KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

DAR ES SALAAM

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Ethnicity and Religious Instability in Nigeria

Case study: - Nigeria, plateau state, Jos.

BY

MUHAMMAD ABDULLAHI IBRAHIM

BCR/0007/102/DT

Supervisor by

Ms. Pribenska Eliska

April 2013

List of table content

Chapter One

List of abbreviation

Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

1.2 Statement of the problem

1.3 Purpose of the study

1.4 Objectives of the study

1.5 Research question

1.6 Hypothesis of the study

1.7 Significant of the study

1.8 Scope of the study

1.9 Operational definition of terms

Chapter Two

Literature review

2.1 Theoretical framework

2.2 Ethno-religious and political conflict in Jos

1. Competing historical interpretations and political claims

2. The creation of Jos north LGA

3. Citizenship and indigene rights

4. Rural land conflicts

5. The ethnic dimension of the Jos crises

6. The religious dimension

2.3 Causes of religious and ethno-politics in Jos

2.4 The causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Jos can be classified into two major heading

1. Remote causes of ethno-religious crises

2. Immediate causes of ethno-religious crises

2.5 Influence of resource control on Jos ethno-religious conflicts

Chapter Three

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Research design

3.3 Population of the study

3.4 Sample size

3.5 Sampling procedure

3.6 Research instrument

3.7 Validation of the instrument

3.8 Reliability of the instrument

3.9 Procedure for data collection

3.10 Method of data analysis

Ethical consideration

List of abbreviation

ANPP All Nigeria People Party

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CAN Christian Association of Nigeria

COCIN Church of Christ in Nigeria

HRW Human Rights Watch

IPCR Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution

LGA Local Government Area

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

PDP People Democratic Party

SAP Structural Adjustment Program

VOA Voice of America

Chapter one

Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

According to James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) argue that, “a good theory of ethnic

conflict should be able to explain why, despite the greater tensions, peaceful and

cooperative [ethnic] relations are by far more typical outcome than is large scale

violence.” According to them, because of the benefits of peace and the costs of inter-

ethnic violence, “decentralized institutional arrangements are likely to arise to moderate

problems of interethnic opportunism.” Although peaceful resolution of inter-ethnic

tensions should always prevail as a rational, more beneficial approach, violent ethnic

conflicts continue to occur across the world. The global community is haunted by

physical and emotional consequences of recent ethnic violence such as the ethnic

cleansing in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda and Darfur, and sectarian violence in Iraq.

Continuous examination of the causes of ethnic conflict is necessary, so that we may

develop a better understanding of what causes the breakdown of peace in various multi-

ethnic contexts and create a more comprehensive basis for peacebuilding and post-

conflict development in ethnically divided societies. Literature on causes of ethnic

conflict covers a number of competing theories. Some of the major explanations include:

primordialist, institutional, political entrepreneurs, and competition over resources

theories. But, as Jalali and Lipset argue, “Given the variety of ethnic conflicts and their

dynamic and fluid qualities, no one factor can provide a comprehensive explanation.”

In Africa, Journalistic accounts of wars in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and several other

countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s have raised concern that ethnic cleavages

and overlapping affiliations of religion and race may undermine prospects for economic

and political development in much of Africa.

Ethnic diversity may lead to increased civil strife. This perception is fostered both by

some graphic individual scenes of inter ethnic violence, and by an aggregate correlation:

Africa has not only the highest ethnic diversity, but also the highest incidence of civil

war. Potentially, this might account for the detrimental economic effects of diversity. In

countries of traditional stability, ethnic conflict is becoming an increasing factor. In

Kenya, ethnic tensions related to multiparty elections resulted in the deaths of 1,500

people between late 1991 and late 1993. Additional deaths have occurred in relation to

the election in 1997, including post election recriminations against non-government

voting areas in early January 1998. South Africa lost 14,000 citizens due to the racial and

ethnic violence, which was part of transition to majority rule between 1990 and 1994.

In Nigeria, the colonial masters provided urban setting, which constitutes the cradle of

contemporary ethnicity. The British colonialist while pretending to carry out a mission of

uniting the warring ethnic groups consciously and systematically separated the various

Nigerian people thereby creating a suitable atmosphere for conflict. With the

heterogeneous nature of the country, the tendency of the various nationals is towards

parochial consciousness at the expense of national consciousness. A far reaching and in-

depth survey of Nigeria public opinion carried out by the International Foundation for

Elections Systems-IFES on behalf of United States Agency for International

Development-USAID in 2000 found out that ethnicity is the strongest type of identity

among Nigerians. Almost half of all Nigerians (48.2%) choose to tag themselves with an

“ethnic” identity.

Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Africa in general arise as result of scarcity of political

resources, multi-culturalism, religion, militarisation of ethnicity among others. These

conflicts cannot be ignored. It is therefore patently clear that realistic measures to solve

these problems are needed. This study, therefore, relies on content analysis as its

methodology to examine ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. It also examines the effects of ethnic

conflicts on the country’s search for unity and identifies the possible issues for resolution.

Over the last decade, the political crises over ‘indigene’ rights and political representation

in Jos, capital of plateau state, has developed into a protracted communal conflict

affecting most parts of the state. At least 4,000 and possibly as many as 7,000 people

have been killed since late 2001, when the first major riot broke out in 2004 Jos in more

than three decades. Ten years later, only the heavy presence of military and police forces

ensures a fragile claim in the city. Tension between ethnic group rooted in allocation of

resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights

have amalgamated into an explosive mix. The presence of well organised armed groups

in rural areas, the proliferation of weapons, and the sharp rise in gun fatalities within Jos

all point to the real risk of future large-scale violence.

1.2 Statement of the problem

More than 13,500 people have been killed in communal violence since Nigeria returned to

civilian rule in 1999 (HRW, 2010). The Middle Belt region, to which Plateau State belongs,

is one of the areas worst hit. The 2001 Jos riot claimed at least 1,000 lives in Jos (HRW,

2001). Subsequently, long-standing tensions within smaller towns and villages in Plateau

State violently escalated. The killings only came to a halt when the federal government

declared a state of emergency in 2004, after about 700 people had been killed in an attack on

the town of Yelwa in southern Plateau State (HRW, 2005). Clashes between Muslim and

Christian youths rocked the city of Jos again in 2008, killing at least 700. In 2008, another

crises was erupted in which close to 200 live were lost, houses and vehicles were set ablaze

during the crises, according to Red Cross said more than a hundred people were seriously

injured in the fighting and 3,000 people were displaced in the clashes, (Dakar and Brussels,

2012). Another analysis according to the report which carried by the news of December 15,

2008, Mr. Bala Zuberu, the trading company, lost about Naira 28 million when his business

centre where he sold car’s was razed to the ground, and also according to the news, Alhaji

Musa Adamu of Pama Motors lost about Naira 60 millions of car’s during the crises, many of

their houses were burnt and many Mosques destroyed, a number of petrol stations belonging

to Muslim at Farin Gada ward of Jos metropolis were also razed to the ground during the

crises, (Dakar and Brussels, 2012).

According to IRIN (2005), the year 2010 has been one of the worst on record, with more than

1,000 lives lost their life. The human cost of the violence is immense, the number of

internally displaced people since 2001 peaked in 2004, with up to 220,000 people displaced.

After the 2008 riot, more than 10,000 were displaced, whilst violence in 2010 resulted in

about 18,000 people fleeing the clashes (IRIN, 2010). Numerous houses in Jos have been

burned and blackened remnants litter the streets in many parts of the city. All sides suffer a

massive loss due to livelihoods destroyed. Violence and displacement have reshaped Jos and

many rural settlements. As neighbourhoods become religiously segregated, ‘no-go areas’

alter patterns of residency, business, transportation, and trade.

On the other hand, the police statement put the number of casualties at 326, whilst another

put it at 362, Human Right Watch confirmed that about 150 dead bodies were pulled from a

village well known at kurum Karama, (Dakar and Brussels, 2012). The Red Cross society of

Nigeria noted more than 8,000 refugees in the Toro local government area of Bauchi state.

According to Vanguard (2012), recently in 2012 Boko Haram increased the tension in Jos

plateau state by killing a senator and house of representative that has been stalking place in

Plateau State thickened, in July 8, 2012, after Senator Gyang Dantong and the Majority

Leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly, Mr. Gyang Fulani were killed whilst

attending the mass burial of about 50 victims of Saturday’s attack on villages in Barkin Ladi

and Riyom local government areas of the state. The death of the lawmakers came on the heels

of the discovery on the remains of over 50 persons mostly women and children burnt inside

the residence of a local pastor where they had taken refuge following the attack on about 14

villages by suspected Fulani herdsmen on Saturday (Vanguard, 2012). The two lawmakers

were reportedly gunned down at Maseh village in Riyom LGA where over 50 victims of

Saturday’s attack were being buried.  The gunmen reportedly stormed the venue and opened

fire on those present, causing more deaths. Member representing Barkin-Ladi/Riyom

Constituency in the House of Representatives, Mr. Simon Mwadkon was lucky as he escaped

with injuries and was resuscitated at the Barkin-Ladi General Hospital where he was rushed

to after he fainted. Senator Dantong was the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP senator

representing the Plateau North Senatorial District and was until his death yesterday, the

Chairman of the Senate Committee on Health (Vanguard, 2012).

