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Background
Research Objective
The use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) dates back at
least to the American Civil War when unmanned balloons were loaded
with explosives in a basket and ignited using a timed fuse. Due to the
unpredictability of wind currents and weather, these primitive UCAVs
were not effective. Other ineffective models were developed over the
years until Nazi Germany developed the V-1, an unmanned flying bomb,
and inflicted thousands of casualties across Great Britain. From WWII
until present day the use of UCAVs has accompanied militaries all over
the world (1).
Military equipment around the world is developed and produced
primarily by private corporations. These manufacturers must make crucial
decisions to determine how to invest time and money. When considering
investment in Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles the following aspects will
demonstrate UCAV superiority: combat ability, cost of operation, and
ethical impact. A clear understanding will direct the wise investor toward
UCAV technology as the next step in future aerial combat.
Demonstrate the superiority of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles to
provide potential investors confidence to invest in UCAV technology.
1
I. Executive Summary
Criteria
If…Then Statement
Purpose and Scope
The following categories have been identified as points of interest when
considering interest in UCAV systems.
1. Combat Ability
a. Are UCAVs an improvement to current systems?
b. What role will they play in combat?
2. Cost of Operation
a. What are production costs?
b. How do UCAVs compare with current systems?
3. Ethical Impact
a. Are UCAV systems acceptable ethically?
If UCAV systems demonstrate feasibility in combat and cost and
do not have a negative ethical affect then they should be seriously
considered for further investment.
The purpose of this report is to demonstrate the capability of
UCAV systems in reference to the current aerial combat standards.
Comparisons will be drawn with the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F-22
Raptor specifically. Factors influencing interest in UCAV technology–
military budget cuts, sensitivity to soldier death, and continual foreign
war–create an opportunity for investment. This paper will not directly
address the issues of why to invest now but will focus on why to invest at
all. Each point of interest will be examined and recommendations for
investment will be made.
2
Conclusion
Current aerial warfare is dominated by bulky and expensive fighter
jets; allowing room for smaller, more agile and cheaper UCAVs to take a
leading role. To fill this role, UCAV technology is producing fighters that
have significant combat advantages over typical manned jets. These
UCAVs can penetrate enemy air space, destroy targets and out maneuver
human pilots (2).
In addition to combat advantage, UCAVs can be produced cheaper
and faster than conventional jets. Smaller in size, UCAVs will soon be
produced at a fraction of the price of the F-22 (2). With increasing budget
obligations, military cuts will generate interest in greater UCAV
production. Those producers ready to manufacture competent UCAVs
will benefit the most.
Monetary savings is not the only driving factor when considering
UCAV technology. The worth of human life is immeasurable. Unmanned
crafts allow combat situations in which human pilots are not at risk. In an
increasingly dangerous world, preserving soldiers’ lives becomes more
difficult. Fully implementing UCAVs will drastically reduce pilot
casualties.
Ethical warfare has evolved as mankind has evolved and will
continue to develop into the future as war and weapons change. As a tool,
UCAVs should not be the focus of a debate on ethics, instead, focus
should be directed at those in control (3). Tactical and cost
3
Overall Conclusion
advantages will shortly yield UCAVs that are ready for combat and the
ethics surrounding will adapt as well.
UCAV systems will be implemented more fully within the decade.
Militaries around the globe will be looking for producers and those
prepared now will have the most to profit.
4
Smaller in Size
A defining characteristic of an aerial combat vehicle is its ability to
maneuver through the air. Vehicle maneuverability often will determine
the success or failure of a mission. Typically a craft with a higher degree
of maneuverability is more valuable in the fleet. Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicles exceed the maneuverability of manned fighter jets in the
following regards.
