View
214
Download
1
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
Took Us Long Enough
A History and Analysis of theAmerican Influence on the Panama Canal
December 4, 2012Kurt Fire
Dr. Schaefer
POLS 207
The creation of the Panama Canal was a dizzying feat of both engineering and
politics. King Philip II of Spain was reported to have concluded that, “it would be
impious to join the waters of the mighty oceans while Providence had seen fit to place
asunder.”1 For hundreds of years the proposition of a canal was prodigiously considered,
reconsidered, and shelved repeatedly. Interested parties, both states and non-state actors,
shifted continuously, including that of the Spanish, British, Americans, private groups,
and the local Panamanian, Colombian, and Nicaraguan governments. This case study will
examine the history of a prospective canal in the Central American isthmus, American
action and opinion concerning the situation, and the factors that led to America choosing
to build the Panama Canal, from the 15th century until Panama gained its independence in
November of 1903.
America was not the first nation to consider building a canal in Central America,
nor was it the first nation to gain influence in the area. In 1452, with the fall of the
Eastern Roman Empire, the Turks closed off land trade routes between India and Europe
and caused attention to shift westward, where it was thought a sea route could exist that
would mitigate the Turkish issue.2 The Spanish government was the first to fully devote
itself to the cause of this possible westward route.3 In the early 1500s, extensive surveys
were done, and it was widely thought that there was a possibility a sea route existed
through Central America that would connect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and provide
access to the Indian coast.4 As explorers brought back report after report with no
indication of a sea route through Central America, the idea was proposed that a manmade
1 Miner, Dwight Carroll. The fight for the Panama route; the story of the Spooner act and the Hay-Herran Treaty. (New York: Octagon Books, 1940), 6.2 Haskin, Frederic J. The Panama Canal. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1913), 3. 3 Miner, 4.4 Ibid., 5.
Fire 1
canal could be erected in lieu of a natural passageway. However, Spain was too
preoccupied with conquering the New World to devote time and energy to researching a
canal, and Spanish monarchs were never convinced of the feasibility of any canal plan
put before them.5 As time passed, other European states, namely the French, English, and
Dutch, gained significant footholds in the New World, and the Spanish realized that
building a canal would be an open invitation for war in the region.6 In the 1700s the
Spanish Colonial Government became diminished over time, to the point where rebellion
was actively taking place amongst the indigenous population. To appease the rebels, the
Spanish government ordered the creation of a canal in 1814, but it was too late, and the
Spanish government lost their grip on the area before work could begin.7
With the weakening of the Spanish, Great Britain made a hard and fast attempt to
garner a stronger foothold in Central America, offering gifts to the natives and pushing
for the area to be placed under British Protectorate status. Over time, the British too
dabbled with the prospect of the creation of a canal in the area. They encountered the
same difficulties as the Spanish, however, and no plans were yet laid out to construct a
canal.8
All the while, America’s interest in the region was far from extraordinary.
Following the War of 1812, American eyes looked to the west and showed little concern
with the area south of Mexico. The State Department, well aware of British interest in
Central America, was not eager to ignite another dispute with Great Britain.9 As Manifest
Destiny took hold of the American public, California’s location on the Pacific Ocean
