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Dynamical Models Explaining Social Balance Vincent Traag, Paul Van Dooren, Patrick De Leenheer Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain Social Balance I Social networks may have positive and negative links. I Sociological balance explains structure of positive and negative links. I “Enemy of my enemy is my friend”. I Balanced triads leads to balanced networks. I Balanced networks can be split in two factions. I Central question: what dynamics leads to two factions? Two Models I First Model ˙ X = X 2 . I Gossip about what neighbour k thinks of j . I Leads to social balance for symmetric initial conditions. I No social balance for non-symmetric initial conditions. I Second Model ˙ X = XX T . I Gossip about what neighbour j did to k . I Exactly same for symmetric initial conditions. I Leads (almost) always to social balance. Balanced Unbalanced Two Factions i j k ˙ X = X 2 The link to be updated. What does i think of k ? What does k think of j ? X (0) t X (t * ) i j k ˙ X = XX T The link to be updated. What does i think of k ? How did j treat k ? Evolution of Cooperation C D C b - c -c D b 0 Agents either Cooperate or Defect 5 10 15 20 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 b Fixation Probability ˙ X = X 2 ˙ X = XX T Against each other Against defectors 5 10 15 20 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 b Fixation Probability ˙ X = X 2 ˙ X = XX T Against each other Against defectors

Dynamical Models Explaining Social Balance

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Poster Presentation, October 3, 2012

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Page 1: Dynamical Models Explaining Social Balance

Dynamical Models Explaining Social BalanceVincent Traag, Paul Van Dooren, Patrick De Leenheer

Universite Catholique de Louvain

Social Balance

I Social networks may have positive and negative links.

I Sociological balance explains structure of positive and negative links.

I “Enemy of my enemy is my friend”.

I Balanced triads leads to balanced networks.

I Balanced networks can be split in two factions.

I Central question: what dynamics leads to two factions?

Two Models

I First Model X = X 2.

I Gossip about what neighbour k thinks of j .

I Leads to social balance for symmetric initial conditions.

I No social balance for non-symmetric initial conditions.

I Second Model X = XXT .

I Gossip about what neighbour j did to k .

I Exactly same for symmetric initial conditions.

I Leads (almost) always to social balance.

Balanced

Unbalanced

Two Factions

i j

k

X = X 2

The link tobe updated.

What does ithink of k?

What does kthink of j?

X (0) t X (t∗)

i j

k

X = XXT

The link tobe updated.

What does ithink of k?

How did jtreat k?

Evolution of Cooperation

C D

C b − c −c

D b 0

Agents eitherCooperate orDefect

5 10 15 20

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

b

FixationProbab

ility

X = X 2 X = XXT

Against each other

Against defectors

5 10 15 20

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

b

FixationProbab

ility

X = X 2 X = XXT

Against each other

Against defectors