The death of the 50 persons in the residence of the pastor of the Church of Christ in Nigeria

at Maseh village was believed to have been the handiwork of the suspected Fulani herdsmen

who were believed to have torched the house when they discovered that the people had taken

refuge there. The killing of the lawmakers sparked off angry reactions around the Plateau as

youths took over the highway to protest what they described as genocide against the Berom

people allegedly by the Fulani. The angry reaction following the killings in 2012, forced

many motorists travelling along the Jos-Riyom highway to turn back to avoid being caught in

the disturbance. The Permanent Secretary in charge of security in the Cabinet Office, Mr.

Istifanus Gyang confirmed the killing of the two lawmakers (Vanguard, 2012).

In another hand, Abraham Yiljap, the state’s Commissioner of Information, confirmed the

assassination in a statement. Gyang Fulani, a member of the Plateau State House of

Assembly, was also reportedly shot during the attack. Meanwhile the AP reports that Raids

and reprisal attacks left 37 people dead in Jos Christian villages on Saturday July 8, 2012,

where authorities have struggled to contain religious violence, authorities said Sunday July 9,

2012 (Information Nigeria, 2013). Mustapha Salisu, spokesman for a special taskforce made

up of policemen and soldiers deployed in the area to curb years of violence, said assailants

launched “sophisticated attacks” on several villages near Jos early Saturday. They came in

hundreds said Salisu, some had (police) uniforms and some even had bulletproof vests, and

he said the special taskforce fought back for hours and two policemen in the battle, he also

added that 14 civilians were killed in the raids and that the task-force killed 21 assailant

(Information Nigeria, 2013).

In view of the above statements, the problems of this study are: -

a) Resource control;

b) Political power sharing;

c) Land;

d) Religious domination; and

e) External forces.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study is to investigate the influence of ethnicity and religious intolerance

on ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state Nigeria, the study also will look at how

poverty and unemployment was a product of ethno-religious instability which in torn gave

birth to incessant the confrontation of the both, in recent times, poverty led to mutual and

mass slaughter of the Jos people, insisting that idle hands were always the devils instrument

and that if people were fully engaged they would hardly have time to see others as their

enemies. These indicate the lack of education, unemployment and political awareness may

also trigger the conflict, the need of this research might provide the mechanism in giving

suggestion and recommendation to overcome the problem.

1.4 Objective of the study

The specific objectives of this study are to: -

1. Determine the impact of indigene-settlers on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau

state.

2. Determine the impact of political power sharing on ethnic-religious conflicts in Jos,

Plateau state.

3. Determine the impact of resource control on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau

state.

1.5 Research question

1. What are the effects of indigene-settlers on ethno-religious conflicts in Jos Plateau

state?

2. What are the effects of political power sharing on ethno-religious conflicts in Jos

Plateau state?

3. What are the effects of resources control on ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau state?

1.6 Research Hypotheses

Ho1= there is no significant effects of indigene-settlers on ethnic-religious conflicts in Jos,

Plateau state.

Ho2= there is no significant effects of political power sharing on ethnic-religious conflict in

Jos, Plateau state.

Ho3= there is no significant effects of resources control on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos,

Plateau state.

1.7 Significant of the study

The study will be of great importance to academics, political groups, leaders, and non-

governmental organisation in the following ways.

The elimination of ethnicity along the divided line through the strengthens the rule of law, the

enforcement of institution like the police and working with the constitution effectively, the

police will be more highlighting about the crisis within (ethno-religious conflict), they would

play a key role in changing the behaviour of the community. This will make their work easy

in identifying the crises in order to prevention as well as securing the society from escalation

of the violence, to control the measures through cautions and suing in the court of law.

The non-governmental organisations, traditional rulers, and other religious sectors would help

the community to prevent the crises from escalation in Jos, (Plateau state) communities, these

might be through the seminars and the religious tolerance will be as a reasonable

accompaniment of such things to not attacking, harassing, insulting, abusing, or looking

down those of other belief. Focusing on the potentially positive role of religion with respect

to morality, social harmony, sustainable development social justice and achievement of

certain development objectives, also the role of religious organisation in the provision of

education and health services, the religious to integrates in all aspect of Jos (Plateau state)

communities can provides a basis for the interaction of different units, introduces order,

harmony and disciplines into social relations, serves as a mechanism that makes society’s

productive and thus has a role in nation building.

The government and institutions more especially the traditional rulers of each ethnic group

have to acknowledge the extent and the impact of ethno-religious conflict in the environment,

specifically around the main major ethnic groups. The law most be formulated and the

penalties to culprits to court the further spreading of such crises. Democracy as an

institutional arrangement that guarantees the preservation of individual’s rights is not only

predicated on the principle of liberty, equality, justice, representation, consensus, and

peacebuilding. For example, a social justice through cultural renewal in Jos (Plateau state)

ordinarily engenders a climate that upholds and ensures the enthronement of the

responsiveness, transparency, and accountability of the state and that they value and actualise

their potentials, and political education and enlighten also to make the leaders accountable to

the citizens and the citizens to obey the government law and regulations. In other word, the

decentralisation of government that enhance the efficiency, equality, and legitimacy of

democracy and the political culture which especially as a democratic values, beliefs,

attitudes, norms, and the creation of a civil society that facilitates and enhance public

participation in the democratic process that prevents abusive power from becoming

concentrated at the centre of the society.

The study is expected to be used by Human Right Watch and academics institutions; the

foundation of human right watch initiation is to investigate if there is violation of human

right, whilst the academic institution is to highlights the impact of ethno-religious conflict in

the region (Plateau state). This study might be have source of getting peace, respect for

democratic rights, commitment to promote regional security, peace, and stability, the

promotion of human development, and freedom to life.

1.8 Scope of the study

The study would take place in Nigeria (Jos, Plateau state) in related to the fact of ethno-

religious conflict, the ethnic groups are the main focus on this study, the centre also will be

much considered to my research, civilian and ethno-religion must be considered in the

society.

1.10 Content Scope

Ethnicity and religious are consider as the independent variable in the influence of instability

in Jos Plateau State, Nigeria.

1.11 Time Scope

The study will cover from April to the end of July.

1.12 Operational definition

Conflict: - refers as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to

their needs, interests or concerns.

Corruption: - refer as the abuse of power for private gain.

Fulbe: - refers to Fulani people traditionally cattle herders of Muslim faith.

Indigene: - refers as a citizen on a particular territory that shares the same historical

ancestries and common values.

Indigenous People: - refers to the ethnic minorities who have been marginalised as their

historical territories became part of a state.

Migrants: - refers to people who came from different area and settle in another place.

Migration: - refers as the movement of people from one place in the world to another for the

purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political

boundary.

Non-Indigene: - refers as the people who settle in another locality area for seeking a refugee.

Peace: - refers as a state of harmony and the absence of physical violence.

Politics: refer as authoritative location of the resources (materials and symbolic leadership) to

particular time.

Poverty: - refers as the population living under 1$ dollar per day.

Religion: - refers as a means and ways through which individuals relate to God or Allah

through prayer and worship.

Settlers: - refers as a person has migrated to an area and established permanent residence

there, often to colonise the area.

Squatter: - refers as a person who live upon premises owned by another person, without the

owners permission either uninhabited building or unused land.

Violence: - refers as is the use of physical force or power, against a person, or against a group

or community.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

2.1 Concepts, ideas, opinions from authors/experts

Nigeria is a plural, highly complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-

religions polity, with a diversity of ethnic groups. (Danfulani, 2009: Smyth and Robinson,

2001). This identity is played out in the way the country is bifurcated along the lines of

religion, language, culture, ethnicity and regional identity, Osaghae and Suberu (2005). Of

the population of over 150 million people, the country is almost half Christians and half

Muslims, aside other religions (Paden, 2008; Schwartz, 2010). In Nigeria, as in all of Africa,

“political competition, via the electoral process, embraces inevitably and inescapably, an

uneasy tension between conflict and consensus” (Diamond, 1982); violent identity conflicts

have become, since 1999, a method of collective action by diverse ethnic and religious

groups engaged in contestations for political power. The most prominent of these conflicts

are those that have pitted Muslims against Christians in a dangerous convergence of religion,

ethnicity and politics.

Jos, the capital of Plateau State in Nigeria has, over the past decade, witnessed violent

communal clashes across ethnic and religious fault lines. These clashes have claimed

“thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of others, and fostered a climate of

instability throughout the surrounding region” (Kwaja, 2011). While large scale violence has

occurred periodically since 2001, in recent years attacks have become more frequent,

widespread, and efficient. The conflict in Jos is often usually characterized as inter-religious

or inter-ethnic, mainly between the majority but marginal Christian ‘indigence’ (Anagula,

Berom and Afrisare) and the minority but dominant Muslim Hausa Fulani groups (Adebanwi:

2005). As is often the case with identity conflicts in Africa, these are socially constructed

stereo-types that are manipulated to trigger and drive violence in Jos (Aapengnuo, 2010;

Kwaja, 2011). They veil deeper institutional factors within the Nigerian social fabric that are

abused and exploited to deny citizens access to resources, basic rights, and participation in

political process; factors that if unaddressed, have the potential to fan the embers of violence

across the country.