The current powerhouse in the United States Air Force is the F-22
Raptor. The Raptor leads the world in warfare ability and, without an
equal, allows the United States aerial dominance. The dominance of the
Raptor is proportional to its size; with a 44-foot wingspan and 62-foot
length the F-22 weighs in at 43,340 pounds (4). By comparison the
Pegasus X-47A (designed by Northrop Grumman) has a 28-foot wingspan
and 28-foot length, while weighing 3, 835 pounds (5). Visual
comparisons are given below in Figure 1. Size reduction opens new
possibilities, as these smaller UCAVs are stealthier, harder to hit and have
better maneuverability.
5
II. Combat Advantage
Stealth AbilityTo strike without warning and without retaliation characterizes the
objectives of stealth warfare. Covert and stealth attacks originated during
primitive conflict and followed clashes into the sky. The benefits of
attacking without being seen are obvious and require no explanation here.
In a satellite world, today’s surveillance relies little on visual observations
and predominately on radar and thermal detection. Radar transmitters
emit radio waves that are reflected back to the receiver when they
encounter objects–larger objects reflect larger amounts of radio waves and
are more easily seen while smaller objects can remain hidden. The
smaller UCAVs have the advantage just from their size. Due in part to
their smaller size, UCAVs can fly closer to the ground, also decreasing
likelihood of detection (6).
6
Figure 1: Size Comparison
The F-22 Raptor (left) is larger in every dimension than the Northrop Grumman Pegasus X-47A (right) (2).
No Onboard Pilot
Apart
from smaller
size, structural design of UCAVs also decreases the ability to be detected.
Smaller size allows designers to develop better geometry because they do
not have as many restrictions in maintaining a larger vessel in flight (7).
The geometry of the body can reflect radar differently to decrease its
appearance on radar. One strategy involves reflecting the radio waves
away from the receiver so the disruptions in the waves are not observed
and the aircraft remains undetected (7). This stealth advantage allows
UCAVs to penetrate enemy airspace and destroy targets or disable targets
while remaining virtually invisible.
Size is only one factor is the superior maneuverability of
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. Human pilots provide a variety of
weaknesses while in the cockpit. Examining these aspects clearly
demonstates the benefits of UCAV systems over human pilots.
G-force is a measurement of non-gravitational forces acting on an
object as it moves. G-force experienced during flight is determined by
maneuvers performed by the aircraft. As seen in Figure 2, NASA trains
pilots to withstand G-force by subjecting them to changes in airplane
flight path.
7
On December 10, 1954, John Stapp withstood 25 G’s for 1.1
seconds with a maximum of 46.2 G’s. While impressive, this feat
ruptured almost every capillary in Stapp’s eyeballs, leaving him sightless
for the rest of the day (8). While alive, Stapp was incapacitated for hours;
any pilot experiencing this would likewise be effectively useless. Human
G-force tolerance depends on magnitude and direction of the force and
length of time applied. Most aerial maneuvers subject pilots to vertical G-
force, which pushes blood away from or into the brain. Most modern
pilots can withstand 9 G’s with the help of training and “G-suits” before
8
Figure 2: NASA’s Reduced Gravity Program Astronauts are trained by creating zero G environments by maneuvering the aircraft. As seen the G’s felt are determined by the flight path (http://jsc-aircraft-ops.jsc.nasa.gov/Reduced_Gravity/trajectory.html)
losing
consciousness
(9). This
human
threshold
cripples the
ability of
manned craft.
Weapons
UCAV thresholds are determined by the strength of the materials
that compose the UCAV. Untethered by human frailties UCAVs could
make 20 G turns and quickly assume superior position in a “dog fight”
with any manned fighter (2). Additionally, UCAV systems can fly upside
down for extended time periods and accomplish missions human pilots
could not endure—due to length or required stress levels (10). Moreover,
a computer pilot does not feel fear and will proceed despite any dangers
associated with the mission. There will be no hesitation when orders are
issued, even in conditions where the pilot would be incapacitated (2).