5 Ibid., 6.6 Ibid., 7.7 Ibid., 9.8 Ibid., 10.9 Ibid., 11.
Fire 2
ignited American interest in a canal. Secretary of State Henry Clay became highly
interested in the prospect of a canal following a report from the American Envoy to the
Central American Republic. A Senate resolution in 1835 officially endorsed the creation
of a treaty that would put a prospective Central American canal under American control,
however the Senate had no intention of actually building a canal, they would simply
protect it as it was built by a third party.10 In 1844, President Polk was elected, and the
idea of a canal continued to float around The White House. In 1847, President Polk urged
Congress to ratify a treaty with New Grenada, the nation in control of the Panamanian
isthmus at the time, which would “allow American citizens and merchandise to move
freely across the Isthmus of Panama.”11
Meanwhile, the British had redoubled their effort to maintain control in the
region, noting America’s acquisition of Texas and New Mexico as reason for suspicion of
future American imperialism to the south. Britain ordered Nicaragua to withdraw from
the mouth of the San Juan River, allowing Britain to move in and secure one of the most
promising prospective canal routes.12
The American response was not drastically reactionary. President Polk sent an
ambassador to Guatemala, hoping to encourage cooperation between Central American
states against the British. When the Ambassador, Elijah Hise, arrived, he found a
dizzying political situation unfolding. The governments of Nicaragua, Honduras, and
Salvador were eager to accept American assistance, but Costa Rica and Guatemala only
sought relations with the British. They were hardly in a position to pose a united front
against the British Empire. Realizing that Britain intended to garner total control of any
10 Ibid., 12.11 Ibid., 13.12 Ibid., 14.
Fire 3
future canal, Hise quickly met with the Nicaraguan government and negotiated a deal
wherein the United States would have exclusive rights to build and protect a canal or
railroad across Nicaragua.13 By the time the news of this deal reached Washington,
President Taylor had been inaugurated, and the California Gold Rush had again turned
American eyes to its western frontier. If the British came to monopolize an isthmian
canal, the United States would lose the capability to reap greater rewards from the Gold
Rush, in addition to any previous economic and transit benefits. President Taylor
replaced Hise with E.G. Squier, and sent Squier to Nicaragua with news that any canal
constructed by the United States would have guaranteed neutrality towards all ships
utilizing it.14
Tensions heightened between the United States and Britain, but neither nation was
willing to fight another costly war just over the prospect of the canal. Negotiations were
slow going, but the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was signed by both nations and verified by the
American Senate in 1850. The treaty was great in scope; it established that neither
signatory would “take possession of, fortify, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part
of Central America”, and that any canal created would be supported and neutral to both
countries.15
Americans, both Congress and the general public, were completely dissatisfied
with the treaty, believing they should have exclusive rights over a canal. As the American
Civil War drew to a close, the idea of an “American canal under American control”
became the prevailing American sentiment. As President Grant came into power, he felt
very strongly that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should be replaced as soon as possible. 16
13 Ibid., 15.14 Ibid., 16.15 Ibid., 17.16 Ibid., 18.
Fire 4
Meanwhile, with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, public interest in a
Central American canal rose dramatically. After 10 years of drawbacks and stalemates
with both the Colombian and Nicaraguan government over a possible canal, the leader of
the Suez Canal’s creation, Ferdinand de Lesseps, was revealed to be heading up a
European operation to build a canal in Panama. He estimated that in 12 years and at a
price of 240 million dollars, a canal could be created, much to the surprise and
bewilderment of the United States.17
The American State Department immediately discouraged Colombia, who was
now in control of the area of Panama, from accepting any European offers. Congress was
nearly unanimous in its voice against this effort, painting this as a flagrant violation of the
Munroe Doctrine. The French Government revealed that they were not actively
supporting the efforts of de Lesseps in any way. After raising nearly 260 million dollars
worldwide, de Lesseps and company purchased land and began excavation in Panama.18
On February 1, 1881, a two-word telegram was sent to France that thrilled newspaper
readers throughout Europe: “Work begun”.19
As excavation began, the American State Department was searching desperately
for a means to remove the burdens of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Secretary of State
Frederick T. Frelinghuysen sought to throw out the Clayton-Bulwer treaty due to reasons
of national defense. However, President Cleveland was inaugurated and appointed
Thomas Bayard as the new Secretary of State, who felt that the United States should
17 Ibid., 19-20.18 Ibid., 22.19 McCullough, David G. The path between the seas: the creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 131.