In the face of violent identity conflagrations, efforts at peace building become sisyphusean, or

very daunting, to say the least. Over the years, government responses to the recurring Jos

conflicts have widely been perceived as ineffective. At least, 16 public commissions have

been launched to examine the conflict and proffer solutions but as yet, little gains have been

made, owing to lack of the needed political will to act on the commissions’ findings. It is

based on the foregoing, that this paper takes another critical look at ethnic and religious

identity construction in Nigeria and its implications for national building in Jos, Plateau State.

Countries where centrifugal and fissiparous tendencies exist are often victims of violent

identity conflicts. More importantly, the patterns of social cleavages in any given society are

an important determinant of the intensity and irreconcilability of conflict. These can best be

situated within the theoretical framework of identity politics, which interrogates the origins of

identity construction and their fundamentalisation, including their recourse to violent

conflagrations.

Identity politics is the political activity of various ethnic religious and cultural groupings in

demanding greater economic, social and political rights or self determination (Osaghae and

Suberu, 2005). It claims to represent and seeks to advance the interest of particular groups,

the members of whom often share and unite around common experience of perceived social

and economic injustice, relative to the society of which they form part and exist in (Ambe-

Uva, 2010). This usually gives rise to a political basis ground which they may unite and begin

to assert themselves in society (Zweri and Zahid, 2007). Identity politics means more than the

sole recognition of ethnic religious or cultural identity. In fact, it seeks to carry these

identities forward, beyond mere self-identification, to a political framework based upon that

identity. Nigeria presents a complex of individual as well as cross-crossing and recursive

identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most

salient and the main basis for violent conflicts in the country. This is both from the point of

view of identities mostly commonly assumed by citizens “especially for political purposes

and the identities often implicated in day-to-day contestations over citizenship as well as

competitions and conflicts over resources and privileges” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

Two approaches aptly capture the nature of Nigeria’s identity diversity. One is Geertz’s

(1963) famous distinction between primordial ties, which are basically inscriptive and based

on the ‘givens’ of life (tribe, Kinship, ethnicity etc) and civil ties, which hinge on society type

aggregations like class, political party affiliation, interest group membership and so on. The

second approach is more or less, a conflict based perspective in which only identities that

form the basis of political demand, mobilization and action, or the so-called politicized

identities, may be regarded as politically salient. Young (1976), Kasfir (1976) and Rothschild

(1981) are some of the leading proponents of politicized identity. While this approach has the

merit of focusing on active identities, it is mistaken in the exclusion of identities that are not

politically salient such as gender and profession. This is because often times, identities tend

to be situational and like volcanoes, identities that are dormant today can become active

tomorrow. Thus, what is clear is that any examination of Nigeria’s identity would necessarily

have to be inclusive of all identities, civil or primordial and the ways in which they are

intricately linked. This is necessary to enable us situate the various identities, especially the

more active and politically salient identities in their fuller, robust and recursive contents.

Plateau, a state of plural ethnicity and religion, has had several cases of identity based

conflicts. It is the second most ethnically diverse state in Nigeria after Adamawa (Alubo,

2006). Like elsewhere in Nigeria, this diverse population is seen as bearing two identities;

indeperes and settlers. There are also two major religions Christianity and Islam. In its

contemporary situation, most of the so-called settlers are Muslims, while the supposed

indigenes are mostly Christians. Based on past experiences, particularly in Jos, conflict which

begin as politically based frequently assume ethnic and religious dimensions (as in 2001 and

2008), in a telling conflation of religion and ethnicity (Alubo, 2009; Cesey, 2007). Identity

conflicts in Jos are mostly between indigenes (Beron, Anaguta and Afrisarte and Settlers

(Hausa/Fulani). In his research on communal violence in Plateau State, Bagudu (2004)

reveals a count of “over 62 identity driven conflicts within a decade, with 22 recorded in

2004 alone”. Also while indigenes have different identities, these are neatly folded into a

common umbrella (Best, 2007) for the purpose of uniting against a perceived common

enemy. Thus, the recurring Jos conflict illustrates how identity is used as the basis to access

opportunities and ultimately, inclusive citizenship.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study is the human needs theory by Burton (1987). The

theory operates on the premise that a pre-condition for the resolution of conflict is that

fundamental human needs be met. Burton adopted eight fundamental needs from the basis of

the work by the American sociologist Paul Sites and introduced one further need of his own.

Those adopted needs included control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning,

rationality and esteem/recognition. Burton’s additional need was ‘role-defence,’ the need to

defend one’s role. Burton called these “ontological needs” as he regarded them as a

consequence of human nature, which were universal and would be pursued regardless of the

consequence.

He argued that, antecedents to human needs theory came from a variety of disciplines. That

in the biological and sociobiological disciplines conflict is perceived to result from

competition over scarce resources as a result of common needs. In social psychology Henry

Murray, Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) describe needs (some

say ‘drives’) as important in understanding factors for human motivation. Further Burton

distinguishes ontological needs from values and interests. He defines ontological needs as

non-negotiable; values as offering some limited opportunities for negotiation; and interests as

negotiable issues.

Burton distinguishes conflict from the related term of ‘dispute’. He defined ‘conflict’ as an

action over these non-negotiable human needs, whereas a ‘dispute’ was over negotiable

values. Burton distinguishes conflict resolution, from the related terms of conflict

management and conflict settlement. To Burton conflict resolution solved deep seemingly

intractable issues, whereas settlement only addressed the superficial factors of conflict. The

theory was not without controversy. His notion of needs falls under criticism especially from

those cultural anthropologists and relativists, who were (and still are) resistant to universal

values, among those were fellow members of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and

Resolution, Kevin Avruch and Peter Black.

The relationship between religious, political power, land, resources control, and international

interference as the factors responsible for the ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, this can be

described by using a model as follows: -

Ethnicity and Religious Conflict in Jos

-Bad governance

-Poverty and exclusion

-Unemployment

-Lack of education

-Deprived of right to life

- Poor infrastructure

-Land

-Religion

-Resources control

-Political power

-international interference

-Competing historical interpretation and political claim

-Creation of Jos North LGA

-Citizenship and indigene right

Conflict

-Conflict resolution

Disarmament Demobilised Reintegration Resettlement Reconciliation Reconstruction e.t.c

-Conflict management

Mediation Negotiation Arbitration Judiciary

-Potential for Sustainable Peace

Economic reforms, creditable institutions, eradicating ethnic sentiment, involvement of ethnic/religious dogmas, rule of law, good governance, and capacity-building in national and local governance such as, reconstruction, free and fair election.

Infrastructural development; roads, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, aids, and so on. Promoting human development and peace, security, and stability. Promoting equality between citizens and settlers, gender equality, human right, right to life,

institutions of basic right, more especially for minority, and respects for democratic rights. Empowerment of both indigenes and settlers for achieving political, social, economic, cultural,

and environmental security among all peoples.

2.3 Ethno-Religious and Political conflicts in Jos

Situated on the northern edge of the ‘middle belt’ in central Nigeria, where the country’s

“predominantly Muslim northern half blends with the generally Christian south, Jos is a

relatively new city” (Kwaja, 2011). Before its descent into violence the city was regarded by

both Nigerians and foreigners alike, as a peaceful settlement with a temperate climate of

magnetic attraction (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Higazi, 2011; Plotnicov, 1967, Gaya Best, 2007).

While the serenity of the place lasted, it was reputed as the “Home of peace and tourism”.

Today however, the city is being mockingly referred to as the “Home of pieces and

terrorism”, (Jeadayibe and Kudu, 2010).

Since the early 1980s and especially from 2001, Jos has witnessed long-running, even if

understated, rivalry between the majority but marginal Christian indigenes (Anaguta, Berom

and Afisare) and the minority but dominant settler Hausa/Fulani (Adebanwi, 2005). The

result of these rivalries has been recurring ethno-religious and political violence. The Jos

crisis is usually attributed to “the polyglot nature of the city which resulted from the

nineteenth century migrations of different ethnic groups to the area to work in the Tin mines”

(Danfulani and Twatshak, 2002).

Today, is founding, or rather precisely who founded Jos city is part of the problem that

sparked of the recurring violence (Gaya-Best, 2007). As such, the ownership of Jos is hotly

contested among the three main indigenous ethnic groups (the Berom, Anaguta and Afisare)

where traditional land meet on an unmarked border line in Jos town on the one hand and the

descendants of Hausa-Fulani settlers, who initially settled in Jos as traders and Tin miners on

the other hand.

Signals pointing towards the manifestation of contentions issues between Muslim settlers and

Christian indigenes started emanating in Jos in the 1990s (Danfulani, 2006), culminating in

1994 into open clashes mainly between the Berom indigenes and Hausa-Fulani settlers over

farmland and chieftaincy issues. Abdu (2002) opines that the “1990s witnessed a resurgence

in identity politics in Jos, this time centering around the control of Jos North Local

Government carved from the former Jos local government in 1991”, which enhanced the

Hausa-Fulani hegemonic control of political powers in the local government.

On April 12, 1994, the growing tension escalated into violent clashes when Sanusi Mato, a

Hausa-Fulani man was appointed chairman of Jos North Local Government transition

committee. The indigenes rejected the appointment because, as Sha (1998:57) observed, they

“interpreted the action as the confirmation of the fear that the federal government wanted to

provide basis for the Hausa-Fulani to assume political hegemony in Jos”. The ensuring

violence led to the “burning down and vandalisation of government properties” (Abdu, 2002).

