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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 1
Abstract
The present study investigated whether and to what extent ideological attitudes relate
to moral reasoning. Specifically, in three studies we tested if Right-Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) are associated with a general tendency to
make either utilitarian (outcome-based) or deontological (principle-based) decisions in classic
trolley-type moral dilemmas. The first study uncovered that both high RWA and high SDO
individuals made more utilitarian versus deontological judgments in trolley dilemmas. A
second study, using a process dissociation approach, revealed that this increased relative
proportion of utilitarian judgments among high RWA and SDO scorers was guided by a
decreased preference for the deontological option, rather than an increased preference for the
utilitarian option. Finally, a third study using the RWA3D scale showed that especially the
‘Authoritarian Aggression’ facet scale is related to the decreased preference for the
deontological option in high RWA individuals. Overall, these studies provide convergent
evidence for substantial differences in moral reasoning tendencies based on ideological
attitudes.
Keywords: Right-Wing Authoritarianism; Social Dominance Orientation; Moral psychology;
Trolley dilemmas; Utilitarian reasoning; Deontological reasoning
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 2
Right-wing Attitudes and Moral Cognition: Are Right-Wing Authoritarianism and
Social Dominance Orientation Related to Utilitarian Judgment?
The chasm dividing the political left and right is not merely motivated by a quarrel
about specific policy options or economic doctrines, but it also reflects different ethical
concerns and divergent value systems (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Koleva,
Graham, Ditto, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012). On a wide variety of morally relevant topics liberal and
conservative ideologies clash. In the US, for instance, conservatives tend to oppose equal
rights for homosexuals, stem-cell research, and abortion, whereas liberals are generally
supportive of these issues. Interestingly, both groups use a value based rhetoric to justify their
stance (Clifford, & Jerit, 2013). Indeed, psychological research suggests that many of these
ideological differences between conservatives and liberals can be explained in terms of
underlying differences in moral cognition. In particular, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009)
asserted that the moral domain is divided in a number of well-defined subdomains that
determine what specific types of content are moralized. Graham et al. further argued that an
individual’s position on the general left-right dimension is associated with different domains
that are considered most relevant for moral judgment. According to this 'Moral Foundation
theory' liberals almost exclusively try to minimize ‘Harm’ and maximize ‘Fairness’, whereas
conservatives also consider (the often competing) domains of ‘Loyalty’ to the ingroup,
submission to ‘Authority’ and metaphorical ‘Purity’, as highly relevant in morality.
Deontological versus Utilitarian Moral Reasoning
Although the moral foundations research program has uncovered interesting
differences between conservatives and liberals with respect to the domains they consider
relevant for morality, potential differences between conservatives and liberals in other aspects
of moral reasoning remain largely unexplored. For instance, a longstanding debate in
philosophy pertains to whether normative ethics should be based in deontological or
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 3
utilitarian moral theory. Whereas the former tries to determine an action’s moral worth by
looking at its inherent moral quality through a general system of duties and rights, and uses
moral principles to guide reasoning, the latter determines the moral worth of an action solely
through its outcome; that is, actions that lead to a net profit in wellbeing are deemed moral
whereas those that decrease overall wellness are considered to be immoral. Hence,
deontologists argue that some actions are morally right while others are wrong, and that this
distinction is based on all-encompassing moral rules (such as ‘thou shalt not kill’). Utilitarians
on the other hand, argue that whether a specific course of action is right or wrong depends on
its consequences. Therefore, to the utilitarian, some actions that might typically be considered
wrong can nevertheless be morally appropriate if in that specific context the positive
consequences outweigh the negatives.
Utilitarian and deontological thinking have traditionally been considered as two
mutually exclusive and opposing perspectives on ethical philosophy. However, a recent
psychological model claims that these two perspectives are not incompatible but are
simultaneously activated in ordinary moral cognition. According to Greene, Nystrom, Engell,
Darley, and Cohen (2004), moral cognition is the result of two independent processes, each
contending for control: one that leads to utilitarian judgment and one that leads to
deontological judgment. When confronted with a moral dilemma our brain will analyze the
dilemma both from a deontological and a utilitarian perspective and whichever process
happens to be stronger at that moment will determine what type of moral judgment a person
will make (Koenigs et al., 2007; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001).
Research within this moral reasoning domain is typically conducted by examining
subjects’ responses to a specific class of moral dilemmas: trolley dilemmas (Thomson, 1976).
