The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on Peronism - J. Howowitz

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The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on PeronismAuthor(s): Joel Horowitz

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (May, 1983), pp. 101-116Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/155925Accessed: 11-06-2015 19:31 UTC

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2/17

J.

Lat. Amer. Stud.

5,

i,

oI--

II6

Printed

in

Great Britain

The

Impact

of

Pre-1943

Labor

Union

Traditions on Peronism*

by

JOEL

HOROWITZ

Although in recent years there has been an increasing quantity of

suggestive

and

important

investigations

of

Peronism,

little

attention has

been

paid

to the

continuity

between

the

pre-I943

and the Peronist labor

movement.

This

continuity

has been

neglected despite general recognition

that there were

important

labor

leaders from the

earlier labor movement

who

provided

key

initial

support

to Peronism and that

the

pre-I943

labor

movement was

one of Latin

America s

strongest.

There can

be

no

doubt that

Argentine

unions

changed profoundly

after

the

coming

to

power

of

Juan

Peron. The labor movement

grew;

it

became

wealthy, less independent, and, for the first time, a major actor on the

political stage.

The

unions

took on a

different coloration under

Peron,

in

part

because

for the

first time

they

had

money

and

a

government

that

was

truly

interested

in

them. But that

does

not

necessarily

mean that older

methods

and desires were abandoned.

Beneath

the dissimilarities were

continuities,

based on one

important

factor,

leadership.

Trade union leaders from the

neo-conservative

era,

1930-43,

provided

much of the crucial

early

support

for

Per6n.

Therefore,

it should

not

be

surprising

that

some basic ideas

continued

from

the earlier

period.

Two traits

usually

regarded

as

Peronist,

a

willingness

to

cooperate

with

the

government

and

a

desire to

provide

social

welfare

programs

for

*

The research

upon

which this article is based was made

possible by

grants

from

the

Doherty

Foundation and the Center

for

Latin American

Studies,

University

of

California,

Berkeley.

An

earlierversion of this

paper

was

presented

at the

Center for

LatinAmerican

Studies,

University

of

California,

Berkeley.

I would like to thank

those

who were

present

for

their

comments.

1

The

principalexceptions

are the

ground-breaking

work

by

Miguel

Murmis and

Juan

Carlos

Portantiero,

Estudios

obre

os

origenes

el

peronismo

Buenos

Aires,

1971),

and

an

excellent and

suggestive

article

by

Ricardo

Gaudio and

Jorge Pilone,

Estado

y

relaciones

obrero-patronales

n

los

origenes

de la

negociaci6n

colectiva

en

Argentina

Centro

de

Estudios

de

Estado

y

Sociedad,

Estudios

ociales,

o.

5

(Buenos

Aires,

1976).

See

also the article

by

Torcuato S. Di

Tella,

Working-Class

Organization

and Politics

in

Argentina ,

Latin

American Research

Review, xvi,

2

(

98

),

pp.

33-56.

IO1


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3/17

I02

Joel

Horowitz

union

members,

will be examined

to demonstrate

that

continuity

did exist.

Other

similarities

can also be found.

Continuity

in

the

Argentine

labor movement

has

been

partially

obscured

by

the

sudden

prosperity

that

the unions

enjoyed

during

their

growth

under

Peron

and,

more

importantly,

after the establishment

of a

dues

check-off

system

in

1945

that

provided

a

steady

source

of income.2 Before

1943

the

style

of the unions had been

simple

and

puritanical, partly

because

there was

not

enough

money

for

large

staffs

or

fancy

offices.

Ideology

also

played

a role. There existed

a

lingering

mistrust

of the

paid

staff member

and

suspicion

of

anything

that was

not austere.

Angel

G.

Borlenghi,

Secretary-General of the FederacionEmpleadosde Comercio(the retail clerks

union),

a

largely

middle-class

organization,

was

attacked for

being

well

dressed

and for

having

a

rug

on the floor

of

his

office.3

A

sudden inflow

of

money

changed

the realm

of the

possible, allowing

the fulfillment

of

plans

that had been

held in

abeyance by

insufficient funds

and

permitted

the

hiring

of new staff. For

example,

in

June I943

the

Federacion

Obreros_yEmpleadosTelef6nicos

the

telephone

workers

union)

received

only

I,264.50

pesos

in

monthly

dues,

but

by

March

1946

income

had

risen to

4,303.30

pesos.4

More

money

presented

an

opportunity

to

change the style of the unions.

The

continuity

has also been

obscured

by

what

has become the

orthodox

view of

why

Peron was

able to come to

power

and control

the labor movement.

Essentially

this

argument

is

that the old labor

establishment

was

overwhelmed

by

the tens of thousands of

migrants

who

flocked

to

the cities

and

could

not be

integrated

into the unions.

In

one

version,

the

migrants

support

for

Peron was

a

result

of

their lack

of

political

sophistication

that

left

them

susceptible

to

his

paternalism.

The

Peronists

were

not adverse

to

accepting

the basic

outlines

of the

argument

but,

instead of

seeing

the new workers as

naive,

viewed the

migrants

as

being

more

Argentine

than

the

immigrants

who

had

supposedly

dominated

the

pre-i943

labor

movement.

The

idea

of a

complete

break with the

old

movement

was

also

appealing

because

the Peronists

were more

than

willing

to

accept

credit

for

creating

the

existing

Argentine

labor

movement.

In

the

last decade

this

view has

come

under

a serious and

wide-ranging

2

See

Decreto

23,852

of

2

Oct.

I945

in

Anales de

legislacion

argentina,

94J,

vol. v

(Buenos

Aires,

1946),

pp.

59

-6.

3

For a

lingering

mistrust of

paid

staff,

see

Lucio

Bonilla,

Instituto

Di Tella

Oral

History

Program, p.

5

2

(hereafter

IDTOHP);

La

Vanguardia,

19-2

3

Dec.

1931;

Federacidn,

Aug.

1931.

For comments

about

Borlenghi,

see

Rafael

Ginocchio,

IDTOHP,

p.

14;

Pedro

Otero, IDTOHP,

p.

76;

Francisco

Perez

Leir6s,

IDTOHP,

pp.

I29-30.

4

Federacidn,

31

July

1943, 3

Dec.

I946.