Also, in March 16, 1996, electoral violence in Angwar Rogo, a predominantly Hausa Fulani

settlement almost escalated to ethno-religious violence. The indigenes alleged that the Hausa-

Fulani tried to rig election by smuggling into the polling stations “Shagari voters” from the

Northern part of the country. This prompted the electoral officers to screen out the unknown

faces thereby evoking anger and protest among Hausa-Fulani youths. The resulting violence

“left three people dead” (Abdu, 2002).

In September 2001 another devastating ethno-religious conflict broke out in Jos when Alhaji

Mohammed Muktar, a Hausa-Fulani and a former chairman of Jos North Local Government

was appointed as the coordinator of the Federal Government’s National Poverty Alleviation

Programme in Jos North. Indigenous Christian youths rejected the appointment on grounds

that while he was chairman of the local government, he was indicted by a court ruling, which

removed him from office for among other offences, falsification of birth records, perjury and

falsehood (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). The Christian youths also felt aggrieved by the

appointment of a person from the minority Jasawa group (Hausa-Fulani) to head such a

sensitive office (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002). The resulting sectarian violence claimed as

many as 1,000 lives (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

In 2004, more than 1,000 people were killed in attacks against Muslim and Christian villages

from February to May, and 250,000 were displaced, especially in the town of Yelwa (Human

Rights Watch, 2009; Kwaja, 2011). These attacks revolved around contestations over land

and chieftaincy. Table 1 below shows in chronological order large-scale communal clashes in

and around Jos since 1994.

Table 1: Large-scale communal clashes in and around Jos

Year Proximate Trigger Extent of Violence

1994 Appointment of lay leaders prompt protests

and counter demonstration

Four killed. Several city markets, an

Islamic school, and places of

worship destroyed.

2001 Appointment of local administrator of

welfare allowances leads to weeks of

demonstrations. Tension rise, resulting in

violence.

An estimated 1,000 to 3,000 killed.

Violence expands across plateau

state. Attacks by youth groups in

Muslim and Christian

neighbourhoods, no mosques and

churches, and at the university of

Jos. Sporadic attacks continue

through 2002-2003, killing

hundreds and destroying 72 villages.

2004 National election held but postponed in

plateau state, local officials are appointed,

resulting in disputes.

More than 1,000 killed in attacks

against Muslim and Christian

villages from February to May, and

250,000 are displaced. Federal

government removes state governor

and appoints temporary

replacement.

2008 Local government election

-The first in Jos since 2002

-Are schedule then delayed three

times. Disputes emerge over

patty nominees and results.

Nearly 800 killed in gang attacks

and riot from November to

December.

2010 A dispute over reconstruction of a home

destroyed by clashes in 2008 leads to

violence in January and reprisal in March

and throughout the year.

January: up to 500 residents killed

over 4 days in January. Many

villages and homes destroyed.

March: up to 500 killed in an

oversight attack.

December: nearly 80 killed

following twin car bombs. Hundred

more die in frequent intermittent

attacks.

2011 Disputes between farmers and herdsmen

over farmland leads to wanton destruction of

lives and property throughout the year and

especially in September and December.

September: over 100 residents killed

in several days of fighting in and

around Jos.

December: over 20 people killed in

coordinated attacks.

2012 Land-related communal conflicts between

the predominantly Berom ethnic group and

Hausa/Fulani herdsmen continue to rear its

ugly head in Jos, leading to a complex

interplay of conflict factors.

February: Suicide Bomber Rams

Car Into Church of Christ in Nigeria

(COCIN), instantly killing three,

injuring 38 and damaging 30

vehicles.

July: gunmen attack over 10

villages, kill over 300, including a

serving Senator Gyang Dantong,

and the majority leader of plateau

House of assembly, Hon. Gyang

Fulani.

Source: Kwaja (2011): Researchers’ Fieldwork, 2012.

According to HRW (2009), again, two days of inter-communal violence on November 28 to

29, 2008, followed a disputed local government election in Jos north local government on

November 27, 2008. The violence pitted predominantly Christian indigenes from the Berom,

Afisare and Anaputa ethnic groups who were largely in support of the Christian candidate

from the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) against Muslim ‘non-indigenes’ primarily

from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, who backed the Muslim candidate from the opposition,

All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The PDP Chairmanship

aspirant, Timothy Buba Polled 92,907 votes to beat his closest rival from ANPP, Aminu

Baba with 72,890 votes (Ambe-Uve, 2010). It was the declaration of Timothy Buba, as

winner of the election that sparked off the chain of events that led to the crisis. During the

crisis, rampaging youths burnt down many vehicles, churches, mosques, filling stations and

private houses. In all more than 700 people were reported dead while thousands were

displaced and took refuge in several locations (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010).

In January 2010, violence quickly broke out when a Hausa-Fulani man attempted to

reconstruct his home which was destroyed during the 2008 clashes. Christians youths in the

area vehemently opposed the reconstruction of the building and soon, the matter resulted in

serious ethnic and religious disputes that left over 1,000 people dead (Kwaja, 2011). In

December of the same year, nearly 80 people were killed in twin car bomb attacks.

Since 2010, several hundreds of Muslims and Christians have died in Jos in coordinated

bomb attacks in worship centres and other public places. The dreaded Boko Haram sect has

claimed responsibility for some of these killings as the security situation continues to

depreciate in Jos. At the times of doing this research, violent ethnic and communal clashes

are still a recurring phenomenon in Jos and environs.

I. Competing historical interpretations and political claims

Labels such as ‘settler’, ‘native’, ‘non-native’, ‘host community’, ‘foreigner’, ‘native

foreigner’, ‘stranger element’, ‘squatter’, ‘non-squatter’, ‘immigrant’, ‘migrant’,

‘indigene’, ‘non-indigene’ [. . .] among many others are used daily in Nigeria to

describe, stigmatise or stereotype the ‘other’ as a category who ‘does not belong’

(Danfulani, 2006).

According to Mohammed (2007) state that, both sides selectively point to historical records

to justify their claim to the city of Jos, to indigene rights, and to political representation.

Hausa–Fulani leaders argue that there was no Jos when they arrived on the Plateau. They

claim to have founded Jos and nurtured it into a modern city. A recent publication circulating

among the Hausa–Fulani cites the 1930 Jos Township census to demonstrate that back then

the Hausa constituted by far the most numerous ethnic group in the township (Mohammed,

2007). Jasawa leaders also point out that parts of what is Plateau State today used to be under

the Bauchi Emirate. The indigenes emphasize that the high plateau was never conquered by

the Dan Fodio jihad movement because plateau people actively resisted the jihad expansion.

As noted above, the British policy of indirect rule initially relied on the structures of the

Bauchi Emirate to administer Jos. In 1926 the British introduced a separate administration for

the high plateau area around Jos (Best, 2007). The contested history of Jos also finds

expression in the trend among the indigenes to rename areas and streets to erase the Hausa

legacy, although most people in Jos speak Hausa fluently.

II. The creation of Jos North LGA

The contemporary political conflict between the indigenes and the Hausa–Fulani dates back

at least two decades. Under the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the

Hausa–Fulani actively lobbied for the establishment of a local government in which they

would be predominant. In 1991, their request was granted with the creation of Jos North

LGA. The new boundaries made the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere minorities within Jos

North LGA.

The three groups vehemently protested the creation of Jos North, arguing that they had not

been consulted and that they had not consented to it. They view the split of the old Jos LGA

into Jos North and South LGAs as a deliberate strategy to give full political control over an

LGA to the Hausa population (Best, 2007). Jos North LGA comprises the commercial centre

of Jos as well as the main political and traditional offices, such as the palace of the indigene

traditional leader, the Gbong Gwom of Jos.

According to Best (2007) state that, since the creation of Jos North LGA, elections and

political appointments has been accompanied by strong tensions between the Hausa and the

indigenes. A first minor crisis occurred in 1994 over the appointment of a Hausa candidate as

chairman of the Jos North Local Government Council. The Berom and other indigene groups

strongly protested the appointment. They maintained that the position should go to an

indigene. Four people were killed during the protests and parts of several market areas as well

as an Islamic school and mosque were destroyed (Best, 2007).

III. Citizenship and indigene rights

Nigeria’s constitution grants every citizen the right to settle anywhere within the country and

prohibits the government from discriminating against citizens based on ethnicity or religion.

Nevertheless, strong regulations continue to favour the indigenes within states and even

LGAs. Non-indigenes are excluded from university scholarships, pay higher school and

university fees, and cannot be recruited into the civil service. The lack of political

representation is thus perpetuated for non-indigene settlers. Local government authorities

decide over the issuing of indigene certificates to their favoured ethnic and religious groups.

The indigene status is therefore highly contested, especially since it is linked to important

political, economic, and educational benefits. Long-term exclusion of one group’s elite from

political offices erodes existing patronage networks. The Jasawa population complains that

since the early 1990s it has become almost impossible for them to receive indigene status,

despite the fact that their community settled there generations ago.