Advantages in maneuverability will not yield victory in combat
alone; to finish the job competent weapons are required. Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicles leave little disappointment in the area of weapon
capability—comparatively keeping pace with the larger jets—and future
advances will continue to generate improvements. The UCAV advantage
9
involves
holding larger
weapon
payloads and
maximizing
jamming
capabilities.
As
previously
discussed
UCAVs
operate
without an
onboard pilot,
allowing the
removal of all
cockpit and
life-support
equipment.
The removal
of the cockpit
decreases the
total weight of
the craft, thus permitting a greater weapon payload without compromising
the integrity of the UCAV (7). Greater weapon payload allows for UCAV
to
Electronic Attack
Future Projections
10
accomplish
multiple
combat or
strike missions
in a single
flight. A
multiple
mission flight
could entail
reconnaissanc
e, target strike,
and continued
monitoring of
the area by the
same UCAV
(still armed).
By 2030,
Pentagon
planners
calculate
UCAVs will be fitted to carry twice the payload as the F-16 Fighting
Falcon (2).
Electronic attack systems are playing an increasingly important
role in modern war and UCAVs are the ideal platform for battle. Battle
ready UCAVs are capable of operating closer to targets than manned craft
and thereby require less power to operate electronic-attack and jamming
systems (11). Less power requirements lead to smaller equipment or
better equipment-weight ratios. UCAVs then become the premiere
platform for jamming technology—closer penetration and better
equipment being driving components for immediate implementation.
Presently, the United States Air Force has had great success by equipping
the US Hunter joint tactical unmanned aerial system with electronic attack
equipment, including communications and radar jamming (12).
Figure 3 depicts protections for future weapon technology installed
on UCAV systems. “Short-Term” describes the state of UCAV weaponry
in 2008, “Medium-Term” describes the development in the next one-two
years, while “Long-Term” describes the projections in the next decade. It
is important to note that an important opportunity for UCAV systems to
grow will be within the upcoming years, as technology will advance to
allow UCAVs to play a more dominate role in air defense (11).
11
Automation
12
UCAV Weapon Projections
UCA
V ty
pes
are
com
pare
d w
ith a
ntici
pate
d pr
ojec
tions
for i
mpl
emen
tatio
n.
The
proj
ectio
ns
prog
ress
from
cur
rent
reco
nnai
ssan
ce U
AVs
that
are
bei
ng e
quip
ped
with
wea
pons
to th
e lo
ng
Differe
nt control
styles of
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles provide operators with needed flexibility
to accomplish missions with greater efficiency than manned craft. Full
Automated Control, Full Manual Control, and Mixed or Hybrid Control
allow UCAVs to be used in a variety of settings.
Full Automated Control permits the UCAV to fly autonomously
without human interference. The UCAV uses onboard sensors to monitor
activities thereby restricting the operator from interfering (13). This style
automation emphasizes the computer’s precision and calculation abilities
but removes the human flexibility. Full Manual Control is the counter to
Full Automated Control and allows an operator to have complete control
of the craft at all times. In this environment the potential for a human
operator to be overwhelmed is problematic. Additionally, communication
disruption between the operator and UCAV—even temporarily—could
result in failure in the craft (13). Mixed or Hybrid Control was developed
to balance advantages and disadvantages of human and computer control.
The recommended procedure includes developing systems that allow
human override ability of the UCAV while allowing the UCAV to manage
aspects relating to staying airborne (13).
13
UCA
V ty
pes
are
com
pare
d w
ith a
ntici
pate
d pr
ojec
tions
for i
mpl
emen
tatio
n.
The
proj
ectio
ns
prog
ress
from
cur
rent
reco
nnai
ssan
ce U
AVs
that
are
bei
ng e
quip
ped
with
wea
pons
to th
e lo
ng
No Loss of Pilot
Pilot Training
The availability of funds determines, in part, the strength of a
modern military. The ability to produce equipment that better
accomplishes a task at a lower cost describes the goal of investment.
