A Swiss-Army Knife? A Critical Assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Ghana

A Swiss-Army Knife?A Critical Assessment of the

Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI)

in Ghana

NATHAN ANDREWS

ABSTRACT

Within the current global atmosphere where a universallyaccepted police force is nonexistent, there are several vol-untary norms and codes of conduct that exist to guidehow corporations behave worldwide. These have come asa result of many years of poor performance in the areas ofsocial, financial, and environmental responsibility. Suchnorms are expected to prescribe and proscribe certaintypes of corporate behavior but when one examines thereality on the ground, the story is not that straightfor-ward. This article assesses the effectiveness of the Extrac-tive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in theGhanaian context with a focus on the mining sector.

Nathan Andrews recently completed his PhD in Political Science at the University of Albertaand is currently an adjunct assistant professor and a Banting postdoctoral fellow at Queen’sUniversity. Nathan’s ongoing research focuses on the international political economy of naturalresources in Africa with a current focus on Ghana. Some of his peer-reviewed publicationshave appeared in journals such as International Journal, Third World Quarterly, World Futures,Africa Today, and Resources Policy. His two co-edited books are Africa Yesterday, Today andTomorrow: Exploring the Multi-dimensional Discourses on ‘Development’ (Cambridge Scholars,2013), and Millennium Development Goals in Retrospect: Africa’s Development Beyond 2015(Springer, 2015). Email: [email protected].

VC 2016 Center for Business Ethics at Bentley University. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.,350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

Business and Society Review 121:1 59–83

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Based on primary qualitative data the argument is thateven though the EITI is performing some function, it hasways to go before it can become an across-the-board via-ble tool for transparency and proper accountability. Fiveprevailing weaknesses are discussed to underscore thiscase.

INTRODUCTION

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) hasbeen deemed to embody the Swiss Army knife of policy toolsas a result of its enormous weight, dynamism, and the man-

ner in which the norm diffusion process works both endogenouslyand exogenously (Dobbin et al. 2007; Greif and Laitin 2004; Hau-fler 2010). But let me note from the outset that this article ques-tions this Swiss army knife analogy because it misleads us intothinking the set of principles that underlie the EITI are so sharpand multifaceted that they can absolutely eradicate existing trans-parency, accountability, and ethical issues corporations are facing.This is simply not the case. Some writings in this journal havecommented on this topic, and the discussion has been as varied asthe broader field of business ethics itself (see Topal and Toledano2013; Vogl 2007). Yet, there is no conclusive evidence to suggestthat the EITI has an overwhelming advantage as a global norm.

The overall objective of the initiative is to increase transparencyover payments by companies to governments and governmentagencies, as well as transparency over revenues by those hostcountry governments. The EITI, by its nature, forms part of globalregimes that are controlled by compliance disclosure measures.According to Fasterling (2012), “regulation through compliance dis-closure is an approach that presents a midway solution betweensubstantive and informational, non-state and state regulation, andin a very broad sense could be categorized as ‘soft law’” (p. 74). The“soft” nature of this disclosure mechanism implies there is no guar-antee that actors will take it seriously, even when powerful advo-cates have embraced the language around it.

It is generally accepted that the EITI as a global initiative becamepopular in 2002 after its announcement in a statement by the then UK

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Prime Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit for Sustainable Devel-opment in Johannesburg. This official launch of the initiative was pre-ceded by the growing literature on the “resource curse” in the 1990sand early 2000s (Caspary 2012). According to resource curse scholars,while revenues from oil, gas and mining companies in the form oftaxes, royalties, signature bonuses and other payments is expected tobe an important engine for economic growth and social development inresource-rich countries, the lack of accountability and transparencyin these revenues often aggravate poor governance and lead to corrup-tion, conflict and poverty (Auty 1993; Humphreys et al. 2007; Stevens2003). Additionally, the work of civil society groups such as Global Wit-ness, Human Rights Watch, and Oxfam America among othersbrought the scholarly debate around the “resource curse” to the gen-eral public. Slogans such as “Publish What You Pay” (PWYP) have nowbecome the mantra for a reputable conglomerate of civil society groupscommitted to transparency in the extractives sector.

The principles were agreed on in 2003, and then endorsed in 2004by the G8 leaders at a summit at Sea Island. And since that time, theinitiative has been embraced by a variety of stakeholders includingcorporations, governments, international organizations, investors,and civil society groups. The EITI is one of those initiatives fuelled bythe growing intersection between social movements and civil societyon the one hand, and the corporate sector on the other hand (de Bak-ker et al. 2013). Governments play an important role by leading theinitiative, making the multi-stakeholder arrangement an example ofwhat has become known as ‘collective governance’ (Rich and Moberg2015). Yet, this new governance mechanism and the involvement ofmultiple sectors does not necessarily resolve the pre-existing conflictsbetween these often-disparate stakeholders, as “the very history ofthe corporate form (and its alternatives) is bound up with societal con-tention over the proper role of business interests in the public agenda,and with debates about the sorts of rights and responsibilitiesaccorded to collective actors” (de Bakker et al. 2013, p. 586).

