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GAME THEORY
History 1928 –
Game theory did not really exist as a unique field until John von Neumann &
Morgenstern published a paper.
1950 -
John Nash developed a criterion for mutual consistency of players' strategies, known as
Nash equilibrium, applicable to a wider variety of games than the criterion proposed
by von Neumann and Morgenstern.
1965 –
Reinhard Selten introduced his solution concept of subgame perfect equilibria, which
further refined the Nash equilibrium.
1970 –
Game theory was extensively applied in biology, largely as a result of the work of John
Maynard Smith and his evolutionarily stable strategy.
2007 –
Leonid Hurwicz, together with Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, was awarded the
Nobel Prize in Economics "for having laid the foundations of mechanism
design theory
2
What's IT?? Game theory is a method of
studying strategic decision
making. More formally, it is "the
study of mathematical models of
conflict and cooperation
between intelligent rational
decision-makers.
Strategic- It is a setting where
the outcomes that affect you
depends on actions not just on
your own actions but on actions
of others. 3
Why game theory ??? Because the press tells us to …
―Managers have much to learn from game theory —provided they use it to clarify their thinking, not as a substitute for business experience.‖
The Economist, 15 June 2007
―Game Theory, long an intellectual pastime, came into its own as a business tool.‖
Forbes, 3 July 2009
―Game theory is hot.‖
The Wall Street Journal, 13 February 2011
Because recruiters tell us to …
―Game theory forces you to see a business situation over many periods from two perspectives: yours and your competitor’s.‖
Judy Lewent – CFO, Merck
―Game theory can explain why oligopolies tend to be unprofitable, the cycle of over capacity and overbuilding, and the tendency to execute real options earlier than optimal.‖
Tom Copeland – Director of Corporate Finance, McKinsey 4
Terminology
Players
Strategies
◦ Choices available to each of the players
Might be conditioned on history
Payoffs
◦ Some numerical representation of the
objectives of each player
Could take account fairness/reputation, etc.
Does not mean players are narrowly selfish
5
Standard Assumptions
Rationality
◦ Players are perfect calculators and
implementers of their desired strategy
Common knowledge of rules
◦ All players know the game being played
Equilibrium
◦ Players play strategies that are mutual best
responses
6
Strategies for Studying Games of
Strategy Two general approaches
◦ Case-based
Pro: Relevance, connection of theory to application
Con: Generality
◦ Theory
Pro: General principle is clear
Con: Applying it may not be
Types of firms :
1)Perfect competition
2)Monopolistic or Imperfect competition.
ex- Motor car industry , mobile markets etcetera.
7
An easy strategy
Asking your friend out for dinner?
A complex strategy
Geopolitical talks?
Where It Exists?
8
Representation of Games The games studied in game theory are well-defined
mathematical objects. A game consists of a set of players, a
set of moves (or strategies) available to those players, and
a specification of payoffs for each combination of
strategies.
Categories :
Extensive form
Normal form
Characteristic function form
Partition function form
9
Extensive form
Games here are played on trees (as pictured to the left).
Here each vertex (or node) represents a point of choice for
a player. The player is specified by a number listed by the
vertex. The lines out of the vertex represent a possible
action for that player. The payoffs are specified at the bottom
of the tree.
10
Normal/Strategic Form
The normal (or strategic form) game is usually
represented by a matrix which shows the players,
strategies, and payoffs. More generally it can be
represented by any function that associates a payoff
for each player with every possible combination of
actions.
11
Types of Games
Cooperative :
A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments. For instance the legal system requires them to adhere to their promises. Often it is assumed that communication among players is allowed in cooperative games. Cooperative games focus on the game at large.
Non-cooperative :
In game theory, a non-cooperative game is one in which players make decisions independently. Non-Cooperative games are able to model situations to the finest details, producing accurate results.
Hybrid games :
contain cooperative and non-cooperative elements.
12
Symmetric :
A symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular
strategy depend only on the other strategies employed, not on who is
playing them. Prisoner's dilemma, and the stag hunt are all symmetric
games.
Asymmetric :
Most commonly studied asymmetric games are games where there
are not identical strategy sets for both players.
Zero-sum games :
In zero-sum games the total benefit to all players in the game, for
every combination of strategies, always adds to zero (more informally,
a player benefits only at the equal expense of others).
Non Zero-sum games :
These type of games have outcomes whose net results are greater or less
than zero
13
Simultaneous games :
Are games where both players move simultaneously, or if they do not move simultaneously, the later players are unaware of the earlier players' actions (making them effectively simultaneous).
Sequential games (or dynamic games) :
They are games where later players have some knowledge about earlier actions. This need not be perfect information about every action of earlier players; it might be very little knowledge. For instance, a player may know that an earlier player did not perform one particular action.
