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8/19/2019 The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on Peronism - J. Howowitz
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The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on PeronismAuthor(s): Joel Horowitz
Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (May, 1983), pp. 101-116Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/155925Accessed: 11-06-2015 19:31 UTC
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8/19/2019 The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on Peronism - J. Howowitz
2/17
J.
Lat. Amer. Stud.
5,
i,
oI--
II6
Printed
in
Great Britain
The
Impact
of
Pre-1943
Labor
Union
Traditions on Peronism*
by
JOEL
HOROWITZ
Although in recent years there has been an increasing quantity of
suggestive
and
important
investigations
of
Peronism,
little
attention has
been
paid
to the
continuity
between
the
pre-I943
and the Peronist labor
movement.
This
continuity
has been
neglected despite general recognition
that there were
important
labor
leaders from the
earlier labor movement
who
provided
key
initial
support
to Peronism and that
the
pre-I943
labor
movement was
one of Latin
America s
strongest.
There can
be
no
doubt that
Argentine
unions
changed profoundly
after
the
coming
to
power
of
Juan
Peron. The labor movement
grew;
it
became
wealthy, less independent, and, for the first time, a major actor on the
political stage.
The
unions
took on a
different coloration under
Peron,
in
part
because
for the
first time
they
had
money
and
a
government
that
was
truly
interested
in
them. But that
does
not
necessarily
mean that older
methods
and desires were abandoned.
Beneath
the dissimilarities were
continuities,
based on one
important
factor,
leadership.
Trade union leaders from the
neo-conservative
era,
1930-43,
provided
much of the crucial
early
support
for
Per6n.
Therefore,
it should
not
be
surprising
that
some basic ideas
continued
from
the earlier
period.
Two traits
usually
regarded
as
Peronist,
a
willingness
to
cooperate
with
the
government
and
a
desire to
provide
social
welfare
programs
for
*
The research
upon
which this article is based was made
possible by
grants
from
the
Doherty
Foundation and the Center
for
Latin American
Studies,
University
of
California,
Berkeley.
An
earlierversion of this
paper
was
presented
at the
Center for
LatinAmerican
Studies,
University
of
California,
Berkeley.
I would like to thank
those
who were
present
for
their
comments.
1
The
principalexceptions
are the
ground-breaking
work
by
Miguel
Murmis and
Juan
Carlos
Portantiero,
Estudios
obre
os
origenes
el
peronismo
Buenos
Aires,
1971),
and
an
excellent and
suggestive
article
by
Ricardo
Gaudio and
Jorge Pilone,
Estado
y
relaciones
obrero-patronales
n
los
origenes
de la
negociaci6n
colectiva
en
Argentina
Centro
de
Estudios
de
Estado
y
Sociedad,
Estudios
ociales,
o.
5
(Buenos
Aires,
1976).
See
also the article
by
Torcuato S. Di
Tella,
Working-Class
Organization
and Politics
in
Argentina ,
Latin
American Research
Review, xvi,
2
(
98
),
pp.
33-56.
IO1
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I02
Joel
Horowitz
union
members,
will be examined
to demonstrate
that
continuity
did exist.
Other
similarities
can also be found.
Continuity
in
the
Argentine
labor movement
has
been
partially
obscured
by
the
sudden
prosperity
that
the unions
enjoyed
during
their
growth
under
Peron
and,
more
importantly,
after the establishment
of a
dues
check-off
system
in
1945
that
provided
a
steady
source
of income.2 Before
1943
the
style
of the unions had been
simple
and
puritanical, partly
because
there was
not
enough
money
for
large
staffs
or
fancy
offices.
Ideology
also
played
a role. There existed
a
lingering
mistrust
of the
paid
staff member
and
suspicion
of
anything
that was
not austere.
Angel
G.
Borlenghi,
Secretary-General of the FederacionEmpleadosde Comercio(the retail clerks
union),
a
largely
middle-class
organization,
was
attacked for
being
well
dressed
and for
having
a
rug
on the floor
of
his
office.3
A
sudden inflow
of
money
changed
the realm
of the
possible, allowing
the fulfillment
of
plans
that had been
held in
abeyance by
insufficient funds
and
permitted
the
hiring
of new staff. For
example,
in
June I943
the
Federacion
Obreros_yEmpleadosTelef6nicos
the
telephone
workers
union)
received
only
I,264.50
pesos
in
monthly
dues,
but
by
March
1946
income
had
risen to
4,303.30
pesos.4
More
money
presented
an
opportunity
to
change the style of the unions.
The
continuity
has also been
obscured
by
what
has become the
orthodox
view of
why
Peron was
able to come to
power
and control
the labor movement.
Essentially
this
argument
is
that the old labor
establishment
was
overwhelmed
by
the tens of thousands of
migrants
who
flocked
to
the cities
and
could
not be
integrated
into the unions.
In
one
version,
the
migrants
support
for
Peron was
a
result
of
their lack
of
political
sophistication
that
left
them
susceptible
to
his
paternalism.
The
Peronists
were
not adverse
to
accepting
the basic
outlines
of the
argument
but,
instead of
seeing
the new workers as
naive,
viewed the
migrants
as
being
more
Argentine
than
the
immigrants
who
had
supposedly
dominated
the
pre-i943
labor
movement.
The
idea
of a
complete
break with the
old
movement
was
also
appealing
because
the Peronists
were more
than
willing
to
accept
credit
for
creating
the
existing
Argentine
labor
movement.
In
the
last decade
this
view has
come
under
a serious and
wide-ranging
2
See
Decreto
23,852
of
2
Oct.
I945
in
Anales de
legislacion
argentina,
94J,
vol. v
(Buenos
Aires,
1946),
pp.
59
-6.
3
For a
lingering
mistrust of
paid
staff,
see
Lucio
Bonilla,
Instituto
Di Tella
Oral
History
Program, p.
5
2
(hereafter
IDTOHP);
La
Vanguardia,
19-2
3
Dec.
1931;
Federacidn,
Aug.
1931.
For comments
about
Borlenghi,
see
Rafael
Ginocchio,
IDTOHP,
p.
14;
Pedro
Otero, IDTOHP,
p.
76;
Francisco
Perez
Leir6s,
IDTOHP,
pp.
I29-30.
4
Federacidn,
31
July
1943, 3
Dec.
I946.