There is also evidence that NGO-centerd international “soft” regu-lation is “too weak for the job” at hand (Wells 2007). Even a WorkingPaper by the Organization for Economic Co-operation Developmenthas indicated that while the EITI has gained global currency, it fallsshort of significantly curbing corruption per se (€Olcer 2009). Despiteits weaknesses, the EITI has currently been embraced by a numberof countries, including 48 implementing countries that have

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disclosed payments and revenues worth about $1.3 trillion as partof their EITI reports, 31 compliant countries,1 and about 17 candi-date countries.2 Overall, 84 global investment institutions andorganizations such as the European Union, African Union, G8 andG20, and the United Nations support the initiative. The World Bankalso unveiled the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative PlusPlus (EITI11) in 2008 as an endeavor to support committed govern-ments particularly in Africa to implement the EITI principles. Theinitial focus of this World Bank initiative has been on enhancing nat-ural resource development and utilization in sub-Saharan Africa.

The prominence of the EITI leads some scholars to argue that“while it is far from a strong global institution, the EITI has success-fully embedded itself in other institutions which further reinforce itsaims” (Haufler 2010, p. 68). The contention in this article is not thatthe EITI is absolutely useless. Rather, the goal is to remind readers ofthis journal that proponents often give it more weight than it actuallyhas in practice. Subsequent sections of the article are divided intofour parts. The first briefly explores the natural resource managementliterature particularly in the context of Africa and why transparencyin the extractive sector has gained global attention. The second partreflects on the source of the primary data used for this article. Thethird section contextualizes the discussion by analyzing the GhanaExtractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI). The primaryfinding is that even though the EITI has helped in making the extrac-tives sector less opaque to some extent, there are fundamental chal-lenges that hinder it from having the impact promised by its strongestadvocates. This, in a general sense, requires us to be both modest andcritical about the practical utility of global norms—particularly thosethat are based on voluntary compliance. The last section of the paper,which is also the conclusion, briefly examines the broader implica-tions of this specific assessment of GHEITI for theories of globalnorms and international institutions.

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENTAND TRANSPARENCY AS A GLOBAL NORM

Apart from guiding behavior, norms from a constructivist standpointare generally considered to provide a motivation for collective action,hence the need for intersubjective consensus among various actors


(Bj€orkdahl 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ruggie 1998). Anorm needs advocates, (also known as entrepreneurs) for it tospread. It is not good enough to have an idea that sits in an individu-al’s head. It only becomes a norm when it is a customary, ordinary,and widely accepted way of behavior. As already pointed out, theEITI was popularized as a global norm in the early 2000s but hasbecome a strong campaign tool in the area of transparency andaccountability of extractive companies with many advocates. Over-all, the initiative has helped to solidify transparency as an interna-tional norm (Gillies 2010; Haufler 2010). As noted above, the ideacame as a way to avert the resource curse—especially the aspect ofthe “curse” that is caused by an overall absence of transparencyresulting from the collusion between governments and corporations.

An underlying rationale is that the EITI should help remove theblinds that make extractive industries opaque, by promoting globaltransparency for oil, gas and mining sectors (Sovacool and Andrews2015; see also Sovacool et al. 2016 (forthcoming)). As a multistake-holder initiative involving a variety of actors such as both multina-tional and state-owned extractive companies, host governments,home governments, industry groups, international financial institu-tions, investors and civil society groups, among others, “the EITIemphasizes the prudent use of natural resources wealth and dic-tates that the management of such wealth should be exercised in theinterests of national development” (Al Faruque 2006). This multista-keholder approach is one of the unique features of the EITI (Fried-man 2001). The expectation is that opening the books would buildtrust between different stakeholders of the extractives sector, andalso promote accountability between governments and corporationson the one hand and society on the other—thereby advancing thegeneral public interest (Eigen 2006; Frynas 2010; Kolstad and Wiig2009; Mej�ıa Acosta 2013).

This expectation exists because corruption is considered both asa primary cause and symptom of the resource curse, a major phe-nomenon that resulted in the birth of the initiative (Corrigan2014). It has been established that the collusion between corpora-tions and government officials further compounds the adverse con-sequences of resource wealth (Humphreys et al. 2007). But beyondthis, the extent of the curse is said to be contingent on politicalincentives (Robinson et al. 2006), the types of resources the coun-try in question has (Boschini et al. 2007), and the nature of rent

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seeking (Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001), among others. It is expectedthat institutions will play a decisive role in steering resource wealthto good use (Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2014). One of theintent behind the EITI is that, through proper financial disclosure,such institutions and their respective actors will become empow-ered to perform their development-oriented role.

