008). The
Kurdish flag resembles two flags relevant to Kurdish history. The first was used by a
separatist movement called "Khoyboun" which means "freedom", and which would
result in the creation of shortlived Republic of Ararat. The second one was used
during the Kurdish Republic (also known as Mahabad Republic) in the forties, which
appeared in northwestern Iran with strong Soviet influence, and which was defeated
after a short period (EDMONDS, 1971). In both cases, the colors are similar (in the
first case, the order is reversed than current order) to the current Kurdish flag,
however, neither had the sun in the center. The first was a representation of Mount
Ararat, and the second, a central symbol of socialist inspiration (a torch with two
sheaves of wheat). In both cases, however, the current Kurdish flag, with the sun at
the center had also been used.
Such discourse can be contested through history, as well as much of the
narratives related to the creation and emergence of flags and national symbols,
however, this is not the goal of this work, but yet to understand how such a discourse
influences the symbolic representation of the universe around such individuals. The 22Officially, the Kurdish flag is still forbidden inside of Syria, but due to the civil war that raged the
country, much of the local legal apparatus is not currently used in practice. Within the three cantons
Kurds in the current Syrian territory, the flag is used commonly, as well as other flags that also refer to
Kurdish identity.
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truth or otherwise of narratives about national or on national traditions symbols has
already been analyzed, for example by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (2010).
The British authors assert that the historicity of these events is less relevant than the
perception that people have of them, being that those narratives are essential in
creating an ethnic and national identity.
In most cases, national symbolic narratives are perfectly able to sustain
themselves regardless of the existence of clear historical evidence for their narratives,
as those stories often resonate within an ethnic and/or national group as they are able
to symbolize relevant national or ethnic elements. In the Kurdish case, the colors of
the Kurdish flag evoke a history of resistance and struggle for self-determination and
a nationalist cause, while not forgeting its past, with references to the martyrs and to
pre-Islamic religions, nor its present, with portraits of an Yazidi symbol and of
Kurdistan landscapes. It also references its future when it deals with a desire for peace
and freedom for the Kurdish population. Thus, the flag of Kurdistan and the Kurdish
people and their colors are a perennial testament to traditions, to present struggles,
and a desired future for an ethnic group whose territory is divided between various
national political territories, and that despite it, it still maintains its own ethnic
identity. The fact that such an interpretation arise or not when the flag comes up, or
even that the colors and elements within the Kurdisf flags have had other meanings
within Kurdish culture through the years matters less than the fact that the current
narrative is extremely publicized and reproduced by the Kurdish community.
Therefore, the use of the Kurdish flag in the events that I witnessed inside
Denmark symbolized a sign of kinship to a distinct ethnic identity to other Middle
Eastern ethnicities present in the Danish society, as well as it symbolizes membership
to an ethnic group that many times has had his identity suppressed in various nation-
states. In such a manner, the Kurdish flag is at the same time an identifying marker
serving two main purposes. The first is to mark the Kurdish community as a distinct
community within the population of non-Danish background in Denmark, and the
second is to reaffirm their belonging to their ethnic identity to their own ethnic group.
The first is a public demonstration that serves both as a way to demonstrate
that the Kurds are a completely different population of any other immigrant group
present in Europe, something which is also emphasized by the public use of Kurdish
language (especially the Kurmanji), Kurdish costumes (the uniform of former
Peshmerga and former guerrillas is quite a common sight), Kurdish music, and also
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through the use of the flag and its colors in different situations. The second purpose is
a performatic pride stepped into ethnic belonging to an imagined community of
Kurds. The pride is expressed in all aspects of Kurdish culture (aspects that are
symbolized in the flag), as the struggle for self-determination, for freedom, the pride
of the ancient historical narrative, geography pride of Kurdish landscapes, culinary
elements, the languages, music, literature, among others which are at the fore of those
public displays of Kurdish ethnicity. Thus, the Kurdish flag takes on a role in which it
is a common element, and therefore easily identifiable by the Kurdish-Danish
population and which symbolizes the ethnic loyalty of such individuals towards the
Kurdish population and Kurdistan. Therefore, the flag is, in addition to a symbol that
invokes a desire for ethnic recognition by the world, it is a symbol of prideness for
being Kurds.
Another fairly common flag which often appears at demonstrations and also at
several social networks of various members of the Kurdish-Danish population is the
flag of the Rojavâ region, which lies in the north of Syria and that currently, due to
the civil war that destroyed the country, is a region with a de facto self-ruler since late
2013, although there are no recognition of this situation by the Syrian central
government or the international community. Composed of three non-contiguous
regions, and still at war with the extremist group ISIS, with the conflict in the town of
Kobanî, at the eponymous canton, being the example which is more easily
recognizable in such a confrontation, with the attacks by ISIS and the resistance of the
Kurdish guerrillas being often the subject of several media narratives.
During such resistance, the situation had reached critical moments, with
stories of guerrillas soldiers preferring suicide to being caught as hostage by Daesh
militants, besides that, images with destruction that befell upon the city becames an
event that happened to mobilize the Kurdish community around Europe. Also it is
necessary to highlight the extremely relevant role of the media on covering such a
resistance, with the great prominence of guerrilla stories of YPG/YPJ (the Kurdish
resistance armies, with the latter being formed only by women) having featured in
publications such as the Guardian and the New York Times, and many others,
including media outlets in Denmark. This event put the Kurdis under the spotlight as
the people responsible for the resistance to attacks made by fundamentalist groups
that shocked the world with reports of its several brutal crimes; that is, in the eyes of
much of the Western media, the Kurds in Kobanî would take a positive and proactive
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role in the resistance narrative of the Islamic State. And it is in this role that the
Kurdish community also seeks to articulate the national politics of the various
countries in which the diaspora that are present, in an attempt to gain the support for
their combatants in Kurdistan.
So in two of the demonstrations that I could attend, in addition to seeing
photographs from some demonstrations that I could not, I could notice the constant
presence of the Rojava flag, which is composed of three horizontal stripes in yellow,
red and green. Said flag is also the to represent the political coalition responsible for
the government of the autonomous part of Syrian Kurdistan, and is, therefore, used to
represent the three Kurdish cantons in the current territory of Syria.
Formed by various Kurdish and non-Kurdish political parties and also by
Kurds and non-Kurds alike, the government of Rojavâ uses various political precepts
which are put forward by Abdullah Ocälan, such as inclusive democracy, greater
participation of women in the political life, as well as using the economic means as a
way to benefit the whole community, and also a form of government that is inclusive
of the various minorities present in the three cantons, and not only to the Kurds.
