Background

Research Objective

The use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) dates back at

least to the American Civil War when unmanned balloons were loaded

with explosives in a basket and ignited using a timed fuse. Due to the

unpredictability of wind currents and weather, these primitive UCAVs

were not effective. Other ineffective models were developed over the

years until Nazi Germany developed the V-1, an unmanned flying bomb,

and inflicted thousands of casualties across Great Britain. From WWII

until present day the use of UCAVs has accompanied militaries all over

the world (1).

Military equipment around the world is developed and produced

primarily by private corporations. These manufacturers must make crucial

decisions to determine how to invest time and money. When considering

investment in Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles the following aspects will

demonstrate UCAV superiority: combat ability, cost of operation, and

ethical impact. A clear understanding will direct the wise investor toward

UCAV technology as the next step in future aerial combat.

Demonstrate the superiority of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles to

provide potential investors confidence to invest in UCAV technology.

1

I. Executive Summary

Criteria

If…Then Statement

Purpose and Scope

The following categories have been identified as points of interest when

considering interest in UCAV systems.

1. Combat Ability

a. Are UCAVs an improvement to current systems?

b. What role will they play in combat?

2. Cost of Operation

a. What are production costs?

b. How do UCAVs compare with current systems?

3. Ethical Impact

a. Are UCAV systems acceptable ethically?

If UCAV systems demonstrate feasibility in combat and cost and

do not have a negative ethical affect then they should be seriously

considered for further investment.

The purpose of this report is to demonstrate the capability of

UCAV systems in reference to the current aerial combat standards.

Comparisons will be drawn with the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F-22

Raptor specifically. Factors influencing interest in UCAV technology–

military budget cuts, sensitivity to soldier death, and continual foreign

war–create an opportunity for investment. This paper will not directly

address the issues of why to invest now but will focus on why to invest at

all. Each point of interest will be examined and recommendations for

investment will be made.

2

Conclusion

Current aerial warfare is dominated by bulky and expensive fighter

jets; allowing room for smaller, more agile and cheaper UCAVs to take a

leading role. To fill this role, UCAV technology is producing fighters that

have significant combat advantages over typical manned jets. These

UCAVs can penetrate enemy air space, destroy targets and out maneuver

human pilots (2).

In addition to combat advantage, UCAVs can be produced cheaper

and faster than conventional jets. Smaller in size, UCAVs will soon be

produced at a fraction of the price of the F-22 (2). With increasing budget

obligations, military cuts will generate interest in greater UCAV

production. Those producers ready to manufacture competent UCAVs

will benefit the most.

Monetary savings is not the only driving factor when considering

UCAV technology. The worth of human life is immeasurable. Unmanned

crafts allow combat situations in which human pilots are not at risk. In an

increasingly dangerous world, preserving soldiers’ lives becomes more

difficult. Fully implementing UCAVs will drastically reduce pilot

casualties.

Ethical warfare has evolved as mankind has evolved and will

continue to develop into the future as war and weapons change. As a tool,

UCAVs should not be the focus of a debate on ethics, instead, focus

should be directed at those in control (3). Tactical and cost

3

Overall Conclusion

advantages will shortly yield UCAVs that are ready for combat and the

ethics surrounding will adapt as well.

UCAV systems will be implemented more fully within the decade.

Militaries around the globe will be looking for producers and those

prepared now will have the most to profit.

4

Smaller in Size

A defining characteristic of an aerial combat vehicle is its ability to

maneuver through the air. Vehicle maneuverability often will determine

the success or failure of a mission. Typically a craft with a higher degree

of maneuverability is more valuable in the fleet. Unmanned Combat Air

Vehicles exceed the maneuverability of manned fighter jets in the

following regards.