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Impact of
Labor
Union
Traditionson Peronism
I03
attack.5 While
not
wanting
to
get
into the
polemics
that
surround this
issue,
it is clear
to the author
that
the orthodox
argument
has hindered the search
for
any
connection between the
pre-i943
labor movement
and that
of
Peron,
because
its basic
proposition
entails
the
elimination
of
the
old labor
movement.
Leadership
A
sudden
ideological
shift
with the
coming
to
power
of Per6n would be
surprising.
Lured
by
the
carrot and
avoiding
the
stick,
unions abandoned
their
opposition
to Peron. The vast
majority
of trade unions
based
in
Buenos Aires supported Per6n or, at least, maintained a neutral position
in the crucial
years
of
change-
I944
through I945.
Only
organizations
with
strong political
ties,
Communist
unions
and a small
handful
of
Socialist
ones,
actively
resisted.6 This
is
not
a
new
observation,
but
what
most writers
have
failed to
mention is that
this
meant a
continuation
in
union
leadership
both
at
the
highest
level
and
in
secondary
roles as well.
In the
first
few
years
of
Peronism,
many
unions were
controlled
by
men
who
had
been active
in
the
labor movement
in
the earlier
epoch.
A
good
example
of
this is the
Union
Ferroviaria
(the
railroad
workers
union).
It
was undoubtedly the strongest union in Argentina in June, I943 when
the neo-conservative
era
ended.7
A
comparison
of
its
seventeen-member
executive committee
of
1942-3
with
that
of
1945-6,
shows that the
same
ten men sat on
both boards.
Of the
additional
members of the later
committee,
one had served on the board
in
1933-4,
while
at
least five
had
previously played
some role in the union. In
1946-7
seven
members had
served
on
the
1942-3
executive
committee,
while at
least five
others
had
been active at other levels
before
1943.
During
both
of
the later
periods,
the
titled
officers,
six
in
total,
were
executive committee
veterans with the
5
This
is an
over-simplification
of a
complex argument
that
became
increasingly complex
as time
went on. For
the
nature of
recent
arguments
on the
subject,
see
Desarrollo
Econdmico,
nos.
51, 54, 56,
57
(I973-5).
Also,
see
Walter
Little,
Popular
Origins
of
Peronism ,
in
David Rock
(ed.),
Argentina
in the
Twentieth
Century
(Pittsburgh, 1975),
pp.
162-78,
and
Di
Tella,
Working-Class
Organization
and
Politics ,
pp.
47-5
i.
6
For detailed and
good
descriptions,
see Louise M.
Doyon,
Organized
Labour and
Per6n
(1943-I955):
A
Study
of
Conflictual
Dynamics
of the
Peronist
Movement in
Power
(Ph.D.
diss.,
University
of
Toronto,
1978),
pp.
197-3
56;
Samuel L.
Baily,
Labor
Nationalism and Politics
in
Argentina
(New
Brunswick,
N.J., 1967),
pp.
7I-96.
7
For
the nature of the Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
see
Joel Horowitz, Adaptation
and
Change
in the
Argentine
Labor
Movement,
I930-1943:
A
Study
of Five
Unions
(Ph.D.
diss.,
University
of
California,
Berkeley, I979).
Juan
Carlos Torre in
La
caida de
Luis
Gay ,
Todo es
Historia,
Oct.
1974,
p.
82,
makes
the
same
argument
that
I
am
making
here
on
the
continuity
of the
leadership,
but he does
not elaborate.
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104
Joel Horowitz
exception
of
one
man in
I946-7.
He
had
been, however,
a
delegate
to
the
Union Ferroviaria s convention
in
I941.8
One other
figure
of
great
importance
remained in
place,
the Union
Ferroviaria s
top
bureaucrat,
Rafael
Kogan.
Kogan
had
a
large
amount of
power
and held his
position
from the
founding
of the union
until
at
least
I948.9
This over-all
continuity
is
especially striking
because
in
the
period
prior
to the
coup
the union had
been
rent
by
internal
unrest,
caused at
least
partially by
the
continuation
in
office of certain
key
individuals.10
The
continuity
in
the
Union
Ferroviaria was
not
unique.
The same
tendency
can be found
in
unions
in
which the
top
leaders became
important
Peronists.
Angel
G.
Borlenghi,
who
was Minister
of the Interior
from
1946
until
195 5,
was able
to
bring
his union with
him.l
Borlenghi
had been the dominant force
in
the
Federacion
Empleados
de
Comercio
of the
Federal
Capital
and the national
Confederacion
General
de
Empleados
de
Comercio
since
I932.
In
late
1946
at least six of the
national
confederation s
eight representatives
to the central committee of the
Confederacion
del
Trabajo
(CGT,
national
labor
federation)
had been active
in
the union
prior
to
1943,
and
a
seventh
was
Angel Borlenghi s
brother.12
A
similar situation
existed
in
the Federacion
Obrerosy
Empleados Telefdnicos.
Luis F. Gay, President of the Partido Laborista, which helped elect Per6n
in
1946,
and
Secretary
General
of the CGT
for
a
short
period
in
1946-7,
8
Manuel
F.
Fernandez,
La
Union
Ferroviaria
a
traves
del
tiempo:
TIeinticinco
nos
al servicio
de un
ideal,
I922-I947 (Buenos
Aires,
I948), pp.
I49-6I.
The
job
history
of these
men
and
those
in the unions
discussed
below
are
included
in
my
files.
If
anything,
I
am
underestimating
the number
of
those active
at
the
secondary
level,
as
I have made
no
attempt
to locate
activists
at the level of
the local
branches,
nor do
I
have
a
complete
list of
all those who
attended conventions.
9
Fernandez,
La
Union
Ferroviaria
a
traves
del
tiempo,
pp.
362-5.
For
his role
see,
Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
Libros
de actas
de
la
Comisi6n
Directiva,
Acta
II,
20
July
I931,
p.
28;
Acta
21,
9 Dec. 1931, p. 28.
10
The
dissent
in
1942
and
1943
was
principally
directed
by
the Communists
and
the
Radicals
and
had
strong political
overtones
but at
least
part
of
the
problem
lay
elsewhere.
For
contrasting
view
of the
struggle,
see La Hora
and El ObreroFerroviario
during
those
years.
For a
summary,
see
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Change
in
the
Argentine
Labor Movement ,
pp.
4
5
8-65.
