Privacy Issues on Social Networking Platforms: the Case of Facebook

Privacy Issues on Social Networking

Platforms: the Case of Facebook

Master Thesis

Jaleh Mazaji

University of Neuchâtel

April, 2016

3

UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG

Faculty of Science

Department of Informatics

eXascale Infolab

Thesis for the Master of Science in Computer Science

Supervised by Prof. Dr. Philippe Cudré-Mauroux

by Jaleh Mazaji

Abstract

The social networking service, Facebook, is the largest social network with the

highest number of users worldwide. Like other social networking sites, Facebook

allows users to share ideas, pictures, posts, activities, and events. Despite its extensive

privacy policies, Facebook for commercial reasons allows third-party access to a large

amount of information about each user, from shopping habits to health records. This

has raised many privacy concerns during the last few years. In the first part of this

thesis, based on a literature search, Facebook‘s privacy policies over the last decade

are described and their potential effects on the social network‘s users is analyzed.

In the second part of this thesis, based on our survey of respondents living in

Switzerland, compared with those in Iran, we attempt to learn how Facebook‘s

privacy policies are understood by its users and what actions they are taking, if any, to

guard their privacy. We also queried a third group - Iranians living in the Europe or

Canada - to see whether their responses differed significantly from responses from the

other two groups.

We found that members of all three groups experienced the same problems with

Facebook‘s privacy policies; ie, their personal information could be intercepted by

third parties. Whether or not they lacked knowledge about those policies - and

Facebook‘s privacy policies are publicly available, although arguably difficult to

interpret and apply - our study participants by and large felt that the information they

posted on this social network is not secure. Surprisingly, more Iranians living in Iran

had a higher opinion of Facebook‘s respect for human rights and privacy than did the

members of the other two groups living in Europe or Canada, and they actually took

fewer steps to guard themselves from third-party surveillance of their information,

despite the risk of disapproval by their government. Like those members of the other

two groups, they knew their identities, networks and postings were transparent, but

they used Facebook anyway because they found it free, useful, and in some cases

essential.

Keywords: Social Network, Facebook, Privacy, Facebook Timeline, Human Rights,

Facebook Privacy Policy, Data Privacy.

5

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr.

Philippe Cudré-Mauroux for his guidance, advice and support over my master

program. His positive and encouraging attitude was priceless.

I greatly appreciate my parents for their endless support and unconditional love. None

of my accomplishments would have been possible without their continuous support.

I would also like to thank all people who participated in my survey for this research

project. Without their passionate participation and input, the validation survey could

not be successfully conducted.

Last but definitely not least, my special thanks to my friend Reginald Rhein, a former

journalist with Business Week magazine, for his time and valuable comments and

editing on my thesis.

Jaleh Mazaji

April 2016

7

Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 3

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 5

List of Figures ................................................................................................................ 9

List of Tables ............................................................................................................... 11

Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 13

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 15

1.1 Context .......................................................................................................... 15

1.2 Problem statement ......................................................................................... 15

1.3 Study questions ............................................................................................. 16

1.4 Report Structure ............................................................................................ 16

2 History of Facebook‘s Privacy Policies, 2005-2015 ............................................... 19

2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 19

2.2 Analysis and Comparison of 2005 to 2010 Privacy Policies ........................ 21

2.2.1 Analysis of 2005 Privacy Policy ............................................................ 21

2.2.2 Comparison of 2005 and 2006 Privacy Policies .................................... 22



2.2.5 Comparison of 2007 with 2009 Privacy Policies ................................... 23

2.2.6 Comparison of 2009 with 2010 (April) Privacy Policies....................... 24

2.3 Analysis and Comparison of 2011-2015 to earlier Privacy Policies ............. 26







8 Contents

2.4 Result and Discussion ................................................................................... 31

3 Facebook Survey ..................................................................................................... 33

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 33

3.2 Study Hypotheses .......................................................................................... 33

3.3 Methodology and Survey Questions ............................................................. 34

3.4 Results and Discussion .................................................................................. 34

3.5 Analysis and Summary of Study Results ...................................................... 55

4 Study Limitations .................................................................................................... 57

5 Conclusions and future work ................................................................................... 59

5.1 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 59

5.2 Answers to Study Questions ......................................................................... 59

5.3 Future Work .................................................................................................. 61

Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire ............................................................................. 63

References .................................................................................................................... 67

9

List of Figures

Figure ‎2.1: One user‘s Facebook pages, including several tabs and buttons .............. 20

Figure ‎2.2: Matt Mckeon‘s chart [6], year 2005 .......................................................... 21

Figure ‎2.3: Matt Mckeon‘s chart[6], year 2006 ........................................................... 22


Figure ‎2.5: Matt Mckeon‘s chart [6]; (a) November 2009, (b) December 2009. ........ 24


Figure ‎2.7: Labels 1-5 show access level of each Facebook element. ....................... 31

Figure ‎3.1 : Results of Q9 ............................................................................................ 38

Figure ‎3.2: Results of Q11 ........................................................................................... 39


Figure ‎3.4: Results of Q13 (Considered by gender). ................................................... 40





Figure ‎3.9: Results of Q.17 (Considered by gender) ................................................... 45

Figure ‎3.10: Results of Q18. ........................................................................................ 46

Figure ‎3.11: Results of Q20 ......................................................................................... 48





10 List of Figures


11

List of Tables

Table 3.1: Number of responses based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA) .............. 34

Table 3.2: Our survey responses based on gender and our three categories ............... 35

Table 3.3: Age ranges for 101 responses .................................................................... 35

Table 3.4: Overview of responses depend whether they use Facebook ...................... 35

Table 3.5: Overview of our survey responses based on our three categories (I), (S),

(IA) without considering gender .................................................................................. 36

Table 3.6: Overview of our survey responses based on our three categories (I), (S),

(IA) considering gender ............................................................................................... 37

Table 3.7: Importance of Facebook’s respect for privacy ........................................... 39

Table 3.8: Overview on Q14 based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA) ................... 42

Table 3.9: Overview on Q17 based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA) ................... 44

Table 3.10: Overview on Q17 considered by gender .................................................. 45

Table 3.11: Overview on Q22 based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA) ................. 50

13

Abbreviations

EPIC Electronic Privacy Information Center

FB

FBI

Facebook

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FoF

FTC

I

IA

ID

S

WWW

Friend of Friend

Federal Trade Commission

People who live in Iran (primarily Iranian citizens)

Iranians who live abroad (primarily in Europe or Canada)

Identification (code)

Non-Iranians (primarily Swiss) who live in Switzerland

World Wide Web

15

Chapter 1

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

Today, there is an ever-expanding global tendency across almost all the demographic

groups to use social networks [1-2]. Among all, Facebook1 is the largest social

network with the highest number of users in the World Wide Web (WWW). As of the

fourth quarter of 2015, Facebook had 1.59 billion monthly active users [3].

Facebook, similar to other social networking sites, allows users to share ideas,

pictures, posts, activities, and events. Users also put their personal information on

Facebook by simply answering Facebook's basic questions about their background

(e.g. gender, their location, their job, their interests, … ) Thus, Facebook can collect a

large amount of information about each user. Facebook will not only make the

answers to basic questions available to advertisers but also their posts, etc [4].

Facebook mentions “We collect information when you visit or use third-party

websites and apps that use our Services (like when they offer our Like button or

Facebook Log In or use our measurement and advertising services” [5].

Demand for this personal information has exploded in recent years. Users‘ personal

information contains everything from shopping habits to health records. Companies

can compile enormous amounts of information about each user. Facebook is one of

the best sources for third parties to collect available personal information at little or

no cost. The availability of the information has raised many privacy concerns

especially during the last few years.

1.2 Problem statement

Beside the advantages of Facebook, the problem of the social network‘s lack of

privacy is an evolving issue not limited to commercial invasions. A major problem for

users in ―closed‖ compared with ―open‖ societies 2 is the government‘s potential

access to the users‘ private information, including their identities (if hidden), their

1 https://www.facebook.com

2 We define a ―closed‖ society as one in which the government restricts what internet users can post

and/or see on their Facebook pages, and an ―open‖ society as one that has no such restrictions.

16 Chapter 1. Introduction

network of friends, and their private comments - especially those of a political nature.

In some countries, people have been punished after sharing their political ideas with

members of their social network, not realizing that their online activity is transparent

to everyone, including their governments.

Even in open societies, which do not monitor Facebook, disclosure of the user‘s

personal information could lead to major difficulties for them, including problems of

an emotional, honor, career, or political nature. For example, a man might lose his job

after the unwanted release of unreported information about his health; a woman could

be the subject of sexual harassment after an embarrassing picture is uploaded without

her knowledge or approval.

It has not been evident how Facebook users in ―open‖ and ―closed‖ societies

understand these problems, how they view them, and to what extent they react to

them by modifying their online behavior.

1.3 Study questions

The problem cited in Section 1.2 of Facebook's lack of privacy raises several

questions which are dealt with in the following two chapters.

In Chapter 2, describing the evolution of Facebook's privacy policies between 2005

and 2015, the major questions are:

1. How and why has Facebook changed its privacy policies over the past

decade? and

2. How and why might Facebook choose to continue or modify its privacy

settings in the future?

In Chapter 3, describing our study of Facebook users in ―open‖ and ―closed‖

societies, we tried to ascertain:

3. What are the general needs of Facebook users regarding privacy?

4. How are these different for users in ―open‖ versus ―closed‖ societies?

5. Do users find Facebook controls easy to use, and do they use them?

6. How do Facebook users in these different societies modify their online

behavior to meet their particular privacy needs?