Perfect information and Imperfect information :
A game is one of perfect information if all players know the moves previously made by all other players. Thus, only sequential games can be games of perfect information, since in simultaneous games not every player knows the actions of the others.
Many card games are games of imperfect information, for instance poker.
14
Combinatorial games :
Games in which the difficulty of finding an optimal strategy stems from the multiplicity of possible moves are called combinatorial games. Examples include chess and go. Games that involve imperfect or incomplete information may also have a strong combinatorial character. A related field of study, drawing from computational complexity theory, is game complexity, which is concerned with estimating the computational difficulty of finding optimal strategies.
Discrete and continuous games :
Continuous games includes changing strategy set.
Much of game theory is concerned with finite, discrete games, that
have a finite number of players, moves, events, outcomes, etc.
15
Infinitely long games :
Pure mathematicians are not so constrained, and set theorists in
particular study games that last for infinitely many moves, with the
winner (or other payoff) not known until after all those moves are
completed. The focus of attention is usually not so much on what is the
best way to play such a game, but simply on whether one or the other
player has a winning strategy.
Meta-games :
These are games the play of which is the development of the rules for
another game, the target or subject game. Metagames seek to maximize
the utility value of the rule set developed.
16
Lesson 1
Dominance Principle :
Do Not Play A Strictly Dominated Strategy.
Player 2
α β
α
Player 1
β
We say that my strategy α strictly dominates my strategy β if my
payoff from α is strictly greater than that from β regardless of what
others do.
Here playing strategy β is a strictly dominated strategy.
0,0
3,-1
-1,3
1,1
17
GAME 1
Put in the box below either the letter α (alpha) or β (beta) .Think of this as a
great bid. I will randomly pair your form with another form and neither your
pair or you would know with whom you were paired.
Here is how grades maybe assigned :-
you pair
α, β – A,C
α, α – B minus , B minus
β, α – C , A
β, β –B plus , B plus
18
α
β
α B
minus
A
β C B
plus
α
β
α B
minus
C
β A B plus
ME
(X)
MY
PAIR
(X`)
MY PAIR
(X`)
ME
(X)
α, β – A, C
α, α – B minus , B minus
β, α – C , A
β, β –B plus , B plus
19
α
β
α B minus ,
B minus
A,
C
β C ,
A B plus ,
B plus
MY PAIR
(X`)
Me
(X)
Outcome matrix
1) We cared about our own grade
2) We cared about other grades
} 2 Different payoffs
20
α
β
α 0,0 3, -1
β -1, 3 1,1
MY PAIR
(X`)
ME
(X)
We try to put numbers into perspective and these are called
# utilities
just represent that we optimise our own gain and others loss.
(A,C) – 3
(B minus , B minus )- 0
If the pair chooses
alpha and I choose
alpha then I get
zero and if player
chooses alpha and I
choose beta I get -1.
0 > -1
If the player
chooses beta and I
choose alpha I get 3
and if player
chooses beta and I
choose beta I get 1
3>1
Hence in both
cases she receives a
higher payoff if she
chooses alpha.
α
β
α 0,0 -1, -3
β -3,-1 1,1
MY PAIR
(X`)
ME
(X)
Replacing (A,C) = -1,(C,A) = -3
22
Penalty kick game
l r
L 4,-4 9,-9
M 6,-6 6,-6
R 9,-9 4,-4
Goal keeper
Shooter
23
FINALS OF UEFA 2008
MAN Vs CHELSEA
It seemed that Chelsea’s strategy of going to Van der Sar’s left had been hatched by someone on the Utd bench. As Anelka prepared to take Chelsea’s 7th penalty Van der Sar pointed to the left corner. Now Anelka had a terrible dilemma. This was game theory in its rawest form. So Anelka knew that Van der Sar knew that Anelka knew that Van der Sar tended to dive right against right footers. Instead Anelka kicked right but it was at mid-height which Ignacio warned against.
24
Lesson 2
Put yourself in others shoes and try to
figure out what they will do. Destroyer
Easy Hard
Easy
Savior
Hard
Here savior should look upon the destroyers payoff before
making a move.
1,1
1,1
0,2
2,0
25
Prisoners Dilemma
Two Prisoners are on trial for a crime and
each one faces a choice of confessing to the
crime or remaining silent.
The payoffs are given below: Prisoner 2
Confess Silent
Confess
Prisoner 1
Silent
4,4
1,5
5,1
2,2
26
Solution to Prisoners Dilemma
Prisoner 2
Confess Silent
Confess
Prisoner 1
Silent
The only stable solution in this game is that
both prisoners confess; in each of the other 3
cases, at least one of the players can switch
from ―silent‖ to ―confess‖ and improve his
payoff.