The current powerhouse in the United States Air Force is the F-22

Raptor. The Raptor leads the world in warfare ability and, without an

equal, allows the United States aerial dominance. The dominance of the

Raptor is proportional to its size; with a 44-foot wingspan and 62-foot

length the F-22 weighs in at 43,340 pounds (4). By comparison the

Pegasus X-47A (designed by Northrop Grumman) has a 28-foot wingspan

and 28-foot length, while weighing 3, 835 pounds (5). Visual

comparisons are given below in Figure 1. Size reduction opens new

possibilities, as these smaller UCAVs are stealthier, harder to hit and have

better maneuverability.

5

II. Combat Advantage

Stealth AbilityTo strike without warning and without retaliation characterizes the

objectives of stealth warfare. Covert and stealth attacks originated during

primitive conflict and followed clashes into the sky. The benefits of

attacking without being seen are obvious and require no explanation here.

In a satellite world, today’s surveillance relies little on visual observations

and predominately on radar and thermal detection. Radar transmitters

emit radio waves that are reflected back to the receiver when they

encounter objects–larger objects reflect larger amounts of radio waves and

are more easily seen while smaller objects can remain hidden. The

smaller UCAVs have the advantage just from their size. Due in part to

their smaller size, UCAVs can fly closer to the ground, also decreasing

likelihood of detection (6).

6

Figure 1: Size Comparison

The F-22 Raptor (left) is larger in every dimension than the Northrop Grumman Pegasus X-47A (right) (2).

No Onboard Pilot

Apart

from smaller

size, structural design of UCAVs also decreases the ability to be detected.

Smaller size allows designers to develop better geometry because they do

not have as many restrictions in maintaining a larger vessel in flight (7).

The geometry of the body can reflect radar differently to decrease its

appearance on radar. One strategy involves reflecting the radio waves

away from the receiver so the disruptions in the waves are not observed

and the aircraft remains undetected (7). This stealth advantage allows

UCAVs to penetrate enemy airspace and destroy targets or disable targets

while remaining virtually invisible.

Size is only one factor is the superior maneuverability of

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. Human pilots provide a variety of

weaknesses while in the cockpit. Examining these aspects clearly

demonstates the benefits of UCAV systems over human pilots.

G-force is a measurement of non-gravitational forces acting on an

object as it moves. G-force experienced during flight is determined by

maneuvers performed by the aircraft. As seen in Figure 2, NASA trains

pilots to withstand G-force by subjecting them to changes in airplane

flight path.

7

On December 10, 1954, John Stapp withstood 25 G’s for 1.1

seconds with a maximum of 46.2 G’s. While impressive, this feat

ruptured almost every capillary in Stapp’s eyeballs, leaving him sightless

for the rest of the day (8). While alive, Stapp was incapacitated for hours;

any pilot experiencing this would likewise be effectively useless. Human

G-force tolerance depends on magnitude and direction of the force and

length of time applied. Most aerial maneuvers subject pilots to vertical G-

force, which pushes blood away from or into the brain. Most modern

pilots can withstand 9 G’s with the help of training and “G-suits” before

8

Figure 2: NASA’s Reduced Gravity Program Astronauts are trained by creating zero G environments by maneuvering the aircraft. As seen the G’s felt are determined by the flight path (http://jsc-aircraft-ops.jsc.nasa.gov/Reduced_Gravity/trajectory.html)

losing

consciousness

(9). This

human

threshold

cripples the

ability of

manned craft.

Weapons

UCAV thresholds are determined by the strength of the materials

that compose the UCAV. Untethered by human frailties UCAVs could

make 20 G turns and quickly assume superior position in a “dog fight”

with any manned fighter (2). Additionally, UCAV systems can fly upside

down for extended time periods and accomplish missions human pilots

could not endure—due to length or required stress levels (10). Moreover,

a computer pilot does not feel fear and will proceed despite any dangers

associated with the mission. There will be no hesitation when orders are

issued, even in conditions where the pilot would be incapacitated (2).