In the archetypal example of these dilemmas a runaway trolley is headed on a collision course
with five oblivious workmen. The only way to save these workmen from their imminent
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 4
demise is to hit a switch that will divert the trolley to another track where it will hit (and kill)
only a single worker, effectively sacrificing the one man to save the other five workers. The
fundamental idea behind these dilemmas is that according to utilitarian theory you should
sacrifice the one man (because this leads to fewer deaths) whilst deontological theory would
prohibit you from infringing on the rights of the individual for the sake of the larger
collective. A choice to sacrifice the individual is then operationalized as a utilitarian judgment
and the choice not to intervene as a deontological judgment. The current research aims to
study to what extent differences in ideology are associated with a differential preference for
either deontological or utilitarian moral judgment.
Dimensions of Ideological Attitudes
Research that investigated the relations between ideology and morality within the
moral foundation theory framework (e.g., Graham et al., 2009) has generally considered
socio-political attitudes to exist on a single one-dimensional left-right measure (i.e., only
contrasting between liberals and conservatives). However, many political psychology studies
have indicated that this left-right dimension is a simplification of the full spectrum of political
thought. According to Duckitt’s (2001) seminal framework of ideological attitudes, citizens’
representation of ideology is better captured by two dimensions of socio-ideological attitudes,
each connected with a specific worldview and motivational goals triggered by these world-
views. On the one hand, viewing the world as a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1988) instigates
a motivational goal of social control and security at the expense of personal freedom and
rights, which gives rise to the adoption of authoritarianism, a construct typically measured
through the dispositional Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981). On the
other hand, viewing the world as a competitive jungle or a dog-eat-dog world (Duckitt, &
Sibley, 2010) elicits the motivational goal of social power and superiority at the expense of
altruistic concern and equality. This dimension is typically measured with a dispositional
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 5
measure of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
Duckitt’s dual process model has been verified on numerous accounts (for an overview, see
Duckitt, & Sibley, 2009). The relationship between RWA and SDO differs across political
contexts (i.e., countries, see Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Mirisola, Sibley,
Boca, & Duckitt, 2007), but they are both unique predictors of a wide variety of political and
ideological phenomena. Among other things, RWA is highly associated with religiosity
(Altemeyer, & Hunsberger, 1992), and having conservative values (Stangor, & Leary, 2006;
Duriez, & Van Hiel, 2002), while SDO is particularly associated with cultural elitism (Pratto
et al., 1994), decreased support for equal opportunity and ameliorative policies (Sidanius,
Devereux, & Pratto, 1992) or even increased support for the use of cognitive ability tests as
part of college admission procedure (Kim, & Berry, 2015). Additionally, both RWA and SDO
are strong predictors for ethnocentrism, sexism, generalized prejudice, and conservatism
(Duckitt, & Sibley, 2010; Van Hiel, & Mervielde, 2002; Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis; 2006;
Roets, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2012).
Interestingly, SDO and RWA have also been related to the differential appreciation of
each of the moral foundations. Two independent studies have revealed that increased SDO
appears to be associated with decreased support for the (liberal) Harm and Fairness
foundations, while increased RWA appears to be associated with increased support for the
(conservative) Loyalty, Authority and Purity foundations (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt,
2013; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014). This pattern of associations corroborates Graham
et al.’s (2009) hypothesis that political differences are rooted in differential moral cognition,
but also suggests that it might be worthwhile to study the relationship between moral
cognition and political ideology within Duckitt’s dual process model for political ideology.
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 6
Relationships between Ideological Dimensions and Deontological versus Utilitarian
Moral Judgment
We are not aware of any prior research that suggests how ideological dimensions and
deontological/utilitarian judgment might relate to one another. However, Greene’s (2007)
model for moral cognition provides a basis to derive hypotheses on how they may be
connected. In particular, Greene argues that utilitarian judgment requires that the utilitarian
process overcomes the competing deontological process. Importantly, the deontological
process is largely driven by a prepotent, negative emotional response to harming others.
Hence, when this emotional response is subdued, utilitarian judgment becomes more likely
(Greene, 2007). Relevant to the present research question, according to Duckitt’s (2001)
framework, SDO is characterized by tough-mindedness, a dog-eat-dog world view, and low
altruistic concern. Indeed, various studies have empirically corroborated a positive link
between SDO and Machiavellianism (Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009), lower empathy
(Sidanius, Kteily, Sheehy-Skeffington, Ho, Sibley, & Duriez, 2013), lower importance of the
Harm foundation (Federico et al., 2013), and increased aggression (Thomsen, Green, &
Sidanius, 2008; Swami, Neofytou, Jablonska, Thirlwell, Taylor, & McCreary, 2013). All of
these are likely to suppress the emotional restraints against harming others and are hence
likely to impact moral cognition. Indeed, in addition to their demonstrated link with SDO,
these traits have also been linked to utilitarian judgments (see Bartels, & Pizzaro, 2011;
Conway, & Gawronski, 2013; Gao, & Tang, 2013). Hence, relying on Greene’s (2007)
theorizing and combining the previous empirical findings, the prediction for SDO is
reasonably straightforward: we hypothesize that high (vs. low) SDO individuals will be more
likely to make utilitarian judgments (Hypothesis 1).