In places like the Niger Delta, years of oil exploration has little toshow for the average citizen even though oil companies have a greatdeal of social responsibility activities meant to better the lives of peo-ple (see Agbonifo 2011; Frynas 2005; Idemudia 2007; Rwabizam-buga 2007). Other African countries such as South Africa, Namibia,Mozambique, Malawi, Kenya, and Ghana still have to do more workto ensure that business practices facilitate sustainable developmentinstead of inhibiting it (Forstarter et al. 2010). Contrary to the NigerDelta, for example, Ghana is not necessarily seen as a typical case ofthe “resource curse.” With reference to the evolving oil industry,Kopi�nski et al. (2013) argue that the country possesses some kind of“structural immunity” to the resource curse due to political stability,economic diversification and active civil society engagement. Otherwriters contest this claim, pointing to real evidence that the curse issurfacing in Ghana due to the continuous exploitation by global cap-ital and perpetuation of an oil enclave that leaves many people onthe fringes of socioeconomic development (Ayelazuno 2014). Thisboils down to the fact that no aspect of oil and gas development inGhana can be left to chance if the country aspires to escape the so-called “curse” (Okpanachi and Andrews 2012; Andrews 2013). Theoil sector aside, based on the fact that over a century of mining (pri-marily gold) in the country has not proven entirely beneficial to itslocal populations (see Akabzaa 2009; Akabzaa et al. 2007; Akpaluand Parks 2007; Mares 2012; Okoh 2014), the EITI is thought of asan effective tool in helping communities receive the expected benefitsfrom mineral exploration. But there is not sufficient empirical evi-dence or nuanced qualitative evaluation to substantiate this case.Subsequent pages of the article will illuminate how this expectationactually plays out on the ground.

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Primary data for this article is deduced from data collected for abigger study on the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of two


foreign mining companies in Ghana, namely Newmont Ghana GoldLtd. (NGGL) and Chirano Gold Mines Ltd. (CGML). Two methodswere used: semistructured interviews and focus group discussions.The in-depth field research was preceded by a pilot study in Janu-ary 2013 where 22 people from Kenyase no. 1, Kenyase no. 2,Akoti, and Etwebo were purposively selected on site and askedsimple questions around the companies and their generalimpressions of their social performance. For the four-month field-work that occurred from May to August 2013, 44 interviews wereconducted involving a variety of mining stakeholders. The inter-views generally lasted between 10 and 60 minutes each.

Out of the total number of interviews, five of them were with gov-ernment officials (i.e., Minerals Commission, Environmental Pro-tection Agency—Ghana, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources,Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology & Innovation, andthe Ghana EITI, which is under the Ministry of Finance and Eco-nomic Planning [MOFEP]); four were with identified NGOs in Accra(i.e., Third World Network-Africa, Wassa Association of Commun-ities Affected by Mining, Integrated Social Development Centre(ISODEC)/PWYP- Ghana, and Associates for Development Partner-ships); and six were with company officials—three from each com-pany. The remaining 29 interviews were split between the twocompanies covering their neighboring towns and villages, andincluding ordinary community members, community consultativecommittee members, opinion/youth leaders, and leaders ofcommunity-based organizations. Two focus group discussionswere conducted involving six females in the CGML three mainfocus areas and five in NGGL’s areas. This included a wide range ofage groups, from 18 to over 50 years. The data gathered were sub-ject to a qualitative analysis to identify and interpret commonthemes.

GHANA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRYTRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE

Ghana became an EITI compliant country on October 19, 2010although it has been considered an implementing country since2003. Until the recent discovery of oil, the implementation hadtaken place primarily in the mining sector. The commitment to join

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in 2003 was spearheaded by both ministries of Finance and Minesand two governing bodies were established to promote it: theNational Steering Committee and the GHEITI Secretariat (Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell 2009). The Secretariat was initially placed inMinistry of Mines but was later moved to the Ministry of Financeand Economic Planning (MOFEP). One rationale for this shift is thefact that it is the MOFEP that manages the fiscal regime underwhich revenue from the extractive industry falls. But civil societygroups have criticized its embeddedness in the Ministry due to per-ceptions that it reduces autonomy and makes EITI susceptible togovernment politics (Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell 2009). TheGHEITI national coordinator, Franklin Ashiadey, notes the mainreason for implementing the initiative in Ghana:

They thought that by publishing what companies are payingand what government is receiving, there could be some formof accountability and transparency in the system so thateventually that kind of mutual suspicion between commun-ities where the resources are extracted and government wouldbe reduced. So Ghana signed on to that in 2003 and westarted implementing [it].