Advantages in maneuverability will not yield victory in combat

alone; to finish the job competent weapons are required. Unmanned

Combat Air Vehicles leave little disappointment in the area of weapon

capability—comparatively keeping pace with the larger jets—and future

advances will continue to generate improvements. The UCAV advantage

9

involves

holding larger

weapon

payloads and

maximizing

jamming

capabilities.

As

previously

discussed

UCAVs

operate

without an

onboard pilot,

allowing the

removal of all

cockpit and

life-support

equipment.

The removal

of the cockpit

decreases the

total weight of

the craft, thus permitting a greater weapon payload without compromising

the integrity of the UCAV (7). Greater weapon payload allows for UCAV

to

Electronic Attack

Future Projections

10

accomplish

multiple

combat or

strike missions

in a single

flight. A

multiple

mission flight

could entail

reconnaissanc

e, target strike,

and continued

monitoring of

the area by the

same UCAV

(still armed).

By 2030,

Pentagon

planners

calculate

UCAVs will be fitted to carry twice the payload as the F-16 Fighting

Falcon (2).

Electronic attack systems are playing an increasingly important

role in modern war and UCAVs are the ideal platform for battle. Battle

ready UCAVs are capable of operating closer to targets than manned craft

and thereby require less power to operate electronic-attack and jamming

systems (11). Less power requirements lead to smaller equipment or

better equipment-weight ratios. UCAVs then become the premiere

platform for jamming technology—closer penetration and better

equipment being driving components for immediate implementation.

Presently, the United States Air Force has had great success by equipping

the US Hunter joint tactical unmanned aerial system with electronic attack

equipment, including communications and radar jamming (12).

Figure 3 depicts protections for future weapon technology installed

on UCAV systems. “Short-Term” describes the state of UCAV weaponry

in 2008, “Medium-Term” describes the development in the next one-two

years, while “Long-Term” describes the projections in the next decade. It

is important to note that an important opportunity for UCAV systems to

grow will be within the upcoming years, as technology will advance to

allow UCAVs to play a more dominate role in air defense (11).

11

Automation

12

UCAV Weapon Projections

UCA

V ty

pes

are

com

pare

d w

ith a

ntici

pate

d pr

ojec

tions

for i

mpl

emen

tatio

n.

The

proj

ectio

ns

prog

ress

from

cur

rent

reco

nnai

ssan

ce U

AVs

that

are

bei

ng e

quip

ped

with

wea

pons

to th

e lo

ng

Differe

nt control

styles of

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles provide operators with needed flexibility

to accomplish missions with greater efficiency than manned craft. Full

Automated Control, Full Manual Control, and Mixed or Hybrid Control

allow UCAVs to be used in a variety of settings.

Full Automated Control permits the UCAV to fly autonomously

without human interference. The UCAV uses onboard sensors to monitor

activities thereby restricting the operator from interfering (13). This style

automation emphasizes the computer’s precision and calculation abilities

but removes the human flexibility. Full Manual Control is the counter to

Full Automated Control and allows an operator to have complete control

of the craft at all times. In this environment the potential for a human

operator to be overwhelmed is problematic. Additionally, communication

disruption between the operator and UCAV—even temporarily—could

result in failure in the craft (13). Mixed or Hybrid Control was developed

to balance advantages and disadvantages of human and computer control.

The recommended procedure includes developing systems that allow

human override ability of the UCAV while allowing the UCAV to manage

aspects relating to staying airborne (13).

13

UCA

V ty

pes

are

com

pare

d w

ith a

ntici

pate

d pr

ojec

tions

for i

mpl

emen

tatio

n.

The

proj

ectio

ns

prog

ress

from

cur

rent

reco

nnai

ssan

ce U

AVs

that

are

bei

ng e

quip

ped

with

wea

pons

to th

e lo

ng

No Loss of Pilot

Pilot Training

The availability of funds determines, in part, the strength of a

modern military. The ability to produce equipment that better

accomplishes a task at a lower cost describes the goal of investment.

