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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
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What the Cārvākas Originally Meant: More on the Commentators on the "Cārvākasūtra"Author(s): Ramkrishna BhattacharyaSource: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 6 (December 2010), pp. 529-542Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23502237 .
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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
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J Indian Philos
(2010)
38:529-542
DOI
10.1007/sl0781-010-9103-y
What the
Càrvâkas
Originally
Meant
More
on the
Commentators
on the
Cârvâkasûtra
Ramkrishna
Bhattacharya
Published online: 30 October 2010
©
Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.2010
Abstract This
essay proposes
to review
the
problems
of
reconstructing
and
interpreting
ancient
texts,
particularly philosophical
commentaries,
in the context of
the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata system
of
India.
Following
an overview of the Indian
philosophical
text tradition and the
ontological
and
epistemological positions
of the
Cârvâkas,
three cases are discussed:
(1)
when there is no invariance in the text and the
commentary,
(2)
when commentators differ
among
themselves in their
interpreta
tions,
and
(3)
when
contradictory interpretations
are offered. The
paper
further dis
cusses
why
certain commentaries are to be treated as inconsistent with the base text
and concludes that innovations inconsistent with the intention of the author should be
treated
differently
from
glosses
that seek to
explain
the
author's
original
intentions.
Keywords
Sanskrit
philosophical
literature
•
Commentaries
•
Reconstruction
•
Interpretation
-
Development
•
Inconsistency
Reconstructing
and
Interpreting
Ancient Texts: Two Views
Recently
there has been
a
controversy
on the
task
of
a
modern commentator on an
ancient text. Michael
LaFrague
declared
quite unambiguously:
I
believe that either one is
trying
as best as one can to reconstruct what the
Daode
Jing
meant to its
original
authors and audience or one is not. If one is
not,
there
is no
basis for
placing any
limits
to what can be considered a
legitimate interpretation.
(Qtd.
Goldin
750)
Paul R. Goldin has taken
exception
to this attitude. He writes: While it
is
praise
worthy
... to remind readers that authors and audiences of
the
past
did
not
R.
Bhattacharya
(El)
Pavlov
Institute,
98 Mahatma Gandhi
Road,
Kolkata 700
007,
India
e-mail:
carvaka_rkb@yahoo.com; ramkrishna.bhattacharya@gmail.com
Ô
Spring
er
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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
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530
R.
Bhattacharya
necessarily
share our modern
world-view,
one cannot
deny
that
twentieth-century
critics such as
Gadamer,
Ricoueur and Derrida
-
whose Hermeneutics
LaFrague
freely grants
are
opposed
to
his own
-
compellingly
demonstrated the limitations of
a
narrowly
historicist
approach.
(Goldin 750)
Goldin
admits that
"historically
informed
reading"
has its merits and can be
defended.
Nevertheless,
in his
view,
it cannot be contended that
"reconstructing
the
author's
original
intent
is the modern reader's
only
legitimate
concern." He con
troverts
LaFrague by
pointing
out: Texts that survive
through
the
ages
do so because
people continually
find new
meanings
in them. Texts that
die,
by
contrast,
are ones
that
have to be read as
though
we
are all
living
in the third
century
B. C.
(Goldin
750).
Goldin
further seeks to refute
LaFrague's
view
by
the
following
observation:
The weakness of the argument is apparent if one tries to apply it to juris
prudence. Lawyers
would
hardly agree
that the
only
two alternatives in con
stitutional law are to
reconstruct the constitution as it would have been
understood
by
its
original
authors and
audience,
or to disavow
any
limits to
what can be considered
a
legitimate
interpretation
(Goldin 750).
This difference of
opinion
obviously
has its
bearings
on ancient texts other than the
Daode
Jing.
I find it
particularly
relevant
to the field of
my
study,
the Cârvâka/
Lokàyata
materialist
system
of
philosophy,
which flourished in
ancient
India
and
totally disappeared
with all its literature after the
twelfth
century.
The whole
system
has to be reconstructed on the basis of fragments, found quoted or paraphrased in
the works of its
opponents.
The task
of reconstruction is made all the more difficult
by
the fact
that its
opponents
did
not
always
follow the rules of fair
play.
Quite
deliberately they
distorted and
misinterpreted
the views of the Cârvâkas
(for
example,
their stand on
inference).
In
spite
of
this,
attempts
made
by
scholars
in the
last two centuries have
resulted in a tentative
reconstruction of the
system
in broad
outline
(Bhattacharya
2009,
pp.
69-104).
Let
me declare at the outset
that I
agree
with
LaFrague
about the task of a
reconstructor
and am
totally
out of
sympathy
with
postmodernist
hermeneutics
which is
avowedly
a-historical.
The case of
jurisprudence
cited
by
Goldin
is
beside
the
point.
No maker of a
country's
constitution can foresee all later
developments.
Some
clauses have to be
reinterpreted
and even
suitably
amended to
keep pace
with
the
changing
times. The case of an
ancient
philosophical
text is
altogether
different.
It
may very
well be so that it had a considerable
number of adherents in the
past
but
is
now as dead as a dodo. It is also evident
that not all adherents stuck to the
original
intention of the author
and
some
reinterpreted
the words of the base text to suit their
own taste or
to
incorporate
new elements
quite
alien to the
system.
Yet it is nec
essary
to know first what
the
system
was
originally
like,
that
is,
what it meant to its
author(s)
and its audience
at the time it had been first
systematized.
