View
222
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 1/20
Locke's ManAuthor(s): John W. YoltonSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 665-683Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654333
Accessed: 23/09/2009 15:01
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upenn.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Journal of the History of Ideas.
http://www.jstor.org
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 2/20
L o c k e ' s M a n
John W. Yolton
Muchattentionhasbeenpaidto Locke's discussionof personal dentity,his
conceptof person,thedistinctionbetweenman andperson.In fact, in that dis-
cussion there arefourtermsorconcepts:man,self, person,andagent.Aroundthose termsanumberof themes,aspectsof Locke'sthought,areclustered, ome
moredirectlyrelatedto those terms,othersmoretangentialbutstill importantfor ourunderstanding f the thoughtof Locke. If possible, some sortingoutof
those fourtermscould be helpfulin reachinganappreciation f the natureand
functionof man nLocke's account.If we can determinewho theagentof action
is, findthe locusof agencyinacting,thesourceof thepower, hatnaturemaybe
explicated.Therearesome similaritiesbetweenthebody-mindrelationandthe
man-person elation, imilaritieswhichmayraise somequestionof materialism.
I think we can say thatLocke's man is not born a person, that the man canbecome aperson,developinto one. Theboy,thechild,growsintoa manthrough
education,acquiring henecessaryattributes f virtueandrationality.There s a
roughanalogbetweentheeducationof a childandtheemergenceof personhoodfrom a man.Also in Locke's discussion of manthere s a firmsuggestionof an
underlyingconstitution rom which theproperties ome as theircausalsource,
anintriguingparallelbetween the constitutionof manandthecorpusculartruc-
tureof body.I propose in this paperto explore these various topics, trustingthat the
natureof man,of a humanbeing in Locke's account,may become a little bitmore clear.Personhas perhapsreceived too much attention; t is man's turn
now.
1. Action andAgency
Man is a biological organism."Sameman"designates"aparticipation f
the samecontinuedLife, by constantlyfleeting particlesof Matter[biological
matter],n successionvitallyunited o the sameorganizedBody."'Wemightsay
1Essay, 2.27.6. See also ?8. References to the Essay concerning Human Understanding
are given in this form, the numbers referring to book, chapter, and/or section.
665
Copyright2001 byJournal f theHistoryof Ideas.Inc.
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 3/20
John W. Yolton
manconsists of two materialities, orporealparticlesanda biologicalbody,but
Locke says elsewhere thatby the term"man"we mean"acorporeal,rational
Creature."2 he term"rational" learly adds a non-corporealproperty o the
corporeal,biological body.Since Lockecharacterized"person" s havingrea-
son, "rational" ddedto "man"ndicatesthat man andpersonarenotseparatedordistinct;samereference or "I"butdifferentcontributionso thecombination
of manandperson.Personaddssomething mportantoman:rationalitys added
tocorporeality.Theproperties f a person-intelligence, rationality, onscious-
ness-are not identified with or reducedto neurobiologicalpropertiesnor to
materialparticles.Severalquestionscan beraised:howdomanandpersonworktogether,how
does agency pertain o theman-person,what is the locus of agency?Tosay,"I
did it,"e.g., repaymentof a debt, is to say I performed hat actionin a certain
way,with armorhandsorby instructingmybanker, tc. Actionsrequireabody,aphysicalbody.As actor,I amboth a personanda man.Thus,I amtheagentof
my actions. We need to ask whether heagencypertains o the unitof manand
person,orare thereaspectsof agencyascribed o theman,othersascribed o the
person?Agency involves power,on Locke's account.If we consult the main
chapterof theEssay where Locke discusses agency andaction(2.21), we find
thatthe majorityof actions locate the power of acting and deciding with the
man.Onesection at leastlocates thatpowerwiththeperson:Libertybelongs"to
the Personhavingthe Powerof doing, or forbearing o do."3Severalsections
give the mind some powerrelevantto acting.Otherpassagesjust referto "theagent."Frequently eferences o man andagentoccurin thesamepassage.
Essay2.21.8 creditsthe manwiththepowerto thinkandto move, thinking
andmoving beingthetwocategoriesof action.A man s freewhenhe canmove
according o thepreferenceof his mind.Section 15characterizesibertyas "the
powera Manhas to do or forbeardoing any particularAction"(see also ??47,
52). Thenext section(?16) speaksof freedom,suggestingthat t canbe "attrib-
utedto thePower,that s in aMan,to produce,orforbearproducing heMotion
in partsof his Body,by choice or preference."Section 18 refersto "different
Powers n theMind,or in theMan,to do severalactions";andsection 19 assertsagainthat "it is the Man that does the Action."Thediscussionof freedomand
libertycites severalspecificactionsperformedby a man,e.g., walking,standing
still, falling from a precipice(?24), andfalling into the water(?9). Latersec-
tions ascribe o amanuneasiness,thespur o act.Manysectionsrefer o manas
free or constrained e.g., ??8, 9, 11, 12, 21-25, 28, 30, 34).
2Ibid., 3.11.16. Earlyin the Essay, Locke describes "the whole Man"as consisting of
"Mindas well asBody"
(2.1.11).3 Ibid., 2.21.10. Fora useful detailed discussionof this chapterof the Essay, see Gideon
Yaffe,LibertyWorthhe Name (Princeton,2000).
666
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 4/20
Locke's Man
Somepassagesmix man andperson,as in 2.21.10: "Again,supposea Man
be carried,whilstfastasleep,into a Room,where s aPersonhe longs to see and
speak with." Is a sleeping man not a person?In 2.27.15 Locke speaksof the
personattheresurrection utgoes on to ask whether t wouldbe the sameman.
Section 22 of this same chapteropens with the question:"Butis not a ManDrunkand Soberthe same Person?"Manypassagesjust referto the agentof
action: he"Power n any Agentto do orforbearanyparticular ction" 2.21.8);
"anAgent capableof Volition" 2.21.13);"whateverAgenthasapowerto think
on its own actions"(2.21.15); "it is theAgent thathas power,or is able to"act
(2.21.19). This lastpassage,as I notedabove,has themandoingthe actionbut
thepowerbelongsto theagent.Is theagent,then,different romthe man?That
sectionactuallyoffersathree-folddistribution: But t is theMindthatoperates,andexerts thesePowers [of choosing andthinking]; t is theMan thatdoes the
Action [of singinganddancing], t is theAgentthathaspower,or is able todo"(2.21.19).4"Operating," exerting," nd"doing"areall powerterms,designat-
ing activecontributions o theresult.Inotherwords,(1) thepowerof themind
formspreferences,makes achoice, (2) the mandancesandsingsbecause(3) the
manas agentpossesses thepowerof acting.Threedifferentpowers: hoseof the
mind,theman,andtheagent.Agency-powermaybethesameasman-power. f
we canthinkof aninactiveman,a manforthemomentnotdoing anything, uch
a manat thatmoment wouldnot be anagent;although, f he was forbearing o
do,I guesshewouldbeanagent.Locke'sexampleof a manasleepwhilecarried
intoanother oomwould be anexampleof a manwho,atthat ime,wouldnotbeanagent.Thechange na manfrompassiveto activemarksachangefrombeinga mantobeinganagent(andperhapsaperson).Agencydependsupontheman:
he is anagentbecause he is a man.