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles satisfies both parties in providing lower
cost weapons that possess significant operational advantages. The
advantages associated with pilot-free operation include no loss of pilot
life, no need for pilot training, and no cost associated with cockpit
manufacturing.
All aerial maneuvers possess some inherit risks, and flying in a
combat zone furthers the possibility for disaster. Removing the pilot from
the onboard cockpit eliminates the potential for a human casualty in the
result of mission failure (13). There will be no need to reclaim down
soldiers, no cost to fly a body home, no one to bury, and no family to
grieve. The American public has become increasingly sensitive to their
sons and daughters dying in combat and UCAVs are the first step to
reduce these fatalities (2). When counting cost how much is a human life
worth? While difficult to answer other aspects of UCAV cost benefits
have more quantitative comparisons.
The United States Air Force audit found that $1.5B could be saved
over the next six years if unmanned vehicles were controlled by
specialized airmen instead of trained pilots (14). Additionally the USAF
spends more than $20M a year on just two of the many basic pilot training
14
III. Cost of Operation
Cockpit Production
platforms (15). These funds are easily recovered with the implementation
of UCAV systems. Considering recent economic challenges, militaries
around the globe will be searching for opportunities to reduce spending.
UCAVs piloting controls operate based on programming and do not
require training (2). When a UCAV is destroyed there is no need to
retrain and replace a pilot, simply program the new craft. Eliminating
training costs allows militaries to allocate funds to other needed programs.
UCAVs completely eliminate the cost associated with cockpit
production and maintenance. The flagship of the United States Air Force
is the unmatched F-22 Raptor. The Raptor potential for air superiority is
uncontested and yet the actual impact of the F-22 has been largely unfelt.
After the first 158 Raptors were delivered they were grounded due to
problems with the life support systems inside the cockpit; causing the
$65B investment to collect dust on the tarmac (16). UCAV systems do
not require life support, control systems, flight sensors and gauges, and
ejection seats like modern manned jets—thereby allowing cheaper
production and no risk of failing life support (2).
By nature of the size, UCAVs require fewer materials to construct.
Considering material, fuel, maintenance costs the Pentagon projects
UCAVs will cost 1/3 of the price of the F-16. F-16 unit production is
15
$18.8M per unit and F-22 unit production is $150M per unit (15). By
2030, Pentagon projections of 1/3 unit cost will result in UCAVs being
produced for $6M per unit. Figure 4 illustrates the $144M savings per
unit when UCAVs are invested in as opposed to the overpowered F-22.
16
F-16 F-22 UCAV$0.00
$20.00
$40.00
$60.00
$80.00
$100.00
$120.00
$140.00
$160.00
Combat Production Costs Per Unit
$ M
illio
ns
Figure 4: Cost ComparisonUnit cost ($M) for the F-16, F-22 and Pentagon projected cost ($M) for UCAVs by 2030.
The attempt to define clear and universal ethics of warfare has struggled
to keep ground in a world of changing values and changing tactics. As an
example, the once considered unethical guerilla fighting has become the common
place on the battlefield (17). To attack without being seen is the new standard.
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles are an extension of the idea of attacking without
being seen.
The counter-argument to UCAV systems has been the unfairness of a
wealthy country equipped with UCAVs attacking a poorer country with no
protection. There is no real protection against this happening. The history of war
is full of powerful countries attacking less powerful ones (3). Introducing or not
introducing UCAVs will have no affect on the strong taking advantage of the
weak. Therefore, the question of ethics does not involve the weapon but how it
will be used (3). It is equally important to understand that one country feeling an
action is unethical does not dictate the affairs of another country (for example,
the United States stopping UCAV development does not mean Russia will stop
as well). The interest in utilizing UCAV technology will create a market for
powerful UCAVs and the common usage will resolve any ethical debate–the
same as every advance in weaponry has done.