In contrast, the link of RWA with moral reasoning seems more ambiguous and the
potential effects are less straightforward to predict. In particular, RWA captures the
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 7
covariation of Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission, and Authoritarian Aggression (see
Altemeyer 1981), which may not have a uniform influence on moral judgment. On the one
hand, high RWA individuals typically show higher regard for conventions and traditional
values, they are more religious, and they are more prone to dogmatism (Altemeyer, 1988;
1996). The intuitive prediction would thus be that they are more readily swayed by duty and
rule-based moral concerns such as ‘thou shall not kill’, increasing their tendencies to choose
deontological options over utilitarian ones (Hypothesis 2a). On the other hand, RWA is also
characterized by Authoritarian Aggression and disregard of personal freedom and rights in
favor of the group (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001, see also Kessler, & Cohrs, 2008). Hence,
the prepotent, negative emotional response to harming another human that is central to the
deontological process may also be lowered in high RWA individuals, especially when
confronted with ‘individual versus group’ situations. This is most relevant in trolley
dilemmas, which typically reflect exactly this kind of conflict between the rights of an
individual versus the benefits to the larger group. This line of reasoning therefore predicts that
authoritarians may actually be more willing to make the utilitarian choice to sacrifice the
individual in trolley-type moral dilemmas (Hypothesis 2b). In sum, how exactly RWA is
associated with moral cognition cannot be straightforwardly predicted and will most likely be
determined by what aspect of RWA drives the association: Conventionalism and the
inclination toward dogmatism, or Authoritarian Aggression and disregard for individual
rights.
We explore these issues in a series of three studies. In our first study we examine the
basic pattern of associations between SDO, RWA, and subjects’ proportion of utilitarian
versus deontological judgments on trolley dilemmas. In our second study, we further explore
these associations by testing whether high SDO and high RWA individuals have an increased
or decreased preference for either of the two options in the dilemma, using Conway and
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 8
Gawronski’s (2013) process dissociation approach. Finally, in our third study, we specifically
examine RWA in greater detail by probing into its attitudinal clusters (Submission,
Conventionalism, or Authoritarian Aggression).
Study 1
Method
Participants. Participants were 160 Dutch speaking undergraduate students (32 men,
128 women, Mage = 18.9, SDage = 2.88) participating in a mass-testing session for course
credit.
Procedure. Participants were invited to enter the lab in groups of up to 45 students
and seated at individual computer terminals. Participants completed all measures in the order
in which they are discussed below.
Measures. First, participants’ ideological attitudes were assessed through
computerized versions of the 24-item RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1981) and the 16-item SDO
scale (Pratto et al., 1994). For both measures, participants were asked to indicate their
agreement with a series of statements on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘totally disagree’
(1) to ‘totally agree’ (7). A sample item of the RWA scale reads as follows: ‘Obedience and
respect for authority are the most important values children should learn’. A sample item of
the SDO scale reads as follows: ‘Some groups are simply not the equals of others’.
Subsequently, participants received a booklet containing four trolley-type moral
dilemmas and were asked for each dilemma whether or not they judged the presented
utilitarian alternative morally appropriate. Participants indicated their answers by writing
down a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ underneath each dilemma, thus making a binary choice between the
deontological and utilitarian alternative for each dilemma. The dilemmas were administered in
Dutch and adapted from earlier research (Greene et al., 2004). English versions of all
dilemmas are displayed in the supplementary materials.
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 9
Data Analysis. After data-collection, one dilemma, which was related to terrorism,
was assessed to be overly ‘politicized’ in nature. Although inclusion of this dilemma actually
strengthened the obtained effects,1 we deemed it prudent to exclude this dilemma from the
analyses to minimize the potential content-specific influence of political stance on the
responses (see general discussion). Given the binary nature of our response variable we
calculated Spearman’s rank correlations to assess the relationship of SDO and RWA with the
proportion of utilitarian (vs. deontological) answers. The association of SDO and RWA was
assessed through a regular Pearson correlation.
Results
RWA (Cronbach α = .81, M = 3.14, SD = 0.63) and SDO (Cronbach α = .87, M = 5.06,
SD = 0.86) correlated significantly with each other; r = .53, p < .001. More importantly,
Spearman’s rank correlations of SDO with the proportion of utilitarian answers (Cronbach α =
0.56, M = 0.50, SD = 0.29) revealed a significant positive correlation; r = .20, p = .013.
Likewise, RWA was also positively associated with the proportion of utilitarian responses; r =
.16, p = .044.