1.4 Report Structure

In Chapter 2, we review the privacy problems that have arisen on Facebook since

their emergence, drawing largely on the work of Matt McKeon [6] and Kurt Opsahl

[7] for their analysis of Facebook‘s privacy policies over the past ten years. In

addition to comparing these changes year to year from 2005 through 2010, we created

our own graph to better illustrate these changes between 2005-2010 in terms of

identity (name, picture, birthday, etc.), contacts (―friends‖, networks, etc.), and

personal opinions (of other people, events, government programs, commercial

products, etc.). For changes between 2010 and 2015, we drew on articles by

Chapter 1. Introduction 17

commentators including Sharon Profis [8], Emil Protalinski [9], Sarah Jacobsson

Purewal [10], Sarah A. Downey [11], Victoria Woollaston [12], Vindu Goel [13], and

Gordon Gottsegen [16].

In Chapter 3, we compare Facebook users living in ―open‖ societies with those living

in a ―closed‖ society. As a control, the study also has included users from a ―closed‖

society temporarily living in an ―open‖ society, to see if their knowledge and

reactions are different from those of the other two groups. For this comparison we

created three categories: 1 – People who live in Iran (primarily Iranian citizens) (I); 2-

Iranians who live abroad (primarily in Europe or Canada) (IA), and 3- Non-Iranians

(primarily Swiss) who live in Switzerland (S). The results of this survey are examined

to see the differences between these three groups concerning their use of and attitudes

toward their privacy protection on Facebook.

Chapter 4 explains the limitations of our study and its results. Chapter 5 gives our

conclusions and recommendations for future work.

19

Chapter 2

2 History of Facebook’s Privacy Policies, 2005-2015

2.1 Introduction

Understanding the evolution of Facebook‘s privacy policies over the last ten years

will help us to better formulate and understand the answers to thesis research

questions in Chapter 3, which seek to ascertain how these changes are perceived by

users, and how (or whether) users change their internet behavior as a result of their

understanding. Specifically, thesis research in Chapter 3 focuses on the differences in

attitudes toward those policies in ―open‖ societies (Europe and Canada) and in a

―closed‖ society (Iran).

Thus, Chapter 2 focuses on Facebook Privacy Policy history from 2005 to 2015, from

which we will learn the following: 1- How and why has Facebook changed its privacy

policies over the past decade; and 2- How and why Facebook might choose to

continue or modify its privacy settings in the future. We have relied on published

reports of Facebook Privacy Policy to find answers to these questions.

In the following subsections of Chapter 2, we are indebted to Matt McKeon [6] and

Kurt Opsahl [7] for their analyses of Facebook‘s privacy policies from 2005 to 2010.

We have used Matt Mckeon‘s charts and Kurt Opsahl timeline to compare each year

with the next, with the exception of 2008, for which there is no data. Our own

contribution to this section is the creation of a chart showing how the policies from

2005 through 2006 changed in terms of highest vs lowest levels of privacy in 11

areas: Likes, Name, Picture, Gender, Other Profile Data, Birthday, Friends, Contact

information, Networks, Wall Posts and Photos.

We have adopted Mckeon‘s definition of ―Like‖ as a person, band, movie, web page,

or any other entity represented on Facebook‘s social graph that has a ―like‖ button [6].

We define ―Friends‖ as those who will receive the user‘s posts after he/she includes

them in his/her network by pushing the Add Friend button.

On the following page, we have adopted a fictitious Facebook page to illustrate this.

20 Chapter 2. History of Facebook‘s Privacy Policies, 2005-2015

(a) Likes Tab

(b) Timeline Tab

Figure ‎2.1: One user‘s Facebook pages, including several tabs and buttons3.

3 These Facebook pages are in the public realm, screenshot from my personal account.

Chapter 2. History of Facebook‘s Privacy Policies, 2005-2015 21

Figure ‎2.1 (a) and Figure ‎2.1(b) : Just below Baraka Obamaa's name and photograph

there are several tabs, from ―Timeline‖ to ―More‖. "Timeline" dates the posts on

Obamaa's Facebook page. By clicking the appropriate button, anyone viewing this

page can see Obamaa's 75 "Friends," or the "Photos" he has added to the page, or the

profile he has written "About" himself, or his "Likes". To show their agreement with

his "Likes," viewers can click the thumb-up symbols next to them (for example, Easy

E, or 2pac). If they want Obamaa to list them as a "Friend", they can click the ―Add

friend‖ button (it is then up to Obamaa whether to "friend" them and allow them even

more access). By clicking on the ―Message‖ button, viewers can send a written

message or, if both parties are online, they can ―Chat‖ with each other.

2.2 Analysis and Comparison of 2005 to 2010 Privacy Policies

2.2.1 Analysis of 2005 Privacy Policy

As we see in Figure ‎2.2, the Like button did not exist in 2005. Now it is one of the

most important aspects in Facebook for gathering information. Available information

in 2005 on Facebook was Gender, Picture, Name and Networks, which were

accessible for all Facebook users. Photos, Wall posts and Friends were available up to

the level of Network. The other categories of information were limited to the level of

Friends.

Figure ‎2.2: Matt Mckeon‘s chart [6], year 2005


Figure ‎2.3: Matt Mckeon‘s chart[6], year 2006

2.2.2 Comparison of 2005 and 2006 Privacy Policies

As we see in Figure ‎2.3 in 2006, compared to 2005, the only important difference that

we see is the increasing of number of users, which shows how rapidly this social

network – and the availability of information on it – is increasing. In 2006, the Likes

button has not yet been created.

In the years of our study, we wanted to know whether only members of a specific

group (―friends‖) could access the other members‘ information. In 2005, this was the

case. A user‘s information was inaccessible to those not designated to receive it.

Comparing 2005 data privacy with 2006, we saw that in 2006 Facebook improved its

privacy settings by adding the “Control Section” for users to choose who can have

access to their information between the groups. This raised two important questions

that we attempt to answer in Chapter 3 in our survey of 101 Facebook users: What

proportion of users actually use this control section? Is it easy to use?

The answers to these questions will help us see the impact of modifying Facebook‘s

privacy policy. For example, there is evidence that in 2005 Facebook added its

Control Section to keep its existing users and entice new ones, who had begun to

worry about widespread dissemination of their supposedly private information. In

both 2005 and 2006, it was less important to the company to expand the recipients of

this information to others besides those in the users‘ own network than it became

later, when Facebook allowed third-parties access to this data, primarily for

commercial reasons.



Compared to 2006, it can be seen from Figure ‎2.4 that the users‘ profile information

in 2007 is now available to anyone who belonged to any of the Facebook networks,

unless the user opted out through the Privacy Control setting. Also, the profile picture

thumbnail has become available in search results across Facebook unless the users

change the privacy setting. During this period, the total number of users increased

rapidly, as has been the case in every year since.



We have no information of important changes for this year.

2.2.5 Comparison of 2007 with 2009 (November-December) Privacy Policies

From Figure ‎2.5 (a) and Figure ‎2.5 (b), we can see several important privacy policy

changes imposed by Facebook in November and December 2009.


(a)

(b)

Figure ‎2.5: Matt Mckeon‘s chart [6]; (a) November 2009, (b) December 2009.

In November 2009, all categories of information except ―Contact info‖ are available

to Facebook users up to the level of Friend of Friend (FoF). In December, Facebook

instituted its ―Likes‖ button, with access up to the entire Internet level. Also in this

period, some of the users‘ personal information on Facebook – ie, gender, username,


picture and networks – became available at the level of the entire Internet. Moreover,

information about Friends became available from the FoF level to all Facebook users.

In 2009, Facebook created further control options for users, where they could decide

with whom they would like to share their information. It should be noted that the

default was access of the information to everyone. It meant that even the individuals

who were not in Facebook could see a member‘s information by just entering his/her

profile into a search.

Although Facebook‘s privacy policy improved over this period, the potential damages

to uninformed users still remained. One of the questions which this thesis will attempt

to answer in Chapter 3 is the proportion of Facebook users who have taken time to

follow the gradual changes, and thus whether some may have missed the opportunity

to modify their profile settings to their preference.

In December 2009, according to Kurt Opsahl [7]: ―Certain categories of information

such as your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender,

geographic region, and networks you belong to are considered publicly available to

everyone, including Facebook-enhanced applications, and therefore do not have

privacy settings. You can, however, limit the ability of others to find this information

through search using your search privacy settings.‖

However, Facebook has not made it easy to understand the changes and methods of

uses that it has set out in its Privacy Policies. The default is for increased visibility of

the user‘s information.

2.2.6 Comparison of 2009 (November-December) with 2010 (April) Privacy

Policies

After 2009, the real privacy challenges to the Facebook user begin. In the period

November-December 2009 through April 2010, we see new privacy controls imposed

on Facebook users. These have enhanced the opportunities of third parties to gather

the users‘ data for their own purposes.

As we see in Figure ‎2.6, in April 2010, a large amount of personal information,

including ―Wall posts‖, ―Birthday‖, ―Photos‖, and ―Other Profile Data‖, became

increasingly accessible from the FoF level to the level of ―The entire Internet‖. Since

then, the default setting for each user has been full exposure of this information to the

public at large.



In April 2010 Compared to November-December 2009, the possibility of third-party

access to the users‘ information was increased. By default, general information such

as list of friends, profile pictures, gender user ID, connections, etc. became available

to the public. Furthermore, when users were getting connected with applications or

websites, the application or website could get access to their general information.

Privacy settings only control who can see our connection on our profile page. If

Facebook users are not happy about that, they can remove or not make the

connection.

So why did Facebook make it so easy for third parties to access users‘ private

information? The answer is advertising revenue.

―While many users still wrongly think that Facebook will charge users because they

aren’t able to pay for the site, the reality is that advertising is proving to be a very big

business for Facebook [8].”

2.3 Analysis and Comparison of 2011-2015 to earlier Privacy

Policies

In this section we gathered our information from different sites, and compared the

years from 2011-2015 to the years 2005-2010. Limitations of the data are noted in

Chapter 4.