4/17

Impact of

Labor

Union

Traditionson Peronism

I03

attack.5 While

not

wanting

to

get

into the

polemics

that

surround this

issue,

it is clear

to the author

that

the orthodox

argument

has hindered the search

for

any

connection between the

pre-i943

labor movement

and that

of

Peron,

because

its basic

proposition

entails

the

elimination

of

the

old labor

movement.

Leadership

A

sudden

ideological

shift

with the

coming

to

power

of Per6n would be

surprising.

Lured

by

the

carrot and

avoiding

the

stick,

unions abandoned

their

opposition

to Peron. The vast

majority

of trade unions

based

in

Buenos Aires supported Per6n or, at least, maintained a neutral position

in the crucial

years

of

change-

I944

through I945.

Only

organizations

with

strong political

ties,

Communist

unions

and a small

handful

of

Socialist

ones,

actively

resisted.6 This

is

not

a

new

observation,

but

what

most writers

have

failed to

mention is that

this

meant a

continuation

in

union

leadership

both

at

the

highest

level

and

in

secondary

roles as well.

In the

first

few

years

of

Peronism,

many

unions were

controlled

by

men

who

had

been active

in

the

labor movement

in

the earlier

epoch.

A

good

example

of

this is the

Union

Ferroviaria

(the

railroad

workers

union).

It

was undoubtedly the strongest union in Argentina in June, I943 when

the neo-conservative

era

ended.7

A

comparison

of

its

seventeen-member

executive committee

of

1942-3

with

that

of

1945-6,

shows that the

same

ten men sat on

both boards.

Of the

additional

members of the later

committee,

one had served on the board

in

1933-4,

while

at

least five

had

previously played

some role in the union. In

1946-7

seven

members had

served

on

the

1942-3

executive

committee,

while at

least five

others

had

been active at other levels

before

1943.

During

both

of

the later

periods,

the

titled

officers,

six

in

total,

were

executive committee

veterans with the

5

This

is an

over-simplification

of a

complex argument

that

became

increasingly complex

as time

went on. For

the

nature of

recent

arguments

on the

subject,

see

Desarrollo

Econdmico,

nos.

51, 54, 56,

57

(I973-5).

Also,

see

Walter

Little,

Popular

Origins

of

Peronism ,

in

David Rock

(ed.),

Argentina

in the

Twentieth

Century

(Pittsburgh, 1975),

pp.

162-78,

and

Di

Tella,

Working-Class

Organization

and

Politics ,

pp.

47-5

i.

6

For detailed and

good

descriptions,

see Louise M.

Doyon,

Organized

Labour and

Per6n

(1943-I955):

A

Study

of

Conflictual

Dynamics

of the

Peronist

Movement in

Power

(Ph.D.

diss.,

University

of

Toronto,

1978),

pp.

197-3

56;

Samuel L.

Baily,

Labor

Nationalism and Politics

in

Argentina

(New

Brunswick,

N.J., 1967),

pp.

7I-96.

7

For

the nature of the Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

see

Joel Horowitz, Adaptation

and

Change

in the

Argentine

Labor

Movement,

I930-1943:

A

Study

of Five

Unions

(Ph.D.

diss.,

University

of

California,

Berkeley, I979).

Juan

Carlos Torre in

La

caida de

Luis

Gay ,

Todo es

Historia,

Oct.

1974,

p.

82,

makes

the

same

argument

that

I

am

making

here

on

the

continuity

of the

leadership,

but he does

not elaborate.




5/17

104

Joel Horowitz

exception

of

one

man in

I946-7.

He

had

been, however,

a

delegate

to

the

Union Ferroviaria s convention

in

I941.8

One other

figure

of

great

importance

remained in

place,

the Union

Ferroviaria s

top

bureaucrat,

Rafael

Kogan.

Kogan

had

a

large

amount of

power

and held his

position

from the

founding

of the union

until

at

least

I948.9

This over-all

continuity

is

especially striking

because

in

the

period

prior

to the

coup

the union had

been

rent

by

internal

unrest,

caused at

least

partially by

the

continuation

in

office of certain

key

individuals.10

The

continuity

in

the

Union

Ferroviaria was

not

unique.

The same

tendency

can be found

in

unions

in

which the

top

leaders became

important

Peronists.

Angel

G.

Borlenghi,

who

was Minister

of the Interior

from

1946

until

195 5,

was able

to

bring

his union with

him.l

Borlenghi

had been the dominant force

in

the

Federacion

Empleados

de

Comercio

of the

Federal

Capital

and the national

Confederacion

General

de

Empleados

de

Comercio

since

I932.

In

late

1946

at least six of the

national

confederation s

eight representatives

to the central committee of the

Confederacion

del

Trabajo

(CGT,

national

labor

federation)

had been active

in

the union

prior

to

1943,

and

a

seventh

was

Angel Borlenghi s

brother.12

A

similar situation

existed

in

the Federacion

Obrerosy

Empleados Telefdnicos.

Luis F. Gay, President of the Partido Laborista, which helped elect Per6n

in

1946,

and

Secretary

General

of the CGT

for

a

short

period

in

1946-7,

8

Manuel

F.

Fernandez,

La

Union

Ferroviaria

a

traves

del

tiempo:

TIeinticinco

nos

al servicio

de un

ideal,

I922-I947 (Buenos

Aires,

I948), pp.

I49-6I.

The

job

history

of these

men

and

those

in the unions

discussed

below

are

included

in

my

files.

If

anything,

I

am

underestimating

the number

of

those active

at

the

secondary

level,

as

I have made

no

attempt

to locate

activists

at the level of

the local

branches,

nor do

I

have

a

complete

list of

all those who

attended conventions.

9

Fernandez,

La

Union

Ferroviaria

a

traves

del

tiempo,

pp.

362-5.

For

his role

see,

Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

Libros

de actas

de

la

Comisi6n

Directiva,

Acta

II,

20

July

I931,

p.

28;

Acta

21,

9 Dec. 1931, p. 28.

10

The

dissent

in

1942

and

1943

was

principally

directed

by

the Communists

and

the

Radicals

and

had

strong political

overtones

but at

least

part

of

the

problem

lay

elsewhere.

For

contrasting

view

of the

struggle,

see La Hora

and El ObreroFerroviario

during

those

years.

For a

summary,

see

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Change

in

the

Argentine

Labor Movement ,

pp.

4

5

8-65.

One reason

for the

continuity may

have been

the nature of

the

government

intervention.

