Two faces of radical right wing populism betz

The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western EuropeAuthor(s): Hans-Georg BetzSource: The Review of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 663-685Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review ofPoliticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407611 .Accessed: 19/03/2011 04:54

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The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism

in Western Europe

Hans-Georg Betz

During the past several years, radical right-wing populist parties have made impressive electoral gains in a growing number of West European countries. Their dramatic surge to political prominence has obscured the fact that these parties hardly form a homogeneous party group. Generally, it is possible to distinguish between neo-liberal and national populist parties. Both types of parties are a response to the profound economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced societies interpreted as a transition from industrial welfare to postindustrial individualized capitalism. National populist parties are primarily working-class parties which espouse a radically xenophobic and authoritarian program. Neo- liberal parties appeal to a mixed social constituency and tend to stress the market- oriented, libertarian elements of their program over xenophobic ones. Rather than being mere short-lived protest phenomena, radical right-wing populist parties are a reflection and expression of new political conflicts created by the transition to postindustrial capitalism.

Politics in the advanced democracies of Western Europe is going through a period of profound transformation, which has largely been the result of marked changes in the relationship between parties and voters. Growing access to higher education, an overabundance of information, and the disintegration of traditional subcultures have contributed to a progressive dissolution of traditional party loyalties. Instead of following the lead of political elites, voters increasingly vote on issues and "shop around" for the best political deal. In most Western democracies there has been a considerable increase of floating voters as well as a rising number of voters dissatisfied with the limited array of political choices. The result has been a significant rise in voter abstention and blank or invalid votes, and the emergence of new political formations.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the most significant new political formations were new social movements and Green and other left- libertarian parties. Since the late 1980s, a growing number of West European democracies have come under pressure from radical

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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

right-wing populist parties.' Although hardly new to the political landscape of West European democracies, their recent explosive growth in a number of countries has made them the most significant political challenge to the political establishment and consensus in Western Europe. In recent years radical right-wing populist parties have made significant political gains in Scandinavia (the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties and the Swedish New Democracy party), Austria (the Freedom party), Germany (the Republikaner), and Switzerland (the Automobile party and the Tessin League), in Belgium (the Flemish Block) and France (the National Front), as well as in Italy (the Lombard /Northern League). Radical right-wing populist parties tend to distinguish themselves by their radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and sociopolitical system, their pronounced advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; their rejection of individual and social equality, their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups and the extension of democratic rights to them, and their promotion of xenophobia, if not overt racism; their populist instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety, envy, resentment, and disenchantment, and their appeal to the allegedly superior common sense of the common people against the dominant cultural and political consensus. In short, they seek to combine a classical liberal interpretation of the role of the individual and the economy with select topoi of the sociopolitical agenda of the traditional extreme and recent new right and deliver it to those disenchanted with their life chances and the sociopolitical status quo in general.

At least three developments account for the rapid diffusion and increasing acceptance of radical right-wing populism in West- ern Europe. Western Europe is in the midst of a political revolu- tion, which appears to have caught the established political parties largely unprepared. Having provoked voter disenchantment in large part themselves, the established political parties have lost much of the public's confidence in their capability and willingness to execute genuine reforms. This voter disenchantment stems from the established parties' inability to respond to the consequences of the profound socio-economic and socio-cultural transformation

1. Hans-Georg Betz, "Political Conflict in the Postmodem Age: Radical Right- Wing Populist Parties in Europe," Current Politics and Economics of Europe 1 (1990): 67-83.

I 664

RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM

investing Western Europe. This transformation is perhaps best characterized as a transition from industrial welfare capitalism to postindustrial individualized capitalism. The ensuing accelera- tion of individualizion and social fragmentation has provoked a wave of individual, regional, and national egoism, reflected in the political discourse of radical right-wing populist parties. Taking advantage of a sociopolitical climate of anxiety and resentment, they present themselves as "catch-all parties of protest."2 How- ever, their political programs show marked differences both in terms of political objectives and demands and the importance accorded to them. Whereas some parties pursue a predominantly neo-liberal-libertarian strategy, others pursue a primarily nationalist-authoritarian one.

