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Tragedy of the Commons: Ins3tu3ons, Prisoners' Dilemma and
Examples from Local Cases.
Miriam Huitric [email protected]
Lecture for “Adap3ve Governance of Socio‐ecological Systems” 2nd December, 2010
1
Yesterday’s list: Nature vs people = MNGT is users and resources, governance is on a higher level? Management is about resources, governance is about people?
Collec3ve ac3on and/ vs ins3tu3ons: the difference? Implementa3on, is that collec3ve ac3on? Is collec3ve ac3on emergent or imposed? When does it become governance?
Typology of ins3tu3ons. Ins3tu3onal diversity – what is its role? Bridging groups? Ins3tu3ons vs governance. (Outsiders crea3ng ins3tu3ons implies governance).
What is governance, a theory or a prac3ce? The adap3ve side of governance. Difference between government and governance.
Link management, governance, ins3tu3ons?
Broader scales and global change. What is the “ecosystem approach”? Local decision making, and global agreements, how do they link? Agenda 21. Science policy interface. Implementa3on for policy – what are some implementa3on challenges?
Prac3cal tools to implement: how to actually do it. 2
First: Win as Much as You Can!!
Two Groups of 8 4 pairs per group
Each pair has 2 cards: an ”X” and a ”Y” We’ll play 7 rounds
Each round you will: 1. In pairs – decide whether to show X or Y
2. Referee tells you to show your card 3. Each pair calculates their score and fills in score sheet.
3
Goal is to:
Win as Much as You Can!!
4
First: Win as Much as You Can!!
How to Calculate Score:
4 Xs All LOSE 1$
3 1
Xs Y
WIN 1$ LOSE 3$
2 2
Xs Ys
WIN 2$ LOSE 2$
1 3
X Ys
WIN 3$ LOSE 1$
4 Ys All WIN 1$ 5
First: Win as Much as You Can!!
Who won?
What happened?
Why?
What was the point? 6
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Burglar 2
Cooperate Defect
Burglar 1 Cooperate (1, 1) (‐2, 2)
Defect (2, ‐2) (‐1, ‐1)
7
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Burglar 2
Cooperate Defect
Burglar 1 Cooperate (1, 1) 2 (‐2, 2) 0
Defect (2, ‐2) 0 (‐1, ‐1) ‐2
8
Tragedy of the Commons
Herder 2
Cooperate Defect
Herder 1 Cooperate 2 0
Defect 0 ‐2
9
Tragedy of the Commons à la Hardin
Priva3se
Na3onalise (State)
What if this is WRONG? 10
Tragedy of the Commons
There are 15 fish Must leave 4 fish We are 16 fishers
WHAT DO WE DO?
11
12
Collec3ve Ac3on
Ac1on by more than one person directed towards the achievement of a common goal that cannot be achieved by an individual ac1ng on his/ her own.
13
Collec3ve Ac3on
(from yesterday’s list) Implementa3on, is that collec3ve ac3on? Is collec3ve ac3on emergent or imposed? When does it become governance?
Collec3ve ac3on and/ vs ins3tu3ons…
14
Ins3tu3ons
The humanly devised constraints that shape human interac3on.
(North 1990)
15
Common pool resources
16
Subtractability – increasing problem with scarcity
Exclusion – Unclearly defined user group/ difficult geography/ mobile resource
Ins3tu3ons The sets of working rules that are used to determine who is elligible to make decisions in some arena, what ac3ons are allowed or constrained, what aggrega3on rules will be used, what procedures will be followed, what informa1on must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their ac3ons.
(Ostrom 1990) 17
Ins3tu3ons
Property Rights
18
Norms Rules
Rights
Formal / Informal
de facto vs de jure Markets
Ins3tu3ons
Property Rights
19
Private
State
Common
Open access
Ins3tu3ons
20
Cons3tu3on
Laws
Policy
Formal / Informal
de facto vs de jure
Ostrom’s 7 Principles for Managing the Commons:
Clearly defined boundaries and users
Congruence among rules and with local condi3ons
Monitoring
Graduated sanc3ons
Ostrom 1990 21
Collec3ve‐choice arrangements
Conflict‐resolu3on mechanisms
Recogni3on of rights to organise
Nested enterprises
Require a network of ins3tu3ons
Ostrom 1990 22
Institutions
Create opportunities
for society
Organisations are created to exploit these opportunities
As they grow they influence
creation of new
institutions
23
Ins3tu3ons
Collec3ve ac3on and/ vs ins3tu3ons Typology of ins3tu3ons.