In this year, according to Sharon Profis [9], concerns by Facebook users that third-

party access to their information might be compromised grew to the point where the

company decided it had to improve its privacy controls. However, since Facebook‘s

revenue now came primarily from advertising, the company had to square the circle

of meeting user‘s privacy concerns with maintaining access of users‘ data by

advertisers. Keeping data transparency the default position, Facebook could with

honesty claim that its users had complete control over their private information, so

long as they successfully navigated the shoals of its voluminous privacy settings.

Facebook‘s latest privacy controls came in a wealth of options:

1- Controlling the app permissions. The default access policy was not changed, but it

became possible for the user to decide whether or not to grant certain permissions to

the apps.

2- Exploring the privacy setting. This primarily concerns how tagging of members in

a photo worked.

3- Hiding the recent activity log. This is a record of the user´s recent activities such as

adding someone to the Friends list. The recent activities were posted on the user`s

timeline and also on Friends´ News Feed page.

4- Adjusting the privacy info, friends and photos. This included the possibility of

choosing the level of privacy on some recently shared information such as ―current

place.‖

5- Hiding the personal phone number. This option allowed users to choose the ―only

me‖ level for the personal cellphone number and not letting others gain access to this

number.

In 2011, as Facebook became more popular, the urge for offering better privacy

settings to the users grew further and Facebook offered the mentioned options to its

users.


Because of a settlement with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission the preceding year,

Facebook´s new ―timeline‖ concept changed users‘ privacy settings.

According to Sharon Profis [9]: “On November 2011, Facebook has agreed to settle

with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Then from this time for each change

made to the privacy settings, users needed to agree first.”

Another observer, Emil Protalinski [10], says the main concern was centered on

privacy through obscurity. EPIC had insisted that the FTCs‘ November 2011

settlement does not allow privacy through obscurity, but Facebook strongly disagreed.

The problem was that before this policy change, the user could choose whether

his/her new friendships could get announced. The change would have allowed access

to all the user‘s Friends of his/her monthly activities, such as becoming friends with

another user.


Furthermore, the chronological arrangement of the changes allowed other users to

quickly scroll through the history of activities of a Friend, according to Sarah

Jacobsson Purewal [11].

“Once you've successfully hidden or deleted all of your Timeline posts, it's time to

move onto other people. This is perhaps a more important step than deleting the posts

on your Timeline, because you have no control over how other people protect their

Facebook privacy (or don't).”


A November 26, 2012 article by Sarah A. Downey, highlighted the five biggest

changes to Facebook‘s privacy policy that year [12].

First, Facebook started sharing the user‘s personal data with more people. Under this

change Facebook could share a user´s information for advertisement purposes with

advertisers and also with whomever the advertisers are cooperating. The data included

all the users‘ Likes, and also what was written as a comment on a post or in private

messages.

According to Downey, Facebook said that this data could include sensitive

information such as religion, health status, and political views, as well as whatever

information was in the user‘s profile. Moreover it could also include information

gathered by a user‘s Instagram account. From this year on, it would then be very easy

for a third party to follow a user‘s activity on Facebook and other sites to which

he/she was linked.

Second, it would no longer be possible to limit who could send private messages to

the Facebook user. Previously, it was possible to control the user‘s private message

reception through his/her ―How You Connect‖ settings. Now, any Facebook member,

including advertisers or anyone else with a Facebook account, could send private

massages to one or more other Facebook members; further, all the recipients of the

message thread could reply to it. This has resulted in Facebook members receiving

advertisements and spam messages.

Third, in 2012 Facebook started to launch an online advertising network. This

extended data sharing included not only Facebook´s advertising partners and

customers, but also the advertisers‘ partner. Facebook also expanded the type of

tracking from cookies ―system technologies in order to serve ads.‖ This further

allowed users‘ private information to get easily into the hands of third parties,

resulting in even less privacy for the user.

Fourth, Facebook has made the possibility of voting for its policies increasingly

difficult. It has allowed for a vote on a proposed change if more than 7,000 people

have commented on it. But after 2012, for a vote to be binding, at least 30% of

Facebook‘s users had to weigh in. Currently, this means 300 million people have to

vote, a number that is more than twice the number of those who voted in the 2012

U.S. presidential election. This new rule has essentially disabled collective voting.

Fifth, Facebook released additional clarification that nearly everything a user had

posted on its site would be visible to everyone, even if the user had limited its

visibility later on. In several places in the proposed data use policy, Facebook

reminded members that its privacy settings are limited. The company stressed that


even hiding an activity or post on the timeline will not necessarily eliminate it.

Although the information will often become hidden from the user, yet it may remain

visible in a search result by anyone. Also information such as timeline and posts

might remain available through a link to another Internet site.


There were three main changes in 2013 compared with 2012.

In January 2013, social search tools were available for Facebook‘s engineers for

testing purposes.

After the testing period, in July 2013 an updated search feature became available to

users to facilitate their search for other members, photos, and places on the website.

Facebook claimed that this feature would maximize availability of information for its

members, which they claimed is the ultimate goal of social networks.

In July 2013, the updated search feature became available for users for searching the

other members, photos, and places in the website.

In October 2013, Facebook removed privacy settings for Timeline searches [13].

That month, Facebook removed the ability of users to limit who could search for

them. Facebook claimed that a very small number of its members were using its

search-blocking feature, but that users could nevertheless protect against unwanted

searches by specifically putting the limitation of availability directly into their posts.

Still, they warned that users‘ pictures and information could be made available by

searching by his/her name. The company encouraged those who care about their

privacy to choose to limit searches for each post or photo put on the social network

site. It added that users could still access the Privacy Settings and limit the audience

of posts which they had shared in the past [14].


In an article in the New York Times on January 29, 2014, titled ―Flipping the

Switches on Facebook‘s Privacy Controls,‖ Vindu Goel described the frustrating

process of keeping Facebook posts private [15].

According to Goel, most Facebook users believe that what they post is shared only

with their friends, but it is not true. To truly protect the privacy of their posts, they

should go to their Facebook settings and actively control the audience by choosing for

each addressee: Public, Friends, Only Me, or Customize. Navigating this labyrinth is

tricky because if Friends or Public is chosen for one post, it will become the default

for future posts until it is changed again. To ensure privacy, each user must exert

stricter control over his/her Facebook settings.

One Facebook principle is that users choose the audience of their posts by controlling

their privacy settings. However, this does not work in all cases. For example, when a

user posts a comment or a Likes for a news article or opinion piece, third parties such

as news agencies or broadcasters can attach that comment or Like to the name of the

user. Most users usually do not know this and may not even care about their


comments and posts being disclosed to third parties. Such data can be used by third

parties for perfectly reasonable purposes, such as statistics, or to analyze the reaction

of Facebook users, or even ascertain a political perspective. Or it can serve specific

commercial purposes. It can also be used against the user‘s own interest.

The other problem is that checking whether a post is public or private is not easy,

particularly when surfing in Facebook through a smartphone, using icons or symbols

that are small and easily overlooked.

In another example, if a user passes along a photo of herself taken at a party by a

photographer, she does not have the power to take this photo down. She can untag

herself from the photo and hide it on her profile page. But it would still remain on the

photographer‘s Facebook page, viewable to her friends and all their common friends.

Of course, she could ask the photographer to remove it.

She could also click on ―Report/Remove Tag‖ on the photo and ask Facebook for

help. Facebook doesn‘t charge users for its services. As previously mentioned, the

revenue for Facebook comes from advertising, which is based on user´s activities on

Facebook. Thus, the proprietor of a kindergarten may look for mothers who have

young children. Unfortunately, so might a pedophile.

At this point, we can say that as soon as a person shares something online, it is no

longer private. Even if Facebook modifies its policies to plug a privacy gap, it is

unlikely that most users will pay attention and modify his/her behavior online. Like

most online services, Facebook frequently changes its privacy rules, not always to its

users‘ benefit, so what may have protected them in the past may no longer apply in

the present or future. Obviously, users should constantly keep current on Facebook‘s

policy changes, but the fact is that most users do not spend enough time to learn about

the new updates, considering their obscurity, complexity, and rigidness.

Even family members of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg have experienced

privacy problems on the social network site. About a year ago, Randi Zuckerberg, a

former Facebook executive and the sister of the company‘s founder and chief

executive, posted a family photo to her Facebook page; someone who was friends

with another Zuckerberg sister saw it and shared it with the world via Twitter. Ms.

Zuckerberg got angry, but there was not much she could do. The photo is still

available to the world on the Internet. ―So the most fundamental rule of all is: If you

really want something to stay private, don‘t put it on Facebook — or any other social

network [16]‖.


According to Gordon Gottsegen [17] in 2015, Facebook became more transparent

about the information it shares. But it did not mean that Facebook had reduced its

sharing of the information. The business model for Facebook was still to gather its

users´ information and share it with interested customers. We can read in detail what

Facebook shares with others, on ―Facebook Data policy 2015 [18]‖.

Because Facebook prefers to expand the possibility of sharing whatever is posted by

its users with more people, by default – if users do not change the privacy setting – all

data would be visible to the entire Friends list.


One of the problems is that many users do not like to be visible in the way that

Facebook likes. One solution offered by Facebook is for the user to control, in his/her

privacy setting, with whom he/she wants to share the data. One easy way might be to

adjust the ―privacy basic‖ feature on Facebook. But such solutions require the user to

always be up-to-date with the periodic changes made to Facebook‗s data policy.

2.4 Result and Discussion

Based on the information we gathered from 2005 up to 2015 privacy policy timeline,

we have devised the following graph, Figure ‎2.7, which brings the privacy elements of

Matt McKeon's five charts together.

Figure ‎2.7: Labels 1-5 show access level (―You‖ to ―The Entire Internet‖) of each Facebook element.