Then
and
only
then we can
judge
where
(and
if
possible,
when)
some later adherents turned
away
from the intent of the
author(s)
or
redactor(s).
This of course cannot and should not
be the
only legitimate
concern.
Later
developments,
too,
have to be taken into
consideration.
But unless and until the
original
intent is
fairly
well
understood,
the
study
of later
developments
cannot
be
truly
fruitful.
Ô
Springer
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What the Cârvakas
Originally
Meant 531
The Indian
Philosophical
Tradition:
An Overview
In the Indian tradition the base texts of some systems of philosophy are first
composed
in the form of a collection
of
aphorisms
(sutras).
The
aphorisms
are brief
and
terse
to the
point
of
being incomprehensible
without some
explanation
provided
by
a
guru
or,
in his
absence,
by
a
commentary
written either
by
the author himself or
herself
(auto-commentary)
or
by
some
later author who is not
necessarily
an
adherent to the
system.1
Over the course of time further commentaries and sub-commentaries
and,
in
some
cases,
independent
works
purporting
to elucidate the basic ideas
of the
philosophical
system
(such
as
Jayantabhatta's Nyáyamañjari
)
come
to
be written. The views of the
opponents
too are
sought
to be refuted in these works. This is how a vast literature
consisting of explanatory material is created. The Nyâya system, for instance, has four
such chief
commentaries and sub-commentaries
by
four different authors
writing
in
widely separated
times.
The
non-dualist
Vedânta
system,
initiated
by
Sañkarácárya,
similarly gave
rise to
a
commentary
tradition that continued for centuries. Other
systems
of Vedânta
(dualist,
non-dualist,
modified
non-dualist,
both dualist and non
dualist, etc.)
also offer a
large
number of
secondary
works,
all
claiming
to be rooted in
the
base
text,
the
Brahmasütra
by Bâdarâyana.
Mîmâmsâ,
Vaisesika and
Yoga
systems
too
belong
to this
text-commentary
continuum
tradition.
The
CârVâka/Lokâyata
too
developed along
the same
line. It had a base text on
which more than five commentaries were written.
The
base
text is sometimes
called the
Bárhaspatya-sütra.2
We also read of a Paurandaram sûtram
and
PauramdarTyavrtti,
presumably referring
to
the
aphorisms
of Purandara and his auto
commentary (Bhattacharya
2009,
pp.
109-111).
Whether Purandara recast the old
base text of a now lost work or redacted the base text itself for the first time
is
not known. Did he add new
aphorisms? Again
we do not know. It is
highly
probable
that he was the first to
employ
the name
Cârvâka
to mean a
system
that was
previ
ously
known as
Lokâyata
in
early
Tamil
epics,
such as the Manimekalai
(incidentally,
these Tamil works
and
their
commentaries,
largely neglected
so
far,
testify
to the
existence of
two
other
materialist schools
besides
Lokâyata
in southern
India,
namely,
1
Vâcaspati
Misra
composed
commentaries on the base texts of
Nyâya, Sâmkhya,
Vedânta,
etc. Most
probably
he was a non-dualist Vedântin but
he
is credited
with
being independent
of all
systems
(sarva
tantra-svatantra),
for he is
reputed
to
have
interpreted
the base texts
faithfully
without
introducing
his
own views. How far it is true needs further
verification,
since
it is
difficult,
if not
impossible,
to be
absolutely
neutral in
philosophical questions.
2
Both Shastri
(1944,
1959)
and Mamoru Namai
(1976)
have called their
respective
collections
of
apho
risms
Bârhaspatya(sûtram),
following
the Purânic tradition of
considering Brhaspati,
the
guru
of the
gods,
as the
eponymous
founder of the doctrine.
Jayantabhatta
has indeed used the name
Barhaspatyasütram
once
(NM
2:
196).
Elsewhere too there are references to
brhaspateh
sûtrâni,
"the
aphorisms
of
Brhaspati"
(see
Bhattacharya
2009,
p.
106
for
details).
The name
"Lokayata-Sütra"
occurring
in Jha's translation
of the
TSP
(2: 893)
is not
supported by
the Sanskrit text
(22.1871
in
Baroda
éd.),
which has sütram
only,
not
"Lokâyata-Sutra". However, Cakradhara has once called it so (GrBh 1: 100). But there are reasons to
believe that the materialists in India such as Purandara called themselves
Cârvâkas
(TSP
2: 528. For a
detailed discussion see
Bhattacharya
2009,
p.
76-77).
All writers since
the
eighth century
CE,
when
referring
to
materialism,
indiscriminately employ
all the three names and
many
more,
some
more fanciful
than others
(such
as
bhiitamàtratattvavâda
(Malayagirisüri)
and
niahâbhûtodbhûtacaitanyavâdamata
(Prajñakaragupta),
both
qtd.
In Franco
(1997,
p.
274 and no.
3).
Springer
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532 R.
Bhattacharya
bhütavñdins
and the
Sarvakas.
Vanamamalai
1973,
p.
36).
In
any
case,
excerpts
from
all these
works,
both
aphorisms
and
commentaries,
are found in the works of other
philosophers, mostly
followers
of
non-dualist
Vedânta, Nyâya
and two non-Vedic
systems, Yogâcâra
Buddhism and Jainism. Since the base text and all the
commen
taries
are
lost,
the views of the
Càrvâka/Lokâyata
have to be
reconstructed on the basis
of these available
fragments.