The GHEITI is a multistakeholder arrangement that includes rep-resentation from government, civil society, and industry—all repre-sented on the National Steering Committee. Key NGOs such asPWYP and the ISODEC are expected to work at the grassroots levelto educate the communities on the annual reports and what itmeans for them. Due to this work, the national coordinator arguesthat “some of the communities are now better empowered andinformed as to what comes to government” (June 9, 2013, Accra).Other members of the steering committee are from the MOFEP, theMinistry of Land and Natural Resources, the Minerals Commission,the Ghana National Petroleum Company, the Ghana Chamber ofMines (representing the mining companies), the Office of the Admin-istrator of Stool Lands, and the Internal Revenue Service. Both Kin-ross and Newmont are EITI supporting companies: Newmont joinedin 2009 while Kinross joined in 2011. Since joining, their respectiveoperations in Ghana have contributed to reports of the GHEITI tothe EITI secretariat in Norway each fiscal year. These reports aresupposed to reconcile payments received by the Government ofGhana from respective companies in the extractive industry.


FIVE MAIN LIMITATIONS OF THE GHEITI

The scholarly literature with a specific focus on the GHEITI issparse.3 Consequently, the answer one gets to the question ofwhether the EITI is effective in Ghana or not depends on who isbeing asked. About five of the over 40 interviews conducted focusedprimarily on the GHEITI. Yet, the variation in responses and thelevel of nuance each interview reached demonstrates that there ismore work to be done. The GHEITI national coordinator insiststhat the nine reports that have been produced since 2004 have ini-tiated several reforms in the mining sector. In his view, thesechanges include a redefinition of royalties and a revision of incen-tives such as capital allowances. Also, the mutual suspicion thatpre-existed between communities and government regarding howmuch is being received is reduced. He argues that “you don’t takeit for granted that companies would do the right thing. They areprofit-making companies; they are business people and if you don’ttake your things seriously as a country [and] as a government,they will get away with whatever they can get” (Franklin Ashiadey,June 9, 2013, Accra). The Technical Director for Mining at the Min-istry of Lands and Natural Resources also believes that a globalnorm such as EITI has impacted reforms in the mining sector. Hisreference was to the June 2013 G8 meeting where world leadersissued a communiqu�e to reinforce their commitment toward theimplementation of the EITI.4 As he explained:

So we have incorporated [the G8 communiqu�e on transpar-ency] into the policy. Ghana is a dynamic country in miningand it undertakes reforms, good reforms anyway, in its min-ing operations . . . we’re not operating as an island. And Ghanahas moved away from managing mines themselves. Rightfrom 1983, Ghana has shifted from managing state minesand we don’t intend to go back to that era (Simon AtebiyaJuly 16, 2013, Accra).

There are other praises of the initiative. A past chairman of theEITI Steering Committee for Africa, and the coordinator for Gha-na’s Steering Committee and ISODEC/PWYP-Ghana, Steve Man-teaw, believes that “Ghana has made great strides in terms ofadvancing the frontiers of transparency and accountability usingthe EITI framework as a result of which at least there is some

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clarity and some openness about how much revenue project byproject Newmont and Chirano are making” (July 17, 2013, Accra).To him, the fact that these two companies opted to be part of theprocess voluntarily is a positive sign of their commitment towardoverall openness. Despite this positive impression, the analysisbelow highlights five prevailing weaknesses of the arrangement.These include the separation of GHEITI from other CSR efforts,challenges with the provision of data for EITI reports, diverse stake-holder expectations and power relationships, general institutionaldisinterest in reforms, and the lack of correlation between recordedrevenues and royalties and demonstrable positive developmentaloutcome(s) in host mining communities.

Dashwood (2012) admits that “the term CSR connotes dutiesthat, even if not legally required, entail obligations that resonatewith societal norms and values” (p. 9). Yet for many, CSR representsa narrower range of responsibilities than what the idea of sustain-able development requires; sustainable development requires thecollaborative efforts of actors such as governments, civil society,and companies. As a result of what may be regarded as “narrowerrange of responsibilities,” there is a general tendency to assume thattransparency and accountability are not primary aspects of CSR. Asnoted by the GHEITI national coordinator: “we are not into actualdirect social responsibility but our reports sometimes touch onwhat companies provide in the form of in-kind benefits to govern-ment and to communities and all that” (Mr. Ashiadey, June 9, 2013,Accra). This point is interesting because the UN Global Compact,which is regarded as the largest CSR initiative in the world, hasanticorruption as one of its ten principles and expressly cautionsbusinesses to work against all forms of corruption including briberyand extortion. The CSR literature itself also tends to consider trans-parency and accountability as crucial aspects of a company’s socialresponsibility performance (Jones et al. 2012; Quaak et al. 2007). InCarroll’s (1991) pyramid of CSR, economic responsibility assumesthe basis of all other kinds of responsibility although it also works intandem with them (i.e., legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibil-ities). The argument can be made here that economic responsibility,which covers a firm’s financial performance, cannot be reachedwithout proper transparency and accountability. Thus, the inherentseparation of GHEITI efforts from all other CSR efforts is the firstthing that obstructs the effectiveness of the global initiative.