For the

intervention,

see

David

Tamarin,

The

Argentine

Labor

Movement

in an

Age

of

Transition,

I930-1945

(Ph.D.

Diss.,

University

of

Washington,

1977),

pp.

292--6.

One of

the union s

employees

in

976

was

related

to the

pre-I943

leadership.

11

He did

have

some

problems

with

the national

confederation

of retail

clerks,

but

he

was

able to

overcome

it.

Juan

Carlos

Torre,

La

CGT

y

el

17

de

octubre

de

1945 ,

Todo

es

HTistoria,

eb.

1976,

p.

74;

Felix

Luna,

El

4X:

Cronicade unanodecisivo

Buenos

Aires,

1969),

p.

225.

12

CGT,

I

6

Nov.

946.

For

Borlenghi s

dominance

in the

union

see

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Change

in the

Argentine

Labor

Movement ,

pp.

469-73.




6/17

Impact

f

Labor

UnionTraditions

n Peronism

105

had

been

a dominant

figure

in

the

telephone

workers

organization

since

its

founding

in

I928.13

In

1947

the

union was taken

over

by

the

government

after

the

public

and

well-known

dismissal of

Gay

as

Secretary

General

of

the

CGT. At that

time,

the union s

Secretary

General,

Modesto

Orozco,

was

a

long-time

militant,

as were the two

men chosen

to

hand

over the

organization s

property

to the

state.14

The

continuation of old labor

leaders

in

their

positions

of

power

was

not

limited

to

unions which

produced

enthusiastic

and vital

supporters

of

Per6n.

Even

in

the

organization

of

the

municipal

workers

of

the

city

of

Buenos

Aires,

the

Union

Obreros

y

Empleados

Municipales,

which

had

extremely close ties to the Socialist Party, leaders could be found who were

willing

to

support

Peron. The

municipal

workers union

had been

dominated

by

workers

placed

in

the

city

government

as acts

of

patronage

by

the

Socialist

Party.

In

1944

the

union

was taken

over

by

the

government

because of

supposed

corruption,

but the real

reason

was

undoubtedly

to

limit

opposition

to Per6n.

Yet,

when

a

national

confederation

of

workers

and

employees

of

municipalities

was

founded

during

the southern

winter

of

1946,

the

three titular

officers had

been

prominent

in

the

Socialist-

dominated

union

before

I943.15

The only segments of the labor movement that did not produce support

for Peron

were the

Communist-dominated unions

and

a few

Socialist

unions.

Peron,

however,

fostered

parallel

unions which with

active

government

support

displaced

these

organizations.16

Even

before

1943,

in

many

industries there were

competing

unions. The

Communist

strength

in

the

meatpacking industry

was

challenged

by

a

Syndicalist

union

based

in

the town of

Zarate.17

The

Union

Obrerosy

Empleados

Municipales

had

competition

from four other

unions,

and a leader

from

the

largest

of

these

organizations

was

an

alternate for

the

executive

committee

of the national

confederation of

municipal

workers founded in

1946.18

These

organizations

provided

a

base

for

creating

an

opposition.

13

Horowitz,

op.

cit.,

pp.

490-500, especially

p.

490.

14

CGT,

6 Mar.

1947.

For information

on

Gay s

fall,

see

Torre,

La

caida

de

Luis

Gay .

15

For

the union

and

patronage,

P6rez

Leir6s,

IDTOHP,

pp.

29-30;

Concejo

Deliberante

de

la Ciudad de

Buenos

Aires,

Actas

del H.

Concejo

Deliberante,

2

Dec.

1933,

vol.

Iv,

pp.

4100-22.

For the

intervention, CGT,

16

May,

I

July 1946.

The

ex-Socialists

served

the union

for three

years

as

advisors

and

then

resigned

and

a strike

followed,

Doyon,

Organized

Labour

and

Per6n , p.

456.

16

To view a declineof a Communist-dominated nion, see El ObreroTextil, 1943-6.

17

The union was active

in the

Syndicalist

confederation,

U.S.A.

18

Francisco

P.

Ruberto,

Alejandro

Priotti,

Enrique

Nigro,

interview

conducted

by

Robert

J.

Alexander,

2

Nov.

1946;

CGT,

16

July I946.

Some of the

other unions

were

ephemeral.

For the alternate

CGT,

12

July

1946;

La

Vanguardia,

12

Sept.

1934.




7/17

io6

Joel

HorowitT

The

Peronist

parallel

unions were not

created out

of

whole

cloth,

but

rather the

leadership

tended to be drawn

from

existing

parallel organizations

or

from

second-level,

non-Communist activists.

Participation

in

the

pre-i943

labor

movement

helped

the

new

leadership

in

their

recruitment

of rank

and

file,

as

some

credibility

had

already

been

established. 9 The

best

example

of

this is the Union

Obrera

Metalzrgica (the

metalworkers

union),

which

under

Peronist

auspices

was

to

displace

a

Communist

organization

and to

become the most

important

union in

the

country.

The

Union

Obrera

Metalzrgica

was

actually

founded

prior

to

June

1943.

It was

originally

a

product

of

the

struggle

not

between Peron and the

Communists,

but between

the

leadership

of the

Union Ferroviariaand the

Communists.

A group of Socialist metalworkers, dissatisfied with the Communist

organization,

founded the new

union with

the aid

of the

UnionFerroviaria

and its branch of the CGT.20 It was these men who

began

to build the

union.

The leaders

of

the

previous

era

played

an

essential

role in

the

establishment of the

Peronist labor

movement.

They

were influential

in

unions that

represented

a

considerable

portion

of the entire labor movement.

Many

of those who had

played important

or

minor

roles

in

the

union

movement before

June

1943

continued to do so

during

the

period

in which

many of the goals and the style of Peronism were set.21.One cannot expect

them to

abandon the desires and dreams

that

they

had

fought

for,

against

considerable odds.22 What was

achievable and

possible

had

changed.

It is

clear

that,

when the

labor leaders turned to

Per6n,

many

of them

expected

a

very

different

and a more balanced

relationship

than

they

in

fact achieved.23

They

had

obviously

misjudged

their

own

strength

and that

of

Per6n. Much of

the

workers

loyalty

went direct

to him. After Per6n

had established his

power,

he

was able

to demand

loyalty,

and

many

of

the

major

labor leaders who

had

originally helped bring

him to

power

were

19

Doyon,

Organized

Labour

and

Per6n ,

pp.