Which makes the political situation in Rojavâ have the sympathy of many groups of
the extreme left from all over the world due to the form of government and their
military resistance to a group of fascist inspiration (ISIS). Aware of such an appeal,
Kurdish individuals in Denmark seek to articulate themselves with leftist parties and
organizations.
Within such a context, Kurdish-Danish individuals bring the flag of Rojavâ for
demonstrations as a way to symbolize their resistance to the attacks made from ISIS,
along with a form of government that evokes tolerance and equality, therefore
bringing the flag means a narrative in which those values interconnect with the
Kurdish ethnic narrative and, for many people I could talk to, both formally and
informally, the flag of Rojavâ was a visual representation of what they expect could
be a relevant Kurdish contribution to the international community.
In addition, the use of Rojava flag becomes a way of exalting the Kurdish
resistance, as the military campaign at Kobanî had the participation from different
regions of Kurdistan who came to help during the siege. The flag, thus, also
symbolizes a recent historical event which illustrates an idea of a Kurdish resistance
across borders, which further strengthens the idea that there is a historical Kurdistan,
even if this territory is being occupied by other national states.
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Therefore the flag of Rojava, alongside having the colors that are also present
in the flag of Kurdistan, and whose colors are constantly used in several Kurdish
contexts (SHEYHOLISMANI, 2007) symbolizes the Kurdish ability to maintain a
territory under their control, while the country that this territory belongs is falling
apart in a civil war. In addition, Rojava, as a territory which happens to apply part of
the teachings proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, retains a very important symbolism for
much of the Kurdish community, both in Kurdistan and in the Diaspora. Thus, Rojava
and its resistance means the practical possibility that much of the propositions
proposed by the main Kurdish leader can be applied in the real world; Rojava means
that much of what the PKK today, discursively, proposes is a possibility. The use of
the flag of Rojava (which itself represents the union of several Syrian-Kurdish and
non-Kurdish parties) means that desire to create a form of government with Kurdish
origin, in a Kurdish area is not only a theoretical abstraction, but rather an empirical
possibility. The use of this flag in a demonstration by the Kurdish-Danish community
in Copenhagen, is for many people in such a community that a freedom for the
Kurdish people is a possible goal and which should be seen by the Kurds in Diaspora
as a goal to be achieved.
Other extremely common flags are flags and banners related to the PKK and
its leader Abdullah Ocälan, or to other martyrs killed in the guerrilla war against the
Turkish state, which serves to mark a political position towards Turkish domestic
politics, while serving to inform the members of the Kurdish-Danish community of
the political position of such individuals. Another reason is the visual and symbolic
affirmation of loyalty to a political group which is considered a terrorist organization
by most of the EU countries, and in Denmark, has been linked to a very peculiar case,
the cancellation of the broadcasting license of a Kurdish channel called ROJ-TV.
ROJ-TV is a TV channel connected to the PKK (both politically and
financially) is a Kurdish television channel which initially operated from Belgium but,
after being banned from operating within the Belgian territory, moved to Denmark in
2004 where it continued its work. However, due to political and diplomatic issues
related to the relationship between the Danish government and the Turkish
government, Ankara has repeatedly maneuvered for it to be put into lawlessness in
Denmark, and the Kurdish TV channel has suffered a few defeats in local courts,
although still remaining operational. A Danish court ruled against ROJ-TV in 2012,
following a complaint made by the local prosecutor in 2010, as being guilty of
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promoting terrorist practices due to the content of their reporting and its editorial line,
and ordered it to pay a fine of 5,2 million DKK. Apart from political pressures made
officially by the Turkish government, there is also the extraofficial diplomatic
pressure which would later become clear via Wikileaks.23
Among the thousands of documents leaked by Wikileaks (THE GUARDIAN,
2010), in one of them it contained an agreement that would have been done together
between the American president, the Turkish government and the Danish government,
in which Ankara would withdraw its objections to the appointment of Andreas Fogh
Rasmussen, former Danish Prime Minister as Secretary General of NATO, and in
return, the Danish government would continue the ban on ROJ-TV operations from its
territory. So the whole question regarding ROJ-TV, which by the time it was present
in the Danish media made the whole question be easily associated by the public with
the local Kurdish community, making PKK flags and parties related to the PKK and
the pictures of Abdullah Ocälan represent both a political identification with his ideas,
as well as an ethnic identity in opposition, mainly to the Turkish government and
state, but also a way to position themselves to what had been seen by a considerable
part of the Kurdish-Danish community as an injustice, and in addition, as an attack on
the freedom of the press and opinion in Denmark. Thus, the flag of the PKK in other
European countries would symbolize a political project and a distinct ethnic identity
of the Turkish state in Denmark also would mean choosing a position on a case that
had been relevant within the Danish political narrative.24
Other flags and banners that also appear to a lesser extent, but that deserve to
be noticed, are the ones from Kurdish-Iranian, Kurdish-Iraqis and Kurdish-Syrians
political with connections or inspired by the ideology of the PKK. As a considerable
part of the Kurdish population in Denmark comes from Turkish-Kurdistan origin, as
well as Turkey being a part of NATO, the elements that reference the Kurdish issues
in Turkey in many cases, tend to have a prevalence compared to other regions, with
the exception of the Rojava flag. The presence of YPG/YPJ flags (militias organized
in Kurdistan in Syria), PJAK (a political party in Kurdistan in Iran inspired by the 23ROJ-TV is legally banned in Turkish territory, and also in Germany. However, as ROJ-TV also has a
website to broadcast their content online, to watch this channel in those countries is not an
impossibility for anyone who has the interest to. 24Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250705 Accessed in May,
26 of 2015.
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PKK), KDP (the political party that holds power in Kurdistan in Iraq) or other smaller
Kurdish parties within any part of Kurdistan. Such banners and flags thus serve to
show situations related to experiences of Kurdish individuals who tend to differ in
relation to most of the Kurdish community in Denmark that is more invested in
Turkish-Kurdistan and its issues. That is, there are a number of individuals who want
Kurdish causes that most relate to their realities or of their ancestors to be constantly
remembered in the Kurdish-Danish community.25
iii) Posters, use of images and different languages: an ethnographic analysis of
Kurdish demonstrations in Copenhagen
There is also a large part of the demonstrations that I could witness and
participate, the presence of several posters with slogans, condemning or expressing
support and sympathy to the Kurdish cause. Such posters were written in different
languages such as English, Danish, Kurmanji, Sorani, and even Arabic, Persian and
Turkish.
The use of English is a very clear attempt to articulate the Kurdish cause that
is the subject of the demonstration within an internationalist perspective, given the
widespread use of English as the closest there is to a lingua franca. Added to this, the
fact that such events constantly occur in places with a large presence of foreign
tourists and the fact that much of the local Danish population is fluent in English. The
use of Danish can be understood, of course, as an attempt of such immigrants and
their descendants in seeking to expose their demands vis-a-vis the Danish population
and at the same time that they place themselves as members of the Danish
'community' while at the same time still being Kurds.