One reason
for the
continuity may
have been
the nature of
the
government
intervention.
For the
intervention,
see
David
Tamarin,
The
Argentine
Labor
Movement
in an
Age
of
Transition,
I930-1945
(Ph.D.
Diss.,
University
of
Washington,
1977),
pp.
292--6.
One of
the union s
employees
in
976
was
related
to the
pre-I943
leadership.
11
He did
have
some
problems
with
the national
confederation
of retail
clerks,
but
he
was
able to
overcome
it.
Juan
Carlos
Torre,
La
CGT
y
el
17
de
octubre
de
1945 ,
Todo
es
HTistoria,
eb.
1976,
p.
74;
Felix
Luna,
El
4X:
Cronicade unanodecisivo
Buenos
Aires,
1969),
p.
225.
12
CGT,
I
6
Nov.
946.
For
Borlenghi s
dominance
in the
union
see
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Change
in the
Argentine
Labor
Movement ,
pp.
469-73.
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Impact
f
Labor
UnionTraditions
n Peronism
105
had
been
a dominant
figure
in
the
telephone
workers
organization
since
its
founding
in
I928.13
In
1947
the
union was taken
over
by
the
government
after
the
public
and
well-known
dismissal of
Gay
as
Secretary
General
of
the
CGT. At that
time,
the union s
Secretary
General,
Modesto
Orozco,
was
a
long-time
militant,
as were the two
men chosen
to
hand
over the
organization s
property
to the
state.14
The
continuation of old labor
leaders
in
their
positions
of
power
was
not
limited
to
unions which
produced
enthusiastic
and vital
supporters
of
Per6n.
Even
in
the
organization
of
the
municipal
workers
of
the
city
of
Buenos
Aires,
the
Union
Obreros
y
Empleados
Municipales,
which
had
extremely close ties to the Socialist Party, leaders could be found who were
willing
to
support
Peron. The
municipal
workers union
had been
dominated
by
workers
placed
in
the
city
government
as acts
of
patronage
by
the
Socialist
Party.
In
1944
the
union
was taken
over
by
the
government
because of
supposed
corruption,
but the real
reason
was
undoubtedly
to
limit
opposition
to Per6n.
Yet,
when
a
national
confederation
of
workers
and
employees
of
municipalities
was
founded
during
the southern
winter
of
1946,
the
three titular
officers had
been
prominent
in
the
Socialist-
dominated
union
before
I943.15
The only segments of the labor movement that did not produce support
for Peron
were the
Communist-dominated unions
and
a few
Socialist
unions.
Peron,
however,
fostered
parallel
unions which with
active
government
support
displaced
these
organizations.16
Even
before
1943,
in
many
industries there were
competing
unions. The
Communist
strength
in
the
meatpacking industry
was
challenged
by
a
Syndicalist
union
based
in
the town of
Zarate.17
The
Union
Obrerosy
Empleados
Municipales
had
competition
from four other
unions,
and a leader
from
the
largest
of
these
organizations
was
an
alternate for
the
executive
committee
of the national
confederation of
municipal
workers founded in
1946.18
These
organizations
provided
a
base
for
creating
an
opposition.
13
Horowitz,
op.
cit.,
pp.
490-500, especially
p.
490.
14
CGT,
6 Mar.
1947.
For information
on
Gay s
fall,
see
Torre,
La
caida
de
Luis
Gay .
15
For
the union
and
patronage,
P6rez
Leir6s,
IDTOHP,
pp.
29-30;
Concejo
Deliberante
de
la Ciudad de
Buenos
Aires,
Actas
del H.
Concejo
Deliberante,
2
Dec.
1933,
vol.
Iv,
pp.
4100-22.
For the
intervention, CGT,
16
May,
I
July 1946.
The
ex-Socialists
served
the union
for three
years
as
advisors
and
then
resigned
and
a strike
followed,
Doyon,
Organized
Labour
and
Per6n , p.
456.
16
To view a declineof a Communist-dominated nion, see El ObreroTextil, 1943-6.
17
The union was active
in the
Syndicalist
confederation,
U.S.A.
18
Francisco
P.
Ruberto,
Alejandro
Priotti,
Enrique
Nigro,
interview
conducted
by
Robert
J.
Alexander,
2
Nov.
1946;
CGT,
16
July I946.
Some of the
other unions
were
ephemeral.
For the alternate
CGT,
12
July
1946;
La
Vanguardia,
12
Sept.
1934.
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7/17
io6
Joel
HorowitT
The
Peronist
parallel
unions were not
created out
of
whole
cloth,
but
rather the
leadership
tended to be drawn
from
existing
parallel organizations
or
from
second-level,
non-Communist activists.
Participation
in
the
pre-i943
labor
movement
helped
the
new
leadership
in
their
recruitment
of rank
and
file,
as
some
credibility
had
already
been
established. 9 The
best
example
of
this is the Union
Obrera
Metalzrgica (the
metalworkers
union),
which
under
Peronist
auspices
was
to
displace
a
Communist
organization
and to
become the most
important
union in
the
country.
The
Union
Obrera
Metalzrgica
was
actually
founded
prior
to
June
1943.
It was
originally
a
product
of
the
struggle
not
between Peron and the
Communists,
but between
the
leadership
of the
Union Ferroviariaand the
Communists.
A group of Socialist metalworkers, dissatisfied with the Communist
organization,
founded the new
union with
the aid
of the
UnionFerroviaria
and its branch of the CGT.20 It was these men who
began
to build the
union.
The leaders
of
the
previous
era
played
an
essential
role in
the
establishment of the
Peronist labor
movement.
They
were influential
in
unions that
represented
a
considerable
portion
of the entire labor movement.
Many
of those who had
played important
or
minor
roles
in
the
union
movement before
June
1943
continued to do so
during
the
period
in which
many of the goals and the style of Peronism were set.21.One cannot expect
them to
abandon the desires and dreams
that
they
had
fought
for,
against
considerable odds.22 What was
achievable and
possible
had
changed.
It is
clear
that,
when the
labor leaders turned to
Per6n,
many
of them
expected
a
very
different
and a more balanced
relationship
than
they
in
fact achieved.23
They
had
obviously
misjudged
their
own
strength
and that
of
Per6n. Much of
the
workers
loyalty
went direct
to him. After Per6n
had established his
power,
he
was able
to demand
loyalty,
and
many
of
the
major
labor leaders who
had
originally helped bring
him to
power
were
19
Doyon,
Organized
Labour
and
Per6n ,
pp.