256-7.

20

El

Obrero

Ferroviario,

I

May

1943;

Angel

Perelman,

Cdmohicimosel

17

de octubre

(Buenos

Aires,

196I),

pp.

43-5.

21

It is

significant

that

union men held

important government positions

that dealt

directly

with labor. The man in

charge

of union affairs

in

the Labor Secretariat

in

1944

was

Luis

Cerutti,

a

former

Secretary

General of

the

CGT, CGT,

i

Sept.

1944.

Juan

Bramuglia,

the

lawyer

of the

Uni6n Ferroviaria also held an

important position.

Robert

J.

Alexander,

The

Perdn Era

(New

York,

195

),

p.

24.

22

It is

interesting

that

as

late as

I

April 1946,

the

CGT carried

an

article

in

remembrance

of

Francisco

Largo

Caballero,

the

Spanish

Socialist leader of the Second

Republic.

It

was

written

by Jose Marotta,

who had been both an

official

of the

municipal

workers

union

and a member

of the

city

council of the

city

of Buenos

Aires,

representing

the

Socialist

Party.

23

Many

of the labor

leaders

had

hoped

to

create

a true

labor

party.

See,

for

example,

Luis

Gay,

IDTOHP;

Torre,

La

caida

de

Luis

Gay .




8/17

Impact

of

Labor Union Traditionson

Peronism

107

swept

away.

Luis

Gay

and

Cipriano

Ryes,

possibly

the

most

influential

figures

in the labor movement in

1946,

were

publicly

pushed

aside.

A

new

era for the Peronist labor movement had started.24

The

link

between

the

leadership

of the

post-1947

period

and

that of

the

pre-Peron

period

is unclear.

There

is,

however,

a

very

great

likelihood that

a

significant percentage

had held at least

secondary

positions

within the

labor movement.25

In

any

case it is clear

that,

in

the first

dynamic years

of the Per6n

era,

those

who

had

led the unions before

I943

were

in

a

position

to establish

many

of the

goals

and tactics of the Peronist labor

movement.

Relations

with

governments

One

characteristic

of the

Peronist labor

movement

has been a

willingness

to

cooperate

and maintain a

close

relationship

with

the

government

in

order to

better

the

movement s

position.

From the

time of General

Lonardi and the

early years

of the

presidency

of

General

Ongania

until

the

present

military

regimes,

elements

of the labor

movement

have tried

to

cooperate

with

governments.26

While

often

less

than

successful and at

times not

pursued

by

all

factions,

it

appears

to

be

a

dominant

characteristic.27

In

part

this is

a tactic

intended to

ensure

survival

in

difficult

times,

but

it is also an attempt to re-create the relationship that existed with the

government

under

Peron.

However,

this

type

of

relationship

antedates

Peron.

Turning

to the

government

for

help

did

not start with

Peronism,

but

was

an

important

feature of the

labor

movement

during

the

neo-conserva-

tive

era,

and even

before.28

While it

is not

possible

to show the

full

scope

of

this

relationship

within

the

space

of this

article,

it

is

possible

to

demonstrate that it

existed.

24

For an

important

discussion of

the

periodization

of the Peronist labor movement

see

Little, La

organizaci6n

obrera

y

el estado

peronista ,

Desarrollo Econ6mico,no. 75

(Oct./Dec.

979), PP.

33 I-76.

25

In

Jose

Luis de

Imaz,

Los

que

mandan

trans.

Carlos

A.

Aztiz),

(Albany,

1970),

pp.

226-8,

it is

stated

that a

significant portion

of the

top leadership

even

after

1946,

had had union

experience

prior

to

I943.

This

entire

argument

is

in

opposition

to what

Torcuato

Di

Tella

observed

in

Working-Class

Organization

and

Politics ,

pp.

5o-I,

but

I

do

agree

that more work is

necessary.

26

Juan

Carlos Torre and

Santiago

Senen

Gonziles,

Ejercito

y

sindicatos

(los

60

dias

de

Lonardi) (Buenos

Aires,

i969);

Ruben

Rotondaro,

Realidady

cambio en el sindicalismo

(Buenos

Aires,

1971),

pp.

317-26;

Rub6n H.

Zorrilla,

Estructuray

dindmica

del

sindicalismo

argentino Buenos

Aires,

1974),

pp.

206-7;

Review

of

the

River

Plate,

9

Apr.

1976,

p.

473

and 18 June 1976, p. 870; La Nacion, edici6n internacional, 26 Apr. I976.

27

See David

Rock,

The

Survival

and

Restoration of

Peronism ,

in Rock

(ed.),

Argentina

in the

Twentieth

Century,

p.

8i.

28 For

more details see

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Change

in the

Argentine

Labor

Movement ,

pp.

342-430.




9/17

io8

Joel

Horowitz

The railroad

unions,

the most

powerful

labor

organizations

in

Argentina,

regularly

used the services

of

the

government

to settle

disputes

with the

companies.

Whether

the

problem

lay

in the

nature

of

the duties

of

the car

cleaners or

in

the

railroads

attempts

to reduce

wages

and

lay

off

workers,

the

government

became involved. For

example,

in

1934,

unhappy

with the

existing

wage

structure,

the

two

railroad

unions threatened

disruptive

activities. The

organizations

refrained

from

any

action

at the

request

of

the

government

and

then submitted

the

dispute

to

arbitration

by

the

President of the nation.29 The railroad

industry

was

tightly supervised;

work rules were laid out in

great

detail

by

a

government agency ensuring

better working conditions.30 That government interest should be most

manifest

in

the railroad

industry

is not

surprising.

The

railroads were of

unusual

political

significance

-

no

Argentine

government

could afford to

see turmoil

disrupt

the

movement

of

freight,

and it was far

easier to deal

with

the unions than it

was

to

use force.

The

willingness

of

the

government

to

deal

with the

railroad workers

was

an

exception,

but

the attitude of the

unions

did not differ

greatly.

Almost

all

turned

with

some

frequency

to

the state. Where the difference

principally

lies with later

periods

is that

the

labor

movement before Peron

could be successfully ignored. It was not an important part of the political

equation,

but rather

something

that had

to

be taken

into

consideration

only

rarely.

On

the other

hand,

the

unions did need

the

government

because

of their own weakness

and the

intransigence

of the

employers. Organizations

from all

political

ideologies

sought

aid

from the

state.