The headingsin the tableof contentsfor sections 14-21 read"Libertybe-
longs not to the Will....But to theAgentor Man."The "or" n this last phrase
maybe ambiguous,meaningtheagent s theman,orthatthetwo differ.Earlier
chaptersrefer to the free agent (1.3.14) and to sensible or voluntaryagents
(2.20.14). Latersectionsin 2.21 havethe agentexercisingthepowerit (he)has
(??29, 72; see 2.27.29). The agent is free (?50) and has the libertyto act inconsequenceof thoughts(?71). Section 13 of 2.27 even has "consciousnessof
pastaction"annexedto an individualagent,and4.21.1 ascribesrationalityand
volition to agents,in his quick descriptionof ethics,"thatwhicha Manhimself
oughtto do, as a rationalandvoluntaryAgent."
4 This sectionbeginswith sayingsome actualthought"maybe theoccasionof Volition,of
exercisingthepowera Man has to chuse."The"choice of theMind[maybe] the causeof actual
thinkingon this orthat
thing."In a similar
way,"the actual
singingof sucha Tune,maybe the
occasion of dancingsuch a Dance,andthe actualdancingof sucha Dance[maybe] theoccasion
of such a Tune."
667
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 5/20
John W. Yolton
What hisbriefexamination f passagesaboutagencyreveals s howimpor-tantthe notion of powerwas for Locke. Both the physicaland social domains
arepervadedby powers,activepowers.5Godtoo is anagent,a wise andunder-
standingagentwith powers (4.3.28, 4.20.15). Wherethereis agency,thereis
power, hepowertoproducephysicalchanges nobjectsand n senseorgans, hepowerto move one's own limbs, to act in accordancewith one's preferences.The power or ability to act morally,to repaydebts, to tell the truth,to help
others, nvolves the mind as well as the body.Suchactionsinvolve intentions,
knowledge,a sense of responsibility, ndrespectfor others.Theknowledgerel-
evant to moralactions s theknowledgeof the laws of nature, hemoral aws on
whichsociety is foundedand which areto governouractions.
We can also say thatthesepassagesconfirm thatit is one "entity" hat has
the power,decides, andacts. Whetherwe speakof the man,the personor the
agent,thereference s the same. We cannotsay the referent s a substance,al-thoughperhapsthe physical body might count as a materialsubstance,even
thoughon Locke's account we have no knowledge of body as the traditional
substance.Certainly t is clear that"person"does not referto a substance,ma-
terialorimmaterial.E. J. Lowe hasrecently suggestedthatwe take thereferent
to be a psychological substance,meaning, I guess, thatwe are dealing with
propertiese.g.,rationality,ntention, onsciousness)whichbelongtosomething,to a consciousbeing.6But if thecore, as it were,of the man-person,of the unit
that is man,personandagent, is the humanbody with its biology andneuro-
physiology,thenmind andconsciousnessbecome propertiesof thatbody.Butthose propertiesdo not become physical (neural)properties.Man, a human,
startsout as anembryo,becomes an infant,an adultand anold man.Manalso
becomesaperson,whencertainconditionsaremet.
The term "person"requentlyhas a moral tone in Locke's accountof per-sonal identity,but it may be too strongto say thatis its only feature.It mighteven be possible to distinguish"self" from "person," he lattercarryingthe
moralconnotation, he formerreferring o self-identity.The agentof actionis
theman,theself. Actions arenot restrictedo moralactions,dancingorsinging,
fencingor talkingareactionsof the agentas muchas aretruth-telling,helping
5Fora summary tatementof thepervasiveroleof powersin the physicalworld,see 3.2.2
and3.2.3. Locke talks there of "natural ubstances."The bulkof the long chapteron power is
devoted to thepowerswe have as agents.6 E. J. Lowe, Subjectsof Experience(New York,1996), 32-35. MarcParmentierhas sug-
gested that the conceptof personis a new categoryfor Locke.The traditionaldoctrineof sub-
stance identified two kinds, material and immaterial.But humans, individualmen embodyboth material and immaterialproperties,extension andthought,so they do not fit into either
one of the traditionalcategories.Parmentier efers to "unelocalisationconcomitantedes es-
prits et des corps."Following his remark,we might suggest thatextension and thoughtare
propertiesof theperson,theperson,we might say,playsthe roleof substance MarcParmentier,Introductiona I'Essai sur l'entendementhumainde Locke [Paris, 1999], 183, see also 271,
273).
668
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 6/20
Locke's Man
others,honoringparents.It is these latter,moralactions,that enableLocke to
give his moststriking chilling)exampleof apersonbecomingaman,orsinkingeven lower:thoseagentsin Locke's Two Treatisesof Governmentwho violate
the lawof nature,herebybecoming ike andcanbe treated s wildsavagebeasts.
The locus of actionin theircase was still withthemselves,perhapswe can saytheirselves, buttheydid notbehaveas persons.
2. SecularSelf, Moral Self
Is theresome textualbasis for a distinctionbetweenself andperson?Or is
"self"justanother erm,alongwith"man,""person," nd"agent,"orspecify-
ingandreferringothesubjectwhothinksandacts?There s a differenceof tone
atleastbetweenspeakingof "myself "and"myperson."Wemaybeself-confi-
dent,buthardlyperson-confident.We can be self-ishbutnotperson-ish.To sayI amconcerned ormy personsoundsrather ormal.Itwouldbemorenatural o
be concerned ormy self, even formy body(my arms, egs, fingers).Wemightask "whowas thepersonat thedoor,"although t is more natural o simplyask
"whowas at thedoor?"We wouldnot ask "Whowas the self atthe door?"
Are theselinguisticconventionsreflected nLocke'suse of"self " and"per-son"?Of these two terms,"self" seems to be the morebasic. If we surveythe
sectionsin 2.27, we find (A) a numberof sectionswhere consciousnessdeter-
mines the self. (B) There arealso two sections thatmix self andpersonin the
discussion.(C)Thereare several sectionsthatapplyto the self thetalkof beingconcerned. tis tempting o suggestthat he(A) sectionspresentwhatwe mightcall the "secular elf,"in oppositionto personas the"moralself."