Fire 5
abide by the treaty. Throughout the Cleveland Presidency the American government
moved towards a consensus that the canal should not strictly be an American asset.20
While American interest waned, progress by the de Lesseps group was proving
itself a massive failure. Costs associated with the canal skyrocketed, and incompetence
was rampant at all levels of the operation. Scandal rocked the operation as it was
revealed, “expenses of all sorts had been systematically ‘padded’, that contractors
received millions of francs for services never rendered, and that a part of the French press
had been subsidized.” Work on the canal was suspended indefinitely, and the de Lesseps
operation disbanded in the wake of highly publicized French court proceedings.
Scandal and high costs were hardly the only things that derailed the work of de
Lesseps, however. No plans had even come near anticipating the true cost of creating the
canal, and the natural obstacles that would come to stymy construction. John Bigelow, an
American lawyer who visited the project to appraise the effort stated, “There probably
was never a more complicated problem- a problem embarrassed by a larger proportion of
uncertain factors… Every step is more or less experimental.” Where the de Lesseps team
had dealt with hot temperatures before with the Suez Canal, they were not prepared for
high temperatures paired with the near constant 98 percent humidity of Panama.21
Medicine had not yet established the connection between mosquitos and disease, which
caused yellow fever to ravage the ranks of both laborers and engineers. Hospitals were
provided for medical treatment, yet they came to exacerbate the problem, as they lacked
20 Miner, 24.21 McCullough, 130.
Fire 6
mosquito nets.22 Hospital beds were set in pans of water that proved excellent spawning
pools for mosquitos.23
Figure 1: The Canal and Transit24
The American press, meanwhile,
reignited interest in the canal. In 1898, the
U.S.S. Oregon had to make a lengthy trip
around the horn of South America in order
to defend against the Spanish in the
Caribbean. This 8,000 mile trip was highly
publicized, and it became apparent that a
canal would have the added benefit of
being a valuable asset for national defense,
giving the Americans a much faster means to move their navy from the Pacific to the
Caribbean and vice-versa.25 The American public spotlight again shined on the prospect
of building a canal, and now that de Lesseps had made a dent in the excavation for the
canal, many analysts inside the U.S. government thought that now was the time to finish
what the Europeans had begun.
With the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt
suddenly became President of the United States. Roosevelt’s fervor and popular support
would make an American Panama Canal a reality.26 Even in his early years in the Senate,
22 Smith, N. 2011. "Classic projects: the Panama Canal." (Engineering & Technology 6, no. 8), 112.23 Haskin, 9.24 HowStuffWorks, The Panama Canal created a shortcut from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, 2009, jpeg image, 2012. http://history.howstuffworks.com/american-history/panama-canal.htm25 Haskin, 10.26 Collin, Richard H. Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: the Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American context. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 12.
Fire 7
Roosevelt had been a staunch proponent of an isthmian canal. In his first message to
Congress, Roosevelt spoke of the canal that, “no single great material work which
remains to be undertaken on this continent is of such consequence to the American
people.” Roosevelt envisioned the canal as the keystone to becoming the greatest naval
power in both the Pacific and Atlantic. With the acquisition of the Philippines, Roosevelt
was convinced that America had to become a veritable naval power, and without a
isthmian canal under America’s control, that would be impossible.27
However, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty still stood between Roosevelt and an
American Panama Canal. He immediately ordered Secretary of State John Hay, a carry-
over from the McKinley administration, to re-negotiate a more favorable treaty with the
British. Britain was as hesitant as ever to allow the United States total control over the
prospective canal, but after Hay removed a clause providing for American fortification of
the canal, the British ambassador signed the new treaty. Another clause in the treaty
provided that the United States would be given the power to protect against “lawlessness
and disorder” throughout the canal, which was interpreted by Roosevelt as still giving
America the ability to fortify the canal. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty now gave the United
States the ability to build and operate an isthmian canal without any British interference.28
With the financial failure of de Lesseps, the French government took control of all
assets pertaining to his canal project. However, both Congress and Roosevelt were not
interested in purchasing the French assets, instead preferring to build the canal in
Nicaragua. It was thought that the French government would only sell the equipment and
property of the de Lesseps project for a price too great to be practical to the Americans, at