The

Syndicalist

telephone

workers

union,

directly

after

the

establishment

of the

dictatorship

of

General

Jose

F.

Uriburu

in

I930,

was faced with

pressure

from the

employer.

The

telephone

company began

to make

changes

in

the work

rules,

and workers

who refused to

cooperate

were

fired. Rather than

strike,

which would have

given

the

government

an

opportunity

to

crush

the

union,

a

delegation

from

the

union went to

see

the chief of

police,

who

agreed

to

mediate

the

dispute.

The

employer

re-hired the

workers,

but the

victory

was

fleeting,

as

many

of

them were

laid off

again

within several months.31 This

was

by

no means an

isolated

29

Boletin

de

la

Direccion

General de

Ferrocarriles,

no.

I

(Jan. 1939),

pp.

40-5;

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Change

in the

Argentine

Labor

Movement ,

pp.

190-4,

219-26,

especially

223-4.

30

The

Leyy

reglamentoeneral

de

losferrocarriles

nacionales.

Publicacidn

oficial(Buenos Aires,

1936)

is

220

pages long.

31

Federaci6n Obreros

y

Empleados

Telef6nicos,

Luchas

y conquistas:

Las

organi,aciones

telefonicas

n

elpais

(Buenos

Aires,

1944),

pp.

78-80;

La

Vanguardia,

14

Sept.

2930.

The

telephone company

was in fact

trying

to crush

the union.




10/17

Impactof

Labor

Union

Traditions

n

Peronism

o09

incident,

as

the

union,

when harassed

by

the

company,

continued to

approach

the

government, usually

with less

successful results.32

Other unions

approached

the

government

in different

ways.

The

Socialist-controlled Federacion

Empleados

de

Comercio

was

dependent

on

government

action. The

union

leadership

realized,

for

example,

that

it

did

not

have the

strength

to force

compliance

with the

legally

mandated

eight-hour

day

in

the thousands of stores that dotted the

capital,

nor did

the

government

have the resources or the will.

The

union

leadership

perceived

that

the

only

thing

that

they

could do was limit the

violations.

Their scheme was

to

have a

law enacted

that

forced stores

to

close

at

8

p.m.

Enforcement of such a statute could be done by a policeman on his beat.

The Federacion

was able to obtain the

passage

of this

legislation through

an

efficient

political

campaign.33

This and

similar

efforts were the

major

organizing

tools of a union that

grew

very

rapidly during

the

I930s.34

The

unions

habitual

dependence

on the

government

is,

perhaps,

best

demonstrated

by

an incident

in

1932.

A

union leader

urged

a

group

of

employees

to strike

to

prevent

lowering

of

salaries,

saying essentially

that

this was

a

different

type

of action

from

what the

organization usually

followed,

but

that

they

could not turn to the

government

because

there

was no law against lowering salaries.35

Even

the

Communist-controlled

unions

sought

help

from

the

govern-

ment when

they

could.

The

Federacion

ObreraNacional de la

Construccion

the

construction

workers

union)

from

1938

until

1941

turned

regularly

to the

National

Department

of

Labor,

to which it

usually

sent a

copy

of the

list

of

demands

presented

to

an

employer.

When

an

agreement

could

not

be

reached,

the

President

of the

Department

of Labor

was asked to

mediate,

and

negotiations

continued at the

department.36

The

Union Obrera Textil

(the

textile workers

union)

followed a

similar

pattern.37

Dealing

with the

government

became an

accepted way

of life. The CGT

32

See,

for

example,

La

Vanguardia,

8

Oct.

to

5

Nov.

I930,

30

Jan.,

13

and

28

Feb.

1931;

Federacidn,

Oct.

1930,

May

1931.

33

La

Vanguardia,Jan.

1932

to

Sept.

1933,

especially

6

Aug.,

21

Sept.

1932,

24

July

I933.

34

For

the

other

campaigns

see,

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Charge

in

the

Argentine

Labor

Movement ,

pp.

228-35,

268-70.

The

Federacidnhad 820

members in

1932

according

to

Liga

Patridtica,

Sindicatos

obreros de la

Capital

Federal

(Sept.,

1932),

enclosure in

U.S.

Embassy,

Buenos

Aires,

to

Secretary

of

State,

13

October

1932,

National

Archives

Record

Group

59,

file

no.

835.0OB/69.

The

original

source

is most

likely

the

police.

In

1936

the

union

claimed

a

membership

of

18,489.

Departmento

Nacional

del

Trabajo,

Boletin

informativo,Sept./Oct. 1936,

p.

4736.

35

La

Vanguardia,

8

May

1933.

36

Celia

Durruty,

Clase

obreray

peronismo(C6rdoba,

1969), pp.

95-7.

37 Uni6n

Obrera

Textil,

Memoriay

balance

correspondiente

l

ano

1939

(Buenos

Aires,

1940),

pp.

10-17;

El

Obrero

Textil,

Jan.

1940.




11/17

I Io

Joel

Horowitt

sent

a

delegation

to

the

celebration of the

first

anniversary

of

the

assumption

of office of

Governor Manuel

Fresco of the

Province of

Buenos

Aires,

despite

his exteme

right-wing

nationalist

views.38 Government

officials were

habitually

invited to attend union

events.39

That this

co-existence

between elements of the labor

movement and

the

state

helped

lead to Peronism is

shown

by

the

way

in

which

Luis

Monsalvo met

Per6n. Monsalvo was an

important figure

in

the Union

Ferroviaria and the CGT and

later was

Secretary

General of the

Partido

Laborista. After

the

coup

of

1943

some

of

the railroad

workers

wanted to

establish contact with the new

leaders:

Thus we established contact with Mr Moran, head of the special section of the

central

police department.

Mr

Moran had as his

job

the

vigilance

of the union

movement.

[His

office was also

in

charge

of

dealing

with

those

that

were

perceived

as a

threat to

society.]

I

knew him

personally

because the

CGT had

entrusted to

me

many

times the

obtaining

from him of

authorization for

public

functions,

assemblies,

etc. We

brought up

the situation of the railroad

workers and he

took

an

interest

in

the

question.

He told us to

return the

following day.

The

next

day

the

railroad men returned and met the

chief of

police,

who

introduced them to

Peron.40

Union representatives during the neo-conservative era had access to the

police

and to the National

Department

of

Labor,

but

rarely

to

people

who

were

important

decision-makers.41 Unions were

simply

not considered to

be an

important

factor in the

social and

political equation.