The use of Kurdish languages, especially Kurmanji (and in some other cases,
the Sorani) is a demonstration both of belonging to a Kurdish identity that constantly
relates to the use of a Kurdish language and the prohibition of their use in states in 25In the Kurdish-Danish Culture Centre, the presence of the Kurdish question in Turkey takes a very
important symbolic role, with photos, posters and pamphlets of Abdullah Ocälan having a very
noticeable prominence. However, FOKUS-A tends to have a more holistic approach to Kurdistan, for
example.
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which Kurdistan is contained, serves as a way that many Kurds, especially the
younger ones, use to position themselves as Kurds (therefore and especially as non-
Turks, but also non-Iranian, non-Syrian or non-Iraqi), and seek a relevant cultural
capital both in relation to other Kurds, both at their age group, and also their parents
and grandparents. To many, the use of Kurdish language was a way to go challenge
the state ethnic persecution, for the younger generation, that was born and raised in
Denmark, the learning and the use of Kurdish language is a way to reconnect both
with elements of their ethnic identity and, and to be taken more seriously by older
members of their community.
The use of non-Kurdish languages, which are not Danish and English, are
more rare, however they were observed during my period of fieldwork. First, there are
Kurdish people who do not give the same symbolic value for the use or the learning of
a Kurdish language as a way of building an identity as Kurdish. And secondly, there
are individuals whose ethnic identity construction as Kurds is a more recent
construction, and therefore they have not started to value the use of Kurdish language
as a way of creating an ethnic boundary between being Kurd and non-Kurd, or even,
their command of a Kurdish language is still rudimentar. And finally, there is also the
objective of using languages such as Turkish and Persian as a way to symbolically
challenge the governments and national states that in the Kurdish narrative are seen as
their oppressors, while using a language that would be understood by Turks or
Iranians connected to or who support the government of the two countries. Some of
my interlocutors, used posters in these languages, to manifest in front of the
embassies of those countries because, according to one of them, "so they will
understand us, because in Denmark one doesn't need to be afraid of them."
Therefore, the use of pictures and posters serve as a way to reify the suffering
of Kurds in the hands of the Islamic State, and hence engage the local Kurdish
community in various support networks against such terrorist group; it also acts as a
way to engage the Danish community, using a strongly oriented discourse aspect of
human rights, in addition to seeking an engagement with the Danish politics towards
the Kurdistan region, and finally, with the use of English, it also seeks a possible
internationalization of the Kurdish question, as well as a union of the Kurdish
population in diaspora in Europe and North America, given the role that English takes
a lingua franca.
In all the demonstrations that I have observed, relevant individuals within the
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Kurdish community as well as relevant individuals in the Danish population gave
speeches on matters related to the demonstration which was organized. In the first
demonstration that I could observe, the speeches were about the Kurdish culture and
the bravery of the peshmerga, and they were all in Kurmanji. In the second one, there
were speeches about the suffering of Abdullah Ocälan, and it had mostly only PKK
sympathizers, and much smaller than the other three demonstrations (around 50, in
contrast to the 350-400 people present in other events). In the third one, the biggest of
them all, and which occured during the siege of ISIS on the Yazidi population in
Shingâl (Sinjar), the speeches were delivered by members of various Kurdish
organizations, including FOKUS-A, as well as researchers and Danish-Dane
politicians. Politicians from parties as diverses as the aforementioned Enhedeslisten,
but also by members of the Social Democrats and the Conservatives attended and
gave talks about the situation in Kobanî. Politicians of Kurdish origin and the former
mayor of Copenhagen also appeared at such a manifestation. Out of the four
demonstrations, this one was the one which had the most sentimental tone, with a lot
of people crying while holding pictures of children and women who were martyred by
Daesh. This event was attended by several Danish media outlets as well as the
Kurdish-Danish media which also appeared in the first demonstration. In the fourth
event, it was also possible to observe a large presence of speeches given by influential
individuals within the Kurdish-Danish communities, including, again, another speech
made by the president of FOKUS-A, and again by figures known in Danish politics,
including Kurdish-Dane politicians, as well as posters and slogans against ISIS.
Therefore, there is a difference from the fourth to the third event, which was the
mobilization of the Kurdish community in seeking donations of clothing, money, and
food to be sent to the Yazidi refugee population. Therefore, if the third manifestation
occured as a form of protest, and to organize some sort of mourning to the massacre
of Yazidis committed by ISIS, the fourth demonstration was locally organized with
the goal of providing financial support to the Yazidi refugees. Thus, in the space of
two weeks, Kurdish-Danish organizations, human rights organizations, political
parties and religious institutions also began to organize a concrete defense of this
population through donations, concurrently as they would fight for political support
by the Danish government, as well as bringing such a cause to the entire Danish
population through continuous dialogue in search of a narrative construction
portraited by the media.
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In addition to posters with demands, a very common occurrence, was the use
of photos of victims of the attacks made by Daesh, especially of children, women and
elderly which were killed with cruelty. The use of such images, during a
demonstration which had a very clear emotional tone, with speeches that often
brought many tears, using images of people who have suffered in the hands of those
terrorists had the role of bringing the suffering that occurred in the mountains of
Sinjâr, in Iraqi Kurdistan for a more concrete reality, in which the visual effect would
serve as a way to reach out to people who were thousands of kilometers away, in a
peaceful country, that there were humans beings going through such suffering, and
that most of these people were Kurds, members of a religion (Yazidi) linked to a
Kurdish historical narrative. The photos also brought a sense of urgency; urgency to
raise funds for refugees who managed to escape, and that help could be delivered to
the ones who still were in the mountains of Shingal without food and water, so there
was a discourse which asked the Danish population to support both humanitarian, and
military interventions to the Kurdish troops who were in direct confrontation with the
soldiers faithful to the Islamic State.
The individuals present in the demonstrations, therefore, saw it as an arena in
which different positions were being negotiated constantly. For the older generation
of political exiles, refugees or immigrants labourers who came invited in the 1970s,
such events are a continuation of their political action against the oppression within
the states where they came from (mostly Turkey). To their descendants, such
manifestations are arenas in which their identity as Kurds is reified in relation to a
Danish sociability. In many cases, to many young people and adolescents that have
been raised in Denmark, and therefore have a more distant relationship with the idea
of Kurdistan (despite not having a distant relationship to the idea of being Kurds), the
demonstrations in public spaces are important locus for the constant reinterpretation
of such individuals and their Kurdish identity, both within the Kurdish-Danish
community, and within the Kurdish population in general. It is in these areas where
there is a dialogue between the various political positions, the various specific
realities of the Kurdish-Danish community, the various linguistic realities, and the
different experiences of the same. It is in these spaces that the Kurdish-Danish
community has a public performance of itself as more Kurdish than Danish. The
demonstrations are, for example, an opportunity in which one of my interlocutors told
me that they use to practice using a Kurdish languages.