It is not
possible
at the
present
state
of our
knowledge
to
determine how
many aphorisms
there
originally
were.
Only
a
few that were at the
centre of
controversy
are found
quoted
over
and over
again.
It is almost certain that
they
were all taken more or less verbatim from the base text.
Over and above these two sources
(aphorisms
and
commentaries
thereon),
quite
a
number of
epigrams, purporting
to
contain
the
Cârvàka/Lokâyata
view,
have been
cited in several
philosophical digests.
The
best known
of
them is the
Sarva-darsana
samgraha (A compendium of all philosophies). It is possible that not all of these
satirical verses
originated
in the Cârvâka circles. Some of them seem
to have
Buddhist and Jain
origins.
In so far as the anti-Vedic attitude is
concerned,
the
Càrvâkas were
regarded
by
the Vedists to be at one with these two
religious-cum
philosophical
schools.
Nobody
will
deny
that
a
successful
philosophical system
cannot remain the
same,
exactly
as intended
by
its
original proponent
and
understood
by
his
original
audi
ence. New
interpretations
are bound to
arise,
particularly
when the
system
has
to
face criticism from the followers of other
systems.
The commentators of
the base
text of the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata
had to take into account the
criticism leveled
against
their
system by
its
opponents.
The
fragments
of the commentaries of the base text
exhibit how the commentators tried to defend the basic
materialist
position by
means of
arguments
and
examples.
Most of the
fragments
appear
to be verbatim
quotations
from
the
commentaries of
Aviddhakarna,
Udbhatabhatta and Purandara.
Thus,
although
the number of
the
aphorisms
and the
fragments
from the
lost
commentaries are
regrettably
few,
the
fundamental
ontological
and
epistemological
positions
of
the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata
are
fairly
well
documented. At least some con
clusions can be
drawn from the available
fragments.
The
Ontology
and
Epistemology
of the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata
What
are the
ontological
and
epistemological
positions
of the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata?
They may
be
stated as follows:
The
whole
of the
material
world,
including
the
human
body,
is made of four basic
elements,
namely,
earth,
air,
fire and
water;
there
can be no
consciousness
without the
living body;
the
spirit
has no
extracorporeal
existence
and,
far
from
being imperishable,
it
perishes
with the death of the
body.
As a natural
corollary
to this
ontological position,
all
religious
acts,
worship
of the
gods, paying
obeisance
to Brahmin
priests,
performance
of
post-mortem
rites,
etc.
are considered
absolutely
futile.
The
epistemological position clearly supports
this
ontology. Perception
is admitted
to be the
only
valid means of
knowledge.
Inference,
in
so far as it is based on
religious
scriptures
alone,
is
rejected
out of hand because the
scriptures
are not based
on
perception
but on
revelation,
not amenable to verification
by
the
senses,
and thus tend
Ô
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What the Carvákas
Originally
Meant
533
to
promote
irrational
faith in
the after-life
(rebirth)
and the after-world
(heaven
and
hell),
God,
and the omniscient
being
(like
the
Buddha
or
Mahâvïra)
(Bhattacharya
2010,
pp.
21-34).
In
short,
the
Cârvàka
system appeared
in the Indian
philosophical
scene as
materialismus
militans,
strongly objecting
to and
opposing
all
religious
dogmas
(not
just
Vedism but Buddhism and Jainism as
well).
Its
epistemology
was
fashioned
to
match
its
ontology,
which consisted of a series of
negations.
The
insistence
on
empirical
verification is the hallmark of this
system.
In
fact
one
has
a
feeling
that the
Cârvâkas
first
provided
the
epistemology
to
the
ontology already
current in India at least from the
Buddha's
time,
when
Ajita
Kesakambala had come
out with his
proto-materialistic
ideas.
Commentaries on the Càrvàkasûtra
The
question
is:
Do the commentators of the base
text,
whether or not
they
adhered to
materialism,
always
reflect the intention of the author/redactor? The
aphorisms
in the
base
text,
we must
admit,
are not
self-explanatory;
their
brevity
stands in the
way
of
any
satisfactory understanding. Fortunately,
however,
there are
some
aphorisms,
the
literal
meaning
of
which
is
fairly
transparent.
When a commentator
goes beyond
the
literal
meaning
of
these
aphorisms
and tries to extract some other
significance by
resorting
to
grammatical
and lexical
acrobatics,
there is
every
reason to
suspect
that
he
is not
being
true to the intention of the
author/redactor.
In most
of
the
cases,
however,
the intention of the
aphorism
and its
interpretations given
in
the com
mentaries are at
one,
although
new instances
and
further
arguments
are
provided
to
defend or to elucidate the
position
of the base
text.
Invariance in Intention
and
Interpretation
Here is an
example.
There are two
aphorisms:
(1)
"Perception
indeed is the
(only)
means of
right
knowledge"
,
and
(2)
"Since the means of
right
knowledge
is to be
non-secondary (agauna),
it is difficult to ascertain an
object by
means of
inference"
(III.
1-2.
Bhattacharya
2009,
pp.
80-87).
This has led to a notion that the
Cârvâkas
believed in one and
only
one instrument of
cognition, namely,
sense
perception,
while
other schools
admitted
inference,
word
(verbal
testimony), comparison,
etc.
in
addition to
perception.
This
gave
rise to the obvious criticism that
by denying
inference,
the
Cârvâkas
proved
themselves to be
utterly
naïve and unfit
to be called
logicians
(cf.
