The top down policymaking model: A model of how elites translate their values, goals, &...

The top down policymaking model:

A model of how elites translate their values, goals, & preferences into policy. This can be seen at different stages of the policy process:

The policy formulation process:

The leadership selection process:

The Interest Group Process:

Opinion Making process:

Policy Legitimation process:

Policy Implementation:

Policy Evaluation Process:

Counter-argument to the Top Down Model

THE BOTTOM-UP PROCESS MODEL

Median voter model-competitive elections

Pluralist model-competing interest groups

Responsible party model - policy divergent parties

So where to we start our top down analysis?

• George Bush? Bill Gates? George Soros?

• No

• We study Institutions, Organizations, and Groups

Policy Formulation

“Policy Formulation occurs from the top down—when institutional leaders, primarily in business, finance, and the media, begin to complain about societal developments they perceive as threatening to their own values or interests.”

A Political Institution is a web of relationships lasting over time, and an established structure of power.

• Media institutions

• Banking institutions

• Rules and Regulations as institutions– Distribution and regulation of airwaves– Rules governing PACs

• Universities, Foundations, Think tanks as institutions

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN VALUES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICY OUTCOMES

Certain political institutions in government promote different behavior

Types of government behavior:

responsive (to societal needs)

representative (to public demands)

bargaining (negotiating between conflicting interests)

coercion (maintain stability through the use of force)

manipulation (acquiescence via misinformation; bait and switch)

symbolic politics (rhetoric v. action)

The Role of Institutions:

Clingermayer and Feiock (2001) state simply, “first and foremost, institutions matter because they affect the behavior of policy makers.”

Similarly, institutions influence how policymakers respond to public opinion and interest groups. Rational choice theorists, like Downs (1957) and Buchanan (1967), suggested early on that scholars should examine how preferences and institutions interact and affect public policy. They argued that preferences alone cannot predict policy outcomes.

Political institutions influence the policy process by limiting “the nature and scope of political actions and choices (Bickers and Williams 2001: 41)” by placing constraints on political actors (i.e., rules and norms), or by insulating political elites from public pressures.

Heclo (2000) argues that much of the written Constitution helps keep the “citizenry at arm’s length from the governing process (p. 18).”

Examples of these institutions may include election rules on who and when people can vote or rules that are placed on judges’ discretion in sentencing. Some studies assume that certain political mechanisms are designed to link citizen demands with policy actions (Downs 1957; Barrilleaux and Miller 1988),

While other scholars have observed, “that democratic institutions in the United States may be decreasingly compatible with democratic norms (Hartley and Russett 1992; Jacobson and Shapiro 2000). Whether it is the dominance of incumbents in elections, bureaucratic autonomy, declining voter participation, or special interest influence, various scholars contend that democratic mechanisms are not functioning as conceived by democratic theory or models (Ginsberg 1990).

What is a political institution?

• A Political Institution is a web of relationships lasting over time, and an established structure of power.

What is a Political Institution? Examples?

ConstitutionalElectoralAdministrativeLegislativeExecutiveJudicialStatutory CulturalEtc., etc., etc.

Institutional setting that might promote representation

Federalism

Elections every two years

Ballot Initiatives

Judicial Elections

Term limits

Institutional settings/rules that might reduce representation

Jacobson (2001) argues that the structure of the U.S. Congress and congressional elections creates incentives for symbolic position taking, leading to a type of responsiveness without collective responsibility. These incentives potentially lead to policy decisions and outcomes incongruent with constituent preferences.

Non-elected Bureaucracies

Legislative Committees

Life tenure for judicial officials

FED

Staggered elections

Term limits?

Registration requirements

Neo-Institutionalism v. the Limits of Institutions

Much of the political science literature holds institutions as important, if not the primary, factors in politics and political behavior. But institutions are only as strong as we are. And even the best laid plans have limitations. (Yugoslavia, Hiati, Lebanon, Iraq?)

Kenneth Arrow’s Possibility Theorem:

Arrow showed that it is impossible to produce a social choice mechanism that doesn’t violate the basic conditions of democratic choice:

• Universal admissibility of individual preference orderings: All policy alternatives are on the table/agenda

• Citizen’s Sovereignty: citizen preferences matter

• Unanimity: Unanimous choices always win

• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: the introduction of a third alternative doesn’t effect the preference ordering of a set of two choices.

• Nondictatorship: no single group should be able to determine a social choice outcome.

A simple example of the limitation of institutions in solving collective action problems (policy disagreements)

Three Legislators: with differing preferences on whether a bridge should be built, a road or neither (status quo)

Official 1: BpRpS

Official 2: RpSpB

Official 3: SpBpR

Need a two stage voting process because if we have a one stage process it ends in a three way tie

One possible outcome

Agenda 1vote 1: B vs R: B winsvote 2: B vs S: S wins

Remember:Official 1: BpRpSOfficial 2: RpSpBOfficial 3: SpBpR

Agenda 2

vote 1: B vs S: S wins

vote 2: S vs R: R wins

Remember:

Official 1: BpRpS

Official 2: RpSpB

Official 3: SpBpR

Agenda 3vote 1: R vs S: R winsvote 2: R vs B: B wins

Remember:Official 1: BpRpSOfficial 2: RpSpBOfficial 3: SpBpR

What does this mean?

Institutions may be incapable of producing stable, predictable outcomes

William Riker: the political entrepreneur / strategic politician (helps) determine the outcome by setting the agenda, introducing a third alternative, etc.