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In the demonstrations there is also a very significant presence of children and
teenagers, which carry their own posters and their flags and their own attire in the
Kurdish colours, for such individuals those are one of the first places outside their
family environment in which their identities as Kurds in Denmark, or as Kurdish-
Danes is shared with a large number of people and performed in public. They are also
places where they learn gradually about the meaning of being a Kurdish from siblings,
parents, relatives, family friends; those public demonstrations are privileged arenas of
cultural exchanges, even to an younger population, such moments are fundamental in
the construction of their identity as Kurds. Those are environments in which the idea
of a imagined Kurdish community becomes concrete.Esmer, the president of FOKUS-
A told me in an interview, that since her childhood her parents would bring her to
major demonstrations in Copenhagen, when they would come from the north of
Jutland, on a bus that was crowdfunded by them and other Kurds. Such
manifestations, for her and for many other members of the Kurdish-Danish
community are a commonplace activity in which they participate from a young, and
that, with time, starts being understood in a more complete and complex way by its
participants. Thus, it can be said that being Kurdish is a constant construction, it is in
the demonstrations that this idea is built publicly, in prime locations in the Danish
capital, and is shared by a large number of Kurdish people.
In addition, the various events organized by the Kurdish-Danish community
have a very significant aspect within it, because they are occasions in which the
Kurdish-Danish community comes to see its own collective organization, and they
also serve as a prime arena for Kurdish sociability in a Danish environment, in which
political discussions are fought, objectives are drawn, alliances are renewed, and
children are educated within the Kurdish culture. If the demonstrations are not the
only ways to achieve these goals, they are one of the few places and occasions in
which all of those aspects converge.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This ethnography sought to describe the interactions that occurred and cultural
events within the Kurdish-Danish community, centered especially in the city of
Copenhagen. Aspects such as Kurdish immigration to Denmark, the construction of
an identity in a Danish context, in addition to a chapter speciffically about FOKUS-
A, a Kurdish student organization, and finally, an analysis of the demonstrations, and
the visual symbols on it.
After analyzing and examining such aspects through anthropological theories,
which themselves are the result of over a century of the discipline's history, a
discipline in which, the author aims to also give his contribution through this work.
However, one has to say that the period of time in which I could make my fieldwork
wass not a period with any arbitrary historical markers within the Kurdish-Danish
community, but it was an arbitrary date set by the anthropologist (as often is with
ethnographies) instead of a significant dates to the community which had been
studied. If issues of many individuals past and collective marks were addressed in my
work, the future, and all interactions, and their social and cultural reinterpretations
continue, for obvious reasons, unable to be analyzed, and that is a fault I believe to be
shared with all ethnographers. People's history is a much like a river, a river which we
cannot be always present at.
However, there are current issues that can and will most likely influence the
future of Kurdish-Danish community, and those issues, among other things, relate to
the four themes that I approached throughout my dissertation. During the completion
of such work, it will be exposed the ways in which events in Kurdistan, in Denmark
and in the states containing Kurdistan ontinue to affect the community and modify the
sociability of the people with which I conducted such an ethnographic work; also
there will be shown how some topics discussed throughout this thesis might relate
with possible perspectives for the Kurdish-Danish community, and at the same time
pointing to future developments within the discipline.
i) The Kurdish-Danish community: their expression and political and cultural
articulations in movement.
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During my fieldwork period, which lasted around five months (three in 2014
and two in 2015), I observed many aspects of the Kurdish-Danish community, and I
could observe, in loco, two extremely different times. The first, at the beginning of
my ethnographic work was Kurdish demonstration which occurred prior to the fights
at Kobanî and Shingâl, and the second one were the demonstrations which happened
after these events. They portraited the various ways in which the Kurdish-Danish
community would seek to articulate, at times, only with its Kurdish aspect, and at
others, their Kurdish aspect in line with its Danish aspect in an attempt to influence
local politics, while at the same reaffirm their Kurdish identity while they created a
dialogue in relation to their culture and their position in the country.
Such articulations are subject to various events that are beyond the control of
the Kurdish-Danish community, even though, it has an active agency in the
construction of the narratives around said events. The Kurdish-Danish community is a
highly organized politically, and that organization is also reflected towards the Danish
politics. Several politicians of Kurdish origin are candidates for national and regional
parliaments as for city councils, and during the period of writing this dissertation,
some of them were in active political campaign, participating in debates and exposing
positions that deal with issues related to local politics, the Kurdish-Danish
community, and also the Danish society. Positions in relation to changes in the time
required for retirement, investments in weapons for the armed forces, and the
privatization of a power supply company are guidelines present in the Danish political
discourse, and guidelines also present in the campaign of politicians of Kurdish origin
to the local parliament, while the Kurdish-Danish community, as residents and the
vast majority of cases, Danish citizens, are invested in these issues for the same
reasons that the rest of the Danish population would also be.
However, there are some positions that are especially relevant to the Kurdish-
Danish population, such political relations with Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria; the
humanitarian and military aids to Kurdish groups in Kurdistan, as well as asylum
policy to the Kurdish population that is under the threat of ISIS, especially the Yazidi.
Also, among the Kurdish-Danish politicians, it is expected by the Kurdish community
that they have opinions on, for example, HDP, a party in Turkey with a strong
presence of the Kurdish people and great political influence of the ideology of PKK
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and political theory of Abdullah Ocälan. Such politicians must think both in their non-
Kurdish constituents and their constituents in the Kurdish-Danish community, which
customarily is the place in which they begin their first political articulations as well as
being the place in which they still have ties with family and friends, and the place
where they come from.
In addition to the Kurdish-Danish politicians, it is necessary to note the work
of Danish politicians toward sector of the Danish population. In two of the events that
I could follow, politicians had the opportunity to give some speeches, and they were
from distinct parties in the political spectrum, members of both the "blue block" and
the "red block", which points to a possible nationalization of the the Kurdish question
in the Danish political discourse. In a democracy, in which every vote is important
(especially in a country with 5.5 million inhabitants), and with the massive presence
of elements related to the Kurdish population in the local media, especially in the
summer of 2014, meant that several politicians were forced to taking a positionin in
relation to the Middle East foreign policy that relates to Kurdistan, regardless of their
political stance, is an important factor for the local elections that would take place in
June of 2015.