Proponents of indigene rights claim that any settler can return to his ‘place of origin’ and

demand an indigene certificate there. In theory, therefore, no citizen would be discriminated

against. In practice, however, many settlers have lived within their localities for several

generations and cannot trace back their origins to a place where their ethnic group would

constitute a majority. Although the Hausa–Fulani dominate the northern Muslim states, many

Hausa–Fulani settlers in Plateau State have no ancestors in these states and cannot claim

indigene rights there. Human Rights Watch refers to such settlers as ‘stateless citizens’ who

are gravely disadvantaged and have no access to higher education or jobs in the civil service,

the military, or the police forces (HRW, 2006). Many Hausa–Fulani are now seeking to

obtain certificates from Kano or Bauchi. But even if they can receive certificates there,

indigene status in another state is of little use for employment within the Plateau State civil

service.

However, many Christians of the Igbo and Yoruba communities are also ‘settlers’ in Jos

North LGA. Their ancestors moved there during the same time period as the Hausa–Fulani.

These settler groups do not claim indigene rights and have never been dominant in the

politics of the city. In contrast, the Jasawa elite held political offices under the British and

under the former military administration. Ostien concludes that ‘the city’s settler problem is a

Jasawa problem’ (Ostien, 2009). A Muslim elder in Jos stated that if a solution could be

found to the conflict over indigene rights, 95 per cent of the potential for violent conflict in

Plateau State would be removed.

Berom elders have reiterated time and again that they are not willing to compromise over the

Hausa–Fulani settler status. In 2001, Berom elders stated that ‘not only is Jos on Berom land,

but Jos is our JERUSALEM and is indigenously inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta, and

Afizere’ (Best, 2007). A few years later, the traditional Berom leader stated that even if the

Hausa had been in Plateau State for more than 1,000 years, they would remain non-indigene

(HRW, 2006). Indigene politicians add that the problem is one of assimilation: -

Box 1 Nigeria’s citizenship crisis

In principle, all Nigerian citizens are equal no matter the circumstances of their birth

and whether or not they reside in their places of origin. But in practice, one is a

Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin [. . .], no matter for how long one resides or

domiciles in a state other than his own (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010).

The conflict over citizenship and indigene rights is in no way peculiar to Plateau State. Most

states of the Nigerian federation face an indigene or citizenship crisis. The constitution

privileges local descent over residency. Those who leave their state of origin risk becoming

‘second-class citizens’ in another part of the federation. Within a country of more than 250

ethnic groups, the discrimination against non-indigenes in all six geo-political zones

threatens to tear the country apart. Indigene status is an important tool in the politics of

identity and labelling. Differing interpretations of local history are applied to mark the

boundaries of who belongs and who is left out.

Source: Golwa and Ojiji (2008)

as long as the Hausa do not identify themselves as Berom, they identify themselves as settlers

(HRW, 2006), thus effectively demanding submission to Berom political control.

However, several respondents also stated that if it were not for the Hausa–Fulani as a

common enemy, the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere would be fighting among themselves over

the ownership of Jos and privileges. Indeed, recent tensions between the Berom and the

Afizere underline how easily notions of indignity are manipulated. The Afizere had sided

with the Jasawa in the lead-up to the 2008 local elections against People’s Democratic Party

(PDP) candidate Jonah Jang. After Jang assumed office, Afizeres complained that he

intended to ‘chase them out to Bauchi’ and sent a letter of official complaint to the Prince

Bola Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Jos unrest of 28 November 2008

(Ostien, 2009). Urban discourse over claims to indigene rights and political control has since

reverberated within smaller towns of Plateau State such as Namu, Yelwa, and Wase.

I. Rural land conflicts

According to Blench, 2003 state that, land conflicts existed in Jos long before the September

2001 crisis. Sporadic violent confrontations over farming and grazing land were already

reported during colonial times. Before the 2001 crisis, conflicts between farmers and herders

in Plateau State had not reached levels as high as in some neighbouring states. Indeed, local

community leaders settled most tensions without having recourse to violent means. Yet with

the expansion of agricultural production over the past decades, land for farming and grazing

became contested. The increase of farming reduced the cattle herders’ access to water for

their livestock and changed the interaction between farmers and herders.

The pastoral Fulani have been accused of allowing their cattle to graze on the land of the

indigene population. These claims gave rise to rustling of the valuable cattle and attacks on

Fulani communities. Large numbers of cattle were stolen from the Fulani, who responded

with counter-attacks on mostly Christian villages (HRW, 2005). After the first riot in Jos in

2001, many Christians brought corpses back to their home village for burial. This practice

further aggravated tensions. Some village communities turned their anger against the Muslim

Fulani, who responded with reprisal attacks. The Fulani claim to have lost at least 1,800 tribe

members and more than 160,000 cows between September 2001 and May 2004 (HRW,

2005). The violent conflict is ongoing.

II. The ethnic dimension of the Jos crisis

The indigene–settler issue is endemic in the ‘Middle Belt’ states surrounding the Plateau.

According to IPCR 2008b, indicate that, the North-Central is a ‘hyperactive conflict zone’

plagued with rural conflicts over land and grazing rights and over political representation.

Several states, such as Benue and Plateau, are reported to host large numbers of ex-soldiers

with access to weapons. These individuals are also available to form and train militias based

on existing vigilante groups. The proliferation of arms in the North-Central Zone has been

recognized as an alarming trend for several years (IPCR, 2003). The presence of militias and

thugs for hire in neighbouring states is worrisome for Plateau State.

In addition, Kaduna and Bauchi states are also infected by violent confrontations between

Muslims and Christians. In 2000, Kaduna city suffered massive communal violence between

Muslims and Christians over the introduction of Sharia criminal law, with at least 2,000

people having been killed. Smaller riots took place again in 2002, this time over the ‘Miss

World’ contest that was set to take place in Nigeria. As a result, the city today is largely

segregated into a Christian southern and a Muslim northern part. Kaduna city has remained

peaceful since 2002, but the April 2011 post-election riots demonstrated the fragility of this

separated arrangement.

Bauchi State was also badly hit by Muslim protests in April 2011. Bauchi has repeatedly been

rocked by clashes with religious dimensions in rural communities. For instance, in May 2011,

a Christian-dominated village was attacked and 16 people were killed (BBC, 2011b). The

Muslim community in Jos is frequently accused of receiving mercenaries from Bauchi and

other states farther north, as well as from Chad and Niger. These accounts are very

widespread. Given the small number of arrests made subsequent to violent clashes in Plateau

State, it is difficult to assess their validity.

Many Christians in Jos point to the discrimination against fellow Christians in Muslim-

dominated northern states and therefore see no wrong in political exclusion of the Jasawa

community in Jos. For instance, the ancient city of Kano hosts a significant Christian

population that is denied indigene rights. Non-Hausa there have never been granted a local

government area but ‘were divided and placed at Hausa dominated areas just to ensure that

non-indigenes never dominated any political space in Kano’ (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010).

Christians in Kano have been subjected to many forms of discrimination and to reprisal

attacks following violence in Plateau State. Other indigene representatives in Jos demand a

national solution to the problem. They argue that they will not be the first to compromise on

privileges widely enjoyed by other ethnic communities throughout the federation. However,

they know that a national solution would require an amendment to the Nigerian constitution,

which is not on the agenda at the moment.

The emergence of militant fundamentalists in the northern states is yet another significant

regional development. The 2010 Christmas bombings in Jos occurred alongside attacks by

extremist Islamists on churches in the northern town of Maiduguri in Borno State. Borno has

been plagued by the re-emergence of the Boko Haram sect despite a major security

crackdown in July 2009, when hundreds of people were killed during clashes between the

sect and security forces. Christian places of worship have since been targeted. On Christmas

Eve 2010 some 30 alleged Islamists killed a pastor and several other Christians at a church in

Maiduguri. In 2011 Boko Haram remained in the news headlines with several bomb attacks,

including the bombing of the headquarters of the United Nations in Abuja, and assassinations

of politicians in Maiduguri.

III. The religious dimension

Several factors have contributed to the religious dimensions of the confrontation in Jos.

According to Falola 1998, argue that, generally, religion has become entrenched in Nigerian

politics since the mid-1970s, with both politicians and religious leaders urging their followers

to vote along religious lines. National regime change in 1999 lent the religious factor a new

fervour. The birth of the fourth republic was followed by violent conflicts between Muslims

and Christians in northern states, which further eroded trust between the religious

communities in Jos. Specifically, the introduction of the Sharia criminal code in 12 northern

states in 2000 and 2001 provoked major protest from Christians. Many objected to what they

perceived as a progressive Islamisation of public life and discrimination against Christian

minorities in northern cities (Falola, 1998). Disputes over Sharia resulted in deadly inter-

religious violence in the cities of Kano and Kaduna. This development led a substantive

number of Christians to move out from the northern states, such as Kano and Bauchi, into

Plateau State. They brought with them stories of discrimination and atrocities, exacerbating

tensions between religious communities in Jos.

Among Christians, perceptions of the Jos conflict have become interlinked with regional and

national politics. They fear that if Muslims win control over Jos North LGA, they will soon

control Plateau State as a whole. This scenario is portrayed as a first step towards winning

political control over Nigeria and expanding Islamic influence on the African continent.