The ranges of privacy in this figure come from Matt McKeon‘s charts, considering 1=you (all

information is accessible only to the user himself/herself or his/her staff), 2=Friends (Information is

only available for the user and his/her friends), 3=Network/FoF (information is available for the user

and his/her friends and his/her ―Network‖ – a term that was exchanged for FoF in November 2009),

4=All Facebook users, and 5=The entire Internet.

In Figure ‎2.7, we separated each concept with a different color, from purple (Photos)

to light blue (Like). For each year, from 2005 up to 2010, we have drawn a tall

cylinder incorporating the concept colors, with numbers designating the strength of

privacy protection ranging from highest (number 1) to lowest (number 5).

2005 2006 2007 2009(Nov) 2009(Dec) 2010

3 3 3 3 3 5

3 3 3 3 3 5

4 4 4 5 5

5

2 2 2 2 2

2

3 3 3

4 5 5

2 2 3 3 3

3

2 2 3 3 3

5

4 4 4 5 5

5

4 4 4 5

5 5

4 4 4 5

5 5

1 1 1 3 5 5

Year

Lev

el o

f P

riv

acy

(L

ow

ests

t =

5,

Hig

hes

t =

1)

Like

Name

Picture

Gender

Other

Profile Data

Birthday

Friends

Contact

Info.

Networks

Wall Posts

Photos


The ranges of privacy in this figure come from Matt McKeon‘s charts, considering

1=you (all information is accessible only to the user himself/herself or his/her staff),

2=Friends (Information is only available for the user and his/her friends),

3=Network/FoF (information is available for the user and his/her friends and his/her

―Network‖ – a term that was exchanged for FoF in November 2009), 4=All Facebook

users (information is available for all Facebook users), and 5=The entire Internet

(information is available for all person on the WWW, whether or not they subscribe to

Facebook).

It should be pointed out that for the three first years – 2005, 2006, and 2007—the

Like button had not yet been created. Consequently, we have given the highest

privacy score (a ―1‖) for the ―Like‖ concept in those years. In the following years,

―Like‖ shows a steady deterioration in its privacy rating, reaching the worst level of

privacy (a ―5‖) in December 2009.

For the year 2009, we have two cylinders – for November and December – because of

the privacy policy changes made in those two months. For the year 2008, there is no

cylinder because we did not find information for that year and assumed there were no

major privacy policy changes.

The chart graphically shows that users‘ privacy on Facebook grew steadily worse

from 2005 to 2010. This had a purpose: to allow Facebook to make money by

allowing third-party (usually commercial) access to users‘ private information for

advertising or other (presumably) legal purposes.

From 2011 to 2015, Facebook tried to hold on to its users, as lack of privacy had

become a problem for many of them, by adding additional privacy control settings.

But it soon became apparent that their privacy status was worse than before 2011. For

one thing, users had trouble keeping up with all the changes, and if they did not

change their settings then, by default, most of their information would be available to

anyone who wanted it.

33

Chapter 3

3 Facebook Survey

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we explore the privacy problems described in Chapter 2 as they relate

to Facebook users' in two different settings: a ―closed‖ society where government

reaction to controversial postings can have serious negative effects, and an ―open‖

society where social or economic consequences of transparency are the most

important considerations.

This survey compares attitudes toward Facebook privacy in three countries,

Switzerland, Canada and Iran, where there are different rules for using Facebook.

Although there are privacy concerns for the social network in all three countries,

Iranians using Facebook could be subject to sanctions for violating their government‘s

rules for using the Internet service. For users in Switzerland or Canada, there is no

comparable risk, but any loss of privacy in their Facebook postings could result in

other kinds of harm to them or to their Friends – or even to others.

3.2 Study Hypotheses

In the previous section of this thesis, it can be seen that the evolution of Facebook's

privacy policies has created less, not more, privacy for its users. In this section, it is

the study's hypothesis that Facebook privacy is generally more important for users

who are citizens of authoritarian ―closed‖ societies such as Iran, where non-private

outspokenness can get them into more trouble than it can in ―open‖ societies such as

Switzerland or Canada.

In Iran the government requires Facebook users to use ―filters‖ to eliminate banned

material including apostasy, pornography and - while not specifically defined -

unwarranted criticism of the government. However, pervasive non-compliance with

this requirement has forced Iranian authorities to be selective in enforcing it. The

problem for most Iranian Facebook users is not knowing exactly what will get them

into trouble with the authorities.

To ascertain the differences in attitudes toward Facebook‘s privacy policies in ―open‖

and ―closed‖ societies, we asked questions of respondents in three categories: Iranians

34 Chapter 3. Facebook Survey

who live in Iran (I); non-Iranians who live in Switzerland (primarily Swiss, but also

non-Iranian foreign residents) (S); and Iranians who live abroad, mostly in

Switzerland or Canada (IA).

We sought to find the main common aspects between these three categories, and

whether lack of Facebook privacy was perceived as more of a problem in Iran than in

Switzerland or Canada, regardless of whether the respondent was a male or female or

whether he/she was living abroad.

3.3 Methodology and Survey Questions

A survey was created to get answers from Iranians and non-Iranians (primarily Swiss)

to the main questions about the importance of privacy to them and to ascertain their

knowledge about data sharing and about Facebook‘s privacy policies.

Study participants were asked to respond to 26 questions, which are posted in

Appendix A, including 11 Yes/No questions, 13 questions that have selected choice

answers, and two questions that require an explanation. The study also included some

open global questions, which were voluntary, to help us better analyze the results. For

those questions, we included additional information.

In addition to helping us find out whether Facebook users had enough information to

assess whether their postings are private, and whether privacy is actually important to

them, the study questions seek to determine their ongoing problems with Facebook

and any suggestions they have for improving the social network program.

3.4 Results and Discussion

In this section we will see the results of our survey by charts and tables. We will also

discuss and analyze our results.

Study participants:

I Living in Iran 30

S Living in Switzerland 36

IA Iranian who live Abroad 35

Table ‎3.1: Number of responses based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA)

We received 101 responses from people in these three categories.

Chapter 3. Facebook Survey 35

Sum of Response by Sex & Nationality=101

Male Female

I S IA I S IA

12 15 17 18 21 18

Table ‎3.2: Our survey responses based on gender and our three categories (I), (S), (IA)

Respondents were fairly evenly distributed, although there was a slight excess of

females living in Switzerland.

Age ranges for 101 respons s

16-25 26-35 36-50 <=51

I S IA I S IA I S IA I S IA

5 20 3 17 12 30 3 1 1 5 3 1

Table ‎3.3: Age ranges for 101 responses

As we see in Table ‎3.3, 87 of the answers (which are 86% of the 101 responders) are

in the range age of 16-35 years. Consequently, we have mostly considered our results

and analyses in terms of this age range.

Use Facebook

Male Female

Yes No Yes No

I S IA I S IA I S IA I S IA 1

0 = 8

3.33

%

12

= 80

%

16

= 94

.12%

2 = 1

6.6

7%

3 = 2

0%

1 = 5

.88

%

12

= 66

.67%

19

= 90

.48%

18

= 10

0%

6 = 3

3.3

3%

2 = 9

.52

%

0 = 0

%

Table ‎3.4: Overview of responses depend whether they use Facebook

As we see in Table ‎3.4, 14 respondents (14%) do not use Facebook. Far higher

percentages of females living outside of Iran use Facebook than those living in Iran.

The same is not true for males living in Iran, where the percentage (83%) is

comparable to Facebook users living outside of Iran.


Facebook user

Yes No

I S IA I S IA

N P N P N P N P N P N P

Q9: 12 54.55 30 96.77 26 76.47 10 45.45 1 3.23 8 23.53

Q11: 9 40.91 4 12.90 7 20.59 13 59.09 27 87.10 27 79.41

Q13 18 81.82 26 83.87 24 70.59 4 18.18 5 16.13 10 29.41

Q16: 7 31.82 4 12.90 8 23.53 15 68.18 27 87.10 26 76.47

Q18: 12 54.55 10 32.26 17 50.00 10 45.45 21 67.74 17 50.00

Q20: 3 13.64 8 25.81 5 14.71 19 86.36 23 74.19 29 85.29

Q21: 10 45.45 25 80.65 19 55.88 12 54.55 6 19.35 15 44.12

Q23: 17 77.27 30 96.77 32 94.12 5 22.73 1 3.23 2 5.88

Q25: 9 40.91 7 22.58 8 23.53 13 59.09 24 77.42 26 76.47

Table ‎3.5: Overview of our survey responses based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA) without

considering gender

In Table ‎3.5, we see the results of answers for the nine Yes/No questions without

considering gender. The blue section is for all these three categories (I), (S), (IA)

where the answer was Yes, and the red section is for persons in these three categories

who answered No. (N) is the numbers of persons and (P) is the percentages.


Facebook user

Yes No

I S IA I S IA

Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male

N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P

Q9 5 41.67 7 70 18 94.74 12 100 13 72.22 13 81.25 7 59.33 3 30 1 5.26 0 0 5 27.78 3 18.75

Q11 4 33.33 5 50 1 5.26 3 25 4 22.22 3 18.75 8 66.67 5 50 18 94.74 9 75 14 77.78 13 81.25

Q13 10 83.33 8 80 16 84.21 10 83.33 15 83.33 9 56.25 2 16.67 2 20 3 15.79 2 16.67 3 16.67 7 43.75

Q16 5 41.67 2 20 4 21.05 0 0 4 22.22 4 25 7 59.33 8 80 15 78.95 12 100 14 77.78 12 75

Q18 5 41.67 7 70 5 26.32 5 41.67 10 55.56 7 43.75 7 59.33 3 30 14 73.68 7 59.33 8 44.44 9 56.25

Q20 2 16.67 1 10 6 31.58 2 16.67 2 11.11 3 18.75 10 83.33 9 90 13 68.42 10 83.33 16 88.89 13 81.25

Q21 5 41.67 5 50 16 84.21 9 75 11 61.11 8 50 7 59.33 5 50 3 15.79 3 25 7 38.89 8 50

Q23 9 75 8 80 19 100 11 91.67 18 100 14 87.5 3 25 2 20 0 0 1 9.33 0 0 2 12.5

Q25 6 50 3 30 4 21.05 3 25 5 27.78 3 18.75 6 50 7 70 15 78.95 9 75 13 72.22 13 81.25

Table ‎3.6: Overview of our survey responses based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA) considering gender

In Table ‎3.6 we see the results of answers for the nine Yes/No questions when considering gender. The blue section is for all these three

categories (I), (S), (IA) where the answer was Yes, and the green section is for persons in these three categories who answered No. (N) is the

numbers of persons and (P) is the percentages.