NM,
I:
9,
Vâcaspati
Misra,
Bhâmotî on
Brahmasütra,
3.3.53;
C/L
154,
243).
Did the
Cârvâkas
really
hold such a view? A
fragment
from the
commentary by
Purandara
has often been cited to disabuse the critics of this notion.3
Purandara said:
3
Mookeijee (pp. 368-369), Dasgupta (3: 539)
and others
(for instance, Gangopadhyaya, pp. 32,
55
no.l,
56 no.
4,
66 no.
51,
and
Chattopadhyaya, p.
52)
drew attention to this
significant passage
from time to
time,
which however was
completely ignored
or
overlooked
by many
modern
scholars,
as
by
ancient
authors.
They
continued to ascribe the
ont-pramâna position
to the Cârvâkas
(more
appropriate
to
Bhartrhari,
who
considered
agama
(scripture)
to be the one and
only
valid
means
of
knowledge.
See
Bhattacharya
(2009,
pp.
117-118,
152).
Springer
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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
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534
R.
Bhattacharya
"The
Carvakas too
admit
of such
an inference as
is well known in the
world,
but
that which is called inference
[by
some],
transgressing
the
worldly way,
is
pro
hibited
[by
them]."
(qtd.
TSP 2:
528)
Purandara was not the
only
one to
explain
the
aphorism
in
this
way.
Aviddha
karna,
another
commentator,
also said: "It is
true
that
inference is admitted
by
us as
a source of
knowledge,
because it is found to be
so
in
general practice;
(what
we
only
point
out is
that)
the definition of a inferential mark is
illogical" (qtd.
PVSVT
19).
He further
explained:
"A source of
knowledge
means an instrument
which
produces
an awareness
of an
object
not
(already)
cognized
and
therefore,
is not a
source of
knowledge,
because it is not an instrument
for
producing
a definite
awareness of an
object"
(ibid.).
Udbhatabhatta too said
so and
distinguished
be
tween the
(1)
probanses
well established in the
world
(lokaprasidhha-hetu)
and
(2) probanses established in the scriptures (tantrasiddha-hetu) (qtd. SVR 266). He
resorted to the
Nyâya-Vaisesika terminology
to establish
why
inference is to be
regarded
as
secondary.
Some
anonymous
commentator4
further
distinguished
between
two kinds of
inferential
cognition:
(1)
"some in case of which the
inferential
cognition
can be
acquired
by
oneself'
(utpanna-pratîti)
and
(2)
"some in
case of which the
infer
ential
cognition
is to be
acquired
on
somebody
else's advice"
(utpàdya-pratïti)
(NM,
1:
184).
He
thereby
suggests
that the firstkind is
valid,
the second is not.
Did all these commentators then desert the
original position
of the
base text?
Some modern scholars indeed think so
(Frauwallner
trans.,
2:
225;
Franco
1991,
p. 159; Franco and Preisendanz 1998, p. 180). They postulate that the commentators
who
appeared
in the wake of Dharmakïrti were
forced
to
turn
away
from the
original
position
of the
Cârvâkas,
and the admission of inference in
howsoever limited a
way
is a
pointer
to this
Abkehr
(Frauwallner's
word,
2:
308).
What is
proposed
is
that this
acceptance
of inference was a later
development,
not
exactly
consistent with the
intention of the
original
author and his audience.
It
can, however,
be
demonstrated that such a view is not well
founded. When the
philosophers
of other schools
speak
of
inference, word,
comparison,
etc.,
they
never
deny
that
perception
is the foremost
(jyestha)
of all
instruments of
cognition
(cf.
NM,
I:
164).
What
they
indeed assert is that
inference,
etc. are all
independent
means of
knowledge,
on a
par
with
perception,
not subservient to it:
co-ordinate,
not
subordinate.
Yet,
as the
Nyâyasûtra
(1.1.5)
declares,
inference has to be
preceded
by perception.
Hence,
inference not based on
perception
cannot be
admitted.
Vatsyâyana
in his
commentary
on the
very
first
Nyâya aphorism
(1.1.1)
added
"scripture"
to
"perception" (pratyaksâgmâsritam
anumânam,
sa
'nvïksâ,
pratyaksâgamâbhyâmïksitasyânvïksanam
anvïksa),
which is
unwarranted and
amounts to
interpolation pure
and
simple.
The base text never
speaks
of
scripture
in
connection with
inference;
it mentions
perception
alone. The
independent
status
of
4
Jayantabhatta
ascribed this view to "the more learned ones"
(NM
1:
184).
The
use of
plural may
not be
honorific but satirical. The
identity
of this
commentator
(or
commentators)
is not known.
Cakradhara,
however,
mentions
that
by "cunning
Cârvâka" and the "learned ones"
Jayanta
meant Udbhatabhatta
(GrBh
1:
52,
100).
Most
probably
the
designation,
"more learned
ones,"
refers to some
commentator(s)
other than
Udbhata,
signified by
the use of the
comparative degree.
It
may
mean Purandara
and his
followers.
Springer
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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
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What the Càrvakas
Originally
Meant
535
perception
is an admitted fact in all realist
philosophical
systems.
So,
when the
Cârvâkas denied
the
status of inference
as an
independent
means of
knowledge, they
ipso
facto did not
reject
all kinds of inference but
accepted only
such inference as
was found true in
everyday
practice
(lokavyavahara).