2.1. On Being Self to Self. The first section in which this curiousphrase
appears s in 2.27.9, thedefinitionof "person" s a "thinkingntelligentBeing,thathas reasonandreflection,and canconsider t self as it self."Consciousness
is the meansforsuchconsideration. pecifically, nsensingandperceiving,"ev-
eryone is tohimself,thatwhich he callsself."Theidentityof thepersonrestson
the samenessof self: "And as far as this consciousnesscan be extendedback-
wardsto any pastAction orThought,so far reachesthe identityof thatPerson;it is the sameself now as it was then;and'tis by thesameself withthis one that
now reflectson it, thatthatActionwasdone."Lockeemploystheterm"Being"
as a way to avoid "substance."He also uses the phrase"thinking hing"in a
similarway.Thatthinkingthingis, he seems to say,a self; over time, via con-
sciousness, it is "thesame to it self." When consciousness is interruptedby
forgetfulness,we lose "sightof ourpastselves"(?10).The curiousphrase"per-
sonal self "occurs nsection 10.Same consciousnessovertime revealsthesame
personalself. The linkbetween consciousnessandself is explicitlystated nthe
Tableof Contents or2.27.17, "Selfdependson Consciousness,"and in section23, "Consciousnessalone makesself."
669
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 7/20
John W Yolton
Section 10endedwithhisremark hat hesameconsciousnessunites"those
distantActions intothe samePerson,whateverSubstancescontributedo their
Production." t is not same substance which accountsfor the person,but the
sameness of consciousness. Section 11 then offers evidence for thatremark.
"That his is so, we have some kindof Evidencein ourvery Bodies, all whoseParticles,whilst vitally united to this samethinkingconscious self, so that we
feel whenthey aretouch'dand areaffectedby,andconsciousof good or harm
thathappensto them, are a partof our selves: i.e. of our thinkingconscious
self" The referentof "this" n the first clause of this sentence is not entirelyclear.If thereference s to thefirst clause of the final sentenceof section 10,the
consciousness thatunites actions and constitutesthe personis said to depend
uponthebody.Thatdependencewould seemto showthat tis notconsciousness
alone thatmakes the person;at least not consciousness acting apart rom the
body.What s touchedandaffectedare,I think,theparticlesor moreprecisely,thepartsof ourbody.If the"this"atthebeginningof this sentencerefersto the
last clause of section 10, "whateverSubstancescontributed o theirProduc-
tion," s thebodyoffered as a "substance"which contributes o theproductionof action?We seem tohavehere anotherndicationof Locke'srecognitionof the
role of the body (of nervesandbrain),in sensing andperceiving.Section 25
confirmsthe relationbetween self andbody:"Thusany partof ourBodies vi-
tallyunited othat,which is consciousinus, makesa partof our selves."Corpo-realparticlesare"vitallyunited" o the thinkingconscious self. The natureof
thatvital union is left obscure.I take Locke to be saying simply that becausethere s a vital linkbetweenthoseparticlesandourbeingawareof beingtouched
and affected(afterour body partshave been affected),we recognize thatthe
bodyis ourbody,partof ourself. Thephrase,"consciousself "goes alongwith
"personal elf,"giving again priority o theself.
Section 13 raises the questionof why "one intellectual[i.e., immaterial]
Substancemay not have represented o it, as done by it self" some actions it
neverdid.Section 14 says againthat f ourconsciousnessfails to includesome
pastaction,an action nfact doneby others,we wouldnot be one self withthose
others.Section21 repeats hepointthat t is consciousness"alonewhich makeswhatwe call self."Section 23 insists that"self s notdeterminedby Identityor
Diversityof Substance," nly by identityof consciousness.Section24 speaksof
a "man'sself,"a phrasethat also occursin section25.7
2.2. Person and Self. We saw above that 2.27.9 includes in its accountof
what"person" tands or thefactthatthethinkingbeingcan"consider t self as
it self."Section17contains hatcuriousexampleof afingerbeingcut off: should
consciousness"goalongwiththe littlefinger,and eavetherestof theBody,'tis
7
See also 2.21.50 (playingthe fool can "drawShame and Misery upon a Man's self');3.3.9 (we can consider "aMan'sself'); and4.11.2 (we can only be certainof the existence of
God and of "aMan'sself'); cf. Locke, Some ThoughtsconcerningEducation, ?175.
670
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 8/20
evidentthe littleFingerwould be thePerson."Under hatcondition, heself then
"wouldhave nothingto do with the rest of the Body."Self andpersongo to-
gether.Section26 thenannounces hat"Person,as I takeit, is thenamefor this
self."The nextsentencereservesthe term"person"orthe use of others,a kind
of third-personuse: "Where-evera Manfinds, what he calls himself, thereIthinkanothermay say is the same Person."I am not sure what to make of
"person" eingthename for "self."Wehave to be carefulnot to maketoo much
of thispassingremark."Man"s also saidto be a name n severalotherpassages
(2.28.15; 2.32.25); 2.27.7 raises thepossibilitythatperson,man,and substance
are "threeNames standingfor threedifferentIdeas."Nevertheless, the term
personas thenameof the self does raiseseveralquestions.Is therea suggestionthat"person"s only a name,thatit does not markor standfor a sortor kind,
that t is not anontologicalcategory? ndistinguishingperson romman, s more
impliedthanthat"person"s only a name?If person s more thana name,whatcan we say aboutpersons?
While discussing trueand false ideas, Locke remarksthatwhen we ask
"what s it"of some"newThingof a kind" hatwe donotrecognize,we meanby
thatquestion"nothingbut the Name"(2.32.7).8If I ask,"what s it that s self to
it self,"the answer n termsof thispassagewouldbe "person," name.Butthat
name would apply,I takeit, to anyonewho is conscious of self, who is self to
self. Does thatgeneralapplication ndicatethat"person"designatesa class or
kind?If thesuggestionsof Lowe andParmentier retakenseriously, hatperson
(for Lowe) is a psychological substanceor (for Parmentier)person is a newcategoryreplacing,as I wouldsay, the traditional ubstancedoctrine, henper-son may after all be more basic than self. The problemfor bothDescartesand
Locke was howtocharacterize he unionof mind andbodyin man.Suchaunion
fell outside the usualtwo-substancedoctrine.The notionof anincompletesub-
stancemayhavebeen Descartes'sattempt o finda differentcategoryfor man.
Similarly,butperhaps or differentreasons(ourlack of any knowledgeabout
substance),Locke may have employed the term"person"as a substitutecat-
egory.
It has been the term"person"which framedthe debatesaroundLocke'sdiscussionfromhisdaytothepresent. n thatway, "person"s themorefamiliar
term,not self. Thetwo termshavealmostequaloccurrences n 2.27. Itmaynot
be too important o decide which of those termsis more basic, especially if
Locke ascribesmostof the sameproperties r features o both.Thereare several
definitionswhichmayhelpus decidewhether here s a distinctionbetweenself
andperson.
8 Cf. Some Thoughts,?120: "Whenany new thing comes in theirway, Childrenusually
ask,the commonQuestionof a Stranger:What s it?Whereby heyordinarilymean
nothingbut
the Name; and thereforeto tell them how it is call'd, is usually the properAnswer to that
Demand."