Second, a challenge that has been reflected in both Ghana’s EITIreport and my interview data with officials involved with GHEITI isthe provision of relevant data. The reports depend heavily on com-panies’ willingness to provide audited financial statements andother relevant data. Thus, any delay or reluctance from their endwill mean that either the reports will be incomplete or there couldbe no reporting at all. As one official explained: “Also in terms ofproduction of the reports, we have to rely on company data and co-operation.” You know, it takes a lot of time to get them to providethe data. They are always reluctant but we are trying to solve thisby initiating a law to back the EITI that will compel them to providethe data within a certain time limit (Franklin Ashiadey, June 9,2013, Accra). This challenge is further worsened by the high turnover of staff within the mining companies. Knowledgeable staffmembers may be moved to different departments and or eventransferred to other locations, thereby affecting the flow of informa-tion and the timely completion of reports. Overall, there is typicallya three-year time-lag that exists in terms of documenting miningrevenue flows in the country, the case where the 2008 audit reportfor example covers data for 2005 (Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell2009). This lag impedes proper accountability. The literature showsthat CSR and transparency that results from industry self-regulation through the adoption of principles and guidelines arenot able to address the manifold problems of the extractive sector(see Nwete 2007). If one is to believe that organizational antece-dents or internal response mechanisms play a primary role in CSRdecisions than moral suasion, advocacy, or the broader externalenvironment as argued by Puplampu and Dashwood (2011), thenit is doubtful that self-regulation of this nature can actually changecorporate behavior tremendously.

Compliance disclosure regimes as an alternative to substantive“command-and-control” regulation has proven to bear major weak-nesses that prevent it from really disciplining a certain type of corpo-rate behavior, for instance, making corporations more transparent(Fasterling 2012). It was expected that this initiative would do betterbut since it relies on what companies themselves provide, it tends toexhibit the characteristics of other nonlegal CSR measures such asthe UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the UNGuiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, among others.Even when we want to assume that companies are operating in

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good faith and providing all the data needed for them to be consid-ered complaint, the greater problem is that “compliance with anorm cannot always be assessed by mere observation of the facts.Applying norms often requires an interpretation of the norm and anevaluation of the company’s practices and the circumstances of theindividual case in light of this interpretation” (Fasterling 2012, p.77). This approach implies that reported facts do not always speakfor themselves, and there is the need to verify them.

The third drawback with the GHEITI entails diverse stakeholderexpectations, power relationships, and the inability of reports toproperly address all of them. In the case of Madagascar, the delicatepower relationships between mining stakeholders have overriddenthe “good governance” motive of the EITI (Smith et al. 2012). InGhana, “there is a challenge of expectations, stakeholders’ expecta-tions. . .Civil society also expects more [and] Government alsoexpects more . . . Sometimes the company also thinks that EITI isgoing a little bit too far. . .” (Franklin Ashiadey, June 9, 2013, Accra).This is because the GHEITI is perceived to be performing an auditfunction by requiring companies to report on not only what hasbeen paid to government, but also on what is actually supposed tobe paid. Therefore, while there are many stakeholders involved inthis transparency framework, not everyone agrees on what needs tobe done, where the power of a particular member ends, or the extentof the watchdog role to be played. And there are instances wherethis ‘watchdog’ is not fully capacitated to perform its role in the EITIprocess, making it difficult to harness the potential of transparencyto stimulate accountability (see Van Alstine 2014; Short 2014).

For some civil society members, CSR is mainly about ensuringthat a company pays what is due the government. An interviewwith a programs coordinator at Third World Network—Africa,Alhassan Atta-Quayson, revealed that “as far as we are concerned,if you are paying fair and adequate taxes to the government [and] ifyou are not involved in any deals that deny the state and commun-ities resources [then] I think you are responsible” (July 22, 2013,Accra). The argument is that if companies were really paying thetaxes due the government, there would be no need for them to takeup developmental projects in host communities. But the case isthat since CSR activities are tax deductible, companies’ tax bur-dens are reduced by the number of activities they claim to do andthe amount of dollars devoted to these activities.


This phenomenon in the long run goes to reduce government’srevenue, which implies several millions in lost financial value forthe country (see Atta-Quayson 2012). “But on top of this if fatmonies are shipped out of the country in the name of consultancyor management fees, there and then you [the company] are irre-sponsible, no matter what you build for the communities” (Alhas-san Atta-Quayson, 22 July 2013, Accra). Underlying the diversestakeholder expectations is the suspicion with which various con-stituents have embraced the GHEITI framework. As has alreadybeen noted, the multistakeholder nature of the framework itselfdefies easy diagnosis because the constituent sectors are not akinto idyllic neighbors (de Bakker et al. 2013). Research has shownthat the partnership is a limited one since governments have notallowed civil society to participate fully in the process as expected,and in most cases, the general public are not aware of it (Aaronson2011; Aaronson and Brinkerhoff 2009; Smith et al. 2012). Atta-Quayson notes that “most of the time you find mining companiesdescribing CSOs as people who are driving away investors and in avery negative connotation” (22 July 2013, Accra). Civil societygroups are expected to speak for the communities, particularly thevoiceless. Therefore, it is interesting that companies accuse themof being anti-mining when they are engaged in such advocacy. It istherefore an onerous task for the GHEITI secretariat to deal withthese diverse ranges of issues at the Steering Committee level,including the suspicion that the government itself may be in bedwith some foreign companies.

