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Session Seven: Panel: Alternative Futures for Cyber and Space - Mark Maybury
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Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Headquarters U.S. Air Force
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Alternative Futures Panel USSTRATCOM Space and Cyber Symposium
Omaha, Nebraska
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15 November 2011
Dr. Mark T. Maybury
Chief Scientist
United States Air Force
SAF/PA Case 2011-0647
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Panelists
Mr. William Scott, Author,
Counterspace: The Next Hours of World War III
Dr. Herb Lin, Chief Scientist, Computers Science and
Telecommunications Board, The National Academies
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Author,
7 Deadly Scenarios
Dr. David White, Senior Manager, Computer Systems
and technologies Group, Sandia National Laboratories
Mr. James M. Brase, Deputy Program Director for
Intelligence, Office of Strategic Outcomes, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory
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Predicting the Future
“Aircraft flight is impossible.” Lord Kelvin
“The [flying] machines will eventually be fast; they
will be used in sport but they should not be thought
of as commercial carriers.” Octave Chanute, 1910
“There has been a great deal said about a 3,000 mile
rocket. In my opinion such a thing is impossible for
many years. I think we can leave that out of our
thinking.” Vannevar Bush, 1945
“…the Gas Turbine can hardly be considered a
feasible application to airplanes…” Committee with
Von Karman, Millikan, Kettering, 1941
(Reported by N. Augustine)
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Questions
What is the likely future of Space and Cyber?
What are the key risks in the future, in particular, what
are the primary trends in terms of threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences?
What are the possible rewards?
Where should our focus be to drive advantageous
futures?
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Air Force Technology Horizons Priority Technology Areas
Autonomous systems
Autonomous reasoning and learning
Resilient autonomy
Complex adaptive systems
V&V for complex adaptive control
Collaborative/cooperative control
Autonomous mission planning
Cold-atom INS
Chip-scale atomic clocks
Ad hoc networks
Polymorphic networks
Agile networks
Laser communications
Frequency-agile RF systems
5 www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100727-053.pdf
Spectral mutability
Dynamic spectrum access
Quantum key distribution
Multi-scale simulation technologies
Coupled multi-physics simulations
Embedded diagnostics
Decision support tools
Automated software generation
Sensor-based processing
Behavior prediction and anticipation
Cognitive modeling
Cognitive performance augmentation
Human-machine interfaces
Most Future Space and Cyber Technologies
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Energy Horizons: Air Force Energy S&T Vision
Mission-focused S&T roles (lead,
follow, watch) in near-, mid-, far-term
Air: Efficient engines and structures,
distributed virtual training, flight
formation
Space: Efficient photovoltaics,
efficient ground stations, fractionated
constellations
Cyber: Efficient cloud and HPC
Infrastructure: Secure microgrids,
Expeditionary energy, small modular
nuclear reactors, solar to petrol
Enabling: nanomaterials, biomimicry,
autonomy
Energy Horizons Vision
Assured energy advantage across air, space, cyberspace and infrastructure
Air
Space
Cyber
Infrastructure
Energy S&T advances can
revolutionize cost, readiness,
and resiliency
Air fuels and facilities/data
centers primary cost drivers
Benefits from systems,
operations, supply, and culture
Partnership and S&T leverage
essential
HPC: High Performance Computing 6
Recommendations Findings
AF/PA Case # 11-589
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Space Trends
Bigger: Distributed communications architectures
Smaller: Rad-hard electronics, catching up to terrestrial node sizes
Diverse: Fractionated, composable satellites such as Software
Defined Radio (SDR) or even Cognitive Radio
More dangerous: Space is congested (debris, users) and contested
– the US operates critical national security capabilities within this
dangerous environment, so the capabilities are vulnerable
More competitive: Commercialization and internationalization
(e.g., SpaceX), however, US losing edge in space technology; ITAR
restrictions reduce global competitiveness of US companies
Less US talent: STEM Challenge as with cyber
www.aero.org/capabilities/cords/
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Cyber Trends
Bigger: HPC: Petascale to exascale
• Programmable, performance (peta to exa), green
Smaller: Nanoelectronics (e.g., nanowires, memristers)
Diverse: Clusters, clouds, GPUs, FPGAs
More dangerous: Advanced threat, insider threat,
supply chain
More competitive: global hardware, software, talent
Embedded: 4.5M LOC in F-35, 90% of functionality
More complex: Interconnected
Greener: infrastructure and algorithms
Less US talent: STEM Challenge
(top500.org)
Source: www.dodlive.mil
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A Perfect Storm
Complexity
Foreign
Supply
Threat
Vulnerabilities
Connectivity
Technology
Change
US Computing
Graduates
Expert Staff
nvd.nist.gov
1998 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006
-12% production engineers
14k in
2004
-5% program managers
Response
Timelines
Years
Cost Overruns
Seconds
-20% financial managers 1.7 k in
2001
~1M viruses in
2008
50K viruses in 2000
20-50%
Overruns
(GAO)
<10%
Overruns in 1950s
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DoD and AFRL
Cyberspace Strategy Aligned
Align with others and grow AF expertise
AFRL Strategic Cyber Thrusts
Assure and Empower the Mission
Optimize Human-Machine Systems
Enhance Agility and Resilience
Invent Foundations of Trust and Assurance
Partner with acquisition
and operational communities
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE
Strategic Initiative 1: Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential
Strategic Initiative 2: Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems
Strategic Initiative 3: Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy
Strategic Initiative 4: Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity
Strategic Initiative 5: Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation
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Observations
Increasing risk = f(threats, vulnerabilities, dependence,
and consequences)
Increasing capabilities and opportunities
Increasingly contested, congested, competitive
Global technology proliferation and acceleration
driving need for rapid acquisition model
Fiction can help shape futures
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