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles satisfies both parties in providing lower

cost weapons that possess significant operational advantages. The

advantages associated with pilot-free operation include no loss of pilot

life, no need for pilot training, and no cost associated with cockpit

manufacturing.

All aerial maneuvers possess some inherit risks, and flying in a

combat zone furthers the possibility for disaster. Removing the pilot from

the onboard cockpit eliminates the potential for a human casualty in the

result of mission failure (13). There will be no need to reclaim down

soldiers, no cost to fly a body home, no one to bury, and no family to

grieve. The American public has become increasingly sensitive to their

sons and daughters dying in combat and UCAVs are the first step to

reduce these fatalities (2). When counting cost how much is a human life

worth? While difficult to answer other aspects of UCAV cost benefits

have more quantitative comparisons.

The United States Air Force audit found that $1.5B could be saved

over the next six years if unmanned vehicles were controlled by

specialized airmen instead of trained pilots (14). Additionally the USAF

spends more than $20M a year on just two of the many basic pilot training

14

III. Cost of Operation

Cockpit Production

platforms (15). These funds are easily recovered with the implementation

of UCAV systems. Considering recent economic challenges, militaries

around the globe will be searching for opportunities to reduce spending.

UCAVs piloting controls operate based on programming and do not

require training (2). When a UCAV is destroyed there is no need to

retrain and replace a pilot, simply program the new craft. Eliminating

training costs allows militaries to allocate funds to other needed programs.

UCAVs completely eliminate the cost associated with cockpit

production and maintenance. The flagship of the United States Air Force

is the unmatched F-22 Raptor. The Raptor potential for air superiority is

uncontested and yet the actual impact of the F-22 has been largely unfelt.

After the first 158 Raptors were delivered they were grounded due to

problems with the life support systems inside the cockpit; causing the

$65B investment to collect dust on the tarmac (16). UCAV systems do

not require life support, control systems, flight sensors and gauges, and

ejection seats like modern manned jets—thereby allowing cheaper

production and no risk of failing life support (2).

By nature of the size, UCAVs require fewer materials to construct.

Considering material, fuel, maintenance costs the Pentagon projects

UCAVs will cost 1/3 of the price of the F-16. F-16 unit production is

15

$18.8M per unit and F-22 unit production is $150M per unit (15). By

2030, Pentagon projections of 1/3 unit cost will result in UCAVs being

produced for $6M per unit. Figure 4 illustrates the $144M savings per

unit when UCAVs are invested in as opposed to the overpowered F-22.

16

F-16 F-22 UCAV$0.00

$20.00

$40.00

$60.00

$80.00

$100.00

$120.00

$140.00

$160.00

Combat Production Costs Per Unit

$ M

illio

ns

Figure 4: Cost ComparisonUnit cost ($M) for the F-16, F-22 and Pentagon projected cost ($M) for UCAVs by 2030.

The attempt to define clear and universal ethics of warfare has struggled

to keep ground in a world of changing values and changing tactics. As an

example, the once considered unethical guerilla fighting has become the common

place on the battlefield (17). To attack without being seen is the new standard.

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles are an extension of the idea of attacking without

being seen.

The counter-argument to UCAV systems has been the unfairness of a

wealthy country equipped with UCAVs attacking a poorer country with no

protection. There is no real protection against this happening. The history of war

is full of powerful countries attacking less powerful ones (3). Introducing or not

introducing UCAVs will have no affect on the strong taking advantage of the

weak. Therefore, the question of ethics does not involve the weapon but how it

will be used (3). It is equally important to understand that one country feeling an

action is unethical does not dictate the affairs of another country (for example,

the United States stopping UCAV development does not mean Russia will stop

as well). The interest in utilizing UCAV technology will create a market for

powerful UCAVs and the common usage will resolve any ethical debate–the

same as every advance in weaponry has done.