A radical right-wing populist party's choice of strategy depends crucially on which social groups it is able to attract. That, in turn, depends in large part on the response of the established parties to the challenge posed by the transition to individualized postindustrial capitalism. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this model, the following analysis focuses on four prominent parties-the Italian Lega Nord, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Austrian FPO, and the German Republikaner.

Evolution and Electoral Gains

THE LEGA NORD "I am the savior of Italy." With this bold claim Umberto Bossi,

the undisputed leader of the Lega Nord, presented himself before the 1992 parliamentary elections to the Italian voters. Two weeks later, his party emerged with almost 9 percent of the popular vote as the fourth largest political force in Italy, a result which marked a turning point in postwar Italian politics. Despite the fact that by now the Lega is closely identified with Umberto Bossi, he had little to do with the origins of the leagues. The first regionalist leagues emerged in the Veneto in the late 1970s and scored moderate gains in the 1983 parliamentary election.3 However, their success was soon eclipsed by the rapid rise of Bossi's Lega Lombarda.

2. Thomas Childers, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote," Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976): 25.

3. Ilvo Diamanti, "La mia patria e il Veneto. I valori e la proposta politica delle leghe," Polis 6 (1992): 225-55.

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Umberto Bossi founded the Lega Lombarda in 1984 in the richest of the northern regions of Italy.4 Promoting Lombardian regional autonomy, the Lega had its first significant political success in the national elections of 1987, which started its rise to political dominance first in Lombardy, then throughout the north. The Lega received national recognition in the 1990 regional elections, where it scored 18.9 percent of the vote in Lombardy, and the 1991 local elections in the city of Brescia, from which the party emerged with 24.4 percent as the largest party ahead of the Christian Democrats. After this success, Bossi united the most important regional leagues in the north into the Lega Nord, with the objective of extending the party throughout Italy. However, the 1992 electoral success was confined almost exclusively to the rich North. There the party was well on its way to dislodging the Christian Democrats as the dominant political party as shown by its electoral successes in the local elections in Varese, Monza and a number of smaller communities in December 1992. These successes paved the way for the Lega's electoral triumph in the local elections in Milan in June 1993, where it received more than 40 percent of the vote and elected Marco Formentini mayor.

THE FPO

Compared to the Lega Nord, the Austrian Freedom party (FPO) has been part of the Austrian party system for most of the post-war period. Founded in 1955 the FPO succeeded the League of Independents (VdU) which had been formed in 1949. The VdU was an attempt to challenge the consociational type of democracy established by the elites representing the Christian-conservative and socialist subcultures. When the practice of consociationalism proved too strong for a "third force" to establish itself as a viable alternative to the two major parties the VdU quickly fell apart. Its remnants formed the FPO, whose national program soon attracted former Nazis and German-nationalists. Central to the FPO's na-

4. Daniele Vimercati, I Lombardi alla nuova crociata, (Milan: Mursia, 1990); Vittorio Moioli, II tarlo delle leghe (Trezzo sull'Adda: Comedit2000,1991); Umberto Bossi with Daniele Vimercati, Vento dal nord (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1992); Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega: Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 1993).



tional program was the rejection of Austria as a separate nation. Instead the FPO contended that the Austrians were part of the German Kulturnation without, however, questioning Austria's status as a separate, but German state.5 With growing distance to the Nazi period the leadership began to strengthen its commitment to liberalism. Particularly the coalition with the Austrian Socialists (1983-1986) "was seen as a success of the emphasis of 'liberalism' and the deemphasis of 'German nationalism."'"6 However, by 1986, growing dissatisfaction with the party leadership and a dramatic decline in voter appeal led a number of the party's rank and file to open dissent.