In Figure ‎3.1, it can be seen that there are differences in responses depending on

whether Facebook users were Swiss (S) or Iranians (I), and also whether Iranians used

the social network application at home or abroad. In addition there are even greater

differences between male and female Iranian users of Facebook, particularly those

using it in Iran. The gender differences for Swiss Facebook users were minimal.

Q9: Do you know Facebook can share your information with third parties?

Figure ‎3.1: Results of Q9

Thus, 100% of male Swiss users versus about 95% female Swiss users know that

Facebook shares their information with third parties. These Swiss users for the most

part are either students or employed persons with higher education – i.e., bachelors,

masters or doctorate degrees – it can be concluded from their responses to the study‘s

questions on age, level of education and occupation (Q2-Q4).

Though the percentages are somewhat less, Iranians living abroad show similar

understanding of Facebook‘s lack of privacy. Thus, 81% of Iranian male users who

live abroad and 72% of Iranian female users who live abroad are aware that Facebook

shares their information with third parties. One reason for the high level of awareness

of Iranian users who live outside of Iran could be that lack of privacy in general is a

major concern of the media and academia in Europe, compared with Iran.

Gender differences become highly significant for Iranians who use Facebook at home

in Iran. For male users, 70% are aware of the privacy problem compared to only about

42% of female users. To put it another way, 30% of males versus nearly 58% of

female users in Iran – that is, nearly twice as many – do not realize their Facebook

postings are compromised. On the other hand, compared with male users, Iranian

female users are more careful about what they put on their Facebook pages, either in

their friends list, their profiles or in their comments.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO

Participant Responses

Q9: Do you know Facebook can share your information with third

parties?

I: Living in Iran

S: Living in Switzerland

IA: Iranian who live Abroad


Q11: Did you ever add people that you do not know to your friendslist?


In Figure ‎3.2, it can be seen that 40% of the Iranians living in Iran said ―yes‖ to this

question. But Table 3.6 on page 37 shows that gender differences for homebound

Iranians are substantial, with half of males (50%) versus a third of females (33%)

responding in the affirmative. For Iranians living abroad, the percentages of ―yes‖

responses for both males and females are smaller than for Iranians living in Iran, but

gender differences are negligible (19% of males and 22% of females responded

affirmatively). ―Yes‖ responses by Swiss users were 25% for males and 5% for

female, but the actual numbers of responders who said they added unknowns to their

friends lists – ie, three males and one female – was too small to validate the high

gender difference.

One reason for the high percentage of males living in Iran who added strangers to

their Friends list may be their desire to increase their connections so that they are not

isolated in their country.

What is central for this thesis is to see how important Facebook privacy is for the

service‘s users. Responses to Q8, presented in Table ‎3.7 , shows that only one male –

living in Switzerland – felt privacy was not important, compared to one female who

was living in Iran. So we can say the Facebook privacy problem, which is the main

subject of this thesis, is also of great importance to the people surveyed.

Importance of Facebook’s respect for privacy

Male Female

Yes NO Yes No

I S IA I S IA I S IA I S IA

12 14 17 0 1 0 17 21 18 1 0 0

Table ‎3.7: Importance of Facebook’s respect for privacy

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q11:Did you ever add people that you do not know to your

freindslist?

I: Living in Iran




Q13: Do you have any limitation for writing on Facebook?

Figure ‎3.3: Results of Q13 shows that most of them have some limitation for writing on Facebook.

We can see in Figure ‎3.3 that most of them have some limitation for writing on

Facebook. Figure ‎3.4 looks at gender differences:

Figure ‎3.4: Results of Q13 (*Considered by gender).

To summarize, around 80% of all Facebook users, with one exception, limit what they

write. The exception is the category of Iranian males living abroad, with only about

half of this group feeling they have to censure what they write. The differences may

be explained by the fact that Europeans in general are more aware of their privacy

vulnerability, which is slight, and Iranian women in general are more careful in all

cases about what they post on their Facebook pages. In contrast to their sisters,

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q13:Do you have any limitation for writing on Facebook?

I: Living in Iran



0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

yes No


Q13:Do you have any limitation for writing on Facebook?

Male

Female


Iranian males living outside of their country feel more freedom to say what they want

than they do at home.

In conclusion, it seems that users do not feel secure in Facebook, even those who

most need to use it. We should look at response of Q14 for a better analysis.

Q14: If yes in which part?

Figure ‎3.5: Results of Q14 shows that that the most important reason for limiting what they write on

Facebook for Iranians living either at home or abroad is Political.

The chart Figure ‎3.5 and Table ‎3.8 indicates that the most important reason for

limiting what they write on Facebook for Iranians living either at home or abroad is

Political. In the first position is category (IA) with 58%; in the second position is (I)

with 44%.

The next most important reason for these Iranian respondents limiting what they write

on Facebook is Family.

For non-Iranian residents of Switzerland, the (S) category, consideration of Family is

the most important reason for limiting what they write on Facebook. (S) category

responders put Other as their next most important reason. In explaining this choice,

some put Privacy as their reason; others came up with a reason like ―not to share all things to save mental energy”.

Then we see that, even for about 20% of Swiss responders, considerations of Politics

is an important reason for limiting what they write on Facebook. Despite the fact that

they live abroad, we see this even more in Iranians living in open societies (IA). One

explanation for this could be that they do not want trouble when they return to Iran.

And as the age range that we emphasized for our research is more or less between 16-

35 years, Iranians in category (IA) would likely have more contact with Iran than

older persons in this category.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Political Cultural Family Other



I: Living in Iran





Political Cultural Family Other

I 44.44% 16.67% 27.78% 11.11%

IA 58.33% 12.50% 25.00% 4.17%

S 23.08% 11.54% 34.62% 30.77%

Table ‎3.8: Overview on Q14 based on our three categories (I), (S), (IA)

Q15: In terms of “Data privacy”, how safe do you think is your information in Facebook?

Figure ‎3.6: Results of Q15 shows that the Swiss are those most likely to believe that, in terms of data

privacy in Facebook, their information is not safe, up to level of ―Not at all‖, with 35%.

We can see in Figure ‎3.6 that the Swiss are those most likely to believe that, in terms

of data privacy in Facebook, their information is not safe, up to level of ―Not at all‖,

with 35%. Further, about a third of Swiss responders think their information is only

―Moderately‖ safe and slightly fewer believe their Facebook information is ―Slightly‖

safe.

Going back to questions Q9 and Q11, we notice that the (S) category is in first

position and the (IA) category is in second position regarding their knowledge that

Facebook shares their information with third parties. The Figure ‎3.6 confirms the

conclusion that the Swiss believe their data are not safe on Facebook. It could also be

the reason why they include the fewest Facebook users who ―Friend‖ people they do

not know.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Compeletly Very Moderatly Slightly Not at all


Q15: In term of Data privacy, how safe do you think is your

information in Facebook?

I: Living in Iran




An interesting point here is that of responders in category (I), 18% think that their

data is completely safe; another 18% believe it is very safe, and 36% think that it is

moderately safe on Facebook. Compared with those in the two other categories,

Iranians at home (I) feel more confident that their postings are safe on Facebook.

Given the facts discussed in Chapter 2, one must conclude that this means that they

have not enough information about how Facebook works.

The responses of users in category (I) to the question of whether they know that

Facebook can share their information with third parties – Q9 – also suggests a lack of

information that Facebook share users information with third parties.

Q16: Did you ever have a bad experience on Facebook?

Figure ‎3.7: Results of Q16 shows in the total (I) category, 32%, reported that they had a bad

experience, which is the highest percentage of "Yes" responses.

All Swiss males in the study (100%) reported that they have never had a bad

experience on Facebook, whereas about one in five Swiss females (21%) said they

did. Somewhat fewer Iranian females living abroad said they had a bad experience

(17%). The group with highest percentage answering ―yes‖ to this question consisted

of females living in Iran (42%). Half that number of males living in Iran had a bad

experience (21%). This perhaps explains why females in general and females in Iran

in particular have been more cautious in their use of Facebook than have males.

Considering Figure ‎3.7 in the total (I) category, 32% reported that they had a bad

experience, which is the highest percentage of ―Yes‖ responses.

By seeing the results of Q17, we can see what sort of bad experiences Facebook users

have had.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q16:Did you ever have bad experience on Facebook?

I: Living in Iran




Q17: If yes, in which part?

Figure ‎3.8: Results of Q17 shows that highest percentages of those having bad experiences were for

category (I), Iranians living at home, and the bulk of these bad experiences is in the Emotional area,

with 57%. In second position for this user category is Security, with 43%. In fact, Security is one of

the main problems for users in categories (IA) and (S) as well.