Locke's Man 671
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 9/20
John W. Yolton
Definition 1: "This being premised to find wherein personal Identity
consists, we mustconsider what Person standsfor;which, I think, s a
thinking ntelligentBeing, thathas reason andreflection,and cancon-
sider it self as it self, the same thinkingthing in differenttimes and
places;whichit does only by thatconsciousness,which is inseparablefromthinking,andas it seems to me essentialto it...."(2.27.9)
No moralovertoneshere, ustthespecificationof intelligence,reason,reflection
andtheconsideringof selfby self. The formation f, ortherealizationbythe self
of its self, is what aperson s on this definition.Theseconddefinitionof personis themore familiar.
Definition2: "Itis a ForensickTermappropriatingActions andtheir
Merit;and so belongs only to intelligent Agentscapableof a Law andHappinessandMisery.Thispersonalityextendsit self beyond presentExistenceto whatis past,only by consciousness,wherebyit becomes
concernedandaccountable,owns and mputes o itself pastActions...."
(2.27.26)
Thedifferencebetweenthesetwo definitionsmightbe characterized s the
differencebetween a cognitiveconsciousnessandanaffectiveoreven a moral
consciousness.9The intelligentbeing of definitionI considershimself to be a
self, not aperson. Consciousness constitutesa self, butin so doing, a personisalso formed.The seconddefinitionrefersto the ascription self-ascription?)of
responsibility orthe actions of thatself. So we cansaythat"person" ames the
self of both definitions. That name embracesboth a secularanda moral self.
The newcategorysuggestedby Parmentierhusplaysa substantiveor(better)a
subjectrole. Inthatway "person"wouldbe themore fundamentalerm.
2.3. Self-Concern.The linkbetweenself intheseconddefinitionandperson
becomes moreexplicitinseveralsectionswheretheimportantanguageof "con-
cern" s appliedto the self. The term"concern"plays a centralrole in the ac-
count of personas a moralagent." So self andperson nthesepassagesbecomeclosely connected,perhapseven interchangeable.Writing n the first person,
9 See Parmentier, 83. This way of characterizinghe differencein consciousness is sug-
gested to me by a remarkParmentiermakes late in his book:"Pourdefinirun sujectmoralla
consciousness ne doit cependantpas etre seulementune conscience cognitive mais ouvrirun
champd' 'interessement'(concernment)."10The role of concernin his accountof personal dentityis announcedas earlyas 2.1.11:
"For if we take wholly away all Consciousnessof our Actions and Sensations,especially of
PleasureandPain,and theconcernment hataccompanies t, it will be hard o know whereinto
place personalidentity."The same section speaksseveraltimes of concernfor
"Happiness,or
Misery"when dealing with the question of whetherthe waking Socrates is the same as the
sleeping Socrates.See also 2.1.12.
672
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 10/20
Locke's Man
Locke says that "Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the Ark and Noah's
Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last Winter, or as that I write
now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames
overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the
same self, place that self in what Substance you please, than that I that writethis am the same my self now whilst I write" (? 16). He goes on to stress the fact
that "as to this point of being the same self it matters not whether this present
self be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and
asjustly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropri-
ated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am that I did the last moment."
Section 17 is even more forthright in employing the affective language for the
self. It captures all of the properties that characterize the person: consciousness
"makes the same Person," thereby constituting what he calls the "inseparable
Self"; the person attributes its actions to "it Self, and owns all the Actions."Section 25 reiterates the concern for self: "This every intelligent Being, sensible
of Happiness or Misery, must grant that there is something that is himself, that
he is concerned for, and would have happy...." Section 26 picks up this associa-
tion of happiness and misery with the self and applies it to the person.
3. Physical Man, Rational Man, Moral Man
My suggested thesis that the term "self" designates a "secular self," as
opposed to or distinguished from "person" as a moral self, does not have anysystematic supportfrom Locke's usage in these passages, but the two definitions
of "person" do establish a dual function for consciousness: a cognitive and a
moral or affective constituting of self and person. The cognitive constituting is a
necessary condition for the moral or affective self or person. We may have a
choice between speaking of two aspects of self or treating these aspects as self
and person. In the first choice, personal identity spans both aspects, so we could
distinguish a secular from a moral self. In the alternative, the term "person"
identifies the moral, affective aspect. On this alternative we can cite two features
of the self that are different from person. (1) The self and the body, even body
parts, have a clear attachment." (2) The self also seems to be more basic than
person in a temporal sense: the person grows out of the self, the self can be called
a person (its name is "person") when certain conditions are met in character-
" Locke expresses this attachment n several ways. We saw above that in 2.27.11, he
speaksof theparticlesof thebody being"vitallyunited"with the"thinking onsciousself."We
also saw that in 2.27.25, he speaksof "any partof our Bodies vitally unitedto thatwhich is
consciousin us." Suchbody partsarethereby"apartof ourselves."In2.27.27, he tells us that
we areignorantof the "nature f thatthinkingthingin us"whichwe taketo be ourselves. He
goes on to say our lack of knowledge aboutthe self includes not knowing if it is "tied to asystem of animalspirits."So the self is the thinkingthing, the body and its partsareunitedto
the self, andthe self is tied to the physiology.The relation of "tiedto" is left unexplained.
673
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 11/20
formation.When a self earnsthe name of "person,"hatis a markof its moral
maturity.Whenwe ask how we shouldunderstandLocke'sdistinctionbetween
manandperson,I suggest we can say "person"s to be takenas adding,or at
least as stressing,the forensic, law-abidingfeaturesto the self, creatingwhat
Lockecalls "moralman,"a self concernedforhappinessandvirtue n this lifeandultimatelysalvation n thenext (3.11.16).12
Locke'sdiscussionof action andthe variouspowersinvolvedindicates hat
someactionsaremoralactions,othersarevariousphysicalactions.Whatmakes
any actionmyactionis the consciousnessI have of doing those things.In this
way,whether t be anactof singingordancing,of walkingby theThameswhen
it was frozen,of experimentingwith differenthandsin water,choppingan al-
mond,or whether t is actionssuchasrepayingadebt,honoringparents,helping
others,consciousness formsa self or a person.My attempt o saythefirstgroup
of actionsbelongs to the self while the second belongs to the persondoes notquitefit thetexts,although hereareonly a few passagesthatspeakof the self in
those forensictones usuallyreservedfor person.Keepingin mind the 3.11.16
passagejust cited, we may have some basis for speakingof a continuum rom
man n aphysicalsense,to manas rational perhaps heself ), to moralman(the
person).Each temalongthis linepossesses physicalpowers,powersof thinkingandacting,andmoralpowers.Themature ndividual, heunit of man, self, and
person, s the locusof all thesepowers. Agency is located nthisunit,the manas
agentof thoughtandaction is bothself andperson.