Even the

so-called

workers

parties

tended to

exclude

union

leaders from

political positions

of

importance.

On

October

17,

1945,

with the massive

demonstration for

Per6n,

the unions and the

working

class

made their

presence

felt

and

they

could not thereafter

be

ignored

-

something

that

by

its

very

nature

changed

the

relationship

between

governments

and the

labor movement.

Social

programs

Any

observant visitor to

present-day Argentina

will notice the

large

number of hotels and

hospitals

controlled

by

the unions.

In

1964

the

labor

movement had

64

vacation

resorts,

28 recreational

facilities,

3

hospitals,

38

Federacion,

eb.

I937;

Provincia de Buenos

Aires,

Ministerio de

Gobierno,

Politica

obreray

egislacidn

del

trabajo

del

gobierno

de BuenosAires

(La

Plata,

I937),

p.

14.

39

See,

for

example,

La

Vanguardia,

i Mar.

1937;

El

Obrero

Ferroviario,

16

Sept. I941.

40

Luis

Monzalvo,

Testigo

de

la

primera

hora

delperonismo(Buenos

Aires,

1974),

pp.

64-5.

41

An

important xception

was the contact

during

a

strike

n

193

2

of the

telephone

workers

with

Roberto

M.

Ortiz.

Ortiz

was elected President

in

I938.

U.S.

Embassy,

Buenos

Aires,

to

Secretary

of

State,

I

July

1932,

National Archives Record

Group

59,

file no.

835.75/13,

pp.

i-2;

La

Vanguardia,

12-14

July

I932;

La

Nacion,

12-14

July

1932.




12/17

Impact of

Labor Union Traditions on Peronism

1i

and

122 clinics.

In

1969

a

quarter

of

the

Argentine

population

was served

by

union

hospitals.42

This

segment

of union

activity

grew

in the late

96os

and

early

1970S.

The

post-1976

military

regime

has

attempted

to

limit

this

side

of the labor movement

in

order

to

circumscribe the unions

power.43

Whereas

most of these social

programs

were established

after

1943

and

are identified

with

Peronism,

they

were a basic

aspiration

of

the

union

movement

in the earlier

period.44

This

should not

be

surprising

as the

Argentine

labour movement

was,

at

least at

an

intellectual

level,

influenced

by

a

European

Social Democratic movement

that

attempted

to

produce

a

separate

set

of

social institutions

for

the

working

class.45

The establishment

of

health, sports,

and recreational

facilities

was a

goal

of

many

unions.

Organizations appealing

to as different a

membership

as

the

poorly paid

textile workers46

and the white-collar retail clerks had in

their statutes

clauses

that called for the

development

of mutual aid

societies,

cooperatives,

and the

provision

of

medical,

dental

and

legal

consultations

for

their members.

Emphasis

was

also

placed

on

the

creation

of technical

schools

and the

practice

of

sports.

The constitution of the

textile workers

union

also called

for

the establishment

of a

vacation

resort.47

The goals were not just unfulfilled wishes. The retail clerks acquired

land

to build

a

vacation resort

for

its members.48

Both

organizations

established

free or low-cost medical and

legal

consultations

for

members

42

Rotondaro,

Realidady cambio n el

sindicalismo,

p.

370;

Carmelo

Mesa-Lago,

Social

Security

in Latin America: Pressure

Groups,

Stratification

and

Inequality Pittsburgh, 1978),

p. 200.

43

It has

tried to limit union

power

by

lessening

union

income.

Under General

Ongania

the unions

power

in this

area had

been

greatly expanded.

44

A

national

congress

of the CGT felt

called

upon

in

1947

to

recommend to its member

unions

that

they

establish various

social welfare

policies,

CGT,

i6

Nov.

1947.

See

founding dates for vacation facilities in Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n, Asesoria de

Turismo

Social

y

Vacaciones,

Tiempo

libre

y

colonias

de vacacions

Buenos

Aires,

195

6).

45

For a recent

review of

the

literature

on such activities in

Germany

see Gerhard A.

Ritter,

Workers Culture

in

Imperial

Germany:

Problems and

Points of

Departure

for

Research ,

Journal

of

Contemporary

History,

xiII,

no. 2

(Apr. 1978), I65-89.

See

also,

Guenther

Roth,

The Social Democrats in

Imperial

Germany:

A

Study

in

Working-Class

Isolation

and National

Integration Totowa,

N.J.,

1963),

especially

pp.

212-47.

46

According

to

Departamento

Nacional del

Trabajo,

Divisi6n

de

Estadistica,

Investigaciones

sociales,

1938

(Buenos

Aires,

193

9),

p. I

19,

textile workers were

the

lowest-paid

blue-collar

workers in the

city

of Buenos

Aires.

47

El

Obrero

Textil,

Dec.

1938;

Federaci6n

Empleados

de

Comercio,

Informe

del

Concejo

Adminstrativo: Asamblea

general

ordinaria,

26

de

agosto

i93o

(Buenos

Aires,

1930),

pp.

39-43;

Confederaci6n

General de

Empleados

de

Comercio,

Estatuto

(Buenos

Aires,

N.D.).

48

Federaci6n

Empleados

de

Comercio,

Memoria

de

la

Comision

Directiva,

periodo

desdeel 1?

de

noviembre

e

1936

al

3i

dejulio

de

I937 (Buenos

Aires,

1937),

p.

77.




13/17

I

I

2

Joel

Horowit.

on

a

limited

basis.49

Many

unions

arranged

for

dental

and

health care and

legal

consultations

through

individual

practitioners.

The nature of

the

arrangement

varied from union to union

and from

professional

to

professional.

Sometimes

the

service was

free;

sometimes union

members

paid

a small

fee,

and at

other

times,

the union

paid.

In

all

cases the

compensation

was

very

small,

and

it

can be assumed that

the

professionals

were active

in

left-wing

politics.50

Ideology

does

not

seem to

be

a

major

determining

factor in union

interest

in

this

type

of

activity.

The textile workers union was

a

Socialist-controlled union that became

Communist-dominated,

while the

retail clerks were staunch Socialists. The Syndicalist FederacidnObrera

Maritima

(the

maritime

workers

union)

built

an

out-patient

clinic

in

their

headquarters.51

The failure to

carry

out

the stated desires

of the

unions resulted

not from

lack of

will

but,

it

appears,

from lack of

funds.