The opposition was led by J6rg Haider, the chairman of the powerful and strongly German-nationalist Carinthian party organization.7 A dynamic speaker with strong ties to the party's nationalist wing, young and telegenic, Haider successfully challenged the party's liberal leadership. Elected chairman in September 1986 just weeks before the general election, Haider orchestrated a successful election campaign which earned the party 9.7 percent of the vote. These were followed by a series of successes in state elections, which gave the FPO seats in state legislatures where they had been absent for years, and in the general election of 1990, in which the party gained 16.7 percent of the vote. Its successes culminated in the electoral triumph in the 1991 regional election in Vienna. With 22.6 percent of the vote the FPO inflicted substantial losses both to the conservative Austrian People's party and the Socialists, who had traditionally dominated the city. Despite the fact that the liberal wing left the FPO in the spring of 1993 and the Liberal International started proceedings to expel the party from its ranks, the FPO successfully maintained its position as Austria's third strongest party.8

5. Max E. Riedlsperger, "FPO-Liberal or Nazi?" in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Today & Tomorrow, ed. F. Parkinson (Detroit: Wayne State Univer- sity Press, 1989); pp. 259-62; Riedlsperger, "Mit der 'dritten Kraft' in die Dritte Republik, Manuscript, Department of History, California Politechnic State Uni- versity, 1993, pp. 7-15.

6. Anton Pelinka, "Alte Rechte, neue Rechte in Osterreich," Die Neue Gesellschaft/ Frankfurter Hefte 36 (1989): 104.

7. Hans-Henning Scharsach, Haiders Kampf (Vienna: Orac, 1992); Andreas Molzer, Jdrg! Der Eisbrecher (Vienna: Suxxes, 1990).

8. Max Riedlsperger, "Heil Haider! The Revitalization of the Austrian Free-

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66 TEREIE FOITICS

THE VLAAMS BLOK The year 1991 witnessed also the biggest political success so far

of the Belgian Vlaams Blok. The Vlaams Blok was founded in 1978 by former members of the Flemish regionalist party Volksunie to protest against the Volksunie's support for the Egmontpact, the first step toward the transformation of Belgium into a federal state. Accusing the Volksunie of having betrayed the nationalist aspirations of the Flemish population, they decided to launch a genuine Flemish nationalist party, the Vlaams Blok.9

Although contesting parliamentary elections since 1978, the political success of the Vlaams Blok remained rather limited. In the 1978,1981,1985, and 1987 elections the party never received more than 2 percent of the vote. Its support came largely from the nationalist wing of the Volksunie and sympathizers of right-wing extremist Flemish organizations.10 It was not until 1988 that the Vlaams Blok emerged as a major political force in the Flemish part of Belgium. In the communal elections the party received almost 18 percent in the city of Antwerp. This was arguably due in large part to the growing influence in the party of Filip Dewinter, a young activist in a number of right-wing extremist organizations and ardent admirer of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Charged with party organization, Dewinter both rejuvenated the party leadership and moved its political program away from Flemish nationalism toward racism and right-wing extremism.1

This strategy proved quite attractive to new voters. Thus in the European elections of 1989, the Vlaams Blok almost tripled its support compared to 1984 to 6.6 percent of the vote in Flanders, and gained more than 21 percent in Antwerp. This was enough to return Dillen to the European Parliament. Finally in 1991, the

dom Party since 1986," Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland 4 (1992): 18-58.

9. See Vlaams Blok, Grondbeginselen, Deume, no date, p. 3; John Fitzmaurice, "The Extreme Right in Belgium: Recent Developments," Parliamentary Affairs 45 (1992): 304-305.

10. Christopher T. Husbands, "Belgium: Flemish Legions on the March," in The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 1992), pp. 126-50; Christian Vandermotten and Jean Vanlaer, "Immigration et vote d'extreme-droite en Europe Occidentale et en Belgique," Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1991, p. 5.