Despite the very significant articulation made by extreme left-wing
Enhedeslisten, from the leftist Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) with
the Kurdish-Danish community (especially younger), there is still room for more
parties from the center and right in the political spectrum. One of my interviewees, a
male, who was about thirty-five years old, and with a son, confessed to me to have
voted for a liberal right-wing party in the last elections, despite always being a leftist
voter before. His age and his fatherhood, according to him, changed his political
perspective. So if there is a large space for political articulation of progressive leftist
parties and the Kurdish-Danish community, especially because of an ideological
confluence, also there is a space for other political parties to do the same. This space
is still something that can be developed more clearly over time, and which would
demonstrate the constant modification of the various forms of articulation within the
Kurdish-Danish community. A possible analysis had been proposed by Diane E. King
(2005) to address the concept of patronage to analyze the Kurdish immigration to
Europe. By analyzing the Kurdish immigration, especially of Iraqi Kurdistan, the
author presents a clear articulation of Kurdish cultural and political elements within
European countries.
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There is in the Kurdish-Danish community, different internal political
positions in relation to Kurdistan. In particular, it had been possible to interview
individuals who, for example, voiced a strong criticism of PKK and Abdullah Ocälan,
and others who had only praise for both, at the same time I could see individuals with
different perspectives on the engagement of various political parties with the Kurdish
cause, ranging from a thanking stance and mutual support through a more pragmatic
view, while some expressed a disbelief in relation to the reasons for such an approach.
Such perspectives are constantly changing as analyzed by Martin Van Bruinessen
(2015), and with the national elections in Denmark approaching, and according to the
geopolitics of Kurdistan, it may alter the way in which different individuals and
groups, engage with Danish local politics, and with Danish politicians (Kurds or not).
In addition to internal political issues, other external factors, constantly
changing, they are mobilizing the Kurdish-Danish community, and serve to strengthen
the transnational ties of the Kurdish community in the diaspora with the Kurdish
community in Kurdistan. Two recent events that have occurred this year are
significant about this issue, and deserve to be examined more thoroughly.
The first are the elections in Turkey, and the consequences of it to the Kurdish
community, and to Kurdistan under Turkish control; and the second was the suicide of
a Kurdish girl in Iranian-Kurdistan after it refused attempts of harassment by an
officer from he Iranian government, and due to his insistance, ends up throwing
herself from the hotel window in which she worked.
The first situation, namely the elections in Turkey, involving not only the
Kurdish community in Turkish territory, but also other minorities in the country, and
of course, the Turkish population. In the case of the Kurdish-Danish population,
demonstrations pro-HDP are quite significant, judging by the events in favor of the
party organized by various Kurdish organizations, or by the number of events that
some politicians and Kurdish-Danish journalists participate. To understand such a
move, one needs to understand the importance and the involvement of HDP in the
Kurdish cause, in addition to its possible role in Turkish politics, specially if it reaches
the required number of votes in order to elect representatives in the Turkish
parliament (which in Turkey is 10%).26
26HDP, which is an acronym for "Halklarin Demokratik Partisi", which means "Democratic Party of
the People" in Turkish. The same in Kurdish (Kurmanji) would be "PDG" (Partiya Demokratik a
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First, Turkey has a very high clause for parties to be represented in the
national parliament, with 10%, which prevents the parliament from having a high
number of parties present. This particular situation makes it so that local parties would
seek to appeal to the largest possible number of voters within a common platform. In
the case of HDP, the party rallied support from diverse ethnic and religious
minorities, as well as feminist and LGBT community groups, along with a support of
the Kurdish community, especially the Kurdish population that sympathizes with
current ideas of the PKK.
With policies such as the use of two party leaders, which are necessarily a man
and a woman, a quota of 50% for women and a quota of 10% for LGBT candidates.
Led by Selahatinn Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, being the first one Kurdish,
making him a figure relevant to the Kurdish-Danish community. The party comes up
with the union of the different candidates and leftist politicians who would be elected
independently, the party has a socialist plataform and is highly critical of capitalism
and imperialism. All these features are, therefore, similar the new political direction
taken by the PKK and Abdullah Ocälan27
So there is a political affinity which is strong and relevant among the Kurdish
community of Denmark and the HDP. This affinity can be clearly observed in the
approach, for example, between Dermitas and Ocälan, being that first visited the
second on more than one occasion in his prison cell. For a considerable part of the
Kurdish community in Turkey, the presence of HDP in the elections held in June, is
the possibility of greater political representation, and that would translate into a loss
of power on the part of Erdogan and his party, the AKP.
While representing different sectors of the Turkish population who are not
covered by the current political actions of the government trying to be re-elected and
with a position that calls for part of the population who protested in Gezi in 2013
(such protest was well-perceived by the party, and the police repression to it was
heavily criticized by it), being that the protests at Gezi Park were being chronicled
extensively in the international media. An article written and published by Firat
Bozcali and Cagri Yoltar (2013), in which the authors analyze the relationship
Gezan). In this case, I choose to use the initials in Turkish, because that's how the party is referred to
both in the international media, as by the Kurdish community in Turkey as in Denmark. 27And also with Enhedeslisten.
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between the various political actors present in it gives us a clearer picture of the
situation. Thus, such a political movement, which is ideologically leftist, led by HDP,
positions the Kurdish population with a very defined political role, as in, being the
opposition to the growing authoritarianism taken over by Erdogan, and a leading role
within the narrative of being an opposition to the current Turkish government. Along
with the Kurdish role in the resistance against ISIS, and the forms of government
applied by the autonomous government of Rojava, there is a clear attempt by sectors
of the Kurdish community (both in Kurdistan and in diaspora) in claiming the Kurdish
identity as a connected political identity to typically leftist ideas.
In the case of the Kurdish-Danish community, this factor had been analyzed
previously, and one of the ways that such articulation is reflected, are the elections in
Turkey, and the support by many Kurds to HDP. Several Facebook pages related to
the cause, the culture and the Kurdish community in Denmark, groups related to it,
and personal profiles of Kurdish individuals discuss the elections in Turkey, and the
role that HDP has. The local Kurdish community extensively encouraged those who
still have Turkish nationality to go vote for HDP, since opinion polls estimate that the
elections would be very tight for HDP to meet the threshold. Attacks organized by
AKP supporters or other Turkish parties and the Turkish state aimed at HDP
supporters and activists resonated widely in the Kurdish-Danish community with
news and matters relating to such events being shared and interpreted within the
context of the conflict that stretches for decades between organized Kurdish groups
and the Turkish government, and they thus tend to mobilize a large number of
individuals in Kurdish-Danish community. Thus, different elements in Turkish-
Kurdistan(located in Turkey) and in Turkey itself continue to influence the various
political elements within the Kurdish-Danish community.