Discussion
The results of the first study confirm that higher levels of SDO are indeed associated
with more utilitarian moral decisions (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, this first study also provides
evidence in favor of one of the competing hypotheses regarding the role of RWA. In
particular, we found that high levels of RWA are associated with a higher inclination to choose
the utilitarian option over the deontological option (Hypothesis 2b).
This initial study, however, has two notable limitations. First, the restricted set of
dilemmas used in this study limits its external validity. Secondly, a mere proportion-score of
utilitarian answers (i.e., relative to the number of deontological answers) is an imperfect
1 Analyses with all four dilemmas included, yielded significant correlations of the response variable with SDO (r = .26, p < .001) and RWA (r = .23, p = .003).
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 10
measure of moral reasoning, given that this result may be caused by either an increased
preference for the utilitarian option or by a decreased preference for the deontological option.
As such, this first study only suggests that in relative terms, individuals high in SDO and
RWA prefer utilitarian over deontological judgment to a greater extent than individuals low in
SDO and RWA do. Yet, whether this is caused by the former viewing the utilitarian option as
more favorable or the deontological option as less favorable cannot be answered. To address
these issues we conducted a second study.
Study 2
The main aim of our second study was to investigate whether SDO and RWA were
related to an increased preference for the utilitarian option or whether these variables were
related to a lowered preference for the deontological option (or both). In order to be able to
discern preference for the utilitarian and the deontological option, we used a process
dissociation approach (Jacoby, 1991), which was first used in a moral dilemma paradigm by
Conway and Gawronski (2013). These authors developed two sets of dilemmas, with each
dilemma in the second set being a variation of a dilemma in the first set. Similar to the
traditional trolley dilemma procedure, each dilemma offered participants a choice to harm an
innocent other in order to procure a certain outcome beneficial to the larger group. In the
‘incongruent’ versions of these dilemmas, this outcome would be worth pursuing from a
utilitarian perspective, but would require the violation of some deontological rule, much like a
traditional trolley dilemma. For example: should you trigger an allergic attack in someone that
will hospitalize him for several days, but will also thwart his plans to infect innocent others
with HIV? Contrastingly, in the ‘congruent’ versions of the dilemmas, the outcome, while
somewhat beneficial, would not be worth pursuing on utilitarian grounds whilst still requiring
the same deontological violation. For example: should you trigger an allergic attack that will
hospitalize that person to thwart his plans to vandalize a bus stop with graffiti? While there is
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 11
a reasonable utilitarian argument to be made to trigger the allergic attack in the incongruent
scenario, the same cannot be upheld when confronted with the congruent scenario. By
contrasting the responses on dilemmas in which both moral reasoning processes pull in the
same direction to those in which they pull in opposite directions, Conway and Gawronski
reasoned that it should be possible to delineate and separately quantify the preference for the
utilitarian option and the preference for the deontological option through a multinomial
processing tree model (for a more in depth explanation of the logic and technical aspects of
this procedure, see Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Although this process dissociation
technique has the obvious benefit of adding further nuance to moral dilemma research, it is
still fairly new and for now, few studies have taken advantage of the new empirical
possibilities it has to offer. Crucially, this procedure allows us to obtain individual measures
for both preferences and allows us to investigate how exactly SDO and RWA are associated
with moral reasoning (i.e. decreased preference for the deontological option or an increased
preference for the utilitarian option).
As outlined before, Greene’s (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2007) model for moral
cognition argues that for utilitarian judgment to prevail, it has to overcome the competing
deontological process driven by a negative emotional response to harming others.
Interestingly, in their initial study, Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that empathic
concern, which is lower in high RWA and SDO individuals (see Bӓckstrӧm & Bjӧrklund,
2007; Sidanius et al, 2013), affected preference for the deontological option in trolley
dilemmas, but was unrelated to preference for the utilitarian option. We therefore hypothesize
that our findings from Study 1, showing that high levels of RWA and SDO tip the scale in
favor of utilitarian decisions, may be due to a decrease in the deontological preference, rather
than an increase in preference for the utilitarian option.
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Method
Participants. One-hundred-thirty-two Dutch-speaking Belgian participants (34 men,
Mage = 35.2, SDage = 15.9) were recruited through snowball sampling as part of a graduate
research project.
Procedure. Participants were invited through e-mail to participate on a voluntary basis
in an online study on morality. Using the lab’s custom-made software, participants completed
the ideological measures first and the moral judgement measures secondly.