Additionally, there is also a general disinterest to implementGHEITI reforms by the relevant government agencies. This isbesides the “weak governance” and capacity problems that Ghana,as well as many African countries, are known to face (Campbell2012). While there is evidence that the EITI has had some impacton aspects of the resource curse phenomenon such as regulationquality and governance effectiveness overall, there are still issueswith corruption and political stability (Corrigan 2014). According toMr. Ashiadey, “implementing some of the recommendations fromthe EITI reports also brings about challenges because you have alot of institutional inertia in the system . . . they don’t want to dothe reforms that are really necessary. You have to do a lot of push-ing . . .” (June 9, 2013, Accra). This goes to show that the EITI onits own cannot ensure good governance and proper accountability

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unless governments are willing and able to initiate significant insti-tutional reforms (Hilson and Maconachie 2008, 2010). The fact isthat transparency alone is not enough to address the multi-layeredproblems facing resource-rich countries (Kolstad and Wiig 2009;Sovacool and Andrews 2015; Sovacool et al. 2016 (forthcoming);Van Alstine 2014).5

The institutional inertia is not solely from the government sector.Some companies are not co-operating as they should. There is ageneral anxiety that as the GHEITI becomes more entrenched evencompanies that currently contribute to the annual reconciliationreports will throw in the towel. As noted by Steve Manteaw, “ourfear now is that as we proceed deeper and deeper into reformingthe sector, there is the likelihood that some of the companies wouldbow out of the EITI because some of the reforms are not quitefavorable to them” (17 July 2013, Accra). To prevent this from hap-pening, there are considerations to legislate the EITI framework bymaking transparency and accountability disclosure mandatory.The goal would be to ensure that all mining stakeholders arereceiving equitable returns from mining activities. Nonetheless, it isnot exactly clear when this would happen.

Despite the institutional inertia, the GHEITI office readily arguesthat the initiative has helped make the system less opaque. Butsome NGOs disagree with this overview. Although some admit thatcompanies are perhaps more transparent than the governmentitself, there is still tremendous room for improvement since a greatdeal of issues are being swept under the carpet (Interview withAtta-Quayson, July 22, 2013, Accra). Hannah Owusu-Korantengof WACAM notes that to due to weak regulation transparency hasnot yet reached the level expected by all the people interested inthe wellbeing of the mining sector:

The sum of it is that [the] mining [sector] is very opaque inGhana and we do not know much about it. We have to gothrough other NGOs outside the country for documentationthat you may not be able to use in Ghana because they areconfidential material. Only advocacy is exposing some of thesethings. You can come and arrest me if I say you are not payingtax and you say it is not true, prove that you are paying. Sothat is what we do. There are many things that the publicdoes not know (23 July 2013, Tema).


Mineral royalties in Ghana are distributed as follows: 80 percentgoes to the Consolidated Fund (the term that describes the generalState account); 10 percent is dedicated to the Minerals Develop-ment Fund (MDF), which will assist the development of the miningsector in Ghana; one percent goes to the Administrator of StoolLands for administrative purposes; and the remaining nine percentof royalties are allocated to the local districts that provide the min-erals (Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell 2009). An example of the opacitythat the WACAM representative describes is that although weknow of the distribution of mineral royalties generally, not much isknown about the specific flow of revenue or the usage of funds inthe MDF to which 10 percent of all mineral royalties are allocatedto assist the development of the mining sector (Nguyen-Thanh andSchnell 2009). It is also uncertain if the nine percent allocated tolocal districts are being properly used for community developmentprojects that advance the wellbeing of people, which reflects thelack of correlation between proactive transparency efforts andimproved livelihoods at the host community level.