Thus,
in the Cârvâka
con
ception perception
includes both what is
sensually apprehended
and
inference
based on such
apprehension. Only
such inferences as derived from the
scripture,
Veda and
Smrti,
are not admitted.
Therefore,
all
the
four
commentators,
Purandara,
Aviddhakarna,
Udbhata
and the
anonymous
one,
were not
deserting
the
original
stand of the base text
by admitting
inference of a
particular
sort but
only explicating
the view of the base text on
inference in relation to
perception.
Other non-Cârvâka
authors too were aware of
this,5
as this
was the view of
earlier,
pre-Cârvâka
Indian
materialists too.
How do we know all this? A passage in the Mbh, Sântiparvan (crit. ed. 211.26;
vulgate
218.27)
says:
The
conclusion based
on
inference
and tradition
-
both are rooted in
per
ception. Perception
and
testimony
(what
we are told to believe
in)
are iden
tical;
reasoned-out truth
(^inference)
too is
nothing
but
perception.6
In
the
Anusâsanaparvan
too
(147.9)
three
instruments of
cognition
are mentioned:
(a)
direct
perception
confirmed
by
the world
(lokatah
siddham
pratyaksam),
(b)
doctrines
propounded by
the
scriptures,
and
(c)
the
practice
of eminent
people
(sista).
Dandekar,
the editor of this
parvan,
observes:
"Presumably,
anumâna is to
be understood to have been included in pratyaksa" (crit. ed., 1119).
It was
only
later,
when the
philosophical
debates between the Vedists and the
non-Vedists
(the
Buddhists
and the Jains in
particular)
were
raging,
that the
question
of
inference as
an
independent
means
of
knowledge along
with word
(scripture)
assumed a focal
position.
Both
Vâtsyâyana
and
Jayantabhatta
spent
much
of
their time and
energy
to establish the
independent
status of inference
(C/L,
pp.
76ff and
128ff).
Inference in fact is the
chief,
if not the
sole,
concern of
the
Nyñyasütra
itself.
Therefore,
the
explication
of the two Cârvâka
aphorisms
(HI. 1-2)
made
by
the
commentators
merely
reiterates and reinforces the
position
of
the
ancient
Indian
materialists,
both
pre-Cârvâka
and the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata.
The
commentators,
regardless
of their differences of
opinion concerning
other
issues,
are
unanimous
in
this
regard: they
do not admit the
independent
status
of inference as a
means
of
knowledge,
and at the same time
they clearly
state that inference based on
per
ception
is
definitely
admissible and is
actually
admitted
by
the Cârvâkas.
Once
we
understand
this,
much of the
lampoon
and
derisive remarks
of its
opponents
such as
Hemacandra
(cf.
AYVD,
v.
20)
and
others
turn out to be mere
calumny.
5 Gunaratna
(TRD
on
SDSam,
v.
83),
Ratnaprabhâ
(on
PNTA 540. See
Bhattacharya
2010,
p.
30),
and the
anonymous
authors of
Avacürni
(on SDSam,
v.
83)
and SMS
(15)
(Bhattacharya
2009,
pp.
116-117,
168)
quite
unambiguously
refer to this
interpretation.
6
Bronkhorst
translates this
verse somewhat
differently (p.
310)
but his
interpretation
too refers to direct
perception
as the root of all true
knowledge.
Ô
Springer
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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
9/15
536
R.
Bhattacharya
When Commentators Differ
So
far,
so
good.
The
position
of
the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata
vis-à-vis inference is made
crystal
clear
by
the commentators. The
problem
arises when the same set of com
mentators differ
in
their
interpretations
of certain
aphorisms.
Udbhata's
interpretation
of the
aphorism,
"Earth,
water,
fire and air are the
principles, nothing
else
(iti)"
(1.2.
Bhattacharya
2009,
p.
80)
is a case in
point.
The
word iti denotes the end.7 Since the
Cârvâkas
accept only
these four
elements,
not
"space"
(âkâsa)
as the
fifth,
s some earlier materialists
(cf.
Bhattacharya
2009,
pp.
33-41 for
sources)
and
many
others
did,
they
are called
four-elementalists
(bhûta-catustaya-vâdins)
as
opposed
to the
five-elementalists
(bhuta-pañcaka
vâdins).
Udbhata, however,
claimed that it was
impossible
to
lay
down
any
fixed
number and essential characteristic of the
sources
of
knowledge (NM,
I:
52),
and
objects
of
knowledge
too are more than
four: 'the
word,
iti,
in the
(aphorism),
"earth,
water,
fire
and air iti"
indicates also the
possibility
of
similar
objects
of
knowledge,
other
than the
earth,
etc.'
(qtd.
GrBh 1:
100).
Vádidevasüri
quotes
more
extensively
from
Udbhata's
commentary:
The
word,
iti,
does not denote the end
(but)
it is illustrative.
There are other
principles
such as
consciousness, sound,
pleasure,
pain,
desire,
aversion,
effort,
mpression
and others
(SVR 1087).
Not satisfied with these
categories,
Udbhata further writes:
"There are also
prior
non-existence of the earth, etc., posterior non-existence, the mutual difference
which are
quite apparent
and distinct
(from
the
principles,
viz.,
earth,
etc.)."
(qtd.
SVR
1087).
Cakradhara
clearly
stated
that
Udbhata
was here
forsaking
the conventional
interpretation
(yathâsrutârtha-tyâgena)
(GrBh
1:
100).