11. See Philippe Brewaeys, "De Clan Dewinter," Knack, 3 June 1992, p. 80.



Vlaams Blok emerged as the undisputed winner of the parliamentary election. With 6.6 percent of the vote overall, and 10.3 percent in Flanders, the party surpassed the Volksunie and was largely responsible for the heavy losses of the established political parties.12

THE REPULIKANER

Compared to the dynamic rise of Lega Nord, FPO, and Vlaams Blok the political evolution of the German Republikaner has been characterized by a number of setbacks, which more than once threatened to destroy the party.'3 The Republikaner were founded in 1983 by Franz Sch6nhuber together with dissenters of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU). As a popular host of a Bavarian television show Sch6nhuber had excellent contacts to the CSU. He was part of the Bavarian establishment until he published his memoirs in which he recounted his days as a member of the Waffen-SS during World War II. He was dismissed by the Bavarian broadcasting service for having presented the Nazi period, and particularly the Waffen-SS, in a rather favorable light. In response, Sch6nhuber decided to get actively involved in politics. After modest electoral successes in Bavarian state elections the party gained immediate attention in 1989 when it scored 7.5 percent of the vote in the state elections in West Berlin. This was followed by 7.1 percent in the European elections and the expectation that the Republikaner might be on their way to become the fifth party to enter the German Bundestag.l4

However, growing disenchantment among its supporters with the party's call to welcome German resettlers from Eastern Europe

12. Marc Swyngedouw, "Het Vlaams Blok in Antwerpen: Een analyse van de verkiezingsuitslagen sinds 1985," in Extreem rechts in West-Europa, ed. Hugo De Schampheleire and Yannis Thanassekos (Brussels: VUB-Press, 1991), pp. 93-114; Xavier Mabille, Evelyne Lentzen, and Pierre Blaise, Les elections legislatives du 24 novembre 1991, Courrier hebdomadaire, no. 1335-36, 1991.

13. Uwe Backes, "The West German Republikaner: Profile of a Nationalist, Populist Party of Protest," Patterns of Prejudice 24 (1990): 3-18; Eike Hennig, Die Republikaner im Schatten Deutschlands (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991).

14. Dieter Roth, "Sind die Republikaner die fiinfte Partei?" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B41-42/89, 6 October 1989, pp. 10-20; Franz Urban Pappi, "Die Republikaner im Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik," Aus Politikund Zeitgeschichte, B21/90, 18 May 1990, pp.37-44.

669


and the Soviet Union (to which the large majority was opposed) and above all Sch6nhuber's failure to take political advantage of the fall of the Wall lost him much support.15 Prevented from participating in the first free elections to the East German Volkskammer in March 1990 the Republikaner failed to gain a foothold in the new Linder. In response to these negative trends Sch6nhuber sought to improve the party's image by drawing a clear line between the Republikaner and the extreme right, many of whom had joined the party. Despite strong opposition from the party's extremist wing and after protracted and vicious internal struggles Sch6nhuber managed to have his opponents expelled and fill the top of the party leadership with his followers.

Although Schonhuber had won the internal power struggle, his and his party's image had been severely tarnished. The result was a rapid decline at the polls. After failing to enter the Bavarian Landtag in October 1990 and with 2.1 percent of the vote remaining far behind their own expectations in the December general election the Republikaner appeared to be politically finished.16 However, in the 1992 election in the important state of Baden-Wurttemberg the Republikaner received more than 12 percent of the vote, which made them the third largest party in one of Germany's most affluent states. The local elections in Berlin later that year and the local elections in Hesse in the spring of 1993 confirmed these results. In both elections the Republikaner received more than 8 percent of the vote. With that the Republikaner not only contributed considerably to the disastrous losses of the two major parties, but also secured their position as the major party on the far right in Germany's changing party system.

Structural Changes and Their Impact on Voting

VOTER DISENCHANTMENT What explains the dramatic gains of radical right-wing popu-

list parties within a relative short time period in Italy, Austria,

15. Hans-Georg Betz, "Politics of Resentment: Right-Wing Radicalism in West Germany," Comparative Politics 22 (1990): 54-55.