4. Definitionsof Man
Inlocatingthesourceof agencyin the unitof man, self, andperson,Locke
takesaccountof theroleof man(especiallyphysicalman)andperson n action.
Bodily motion andconscious intentionsare oint components n all humanac-
tion.His reference o theparticlesof matterandbody-partsbeingvitallyunited
with, even partsof, the conscious self is an emphaticrecognitionof the dual
involvementof bodyand mind in action.Locke does notgive us anydetailson
how thephysiology of thebody,the systemof animalspirits, s tiedto the self,but he makes use of the physiology in explainingsome sensoryexperiences.Mostoften,he confesses ignoranceof theway in whichsensation s causedby
physicaleventsoutsideand nside thebody.Butheassignsthatvitalunionwhich
particlesof matterhave with the self also to thebody:"theIdentityof thesame
Man consists ... in nothingbut a participation f the same continuedLife, by
constantly leetingParticlesof Matter, n successionvitally unitedto the same
organizedBody"(2.27.6; cf. 2.27.8). Thevitalunionof materialparticleswith
12
See 3.11.16: "Andtherefore,whethera Child or Changelingbea Man in a
physicalSense, may amongstthe Naturalistsbe as disputableas it will, it concernsnot at all the moral
Man, as I may call him...."
674 John W.Yolton
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 12/20
the body is presumably of a different sort from the vital union of those particles
with the conscious self. "Union" and "partof " are left unanalyzed.
In the 2.27.8 passage Locke identifies the 2.27.6 remark as a definition,
adding that "the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is
the Sign, is nothing but of an Animal of such a certainForm [i.e., shape]"(2.27.8).When he says that "ingenuous observation puts it past doubt" that the word
"man" is a sign of animal with a specific shape, he seems to be reporting on
common usage among his contemporaries.'3Definition for Locke was not a mat-
ter of giving the genus and differentia. Rather,it is the enumeration of the simple
ideas comprising some complex idea (3.3.10). This is, he thought, the best way
to make "anotherunderstand by Words. what Idea the term defined stands for."
In the example from 2.27.8 the idea of man contains the ideas of animal and a
specific shape. He cites other definitions in 3.3.10, but there is no indication as
to whether he accepts either of them. Notice the way he starts the first definition:
Definition 1: "if it should be said, that Man was a solid extended Sub-
stance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of
Reasoning," the meaning of that word would be understood.
Definition 2: Man is "a rational Animal; which by the several defini-
tions of Animal, Vivens, and Corpus, resolves it self into those enumer-
ated Ideas."
He repeats definition 1 in 3.6.3 with some variation: "Forthough, perhaps, vol-
untary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain shape, be
the complex Idea, to which I, and others, annex the name Man." The "perhaps"
leaves it open as to Locke's acceptance of this definition. In that passage, he is
concerned to deny that that definition would be, or would give us, the real es-
sence of man. It would only be the nominal essence.4 The same point about
essence is made in 3.11.16, where he cites anotherdefinition of man, one related
to morality: "when we say that Man is subject to Law: We mean nothing by
Man, but a corporeal rational Creature." With this definition in the context ofmoral discourse shape is irrelevant: "For were there a Monkey, or any other
Creature to be found, that had Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to under-
stand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general Ideas, he would
no doubt be subject to Law." Section 20 of this same chapter says that if shape
is taken as the mark for "Creatures of our kind," then the definition of man (of
the same man) as an idea "made up of Animalitn and Rationality, united in the
'3 In the seventeenthcentury"ingenuous"was often confused with "ingenious" Oxford
EnglishDictionary);Locke must mean the latter,hence "skillful"or "careful"observationof
wordusage.14Cf. 3.11.20 and 3.6.21, 22.
Locke's Man 675
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 13/20
sameSubject"wouldnot serveas well as does thedefinition n termsof shapefor the class or kind "man."So perhapsdifferentdefinitionsarerequired or
differentpurposesandfunctions.15
5. TheFundamentalConstitutionof Man
Kinds, sorts,or classes, as far as ourknowledgeextends,referonly to our
generalabstractdeas."Essential" nlyrelates othe ideaswe form.WhenLocke
says in 3.6.4, "'Tisnecessaryfor me to be as I am;GODandNaturehas made
me so,"hegoes on to say,"there s nothingIhave,is essentialto me."This latter
clause can be interpretedntwo ways:(a)essentialrelatesonly toclasses, not to
individuals,or (b) none of my propertiesrevealthe realessence of man. Since
the example here is of a particularndividual,the first interpretation pplies.
Thepropertiesof anyindividualmancould revealsomeof thepropertiesof theclass of men,butas thesecondinterpretationemindsus, Lockedidnot believe
ourknowledgereachesto realessences.Therealessenceof bodiesorof man, f
there are suchessences, do not show upin our observations or we cannotsay
theydo).WhetherLockethought herewere realkinds n naturemaybe unclear
fromhis extendeddiscussionof essence,but it does seemthathe entertainedhe
possibilityof therebeingan internal tructure f physicalbodiesfromwhichwe
could have a deductivescienceof nature.16Perhaps hecorpuscular tructure f
mattermay have been what he had in mind. His extendedexposition of this
notionof anapriorideductivescienceof nature ervesto contrast twithexperi-mental and observational cience, theonly science opento man'sfaculties and
knowledge.Theimportant uestion s did Lockebelievetherewererealessences
in natureand realnecessaryconnections?He certainlyrejectedthe traditional
notionof realessence,butacase canbe madeforsayinghe accepted hecorpus-
culartheoryas a replacement orthetraditionalheory.He didcharacterizehe
corpuscular heoryas the mostprobable, o he left theway openforsome other
candidate o fill therole of the sourceof theobservedpropertiesof body.'7But
his acceptanceof a foundationalstructureof matterwhich is responsiblefor
properties hatwe discoverby experienceand observationseems clear,eventhoughsucha structurewas beyondourexperience.
15 Essay 4.3.23 characterizesman as an "inconsiderable,mean, and impotentCreature,"
one of the lowest of all "IntellectualBeings"on the scale of Being.16 See, e.g., Essay 2.31.6,11; 2.32.24; 3.6.3; 4.3.16; 4.3.29; 4.6.11.
17 Essay, 4.3.16: "thecorpuscularianHypothesis... is thoughtto go farthest n an intelli-
gible Explicationof the Qualitiesof Bodies" (Essay, 4.3.16), and "theWeaknessof humane
Understanding s scarce able to substituteanother,which will afford us a fuller and clearer
discoveryof the necessaryConnexions,and Co-existence,of the Powers,which are to be ob-
served unitedin severalsorts of them."In SomeThoughtsconcerningEducation,?193, Locke
suggeststhat naturalphilosophyshould be studiedfor the
hypothesesadvanced,rather han"to
understand he Terms and Ways of Talkingof the several sects," adding that "the Modern
Corpuscularians alk, in most Things, more intelligiblythanthe Peripateticks."