Apparently
Udbhata was
referring
to issues that
are well
known to the
Nyâya
Vaisesikas. He knew full well that iti cannot be
equated
to
ityadi
(etc.).
Yet he
attempted
to fit the Cârvàka
aphorism
into the
Nyâya-Vaisesika
frame.
This
may
be considered
ingenious,
as is his defence of the
Càrvâka
position
of
viewing
inference as
secondary
(see above).
But there is
nothing
to show that the
Cârvâkas ever thought in terms of Nyâya-Vaisesika categories. Udbhata does not
adduce
any
new
argument
in
support
of his novel
explication
(as
he does in relation
to
inference).
On
the
contrary,
he flies in the
face of
the
accepted meaning
of
iti
and,
maybe
with the
best
of
intentions,
introduces
Nyâya-Vaisesika
categories
which are
quite
alien
to
the
original Cârvâka/Lokâyata.
7
Explaining
KA 1.2.10
(sâmkhyam yogo lokâyatam cetyânvîksikï)
Jacobi
says:
"According
to
Kautilya
the essence of
philosophy
lies in
systematic investigation
and
logical
demonstration;
in his
judgement
these conditions are satisfied
only
(iti)
by Sâmkhya, Yoga
and
Lokayata" (p.
102).
Ô
Springer
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What the Cârvakas
Originally
Meant
537
All
this does show marks of what is
sometimes viewed as
"growth"
or "radical
innovation",
but
at
the same time it exhibits alien addition as
well.8
The Cârvâka View on
Inference
in
the SDS
It is well known
that all the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata
works,
the base text
and the com
mentaries,
had
disappeared
from India before the
SDS
was
composed.
Not
a
single
verbatim
quotation
from
any
Cârvâka work is
found
in
the whole of the
SDS,
not
even a
single
name
(excepting
that of
Brhaspati).
Whatever the
author of the first
chapter
of the SDS
(Sâyana-Mâdhava
himself or
someone
else)
knew about the
system
was not based on his
reading
but most
probably
on
what
he had heard from
his guru. (It may be added in parentheses that in ancient India gurumukhTvidya was
sine
qua
non;
no amount of
reading
would
be
considered a
fitting
subsitute for it.
See
Aiyangar
10. Cf. Jha's
regret,
1:
x).
Moreover,
it is doubtful whether the
guru
himself had
ever
glanced
at an authentic Cârvâka work.
Apparently
there
was a
guru-sisya paramparâ
(a
continuum from
preceptors
to
disciples)
and that was the
only
source to learn
anything
about the Cârvâka. Yet a
very cogent argument
is
found in the
SDS
(7-10;
C/L,
pp.
250-251)
to
justify
the
Cârvâka
position regarding
the
admissibility
of
perception
alone as a valid instrument of
cognition, rejecting
summarily
the claims of all others
(inference,
word,
comparison,
and
upâdhi
or
absence of a
condition).
Nevertheless it will not be advisable to accept the passage in the SDS as a
statement
reflecting
the
genuine Cârvâka/Lokâyata
view. The
reason is this: there is
no
supporting
evidence in
favour of such
a
representation.
Since no
authority
is
mentioned,
the
passage
should
be
taken
as
a
formulation made
by
the learned author
of the
SDS,
not
by
a Cârvâka. This is an
instance
in
which the view of the
digest
maker is not to be admitted because of the lack
of
any
corroborative evidence.
Moreover,
no mention is made in the
SDS
of
the limited
validity
of
inference,
as
Purandara and others have
unequivocally
declared
(see above).
This is another
reason
why
the
passage,
like the so-called
Lokâyata aphorisms
in
the Kâmasû
tra,
1.2.26-30,
is
unacceptable
(see
Bhattacharya
2009,
pp.
94-95).
Contradictory Interpretations
Offered
by
Commentators
Now we
come to
an
example
of
contradictory
explanations.
After
stating
that the
principle
is the four elements
and
that
their combination is called the
body,
sense
and
object,
the
base
text
says, probably
in the
very
next
aphorism, tebhyas
(that
is,
8
Karin Preisendanz
(2008)
apparently
does
not
consider such alien additions
to
be of
much
significance.
She classifies commentaries into two kinds:
(i)
creative,
(ii)
philosophically unproductive (pp.
609-611).
In her usage Udbhata would be considered creative in the sense of being "philosophically productive".
But as both Cakradhara and Vâdidevasûri noted
(see below),
Udbhata
was known
to
be an
innovator
and
hence
was contrasted to Bhâvivikta who
apparently
remained true to the
spirit
of the base text
(GrBh
2:
257-258).
Udbhata was not treated on a
par
with Bhâvivikta and
others,
since he did not
represent
the
views of the ancient
(cirantana)
Cârvâka teachers.
Similarly,
when
Solomon
calls
Udbhata "a
progressive
Cârvâka"
(p.
990)
she
implicitly
admits that
he
did
not
adhere
strictly
to the
original
stand of the school.
â
Springer
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8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra
11/15
538
R.
Bhattacharya
bhiltebhyas)caitanyam
(1.2-4).
Literally
it
appears
to mean: "From them
(the
ele
ments),
consciousness."
As is
evident,
there is no
supplementary
verb to
complete
the sentence
(technically
called
adhyâhâra).
What was in the mind of
the redactor/s
of the base text can
only
be
guessed.
