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Oh, I almost forgot, it packs a
150 to 170 kiloton nuclear
punch
It’s about the size of an office trash can
Let’s start with a
modern nuclear weapon
Here’s one – this is a US
W80-1 thermonuclear
warhead
It’s about 800mm long by
300mm diameter and weighs 130kg
Here’s a button, let’s
see if it works!
Let’s click through
that sequence!
So, basically, the trick is to compress a
fissile material
down to its critical mass very quickly
There is another way to achieve a critical mass
but it requires a different
fissile material
950mm100mm
110kg
This baby is the US W79 with
dial-a-yield of 2 to 10 kilotons – wanna see it go
nuke ?
and it converts with a tritium boost to an enhanced
radiation or neutron bomb
So, Iran’s nuclear weapon development
relates to its procurement of these IAEA SAFEGUARDED
materials
Only LEU
This is what Iran claims to
have capacity
for
Zirconium for its Bushehr
fuel fabrication plans
Depleted uranium
from reactor
fuel enrichme
nt
No plutoniu
mBUT the IAEA found several milligrams of
plutonium nitrate from extraction
activities during 1988 and 1992
No polonium
BUT the IAEA found traces of
polonium in 1993
TritiumNothing much to speak of
Only Low Enriched Uranium for the
Bushehr and Tehran
reactor fuel
development
BUT the IAEA found several
particles of HEU in cascades in
2003 – this led to the current IAEA-IRAN
crisis.
So let’s examine
those areas where the IAEA and
Iran are in dispute
If so, that’s a lot of trouble and expense from
mining to fuel in the reactor
Iran claims its enrichment
programme is solely for the civil nuclear reactor at Bushehr
From the cooling capacity you can backtrack to the
size of the enrichment
cascades which, here, is about
30,000 centrifuge units
So, if the IAEA
cannot access the
Natanz plant it looks at
the radioactive waste
for traces of HEU
This is what
caused the IAEA-Iran
spat in 2003 when the IAEA
found >36% HEU particles at Kalaye
The IAEA’s concern is that
HEU can be diverted at
Natanz
say by 2007
100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale
Now we can fill in IRAN’s DU and
HEU capacity
Now let’s look at Iran’s progress
with materials for the compression
weapon
For this route, fissile plutonium has to be
extracted from natural uranium U-238 irradiated in a
reactor
So the IAEA require the Bushehr fuel to be supplied by and
RETURNED to Russia
RU
SS
IAN
FED
ER
ATIO
NR
US
SIA
N F
ED
ER
ATIO
N
Iran could do this by reprocessing the uranium fuel from
Bushehr
So, to overcome this, Iran builds a new, high capacity research reactor,
thereby bypassing Bushehr
To separate the
plutonium from the fuel
a small reprocessing
plant
A plant to provide the
Heavy Water for the reactor
The ARAK Heavy Water plant was
started this year, it produces ~10 to 15 tonnes HW per year
and the RD-40 reactor requires an initial 60-80 tonnes – so 4 to 5
years before it is commissioned
say by 2007 10kg/y - 2010
100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale
Now we can fill in IRAN’s
plutonium capacity
say by 2007 10kg/y - 2010
100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale
The RD-40 reactor will also
provide a Polonium-
210 generator
say by 2007 10kg/y - 2010 now TRCR by 2010 100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale
And the heavy water
moderator is a rich
source of tritium
Let’s compare the Iran, North Korea and Israel nuclear
programmesIran’s programme is dual-role and
complex
Bushehr and Tehran reactors are safeguarded
under IAEA
Economy Model
No Frills
One Track Military
One Track Military
Sophisticated
Thermonuclear
Iran has experimented
with and is now building
the technology – so when will it break out?
MUCH OF THIS
MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY IN PLACE AT
ESFAHAN
TROUBLE AT NATANZ
WITH MULTIPLE CASCADES
TAKE TEHRAN REACTOR OUT
OF SAFEGUARDS OR WAIT FOR
RD-40 AT ARAK
COULD BE PROCURED
AND POLISHED AT ESFAHAN
WAIT FOR ARAK RD-40 REACTOR TO COMMISSION
Well, what’s
it to be ?
Is IRAN on a dash
for nuclear
weapons
Or is it a confused
civil nuclear power
programme?
Remember what the US
and Brits concluded
about Iraq’s WMD !
Whatever, one outcome is
there is now to be UN Security
Council sanctions
against Iran
}
It may be that the risk is not be
directly with Iran’s nuclear
weapons programme but, because of UN sanctions, a
breakdown of nuclear safety at
Bushehr!
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