With elections taking place on June 7th, the result turned out to be positive for
HDP and its supporters, both inside and outside Turkey. By managing to assess 13.1%
of the votes, therefore surpassing the electoral coefficient (which as was mentioned
above is 10%), HDP got 80 seats in the Turkish parliament, being the first time in
history that a Kurdish party (or one who is openly pro-Kurdish cause) is elected to the
Turkish parliament. With the election of HDP, and the consequent loss of votes on
Erdogan's party (AKP), it was also possible to see an increase in the number of
women in parliament, the presence of candidates from the Yazidi religion, Armenians,
and LGBT politicians. Mostly anywhere in the world (and also in Turkey) the politics
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of a party with the same platform as HDP would be seen as a platform associated with
left-wing and progressive values.
In Denmark, HDP was the second largest party with 36.82% of the total votes,
only slightly behind AKP with 42.1% (JYIAN.DK, 2015). Such significant numbers
of pro-HDP voters and its relationship to the elections in Turkey demonstrate how
organized the campaign for the HDP was in the country, being taken over by various
sectors of the civil society in the Kurdish-Danish community. Organizations such as
the Fey-Kurd, FOKUS-A, Jyian.dk, The Kurdish-Danish Cultural Center, and also
Enhedeslisten, all supported the HDP and played an active role in its political
articulation during the campaign for the Turkish election.
In the case of Kurds, both in Turkey and in diaspora, it is possible to identify
an increase in the tendency for them to associate with values more identified with the
left, and with more progressive social values and the Kurdish-Danish community
followed the trend. For example, various interviews conducted with members of
FOKUS-A could show that. As such identification affects and will continue to affect
the Kurdish-Danish community is a very important issue to think about regarding
their future. What role the Kurdish-Danish community will have, both vis-a-vis the
Danish population, and also compared to the Kurdish population, both in diaspora and
in Kurdistan; and furthermore, how will the Kurdish-Danes articulate their ethnic
identities and their political perspectives? Such questions are increasingly relevant,
especially with the changes in the political situation in Turkey and also in Rojava, in
addition to the growing independence of the Kurdish government in Iraq.
The other issue mentioned earlier that involved different sectors of the
Kurdish-Danish community is what happened in Iranian-Kurdistan. In a town that was
largely Kurdish, an official from the Iranian government, while staying at a hotel,
tried to abuse a worker of Kurdish origin. The woman, whose name was Ferinaz
Xosrawanî, resisted the advances, and throws herself from the window of her
workplace, dying as a result of the fall.
Such a tragic death, along with a political climate in which many Kurdish
activists have recently been sentenced to the gallows by Tehran has caused many
protests in the Kurdish areas; those protests were violently repressed by the Iranian
police, as usual. In Denmark, the Danish-Kurdish community was organized through
demonstrations both in the Danish capital, in central places such as in front of the
parliament or Rådhuspladsen, but also in front of the Iranian embassy.
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Such demonstrations usually are organized by FOKUS-A, and are customarily
smaller than the demonstrations occurring in more central locations in the capital.
However, demonstrations of support in this case were much larger than the
demonstrations that occur in front of Iranian Embassy usually are. First, the events in
the summer of 2014 still echo within the Kurdish-Danish community. The Kurds in
Denmark are still a political, social and culturally articulated people. And secondly,
the symbolism of the act that caused the commotion was quite large. A Kurdish
woman who sacrificed herself to not be raped (and therefore was able to keep her
pride until the very end) by an Iranian government agent, is present in several
narratives within Kurdish community.
The attacks perpetrated by Islamic State against the Yazidi women, in which
they were systematically raped, the struggle of YPJ female soliders against the same
extremist group are all recent events that evoke, symbolically, what occurred in
Kurdistan in Iran. In addition, the symbolic strength of a rape narrative, in which
Kurds in Kurdistan, are constantly subjected to humiliation in four states different
nations, and the sacrifice of the armed struggle is for many, the most acceptable
option in favor of the cultural independence of the Kurdish population in general.
Thus, the sacrifice of a young woman also evokes the historicity of the Kurdish
resistance, in which one's life becomes secondary to the liberation of the Kurdish
people.
And through such articulations (the first in relation to the elections in Turkey
and support for the HDP, and the second as a protest over the death of a young
Kurdish woman in Iran) that elements already discussed above, related to sociability,
and the social capital of several individuals are constantly negotiated within the
Kurdish-Danish community. That is, it is important to realize that despite the
delimited time of this ethnography, movements characterized and described by it
continue to occur, and situations that make the Kurdish-Danish community to
mobilize in relation, both to itself as the Danish state are constant, causing the
Kurdish-Danish community to be constantly changing, both in relation to itself and in
relation to Denmark, and also in relation to the Kurdish question.
The two examples are extremely significant for another very important reason.
It is possible to analyze the circumstances that make the Kurdish-Danish community
to remain cohesive continue to manifest themselves in various ways, in other words,
there are always new narratives shared by Kurdish-Danish community that maintain a
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sense of community and a shared ethnic identity between the various individuals who
recognize themselves as Kurds. Such articulations are easily observable, for example,
through the performance of many Kurdish people through social networks like
Facebook and Twitter.
There are always new elements in the narratives related to ethnic Kurds who
serve as factors, that, when used in the Kurdish-Danish community (and in this aspect,
a Weberian view of the concept of charisma, plus an analysis of cultural and social
capital through Bourdieu might help explain why some individuals exercise
prominent positions within such a community) are reinterpreted and introduce new
elements within the same narrative, while at the same time new factors are also
associated with it. As the Kurdish-Danish community is composed of individuals
from different generations (both immigrants and their descendants), the importance of
a recent narrative has to constitute a Kurdish ethnic identity is an important factor in
understanding the dynamics between the various individuals who are a part of it, and
also the role that various narratives related to Kurdish identity have within the
Kurdish-Danish community. Thus, there will always be events related to Kurdish
ethnicity and the Kurdish question which are fundamental, both in the constant
political organization of the Kurdish community in diaspora (including, of course, the
Kurdish-Danish community) and for ethnic and identity construction of younger
individuals, and which only recently entered adulthood.
Those younger individuals, when faced with recent narrative which relates to
the Kurdish transnational community, and with the most present responsibilities of
their adulthood, tend to take for themselves a role (or part thereof) regarding the
Kurdish cause . It is in this context that organizations focused on young adults, such
as the aforementioned FOKUS-A, become relevant within the Kurdish-Danish
community, with role of bringing and integrating new individuals within a political
and identitary context linked to a idea of Kurdish ethnicity. Apart from such
individuals being in a different situation considering Danish politics than their parents
and grandparents.
And it is within this context that another factor within anthropological theory
can also be highlighted and analyzed, and whose possible links are possible will most
likely still continue to influence the Kurdish-Danish community in the future.