16. Dieter Roth, "Die Republikaner: Schneller Aufstieg und tiefer Fall einer Protestpartei am rechten Rand," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B37-38/90, 14 September 1990, pp. 27-39.

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Belgium, Germany, and elsewhere in Western Europe? The most immediate explanation is found in the widespread disaffection with politics, growing cynicism toward the established political parties, and rapidly dwindling confidence in the political class's ability to solve society's most urgent problems. Analyses of survey data provide ample support for this proposition. In Germany, the proportion of voters who thought parties cared more about votes than their voters' opinions increased from 63 percent in 1980 to 75 in 1989. At the same time the number of respondents who thought that politicians were neither interested in what the average person thought nor knew much about it increased from 58 to 81 percent. The situation was similar in Austria and in Italy.17

However, can voter cynicism and disenchantment directly explain the dramatic increase in support for radical right-wing populist parties? It is certainly the case that their supporters are particularly disaffected with political parties, politics, and the political process in general. Thus in 1991, 81 percent of the (West) German population, but only 57 percent of Republikaner supporters expressed satisfaction with the state of democracy in Germany; 25 percent of the West German public, but only five percent of Republikaner supporters expressed trust in political parties. Simi- lar results were obtained in Italy and Austria.18 However, since disenchantment and cynicism have become so widespread, radical right-wing populist supporters differentiate themselves from the supporters of the established parties primarily by the degree of

17. Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, "Politisch-kultureller Wandel in Osterreich," in Staatsbiirgeroder Untertan? PolitischeKulturDeutschlands, Osterreichs und der Schweiz im Vergleich, ed. Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram (Frankfurt/ Bere/New York/Paris: Peter Lang, 1991), pp. 113-15; Renato Mannheimer and Giacomo Sani, II mercato elettorale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987), p. 16; Renato Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e simpatizzanti della Lega Lombarda dopo le elezioni politiche del 1992" (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992).

18. H.-J. Veen, N. Lepszy and P. Mnich, Die Republikaner-Partei zu Beginn der 90er ahre, Intere Studien, no. 14/1991-1992 (Sankt Augustin: Forschungsinstitut der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1992), p. 48; Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e simpatizzanti della Lega Lombarda;" Diamanti, La Lega, pp. 88-89; Plasser and Ulram, "Politisch-kultureller Wandel in Osterreich," p. 114; Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, "Uberdehnung, Erosion und rechtspopulistische Reaktion. Wandlungsfaktoren des osterreichischen Parteiensystems im Vergleich," Osterreichische Zeitschriftfiir Politikwissenschaft 21 (1992): 147-64.

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their disenchantment. What needs explanation is thus why, despite widespread cynicism, only a relative minority of the general public has yielded to the radical populist right's appeal. Underly- ing the following analysis is the argument that the established political parties are increasingly less prepared to respond to the challenge posed by the economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced Western democracies. This transformation has created winners and losers. When the established political parties fail to meet their political demands, both groups increasingly turn to new political formations.

SOCIAL BIFURCATION AND ACCELERATED INDIVIDUALIZATION The contemporary political space of advanced Western de-

mocracies is structured by a shift from modern industrial welfare capitalism to postindustrial individualized capitalism. At least three developments account for this shift: the rapid spread and diffusion of new information technologies which have allowed companies to switch from standardized industrial mass manufacturing to flexible specialization; the expansion of the service sector with the creation of new social, cultural, technical, and managerial services; finally the maturation of the welfare state which increasingly dispenses public services rather than transfer payments.19

Despite marked differences in the degree and extent to which postindustrial trends have manifested themselves in advanced Western societies, the patterns are rather similar. Generally the postindustrialization of society has entailed a bifurcation of the labor market into highly demanding and attractive jobs and "junk- jobs." In manufacturing, the shift toward flexible specialization has led to a fragmentation of the labor market into core and periphery sectors. The core includes flexible, mobile employees with advanced levels of formal education and technical training. They enjoy full-time, permanent positions with job security, relatively generous benefit packages, and good promotion prospects.