256-7.
20
El
Obrero
Ferroviario,
I
May
1943;
Angel
Perelman,
Cdmohicimosel
17
de octubre
(Buenos
Aires,
196I),
pp.
43-5.
21
It is
significant
that
union men held
important government positions
that dealt
directly
with labor. The man in
charge
of union affairs
in
the Labor Secretariat
in
1944
was
Luis
Cerutti,
a
former
Secretary
General of
the
CGT, CGT,
i
Sept.
1944.
Juan
Bramuglia,
the
lawyer
of the
Uni6n Ferroviaria also held an
important position.
Robert
J.
Alexander,
The
Perdn Era
(New
York,
195
),
p.
24.
22
It is
interesting
that
as
late as
I
April 1946,
the
CGT carried
an
article
in
remembrance
of
Francisco
Largo
Caballero,
the
Spanish
Socialist leader of the Second
Republic.
It
was
written
by Jose Marotta,
who had been both an
official
of the
municipal
workers
union
and a member
of the
city
council of the
city
of Buenos
Aires,
representing
the
Socialist
Party.
23
Many
of the labor
leaders
had
hoped
to
create
a true
labor
party.
See,
for
example,
Luis
Gay,
IDTOHP;
Torre,
La
caida
de
Luis
Gay .
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8/17
Impact
of
Labor Union Traditionson
Peronism
107
swept
away.
Luis
Gay
and
Cipriano
Ryes,
possibly
the
most
influential
figures
in the labor movement in
1946,
were
publicly
pushed
aside.
A
new
era for the Peronist labor movement had started.24
The
link
between
the
leadership
of the
post-1947
period
and
that of
the
pre-Peron
period
is unclear.
There
is,
however,
a
very
great
likelihood that
a
significant percentage
had held at least
secondary
positions
within the
labor movement.25
In
any
case it is clear
that,
in
the first
dynamic years
of the Per6n
era,
those
who
had
led the unions before
I943
were
in
a
position
to establish
many
of the
goals
and tactics of the Peronist labor
movement.
Relations
with
governments
One
characteristic
of the
Peronist labor
movement
has been a
willingness
to
cooperate
and maintain a
close
relationship
with
the
government
in
order to
better
the
movement s
position.
From the
time of General
Lonardi and the
early years
of the
presidency
of
General
Ongania
until
the
present
military
regimes,
elements
of the labor
movement
have tried
to
cooperate
with
governments.26
While
often
less
than
successful and at
times not
pursued
by
all
factions,
it
appears
to
be
a
dominant
characteristic.27
In
part
this is
a tactic
intended to
ensure
survival
in
difficult
times,
but
it is also an attempt to re-create the relationship that existed with the
government
under
Peron.
However,
this
type
of
relationship
antedates
Peron.
Turning
to the
government
for
help
did
not start with
Peronism,
but
was
an
important
feature of the
labor
movement
during
the
neo-conserva-
tive
era,
and even
before.28
While it
is not
possible
to show the
full
scope
of
this
relationship
within
the
space
of this
article,
it
is
possible
to
demonstrate that it
existed.
24
For an
important
discussion of
the
periodization
of the Peronist labor movement
see
Little, La
organizaci6n
obrera
y
el estado
peronista ,
Desarrollo Econ6mico,no. 75
(Oct./Dec.
979), PP.
33 I-76.
25
In
Jose
Luis de
Imaz,
Los
que
mandan
trans.
Carlos
A.
Aztiz),
(Albany,
1970),
pp.
226-8,
it is
stated
that a
significant portion
of the
top leadership
even
after
1946,
had had union
experience
prior
to
I943.
This
entire
argument
is
in
opposition
to what
Torcuato
Di
Tella
observed
in
Working-Class
Organization
and
Politics ,
pp.
5o-I,
but
I
do
agree
that more work is
necessary.
26
Juan
Carlos Torre and
Santiago
Senen
Gonziles,
Ejercito
y
sindicatos
(los
60
dias
de
Lonardi) (Buenos
Aires,
i969);
Ruben
Rotondaro,
Realidady
cambio en el sindicalismo
(Buenos
Aires,
1971),
pp.
317-26;
Rub6n H.
Zorrilla,
Estructuray
dindmica
del
sindicalismo
argentino Buenos
Aires,
1974),
pp.
206-7;
Review
of
the
River
Plate,
9
Apr.
1976,
p.
473
and 18 June 1976, p. 870; La Nacion, edici6n internacional, 26 Apr. I976.
27
See David
Rock,
The
Survival
and
Restoration of
Peronism ,
in Rock
(ed.),
Argentina
in the
Twentieth
Century,
p.
8i.
28 For
more details see
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Change
in the
Argentine
Labor
Movement ,
pp.
342-430.
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io8
Joel
Horowitz
The railroad
unions,
the most
powerful
labor
organizations
in
Argentina,
regularly
used the services
of
the
government
to settle
disputes
with the
companies.
Whether
the
problem
lay
in the
nature
of
the duties
of
the car
cleaners or
in
the
railroads
attempts
to reduce
wages
and
lay
off
workers,
the
government
became involved. For
example,
in
1934,
unhappy
with the
existing
wage
structure,
the
two
railroad
unions threatened
disruptive
activities. The
organizations
refrained
from
any
action
at the
request
of
the
government
and
then submitted
the
dispute
to
arbitration
by
the
President of the nation.29 The railroad
industry
was
tightly supervised;
work rules were laid out in
great
detail
by
a
government agency ensuring
better working conditions.30 That government interest should be most
manifest
in
the railroad
industry
is not
surprising.
The
railroads were of
unusual
political
significance
-
no
Argentine
government
could afford to
see turmoil
disrupt
the
movement
of
freight,
and it was far
easier to deal
with
the unions than it
was
to
use force.
The
willingness
of
the
government
to
deal
with the
railroad workers
was
an
exception,
but
the attitude of the
unions
did not differ
greatly.
Almost
all
turned
with
some
frequency
to
the state. Where the difference
principally
lies with later
periods
is that
the
labor
movement before Peron
could be successfully ignored. It was not an important part of the political
equation,
but rather
something
that had
to
be taken
into
consideration
only
rarely.