Two different
suggestions
were made
by
two
commentators. One
(anonymous)
said:
the
missing
verb should
be "is
born";
the
other
(again
anonymous) proposed
"is manifested"
(TS
v.
1858,
TSP 2:
633-634).
The two
proposals
are
contradictory,
for,
if
the first is
admitted,
the second
cannot
be true
and vice versa. The first would assert that there can be no
consciousness
prior
to
the
existence
of a
living
human
body.
The
second,
on the other
hand,
would
suggest
that consciousness is
already
existent,
apart
from and
quite
independent
of
the human
body;
it is manifested
when the human
body
is formed and born. The
second
proposal
then would mean desertion of the monistic materialist
position
traditionally ascribed to the Cârvâkas.
This
is
not
all.
Udbhata,
writing
at least a
century
or so after these
two
anonymous
commentators,
reopened
the issue
by challenging
the
common
understanding
of the
word
tebhyah
as "from
these",
taken
in
the
sense
of ablative case
(fifth
declension).
In Sanskrit
tebhyah
can mean "for these" as
well.
Preferring
the second
meaning,
Udbhata
explained
the
aphorism
as: it is
for
the sake
of
the four elements that
consciousness comes into
being.9
He
did not concern himself with the
missing
verb
but
sought
to establish a dualist view that consciousness existed
apart
from and even
prior
to matter. He had
apparently
taken his cue from the second
interpretation
(or
it
may
have been
derived from
Sâmkhya)
and
explained
this
aphorism
as follows:
"Consciousness is for (the sake of) elements; consciousness is independent and aids
the
physical
elements
which
constitute
the
body" (qtd.
GrBh
2:
257).
Udbhata's
interpretation
is not
grammatically
invalid. There is indeed a rule in
Kâtyâyana's
Vârttika
(on
Astâdhyâyï
1.4.44)
that
provides
for the use of the fourth
declension to
suggest purpose
or
intent
(tâdarthye
caturthT
vâcyâ,
Vasu
352).
But
by
saying
that consciousness is
independent
of
the
four elements that constitute the
human
body
Udbhata leaves the door
open
to a non-materialist
position.
The
Cârvâka
position
was
essentially
monistic:
no
body,
no consciousness. Even if we
take Udbhata to be a dualistic
materialist,
it
clearly
involves desertion of
the
original
Cârvâka
position.
All this does show
signs
of
growth
but at the same time
exhibits
a
tendency
to
move
away
from
the
original
doctrine.
Quite
appropriately,
therefore,
Cakradhara
contrasts Udbhata
with Bhâvivikta and other ancient
Cârvâka teachers
(GrBh
2:
257).
Unlike
them,
Udbhata did not
uphold
the
old,
traditionally accepted position.
On another
occasion,
too,
Cakradhara notes that Udbhata
forsook the conventional
interpretation
(GrBh
1:
100).
9
This second
position
is reminiscent of Sri Aurobindo's realist but
anti-materialist stand
regarding
matter vis-à-vis consciousness . Unlike the non-dualist Vedantins like
Sañkara
he
admitted this world to
be real but added:
[T]here
is a
course of life and consciousness
originally
alien to Matter which has
yet
entered into
an
occupied
Matter,
-
perhaps
from another world. From
whence, otherwise,
can it
have come...
nothing
can evolve out of Matter which is not therein
already
contained,
(pp.
96-97).
Sri Aurobindo does not
accept
the dualist
position
of
Sâmkhya
either,
nor
does
he
regard
Sankara's
theory
of illusion as valid
(p.
11).
Springer
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What the Cârvâkas
Originally
Meant
539
Vadidevasüri too
writes,
"This
respectable
veteran twice born
(sc.
Udbhata)
is
revealing
to us a novel
way
of
answering
criticism."
(SVR
764).
Here the assertion made
by
LaFrague
is of seminal
importance. Surely
the
redactor(s)
of the base text
could not have meant all three
interpretations
when
he/
they
framed
the
aphorism.
Since we have no
way
of
knowing
the
author's
mind,
we
must
go
for
a
reasonable
conjecture.
If he had
the second or the third
interpretation
in
mind,
the
very
basis of
the
Cârvâka/Lokâyata
doctrine would be
compromised.
The
first two
aphorisms clearly
state the
primacy
of the four elements as the
principle
(tattva).
If
consciousness were the
principle
or one of the
principles,
the
second
aphorism
would have said so instead of
naming
all
the
four elements indi
vidually
and
stopping
there with a decisive
word,
iti.
So the second and the third
interpretations
of the third
aphorism
are
unacceptable.
What
led
the second and the
third
interpreters
to
defy
the
spirit
of the first
three aphorisms is not known to us.
But
one
point
is
evident: the
aphorisms
could
mean,
both to the author and to his
audience,
only
what the first
interpretation
says.
The second
and
the
third inter
pretations definitely suggest
different lines of
development
away
from
the intention
of the author.
Conclusion
Development
and
growth
are
only
to be
expected
of all
philosophical systems
that
continue to exist over the centuries. Thus we have the development of Sâmkhya,
which
becomes allied to
Yoga
and becomes a
syncretic
theistic
system.
The same
story
is
repeated
when the
atheistic
Nyáya merges
with Vaisesika and becomes a
theistic
system.
Such
syncretic
doctrines doubtless reflect
development
and
growth.