676 John W. Yolton
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 14/20
Locke's Man
What is fascinatingabouthis discussion of man is his ratherclear albeit
brief statementof such a structure or man, notjust for man'sbody.Real es-
sence in man,he says, would be the "Sourceof all thoseOperations,whichare
to be found in anyIndividualof that Sort....The foundationof all thoseQuali-
ties,which are heIngredients f ourcomplexldea" 3.6.3).Presumably, source"means"cause."Whatthe operationsare which are causedby the sourceis not
clear. The operationshe refersto maybe some of thepowersmentioned n the
nextpassage.The"qualities" re,I assume, hosereferredo in thedefinitionsof
man: solid substance, ife, sensation,andreasoning.The sourceor foundation
would be quitedifferent romthe qualitiesandoperationswe experienceand
observe.
Locke thenturnsto the knowledgewe wouldhave, were realessence (the
source)available o us. Ourknowledgeof manwould be of thekindthatAngels
orGod have:"Andhadwe sucha Knowledgeof thatConstitutionofMan,fromwhich the Facultiesof Moving, Sensation,and Reasoning,andother Powers
flow; andon whichhis so regular hapedepends .. we shouldhaveaquiteother
Idea of his Essence, than what now is contained n ourDefinitionof thatSpe-
cies, be it what it will" (3.6.3). Real essence would replacenominalessence,
certainknowledge would replace experienceandobservation.We learnfrom
this remark hatthe source also causesthe facultiesandpowerswe have,facul-
ties of moving,sensing,andreasoning.Suchknowledgewouldchangeour dea
of man,even the idea of a particular,ndividualman"wouldbe as far different
fromwhat it now is, as is his, who knows all theSpringsandWheels,andothercontrivanceswithin,of thefamous Clock atStrasbourg, romthatwhich a gaz-
ing Country-manhas of it, who barelysees the motionof the Hand,andhears
theClock strike,andobservesonly some of the outwardappearances"cf. Es-
say 3.6.9). Weonly have the appearances o workwith, our idea of man,of a
humanbeing, is only based on ourexperienceoron ouraccepteddefinitions.
Thesepassagesseem to be in Locke's own voice. Wecannotsay withcer-
taintywhat he mayhaveimagined he constitutionof manto be, butit wouldbe
difficult for it not to be physicalor biological, perhapsboth.18Locke seems to
have taken he notion of properties"flowingfrom"ahidden, heoreticsourceas"deducible from" such a source;at least, he stressedthis featurein orderto
highlighthis insistenceon anexperimental cience.But"flowfrom"also marks
a causalrelation.If we keep in mindhis clear ascriptionof a "vital union"of
particlesof matterwith bothbody andself, it looks as if he may have had in
18 Today,we would say thatthe knowledgeof the humangenome would yield a detailed
knowledgeof the sources and causes of manyfeaturesof humans.An articlein TheNew York
Times for 11 February2001 about the humangenome projectspeaksof "theset of DNA-en-
coded instructions hatspecify a person."WithLocke's distinctionbetween man andperson,
perhapswe should
saythe DNA instructions
pecifya man.Such
knowledgederivedfromthat
biologicalsourcemaybe thesort of knowledgeLockewas suggesting,althoughhardlya deduc-
tive knowledge.
677
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 15/20
John W Yolton
mindthecorpuscular tructure f matteras the constitution orbodyand man,
even formoralman. He doesnotidentifythecorpuscular tructure s the source
of intelligenceorreason,but thattheorydoes assigna causalrole to corpusclesfor sensationand the origin of ideas, perhapsalso for the shape of physical
objects.He doesnot mentionanyotherfundamental tructureorthepropertiesof man.Thus,theconstitutionof man, self, andpersonmaybe the sameas the
constitutionof man'sbody.Thentheproblem s toexplainthecausal"flowingfrom"relation or thepsychologicalor mentalpropertiesof moralman,self or
person.Locke does notofferanyexplanationor illustration.'9
5.1. TheConstitutionof Children.The "flow from"metaphoralso occurs
in a differentcontext whenLockediscusses the importanceof forminga goodcharacter n children.There,he refersto "Actions,whichnaturally low from a
well-formedMind."20hatsame treatisecontainsmanyreferences o theconsti-
tutionof children,of theirbodies and theirminds.2'This useof "constitution"sclearlydifferent romthatterm n theEssaypassagesabouta deductivescience
of nature.There s aninterestingproblem,perhapsatension,betweenthese two
uses of the notionof a constitution rom which specific properties low. If we
identify the references to an underlyingconstitution n the Essay as the real
essence constitutionandthe SomeThoughtsconstitutionas the constitutionof
character,one difference s thatthe lattercanbe formedandinfluencedby the
guidanceof parentsand tutor.The role of education s in largepartto builda
goodcharacter,oprovide orsuchqualitiesascivility,modesty,andmanyother
virtues.Theformingof agoodcharacter as to recognizesome "nativePropen-sities,"some"tempers rtraits" uch as "FierceorMild,BoldorBashful,Com-
passionateorCruel,OpenorReserv'd.""Whether hesenativepropensitiesare
causedby some feature of the real essence constitution,on the basis of what
LockewritesinSomeThoughtswe cannotsay.Therearea few nativepropensi-ties cited in the Essay, "Principlesof Action ... lodged in Men's Appetites"
(1.3.13), "tendenciesmprinted n theMinds of Men," endencieswhich"from
the very first instances of Sense andPerception .. aregrateful,andothersun-
welcome; some thingsthatthey inclineto, andothersthattheyfly" (1.3.3). He
does notsuggestthatthese tendenciesor traits"flowfrom" heunderlyingcon-stitutionof man.There s not,of course,a detailedorclearlydeveloped heoryof
19When he discusses the chain of being, Locke appliesthe notionof internalconstitution
to other memberson thechain. He raises thequestionof whether he "internalConstitutionand
Frame"of the various creatureson the scale or chain are specifically different,different in
kind,remarkinghat it is impossibleforus to say (3.6.22). But he does say "we haveReasonto
think,that where the Faculties,or outwardFrameso muchdiffers,the internalConstitution s
notexactlythe same." So thenotionof an internalconstitutionof thebeingsorcreatureson the
scale is clearly entertained.20
See, e.g., Some ThoughtsconcerningEducation.?66.21 Ibid., ??101, 102, 122, 126.22Ibid., ?102.
678
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 16/20
Locke's Man
whatfeaturesof man do flow from,arecausedby the realessence constitution.