Emotional Security Careers Honor Other

I 57.14% 42.86% 0% 0% 0%

IA 0% 50% 0% 0% 50%

S 0% 50% 0% 25% 25%


Based on Figure ‎3.8 and Table ‎3.9, we see that highest percentages of those having

bad experiences were for category (I), Iranians living at home, and the bulk of these

bad experiences is in the Emotional area, with 57%. In second position for this user

category is Security, with 43%. In fact, Security is one of the main problems for users

in categories (IA) and (S) as well. Both had the same percentage of 50%, which is

comparable to that for Iranians in the (I) category.

The ―Other‖ Explanations given by those in the (IA) category included: ―Sharing my

slightest activities with my friends,‖ ―Some of my friends were arrested by

government‖. For those in the (S) category, problems of Security and Honor counted

the most, with Security a problem for 50% of them and Honor and Other for 25%

each. The ―Other‖ explanation included problems such as ―hacked account‖.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%




I: Living in Iran




Of interest is the fact that no Facebook user had a Career problem from using the

social network service, and Honor was not a problem for Iranians at home or abroad,

even for female users for whom potential violations of honor might be considered a

major disincentive for using a service where privacy is not guaranteed.

Figure ‎3.9: Results of Q.17 (*Considered by gender) shows that the security problem for females, with

62%, is far greater than for males, with about 17%.


Male 33.33% 16.67% 0% 0% 50%

Female 15.38% 61.54% 0% 7.69% 15.38%

Table ‎3.10: Overview on Q17 considered by gender

In Figure ‎3.9, and then in Table ‎3.10 when we included all females in one category

and all males in another, we notice an interesting point: the security problem for

females, with 62%, is far greater than for males, with about 17%. We can say in

general that most of the bad experiences in Facebook for females is related to Security

problems.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%




Male

Female


Q18: Did you ever quit Facebook?

Figure ‎3.10: Results of Q18 shows more or less in all three categories (I), (S), (IA) –a minority of users

have quit Facebook at least once.

In Figure ‎3.10, we see that – more or less in all three categories (I), (S), (IA) – a

minority of users have quit Facebook at least once.

Our Table 3.6 on page 37 shows that, of those who quit Facebook, males in Iran

predominate (70%), followed by Iranian females living abroad (56%), then by Iranian

males living abroad (44%), Swiss males (42%), females living in Iran (42%), and –

the lowest number – Swiss females (26%).

By analyzing the responses to Q19, we can begin to understand the reasons.

Q19: If yes, why?

We gathered the reasons for quitting Facebook, as described below. Q19 was one of

the survey‘s open questions, which means that responders could answer or not answer

it, and they could explain their responses.

Here are the reasons for quitting Facebook given by female Swiss users (S):

1- ―I thought it was useless, because I don't care about what people post about their

life and I don't like to post something about my life. But I realize that Facebook is not

just that, there is other more or less interesting information.‖

2- ―I had to work hard and I spent too many time on Facebook.‖

3- political reason.

4- ―To enter Israel, they can ask you to open your FB so I closed my account to cross

the border. I am always thinking to quit but I find some advantage (keeping in touch

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q18:Did you ever quit Facebook?

I: Living in Iran




to far-a-way people, organizing events, having regular news from different pages and

newspapers...) ‖

Here are the reasons given by male Swiss users (S):

1- ―jealous girlfriend‖

2- ―passing too much time on Facebook‖

3- ―did not interest me anymore.‖

4- ―I was getting addicted to it.‖

Here are the reasons given by female Iranians living abroad (IA):

1- (4 times) time consuming and addicted,

2- Safety issue while traveling to Iran, Security problem, or b/c of political problem in

Iran while traveling back home

3- ―I did not like this communication it term of data privacy.‖

Here are the reasons given by male Iranians living abroad (IA):

1- (3 times) didn‘t like to waste time on it.

2 -―Its like cigarette‖.

3- ―personal reason‖.

4- ―I was not using it as much.‖

The reasons given by females living in Iran (I):

1- not usable,

2- ―tired of Facebook‖

3- ―spent too much time and decided to quite but lasted only a day or two!!.‖

The reasons given by males living in Iran (I):

1- ―because sometimes I have so much work to do and not enough time to sign in

Facebook‖

2- ―for short time at my exam‖

3- ―not waiting people to see my every move.‖

The most common reason in all of the categories was ―investing too much time on

Facebook‖.

One interesting result is that, for female Iranians living abroad (IA), the most common

reasons they gave for dropping the service, beside time consumption, were data

privacy, security, and the ―political issue‖ while visiting their country. Again, Honor

was not an issue for them.


Q20: Did you ever sign up on Facebook with any unreal profile information?

Figure ‎3.11: Results of Q20 shows the largest percentage of users who said they provided false

information on their profiles is from Swiss females (32%).

We can see in Figure ‎3.11 that most of users provide their real profiles on Facebook.

The largest percentage of users who said they provided false information on their

profiles is from Swiss females (32%). For the others, between 10 and 19 percent said

they had provided unreal information. One explanation for the low incidence of false

profiles is that a major use and benefit of this social network is to easily find family

members, old friends and others that users already know. As in Q.11, we see that most

study participants do not add people they do not know to their friends list.

By going into detail we see that the (S) category, with 26%, has the highest

percentage of users to enter unreal information on their profiles. As we have seen in

the responses to Q11, most of these users know that Facebook shares their

information with third parties. These users are also less likely than the others to add

people they do not know to their Friends list.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q20:Did you ever sign up on Facebook with any unreal profile

information?

I: Living in Iran




Q21: Do you know that even if you don't provide personal details of yourself on

Facebook, other Facebook users can approximately figure out who you are

(based on Friends, their posts and tags about you, your location and IP address

of your connection)?


In the gender breakdown of Q.21 responses, in Table ‎3.6 (on page 37), we see that

Swiss males (75%) and females (84%) are more aware than the other responders

about the risks of sharing data and also about the possibility of Facebook finding

them, even with false Facebook profiles. Females living in Iran (42%) know less than

other Iranians, consistent with preceding responses. This is not strictly a question of

gender, however, because 61% of Iranian females living abroad are more aware than

are Iranian males living abroad (50%) of the risk that their identity will be discovered

by Facebook despite their attempts to conceal it. Again, the explanation for the higher

awareness of Iranians living abroad could be their easier access to information

concerning Facebook‘s privacy policies. Facebook is ―filtered‖ in Iran, limiting

information about the social network.

What we see during our discussion concerning Facebook‘s privacy policy timeline is

that a gap of privacy now exists and it is known which information will be gathered

by Facebook – information that can be seen by third parties. As the range of people

for whom we have collected our results are between ranges of 16-35 years old, and

most are students or they have high level of education, we can conclude that this gap

of knowledge is probably worse than what we see in Figure ‎3.12.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q21:Do you know that even if you don't provide personal details of

yourself on Facebook, other Facebook users can approximately

figure out who you are?

I: Living in Iran




Q22: If yes what is your reaction?

Figure ‎3.13: Results of Q22 shows despite its privacy limitations, most of them will not quit Facebook

permanently because of its other advantages.


Quit

Facebook

Does not

matter

Important but still

use Other

I 1=10% 4=40% 5=50% 0%

IA 0% 6=46.15% 7=53.85% 0%

S 0% 4=16% 21=84% 0%


Even though they know that anyone can find out who they are when they try to

remain anonymous on Facebook, and even though they think this is an important fact,

84% of Swiss users (S) said they will use the service, as we can see from Figure ‎3.13

and Table ‎3.11. In other words, despite its privacy limitations, they will not quit

Facebook permanently because of its other advantages, such as being in

communication with their friends, organizing their activities with other Facebook

users, or simply finding out what is going on in the world from news reports or other

media. Interestingly, at least half of the Iranian users, both (I) and (IA), seem more

concerned about maintaining this communication than they are about any penalties

they might incur for violating government social network rules.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Quit Facebook Does not matter important but still use Other



I: Living in Iran




Q23: Did you ever change the privacy setting section in Facebook?

Figure ‎3.14: Results of Q23 shows that that both (S), at 97%, and (IA), at 94%, were categories with

very small differences in changing their privacy section.

Most responders said they had changed their Facebook privacy settings at one time or

another, with the fewest (75%) being females living in Iran, and the highest (100%)

being all females living outside of Iran, whether Swiss or Iranian. Males fell in

between.

Without considering gender, we can see in Figure ‎3.14 that both (S), at 97%, and

(IA), at 94%, were categories with very small differences in changing their privacy

section. Category (I) category is the lowest at 77%.

This result shows the general importance of privacy for Facebook users, and it

suggests a somewhat higher understanding of the function of Facebook‘s privacy

settings outside of Iran.

Of the three categories of respondents, Iranians in Iran are the most convinced that

social networks like Facebook respect human rights and privacy, either completely,

very much, or moderately. We can see in Figure ‎3.15 that most of the Iranians who

live in Iran, category (I), think that this kind of social network at least ―moderately‖

respects human rights and privacy. Only 23% of Swiss respondents (S) and 29% of

Iranians living abroad (IA) believe this, perhaps because of the negative publicity

surrounding Facebook‘s privacy policies in Europe that Iranians at home do not see.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q23:Did you ever change the privacy setting section in Facebook?

I: Living in Iran




Q24: How much do you think this kind of social network respects human rights

and privacy?

Figure ‎3.15: Results of Q24 shows that most of the Iranians who live in Iran, category (I), think that

this kind of social network at least ―moderately‖ respects human rights and privacy.

Q25: Did you ever read the Facebook Privacy Policy?

Figure ‎3.16: Results of Q25 shows less than 30% of study responders had ever read it – with the major

exception that 50% of females in Iran had done so.

Considering the complexity of the Facebook Privacy Policy (see preceding Section 2),

it should not be surprising that fewer than 30% of study responders had ever read it –

0%

15%

30%

45%

60%

Compeletly Very Moderatly Slightly Not at all


Q24: How much do you think this kind of social network respects

human rights and privacy?

I: Living in Iran



0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

I S IA I S IA

YES NO


Q25:Did you ever read the Facebook Privacy Policy?