Measures. Before starting the moral dilemma tasks, participants completed online
forms of the 14-item version of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel & Duriez, 2002),
and a 10-item version of Altemeyer’s (1981) RWA scale (see Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, &
Cornelis, 2011), both rated on 5-point Likert scales ranging from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to
‘totally agree’ (5). The moral dilemma task consisted of 20 moral dilemmas of which 10 were
congruent and 10 incongruent. We translated the full set of dilemmas of Conway and
Gawronski (2013) in Dutch. However, some dilemmas were inappropriate for the current
sample. For example, one of Conway and Gawronksi’s original dilemmas is about a teenage
girl faced with the choice whether or not to abort an unwanted pregnancy. This dilemma is not
nearly as controversial in a Belgian context as it is in the United States, and pre-testing
revealed a unanimous response to this specific dilemma. We therefore created twelve new
dilemma pairs and pre-tested the congruent versions of these along with Conway and
Gawronski’s original dilemmas (N = 40). Based on this pre-test, we selected those dilemmas
that displayed the least amount of inter-subject consensus (i.e., most variability in responses).
Translated versions of the final set of dilemmas used in Study 2 are presented in the
supplementary materials. The order in which the dilemmas were displayed was randomized
between participants.
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 13
Data Analysis. Consistent with Study 1, we excluded one dilemma that referred to
terrorism from the analyses, given that it was considered too ‘politicized’. Again, this did not
substantially affect the results.2 The exact procedure used to obtain the moral preference
scores (as per Conway and Gawronski, 2013) is presented in the supplementary materials.
For one participant we were unable to calculate a deontological preference score
(because it required dividing by zero). This participant was included for the analyses on
utilitarian preference but excluded for the analyses for the analyses on deontological
preference. Pearson correlation tests were conducted to investigate the relationships between
ideology dimensions and the deontological and utilitarian processes.
Results
SDO (Cronbach α = .84, M = 3.72, SD = 0.62) and RWA (Cronbach α = .84, M = 2.58,
SD = 0.69) were positively associated with each other; r = .46, p < .001, and preference for
the utilitarian option (M = 0.43, SD = 0.24) was negatively associated with preference for the
deontological option (M = 0.77, SD = 0.29); r = -.26, p = .003. Importantly, the analyses
revealed that SDO was not significantly associated with preference for the utilitarian option; r
= .02, p = .782, but it was negatively associated with preference for the deontological option;
r = -.34, p < .001. Furthermore, a similar pattern of associations arose for RWA. That is, RWA
was not significantly associated with preference for the utilitarian option; r = .12, p = .153,
but it was negatively associated with a preference for the deontological option; r = -.29, p
< .001.
Discussion
The results from the second study confirm the general association of right-wing
political attitudes with moral reasoning found in Study 1. Furthermore, this more intricate
2 Analysis on the full dilemma set was qualitatively the same as the results reported here. More specifically: we did not find any association of preference for the utilitarian option with SDO or RWA; r = .05, p = .587, and r = .16, p = .073, respectively, but did find a significant (negative) association with preference for the deontological option; r = -.36, p < .001 and r = -.32, p < .001.
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 14
procedure showed that the increased proportion of utilitarian responses associated with both
dimensions of right-wing ideology is not caused by an increased preference for the utilitarian
option, but in fact by a decreased preference for the deontological option. People high in
right-wing ideologies thus feel less compelled by the principled moral concerns prohibiting
action in trolley-dilemmas. As such, the results of this second study provide additional
evidence for our hypothesis regarding the effect of SDO (Hypothesis 1) and again also clearly
favored one of the two competing hypotheses for RWA. That is, people high in RWA showed
a decreased preference for the deontological option, resulting in an increased tendency to
make utilitarian judgments (Hypothesis 2b).
The latter finding demonstrates that high RWA individuals are less reluctant to hurt an
individual if it serves the larger collective and suggests that ‘Authoritarian Aggression’ may
lie at the basis of their choices in moral dilemmas. Unfortunately, although the original RWA
scale is conceptually based on three sub-constructs, one of which is Authoritarian Aggression,
the scale itself does not measure each of these constructs separately (see Altemeyer, 1981). In
particular, most items of the traditional RWA scale are multi-barreled and tap into two or even
all three of these sub-constructs at once. Funke (2005) gives the following RWA example item
to more clearly illustrate this point: ‘Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our
forefathers [Conventionalism], do what the authorities tell us to do [Submission], and get rid
of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything [Aggression]’. Therefore, neither Study 1 nor
Study 2 allows for a direct test of the more specific hypothesis that specifically the
Authoritarian Aggression aspect drives the association between RWA and the decreased
preference for the deontological option. Accordingly, in a third study, we administered a
recently developed authoritarianism scale by Funke (2005) that explicitly aims to differentiate
among the Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission, and Authoritarian Aggression facet
scales.
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 15
Study 3
The main aim of the third study was to confirm whether the association of RWA with a
decreased preference for the deontological option can be attributed to one of the facets of the
construct, namely Authoritarian Aggression.3 The current study differed from the previous
studies in several ways. First, we used the RWA3D scale (Funke, 2005), a variant of the RWA
scale that has been explicitly constructed to measure each of RWA’s sub-constructs separately.