27 McCullough, 254-256.28 Ibid., 258.
Fire 8
109 million dollars. However, representatives of the French government later met with
the American canal commission in February of 1902, giving a price of only 40 million
dollars. Surprisingly, this was almost exactly the appraised value of the equipment and
property. Unfortunately, the findings of the American canal committee were not made
available to congress before the House had passed a vote to go ahead with a Nicaraguan
canal. The Senate amended the bill, moving the prospective canal location to Colombia.29
As preparations were made to go forth with building the Panama Canal,
negotiations with the Colombian government hit another snag. The Colombian Vice-
President kidnapped the President of Colombia and “locked him in an insanitary prison,
where he died.” This unforeseen regime change prompted the Colombian Congress,
which was regarded as a puppet for any Colombian sitting President, to reject outright
their treaty with the United States regarding the canal. The Colombian government made
a counter-offer in which they would allow the canal to go forward only if the United
States would assist Colombia in putting down the revolution brewing in Panama. These
Panamanian rebels “felt that they had the same sort of grievance against Colombia that
the people of the American colonies felt they had against England in 1776.” 30
Panama, which was once an independent state following the expulsion of the
Spanish, had decades ago received an invitation posed by the Colombians “to put itself
under the Government there with the understanding that it was to retain its sovereignty”.
The Panamanian people considered their state too small to function meaningfully alone,
and accepted in earnest. However, the Colombian government came to ignore the
Panamanians and didn’t allow any Panamanian representation in the Colombian
29 Ibid., 266-269.30 Ibid, 234-236.
Fire 9
government. Eventually revolts occurred, and Panama claimed independent statehood
repeatedly, but each time they did so the Colombian government cracked down on the
revolution. As the Panamanians became aware that their land was ripe for canal-building,
they made every effort to entice nations to build a canal in Panama, as doing do would
give Panama a tremendous resource and power all nations in the region lacked. If the
United States chose Nicaragua to build a canal, Panama would surely fade back into
obscurity.31
Meanwhile, in late 1904, America picked up where the French lad left off, and
began their own construction efforts. Of the 300 over million dollars the French spent on
excavation, approximately 30 million of excavation work was available to the
Americans.32 A dedicated effort was made to not repeat the mistakes of the de Lesseps
group. The Americans realized, as de Lesseps did in hindsight, that the greatest challenge
to overcome was not excavation, or building the canal itself, but doing combat with the
mosquito population. It was now fully realized that Yellow Fever spread through
mosquito bites, and President Roosevelt appointed a chief sanitary officer for the project,
whose job it was to prevent the spread of Yellow Fever. Over 2 million dollars per year
was set aside to operate hospitals, 16 million square yards of mosquito-laden brush was
burned, and a million square yards of swamp was drained away. 150 million gallons of
mosquito oil, which stopped mosquitos from growing by preventing their larva from
breaking the surface of water, was dispersed per year throughout the canal operation.33
While the Americans worked, however, the question of Panamanian sovereignty festered.
31 Ibid., 238-242.32 Ibid., 243-246.33 Haskin, 115.
Fire 10
An engineer from the de Lesseps group, Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, met with
President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay, urging them to support the cause of
Panamanian independence. With the density of the Panamanian forest, it was apparent
that the only means Colombia had of doing real combat with Panama would be by sea.
The superiority of the American Navy could easily prevent a Colombian Navy force from
landing troops in Panama. Convinced that Colombia would not make war with Panama
while under the protection of the United States military, and that the new Panamanian
government would be very conducive to American diplomacy, Roosevelt endorsed
Panamanian independence. In November of 1903, American gunboats stood off the shore
of Colón and Panama City while Panama formally declared its independence. If the
American Navy were not standing by, “the Republic of Panama would not have lasted
more than a week.”34 The new Panamanian government quickly ratified a treaty giving
the United States unhindered access to its territory, and the United States was free to
continue work on the canal.