On
the other
hand,
the
unions did need
the
government
because
of their own weakness
and the
intransigence
of the
employers. Organizations
from all
political
ideologies
sought
aid
from the
state.
The
Syndicalist
telephone
workers
union,
directly
after
the
establishment
of the
dictatorship
of
General
Jose
F.
Uriburu
in
I930,
was faced with
pressure
from the
employer.
The
telephone
company began
to make
changes
in
the work
rules,
and workers
who refused to
cooperate
were
fired. Rather than
strike,
which would have
given
the
government
an
opportunity
to
crush
the
union,
a
delegation
from
the
union went to
see
the chief of
police,
who
agreed
to
mediate
the
dispute.
The
employer
re-hired the
workers,
but the
victory
was
fleeting,
as
many
of
them were
laid off
again
within several months.31 This
was
by
no means an
isolated
29
Boletin
de
la
Direccion
General de
Ferrocarriles,
no.
I
(Jan. 1939),
pp.
40-5;
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Change
in the
Argentine
Labor
Movement ,
pp.
190-4,
219-26,
especially
223-4.
30
The
Leyy
reglamentoeneral
de
losferrocarriles
nacionales.
Publicacidn
oficial(Buenos Aires,
1936)
is
220
pages long.
31
Federaci6n Obreros
y
Empleados
Telef6nicos,
Luchas
y conquistas:
Las
organi,aciones
telefonicas
n
elpais
(Buenos
Aires,
1944),
pp.
78-80;
La
Vanguardia,
14
Sept.
2930.
The
telephone company
was in fact
trying
to crush
the union.
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Impactof
Labor
Union
Traditions
n
Peronism
o09
incident,
as
the
union,
when harassed
by
the
company,
continued to
approach
the
government, usually
with less
successful results.32
Other unions
approached
the
government
in different
ways.
The
Socialist-controlled Federacion
Empleados
de
Comercio
was
dependent
on
government
action. The
union
leadership
realized,
for
example,
that
it
did
not
have the
strength
to force
compliance
with the
legally
mandated
eight-hour
day
in
the thousands of stores that dotted the
capital,
nor did
the
government
have the resources or the will.
The
union
leadership
perceived
that
the
only
thing
that
they
could do was limit the
violations.
Their scheme was
to
have a
law enacted
that
forced stores
to
close
at
8
p.m.
Enforcement of such a statute could be done by a policeman on his beat.
The Federacion
was able to obtain the
passage
of this
legislation through
an
efficient
political
campaign.33
This and
similar
efforts were the
major
organizing
tools of a union that
grew
very
rapidly during
the
I930s.34
The
unions
habitual
dependence
on the
government
is,
perhaps,
best
demonstrated
by
an incident
in
1932.
A
union leader
urged
a
group
of
employees
to strike
to
prevent
lowering
of
salaries,
saying essentially
that
this was
a
different
type
of action
from
what the
organization usually
followed,
but
that
they
could not turn to the
government
because
there
was no law against lowering salaries.35
Even
the
Communist-controlled
unions
sought
help
from
the
govern-
ment when
they
could.
The
Federacion
ObreraNacional de la
Construccion
the
construction
workers
union)
from
1938
until
1941
turned
regularly
to the
National
Department
of
Labor,
to which it
usually
sent a
copy
of the
list
of
demands
presented
to
an
employer.
When
an
agreement
could
not
be
reached,
the
President
of the
Department
of Labor
was asked to
mediate,
and
negotiations
continued at the
department.36
The
Union Obrera Textil
(the
textile workers
union)
followed a
similar
pattern.37
Dealing
with the
government
became an
accepted way
of life. The CGT
32
See,
for
example,
La
Vanguardia,
8
Oct.
to
5
Nov.
I930,
30
Jan.,
13
and
28
Feb.
1931;
Federacidn,
Oct.
1930,
May
1931.
33
La
Vanguardia,Jan.
1932
to
Sept.
1933,
especially
6
Aug.,
21
Sept.
1932,
24
July
I933.
34
For
the
other
campaigns
see,
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Charge
in
the
Argentine
Labor
Movement ,
pp.
228-35,
268-70.
The
Federacidnhad 820
members in
1932
according
to
Liga
Patridtica,
Sindicatos
obreros de la
Capital
Federal
(Sept.,
1932),
enclosure in
U.S.
Embassy,
Buenos
Aires,
to
Secretary
of
State,
13
October
1932,
National
Archives
Record
Group
59,
file
no.
835.0OB/69.
The
original
source
is most
likely
the
police.
In
1936
the
union
claimed
a
membership
of
18,489.
Departmento
Nacional
del
Trabajo,
Boletin
informativo,Sept./Oct. 1936,
p.
4736.
35
La
Vanguardia,
8
May
1933.
36
Celia
Durruty,
Clase
obreray
peronismo(C6rdoba,
1969), pp.
95-7.
37 Uni6n
Obrera
Textil,
Memoriay
balance
correspondiente
l
ano
1939
(Buenos
Aires,
1940),
pp.
10-17;
El
Obrero
Textil,
Jan.
1940.
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I Io
Joel
Horowitt
sent
a
delegation
to
the
celebration of the
first
anniversary
of
the
assumption
of office of
Governor Manuel
Fresco of the
Province of
Buenos
Aires,
despite
his exteme
right-wing
nationalist
views.38 Government
officials were
habitually
invited to attend union
events.39
That this
co-existence
between elements of the labor
movement and
the
state
helped
lead to Peronism is
shown
by
the
way
in
which
Luis
Monsalvo met
Per6n. Monsalvo was an
important figure
in
the Union
Ferroviaria and the CGT and
later was
Secretary
General of the
Partido
Laborista. After
the
coup
of
1943
some
of
the railroad
workers
wanted to
establish contact with the new
leaders:
Thus we established contact with Mr Moran, head of the special section of the
central
police department.
Mr
Moran had as his
job
the
vigilance
of the union
movement.
[His
office was also
in
charge
of
dealing
with
those
that
were
perceived
as a
threat to
society.]
I
knew him
personally
because the
CGT had
entrusted to
me
many
times the
obtaining
from him of
authorization for
public
functions,
assemblies,
etc. We
brought up
the situation of the railroad
workers and he
took
an
interest
in
the
question.
He told us to
return the
following day.
