- 1. Chinas competitive threat toLatin America Sanjaya Lall
(Oxford University) and John Weiss (ADBI) 2004 LAEB ANNUAL
CONFERENCE THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
LATIN AMERICA AND ASIABeijing, 3-4 December, 2004
2. Outline
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- What is a competitive threat?
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- Measuring the threat in third markets
- Data analysis: China vs. LAC
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- Global trends and regional performance
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- Technological & product level overlap
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- Relative market share changes
3. Some LAC countries worry about the Chinese competitive threat
The Economist (July 24, 2003), in The sucking sound from the East
says Labour costs in China are about a quarter of their level in
Mexico. The result: about 300 manufacturing plants have moved from
Mexico to China in the past two years. TheInternational Herald
Tribuneis more gloomy: In all, 500 of Mexicos 3,700 maquila plants
have shut down since 2001, at a cost of 218,000 jobs. September 3,
2003 The Economist (July 24, 2003), in The sucking sound from the
East says Labour costs in China are about a quarter of their level
in Mexico. The result: about 300 manufacturing plants have moved
from Mexico to China in the past two years. TheInternational Herald
Tribuneis more gloomy: In all, 500 of Mexicos 3,700 maquila plants
have shut down since 2001, at a cost of 218,000 jobs. September 3,
2003 4. Popular perception of a competitive threat Rapid export
growth by China reduces exports and (if they are open to imports)
domestic production by other countries This leads to losses in
incomes, jobs andgrowth Rapid growth by China can also reduceaccess
to, or raise cost of, resources like capital (esp. FDI) and natural
resources 5. Economists dislike this perception: trade isnota
zero-sum game
- Countries do not compete like firmswhere gain for one is loss
for another
- Comparative advantage theory:
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- Resources move between activities: loss of one is offset by the
rise of another, with greater welfare as a result
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- Entry of low wage competitor induces others to move up
skill/technology scale: China accelerates upgrading elsewhere
Thus, to Krugman, competitiveness is a meaningless word when
applied to national economies. And the obsession with
competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous.(1994) 6. But this
simple trade theory is based on strong assumptions
- It assumes efficient & competitive markets, with perfect
information, identical production functions, no scale economies, no
learning, fully mobile factors within economies, full employment,
no transport costs, etc.
- It implies thepattern of specialization does not matter.With no
externalities, cumulative learning or agglomeration, all activities
are equally beneficial. Structural change is automatic and
instantaneous in response to changing factor prices
7. If these assumptions are relaxed, implications are
different
- Withscale economies, cumulative learning, technology gaps,
unemployment, risk & uncertainty, externalities, information
failures, immobile factors, and so on:
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- While there are certainly potential benefits from
specialization & trade can be non-zero sum game
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- Therealisationof benefits from trade depends on the ability of
economy to create competitive capabilities and exploit activities
that offer the best opportunities for growth, technology &
spillovers
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- The processmay not be automatic, instantaneous, costless or
complete : there are cumulative, path-dependent effects (leading to
multiple equilibria)
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- Strategy is necessary, given widespread market failures, to
create capabilities and move from low to high equilibrium. Success
breeds success
8. In this (more realistic) world
- Entry of a large, efficient low-wage competitor like Chinacan
involve significant adjustment costs :
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- Quantitative lossof income, employment, exports
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- Qualitative declineof production/export structure into slower
growing, technologically inferior activities
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- Thesimilarity of export structuresin competing countries
(extent ofcompetitive overlap )
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- Nature of export structuresin both countries (nature
oftechnological specialisation )
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- Thespeed and extent of adjustmentin each country ( ability to
upgradewithin and across competing activities, move into fast
growing segments, reach new markets and so on)
9. If there is a possible competitive threat, how can we measure
it?
- Computable general equilibrium model (needs strong simplifying
assumptions)
- Detailed case studies of each industry (rich but limited in
coverage)
- Trade data analysis to gaugepotential for
competition&competitive performance(needs careful
interpretation)
- This study uses last method: 1990-2002 trade data on market
shares in world/US and bilateral trade by technologycategories
10. Five possible combinations of relative market share changes
E.Mutual withdrawal: no threat Both parties lose shares in export
markets to other competitors.D.Direct threat China gains market
share and other country loses, this may indicate causal connection
unless other country was losing market shares in the absence of
Chinese entry.Falling C.Reverse threat No competitive threat from
China. The threat is the reverse, from the other country to
China.A.No threat Both China and other country have rising market
shares and latter is gaining more than ChinaB.Partial threat Both
are gaining market share but China is gaining faster than other
countryRising Other countrys export market shares Falling Rising
Chinese export market shares Matrix of competitive interactions
between China and other country in export markets 11. Technological
structure
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- RB ( Resource based):e.g. food, wood & forestry products,
processed minerals, petroleum products
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- LT(Low technology):e.g. textiles, clothing, footwear, toys,
sports goods, simple metal products
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- MT(Medium technology):e.g. automotive products, consumer
durables (incl. simple electronics), most industrial machinery,
chemicals, steel
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- HT(High technology):Advanced ICT andelectricals,
pharmaceuticals, aerospace, precision instruments
12. Shares of world exports by technology (%) 13. Shares of
developing countries in world exports (1990-2002) 14. 50 most
dynamic exports in the world, 1990-2002 15. LACs manufacturing
value added record(world share, 1980-2000) 16. World market shares
of LAC and East Asian exports (1990-2002) 17. Changes in world
market shares, 1990-2002 18. World market share performance in LAC
and EA
- EA 8 and China perform impressively across most sectors, with
increasing specialization in technology-based products.