4,4
1,5
5,1
2,2
27
Odds to Prisoners Dilemma What would the Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2 decide if
they could negotiate?
They could both become better off if they reached the
cooperative solution….
which is why police interrogate suspects in separate
rooms.
Equilibrium need not be efficient. Non-cooperative
equilibrium in the Prisoner’s dilemma results in a
solution that is not the best possible outcome for the
parties.
Alternative: Implied contract
if there were a long relationship between the parties—(partners in crime) are more likely to back each other
28
CPU Competition
Intel and AMD compete fiercely to develop innovations
in CPUs for PCs
As a result of this, CPU speeds have increased
dramatically, but there are few differences between the
products of the two companies
Even though both companies expended huge amounts
of money to gain a competitive advantage, their relative
competitive position ends up unchanged.
Both companies are worse off than if they had each
slackened the pace of innovation
This is an example of a prisoner’s dilemma
29
Sale Price Guarantees
Globus and many other stores like
Pantaloons offer sale price guarantees
◦ If an item comes on sale in the time period
after you bought it, they will match the
difference in prices
◦ Thus, consumers wishing to buy now are
―protected‖ against regrets from future price
reductions
30
Walking Down the Demand Curve
Globus would like to sell goods at high prices
to those with high willingness to pay for them
and then lower prices to capture those with
lower willingness to pay.
They might do this by running sales after new
items have been out for a while
But high value consumers will anticipate this
and wait for the sale to occur.
31
The Power of Commitment
By offering to rebate back the difference
in prices, Globus makes the sale strategy
less profitable for its ―future‖ self.
This commits it to less discounting in the
future
In fact It enables it to charge higher prices
today…and tomorrow.
32
Coordination Game
Coordination game involves multiple outcomes that can be stable. A simple
Coordination game involves two players choosing between two options,
wanting to choose the same.
Battle of the Sexes :
33
Solution to Battle Of the Sexes
Solution: Both should play the same game.
Everyone benefits from being in
cooperative group, but each can do better
by exploiting cooperative efforts of
others.
34
Anti Coordination Game
Routing Congestion Game :
Solution: The players must coordinate to send
traffic on different connection points.
35
Rules of the Game
The strategic environment
◦ Players – I , j
◦ Strategies- S(i) – strategy of player I
◦ S(i) – set of possible strategies of player I
◦ S – strategy profile
◦ Payoffs- µ (i)
◦ µi (s) – profile utilities
36
The rules
◦ Timing of moves
◦ Nature of conflict and interaction
◦ Informational conditions
◦ Enforceability of agreements or contracts
The assumptions
◦ Rationality
◦ Common knowledge
37
Prisoner's Dilemma (communication is not legal)
communication wont help
38
Investor game
(where both can communicate legally.)
A communication can help
L
R
U 1,1 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
39
So far we have used the dominant strategy solution and iterative
elimination of dominated strategy (IEDS) solution concepts to solve
strategic form games. A third approach is to use the Nash equilibrium
concept.
40
Nash Equilibrium- Necessary requirements
for a Nash equilibrium are that each player
play a best response against a conjecture,
and the conjecture must be correct.
41
Going to movies
Person 1 Person 2
Person 3
Movie1 2,1 0,0 0,-1
Movie 2 0,0 1,2 0,-1
Movie 3 -1,0 -1,0 -2,-2
She
He
Either both people go for movie 1 or Both go for Movie 2 You call this each persons ―equilibrium‖ or ―Nash equilibrium ―
42
How do we identify the Nash equilibria in a game?
Look for the dominant strategy.
Eliminate the dominated strategies.
Play a minimax strategy. In a zero sum game you choose that strategy in
which your opponent can do you the least harm from among all of the
'bad' outcomes.
Cell-by-cell inspection or trial and error
43
1- no regrets as we choosing the best
move
2- Self fulfilling believes
44
Coordination game –
1) Your farewell party
2) LED technology
3) Tv shows
4) Software platforms coordination
45
selfish routing in large networks like the Internet
theoretical basis to the field of multi-agent systems.
Use of NLP for optimizing results.
46
Diverse applications
1)Economics and business
2) Political science
-game-theoretic models in which the players are often voters, states, special
interest groups, and politicians.
3) Biology
-Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the application of game theory to
evolving populations of lifeforms in biology.
4) Computer science and logic
-Algorithmic game theory and within it algorithmic mechanism design
combine computational algorithm design and analysis of complex systems
with economic theory.
5) Philosophy-common beliefs or knowledge
6) Legal problems and behavioral economics.
47