The
next
day
the
railroad men returned and met the
chief of
police,
who
introduced them to
Peron.40
Union representatives during the neo-conservative era had access to the
police
and to the National
Department
of
Labor,
but
rarely
to
people
who
were
important
decision-makers.41 Unions were
simply
not considered to
be an
important
factor in the
social and
political equation.
Even the
so-called
workers
parties
tended to
exclude
union
leaders from
political positions
of
importance.
On
October
17,
1945,
with the massive
demonstration for
Per6n,
the unions and the
working
class
made their
presence
felt
and
they
could not thereafter
be
ignored
-
something
that
by
its
very
nature
changed
the
relationship
between
governments
and the
labor movement.
Social
programs
Any
observant visitor to
present-day Argentina
will notice the
large
number of hotels and
hospitals
controlled
by
the unions.
In
1964
the
labor
movement had
64
vacation
resorts,
28 recreational
facilities,
3
hospitals,
38
Federacion,
eb.
I937;
Provincia de Buenos
Aires,
Ministerio de
Gobierno,
Politica
obreray
egislacidn
del
trabajo
del
gobierno
de BuenosAires
(La
Plata,
I937),
p.
14.
39
See,
for
example,
La
Vanguardia,
i Mar.
1937;
El
Obrero
Ferroviario,
16
Sept. I941.
40
Luis
Monzalvo,
Testigo
de
la
primera
hora
delperonismo(Buenos
Aires,
1974),
pp.
64-5.
41
An
important xception
was the contact
during
a
strike
n
193
2
of the
telephone
workers
with
Roberto
M.
Ortiz.
Ortiz
was elected President
in
I938.
U.S.
Embassy,
Buenos
Aires,
to
Secretary
of
State,
I
July
1932,
National Archives Record
Group
59,
file no.
835.75/13,
pp.
i-2;
La
Vanguardia,
12-14
July
I932;
La
Nacion,
12-14
July
1932.
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Impact of
Labor Union Traditions on Peronism
1i
and
122 clinics.
In
1969
a
quarter
of
the
Argentine
population
was served
by
union
hospitals.42
This
segment
of union
activity
grew
in the late
96os
and
early
1970S.
The
post-1976
military
regime
has
attempted
to
limit
this
side
of the labor movement
in
order
to
circumscribe the unions
power.43
Whereas
most of these social
programs
were established
after
1943
and
are identified
with
Peronism,
they
were a basic
aspiration
of
the
union
movement
in the earlier
period.44
This
should not
be
surprising
as the
Argentine
labour movement
was,
at
least at
an
intellectual
level,
influenced
by
a
European
Social Democratic movement
that
attempted
to
produce
a
separate
set
of
social institutions
for
the
working
class.45
The establishment
of
health, sports,
and recreational
facilities
was a
goal
of
many
unions.
Organizations appealing
to as different a
membership
as
the
poorly paid
textile workers46
and the white-collar retail clerks had in
their statutes
clauses
that called for the
development
of mutual aid
societies,
cooperatives,
and the
provision
of
medical,
dental
and
legal
consultations
for
their members.
Emphasis
was
also
placed
on
the
creation
of technical
schools
and the
practice
of
sports.
The constitution of the
textile workers
union
also called
for
the establishment
of a
vacation
resort.47
The goals were not just unfulfilled wishes. The retail clerks acquired
land
to build
a
vacation resort
for
its members.48
Both
organizations
established
free or low-cost medical and
legal
consultations
for
members
42
Rotondaro,
Realidady cambio n el
sindicalismo,
p.
370;
Carmelo
Mesa-Lago,
Social
Security
in Latin America: Pressure
Groups,
Stratification
and
Inequality Pittsburgh, 1978),
p. 200.
43
It has
tried to limit union
power
by
lessening
union
income.
Under General
Ongania
the unions
power
in this
area had
been
greatly expanded.
44
A
national
congress
of the CGT felt
called
upon
in
1947
to
recommend to its member
unions
that
they
establish various
social welfare
policies,
CGT,
i6
Nov.
1947.
See
founding dates for vacation facilities in Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n, Asesoria de
Turismo
Social
y
Vacaciones,
Tiempo
libre
y
colonias
de vacacions
Buenos
Aires,
195
6).
45
For a recent
review of
the
literature
on such activities in
Germany
see Gerhard A.
Ritter,
Workers Culture
in
Imperial
Germany:
Problems and
Points of
Departure
for
Research ,
Journal
of
Contemporary
History,
xiII,
no. 2
(Apr. 1978), I65-89.
See
also,
Guenther
Roth,
The Social Democrats in
Imperial
Germany:
A
Study
in
Working-Class
Isolation
and National
Integration Totowa,
N.J.,
1963),
especially
pp.
212-47.
46
According
to
Departamento
Nacional del
Trabajo,
Divisi6n
de
Estadistica,
Investigaciones
sociales,
1938
(Buenos
Aires,
193
9),
p. I
19,
textile workers were
the
lowest-paid
blue-collar
workers in the
city
of Buenos
Aires.
47
El
Obrero
Textil,
Dec.
1938;
Federaci6n
Empleados
de
Comercio,
Informe
del
Concejo
Adminstrativo: Asamblea
general
ordinaria,
26
de
agosto
i93o
(Buenos
Aires,
1930),
pp.
39-43;
Confederaci6n
General de
Empleados
de
Comercio,
Estatuto
(Buenos
Aires,
N.D.).
48
Federaci6n
Empleados
de
Comercio,
Memoria
de
la
Comision
Directiva,
periodo
desdeel 1?
de
noviembre
e
1936
al
3i
dejulio
de
I937 (Buenos
Aires,
1937),
p.
77.
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I
I
2
Joel
Horowit.
on
a
limited
basis.49
Many
unions
arranged
for
dental
and
health care and
legal
consultations
through
individual
practitioners.
The nature of
the
arrangement
varied from union to union
and from
professional
to
professional.
Sometimes
the
service was
free;
sometimes union
members
paid
a small
fee,
and at
other
times,
the union
paid.
In
all
cases the
compensation
was
very
small,
and
it
can be assumed that
the
professionals
were active
in
left-wing
politics.50
Ideology
does
not
seem to
be
a
major
determining
factor in union
interest
in
this
type
of
activity.