17

IV. Ethical Impact

Final Conclusion

Discussion

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles are a dynamic addition to the world air

force–providing lower cost, stealth weapons capable of competing with larger

manned jets. Potential for investment in the approaching years will grow as

UCAV technology grows and implementation in aerial fleets matures. Therefore,

it is recommended steps be taken now to ensure an investment in UCAV systems.

The future of aerial warfare is changing and Unmanned Combat Air

Vehicles are paving the ground for those changes. UCAVs show dominance in

the multifaceted evaluation of combat situations. By nature, the smaller size of

UCAVs permits greater agility, smaller target for enemy attacks, and increased

stealth. These aspects alone merit investment in the future of UCAV systems.

Additionally, the removal of an onboard pilot allows UCAVs to accomplish

objectives impossible to manned fighters. UCAV weapon capability allows for

drones carry more weapons and be especially effective in communication

jamming and electronic-attack. Furthermore, UCAV automation options allows

for optimal control in a variety of combat scenarios. The clear combat benefits of

UCAV systems show the certainty of their place in the future of aerial combat.

The current transition state of UCAV systems (from small armed UAVs to

equipped UCAVs) opens to the door for immediate investment action.

UCAV cost of production and operation is far below that of typical

manned jets. Specifically comparing the F-22 to 20-year projections each UCAV

will save $144M. UCAV systems do not require fighter pilots to operate them

and therefore provide savings in pilot training. Perhaps most importantly,

UCAVs allow militaries to operate in dangerous situations without the risk of

losing a human pilot.

18

V. Overall Conclusion

Warfare ethics change as standards of acceptable conduct change. As

UCAVs become more common they will be more wildly accepted. The

important point to remember is that those responsible for UCAV actions are the

ones that should be faced with ethical questions, not the UCAVs themselves.

19

1. J. D. Blom, Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective, vol. 45. Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010.

2. S. Douglass, “NO PILOT REQUIRED. (cover story),” Popular Science, vol. 258, no. 6, p. 40, Jun. 2001.

3. D. W. Kolff*, “‘Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni Cooperation’—Using UCAVs to Kill Alleged Terrorists: A Professional Approach to the Normative Bases of Military Ethics,” Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 240–244, 2003.

4. www.af.mil

5. www.air-attack.com

6. W. In, M. E. Franke, E. J. Stephen, and M. F. Reeder, “Aerodynamic ground effects of tailless chevron and lambda-shaped UCAV models,” in 45th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting 2007, January 8, 2007 - January 11, 2007, 2007, vol. 12, pp. 8239–8249.

7. W. Jinzhong, W. Guangyao, and G. Songfen, “Cost efficiency analysis of attack UCAV,” Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, vol. 6, p. 014, 2009.

8. N. Spark, “The Story of John Stapp: The Fastest Man on Earth,” 2000.

9. W. L. Epperson, R. R. Burton, and E. M. Bernauer, “The influence of differential physical conditioning regimens on simulated aerial combat maneuvering tolerance.,” Aviation, space, and environmental medicine, vol. 53, no. 11, p. 1091, 1982.

10. J. A. Tirpak, “The robotic air force,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 80, no. 9, pp. 70–74, 1997.

11. M. Franklin, “Future Weapons for Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles,” Rusi Defence Systems, 2OO8, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 93–96, 2008.

12. http://www.army-technology.com/projects/hunter/

20

VI. Works Cited

13. M. Mouloua, R. Gilson, E. Daskarolis-Kring, J. Kring, and P. Hancock, “Ergonomics of UAV/UCAV Mission Success: Considerations for Data Link, Control, and Display Issues,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 144–148, Oct. 2001.

14. M. Hoffman, “UAV pilot career field could save $1.5B,” http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20090301/, 2009.

15. USAF. "FY 2011 Budget Estimates," U.S. Air Force, February 2010.

16. W. J. Hennigan, “Sky-high overruns, safety ills plague jet,” Los Angeles Times, 07-Aug-2011.

17. E. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. Rowman & Littlefield, 1985.

21