Oh, I almost forgot, it packs a

150 to 170 kiloton nuclear

punch

It’s about the size of an office trash can

Let’s start with a

modern nuclear weapon

Here’s one – this is a US

W80-1 thermonuclear

warhead

It’s about 800mm long by

300mm diameter and weighs 130kg

Here’s a button, let’s

see if it works!

Let’s click through

that sequence!

So, basically, the trick is to compress a

fissile material

down to its critical mass very quickly

There is another way to achieve a critical mass

but it requires a different

fissile material

950mm100mm

110kg

This baby is the US W79 with

dial-a-yield of 2 to 10 kilotons – wanna see it go

nuke ?

and it converts with a tritium boost to an enhanced

radiation or neutron bomb

So, Iran’s nuclear weapon development

relates to its procurement of these IAEA SAFEGUARDED

materials

Only LEU

This is what Iran claims to

have capacity

for

Zirconium for its Bushehr

fuel fabrication plans

Depleted uranium

from reactor

fuel enrichme

nt

No plutoniu

mBUT the IAEA found several milligrams of

plutonium nitrate from extraction

activities during 1988 and 1992

No polonium

BUT the IAEA found traces of

polonium in 1993

TritiumNothing much to speak of

Only Low Enriched Uranium for the

Bushehr and Tehran

reactor fuel

development

BUT the IAEA found several

particles of HEU in cascades in

2003 – this led to the current IAEA-IRAN

crisis.

So let’s examine

those areas where the IAEA and

Iran are in dispute

If so, that’s a lot of trouble and expense from

mining to fuel in the reactor

Iran claims its enrichment

programme is solely for the civil nuclear reactor at Bushehr

From the cooling capacity you can backtrack to the

size of the enrichment

cascades which, here, is about

30,000 centrifuge units

So, if the IAEA

cannot access the

Natanz plant it looks at

the radioactive waste

for traces of HEU

This is what

caused the IAEA-Iran

spat in 2003 when the IAEA

found >36% HEU particles at Kalaye

The IAEA’s concern is that

HEU can be diverted at

Natanz

say by 2007

100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale

Now we can fill in IRAN’s DU and

HEU capacity

Now let’s look at Iran’s progress

with materials for the compression

weapon

For this route, fissile plutonium has to be

extracted from natural uranium U-238 irradiated in a

reactor

So the IAEA require the Bushehr fuel to be supplied by and

RETURNED to Russia

RU

SS

IAN

FED

ER

ATIO

NR

US

SIA

N F

ED

ER

ATIO

N

Iran could do this by reprocessing the uranium fuel from

Bushehr

So, to overcome this, Iran builds a new, high capacity research reactor,

thereby bypassing Bushehr

To separate the

plutonium from the fuel

a small reprocessing

plant

A plant to provide the

Heavy Water for the reactor

The ARAK Heavy Water plant was

started this year, it produces ~10 to 15 tonnes HW per year

and the RD-40 reactor requires an initial 60-80 tonnes – so 4 to 5

years before it is commissioned

say by 2007 10kg/y - 2010

100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale

Now we can fill in IRAN’s

plutonium capacity

say by 2007 10kg/y - 2010

100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale

The RD-40 reactor will also

provide a Polonium-

210 generator

say by 2007 10kg/y - 2010 now TRCR by 2010 100kg/y - 2009 small scale small scale

And the heavy water

moderator is a rich

source of tritium

Let’s compare the Iran, North Korea and Israel nuclear

programmesIran’s programme is dual-role and

complex

Bushehr and Tehran reactors are safeguarded

under IAEA

Economy Model

No Frills

One Track Military

One Track Military

Sophisticated

Thermonuclear

Iran has experimented

with and is now building

the technology – so when will it break out?

MUCH OF THIS

MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY IN PLACE AT

ESFAHAN

TROUBLE AT NATANZ

WITH MULTIPLE CASCADES

TAKE TEHRAN REACTOR OUT

OF SAFEGUARDS OR WAIT FOR

RD-40 AT ARAK

COULD BE PROCURED

AND POLISHED AT ESFAHAN

WAIT FOR ARAK RD-40 REACTOR TO COMMISSION

Well, what’s

it to be ?

Is IRAN on a dash

for nuclear

weapons

Or is it a confused

civil nuclear power

programme?

Remember what the US

and Brits concluded

about Iraq’s WMD !

Whatever, one outcome is

there is now to be UN Security

Council sanctions

against Iran

}

It may be that the risk is not be

directly with Iran’s nuclear

weapons programme but, because of UN sanctions, a

breakdown of nuclear safety at

Bushehr!