19. Stephen Crook, Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society (London/Newbury Park/New Delhi: SAGE, 1992); G0sta Esping-Andersen, "Postindustrial Cleavage Structures: A Comparison of Evolving Patterns of Social Stratification in Germany, Sweden and the United States," in Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies, ed. Frances Fox Piven (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 147-68.

672


Opposed to them is a growing periphery including both full- and part-time labor with little or hardly any formal education and/or technical training and few prospects for the future.

Similar tendencies can also be observed in the service sector. Its expansion has opened new opportunities for a growing segment of "symbolic specialists" defined as professionals with higher levels of education either in human- or culture-oriented public sector or public sector-dependent services or in business-or finance-oriented private sector services. At the same time there has been a significant growth of "McDonaldized" services which employ a new multi-collar service proletariat performing skill-poor "McJobs."20 Finally, the expansion of the welfare state has led to a general expansion of the public sector, both in traditional administrative tasks as well as in the expanding human-oriented services, which in some countries have increasingly become a domain of female employment.

The transformation of the economy and the labor market has significant social and political implications. As the diffusion of sophisticated information-driven technologies progresses, the need for un- and semiskilled workers rapidly declines. The "technological elimination of unskilled and semiskilled jobs means that a great many people will be caught in a world of despair, lacking market- able skills or hope for the future."21 Prominent among these groups are the long-term unemployed, female-headed single households with children, foreign workers, and unskilled young people.22

It would be tempting to see in the success of radical right-wing populist parties primarily a protest by marginalized groups which

20. Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), chap. 8; Robert Reich, "Secession of the Success- ful," New York Times Magazine, 20 January 1991, p. 42; George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society (Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Pine Forge Press, 1993); Douglas Adams, Generation X: Talesfor an Accelerated Culture (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 5.

21. Jerald Hage and Charles H. Powers, Postindustrial Lives: Roles and Relation- ships in the 21st Century (Newbury Park/London/New Delhi: SAGE, 1992), pp. 41, 55; see also Staffan Marklund, "Structures of Modem Poverty," Acta Sociologica 33 (1990): 125-40; Graham J. Room and Bemd Henningsen, Neue Armut in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 1990).

22. Rainer Geissler, Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992), pp. 165-93.

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society can do largely without.3 However, empirical studies provide little evidence for this view. Thus in 1989, Republikaner supporters were only slightly more likely (26 percent versus 22 percent for the general public) to place themselves in the bottom third of West German society. A similar picture emerges from a 1992 survey which tried to find out which groups thought society no longer needed them. Only 12 percent of Republikaner supporters (compared to 22 percent for the whole population) agreed with that statement. In fact, with 88 percent, Republikaner supporters were the most confident of all party supporters that society still needed them.24 These results suggest that the inclination to vote for the radical populist parties might not necessarily be a direct response to experienced social marginalization, which is still relatively limited. It might rather be the result of experiences directly related to changes in the workplace.

It has been argued that the increase in jobs that call for better education and higher qualifications has been followed by a marked increase in the level of professional autonomy and formal egalitarianism.25 Autonomy and egalitarianism at the workplace, in turn, are important determinants of social and potentially also political values and preferences: "people in jobs characterized by considerable autonomy come to value personal initiative, while people in jobs that are narrowly constrained or closely supervised come to value conformity and external authority."26 In politics, it can be expected that those better educated and employed in the high quality sectors of the postindustrial economy are most likely to eschew the largely elite-directed politics of the traditional parties and to get attracted to political formations which espouse a libertarian agenda. On the other hand, those performing narrowly constrained or closely supervised tasks, characteristic of traditional "fordist" mass production or the new McDonaldized services, are most likely to maintain their loyalties to the established parties or to get attracted to new political formations which espouse an authoritarian agenda.