A multitude of factors led to the successful American construction of the Panama
Canal. Firstly, the inevitability of a canal being created in the Central American isthmus
made it only logical for the United States to attempt to become first to build the canal.
The reduction in time traveled from the American East to West coast, from 13,000 miles
to 5,200 miles in sea travel from San Francisco to New York City, made it a valuable
asset for both economic as well as military means. America could now not only see a
benefit in decreased cost of moving naval assets, both commercial and military, but it
could now charge a fee for vessels entering the canal, and bar access, if needed, to any
ships as it saw fit.
34 McCullough, 370-378.
Fire 11
American progress towards construction of the canal was also greatly furthered by
the threat of a European power constructing a canal first. American interest, both of the
public and the government, increased greatly as the threat of another nation or group
constructing a canal before the United States became real. When Britain began taking
control of territory needed for the canal, the United States sprung into action and took
measures to stop Britain. Citing the Munroe Doctrine, the prevailing American attitude
was that Europeans should be barred completely from imperial affairs in the Western
hemisphere.
However, the American government made a number of follies that unnecessarily
added to the time before it built the Panama Canal. Firstly, the policy reversal in
Cleveland’s Presidency, to be content with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, halted progress
towards canal construction. Later, America was blindsided by the sudden prospect of the
de Lesseps group starting a canal, and its lack of foresight and intelligence regarding the
de Lesseps project left Congress and the President scrambling for answers. The single
factor that contributed to the amount of time it took for America to build the canal,
though, was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Not realizing the implications of giving Britain
an equal share of a prospective canal prevented the United States from going forward
with canal construction for nearly half a century.
Additionally, the leadership of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay
allowed for the canal to finally be constructed, after a half century of delays. Roosevelt’s
determination to construct an American Canal, paired with Hay’s shrewd diplomacy
skills, allowed the United States to overcome the restraints of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
and circumvent British desire to have some sort of claim to the canal. Roosevelt and Hay,
Fire 12
set on building the canal in Nicaragua, left themselves open to debate, and their open-
mindedness allowed America to build the canal in Panama, where the de Lesseps group
had already made progress. Noting the failures of the de Lesseps group, Roosevelt took
the necessary action to ensure that America did not make the same mistakes in building
the canal. During the disputes between Panama and Colombia, Roosevelt decisively
chose to support Panama, which allowed America to enter into a favorable treaty with
them and eventually be able to build and finish the canal.
Ultimately, America completed the canal in 1914.35 From the Spanish realization
that a manmade canal must exist, to its eventual completion, the Panama Canal was a
veritable point of international contention. As time passed, each American presidency
gave a different perspective to the issue, ending with Roosevelt’s decisive action that
made the canal to be built in America’s hands. Generally, Congress, the State
Department, and the President echoed each other’s sentiments on the issue, and no branch
of the American foreign policy machine presented a serious encumbrance regarding the
canal. The Panama Canal, through the multitudes of factors that eventually ended in its
creation, was a success in American foreign policy. One can only ponder the implications
if Britain or Spain had actually finished the canal before the United States could.
35 Haskin, 3.
Fire 13
Bibliography
Collin, Richard H. Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: the Panama Canal, the Monroe
Doctrine, and the Latin American context. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1990. Print.
Figure 1: HowStuffWorks, The Panama Canal created a shortcut from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Pacific, 2009, jpeg image,
<http://history.howstuffworks.com/american-history/panama-canal.htm>
Haskin, Frederic J. The Panama Canal. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co.,
1913. Print.
McCullough, David G. The path between the seas: the creation of the Panama Canal,
1870-1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. Print.
Miner, Dwight Carroll. The Fight for the Panama route; the story of the Spooner act and
the Hay-Herran Treaty. New York: Octagon Books, 19661940. Print.
Smith, N. 2011. "Classic projects: the Panama Canal." Engineering & Technology
(17509637) 6, no. 8: 112-113. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed
December 1, 2012).
Fire 14
Recommended