I: Living in Iran




with the major exception that 50% of females in Iran had done so. For those living

outside of Iran, perhaps because of their lack of concern that their identities and

postings on Facebook can be accessed by third parties, only 25% of Swiss males, 21%

of Swiss females and 28% of female Iranians living abroad had ever bothered to read

the Facebook Privacy Policy. This is comparable to males living in Iran (30%), but

considerably higher than Iranian males living abroad (19%). Based on Figure ‎3.16,

Iranians in Iran (I) have read the Facebook privacy policy more than those in the other

two categories, (S) and (IA). But only a minority in all three categories has taken the

trouble to read it.

Arguably, the Facebook Privacy Policy, which is accessible on the social network‘s

Internet site, may be the best or only method for females in Iran to understand the

likelihood that the government will be able to identify them and read everything they

post on Facebook. Their higher concern over discovery by third parties, as illustrated

by their responses to preceding questions, explains why at least half of female users in

Iran have taken advantage of this information access.

Another possible reason for the low readership is that e-documents are so very

important today compared to the past that Facebook users rush to use the service

without taking the time to understand and use the privacy controls. They fail to see

that, if there are negative consequences to this lack of due diligence, the company and

its staff can simply say that they had informed you of their policy and it is your fault

if you did not take the trouble to find out what it is.

Q26: If you agree that better privacy needs to be given throughout the Internet,

what is your suggestion to do for social networks such as Facebook? (Explain)

Here are some of the comments received from the study respondents:

The comments given by female Swiss users (S):

1- ―Prohibit people to post picture/video showing some people they don't know (=

have as friend on Facebook), or people who don't want to be identified on the

picture/video. Actually this is not controlled so people who didn't want it can find

themselves on Google on other people picture.‖

2- ―There are alternative programs, such as Telegram instead of What's app, or Rise

Up for emails, that care much more about their users‘ privacy. We should use those

programs more. It would be good to have the company sensitized about the privacy

issue on Internet for children and adults, so that everybody knows what they are doing

on Internet. We should be careful not to be our own spy, creating our own ‗big

brother‘...‖

3- ―not share with third part the private information; don't track the movement

(linking friends, location, tastes...)‖

4- ―Non-profit website, such as ‗bewelcome.com‘ for example.‖

5- ―multi + private servers... but still not enough! I don't believe in governmental laws

about Internet privacy, I think people should take control on the Internet.‖

6- ―As a big company, Facebook will never take care about that...‖

The comments given by male Swiss users (S):


1- ―I suggest that people who do not have a friend in common with you, cannot add

you to their friendslist.‖

2- ―Stop trying to take the most money possible out of the customers, stop selling our

private data to commercials and politics––>those big groups like Google or FB are

acquiring more and more power by the information they are collecting and they are

pushed by states that want to have ‗rights‘ on the rights of users to control the free-

space that should be internet. It's a state systemic logic to want to control their citizens

(either totalitarian regimes like Iran or ―democracies‖ like US or UE). They shouldn't

be neither in a liberal logic of profit being in the ‗bourse‘ (wall street)––> that push

them to act hand in hand with all the praetors of liberties in fear of economic

consequences... ‖ [This text is a beginning of a longer response to the question.]

3- ―Social networks shouldn't work as a company with the goal of profits but as a

non-profit organization. Money has rotted the idea and has perverted the concept.‖

4- ―You don't post any private information on social networks. What is on Facebook

is public. It is the same as if I speak out loud in a bar or in the street. Maybe no one

will care, but they can at least hear me.‖

5- ―Personal information should be kept private. That is, no third parties should have

access to it. Social networks should only collect data that I explicitly agreed to be

collected.‖

6- ―Establish a network of Internet firms that verifies that social networks such as

Facebook are complying with privacy and people‘s data of their users and control the

drafting of conditions made by social networks. Moreover, it would be that users

should note a few times a year dangers that can occur and the consequences related to

publications, sharing photos, etc.‖

The comments given by female Iranians living abroad (IA):

1- ―Allow users to decide on what can be shared, and to whom it can be shared.

Disable the "auto-recognition" ability of Facebook. Disable third party data sharing.‖

2- ―Clear and short terms if reference - Not sharing any personal info with third party

- More and options for privacy setting control‖

3- ―If they really want to respect users privacy they should explain the policies in

brief and simple [terms], but I assume they are representing it in a complicated way

and, in case of any enquiries, they can easily get out of it.‖

The comments given by male Iranians living abroad (IA):

1- ―…fully manual and controllable privacy settings, which by default would limit

automatic postings and data sharing to its minimum.‖

2- ―Just logout‖

3- ―It should allow people to delete their data forever from even Facebook history.‖

4- ―I think they shouldn't share our information with third parties. Furthermore they

shouldn't track our IP address or gather our private information.‖

5- ―If privacy is the first priority for someone, it is better to quit Facebook or any

other social network.‖


6- ―It is all about the business. Even if you ask they don't care. Don't bother yourself.‖

7- ―The most important one is to stop sharing data with a third party.‖

The comments given by female living in Iran users (I):

(They had not any suggestion.)

The comments given by male living in Iran users (I):

1- ―I believe they should respect our privacy as much as possible; for example, not

sharing our information with third parties without our permission. On the other hand,

I understand that they need our information in order to boost their profits as well as

being prosperous. So I opine the suggestions would be limited and individuals who

use such social networks should be aware about the repercussions before registering.‖

3.5 Analysis and Summary of Study Results

The most important findings of this study are that most Facebook users between the

ages of 16 and 35 (ie, 87% of those surveyed):

know that Facebook can share your information with third parties. Those

living in open societies, such as Switzerland and Canada, are most informed

about this.

have never added people they did not know to their friendslist. Again, those

living in open societies were most conscientious about this.

limit what they write on Facebook, with more than 40% of the total number of

respondents – including Iranians, no matter where they live – doing so for

Political reasons.

think their information is either completely, very, or moderately safe on

Facebook. Non-Iranian respondents living in Switzerland (largely Swiss

citizens) are less persuaded than others.

never had a bad experience on Facebook. Of the minority who did, however,

most were Iranians who had Emotional, Security or ―Other‖ bad experiences

on the social network service. Most of the bad experiences in Facebook for

female respondents were related to Security problems.

never quit Facebook. Of the minority who did quit, most were Iranians living

either at home or in open societies. The most common reason given for

quitting was ―investing too much time on Facebook.‖ The problem of

―Honor‖ was not an issue.

never signed up on Facebook with unreal profile information, by very large

majorities. Still, about a quarter of non-Iranians living Switzerland did post

false profiles.

know that providing false – or no – personal profile details will not prevent

other Facebook users from learning who they are. This includes a majority of

Iranians living in open societies but slightly less than a majority of Iranians

living at home. Despite their knowledge of their privacy vulnerability, a

majority of users say it either doesn‘t matter to them or, even though they

know it is important, they will still use the service. This latter group includes

non-Iranians, mostly Swiss, living in Switzerland.


Changed their Facebook privacy settings at one time or another, with the

fewest being females living in Iran (75%) and the highest (100%) being

females living outside of Iran, whatever their nationality. Males fell in

between.

Believe this kind of social network at least moderately respects human rights

and privacy. Most of the other respondents think it only slightly respects

human rights and privacy, or not at all.

Never read the Facebook Privacy Policy, although 50% of females in Iran said

they had read it. For those living outside of Iran, fewer than 30% had read

Facebook‘s Privacy Policy.

57

Chapter 4

4 Study Limitations

In Section 2.1, we relied extensively on the work of Matt McKeon. However, his

published Internet article [6] and also Kurt Opsahl‘s analyses [7] did not include data

from the year 2008, so we have concluded that Facebook made no important private

policy changes that year.

In Section 2.2, we collected information from different sites, so the information was

not well organized as it had been in Mr. McKeon‘s study. We could not find one

exact comparison or chart for the years from 2011 to 2015. As we did in Section 2.1,

we tried to explain the changes in each year and then compare the changes.

In Section 3, we struggled with the problem of categorizing the participants in the

study, who were either Iranians, which we designated by the symbol (I), or were not.

However, a two-division categorization of participants would not include the answers

of Iranians who live abroad, despite the fact that a huge number of Iranian are living

abroad. We felt that including them for analysis and seeing the differences would be

interesting. We designated this category by the symbol (IA).

For the non-Iranian in our study, most lived in Switzerland, where the study was

conducted. We have identified them by the symbol (S). We cannot assume that all

residents of Switzerland are Swiss citizens, or that their thinking is necessarily

influenced by Swiss law, because about a quarter of those who live in Switzerland are

foreigners. For Iranians who live abroad, for example, Facebook is not ―filtered,‖ as it

is in Iran, but they are still influenced by Iranian law, especially those who expect to

return to their country. The influence may not be direct, but as long as they have an

Iranian passport, the Iranian government expects them to comply with Iranian law

pertaining to Facebook.

The statistical validity of discerning trends in subsets is problematical because the

respondents in some cases are too few for valid comparisons. For example the data for

Question 9 (see page 38) show that 70% of male Facebook users in Iran versus only

42% of female users in that country are aware that Facebook can share their

information with third parties. But the numerical difference between the two groups is

just two individuals, suggesting that if both had changed their response there would

be no difference at all.

59

Chapter 5

5 Conclusions and future work

5.1 Conclusions

These days we cannot live without the Internet. A consequence of this fact is that all

of our information may now be put online, without our permission, for everyone to

see – whether our friends, or their friends, or their friends of friends, or anyone else.

This is especially true of social networks, such as Facebook, where privacy policies

encourage widespread distribution of users‘ information, largely for commercial

purposes. Besides advertisers and others trying to sell us something (including ideas),

our private postings and information can be readily obtained by others – such as

government agencies, or thieves – whose purposes may be antithetic to ours.

