27
Marc Smeets KPMG IT Advisory Information Security & Control October 24 2008 IT ADVISORY Network (in)security: Attacking the network one layer at a time

Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

Marc Smeets KPMG IT Advisory

Information Security & Control October 24 2008

IT ADVISORY

Network (in)security: Attacking the network one layer at a time

Page 2: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

1

l Unfortunately hard to demo without a full network

l Please ask your questions as soon as you have any!

Page 3: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

2

Outline

l  Isn’t network security covered by now?

l Basic theory

l Attack!

l How to improve?

Page 4: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

3

Isn’t network security covered by now?

l  Isn’t all focus on web applications and ‘new stuff’ like RFID passports?

l  No!

-  Cisco IOS exploits (1 year ago, and new stuff coming soon ;-) )

-  DNS cache poisening (3 months ago)

-  TCP/IP DoS (4 weeks ago)

-  MS08-067, remote RPC attack, Sasser/Blaster all over again? (2 days ago)

l  What makes it fun? Major impact! Oh, and many, many companies still struggle with it

Page 5: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

4

Basic theory

l OSI OSI OSI !

l  I assume you are all familiar with it

Page 6: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

5

Basic theory

l  Layer 1: RJ45, fibre, wifi

l  Layer 2: Ethernet (CSMA/CD)

l  Layer 3: IP protocol

l  Layer 4: TCP / UDP protocol

l  PC-application -> DNS-name -> TCP/IP stack -> route tabel -> IP adres in my own subnet?

-  Yes: check MAC table for address, otherwise send ARP request

-  No: packet needs to go to default gateway, address in MAC table?

-> send frame to the correct NIC, the NIC will handle the details

Page 7: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

6

OSI layer history?

l OSI model is old, very old

l What is the disadvantage of old techniques in IT?

Page 8: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

7

Attack layer 1

l Netwerk tap

l Span port

l This is what makes wireless vulnerable!!!

Page 9: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

8

Attack layer 2

l Which protocols and accompanying attacks do you know?

Page 10: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

9

Attack layer 2

l  MAC attack

-  CAM table flooding

-  ARP spoofing

l  VLAN’s

-  Trunking: ISL, dot1Q

-  Dynamic Trunking Protocol, VLAN Trunking Protocol

-  Configuring VLAN interfaces

l  Other

-  Cisco Discovery Protocol, Spanning Tree

Page 11: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

10

Layer 2 MAC attack

l CAM = Content Addressable Memory

l CAM table = Switch DB with information about MAC address, physical port and VLAN

l Limited by available memory

l After the attack de switch will become a HUB, but..

-  Attack only applicable for new addresses in the DB

-  In which year this attack was introduced?

Page 12: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

11

Layer 2 ARP spoofing

l Gratious ARP

Page 13: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

12

ARP spoofing tooling

l Dsniff is an UNIX tool and supports 30+ protocols

l Ettercap UNIX tool + SSL/SSH interception

l Cain & Abel

l And many more

l What can we do about it?

Page 14: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

13

Layer 2 VLAN’s

l VLAN safe?

l VLAN hopping on the access poort is possible by performing VLAN labeling

l VLAN hopping possible by using double labeling. However, not in both directions.

Page 15: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

14

Layer 2 trunks

l VLAN’s only for local switch

l Administration of many switches time consuming

l  ISL vs Dot1q (802.1Q) | VTP vs DTP

l Trunks and trunk mngt prot. Give access to all vlan’s

l DTP modes:

-  On, Off, desirable, auto (default!) non-negotiate

l VLAN’s safe?

Page 16: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

15

Layer 2 CDP

l Cisco Discovery Protocol

Page 17: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

16

Layer 2 STP

l What is the function of STP?

Page 18: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

17

Layer 2 STP l Spanning Tree default enabled on switch access ports

l Attack could be beneficial, could be (switches remain intelligent devices not all packets will pass)

l DoS-danger: Could have major impact on the network

Page 19: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

18

Layer 3 and up?

l Which protocols and accompanying attacks?

Page 20: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

19

Layer 3 and up

l HSRP / VRRP

l DHCP

l DNS

l Routing protocols are fun! OSPF, RIP(v2), EIGRP, etc. No BGP

l Can we add IP/TCP stressing..?

Page 21: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

20

Layer 3: HSRP / VRRP

l Router redundancy

l Priorities determine who is active

l Password protected come on… it’s 2008

Page 22: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

21

Layer 3: HSRP / VRRP

Page 23: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

22

How to improve?

l MAC flooding?

-  Port security at switch level (restricting # of allowed MAC addresses)

l ARP poisoning?

-  Static ARP gives strange results, administrative hell

-  switches nowadays are equipped with ARP poisoning detection

Page 24: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

23

How to improve?

l VLAN’s?

-  Limit amount of VLAN’s on access ports

-  Use separate native VLAN for trunks

-  Don’t use VLAN 1

-  On access ports don’t use DTP or other VLAN mngt protocols

-  Disable unused ports and put them in an unused VLAN.

Page 25: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

24

How to improve?

l CDP?

-  CDP could be disabled on access ports

l STP?

-  No STP enabled on access ports (BPDU root guard)

l HSRP?

-  ACL’s, non-default password and non-clear text password

Page 26: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

25

Questions

Page 27: Network insecurities: attacking the network one layer at the time

26

Marc Smeets KPMG IT Advisory ICT Security & control [email protected] 06 51366680