Lastly, there is the expectation that the more revenue govern-ment receives as a result of increased transparency, the better offhost communities will be. However, the prevailing concerns in localmining communities imply that government agencies are not per-forming their developmental role as expected.6 Even some govern-ment officials agree that Ghana as a country has not fullybenefitted from its natural resources, partly due to the kinds ofagreements negotiated between government and the mining com-panies. Worse still, the host communities are at a greater disad-vantage since proper institutional mechanisms are not in place tosafeguard their needs amidst the presence of dominant corpora-tions. It is easy to “realize that the lack of sustainable livelihoods inmining communities in the presence of large mining companieswho have collected huge [portions] of land has really been a majorfactor in people resorting to illegal activities” (interview with Atta-Quayson, July 22, 2013, Accra). Such activities, including “illegal”artisanal mining operations, have led to conflicts in several miningcommunities (Akpalu and Parks 2007; Okoh 2014). And certainlythe case of Nigeria does show that EITI is not a useful tool for con-flict resolution per se (Asgill 2012). With the introduction of theGHEITI some years ago, there was hope that “the resources thatcome in [shall] also be well used to ensure that the people really

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benefit from that. As companies pay more, government must alsoensure that resources are used properly to benefit the people” (Mr.Ashiadey June 9, 2013, Accra). This hope, nonetheless, meets astark reality of socioeconomic deprivation in many mining areas.

A community member interviewed did speak to the disparitybetween the residence of mining officials and employees and thedilapidated conditions in which other community members live: “ifyou compare where they live and where we also live, in fact, youwould say we should drive the company away!” (June 18, 2013,Kenyase no. 1). From the 2011 EITI report submitted by theMOFEP in February 2013, Ghana’s revenue from the extractivesector has quadrupled. This is mainly due to the oil boom at thetime and the increase in corporate taxes for the mining sector(MOFEP 2013). Of course, without such a report the general publicmay not know exactly how much government is receiving. Never-theless the issue is more than just knowing; it is also about howthese royalty payments are being used to provide basic amenitiesfor people in rural mining areas. When one examines the severalcomplaints from people living in or perhaps near host commun-ities, it might seem appropriate to postulate that even CSR trans-parency claims are quite elusive on the ground – a kind of “pseudo-panopticon” as Coombs and Holladay (2013) call it.

CONCLUSIONS: BROADER THEORETICALIMPLICATIONS

At this point, it is worth bringing the discussion back to its theoret-ical underpinnings. Although norms are undergirded by an inher-ent logic of appropriateness, they can be vague and may onlyrepresent what ought to be instead of what is practically or pres-ently feasible. Yet still, actors adopt such norms because theirvagueness allows them to use interpretation to achieve differingobjectives (van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007). Also due to theimprecise nature of international norms, they are often subject torenewed battles over their meaning from time to time. To Wiener(2007), the three main logics when dealing with how norms workinclude norms as facts explained through the “logic of appro-priateness”; norms as disputed facts understood through the “logicof arguing”; and the “logic of contestedness” which clarifies the


difference between facts and norms. He further points out that “theperception of norms as either stable or entailing a dual qualitymarks a significant conceptual difference with potentially interest-ing consequences for politics and policy toward legitimate gover-nance beyond the state” (Wiener 2007, p. 48). Nonetheless, thelack of a common definition also means lack of a shared taxonomy;hence, scholars themselves tend to interpret norms differently(Bj€orkdahl 2002).

The more vague a norm is the likelier it will face clashes in its“life cycle” over its precise definition (van Kersbergen and Verbeek2007). It is due to this demerit that most international norms can-not be said to characterize what Hopf (2010) defines as the “logic ofhabit” even when they result from multiple stakeholder engage-ment efforts. According to him, habits are “uninten tional, uncon-scious, involuntary, and effortless, that is, they do not consumelimited cogni tive processing capacity” (Hopf 2010, p. 541). A normcan only become a habit if the normalization process has allowed itto provide individuals with ready-made responses to issues evenwithout thinking. Although “habit” is considered one of the domi-nant mechanisms under Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) thirdstage of the norm life cycle, it cannot be said that any voluntaryCSR or transparency norm has currently become an automatic“cognitive” taken-for-granted practice as Hopf (2010) theorizes. Ofcourse, it would be a desirable outcome for any global norm. But tobe sure, the EITI as a norm does not have this across-the-boardlevel of conformity or practicality. Even a reputable internationalinstitutionalist such as Robert Keohane admits that although insti-tutions are pertinent to the statement attainment of a “good life,”“they may also institutionalise bias in ways that make the good lifeimpossible to attain for many people” (Keohane 2002, 16). Anotherprominent global governance scholar also posits that “while trans-parency at an abstract level can produce better governance, theimplementation of transparency does not always achieve its desiredends” (Haufler 2010, p. 55). These statements reflect the paradoxi-cal effects of institutions in general (and of transparency norms inparticular) that advocates of global normative frameworks such asthe EITI should pay attention to.

The voluntary nature of the norm is by far its greatest weakness.In essence, “voluntarism limits the potential scope of the club ofcountries, whereas the discretionary side to the initiative limits the

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utility of the disclosure requirements” (Topal and Toledano 2013,p. 277). Being an optional endeavor, corporations that wish toevade taxes could opt out of the EITI and move on to other coun-tries that have not adopted it yet (Otusanya 2011). In the samevein, governments that seek to remain unaccountable do not haveany forceful incentive to change (Kardon 2008). Obviously, this isnot the case in Ghana. However, the weaknesses explored aboveshould lead us to question the ambitious claims made by its advo-cates. One point worthy of note is that the EITI is possibly moreuseful than other “soft” norms such as the UN Global Compact.GHEITI’s multistakeholder approach entreats companies to prop-erly report revenues as well as requires government to make thesepayments public. One reason also is the verification process thatannual reports undergo, which is a positive mechanism that needsto be mentioned. Nonetheless, it really takes nothing away from allthe weaknesses noted above.