In this thesis we considered Facebook as one important social platform that gathers

very large amounts of information from, and about, its users. We were interested in

the knowledge and understanding of the social network‘s privacy policies by

Facebook users in both ―open‖ and ―closed‖ societies, and its actual or potential

consequences to these users. We also drew on published literature concerning the

evolution of those policies from 2005 to 2015.

In our study of 101 respondents, we sought to find the main common aspects between

three categories of users – 1) those living in ―open‖ societies (Switzerland and

Canada), 2) those living in a ―closed‖ society (Iran), and 3) citizens of the ―closed‖

society temporarily living in an ―open‖ society. We also wanted to learn whether lack

of Facebook privacy was perceived as more of a problem in the ―closed‖ society than

in the ―open‖ society – with attention to whether the respondent was a male or female.

5.2 Answers to Study Questions

1. How and why has Facebook changed its privacy policies over the past decade?

We found that, compared to the year 2005, it is today far easier for other Facebook

users, and even third parties, including commercial entities and the government, to

gather information about members‘ habits, opinions, and lives – starting with their

60 Chapter 5. Conclusions and future work

identity, even if they try to remain anonymous. Essentially, anything that a user posts

on his/her Facebook site is now, and perhaps will be forever, in the public domain.

The reason is straightforward, although not specifically acknowledged by Facebook in

its public pronouncements. At least since 2010, Facebook's business model has been

to sell, or make available to third parties for financial remuneration, the private

information of its (non-paying) "users" which its (paying) "customers" want for

commercial or private purposes, such as advertising, product or other user

preferences, statistics, etc.

2. How and why might Facebook choose to continue or modify its privacy settings in

the future?

Considering its business model, there is no good reason for assuming that Facebook

will willingly improve its privacy policies, unless a) it is required to by government

regulation, or b) discontent over privacy issues starts eroding its user numbers. There

are some signs that government agencies, such as the U.S. Federal Trade

Commission, have taken the first steps to force Facebook to give users the ability to

keep their data private. In 2011, Facebook agreed to settle with the FTC to continue

allowing users to choose whether his/her monthly activities, such as becoming friends

with another user, would be private or generally available. However, Facebook has

since strongly argued that the settlement nevertheless allows ―privacy through

obscurity,‖ which should be sufficient protection. Deleting posts on your own

Timeline does not control how or whether others delete your Timeline posts,

according to one commentator [11].

As for user discontent, there is no sign (beyond complaints) that Facebook is losing

many of its users. In fact, since 2012, when the active user base hit one billion, it has

grown to 1.59 billion at the end of 2015[3]. However, in the early days of Facebook,

before it became a necessary fixture in the lives of billions (and before user data

became the company‘s cash cow), the company was cognizant of complaints about

privacy and instituted its early privacy policies, which did for a time encourage the

company to protect user privacy. Those days are over, unless competition from other

social networks makes Facebook listen to users‘ privacy complaints again.

3. What are the general needs of Facebook users regarding privacy?

Our study addressed this with a series of 26 survey questions, the answers to which

were analyzed discussed in Section 3.4. Respondents in both ―open‖ and ―closed‖

societies say they need to be able to choose the recipients of their personal

information, but they do not believe Facebook will give them this option.

4. How are these different for users in open versus closed societies?

Though the majority says they know that Facebook can share their information with

third parties, this does not appear to be of great concern to most users, even those

living in a closed society like Iran. Even there, where the results of privacy incursions

by the government can be quite serious, users say they will not quit Facebook,

because it is useful or even essential to them. With the exception of female Facebook

users in Iran, most respondents have never had a ―bad experience‖ on Facebook. (For

those women who did, the most common issue was ―security.‖)

5. Do users find Facebook controls easy to use, and do they use them?

Chapter 5. Conclusions and future work 61

With the exception, again, of female users in Iran, most of the respondents in our

study have never read Facebook's published privacy policy. Although the literature on

Facebook's privacy policies suggests that privacy controls are complex and difficult to

use, the great majority of the respondents in our study said they have changed their

Facebook privacy settings at one time or another anyway.

6. How do Facebook users in these different societies modify their online behavior to

meet their particular privacy needs?

Most of our respondents think their information is at least moderately safe on

Facebook. Consequently, the great majority of those in Switzerland, Canada and Iran

have never signed up with false profile information on Facebook. But rather than

completely relying on the service's privacy settings to protect them, the majority are

careful in whom they "friend" and what they post, with around 80% of all Facebook

users, with one exception, limiting what they write on the social network. The

exception, with about 70% limiting their Facebook writings, is the category of

Iranians living abroad. Of those, over half (58%) say the reason is ―political‖,

compared to 44% of Iranians living at home and about 20% of non-Iranians (mostly

Swiss) living in Switzerland.

5.3 Future Work

An extension of the current study with many more participants would achieve greater

statistical validity. In such a study, it would be beneficial to equalize the number of

respondents in each of the three main categories (I, S and IA), and also the number of

male and female respondents. Also, more respondents, and additional questions, could

better illuminate the reasons some users have quit Facebook. Also, with more

respondents, expressed opinions about Facebook could be collated to give a statistical

rather than anecdotal sense of what users think of the service. In our current study,

non-users and older users were too few to include in the results. A larger study should

include them.

Participants made many suggestions for improving their Facebook privacy

experience, although there was wide skepticism that the company would consider

their ideas, a feeling which seems to be universal among Facebook users. A common

suggestion was that Facebook must allow users more control in their privacy settings,

with clear instructions and ease of use. This had not been a problem a decade ago, but

several important changes the company made since 2010 have made it almost

impossible for users to achieve complete privacy in their Facebook postings.

Would applying the highest level of cryptography for data on this kind of platform be

a viable solution? This thesis does not explore this idea although it is a good subject

for a follow-up study. Another idea worth exploring is creating a strong international

law applied to the Internet world, one which would protect users‘ privacy, discourage

abuses, and still allow companies like Facebook to make a profit – to stay in business

and grow – while respecting human rights.

63

6 Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire

1- What is your gender?

Male

Female 2- How old are you?

>=15

16-25

26-35

36-50

<=51 3- What is your level of education?

Under high-school degree

High-school degree

Associate degree

Bachelor‘s degree

Master‘s degree

PHD or higher degree

4- What is your occupation?

Employed

Student

Retired/Non-employed 5- Do you use Facebook?

Yes

No 6- If not, Why?

Do not like it

Do not need it

Privacy aspect

Other

7- Which category are you in?


Living in Iran (I)

Iranian who lives abroad (IA)

Living in Switzerland [non-Iranian] (S)

8- Is it important for you that Facebook respect your privacy?

Yes

No 9- Do you know Facebook can share your information with third parties?

Yes

No 10- How many hours per day do you spend on Facebook?

Less than 5 min

5-10 min

11-20 min

21-30 min

31-60 min

More than 1 hour 11- Did you ever add people that you do not know to your friendslist?

Yes

No 12- If yes, how many approximately?

Less or equal to 6

More than 6 13- Do you have any limitation for writing on Facebook?

Yes

No 14- If yes in which part?

Family

Cultural

Political

Other

15- In terms of “Data privacy”, how safe do you think is your information in Facebook?

Completely Safe

Very Safe

Moderately safe

Slightly Safe

Not at all safe

Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire 65

16-Did you ever have a bad experience on Facebook?

Yes

No 17- If yes, in which part?

Emotional

Honor

Security

Careers

Others 18- Did you ever quit Facebook?

Yes

No 19- If yes, Why? (Explain)

20- Did you ever sign up on Facebook with any unreal profile information?

Yes

No 21- Do you know that even if you don’t provide personal details of yourself on Facebook,

other Facebook users can approximately figure out who you are (based on Friends, their

posts and tags about you, your location and IP address of your connection)?

Yes

No

22- If yes what is your reaction?

Quit Facebook

Does not matter for me

It is important for me but still I need to use Facebook

Other (Explain)

23- Did you ever change the privacy setting section in Facebook?

Yes

No

24- How much do you think this kind of social network respects human rights

and privacy?

Completely respects

Very much respects

Moderately respects

Slightly respects

Not at all respects


25- Did you ever read the Facebook Privacy Policy?

Yes

No

26- If you agree that better privacy needs to be given through the Internet, what

is your suggestion for improving social networks such as Facebook? (Explain)

67

References

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group/ (accessed March 2016)

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users-worldwide-by-platform/ (accessed March 2016)

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worldwide/ (accessed November 2015)

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settings over time‖, May 2010, URL http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/

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[11] Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, PCWorld ―Facebook Timeline Privacy Tips: Lock

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http://www.pcworld.com/article/249019/facebook_timeline_privacy_tips_lockdown_

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68 References

[13] ―Facebook gets rid of privacy setting for Timeline searches‖, October 11, 2013,

URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-gets-rid-of-privacy-setting-for-

timeline-searches/(accessed May 2015)

[14] Victoria Woollaston ―Now ANYONE can find you on Facebook: Outrage as site

removes privacy option for users to hide their profile in search results‖, October

11,2013, URL http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2454109/Facebook-

removes-privacy-option-users-hide-profile-search-results.html (accessed May 2015)

[15] Vindu Goel ―Flipping the Switches on Facebook‘s Privacy Controls‖, New York

Times on January 29, 2014, URL

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/technology/personaltech/on-facebook-deciding-

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[16] Jack Moore ―Mark Zuckerberg‘s Sister Complains Of Facebook Privacy

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[17] Gordon Gottsegen ―Here‘s How to Use Facebook‘s Mystifying Privacy

Settings‖, NOV 8,2015, URL http://www.wired.com/2015/08/how-to-use-facebook-

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[18] https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (accessed October 2015)

Social Media

Privacy Issues on Social Networking Platforms: the Case of Facebook