Nevertheless,we canfill in somedetailsof a generalconceptof man,of a human
being.We knowfrom theearlybooks of theEssaythat hephysicalorganism, ven
pre-natally, xperiencessome sensationsof warmthandlight;after birthspe-cific ideas aregraduallyacquired.Thereare no nativeor innate ruthsbut,as we
just saw, thereis a practical nnateprincipleor tendencyto seek pleasureand
avoidpain.Wecanalso saythatdespiteLocke'suse of thewhitesheetorblank
tabletmetaphor, he organismhas a numberof faculties,at least the necessary
equipmentfor the functions of sensation, memory and reason. From Some
Thoughtswe learnthatthe child has, is bornwith, certaintraitswhich parentsand thetutormustacknowledgeand work within leadingthechild to becomea
rational,moralperson.Then from the brief passage in Essay 3.6.3, we know
thatLocke at least entertained he notionof an underlyingstructureprobablycorpuscular)whichcauses some of thesequalitiesor traitsof man.
5.2. RationalCreatures.Besides themanyvirtuescitedby Locke as impor-tantfor the child to acquire,rationality s perhapsof even greater mportance.After his detailedrecommendationson how to develop a strongand healthy
body, "Thenext and principleBusiness is, to set the Mind right, that on all
occasions it maybe disposedto consentto nothingbutwhatmaybe suitable o
theDignityandExcellencyof a rationalCreature."23ockeremarks,we all do
wantto be "thoughtRationalCreatures."24o we must treatchildrenas rational
creatures n order thatthey will come to see the value of rationality.' Lockeexplainsthattreatingchildren hatway involves makingthem"sensibleby the
Mildnessof yourCarriage, ndtheComposure ven inyourCorrection f them,
thatwhatyoudo is reasonablenyou,and usefulandnecessary orthem."26 he
faculty of reason,the operationof reasoning,andbeing rationalall appear n
Locke's definitionsof man andperson.Whetherwe believe physicalmanforLocke includesrationality thechild
has tobecomerational),or whetherwe thinkLockelimitedrationalityo the self
or person, what "flows from" the foundationof man, the innerconstitution,
includes thatproperty.Withthe distinctionhe suggestsin one passagebetweenphysical andmoralman,shape maybe thedefiningfeatureof theformer,ratio-
nality and otherpropertiescharacterize he latter.Whateverpropertiesare in-
cluded nthe definitionof manareonlythose we decideto includeor thatwe find
23Ibid., ?3124 Ibid., ?41. In the first edition of the Essay, Locke refersto "the Idea of ourselves,as
understanding, ationalCreatures"4.3.18); subsequenteditions replaced"rationalCreatures"
with "rationalBeings." Costes's Frenchtranslation,from a lateredition, preservesthe first
editionphrase:"l'id6e de Nous-memes comme le Creature ntelligent& Raissonnable."25
Ibid., ?81.26 Ibid.Civilized nations,Locke says laterin this work,are"groundeduponPrinciplesof
Reason"(?186).
679
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 17/20
John W Yolton
atwork n our anguage.None of thesegoes beyondwhat s discoveredby expe-rience andobservation,but all of thesewould havesome relation o theconstitu-
tion of man. Withphysicalbodies, bothprimaryandsecondaryqualitieshave
some relationto the corpuscular tructure,but the perceiveror observerplays
some role as well in theirappearance.There s no suchdistinctionof qualities nLocke's account of man, unless we take the physical man as "primary" nd
rational,moralmanas "secondary" r derivative.The "flowfrom"relationap-
plies to thepropertiesof both theprimaryandsecondaryman.The basicunitis
physicalman.Itis clearthat hepropertiesof thepersonandmoralmanare also
contributionsby the man himself, so theremay be a double causality in the
origin of person-qualities.Theremay be some questionaboutthe strengthof
Locke's acceptanceof the notion of a constitutionon which all propertiesde-
pend.Still, thoseremarks n Essay 3.6.3 are ratherunambiguous, f lackingin
detail.Lockedoes notprovideuswith evena hintabout hepossibleconstitutionof man, if indeed it differs from the constitutionof bodies. But it does seem
reasonablefor us to suggest that the constitutionof the propertiesof rational
man(thesecondary enseof "man")wouldconsistof theparticlesof the matter
of the physicalbody and,perhaps, he workingsof the biological mechanism.
Howto fit intosuch anotionthe role of theman n theconstitutionof theperson,is notclear,butI thinkwe findinLocke'sSomeThoughtsheways in which the
childacquires,under hecare of parentsandtheguidanceof thetutor, hequali-ties of a rationalperson.
5.3. Definitionand Theory.Whatwe includein ourideas of physical ob-jects, e.g., iron, gold, lead, is constrainedby the qualitieswe find coexisting
together nthoseobjects.Ourmoral deas,whatLockecalls "mixedmodes,"are
less tied to whatwe discover in humanaction,althoughthose ideas arefairlyfixedby thesocietywe areborn nto andbythelanguageof thatsociety. Strictly,to use Locke's terminologymixed-modeideas arearchetypes, hey determine
whatcountsasparricide, evenge, voting,bidding.Wheredoes the definitionof
manbelong,to mixedmodes orto physicalobjects?It seems morelike a mixed
mode:dependinguponourinterest,manis definedin termsof shape(physical
man)orin termsof rationality moralman).Life, sense, andperhaps olid sub-stancemaybe included n the definitionof physicalman;rationality,oncern or
happinessandmisery,acceptanceof responsibility or one's actionscharacter-
ize moralman,orperhaps he self orperson.The reference to the constitutionof man from which all those properties
flow complicatesthequestionof the definitionof man ust a bit.Thesimilarity
withphysicalsubstances,a fundamental onstitutiondetermining he observed
qualities, might suggest thatdefining man is similarto defining gold or iron:
make carefulobservationsof thequalitiesandcharacteristicshatwe find coex-
istingtogether.Whatwe include in our definitionof gold dependsuponouruseandinterestin thatmaterial,but whateverqualitieswe select must in fact be
680
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 18/20
foundto go together.Whatwe meanby "gold"cannot ncludepropertieswhich
experienceandexperiment annot ind.Experience nlargesourknowledgeand
understandingf gold orof anyothernatural ubstance. ndefiningmantoo we
cannotimputeproperties hatthose we taketo be humanbeings do not have.
Withphysicalman,we referto thebodyandits innerworkings; hatman s likeanyotheranimalorbiologicalcreature: norganization f partswith a common
life (Essay 3.6.5). A specific shapewith sense organsarealso foundin animals
and nmanby experienceandobservation.Wedo notnormally hinkof humans
as afunctioningbiologicalbody,althoughof coursewe recognizethat heyhave
such a body,a body necessaryfor action.As an anthropologistor sociologist,we can observepeoplein society, notingbehavior, peech,accomplishments.To
impute raits o thosewe observewhich cannotbe found sjustas improper s it
is to ascribeproperties o materialbodies thatwe do not find.Defining manin
Locke's projectis not, I think,an anthropological ask. It is more a matterofunpacking he term"man"as used in the languageandpracticesof society.At
the sametime, this enumerationof the ideas contained n the complex idea of
man is joined with the theoryof a foundationor constitution or the observed
features.Thattheoryis not partof the idea of man, it is a featureof Locke's
accountwhichis addedto theenumeration.