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ii) The social drama and the Kurdish ethnicity: Prospects for a community in
constant construction.
There are some elements observed during my fieldwork that should continue
after the completion of this thesis. One of these elements, which had been discussed
earlier, is the role that various manifestations, as well as trips to Kurdistan, have,
especially towards the younger population, as a rite of passage for a population that is
largely second or third generation Kurdish in Denmark, and, therefore, have been
raised or even born in Denmark, and that unlike the population born in Kurdistan, has
not actively participated in a sociability within Kurdistan, or participated in the
various narratives related to Kurdish identity, in which they suffer oppression for
being Kurds in the various states containing the Kurdish territory, instead they hear
second or third-hand stories by older individuals, the media or through literature and
other forms of art. That is, there is a difference, which was already addressed,
between the experiences of individuals with experiences in Kurdistan and individuals
who do not have it.
Such individuals, whe taking an active part in the Kurdish-Danish community,
and when they have an involvement in the Kurdish question, seek to reduce this
difference through various symbolic elements related to Kurdish identity, history,
culture, language. Those are individuals who seek to learn a language, to have a
political or cultural engagement with the Kurdish cause through events and
demonstrations, and also to have an experience in Kurdistan. The search for a more
active role in the Kurdish-Danish community occurs on several occasions which
relate to the shared identity of being a Kurd. If, during the author's fieldwork, the
event that most mobilized the Kurdish-Danish community was the ISIS in Shingâl and
Kobanî, after the end of it, the two events mentioned above - the election in Turkey
and the uprising in Iran - were responsible for the mobilization of Kurdish-Danish
community.
The role that the events mentioned during my ethnography had in mobilizing
the Kurdish community have become quite obvious in many aspects. The increase in
the number of participants in the demonstrations, the increase in the presence of
individuals from outside of the Kurdish-Danish community, and also the increasing
number of individuals who, for example, became part of FOKUS-A, which had
146
become very clear during the Kurdish film festival. Thus, significant events had an
obvious role in the mobilization of young Kurdish-Danes. It is possible to conjecture
that the role that events that occurred after my fieldwork had to mobilize, within the
Kurdish-Danish community were also, in some respects, similar to the events narrated
in this dissertation.
Outro fator que fora analisado durante a etnografia do autor, e que passaria a
apontar novas direções para a comunidade curdo-dinamarquesa é a questão política
dentro da própria Dinamarca. Com um número considerável de candidatos de
ascendência curda concorrendo as eleições nacionais que ocorrerão no segundo
semestre de 2015, e com a presença de questões relacionadas a causa curda dentro da
política externa dinamarquesa (como ajuda as tropas curdas e questões relacionadas a
asilo para membros de religião yazidi), as eleições desse ano refletem uma maior
influência da comunidade curdo-dinamarquesa na política local dinamarquesa, sendo,
portanto, a influência da identidade curda na política dinamarquesa uma realidade que
afeta e fora afetada pelas diversas interações ocorridas dentro de tal comunidade.
It is possible to identify such influence as a direct consequence of the political
articulation between various groups and various Kurdish individuals. The role that
they have within the local Danish politics is palpable, and inside the Kurdish-Danish
community, the knowledge that they have of their influence and decision-making
power within the political issues Copenhagen can not be underestimated. When
thinking within a tradition of transnational Kurdish political organization, the Danish
case is another case whose study becomes interesting from the perspective of Kurdish
studies. The role that the Danish political will within the Kurdish-Danish community
has and vice versa are questions that still remain and will remain open and dependent
on both internal factors and external factors.
For example, among individuals of FOKUS-A that I could interview for this
work, one of them is an active member of the campaign of a Socialist People's Party
candidate, whom I also interviewed, while two of them were placed as possible
candidates (a man and a woman) by Enhedeslisten, but neither secured the nomination
by a few votes, despite achieving a relatively strong vote in the party. The two
continue as present members of the party, along with other individuals of Kurdish
origin, including some members of FOKUS-A. In addition to them, there are a
number of Kurdish candidates who are supported by various sectors of the Kurdish-
Danish community and competing for nominations at other parties, and in other
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locations in Denmark. The prospects that the Kurdish-Danish community have in the
Danish politics in the future will depend on several factors which are also influencing
politics in the present and will also have an effect in the parliamentary election of
2015. The capacity that the Kurdish-Danish community has of organizing itself
through viable candidates, their ability to get the support of other sectors within
Denmark, plus the charisma of these candidates to get the message across that they
are viable candidates are all relevant factors to understanding it. All of these factors
which can be seen more clearly in the current election (but not only during them), are
constantly being renegotiated, and will also be in future. Such negotiations,
articulations, political, social and individual alliances are therefore a subject that was
addressed in such work, but never as much as they could be considered as exhausted;
they are still topics which can continue to be analyzed through an anthropological
bias.
iii) Kurdish-Danish community and their organizations outside of Copenhagen:
prospects and possibilities
Finally, another factor that wast not addressed during this work due to the
geographical distance, is about the study of other Kurdish-Danish communities in
Denmark, and their possible social, cultural and political articulations, and the
relationship that such groups maintain with the Kurdish-Danish community based in
Copenhagen and its metropolitan region. After the first stage of the author's
fieldwork, which lasted between June and September 2014, it had been possible to
observe, through local media and the Kurdish-Danish media, as well as social
networks, an increase of pro-Kurdish events in Denmark. This increase, despite being
more visible in Copenhagen and its metropolitan region, had also been observed in
other cities, both in the region of Sjælland as well as in Fyn and Jylland.
Large cities such as Aarhus, Aalborg and Odense counted with demonstrations
regarding the Kurdish question, as well as in smaller cities like Skandeborg and
Helsingør. When I would ask some of my interlocutors about the influence of those
groups and the Kurdish organizations responsible for such marches and
demonstrations, the answers were somewhat dubious. Some people told me that was
148
an influence of the events that occurred in the capital in the organization of such
events around the country. However, none of them confirmed me if there had or not
been an effective coordination among them, or that such events occur under the
command of some Kurdish organization based in Copenhagen.
If the various events that took place in the Danish capital were widely present
in the Danish media and in the Kurdish-Danish media and served as a way to bring
the various public articulations related to the Kurdish issue to a prominent position,
this factor does not mean that the events that occurred elsewhere were a direct result
of some leadership (both individually and of an organization) based in Copenhagen.