Secondly, rather than using the process dissociation approach to delineate deontological and
utilitarian preferences, we opted for the more straightforward and parsimonious approach of
giving subjects a series of moral dilemmas and asking them for each dilemma to rate the
moral appropriateness of both the utilitarian option and the deontological option separately
(i.e. to what extent they find each option morally appropriate).
Building on the results of the previous studies, we hypothesized that RWA’s
Authoritarian Aggression facet would be negatively associated with preference for the
deontological option while the other two facets would not be meaningfully related to
deontological preference. We did not have a priori hypotheses about the manner in which each
of RWA’s facets would be related to preference for the utilitarian option. Given that we did not
find any effect of RWA on the utilitarian process in the previous study, the effects of the
RWA3D facets could be either insignificant or antagonistic, cancelling out each other.
Method
Participants. Two-hundred-twenty-eight North-American participants (128 male, 100
female, Mage = 35.1, SDage = 11.5) were recruited through the online labor platform Amazon's
mechanical Turk and paid US$0.75. Participation was limited to Mturk users with an AMT
approval rating higher than 95% that had completed at least 100 tasks on Mturk in the past.
3 As this study was explicitly construed as a further investigation into the associations between RWA and moral judgment, SDO was not included.
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Procedure. All participants were redirected to an online questionnaire running on the
lab’s custom software. After providing demographic information they completed an online
version of the RWA3D scale first, and the moral dilemma task subsequently.
Measures. The RWA3D scale consists of 12 statements; four for each of the scales
three facets. Participants expressed their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5). A sample item for the Conventionalism facet
reads as follows: ‘The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal fault one day’. A
sample item of the Submission facet reads as follows: ‘Obedience and respect for authority
are the most important values children should learn’. Finally, a (reverse scored) sample item
of the Authoritarian Aggression facet reads as follows: ‘There is no such crime to justify
capital punishment’.
After completing the RWA3D scale participants rated the moral appropriateness of
both the deontological option and the utilitarian option of six moral dilemmas on a 7 point
scale going from ‘absolutely inappropriate’ (1) to ‘absolutely appropriate’ (7).
Appropriateness ratings for the deontological and utilitarian options were averaged across
dilemmas. To ensure all participants had read the dilemmas correctly, they were asked a single
true or false question about each of the dilemmas immediately after supplying their
appropriateness ratings. All dilemmas and comprehension questions are presented in the
supplementary materials.
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 17
Data Analysis. Before running any analyses we removed participants that had
responded incorrectly on any of the comprehensions questions. This was the case for exactly
30 participants, thus reducing our total sample to 198 participants. Although this procedure
lowers our overall sample size, it actually increases statistical power by removing distracted
or confused participants (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, 2009). We calculated a
Pearson correlation for each of the RWA3D’s components with the moral preference scores,4
as well as difference between paired correlation tests to compare the strength of the
relationships.
Results
4 The results of an alternative analysis using multiple regression generally confirmed the pattern of results from the bivariate analyses. However, the multiple regression model on preference for the utilitarian option violated several assumptions of linear regression and thus required us to model the relation through non-parametric means. Because the conclusions from both analyses were the same, we report the more complex analyses only in the supplementary materials.
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All three subcomponents of RWA3D were positively associated with each other; all r
> .61, all p < .001. As was the case in Study 2, preference for the utilitarian option (Cronbach
α = .79, M = 3.70, SD = 1.27) was negatively related to preference for the deontological
option (Cronbach α = .70, M = 4.04, SD = 1.11); r = -.62, p < .001. More importantly, the
results showed that preference for the utilitarian option did not significantly correlate with any
of the authoritarianism components: Authoritarian Aggression (Cronbach α = .68, M = 2.65,
SD = 0.91), r = .09, p = .192 and Authoritarian Submission (Cronbach α = .72, M = 2.43, SD
= 0.82), r = -.04, p = .555, although it was marginally significantly associated with
Conventionalism (Cronbach α = .79, M = 2.39, SD = 1.04), r = -.13, p = .059. Furthermore,
we found that preference for the deontological option did not significantly correlate with
Authoritarian Submission, r = -.06, p = .378, nor with Conventionalism, r = .03, p = .718.
Most importantly, however, a statistically significant association of Authoritarian Aggression
with lower preference for the deontological option emerged, r = -.16, p = .024. Furthermore, a
difference between paired correlations test revealed that the association of Authoritarian
Aggression with preference for the deontological option was marginally different from that of
Authoritarian Submission, t(197) = 1.91, p = 0.061 and significantly different from that of
Conventionalism, t(197) = -3.03, p = .002. As such, these results confirm our hypothesis that
the negative association of authoritarianism with preference for the deontological option can
be explained through the subcomponent of Authoritarian Aggression.