Nevertheless,
they
are not to be identified with
the
original Sâmkhya
or the
original
Nyâya
or the
original
Vaisesika. When we
speak
of
development
and
growth,
which
are
admittedly
inevitable,
we should not turn a blind
eye
to the
fact
that
later works
often
move
away
from the
original position
of
the
system.
It is not the case that all
forms
of
development
and
growth necessarily
reflect the
original
intention of the
author.
The critics of the Cârvâka/Lokâyata, we have seen, knew
only
too well that
Udbhata had
taken a
position
that was
quite
different from the
original
one. Are we
to call this
development?
When new facts and
arguments
are
proposed
to affirm the
contention of
the base text
in
order to reassert its
validity,
as viewed
by
its later
adherents
or
explicators,
such events
may very
well
be called
development.
On
the
other
hand,
when
quite
novel but
contrary positions
are
proposed, presumably
to
support
the
contention of the
aphorisms
in a different
way,
the event cannot but be
called
inconsistency.
Such inconsistencies
may
gain
currency
over the course of
time and become a
part
of the tradition of this or that
system,
but
they
evince
inconsistency
all the same.
This
happened
to
Nyâya,
Mîmâmsâ and other
systems.
The
Brahmasütra
in
fact
has been
interpreted
in a dozen different
ways by
its
commentators,
so much so that
it is
impossible
to assert what
Bâdarâyana,
to
whom
the
authorship
of
the base text
is
attributed,
had in mind. Yet it cannot be denied that he must have had
something
Springer
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540
R.
Bhattacharya
in
his
mind which the commentators in their zeal to establish
their own
philo
sophical systems
have more than once
misused,
sometimes
going against
the
position
he held. After all
Bâdarâyana
could not have been a
dualist,
a
non-dualist,
a
modified
non-dualist,
a
realist,
a
subjective
idealist,
etc. all at
the same time It is
therefore futile to
think
of
the Vedânta doctrine. We
have several Vedânta
doctrines.
That
is all.
Vedânta
is
of course an extreme case. But
Nyâya,
Mïmâmsâ and
the Cârvâka
systems
also exhibit several
different
approaches,
not all of which can be considered
consistent with the view
of
the
original
authors and
their
audiences. In order to
study
these
systems,
instead of
concentrating solely
on the
doctrine,
a
historicist
approach
is essential
in
order to
trace their
developments
and
note where and how some
commentators moved
away
from
the
original position.
Whenever there is a
sign
of
any forced explanation, inconsistent with grammar and conventional use, it has to be
taken as
a
case of
inconsistency.
The
more
the
commentator tries to hold fast to the
words of the
aphorism
but
interprets
them
by
doing
violence to
these two criteria
(grammar
and conventional
use),
the more certain it is that he is
moving away
from
the
original position.
Udbhata's
interpretations
of iti and
tebhyah
are cases in
point.
Polemicists like
Jayantabhatta may
not
distinguish
between the
original position
and
the new
position,
but a student of
philosophy
cannot afford
not to do so.
Having
no
axe
to
grind
either in defense or
reputation
of
any system,10
one should first
ascertain,
as
best
as
one
can,
what the doctrine meant
to its author and its
audience,
and then
proceed
to
study
the
development
of the
system
over the
ages.
No other
approach can do justice to the systems of philosophy in India that flourished and
continued to
hold
sway
over one
or the
other section of the
people
for
several
centuries.
Let me reiterate: there is no
gainsaying
that some
changes
are
inevitable
in
any
system
of
philosophy
because of its constant interface with other
systems.
But
we
should not view all such
changes
on a
par
with one another. Doctrinal or
religious
bias should not make us
forget
that in
pre-modern
India a
master of
philosophy
was
supposed
to be a master of all
philosophical systems, living
or
dead,
the
Cârvâka/
Lokâyata
not
excepted.
Consider,
for
instance,
the
praise
of
Vyomasiva
(or
Vyomasambhu
or
Vyomesa)
in the
Ranode
stone
inscription
(Epigraphia
Indica,
1:
358)
in which
Vyomasiva
is
eulogized
as
lokâyate
sadgurur
bbuddho buddhamate
jinoktisu
jinah,
Sadguru (Brhaspati)
in
the
Lokâyata,
the Buddha in the
doctrine of
the
Buddha,
and Jina
(Mahâvïra)
in
the
sayings
of the Jina
(line
37).
Had it been
otherwise,
the
authors of
philosophical digests
and
compendia
from
Haribhadra
(eighth century)
down to Cimanabhatta
(nineteenth
century)
would
not have included
in their
works
all
systems,
both orthodox and
heterodox,
known
to them.
10
No less
a
savant than Louis de Vallée
Poussin,
because of his
idealist
mindset,
calls
materialists
"philosophers
without
philosophy"
(8: 494).
Speaking
of the
parable
of the
Wolfs
Footprint
(SDSam,
v.
81),
he writes: 'A man who wanted to convert—let us
say "pervert"—a
woman to
his materialist
opinion...' (ibid.). All this in an encyclopaedia article
To cite another
example,
nearer home: B.
Bhattacharya proposed
to
identify
Kambalâsvatara of
the TS
with the Kambalâsvatara mentioned in the
Sargttâloka
on the
following ground:
"It is not at all
strange
that a member of a materialist
sect should devote himself to
music;
disbelieving
in
transmigration
of soul
or in a future life the
cultivation of
pleasure
in this life should seem
logical
and
entirely
proper"
(p.
xxxviii).
Ô
Springer
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What the
Cârvâkas
Originally
Meant
541
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Recommended