Ins3tu3onal diversity – what is its role? Ins3tu3ons vs governance
24
Case study: Shrimp farming in Thailand
Huitric, Folke and Kautsky 2002:
”Development and government policies of the shrimp farming industry in Thailand in rela3on to mangrove ecosystems”
Ecological Economics 40: 441‐455
25
Tide w/ larvae
• Traditional • Polyculture • Extra protein/ income
• Low input • Low output • Labour intensive • Low capital
• Depend on mangroves
Extensive
110 kg / ha/ yr
26
• Monoculture • Higher stocking density
• Hatchery • Higher output • Feed: waste - fishmeal • Agro-chemicals • Mechanisation
• Side industries
Semi-intensive
Freshwater
27
• Monoculture • Capital -intensive
• Higher stocking density • Hatchery • Industrial feed • Fertiliser • Agrochemicals • Mechanised
• Side industries
Intensive
3500 kg/ ha/ yr
28
local
national
international
Fossil fuels
Agro-chemicals Pharmaceuticals
Fish meal Cassava...
Feed
Larvae & broodstock
Consumers
Intensive Shrimp Farming
29
Photo: S. Gräslund
Shrimp farms in Thailand
30
Sequential Exploitation
1
2
3
4
5
31
Constitution
1954 Land-use code of Thailand
1987 Land-use plan
1991 Fisheries act & ministerial regulations
Legislation
32
A - Logging, charcoal
B - Other activities
C - Conservation A
B
C
Land-Use Plan 1987
33
Change perceptions
Scale
Monitoring & enforcement
Inappropriate
Problems with Legislation
34
Environmental impacts
Short life-span
Vulnerable to international market
Subsidies and externalities
Clash with other industries
Unreliable Industry
35
New users and increased exploitation
Increased capitalisation
Increased dependence on yield
Increased pressure on enforcement agencies
Respond to socio-economic feedback
Pathology of Resource Use
36
Misfit of Institutions
Limited ecological context
Poor property rights
Inappropriate for the structure of the industry
Poor enforcement
37
Social Ecological Systems
feedback
management
drivers
local ecosystem
seascape
bioregion
local management
managing institutions
institutional setting
38
Yesterday’s list: Nature vs people = MNGT is users and resources, governance is on a higher level? Management is about resources, governance is about people?
Collec1ve ac1on and/ vs ins1tu1ons: the difference? Implementa1on, is that collec1ve ac1on? Is collec1ve ac1on emergent or imposed? When does it become governance?
Typology of ins1tu1ons. Ins1tu1onal diversity – what is its role? Bridging groups? Ins1tu1ons vs governance. (Outsiders crea3ng ins3tu3ons implies governance).
What is governance, a theory or a prac3ce? The adap3ve side of governance. Difference between government and governance.
Link management, governance, ins1tu1ons?
Broader scales and global change. What is the “ecosystem approach”? Local decision making, and global agreements, how do they link? Agenda 21. Science policy interface. Implementa3on for policy – what are some implementa3on challenges?
Prac3cal tools to implement: how to actually do it. 39
Seminar
How many of Ostrom’s (93) 9 variables conducive to selec3on of norms etc are met in each case?
What forms of implementa3on are needed in both cases? What are the challenges for each?
Based on Fig 3 in Dietz et al.: where do you foresee conflict? What ins3tu3ons exist that should asenuate this conflict?
Is there diversity of ins3tu3ons in either case? Clue: yes, in both. Now, look for it
40
Group 1. 9‐10.20 ‐ Anders, Stefan, Marte, Gabriella, Ylva, Ulrika, Malena
Group 2. 10.40‐12 ‐ Daniel, Hendrik, Peser, Caroline, Niko, Marika, Anna, Johanna