London: Hazards, Threats, Preparedness

and ResilienceResponding to Terrorism (Kings College

London)

07 Nov 2013

Matthew Hogan | London Resilience Team @London_Prepared

Risks in LondonR

ela

tive I

mp

act

Conventional Attacks on Locations

Maritime Incidents

Industrial Accident

Transport Accident

Structural Collapse

Emerging Infectious Disease

Industrial Action

Pandemic Human Disease

Flooding

Other Local Flooding

Telecoms failure

Animal Disease

Heatwave

Relative Likelihood

1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War

Jacobean Terrorism

How different was it to modern day terrorism?

a fringe group of religiously motivated fanatics

planning to detonate explosives in an underground area

beneath a well-known location

in an attempt to change the government to one favouring their religion

1605 War

@Anon_UK

1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War

Plague

Risk relatively unchanged but much reduced vulnerability

• Border Biosecurity 

• Containment 

• Surveillance 

• Medical Treatments 

• Protection 

• General Health 

1605 War

Museum of London

Paul Furst BeeThomas

1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War

Fire

Risk remains but vulnerability much lower

• Land Use 

• Building Codes 

• Fire Suppression Systems

• Fire Fighting techniques and equipment

• Fire safety  

1605 War

RadioTimes/Museum of London/Rightmove

1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War

Industrialisation

The advancement of industry lead to a whole range of new risks

• Health & Safety Practices

1605 War

Rail Accidents

The advancement of industry lead to a whole range of new risks

• Transport Safety Improvements

PA

Illustrated London News

1973 1665 1666 1800s Post War

Lessons from War

• Formalisation of Ambulance Services

• Battlefield medicine

• Advances in technology

• Target hardening

• Remote sensing

• Intelligence advances

• Public messaging 1605 War

BombSite/GoogleMaps

1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War

Trains and Planes

• Impact of technological advances and demographic change on risk

• The first Decade of Disasters

1605 War

Pathe

NationalArchives

1973Pre 2002

2005 2010Post 2012

London Emergency Services Liaison Panel

• Shared Major Incident Definition

• Roles and Responsibilities of organisations

• Initial response actions

• Command and Control structures

• Specialist response information

1973 2012Pre 2002

2005 2010 2012Post 2012

19831984

19851986

19871988

19891990

19911992

19931994

19951996

19971998

19992000

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

-2

3

8

13

18

23

Tidal ClosureFluvial ClosuresTotal Closures

GoogleStreetView

DiamondGeezer

RexFeatures

Response Capabiliti

es

Mass Casualtie

sMass

Fatalities

Mass Evacuati

on

Flooding

Mass Shelter

Structural Collapse

Recovery

Business Continuit

y

Communicating

with the Public

Command and

Control

GOLD (STRATEGIC)

SILVER (TACTICAL)

BRONZE(OPERATIONAL)

Sca

le o

f In

cident

SCG

Partnership Meeting

Coordination and Information Sharing Protocol

Joint Emergency Services

Coordination CellLESLP Manual

Tripartite

Discussion

Single Agency Command &

Control

Multi Agency Coordination

Doctrine

Response : Coordination

Health Sector

Local Authorities and Busines

ses

Climate and Environment

Sector

Transport

Sector

Emergency

Services Sector

Utilities Sector

Trains Stop (5 mins)

Loss of Passenger Info Systems

Emergency Generator Systems kick in

Likely changes in demand profile

Emergency

Generator

Systems kick in

Acute

Primary &

Community

Impact on

Community

Water

Electricity

TelecomsHealth and

Safety issues

Revert manual systems

Safety issues for nursing

and residential

care

Comms difficulties with fleet

Variability in mortuary business

continuity plans

Monitoring equipment

affected

Loss of electronic

transactions and ability to obtain cash from ATMs

Distress for MH

patients

H&S issues for schools

Failure of automatic

flood protection systems

Continuity of cold

chain drug storage Potential

rise in admissions (vulnerable

)

Retail fuel

stops

Rise in food safety

incidents

Impact to water pumping (mains)

Potential water pumping issues in buildings

Potential water quality issues

Security barriers and theft prevention systems fail

Staff H&S issues

Challenges communicating with oncoming staff

Cessation of

elective and non-emergency cases

Challenges to some

diagnostic services

VOIP, DECT and Internet likely to fail

Mobile base stations fail (hours)

Increased fixed line demand

Implementation of demand management

Unable to recharge mobile phones and Airwave terminals

Electricity

Failure

Relocation to

alternative sites

Additional problems may be

caused by limitations of

working during natural light

Unable to send Flood

Alert notification

s

Trapped passenger

s

Reduced ability to heat/cool

home

Dependencies on equipment

at home

Impacts on

national transport

Airport diversion possible

Likely changes in

demand profile

Limited train

service resumes

Potential for public disorder incidents

Possibly unable to retrieve electronic data

Impacts to manufacturing, banking and leisure

Difficulties in communicatin

g between schools and

parents

Large scale evacuation or

shelter may be required

Mutual aid to provide alternative supply

Challenges in communicatin

g with residents and

businesses

Reading List

• London Risk Register• Civil Contingencies Act – Short Guide • National Risk Register• Hyogo Framework for Action • Report of the 7th July Review Committee•

Coroners Inquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

• CONTEST – UK Counter Terrorist Strategy• LESLP Manual Version 8• London Command and Control Protocol Ver

sion 5

London: Hazards, Threats, Preparedness and Resilience

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