Overall, the fact that the expected beneficiaries of EITI do notadequately feel part (and are unaware) of these mechanisms sug-gests that the intersubjectivity norms are expected to have is notyet operationalized in this framework. Most of the communitymembers may not know what global initiatives the respective com-panies under study have subscribed to, but their perceptions ofwhat these companies are doing or not doing solidify the argumentthat global frameworks have limited impact on corporations—par-ticularly those operating in Africa and other parts of the globalSouth. And the cosmetic nature of CSR really does not help makethe situation any better (Weszkalnys 2009).

Based on the arguments so far, one can very much remaindoubtful that the EITI can fulfill its expected positive impact ontransparency and accountability in the extractives sector. However,it is probably too early to cast the baby out with the bathwater. Ina practical sense, the EITI has changed since 2013. Prior to thistime and based on the 2011 EITI Rules, the focus was mainly ontransparency to the neglect of accountability and the initiative wastherefore criticized as a ‘tick-the-box’ endeavour (see Short 2014).A new EITI Standard adopted in May 2013 is now in place toaddress some of these critiques. Specifically, the Standard encour-ages multi-stakeholder groups to explore context-specific innova-tive approaches to ensure both transparency and accountability,includes a civil society (participation) protocol, and sets new


disclosure requirements such as electronic data submission toenable further scrutiny and access (EITI 2015a). All these meas-ures are meant to improve the efficacy of the initiative and the2015 Progress Report already speaks of some improvement (EITI2015b), but we wait to see how it plays out in all 48 implementingcountries. By way of conclusion, as a colleague and I have arguedin a forthcoming paper, the EITI is not the only initiative focusedon promoting transparency and accountability in the extractivessector. Thus, its effects should be fully assessed within the contextof other global and regional initiatives that are in operation incountries endowed with natural resources (Van Alstine andAndrews, 2016; see also Shaw 2014). This is certainly one of theareas that future research on this topic could explore.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Canadian Asso-ciation for the Study of International Development annual confer-ence at Brock University, which was organized as part of Congress2014. My appreciation goes to the participants for their thoughtfulcomments. Second, I am grateful to Rob Aitken, Joanna Harringtonand Janine Brodie for their comments on earlier drafts. Additionally,I appreciate the financial support provided by both the TrudeauFoundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities ResearchCouncil (Canada) to complete this research in a timely fashion.

NOTES

1. A country is designated as EITI compliant when the EITI Board consid-

ers that it meets all of the EITI requirements. Compliant countries must

undergo validation every three years or on the request from the EITI Board. To

be EITI compliant does not necessarily mean a country’s extractive sector is

fully transparent, but that there are satisfactory levels of disclosure and open-

ness in the management of the natural resources, as well as a functioning pro-

cess to oversee and improve disclosure.2. A candidate is a country that has fully, and to the satisfaction of the EITI

Board, completed the four sign-up steps set out in the EITI standard. EITI can-

didature is a temporary state intended to lead, in a timely fashion, to compli-

ance with the EITI standard. When the EITI Board admits an EITI candidate, it

77NATHAN ANDREWS

establishes deadlines for publishing the first EITI report and undertakes vali-

dation. The first EITI report must be published within 18 months and valida-tion must commence within two and a half years.

3. A search for “Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative” in the

Political Science Complete database on January 15, 2015 revealed van Alstine’s(2014) article. And several Google Scholar searches as of June 9, 2015 for theterm “The Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” did not yield any

relevant hits in terms of specific focus on Ghana. However, there are severalarticles on the implementation of EITI in sub-Saharan Africa in general, andNige-ria in particular (see Aaronson and Brinkerhoff 2009; Asgill 2012; Hilson and

Maconachie 2008, 2010; Smith et al. 2012).4. For details on what occurred at this meeting, see http://eiti.org/news/

eiti-focus-g8-summit-2013, accessed December 20, 2013.5. For instance, Ghana’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corrup-

tion Perceptions Index remains low. In 2014, the country had a score of 48(out of 100) up from 45 in 2012. The ranking places Ghana in eighth positionin sub-Saharan Africa but 61st in the world (out of 175 countries and territo-

ries). For more details see, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results(accessed July 17, 2015).

6. For the case of Ghana’s emerging oil sector, see Andrews 2013. Also for

a Nigerian example, see Frynas 2005.

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Documents

A Swiss-Army Knife? A Critical Assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Ghana