The demonstrations in Copenhagen for its centrality in relation to the Danish media
and politics serve as a visible factor in the Kurdish-Danish community. Individuals
located in other regions and distant from the capital cities can, when seeing the
demonstrations in Copenhagen and other major cities, seek an organization among
themselves, through articulated actions in public places in certain locations. These
symptoms mean, therefore, that the Kurdish-Danish community, especially based on
capital does not maintain a leading role, but still has a leading position within it for
being the group with greater visibility in the media narrative, both Danish and
Kurdish-Danish. If the performing actions that take place in Copenhagen reverberate
in various communities throughout the country, the Kurdish-Danish in Copenhagen is
not directly responsible for the political organization of other communities across the
country (although in some cases organizations based in Copenhagen try to take such
a role, and some larger events do attract Kurds scattered throughout the country to the
capital).
Thus, it is possible to think of the Kurdish-Danish community around the
country through a rhizome structure, as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1995). The
concept of rhizome applied to the human and social sciences was proposed by two
French authors together, and it derives from a biological concept. Rhizome, briefly,
within biology, and specifically within the botanical science, would be the
multiplicity of extensions that the roots of some plants have, and within this
multiplicity, each of these extensions would be able to produce a new plant on its
own. The authors resignify this concept and apply it within philosophy to denote
multiplicity. Moreover, the multiplicity thought by Deleuze and Guattari is a thought
out in a non-hierarchical way, where several groups and individuals could build and
think their interpretations of facts, and their ways of organizing themselves. In the
149
case of the Kurdish-Danish community, some questions may help us better understand
how this concept can be applied to such a group.
So, if one thinks of the Kurdish-Danish community as formed by a different
number of leaders (or, by influential individuals), not centralized within several
organizations that articulate elements through markers such as gender, age, level of
education, political opinion, which generates several organizations and a very large
number of possibilities. Considering also the presence of several Kurdish
communities in several other cities (not only the largest, but often in smaller cities as
well), they can organize on their own, taking into accoun,t in addition to the Kurdish
identity, also the reality of these communities and history of its members and their
presence in such places. Therefore, it is possible to think of a rhizome structure that
extends beyond Copenhagen and its metropolitan area and encompasses the entire
country, in which groups within the Kurdish-Danish community organize themselves
politically, socially and culturally independent of the present centralization in the
capital. So the other regions do not necessarily need such centrality to their political
and cultural organizations, and they are much more linked to the events that occur in
Kurdistan. This rhizome factor, however, does not prevent a link between the various
groups around the country, if it is the desire of such groups. That is, if there are
several common factors among several included groups within the Kurdish-Danish
community, there is not necessarily a hierarchy among them, or a control group over
the other, only a possible influence that igroups present in Copenhagen have on
groups from other cities, yet unable to govern the manner in which they are organized,
being this an issue of exclusive to them. The summer of 2014, for example, saw a
series of demonstrations in several Danish cities, with many decentralized in relation
to organization, but with a common goal.
Assuming that there are different groups of Kurdish immigrants across the
country, and that they do not necessarily maintain ties of some type or an institutional
contact with groups and organizations linked to the Kurdish cause situated in the
Danish capital, one has to imagine that there is a plethora of possibilities organization
formed in which Kurdish people (which, depending on the location can be only a few
families) would, due to some event involving Kurdish identity or Kurdistan, manifest
themselves in public places in several cities across the country. However, we can not
move away from the political influence that Copenhagen-based groups have
compared to the Kurdish-Danish community spread all over the country (as well as
150
the Danish capital has in the rest of the country). Still, one can credit the mobilization
that Kurdish-Danish politics has, and also the ability of such groups to bring the
Kurdish question to a prominent position in the Danish media narrative and to various
organizations located in Copenhagen; however, the organization of events in other
locations can not be effectively allocated to such groups.
An analysis that addresses the various groups located around the country as
rhizomes within the Kurdish identity, in that, in some cases, they would not be
subjected to the control of a central organization based in Copenhagen, in others, they
might be articulated with them, and even more in some situations, they would be
under the control of transnational Kurdish organizations. Therefore, the possible
multiplicity of forms of political, cultural and social organization within the Kurdish
community located outside of Copenhagen is quite large; with the possibility of a
rizomatic analysis being an useful tool for understanding some groups, events and
organizations within the Kurdish community in Denmark or even in other contexts.
In addition to that, one needs to consider the individual influence and the
easiness of locomotion and relocation of many individuals within Denmark (or to
some extent, within Scandinavia or even the European Union). Several individuals
that were interviewed, especially the younger ones, came from cities in Jylland, Fyn
or in other places in Sjælland, having immigrated to Copenhagen (and its
metropolitan area) more recently, due to the possibility of employment, or in most
cases, due to educational issues, since the capital has a greater number of universities
and university campuses than other places such as Aarhus, Aalborg or Odense. In the
cases of such individuals, it is necessary to think if they maintained some kind of
political and cultural organization within the Kurdish community in their cities, or if
they were the only or one of the only families of Kurdish origin, and if their position
within the Kurdish-Danish community flourished because of the possibilities
presented within this same community in the Danish capital.
Still, what is the possible influence that these individuals would if returned to
their home towns around Denmark? One might think a future perspective for greater
coordination (or just a cooperation) of organization of Kurdish groups in several cities
in Denmark (such as occurs with the FOKUS-A), or whether those individuals, if
organized, bureaucratically, sought an articulation with groups based in other cities,
but still having their own autonomy. Such questions are still open, and depended on
several factors related to Kurdish politics in general, which also reverberate in the
151
diaspora population, including the Kurdish-Danish community, and also more
localized factors such as those alliances that were created (or denied) among such
community.
Therefore, this concept can be useful in developing a deeper analysis of the
political organizational dynamics within the Kurdish-Danish community, and thus it
can help reveal other aspects of it, as the alliances formed within such a group, the
accumulated capital of many individuals within it, and in addition, the cultural
elements that would help sustain such analyzes.
Therefore, the Kurdish-Danish community as a population inserted both in
Danish society, and therefore subject to the various specific subtleties of Danish
sociability, and also inserted within the Kurdish transnational immagined community
(being the Kurdish population in diaspora, for example, in numbers, quite significant)
and inserted also inside Kurdish sociability; the Kurdish-Danish community is, thus a
community in constant construction, in which founding myths, alliances,
relationships, political positions, culinary, artistic production are constantly created,
recreated and reinterpreted.
These constant changes, which in some cases are subtle, and in some are not,
are what establishes, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz (1973) the meaning of the webs
that make up the Kurdish-Danish community and its culture. Some of the lines
forming such a web result from factors typically Danish, other from Kurds factors,
other to factors specific to being a non-Danish-Dane in Denmark, and still others due
to specific political positions. There are also other webs that are direct results of the
relationship among different individuals in that community, and these may never be
considered as secondary to the other. And it is about this web of meanings that this
work and its author sought to elucidate through a dissertation based on his
ethnographic research of it.
152
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