Several Christian respondents stated: ‘If the Muslims have Jos, they have Nigeria. And if they

have Nigeria, they have Africa’. Other Christian respondents refused to give credence to

generalizations that portray the local conflict over political participation in Jos North LGA as

a religious confrontation of international dimensions. Still, many Christians—among them

high-level religious leaders, academics, and journalists—invoke the terms ‘jihad’ and

‘terrorists’ to explain the current situation. Several Christian representatives and NGOs

understand the struggle over Jos North LGA as a direct extension of the 19th-century Dan

Fodio jihad, which came to a halt on the mountains of Plateau, taking the causes of the

contemporary political crisis in Jos into lesser account.

In response to the 2008 crisis, many Christian leaders linked the Jos conflict to a broader

religious confrontation. They pointed to the destruction of religious rather than political

institutions after election disputes. For example, the former chairman of the Plateau State

Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama, known for his very

active role in inter-faith peace-building, stated subsequent to the 2008 riot: -

We were taken aback by the turn of events in Jos. We thought it was political, but

from all indications it is not so. We were surprised at the way some of our churches

and property were attacked and some of our faithful and Clergy killed. The attacks

were carefully planned and executed. The questions that bog our minds are why

churches were and Clergy attacked and killed? Why were politicians and political

party offices not attacked if it were a political conflict? Why were the business

premises and property of innocent civilians destroyed? We strongly feel that it was

not political, but pre-meditated act[s] under the guise of elections (This Day, 2008).

The Muslim leadership in Jos vehemently protested the religious framing of the 2008 crisis.

In the name of the Jos North Muslim Ummah, they stated: -

The November 2008 violence in Jos was ethno-political in all ramifications; its

antecedents, the circumstances, the principal actors and the reason so far adduced by

all parties only point to one inevitable conclusion; the struggle by ethnic groups to

capture political power and manipulate for selfish reasons or to keep as vehicle for

attaining socio-political goals. [. . .] We cannot deny the fact that Mosques and

Churches were destroyed in the mayhem, so also Schools, Residential houses, markets

and other places that serve the common needs of all, regardless of faith, were

destroyed (Jos North Muslim Ummah, 2009a).

During the 2011 campaigns for gubernatorial elections, the religious and regional framing of

the Jos conflict surfaced once more. Former Vice-Governor Pauline Tallen had secured

Jasawa support in her race against Governor Jonah Jang. Yet days before the vote, text

messages were sent around in Jos claiming that she was an instrument within the collective

Hausa aspirations to rule Nigeria:

‘To all Muslims: we must reclaim Kaduna, install a Muslim governor in Taraba, plant

a deputy governor in Benue, install a woman as governor (which is Haram but she’s a

necessary weapon of change) in Plateau. We must capture Central Nigeria. Council

of Ulama, Northern Nigeria’ (Owuamanam, 2011).

The Council of Ulama has not confirmed responsibility for the text message. Its origin

remains unclear, but deliberate fabrication is very likely. The voting pattern confirmed that

Tallen’s cooperation with the Jasawa in Jos damaged her chances among Christian and

indigene voters. Governor Jang won the election by a clear margin.

2.4 Causes of Religious and Ethnic Politics

As Last 2007 argue that, for both Islamic and Christian organisations in northern Nigeria, Jos

is a centre point for proselytisation and it has proved to be a fertile ground for the

establishment and development of new religious movements and ideas. This is partly because

Jos is a relatively new city – only about one hundred years old – without the long established

traditions and religious orthodoxies in old northern cities like Kano and Zaria. This makes it

attractive for Muslim reformers, who have been able to establish themselves more easily in

Jos than elsewhere. The largest Islamic reform movement in Nigeria (with a presence in

contiguous countries in West Africa too) is Izala: Jama’atu Izalat al-Bid’a wa Iqamat al-

Sunna (the Association for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna). Izala was

started in Jos in 1978 and is considered Salafist, promoting what it asserts is a more orthodox,

scriptural Islam, emphasising the Sunna and denouncing the supposedly heterodox practices

of the Sufis (Loimeier, 1997; Kane, 2003).

Jos has also been conducive for Christian missions, from the European missionaries who

established their presence with the founding of the town, to Nigerian and foreign evangelists

in the present. The position of Jos as a bastion for Christianity in the north is enhanced by its

location on the cusp of the core north while being indisputably part of the middle-belt.

Initially Jos was the base for the evangelisation of Plateau peoples but it then became the

most important missionary centre for all of northern Nigeria, a base from which

evangelisation was organised into areas beyond the Plateau, among the heterogeneous non-

Muslim populations of central Nigeria who until the 1930s were unconverted to either of the

world religions and difficult to access, physically and socially. Also with its large southern

population, Jos became more orientated towards Christianity, although Muslims have always

had a strong presence in the city. Religious competition, fundamentalism, and assertiveness

have increased in Nigeria and violence occurred elsewhere in the north through the 1980s and

1990s, but large scale violence in Jos still did not seem inevitable. The culture of the city was

more cosmopolitan, with tolerance and even friendly relations between the two religious

groups. This situation has now been undermined.

As Kane (2003) argues, there has been a fragmentation of religious authority in Nigeria. The

multiplicity of movements among both Muslims and Christians have had to formulate their

own responses to insecurity and conflict, so processes of mobilisation can be relatively

decentralised. Religious reform movements began around the time of an upsurge in

communal politics more generally, in the late 1970s. Born-again Christians have at times

been strident in their rhetoric against Muslims, and even critical of the principles of

democracy (Marshall, 1995, 2009). The same is true of some of the Islamic movements in

attitudes towards Christians and the secular state, although the disputes among Muslims

themselves have also been intense (Loimeier, 1997; Falola, 1998; Kane, 2003). The

intensification of ethnic and religious politics coincided with growing socio-economic crisis

in Nigeria, prevalent through the 1980s with falling oil revenues and the impact of a

disastrous Structural Adjustment Programme, implemented by Babangida’s military regime

from 1986. As communal politics became more acute, social and political exclusion on the

basis of ethnicity and religion increased. This does not explain why violence occurred on

such a large scale, but discrimination and bias in government, and the narrow ethnic and

religious politics among both Christians and Muslims increased tension and polarisation

along communal lines. In addition, social problems at different levels of society – including

high levels of group inequality and youth unemployment – have increased the propensity for

violence.

The dominant discourses in the conflicts refer to political exclusion on the basis of ethnicity

and religion, on the Muslim side, and fears of religious and cultural domination, among

Plateau Christians. There are variations across Plateau State in the way these themes are

articulated, but the issues are similar. There is much political propaganda, inciting religious

or cultural fears – such as of a Muslim conspiracy to Islamise Nigeria – that are not

necessarily grounded in reality. In most cases the state is a central reference point. A key

element of the dispute is over which groups are represented in government and have access to

the state, with much controversy over how state and local governments exercise power. For

these reasons the conflicts need to be placed in the context of the local political economy.

Sometimes the behaviour of actors within the political and economic spheres is influenced by

religious beliefs and ethnic patronage and clientelism, but people also act according to

political and economic expediency. Government decision-making and patronage tends to

benefit communities with representatives in positions of political power more than it does

communities who are excluded. In fact, government decisions may be made to the detriment

of those who do not have political power, particularly where politics is underpinned by ethnic

ideologies – where politics is ethnically exclusive rather than inclusive.

According to Suberu 2001, suggested that, among Nigerian elites there is a big financial

incentive for gaining political positions and there are instrumental reasons for ethnic

mobilisation, which is even used to create new political constituencies. Nigeria is an oil-

based, rentier state. Money is transferred monthly to each of the 36 states and 774 local

governments in the federation. This transfer, the federal revenue allocation, goes from the

central government into a separate account for each state and LGA. A formula is used to

calculate the size of the transfer to each unit in the federation, based on population size and

the derivation principle (oil-producing states receive a higher share than non-oil producing

states). Oil revenues comprise more than 90 per cent of Nigeria’s internal income and its

diversion by political elites allows that class to sustain itself in power.

This lucrative arrangement generates demand for new administrative units in Nigeria,

although other factors, such as minority concerns, are also important (Suberu, 2001). The

creation of new states and local government areas is often demanded on an ethnic basis, with

groups making territorial claims by arguing they have a historical attachment to a particular

area. This tendency has greatly exacerbated indigeneity politics, as groups compete for the

control of states, local governments, and even wards, on account of the financial benefits and

status this will bring to them. Statism is exacerbated by the dependence on petroleum export

revenues, which have undermined and led to the neglect of other economic sectors – to quote

Rotimi Suberu (1998), the ‘economic centrality of the Nigerian state derives significantly

from the underdevelopment of the country’s economy’.

2.5 The Causes of Ethno-Religious conflicts in Jos Can be Classified into two major

headings: -

i. Remote Causes of ethno-religious crises

The crises on the Jos Plateau are first and foremost a struggle over land. Majority of Plateau

State indigenes are Christians tied to the land as peasant farmers or workers in the civil

service, while the mainly Muslim minorities are Hausa dry-season farmers and cattle raring

Fulani, with the Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba and Hausa dominating the business life of the

metropolis. Some indigenes, particularly from the Southern Senatorial district are also cattle

herders. The land thus remains an important emotive factor to a region that is predominantly

inhabited by peasant farmers (frustrated over lack of fertilizers) and cattle herders, who

usually are mutually conflict prone. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) brought about

the retirement and retrenchment of many public servants, semi or low educated-petty

company workers and military personnel (most who actively participated in the civil war)

occasioning their return to the farmlands thereby exerting great pressure on land resources

Thus: -

Suddenly, land which used to be available to those who used or needed it became a prized

possession. Both the host communities and settlers alike began to rationalise their inability to

acquire and possess land to the presence of the other group, thereby undermining the

imperative of their co-existence and the basis of consensus and confidence building. These

factors probably account for the preponderance of land disputes as an index in the perennial

communal conflict profile of the Middle-Belt.