The

money

raised

from

dues was

often insufficient for

anything

beyond

the

primary

function of

the

organization.

The textile workers

union,

for

example,

had an

income

in

April

i941

of

3,986.42 pesos;

after

expenses

for

rent, utilities,

salaries

and

propaganda

there was

a

surplus

of

307.47

pesos.

The textile workers

earned extremely low salaries; extra money could be raised for strikes but

for

nothing

else.52 Few unions before

the Per6n era had the income and

the

stability

to

provide anything

but

rudimentary

social

programs.

There

were several

influential

and

stable

unions that did

put

together

significant

social

programs.

These

unions tended to be well

established,

but

unable to

improve

conditions for

their members. For

a

variety

of

reasons

their

ability

to strike

was

strictly

limited.

One can

hypothesize

that

it was the need to

provide

the

rank and file with

something

other than

improvements

in salaries

or

working

conditions that

propelled

them so

far in this direction. The

municipal

workers of the

city

of Buenos Aires

and the two railroad

unions most

fully

developed

these

concepts.

The

municipal

workers

union was

in

a

particularly

difficult

position.

It felt that

it

could

not

strike.

The

neo-conservative-controlled

executive

49

Federaci6n

Empleados

de

Comercio,

Informe

del

Concejo

Adminstrativo: Asamblea

general

ordinaria,

26de

agosto

o30,

pp.

32-3;

El Obrero

Textil,

June 1938,

July

1941,

Nov.

I941,

Apr.

1943.

50

See,

for

examples,

Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

Libros de actas

de la Comisi6n

Directiva,

Acta

21,

15

November

1933,

p.

37;

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

15

Jan.

1933,

i

May

1936;

La

Vanguardia,

26

Sept. 1930,

9 May,

20

June

1931;

Federacidn,

Feb.,

1936.

51

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

i6

Nov.

I94I.

52

This was

a

typical

month.

For strike

expenses,

see

May 194I.

El

Obrero

Textil,

primer

quincenal,

July I941.




14/17

Impact

of

Labor Union Traditionson

Peronism

113

branch

of

the

city

government

saw

no

need

to

improve

significantly

the

conditions

of these

well-paid

workers. The

Union

Obreros

Empleados

Municipales

also

faced

competition

from other

organizations

for the

loyalties

of the

workers. What the union could

provide

was social

programs.

In

this,

it did have the

support

of

the

municipal

government,

which,

while

not

willing

to make

major

concessions,

was

willing

to make

minor

ones,

in order to

placate

the union s

ally,

the

Socialist

Party.53

The

organization s

social

welfare

program

started

prior

to

1930.

In

1927

the

municipal government

lent the union

an

empty

field that the labor

organization

built

into a

highly developed

recreational

area.

Trees and

a

children s wading pool were provided by the city.54The union built tennis,

bowls

and

basketball

courts,

soccer

fields,

a

playground

and facilities

for

dances

and entertainment.55

As well as

serving

the

members,

the

recreational

facilities were used

to hold festivals and

receptions

for other labor

organizations.56

In

9

3

5

the

municipal

workers went

a

step

further and

opened

a

vacation

resort

in

the hills of Cordoba. The

goal

was

to

establish

a

place

where the

membership

could

enjoy

the

benefits

of a

low-cost vacation

away

from the

city.

In

1940

the

resort

had 62 rooms with

accommodation for 181

people.

The union also acquired a bus to lessen transportation costs. The resort

was built with the

help

of the

government.57

The union

also

provided

the

same

type

of

help

with

medical,

judicial

and

pension problems

that

was

done

by

other

organizations.

The two railroad

unions,

the

Union Ferroviariaand La

Fraternidad

the

engineers

and firemen s

union),

went the

farthest

in

providing

social

services.

They

were

pushed

in

that direction

by

serious

problems

in

their

industry.

The

fall in

exports brought

on

by

the

depression

and the

increasing

use of

trucks

to

move

freight produced

in

the

1930S

a

major

crisis for the rail

companies

and their workers. The railroad unions had

to

fight

extremely

hard

to

maintain the

status

quo.

Despite

this

problem,

they

were

large,

stable

organizations

that

received

sizable

sums

of

money

53

The Socialist

Party

was

during

the

1930S

the

largest

or

second

largest party

on

the

city

council of

Buenos Aires. For

the

nature of the

relationship

between the union and the

government,

see

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Change

in the

Argentine

Labor

Movement ,

pp. 369-75.

54

Concejo

Deliberante

de

la Ciudad de

Buenos

Aires,

Actas del H.

Concejo

Deliberante,

II,

28

June

1932,

p.

2277;

IV,

28 Dec.

1933,

p.

4578;

La

Vanguardia,

8

July I932.

55

Uni6n Obreros

y

Empleados

Municipales, Dignificando

n

vacaciones:

Obra

que

debe mitarse

(Buenos

Aires,

1940),

front

piece

with no

pagination.

56

See,

for

examples,

La

Vanguardia,

I

Oct.

193I,

27

May I932.

57

Uni6n Obreros

y

Empleados

Municipales, Dignificando

en

vacaciones,

pp.

9-i2;

La

Vanguardia,

8

Sept.

1935;

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

6

Feb.

935.




15/17

I

I4

Joel

Horowitt

in

dues.

In

1942

the

Union Ferroviaria

collected

800,468

pesos

in

dues and

had

a

capital

of

2,569,80o pesos.

The railroad

unions,

because of their

strategic position

within

the

economy

and their

acceptance

by

the

companies

and

by

the

government

as

legitimate

entities,

found it

extremely

difficult to strike. There

was

a tacit

agreement

between the unions and the

government

that the railroad

system

would

not be

disrupted

by

a

massive

action.58

This left the unions with

large

sums

to

carry

out a social

program,

as

well as

a

need to do so. Even

prior

to the

1930S

the two

unions had

begun

to

provide

some

forms

of social

programs

for their

members. La

Fraternidad reated its first technical school in I 890 in order to train firemen

to become

engineers.

By 1929

the

two

unions had

sixty-three

schools

spread

across the

country.

In

the

1930S

the

schools

made

available not

only

technical education for the

workers,

but also

a

wide

variety

of

courses,

from basic

literacy

to

English

and

drawing,

in

which their families

could

enroll.59

In

the

1930S

the unions extended

their

program.