- China outperforms rest of EA in most categories, suggesting a
growing competitive threat within the region, particularly in LT
products.
- But in HT there is growing complementarity within EA.
- LAC without Mexico does poorly, raising its world market share
in all manufactured exports by less than 0.2 percentage points; the
weakest performance is by the two giant economies, Argentina and
Brazil.
- The largest world market shares held by LAC-M are in primary
and resource-based products and MT process industries
- Mexico behaves like an EA Tiger, with significant gains across
the spectrum (primary products excepted).
19. Export dynamism: % dynamic products in manufactured exports
20. Technological similarity of export structures, China and LAC
21. Structural stability of exports(181 three-digit manufactured
products) 22. Correlation of Chinese and LAC export structures,
1990 & 2000 23. Measuring the competitive threat by relative
WMS changes 100.0% 100.0% 325,978.5 117,403.4 Total14.5% 32.0%
47,253.8 37,538.4 Mutual Withdrawal 14.6% 12.1% 47,648.8 14,229.0
China under Threat 11.4% 30.5% 37,142.1 35,809.9 Direct Threat
31.5% 10.8% 102,644.9 12,661.4 No Threat 28.0% 14.6% 91,288.9
17,164.8 Partial Threat 2002 1990 2002 1990 Distribution (%) Values
($ m.) Competitive threat from China for LAC 18 24. Chinese
competitive threat by LACcountry in 2000(% of manufactured exports)
25. 26. Some implications
- Most threatened LAC countries are C Rica, El Salvador,
Chile.
- In Chile it reflects the large share of its exports in copper,
where China gains WMS while Chile loses (direct threat). Its fish
exports are partially threatened because China gains more WMS
- In C Rica the Chinese threat is largelypartial: China gains
greater WMS in electronics, instruments, apparel and processed
foods.
- In El Salvador, direct and partial threat in textiles and
clothing
- Mexico faces the greatestpotentialthreat from China, but
because of its very rapid gains in WMS it has notactuallyfaced a
significant threat over 1990-2002.
- Brazil faces a larger competitive threat (30% direct and 31%
partial threat in 2002) but the direct threat declines from 60% in
1990. The largest threatened exports by Brazil are in the partial
threat category: telecoms and footwear. But its largest single
export, aircraft, faces no threat from China.
- EA faces much greater direct and partial threat than LAC.The
unweighted average for EA 8 is75.2%,much higher than LACs total
of39%.
- However, these results have to be interpreted with care (e.g.
Chinese threat to Chile in copper). And past is not good guide to
future (e.g. threat to Mexico)
27. Bilateral trade patterns 28. Technology breakdown of
bilateral trade between LAC & China86.33% 89.22% 90.08% 60.45%
23.85% 17.64% 21.64% 33.85% 'Pure' manufactures13.67% 10.78% 9.92%
39.55% 76.15% 82.36% 78.36% 66.15% Primary + RB 2.66% 2.37% 2.68%
2.42% 0.90% 1.53% 0.58% 0.13% Other HT 11.75% 10.11% 3.20% 0.41%
5.69% 5.04% 0.17% 0.11% Electronics 14.41% 12.48% 5.88% 2.83% 6.58%
6.57% 0.75% 0.24% High technology 16.51% 18.50% 21.40% 20.10% 2.10%
1.22% 2.75% 0.48% Engineering 7.28% 7.48% 6.25% 3.97% 4.25% 3.36%
5.10% 21.93% Process 2.64% 2.44% 3.30% 3.17% 2.65% 0.51% 2.90%
0.91% Automotive 26.43% 28.42% 30.94% 27.24% 9.00% 5.09% 10.75%
23.31% Medium technology 12.67% 16.23% 18.36% 10.88% 2.83% 0.80%
3.99% 8.59% Other LT 32.82% 32.09% 34.90% 19.49% 5.44% 5.18% 6.15%
1.71% Fashion cluster 45.49% 48.32% 53.26% 30.37% 8.27% 5.98%
10.15% 10.30% Low technology 10.11% 8.82% 7.84% 10.04% 20.37%
20.31% 16.52% 8.87% Mineral-based 0.39% 0.45% 0.42% 0.48% 13.26%
8.50% 37.14% 22.97% Agro-based 10.50% 9.27% 8.26% 10.52% 33.63%
28.81% 53.66% 31.84% Resource based 96.83% 98.49% 98.34% 70.97%
57.48% 46.45% 75.31% 65.68% Manufactured 3.17% 1.51% 1.66% 29.03%
42.52% 53.55% 24.69% 34.32% Primary Products 2002 2000 1995 1990
2002 2000 1995 1990 China's exports to LAC 18LAC 18 exports to
China Distribution of bilateral exports between LAC and China (% of
total exports) 29. Bilateral trade of big three 30. Some findings
on the big three
- Argentinais overwhelmingly an exporter of primary products,
with its share of RB declining significantly. It has no noticeable
exports of HT products to China. Its imports from China are
predominantly LT, but with large and growing shares of MT and HT
products. Argentina runs a trade surplus with China, $763 m. in
2002, most of it in primary products, with a smaller surplus in
agro-based RB products.