Discussion
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The results of this third study corroborate the results from Study 1 and Study 2, and
allow us to clarify the nature of the association of RWA with moral preference. In particular,
the results of Study 3 indicate that the previously uncovered negative association of RWA
with preference for the deontological option can indeed be explained by the Aggression
subcomponent, as neither of the other two components seemed to be associated with the
outcome. Moreover, this study also helps explain why we failed to find an association of RWA
with preference for the utilitarian option. The overall effects of the different facets were not
only smaller (with only Conventionalism showing a marginally significant effect), they were
also more balanced, with the different effects cancelling out each other.
General Discussion
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 20
Across three studies and in three different populations (Belgian students, Belgian
adults, and US adults) we obtained a robust association between right-wing attitudes and
response patterns on trolley-type moral dilemmas. Both SDO and RWA were associated with
a higher proportion of utilitarian responses on these types of dilemmas (Study 1), which can
be explained by a reduced preference for the deontological option, while preference for the
utilitarian option was not affected (Study 2). Given that SDO is characterized by tough-
mindedness, a dog-eat-dog worldview, and low altruistic concern (see Duckitt, 2001), the
results we predicted and obtained for SDO are fairly intuitive; individuals high in SDO are
less concerned about harming another person than those low in SDO, and in these dilemmas
the end justifies the means. For RWA, however, we advanced two competing hypotheses. On
the one hand, RWA is characterized by adherence to traditional values and dogmatism
(Altemeyer, 1988), which may lead people to adhere more to duty- and rule-based moral
concerns (i.e., more deontological choices). On the other hand, RWA is characterized by
disregard of individual rights and increased aggression, especially if security of the group is at
stake, which may render authoritarians less concerned about the individual in situations where
a ‘greater good’ can be achieved. The results of Studies 1 and 2 clearly aligned better with the
latter hypothesis and in order to further clarify the results from these first two studies, in
Study 3 we untangled RWA’s three subcomponents. As predicted, we found that the
aggression subcomponent of RWA was the key in explaining the decreased preference for the
deontological option in trolley dilemmas.
Towards a Better Understanding of Moral Cognition and its Relationship with Ideology
From a purely moral cognition perspective, the contribution of the present research is
primarily of a theoretical and methodological nature. It is worth reiterating that the current
study not only studied subject’s moral judgments (i.e., choices; Study 1) but measured
preference for each of the two options in a trolley dilemma separately (Study 2 and Study 3).
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 21
Although this distinction may seem of minor importance, it is quite crucial for a nuanced
interpretation of the results of this type of research. Indeed, the current study demonstrates
that an increased proportion of utilitarian choices does not necessarily reflect increased
support for utilitarian concerns, and should therefore not be interpreted as such. Instead, as
demonstrated in the present study, a relative increase in utilitarian choices can be driven by a
decrease in deontological concerns. This is especially relevant in light of a recent wave of
research that has uncovered that utilitarian choices are also associated with some personality
traits that seem distinctly ‘un-utilitarian’ (i.e., not aimed at the largest net profit in overall
wellbeing). In particular, recent studies have shown that utilitarian choices are associated with
egocentric attitudes and decreased charitable giving (Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, &
Savulescu, 2015), anti-social personality traits (Bartels, & Pizarro, 2011), and a desire to
obtain power over others (Suessenbach, & Moore, 2015). As such, these findings have been
used to argue that utilitarian judgment does not necessarily reflect a concern for the greater
good and therefore, that judgments in trolley dilemmas are a suboptimal way to measure
commitment to any kind of ethical theory (Kahane et al., 2015). However, while this
perspective is definitely thought-provoking, it might be somewhat premature in its
conclusions. Our results point to a possible alternative explanation for this pattern of
associations: as was the case in our study, it seems quite likely that at least some of these
earlier effects are driven by decreased preference for the deontological option and not by
increased preference for the utilitarian option. Taken at face value, it is indeed quite surprising
that an increase in utilitarian judgment can be associated with these un-utilitarian traits.
However, if it turns out that these associations are driven by a decreased preference for the
deontological option, these findings are not as surprising. We hope the current study may
serve as a call to the moral cognition research field to move away from binary judgment
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 22
measures, and instead move towards ‘double preference’ measurement methods that can
provide a more refined view of moral cognition.
In the field of political psychology, the current study provides novel insights in the
associations between ideology and morality in terms of the classic deontological versus
utilitarian reasoning opposition. Our results suggest that people holding a more right-wing
ideology tend to be more outcome focused in their morality, and feel less morally restricted by
the rights of each individual when these conflict with the benefit of the larger group. As such,
these results converge with and extend on the findings from Moral Foundations research
which showed that liberal morality focuses more on the individualizing ‘Harm’ and ‘Fairness’
foundations, whereas conservative morality is built around the more group based ‘Binding’
foundations (Graham, et al., 2009). Furthermore, the current results might help to better
understand differences in moralization of concrete (policy) issues between liberals and
conservatives as they clearly suggest that liberals and conservatives might have different
moral sensibilities (see below).