17
IV. Ethical Impact
Final Conclusion
Discussion
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles are a dynamic addition to the world air
force–providing lower cost, stealth weapons capable of competing with larger
manned jets. Potential for investment in the approaching years will grow as
UCAV technology grows and implementation in aerial fleets matures. Therefore,
it is recommended steps be taken now to ensure an investment in UCAV systems.
The future of aerial warfare is changing and Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicles are paving the ground for those changes. UCAVs show dominance in
the multifaceted evaluation of combat situations. By nature, the smaller size of
UCAVs permits greater agility, smaller target for enemy attacks, and increased
stealth. These aspects alone merit investment in the future of UCAV systems.
Additionally, the removal of an onboard pilot allows UCAVs to accomplish
objectives impossible to manned fighters. UCAV weapon capability allows for
drones carry more weapons and be especially effective in communication
jamming and electronic-attack. Furthermore, UCAV automation options allows
for optimal control in a variety of combat scenarios. The clear combat benefits of
UCAV systems show the certainty of their place in the future of aerial combat.
The current transition state of UCAV systems (from small armed UAVs to
equipped UCAVs) opens to the door for immediate investment action.
UCAV cost of production and operation is far below that of typical
manned jets. Specifically comparing the F-22 to 20-year projections each UCAV
will save $144M. UCAV systems do not require fighter pilots to operate them
and therefore provide savings in pilot training. Perhaps most importantly,
UCAVs allow militaries to operate in dangerous situations without the risk of
losing a human pilot.
18
V. Overall Conclusion
Warfare ethics change as standards of acceptable conduct change. As
UCAVs become more common they will be more wildly accepted. The
important point to remember is that those responsible for UCAV actions are the
ones that should be faced with ethical questions, not the UCAVs themselves.
19
1. J. D. Blom, Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective, vol. 45. Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010.
2. S. Douglass, “NO PILOT REQUIRED. (cover story),” Popular Science, vol. 258, no. 6, p. 40, Jun. 2001.
3. D. W. Kolff*, “‘Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni Cooperation’—Using UCAVs to Kill Alleged Terrorists: A Professional Approach to the Normative Bases of Military Ethics,” Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 240–244, 2003.
4. www.af.mil
5. www.air-attack.com
6. W. In, M. E. Franke, E. J. Stephen, and M. F. Reeder, “Aerodynamic ground effects of tailless chevron and lambda-shaped UCAV models,” in 45th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting 2007, January 8, 2007 - January 11, 2007, 2007, vol. 12, pp. 8239–8249.
7. W. Jinzhong, W. Guangyao, and G. Songfen, “Cost efficiency analysis of attack UCAV,” Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, vol. 6, p. 014, 2009.
8. N. Spark, “The Story of John Stapp: The Fastest Man on Earth,” 2000.
9. W. L. Epperson, R. R. Burton, and E. M. Bernauer, “The influence of differential physical conditioning regimens on simulated aerial combat maneuvering tolerance.,” Aviation, space, and environmental medicine, vol. 53, no. 11, p. 1091, 1982.
10. J. A. Tirpak, “The robotic air force,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 80, no. 9, pp. 70–74, 1997.
11. M. Franklin, “Future Weapons for Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles,” Rusi Defence Systems, 2OO8, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 93–96, 2008.
12. http://www.army-technology.com/projects/hunter/
20
VI. Works Cited
13. M. Mouloua, R. Gilson, E. Daskarolis-Kring, J. Kring, and P. Hancock, “Ergonomics of UAV/UCAV Mission Success: Considerations for Data Link, Control, and Display Issues,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 144–148, Oct. 2001.
14. M. Hoffman, “UAV pilot career field could save $1.5B,” http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20090301/, 2009.
15. USAF. "FY 2011 Budget Estimates," U.S. Air Force, February 2010.
16. W. J. Hennigan, “Sky-high overruns, safety ills plague jet,” Los Angeles Times, 07-Aug-2011.
17. E. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. Rowman & Littlefield, 1985.
21
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