- Brazilalso raises its exports of primary products but maintains
a very large share for RB. It has a small, growing share for HT but
a sharply falling one for MT. Chinas exports to Brazil span all
categories, with all manufactured categories growing at the expense
of primary products. The largest category by far is HT products.
Brazil runs a trade surplus with China, $823 m., mostly in primary
products and RB manufactures (both mineral and agro-based
products). Its largest deficit is in HT products, followed by MT
engineering products.
- Mexicoexports few primary or resource-based products to China,
and makes a massive shift from MT to HT products. Chinese exports
to Mexicohave HT as the largest category. This suggests growing
integration of electronics production in the 2 economies, similar
to EA.
- Thevalues of Mexican HT exports to China arefar smaller than
Chinese HT exports to Mexico. In 2002, the figures are $320 million
and $2.1 billion, respectively. Overall, Mexico runs a huge $5.7
billion trade deficit with China. It also runs a deficit with China
in every single category of trade, including primary products
31. To sum up on bilateral trade
- There is arapid structural transformation of LACs trade pattern
with Chinain the course of a relatively few years.
- This transformation is undesirable in technological terms.
- To the extent that this influences LACs future competitiveness
patterns in bilateral trade or exports to third countries, it can
be damaging
32. But bilateral trade so far is very small 5.9% 2.2% 1.8%
6,941 7,500 5,787 Japan 24.2% 11.3% 11.7% 28,707 38,433 38,481
EEC153.7% 2.1% 2.6% 4,436 7,277 8,676 East Asia ( excl. China &
Japan )12.8% 14.7% 13.2% 15,216 49,852 43,299 LAC total39.1% 59.5%
58.7% 46,305 202,024 192,619 United States 0.7% 1.1% 1.9% 864 3,691
6,224 China 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 118,428 339,671 328,301 World 1990
2000 2002 1990 2000 2002 Distribution (%) Export values (US$
million)LAC18's export to9.6% 15.3% 14.8% 5,932 38,230 48,256
EEC1514.5% 16.7% 14.9% 9,011 41,654 48,434 Japan 52.6% 31.7% 32.3%
32,670 79,051 105,242 East Asia ( excl. China & Japan )8.3%
20.9% 21.5% 5,175 52,156 70,050 United States 1.1% 2.2% 2.4% 661
5,594 7,742 All LAC100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 62,091 249,203 325,596
World 1990 2000 2002 1990 2000 2002 Distribution (%) Export values
(US$ million)China's export toExports destinations of China and
LAC18 33. Conclusions
- Some LAC countries are benefiting from growing imports of
primary and RB products by China
- China remains a relatively small market for LAC (but China
overtook Japan as import supplier in 2003).
- The trade structure of most LAC is more complementary than
competitive with that of China
- The main exceptions are Mexico and Costa Rica, but in HT they
may benefit from intra-industry trade with China within MNC
production networks
- WMS analysis suggests that all threatened exports (direct +
partial) in LAC are well below comparable figure for EA. Goods in
the more serious direct threat category are only 11% of
exports
- This suggests low competitive impact of China
34. But there are caveats
- Past is not good guide to future, in particular for Mexico
- LAC is suffering massive downgrading of comparative advantage
in bilateral trade not a good portent for future
- China may reinforce LAC poor export performance in third
markets, pre-empting dynamic segments. Different export structures
may be sign of LAC weakness if it means specialisation in
slow-growing and technologically unrewarding products