Understanding Morality through Trolley Dilemmas: Limitations and Opportunities
While we feel the current research offers up a new and intriguing perspective into the
relation between ideology and moral cognition, there are also some limitations and challenges
associated with this type of research. Perhaps the biggest limitation of the current work is that
one could argue that moral dilemmas are never fully context free and that some dilemmas
may even tap directly into constructs that are deeply associated with ideological or political
positions. Hence, what drives peoples’ responses to these dilemmas may be specific
convictions about the topic of the particular dilemma at hand, rather than an overarching way
of ethical reasoning. For instance, one well known trolley-type dilemma confronts the subject
with the choice to torture the son of a terrorist to locate a bomb hidden somewhere in a busy
city center. One could argue that responses to this dilemma are more likely to reflect the
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 23
subjects’ views on torture as a counter-terrorism tactic than their inclination towards either
utilitarian or deontological thinking. For this reason, in both Study 1 and Study 2, we dropped
a dilemma that directly referred to terrorism (although this made no substantial difference to
our findings). While some of the remaining dilemmas might still refer to ideology to a lesser
extent, we have reason to believe that the robust effects that we obtained across a variety of
moral dilemmas are nevertheless indicative of differences in moral reasoning rather than
being directly determined by political position. A most telling example is the ‘life-insurance’
dilemma used in Study 3, which asks participants to rate the moral appropriateness of
euthanizing a dying man so that his poor family can cash a life-insurance check before the
policy runs out a few hours later. It is well-known that high authoritarians tend to oppose
euthanasia more strongly than their low authoritarian counterparts (Kemmelmeier, Burnstein,
& Peng, 1999). However, for this particular dilemma, the data showed that especially
respondents high in Authoritarian Aggression showed lower approval of the option not to
euthanize the man to help his family, as demonstrated by the significant negative correlation
with approval of the deontological option, r = -.26, p < .001. Hence, it seems that participants
did not base their judgment on their general view of euthanasia, but instead used the specific
context of the dilemma to reach a moral judgment. We are therefore confident that the robust
pattern of results we obtained across various sets of dilemmas does reflect participants’ moral
attitudes in terms of general preference towards utilitarian versus deontological reasoning.
The use of trolley dilemmas itself may also have limitations, especially in terms of
ecological validity. Indeed, although this type of dilemma has proven to be very valuable for
the field of moral cognition (see Cushman & Greene, 2012 for an overview), it is still
somewhat unclear to what extent response patterns on moral dilemmas translate to actual
behavior in real life. Bloom (2011) argues that trolley dilemmas, while interesting from a
philosophical perspective, may be too far removed from everyday moral behavior to be of
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 24
much (predictive) value. While there is undoubtedly some truth to that argument, a case can
be made for the relevance of trolley dilemma research in the context of political ideology.
Although most people may rarely experience dramatic trolley-like dilemmas in their lives, the
policy makers and politicians they elect are more likely to be confronted with such problems.
Politicians do have to weigh competing moral principles quite often. Indeed, many policy
decisions revolve around weighing the rights of each individual versus those of a larger group.
Therefore, we believe it is meaningful to get a better understanding of how left-wing and
right-wing voters, and the politicians that represent them, may address these issues from
different moral angles.
Finally, as we described before, the opposition between deontological versus
utilitarian morality, as well as its established procedure of measurement in the form of trolley
dilemmas, typically present situations that involve physically harming other people. Future
research may seek to develop and test other types of dilemmas that also tap into deontological
versus utilitarian morality, but focus less on physical harm (e.g., white lie dilemmas, Kahane,
Wiech, Shackel, Farias, Savulescu, & Tracey, 2012). Such dilemmas could be useful to
investigate whether the relationship between ideology and deontological/utilitiarian reasoning
found in the present studies, extends beyond the core domain of harm.
Conclusion
In three studies, the present research demonstrated that ideology plays a substantial
role in the way people approach moral (i.e., “trolley”) dilemmas. In particular, high levels of
Social Dominance Orientation as well as high levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism are
associated with a relative preference for utilitarian solutions over deontological solutions in
these dilemmas. This effect is due to a decrease in deontological concerns, rather than an
increase in utilitarian reasoning in people who hold right-wing attitudes. Of particular interest,
when confronted with these dilemmas where the rights of the individual are at odds with the
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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 25
benefits of the larger group, the negative impact of Authoritarian Aggression overcomes the
weaker positive influence of Conventionalism on deontological concerns.
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