6. Man as Proprietor
Inwritingaboutman,person,andself, Lockewas notonly offeringdefini-tions based on the currentuses of those termsin his society. He also reveals
some of his beliefs aboutman.The reference o a constitution romwhichflows
all the observedfeatures andqualitiesof a manor person,is one such belief.
Otherbeliefs (perhaps hey may be stipulativedefinitions)areprovided n his
discussionof personal dentity,e.g., "person"s a forensicterm, t is the nameof
the self. There is anotherbelief aboutman and personheld by Locke which
reveals thespecialrelationhe wantsto establishbetweenthosetwo:"everyMan
has aProperty in his own Person."'7 This curious notion of owning one's person
receives a moreinterestingexpression n a latersectionof TwoTreatises:"Man(by beingMasterof himself andProprietorof his ownPerson,andtheActions
or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Plpertl" (?44).
The term "himself"refers to the man,the little word"it"refersto the person.
The man is the ownerof his person,thepersonactsandlabors.As theownerof
his person,the man(all men) in the stateof naturehave the freedom"to order
theirActions,anddisposeof theirPossessions andPersonas theythinkfit,"so
long as they do so "withinthe bounds of the Law of Nature" ?4). Section 6
27TwoTreatises,II, ?27. Cf. section 173:"by PropertyI must be understoodhere, as in
otherplaces, to mean thatPropertywhich Men have in theirPersonas well as Goods."
Locke's Man 681
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 19/20
John W Yolton
pointsout that hedisposalof hispersondoes notincludesuicide,theproprietor-
shipof his person s qualifiedby thelaw of natureandthe banon takinghis own
life. The term"proprietor"s definedin theOxfordEnglishDictionaryas,"One
whoholdssomethingas property; ne who hasthe exclusive rightor title to the
use ordisposalof a thing,"citing examplesfrom 1639and 1645.28The term "proprietor"s frequentlyfound in a political context, as "the
LordsProprietors f Carolina" n the FundamentalConstitutionsof Carolina
(1669),withwhichLocke wasassociated.Thetermoccursfrequentlyn Locke's
critiqueof RobertFilmer, n the first of Locke's Two Treatises e.g., ??16, 23,
39, 74, 92). Essay 2.12.5 explainsthe complex idea of theftas "theconcealed
changeof the possession of any thing,withoutthe consentof the Proprietor."Section 120 of the second of TwoTreatisesexplainsthatwhen a manincorpo-rateshimself "intoany Commonwealth,he, by his unitinghimself thereunto,
annexedalso, andsubmitsto theCommunity hosePossessions, whichhe has,orshallacquire."Man in thispassageis describedas theproprietor f his land,
his landandpossessions come underthejurisdictionof the governmentof the
community. nunitingwith thecommonwealth,hemanalso"uniteshisPerson"
to thecommunity.Theman'spossessions, lands andpersonbecome"subject o
theGovernment ndDominion of thatCommonwealth."
Lockedoes notsayin thepassage nsection44 thatacondition orbeingthe
proprietorof his personis being masterof himself, but thereseems to be an
implicit inkbetweenmasteryandproprietorshipf man'sperson.Tobe master
of one's self is to havereasonas thecontrolof one'sdesiresandpassions: hat sin partwhat it is to be a rationalcreature.Toearntherightto own one's person,
Locke may be suggesting, I must become a rationalcreature.Perhapsbeingrational s beinga person.Locke'sSomeThoughts s amanual,a setof instruc-
tions forparentsandtutorto follow in moldingthechild into a rational,moral
person,wheremasteryof one's self is thegoal. Locke's Conductof the Under-
standingalso speaksof mastery,of theimportance f gettingmasteryoverone's
understanding ndof one's thoughts.29Whathe says in Some Thoughtsabout
the mind of the child thatis "in tune,and well-disposed" o learning, applies
equally to the child. The goal is "to teach the Mind to get the Masteryoveritself" (?75). Learning o gain"aMasteryoverhis [thechild's] inclinations"s
also one of the tasksassignedto the tutor(?45).
GeneralConclusion
Locke'sworkoneducation llustrateshisdevelopmental onceptof man,of
humans.We arein thefirst instancea material,corporeal,biologicalorganism,
28
In his Dictionary,Samuel Johnsongives the definitionas "apossessorin his own right"andthen cites the section 44 passagefrom Locke.
29See Conduct, ?43.
682
7/30/2019 Yolton Locke's Man
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/yolton-lockes-man 20/20
the matterof which is composed of corpuscularparticles.The differencebe-
tween this matterand thatof substancessuch as gold or lead is that life and
sense have been added.Locke expressesthis differenceby sayingparticlesof
matterare"vitally"unitedto ourbody.Hedoes not offerany explicationof that
vital union,norof what makes for the difference between vital andnon-vitalunion.But he does make it clearthat the vital unionof particlesof matteralso
includes the self, wherethe self represents he non-corporeal spectof the live
organism.Thedualityof thisvital unionof particles,withthebodyand with the
self, indicatesLocke'srecognitionof thetightrelationbetweenmind andbody.The treatiseoneducationalsoreveals Locke'sfirmconviction n theimpor-
tanceof buildingspecificcharacterraits ntothecombinationof live matterand
mind.But he stresses in thatwork,as we have seen, thatthe child is bornwith
certain empersortraits.Thosenativepropensitiesare oinedby a general ncli-
nationto seek whatgratifiesandavoidwhat is distasteful.Besidesthese inbornfeatures,we arebornwithspecificfacultieswhichareimportantorlaterdevel-
opment.Thatcurioussuggestionof a constitutionof manfromwhich certain
operationsandqualities"flow"addsa furthernativesourceforman.Withthese
variousfeatures,man has a potentialfor growth,a potentialwhich education
(familyandsociety) reinforces,andwhichtherecognitionof a life to come, of
resurrection ndimmortality,makesurgent.What s importantor immortality
is not for Locke a soul; it is theperson,therational,moral,thinkingbeing that
eachof us owns. Wemust actin thispresentworld,theactsthatcountarethose
thatdefine andcharacterize he person,moral acts directedby reasonandthelaws of nature,God's laws.
So of those fourtermswithwhich thisdiscussionbegan-man, self, person,
agent-man turnsout to be the central,basic, andmost important,man who is
self to his self, theagentof action andtheproprietor f his person.3?
RutgersUniversity.
30 have not in this paperbroughtinto the accountof Locke's man the ontologicaland
theologicaldimensions,a most
important spectof man forLocke. Manis the
workmanshipf
God,one amongmanyother creatureson the scale of being. slightlyhigherthanthe beastsand
lower thanangels and otherintelligentspirits.
Locke's Man 683
Recommended