The textile workers union was
a
Socialist-controlled union that became
Communist-dominated,
while the
retail clerks were staunch Socialists. The Syndicalist FederacidnObrera
Maritima
(the
maritime
workers
union)
built
an
out-patient
clinic
in
their
headquarters.51
The failure to
carry
out
the stated desires
of the
unions resulted
not from
lack of
will
but,
it
appears,
from lack of
funds.
The
money
raised
from
dues was
often insufficient for
anything
beyond
the
primary
function of
the
organization.
The textile workers
union,
for
example,
had an
income
in
April
i941
of
3,986.42 pesos;
after
expenses
for
rent, utilities,
salaries
and
propaganda
there was
a
surplus
of
307.47
pesos.
The textile workers
earned extremely low salaries; extra money could be raised for strikes but
for
nothing
else.52 Few unions before
the Per6n era had the income and
the
stability
to
provide anything
but
rudimentary
social
programs.
There
were several
influential
and
stable
unions that did
put
together
significant
social
programs.
These
unions tended to be well
established,
but
unable to
improve
conditions for
their members. For
a
variety
of
reasons
their
ability
to strike
was
strictly
limited.
One can
hypothesize
that
it was the need to
provide
the
rank and file with
something
other than
improvements
in salaries
or
working
conditions that
propelled
them so
far in this direction. The
municipal
workers of the
city
of Buenos Aires
and the two railroad
unions most
fully
developed
these
concepts.
The
municipal
workers
union was
in
a
particularly
difficult
position.
It felt that
it
could
not
strike.
The
neo-conservative-controlled
executive
49
Federaci6n
Empleados
de
Comercio,
Informe
del
Concejo
Adminstrativo: Asamblea
general
ordinaria,
26de
agosto
o30,
pp.
32-3;
El Obrero
Textil,
June 1938,
July
1941,
Nov.
I941,
Apr.
1943.
50
See,
for
examples,
Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
Libros de actas
de la Comisi6n
Directiva,
Acta
21,
15
November
1933,
p.
37;
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
15
Jan.
1933,
i
May
1936;
La
Vanguardia,
26
Sept. 1930,
9 May,
20
June
1931;
Federacidn,
Feb.,
1936.
51
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
i6
Nov.
I94I.
52
This was
a
typical
month.
For strike
expenses,
see
May 194I.
El
Obrero
Textil,
primer
quincenal,
July I941.
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Impact
of
Labor Union Traditionson
Peronism
113
branch
of
the
city
government
saw
no
need
to
improve
significantly
the
conditions
of these
well-paid
workers. The
Union
Obreros
Empleados
Municipales
also
faced
competition
from other
organizations
for the
loyalties
of the
workers. What the union could
provide
was social
programs.
In
this,
it did have the
support
of
the
municipal
government,
which,
while
not
willing
to make
major
concessions,
was
willing
to make
minor
ones,
in order to
placate
the union s
ally,
the
Socialist
Party.53
The
organization s
social
welfare
program
started
prior
to
1930.
In
1927
the
municipal government
lent the union
an
empty
field that the labor
organization
built
into a
highly developed
recreational
area.
Trees and
a
children s wading pool were provided by the city.54The union built tennis,
bowls
and
basketball
courts,
soccer
fields,
a
playground
and facilities
for
dances
and entertainment.55
As well as
serving
the
members,
the
recreational
facilities were used
to hold festivals and
receptions
for other labor
organizations.56
In
9
3
5
the
municipal
workers went
a
step
further and
opened
a
vacation
resort
in
the hills of Cordoba. The
goal
was
to
establish
a
place
where the
membership
could
enjoy
the
benefits
of a
low-cost vacation
away
from the
city.
In
1940
the
resort
had 62 rooms with
accommodation for 181
people.
The union also acquired a bus to lessen transportation costs. The resort
was built with the
help
of the
government.57
The union
also
provided
the
same
type
of
help
with
medical,
judicial
and
pension problems
that
was
done
by
other
organizations.
The two railroad
unions,
the
Union Ferroviariaand La
Fraternidad
the
engineers
and firemen s
union),
went the
farthest
in
providing
social
services.
They
were
pushed
in
that direction
by
serious
problems
in
their
industry.
The
fall in
exports brought
on
by
the
depression
and the
increasing
use of
trucks
to
move
freight produced
in
the
1930S
a
major
crisis for the rail
companies
and their workers. The railroad unions had
to
fight
extremely
hard
to
maintain the
status
quo.
Despite
this
problem,
they
were
large,
stable
organizations
that
received
sizable
sums
of
money
53
The Socialist
Party
was
during
the
1930S
the
largest
or
second
largest party
on
the
city
council of
Buenos Aires. For
the
nature of the
relationship
between the union and the
government,
see
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Change
in the
Argentine
Labor
Movement ,
pp. 369-75.
54
Concejo
Deliberante
de
la Ciudad de
Buenos
Aires,
Actas del H.
Concejo
Deliberante,
II,
28
June
1932,
p.
2277;
IV,
28 Dec.
1933,
p.
4578;
La
Vanguardia,
8
July I932.
55
Uni6n Obreros
y
Empleados
Municipales, Dignificando
n
vacaciones:
Obra
que
debe mitarse
(Buenos
Aires,
1940),
front
piece
with no
pagination.
56
See,
for
examples,
La
Vanguardia,
I
Oct.
193I,
27
May I932.
57
Uni6n Obreros
y
Empleados
Municipales, Dignificando
en
vacaciones,
pp.
9-i2;
La
Vanguardia,
8
Sept.
1935;
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
6
Feb.
935.
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I
I4
Joel
Horowitt
in
dues.
In
1942
the
Union Ferroviaria
collected
800,468
pesos
in
dues and
had
a
capital
of
2,569,80o pesos.
The railroad
unions,
because of their
strategic position
within
the
economy
and their
acceptance
by
the
companies
and
by
the
government
as
legitimate
entities,
found it
extremely
difficult to strike. There
was
a tacit
agreement
between the unions and the
government
that the railroad
system
would
not be
disrupted
by
a
massive
action.58
This left the unions with
large
sums
to
carry
out a social
program,
as
well as
a
need to do so. Even
prior
to the
1930S
the two
unions had
begun
to
provide
some
forms
of social
programs
for their
members. La
Fraternidad reated its first technical school in I 890 in order to train firemen
to become
engineers.
By 1929
the
two
unions had
sixty-three
schools
spread
across the
country.