Land is central to survival, hence conflict very often occur over access to pastoral and arable

land. Differences in ethnic nationality and religion between Plateau ethnic groups and the

Hausa-Fulani only serve to compound these economic problems. The collapse of the once

thriving tin mining industry in the state and the arrival of petro-dollars gave birth to attendant

dislocation and job losses. This unfortunately coincided with period of Shari’ah expansion in

the northern states.

The second cause of the Jos Plateau crises is centred over the politics of participation in

government by both “indigenes” and “settlers”. Issues here include the creation of the Jos

South LG out of Jos North by the military administration of Babangida, along religious lines,

with the former purportedly for Christians and the latter for Hausa-Fulani Muslims.

Moreover, appointments in Plateau State which is predominantly Christian during the long

military (mis)rule was along religious lines, with the Muslim minority sometimes having

more portfolios than Christians. With the return to multi-party democracy, however, the

Hausa-Fulani Muslims were left out in the cold, since they lacked the numerical strength to

successfully back their candidates. This coupled with the issue of ethnicity coalesce to cause

Muslim Hausa-Fulani minority, who used to be in the centre of political activities to feel that

they are losing control. The Christians were eager to exercise their voting right to wrestle

political control from the Hausa-Fulani Muslims whom they regard as “settlers”. In 1999, no

Hausa-Fulani Muslim was voted to either to the Senate or the National House of Assembly

and only one was voted to the Plateau State of Assembly.

This heightened the indigene-ship, citizenship and settler-ship syndrome in the area. The

recurrent problem constituted by the indigene/settler syndrome in Jos, mostly between the

Hausa-Fulani self styled Jasawa and the traditional natives of Jos town (the Berom, Anaguta

and Afisare) constitute a major factor for the Jos crises.

The social dimension is also very revealing, since despite their many years in Jos, the Hausa-

Fulani Muslim community failed to integrate fully into the Jos Plateau society. The

community being Muslim does not tolerate marriage between their daughters and Christian

but they do marry Christian girls. Most Jos Plateau Christian communities detest this lopsided

mode of social interaction. This has given birth to what the Christians refer to as Hausa-

Fulani raini ‘culture of belittling’ and arrogance since they look down with open contempt

and lack of respect upon their host community, using such intemperate language and

stereotypes as arna, infidels, Sarkin arna, the chief of infidels, kafirai (kafir) to describe

them. They exhibit total disregard for the culture, religion and traditional institutions of their

host communities. This is a fundamental reason that has birthed deep seated bitterness, with

far reaching social consequences, that has continued to fan conflict on the Jos Plateau. This

has severely breached the laws of communal harmony and interaction.

Indeed the source of tension in the Jos settler/indigene relationship also stems from the

Hausa-Fulani claim over the ownership of Jos, the chieftaincy stool and other tenuous claims

to political offices. This is what has pitted Muslim Hausa-Fulani against such predominant

Christian indigenous ethnic groups as the Berom, Afisare and the Anaguta on one hand and

other settlers like the Yoruba, Urhobo, and Igbo on the other. Issues such as lopsided/partisan

reporting of the crisis by both local and foreign media, cow theft or cattle rustling and

religious affiliation only served as gasoline added to flames that are consuming dry grass in

harmattan season. It should be noted that BBC Hausa Service, DW Hausa and VOA Hausa

units covering of the Jos Plateau crises was biased because the Hausa speakers working for

these media outfits are mostly Hausa Muslims.

ii. Immediate Causes of ethno-religious crises

The immediate causes of the September 2001 ethno-religious crises in Jos are three, namely,

struggle over political appointments, blockage of street for the purposes of praying, eslewhere

referred to by this author as street praying, and the expansion of Shari’ah laws that

introduced rather severe punishments for hadd crimes in twelve northern states of Nigeria.

The Jos April 12th 1994 conflicts between the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Anaguta, Afizare

(Izere) and Berom centred on the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato, a Hausa-Fulani as Jos

North LG Chairman of the Caretaker Committee by the military. When Alhaji Muktar a

Hausa-Fulani again became coordinator of the Federal Government initiated Poverty

Alleviation Programme (NAPEP) in 2001, tensions resume immediately between along the

old lines of ethnic and religious divide. Thus, contestations over economic and political space

constitute one of the immediate causes of conflicts in Jos in September 2001.

Another cause of the crisis is street praying, that is the blocking of a major street for the

purposes of religious worship or rituals. Some Muslim zealots boldly beat up Miss Rhoda

Haruna Nyam, a young Christian lady ostensibly because she was walking on a major street,

the only access to her home, while the street was ‘closed’ for the Juma’at prayers.15

According to Rhoda, on 7th September, 2001, by 1.45 pm while she was going back to her

work place from break at home, she was accosted and beaten up by some Muslim youth for

passing through a footpath near a mosque, which is beside her home. When she ran home for

safety, the youths followed her in a large number and beat up her father. This free for all fight

later spread to some parts of Jos town. The expansion of Shari’ah in twelve northern states

forced a great deal of Christians to flee from the core north. Most of them sought for and

found refuge in Jos, which they considered a safe haven. Likewise, a number of liberal

Muslims fleeing from a more strict form of Islam sought refuge in Jos. However, the

remnants of the followers of Maitatsine, a Muslim fundamentalist, whose followers caused

mayhem across the northern Muslim states of Nigeria from 1980 to the 1990s have been

living in the Angwan Rogo and Kona Shagari area of Jos for many years. These militant

elements also wanted Shari’ah law imposed in Plateau State. Naturally, fleeing Christians felt

they should not give and inch to Muslims in a “Christian state”. So,

The September 7, 2001 crisis in Jos is commonly believed to be a spill out of the Shari’ah

fervour [sic]. As the Shari’ah law was adopted in surrounding state in domino-fashion,

religious passion became inflamed in Plateau State. The President’s complacency in the

face of the grievous infringement of Nigeria’s secularity not only emboldened some

Muslims to demonstrate defiance for constituted authorities elsewhere but encouraged

them to nurse particularistic religious sentiments for the Shari’ah even in areas where

they constituted a minority population of settlers.

The ineptitude of government in dealing with the Zamfara declaration of State religion sent

the wrong signals across the nation. Obasanjo’s position was that being a political Shari’ah,

given time it will fizzle out and disappear in thin air.

2.6 Influence of resource control on Jos ethno-religious conflict

The Jos Plateau attracted pastoralists in the nineteenth century when its human population

was relatively sparse. The discovery of tin and the subsequent growth of Jos, inevitably

brought a major expansion of the farming population, and all but very marginal land was

brought into cultivation. Colonial officials were already noting instances of farmer-grazier

conflict on the Plateau as early as the 1940s (Davies, 1946), while Awogbade (1983)

documented similar problems in the 1970s. During the 1980s, some Fulbe from the Plateau

moved permanently into the lowlands, especially into the forested region along the Benue,

where farming populations are still sparse. Nonetheless, the low-disease environment and

wide grasslands of the Plateau were too attractive to pastoralists and many began to settle and

integrate with local communities. While most indigenous Plateau populations depended on

upland rain fed cultivation, and the principal cereal crops were sorghum and millet, this

provided a significant basis for interaction between the two groups. The farmers kept few

cattle (although populations of the indigenous muturu, a humpless longhorn were probably

higher than today) and the Fulbe could graze their cattle on the crop residues, with the

farmers benefiting from the manure. However, once dry-season gardening began to take off,

the river edges that had provided lush grazing were increasingly populated by farms.

Moreover, the tubers and vegetables mainly grown there did not provide attractive residues

for cattle and the farmers increasingly preferred fertiliser. At the same time, the ADP system

encouraged a switch to maize while the growth of potato cultivation made even crop residues

in upland areas unsuitable for cattle.

These agronomic changes did not take place without problems; pastoralists came to river-

banks previously covered in grass to find tomatoes. Young men herded their cattle between

upland cereal fields and the cattle strayed into the crops. However, these types of conflicts

were usually settled informally and the types of violent clashes characteristic of some other

northern states were not characteristic of Plateau. However, from 2001 onwards the situation

has changed dramatically in character, with urban conflicts being replayed in rural areas with

unattractive consequences for all sides. On the 8th of September, 2001, serious religious

conflict broke out in Jos, and riots between Christians and Muslims led to substantial loss of

life and property. Once the news filtered through to rural areas, there was significant pressure

for the indigenous farming populations to attack the resident Fulbe pastoralists. This occurred

at several sites around Jos, notably Miango, Vom and Riyom, leading to numbers of deaths,

burnings of houses and property and theft of stock. Elsewhere in rural communities,

emissaries were sent to urge these attacks, but fortunately more pacific counsels prevailed

and the peace was kept. Nonetheless, many pastoralists were forced to flee Plateau State and

reached Bauchi, which has a reputation for being more sympathetic to Muslims. The

governor offered to open up Forest Reserves and it is there that many of the refugees are now

settled; few have any intention of returning to Plateau State. In June 2003, some herds were

encountered making their way on to the Plateau on an experimental basis; but relations

remain very tense.