In

late

1942,

the

Union

Ferroviaria

opened

a vacation resort

in the

hills

of

C6rdoba for its members

and those of La Fraternidad.

The

former

union

also

acquired

a

recreation

field in greater Buenos Aires and by I943 was searching for a property

to

buy along

the seacoast.60

The

Unidn Ferroviaria

had

provided

medical

and dental care for its

members for free or at low

cost,

through

individual health-care

practioners.

In

1936

the two railroad unions outlined

a more

comprehensive

scheme,

a

plan

to build

a

hospital,

a sanatorium

and,

in

key

railroad

centers,

out-patient

clinics.6

By

the end of the neo-conservative

era the unions had

made

major

strides

towards

achieving

their

goal.

In

1940

they

purchased

a

private

hospital.

Two

years

later

an

out-patient

clinic was

opened

in

Rosario,

Argentina s

second

largest

city

and a vital railroad center. The

58

For

dues,

see Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

Memoria

y

balance

correspondiente

l

ano

I942

(Buenos

Aires,

1943),

pp.

107,

2

. For

the

nature

of

the union and

its

philosophy,

see

Horowitz,

Adaptation

and

Change

in the

Argentine

Labor Movement .

59

Juan

B. Chiti

and Francisco

Agnelli,

Cincuentenario

e La Fraternidad :

Fundacidn,

desarrollo,

bra

Buenos

Aires,

1937),

pp.

3 3

7-41;

Fernandez,

La

Union

Ferroviariaa

traves

del

tiempo,

p.

43

;

Partido

Socialista,

Anuario

socialista

930

(Buenos

Aires,

I929),

p.

48;

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

i Feb.

I93I,

I

Dec.

1937,

I

May,

i Oct.

1939,

i6

Feb.

I942.

Libraries were

also

extremely

important

in the railroad

unions and elsewhere

in the

labor

movement.

60

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

16

Feb.,

i Mar.

1943;

Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

Memoria

y

balance

correspondiente

l

ano

1940 (Buenos

Aires,

1941),

p.

37;

Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

Memoria

y

balance

correspondiente

l ano

1942,

p.

46.

61

Fernandez,

La Unidn

Ferroviaria a

traves

del

tiempo,

pp.

255-260.




16/17

Impact

of Labor Union

Traditionson

Peronism

i5

facilities were

available

for use

by

all

railroad workers and

their families

who

paid special

dues,

as

part

of an

arrangement

with the

government

in

which

the state authorized

the rail

companies

to

deduct dues

directly

from

the salaries

of

any

worker who wanted to

participate.

The

deduction of

dues was

an

insurance that the flow of

money

would

be

steady.

By

December

I942,

44,677

railroad

workers

out of a

possible

13I,oo6

were

eligible

to use

the

medical facilities.62

The railroad unions had

gone

a

long way

towards

implementing

their

social

welfare

plan

before

the

end

of the

neo-conservative era. The

type

of

program

that could be built with more active state

intervention can be

seen by what happened in the period immediately after I943.63 The

government,

with the

direct intervention of

Juan

Per6n

-

it

was he who

made the announcement

-

provided

money

for

the extension of health-care

services

and

established

a

mechanism for continued

financing.

Both the

workers

and the

companies

were

to

contribute to

this service.

By

the end

of

1946,

the

railroad unions were

building

a much

larger hospital

and

had

clinics

in

nine additional

cities.64 What had

changed

in the

railroad unions

was not

ideology

but the

ability

to

carry

out their

desires.

Similar

desires

existed

in

other unions but were

blocked

by

a lack of

money.

Conclusion

It is

perhaps necessary

to

add

that I

am not

trying

to create a

model

in

which the unions

did

not

change

with the

coming

to

power

of

Juan

Peron.

There

was

undoubtedly

a

sharp

shift in

attitudes

and

behavior,

but one

must examine the nature

of that

change,

keeping

in

mind that

the

environment of the

labor movement

had been

drastically

altered. Some

of the

changes

were

produced by

the

increased

attention from

the

government

and

the

unions

greater

wealth rather than a

shift in

ideology.

Before

I943

the labor movement had been an isolated

group

within a

62

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

I

Mar.

1937,

i6 Feb.

I939,

i

Aug.

I940;

i

Aug.

I942;

Uni6n

Ferroviaria,

Memoriay

balance

correspondiente

l

ano

1942,

p.

42;

Juan

Manuel Santa

Cruz,

Ferrocarriles

argentinos

Santa

Fe,

1966),

p.

33.

The

percentage

would have

been

higher,

but the state railroad workers were

already

covered for

hospitalization

through

a

mutual

aid

society.

63

Besides

allowing

for subtraction of the

dues from the

pay

of the

workers,

the

government

had offered to

help

finance

the

building

of

a

hospital.

The unions never

received the

money

because

they

bought

a

hospital.

El Obrero

Ferroviario,

6 Nov.

1940,

i6

July/i

Aug. 1943.

64

See

CGT,

i6

Jan.

1944,

i6

Jan.

I947.

For information on individual clinics

see,

for

example,

CGT,

i6

Mar.,

I

Sept

I946.

The rail

unions were not the

only

organizations

to

benefit. For

example,

the national

confederation of retail clerks received

two million

pesos

to establish a vacation

resort, CGT,

i6

Oct.

1947.




17/17

I 6

Joel

Horowit.

society

that

paid

little

attention to

it,

except

in a

negative

sense. Unions

were

poor

and unable

to

carry

out

many

functions

because

of a lack of

funds. Under Peron, the unions became the

keystone

of the

governing

group;

a force that had to be

both

wooed and controlled. It

is

not

surprising

that

things

changed.

Among

other

factors,

legal recognition

and

dues check-off

provided

the

possibility

for a new

style

of

activity.

Given the fact that there was not

an

entirely

new

leadership

in

the

crucial

early years

of

Peronism,

it should not be

surprising

to see certain trends

continuing

from

the earlier

period.

The connections

may

not

always

be

clear,

but

they

are there.

If

we are

going

to

understand

fully

what Peronism

was and

is,

it

will be

necessary

to

keep looking

at

the

period

in

which

Peronism

was

formed,

and at the same

time not to

assume

that it

was

something entirely

new.

Documents

The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on Peronism - J. Howowitz