In
the
1930S
the
schools
made
available not
only
technical education for the
workers,
but also
a
wide
variety
of
courses,
from basic
literacy
to
English
and
drawing,
in
which their families
could
enroll.59
In
the
1930S
the unions extended
their
program.
In
late
1942,
the
Union
Ferroviaria
opened
a vacation resort
in the
hills
of
C6rdoba for its members
and those of La Fraternidad.
The
former
union
also
acquired
a
recreation
field in greater Buenos Aires and by I943 was searching for a property
to
buy along
the seacoast.60
The
Unidn Ferroviaria
had
provided
medical
and dental care for its
members for free or at low
cost,
through
individual health-care
practioners.
In
1936
the two railroad unions outlined
a more
comprehensive
scheme,
a
plan
to build
a
hospital,
a sanatorium
and,
in
key
railroad
centers,
out-patient
clinics.6
By
the end of the neo-conservative
era the unions had
made
major
strides
towards
achieving
their
goal.
In
1940
they
purchased
a
private
hospital.
Two
years
later
an
out-patient
clinic was
opened
in
Rosario,
Argentina s
second
largest
city
and a vital railroad center. The
58
For
dues,
see Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
Memoria
y
balance
correspondiente
l
ano
I942
(Buenos
Aires,
1943),
pp.
107,
2
. For
the
nature
of
the union and
its
philosophy,
see
Horowitz,
Adaptation
and
Change
in the
Argentine
Labor Movement .
59
Juan
B. Chiti
and Francisco
Agnelli,
Cincuentenario
e La Fraternidad :
Fundacidn,
desarrollo,
bra
Buenos
Aires,
1937),
pp.
3 3
7-41;
Fernandez,
La
Union
Ferroviariaa
traves
del
tiempo,
p.
43
;
Partido
Socialista,
Anuario
socialista
930
(Buenos
Aires,
I929),
p.
48;
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
i Feb.
I93I,
I
Dec.
1937,
I
May,
i Oct.
1939,
i6
Feb.
I942.
Libraries were
also
extremely
important
in the railroad
unions and elsewhere
in the
labor
movement.
60
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
16
Feb.,
i Mar.
1943;
Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
Memoria
y
balance
correspondiente
l
ano
1940 (Buenos
Aires,
1941),
p.
37;
Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
Memoria
y
balance
correspondiente
l ano
1942,
p.
46.
61
Fernandez,
La Unidn
Ferroviaria a
traves
del
tiempo,
pp.
255-260.
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Impact
of Labor Union
Traditionson
Peronism
i5
facilities were
available
for use
by
all
railroad workers and
their families
who
paid special
dues,
as
part
of an
arrangement
with the
government
in
which
the state authorized
the rail
companies
to
deduct dues
directly
from
the salaries
of
any
worker who wanted to
participate.
The
deduction of
dues was
an
insurance that the flow of
money
would
be
steady.
By
December
I942,
44,677
railroad
workers
out of a
possible
13I,oo6
were
eligible
to use
the
medical facilities.62
The railroad unions had
gone
a
long way
towards
implementing
their
social
welfare
plan
before
the
end
of the
neo-conservative era. The
type
of
program
that could be built with more active state
intervention can be
seen by what happened in the period immediately after I943.63 The
government,
with the
direct intervention of
Juan
Per6n
-
it
was he who
made the announcement
-
provided
money
for
the extension of health-care
services
and
established
a
mechanism for continued
financing.
Both the
workers
and the
companies
were
to
contribute to
this service.
By
the end
of
1946,
the
railroad unions were
building
a much
larger hospital
and
had
clinics
in
nine additional
cities.64 What had
changed
in the
railroad unions
was not
ideology
but the
ability
to
carry
out their
desires.
Similar
desires
existed
in
other unions but were
blocked
by
a lack of
money.
Conclusion
It is
perhaps necessary
to
add
that I
am not
trying
to create a
model
in
which the unions
did
not
change
with the
coming
to
power
of
Juan
Peron.
There
was
undoubtedly
a
sharp
shift in
attitudes
and
behavior,
but one
must examine the nature
of that
change,
keeping
in
mind that
the
environment of the
labor movement
had been
drastically
altered. Some
of the
changes
were
produced by
the
increased
attention from
the
government
and
the
unions
greater
wealth rather than a
shift in
ideology.
Before
I943
the labor movement had been an isolated
group
within a
62
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
I
Mar.
1937,
i6 Feb.
I939,
i
Aug.
I940;
i
Aug.
I942;
Uni6n
Ferroviaria,
Memoriay
balance
correspondiente
l
ano
1942,
p.
42;
Juan
Manuel Santa
Cruz,
Ferrocarriles
argentinos
Santa
Fe,
1966),
p.
33.
The
percentage
would have
been
higher,
but the state railroad workers were
already
covered for
hospitalization
through
a
mutual
aid
society.
63
Besides
allowing
for subtraction of the
dues from the
pay
of the
workers,
the
government
had offered to
help
finance
the
building
of
a
hospital.
The unions never
received the
money
because
they
bought
a
hospital.
El Obrero
Ferroviario,
6 Nov.
1940,
i6
July/i
Aug. 1943.
64
See
CGT,
i6
Jan.
1944,
i6
Jan.
I947.
For information on individual clinics
see,
for
example,
CGT,
i6
Mar.,
I
Sept
I946.
The rail
unions were not the
only
organizations
to
benefit. For
example,
the national
confederation of retail clerks received
two million
pesos
to establish a vacation
resort, CGT,
i6
Oct.
1947.
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I 6
Joel
Horowit.
society
that
paid
little
attention to
it,
except
in a
negative
sense. Unions
were
poor
and unable
to
carry
out
many
functions
because
of a lack of
funds. Under Peron, the unions became the
keystone
of the
governing
group;
a force that had to be
both
wooed and controlled. It
is
not
surprising
that
things
changed.
Among
other
factors,
legal recognition
and
dues check-off
provided
the
possibility
for a new
style
of
activity.
Given the fact that there was not
an
entirely
new
leadership
in
the
crucial
early years
of
Peronism,
it should not be
surprising
to see certain trends
continuing
from
the earlier
period.
The connections
may
not
always
be
clear,
but
they
are there.
If
we are
going
to
understand
fully
what Peronism
was and
is,
it
will be
necessary
to
keep looking
at
the
period
in
which
Peronism
was
formed,
and at the same
time not to
assume
that it
was
something entirely
new.
Recommended