One of the other bases for interchange between Fulbe and farmers was the hiring of boys to

herd cattle. Most Fulbe herds are too large to be herded by the family labour alone, and

indeed many Fulbe household heads noted that their sons would rather hang around in towns

than herd cattle, as a result of education. But it was common for many of the larger tribes to

send their sons herding with the Fulbe; usually they would be paid with a one- or two-year

old bull after one year or a heifer after two years. Such animals have become the basis for

small village herds now kept by many indigenous groups. However, since the crisis, a

breakdown of trust has meant that many of the larger groups, such as the Irigwe and the

Berom have withdrawn their children and many other groups are now more sceptical.

A major consequence of the crisis has been that a number of key stock routes across the Jos

Plateau, especially those passing near Miango, Riyom and Vom are now permanently

blocked and are unlikely to reopen in the near future.

There has been a response to this, albeit hard to interpret. In October 2002, a series of attacks

by well-armed groups on villages in the Jos area began and continued through into 2003 with

the Berom people of Rim and Bachit the principal victims. The attackers are widely to

believe to be mercenaries, coming either from Niger or further north in Nigeria and their goal

seems to be creation of mayhem rather than theft. It is widely believed that this is revenge

exacted by the Fulbe for the earlier killings, but this seems unlikely. More probable is that

elite northern interests are taking advantage of the situation to foment disorder. The

consequence has been to further sow distrust in rural areas but also to give the resident

farming populations a powerful rationale for permanently taking over valuable Fulbe

farmland along rivers.

If this were not enough, at the other end of the state, an even more serious outbreak of

hostilities has turned the region into a virtual no-go area.

The most striking feature of this rural strife is the absence of any effective response from

government. After a conflict occurs, police and army roadblocks are set up for a week or so,

but then are removed once there is no immediate fighting. Refugees are settled in rural areas

or have moved to towns such as Langtang and Jos to stay with relatives. Insecurity has

discouraged farming in many areas and severe food shortages are beginning to be felt,

especially in the southeast.

These episodes illustrate the problems in dealing with community conflict. What are

originally conflicts for resources are being transformed through religious affiliation; the

original issue may not have been the Fulbe, but they have been drawn in. The consequence of

government failure to restrain expanding private ownership and trade in modern weapons is

now highly apparent. They also show that the churches have now become wealthy and are no

longer willing to remain passive. They are highly organised and willing to fund ethnic

agendas and confront armed attacks. This is unlikely to provide fertile ground for the LDPs

proposed by Fadama II.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The study examines the ethnicity and religious instability in Nigeria, a case study of

Jos plateau state. This chapter describes the procedures, techniques and strategies

employed in the study. The method to be used is discussed under the following

headings:-

Research design

Population

Sample and sampling techniques

Research instrument;

Validity of the instrument;

Reliability of the instrument;

Administration of instrument;

Procedure for data collection

Method of data analysis

3.2 Research Design

The design of the study is a descriptive survey aimed at assessing the influence of

ethnicity and religious instability on conflict in jos plateau state, by examining the

opinions of political leaders, religious leaders, religious bodies, traditional rulers,

members of the communities, and other stake holders. Descriptive survey research

design according to Ali (1996) is concerned with describing events as they are

without any manipulation of what is being observed while in Nwan’s words (2005)

survey research is one in which a group of people or items is studied by collecting and

analyzing data from only few people or items (sample) considered to be representative

of the entire group, and the finding from the sample is expected to be generalized to

the entire population. Therefore, this study’s adoption of descriptive survey research

design is justified.

3.3 Population of the Study

The population for this study will comprise all the five local government areas the worst

heats by the conflict, which comprising Jos north, Jos east, Jos south, langtang north, and

langtang south with the total of 1,068,563, with respondent both Muslim and Christian. The

population is suitable for this study in that it is gender sensitive and is characterized by both

subjects (Muslim and Christian) equally selected that can easily be studied with the use of

the proposed research instruments.

Table 1: data showing the population of each of the five local governments in Jos

No. Local government areas

Resources Population Sample

1 Jos north Trading and commerce 429,300 802 Jos east Coffee, farm product, and

farm land85,602 80

3 Jos south Fertile land, mining ponds and farming

306,716 80

4 Langtang north Fertile land and farm land 140,643 805 Langtang

southFertile land and farm land 106,305 80

Total 1,068,563 400

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, 2006 National Census.

3.4 Sample size

The sample will comprise of 400 respondents from the selected local government areas

from Jos plateau state. The researcher will obtain this sample size form the target

population of 1,068563 with the aid of Slovene formula of: -

n= N

1+ n(e)2

Where

n= Sample size

N = sampled population and

e = Level of significance of 0.05

3.5 Sampling procedure

The researcher will use stratified random and purposive sampling techniques to

collect data (select sample) form various local government areas of the survey

population according to glass and Hopkins in Muddah (2006) stratified random

sampling ensures that all members of the population have equal chances of being

selected. First the plateau state conflict were stratified in to five (5) local government

areas form which the required sample of respondent will be selected though stratified

random sampling method to ensure that each stratum (local government areas) is

equally represented white purposive sampling will be used to select the required form

the sampled from the population.

3.6 Research Instrument

The research instrument for this study is a researchers developed questionnaires titled:

ethnicity and religious conflict questionnaire (ERIQ). The items used in the

questionnaires were obtained from literature.

The questionnaire consists of 20 items divided into four sections based on types of

ethno-religious conflict factors effecting Jos plateau state which deals with the views

of the respondents on the influence of these ethno-religious conflict factors. The

questionnaire was structured on a closed ended format on YES or NO responses.

3.7 Validation of the Instrument

The instrument will be validated by three experts in the field of conflict management,

statistics and the research supervisor and senior executive members of the local

government areas selected in Jos plateau state. They will review the items in terms of

theirs clarity, relevance, contents coverage and appropriateness; their suggestions will

then be incorporated in to the final version of the instrument for use in this study.

Gazali (1993) called this ‘Logical Reasoning and personal judgment of specialist’

3.8 Reliability of the Instrument

To test the reliability of the instrument, a pilot study will be conducted in five local

government areas selected from plateau state and 40 subjects or sample selected

consisting of 5 local government area and 10 politicians, religious leaders and

followers. Split half reliability co-efficient will be determined by correlating the

scores of the odd items against even number items Anatasi (1976) in Sadiq (1991).

After obtaining the 2 scores for each respondent, they will then be correlated using the

person product-moment correlation methods.

To get the consistency of the total test, it will be necessary to correct the split half test

correlation to the expected full – length value. This will be done by applying the

Speaman Brown prophecy formula, which is: -

r1=2r

1+r

Where r1 = Reliability of whole test

r = Correlation co-efficient of the split test and

2 = Doubling factors

Agu, (2002)

If for example the correlation co-efficient of the spit half test

r = 0. 7

r1=2 X 0.741+0.74

=0.85

The above was to give unbiased reliability indices for the full length test.

3.9 Procedure for Data Collection

A letter of introduction will be obtained from the researcher’s department to the local

government areas, political organizations, and religious bodies in Jos plateau State.

The researcher having secured permission from the local government areas authorities

will visit the selected bodies. The researcher and one research assistants selected in

each organisation will administer the questionnaire in the following ways.

The procedure for the administration of questionnaire will be done as follows:

Stage i: the researcher and the research assistant selected in each organisation with

the help of the politicians, religious leaders and followers, and research assistants will

administer the questionnaire to the respondents using simple random sampling

without replacement. On the whole, four hundred (400) questionnaires will be

administered.

Stage ii: after an interval of one hour the researchers and research assistant will go

round to collect the completed questionnaire. Only the correctly filled or completed

questionnaire will be used for data analysis.

Stage iii: completed questionnaires will be collected on the sport to ensure good

return and the total number collected back will be the figure to the used for the

purpose of data analysis.

3.10 Method of data Analysis

The completed questionnaires are gathered, the frequency of respondents to each of

the 20 items of the questionnaire will be compiled. The descriptive statistics of

frequency counts, and percentages, will be used to describe data from respondents and

to answer the research questions, while inferential statistics of chi-square (X2) test will

be used in testing and analyzing the null hypotheses at 0.05 alpha levels.

Ethical considerations

Firstly, the researcher will make self identification to the respondents without creating room

misrepresentation. The respondents will be provided with the researchers, information

through his identity card and covering letter from the department of social sciences for further

identification.

Secondly, the respondents will also be informed about the title this of the research, that is an

informed consent and participation of respondents. The procedure to be used and the

expected benefits to the participants and the society will also be disclosed to them.

Thirdly, the respondents will be given enough information about the study and opportunity

to ask questions and have them answered. They will voluntarily participate in giving

information and no coercion or promises of benefits as a result of participation will be

applied.

Fourthly, anonymity is another ethical consideration that the study will take into

consideration. In this respondents will not provide their names and other identifications that

will give clues of knowing the person who has provided the information, this will ensure

that the privacy and security of respondents are grantee. Dresser (1998) stated that the

administrative burden of ethical reviews and procedures is balanced by the protection of

participants.