23. Barbara Schmitter Heisler, "A Comparative Perspective on the Underclass," Theory and Society 20 (1991): 455-83.

24. See EMNID/Spiegel surveys, 1-18 March 1989 and 24-29 November 1992. 25. Crook, Pakulski and Waters, Postmodernization, p. 176. 26. Hage and Powers, Postindustrial Lives, p. 65.



THE RESPONSE OF THE ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES

Social bifurcation and fragmentation have given rise to distinct social groupings with rather divergent political expectations. Those better educated and employed in the human-oriented sectors of the public service tend to favor Green and other left-libertarian parties, representing a commitment to egalitarian redistribution, participatory democracy, and individual autonomy.27 Those better educated and employed in the private service sector can be expected to favor the free market, lower taxes and reduced welfare state outlays over extended state intervention. Finally those lacking human capital and thus most threatened by new modernization pressures can be expected to favor state intervention and the welfare state in general, as long as they themselves are the beneficiaries. Both groups are a potential constituency for the populist right, depending on the established parties" response to social change.

During the 1980s, the major established parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy have differed markedly in their response to postindustrialization. In Germany, the Christian Demo- crats began in the early 1980s an open debate on new issues such as feminism and multiculturalism in order to attract new middle- class voters. Although this strategy was likely to alienate conservative voters, the presence of a populist Bavarian CSU was supposed to ensure that disgruntled voters would remain loyal to the center- right camp. In Belgium, the election of 1981 saw large gains for the Flemish liberals, who managed to attract new voters by adopting a pronouncedly neo-liberal agenda, largely at the expense of the Christian Democrats.2 In Austria and Italy, on the other hand, the dominant center-right parties failed largely to adapt to social changes and the resulting transformation of electoral competition.

27. Herbert Kitschelt, "New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organization," in Challenging the Political Order, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 179-208.

28. Elmar Wiesendahl, "Volksparteien im Abstieg," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B34-35/92, 14 August 1992, pp. 9-14; Christan Vandermotten and Jean Vanlaer, "Partis et elections depuis 1946," Pouvoir 54 (1990): 66; Marc Swyngedouw, Waar voorje waarden: De opkomst van Vlaams Bloken Agalev in dejaren tachtig ISPO-schrift 1992/1, Leuven, 1992, p. 32.

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Instead of actively pursuing emerging social groups, the center- right parties sought to preserve their traditional clientele.29

Whatever way center-right parties chose to respond to social modernization, they could expect to alienate some of their traditional or potential clientele. In those cases where they consciously sought to attract the winners of the postindustrialization process, they could expect to alienate those voters who saw themselves increasingly left behind on the road to a postindustrial future. Where they appeared paralyzed when confronted with large-scale social changes, they could expect to alienate both winners and losers. Radical right-wing populist parties seeking to exploit voter alienation thus had to appeal to different social groups. This has had significant consequences for their political programs.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM A number of studies suggest that there are significant differ-

ences between radical right-wing populist parties in terms of the social background of their supporters and sympathizers. Some parties appeal primarily to lower-class voters, others to a more equal distribution of lower and middle-class voters. Generally male voters predominate among the supporters of all four radical right-wing populist parties. All four parties also appeal to a significant portion of young and first-time voters. Republikaner and Vlaams Blok voters distinguish themselves by their primarily low levels of formal education and training, their predominant working-class status, and their concentration in areas characterized by a relatively low level of quality of life.3 For example in Berlin and Frankfurt in 1989 the Republikaner were particularly successful in

29. Gianni Statera, Come votano gli Italiani (Milan: Sperling and Kupfer, 1993), pp. 102-104; generally, Giorgio Galli, Mezzo Secolo DC (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993); Fritz Plasser, "Die Nationalratswahl 1986: Analyse und politische Konsequenzen, Osterreichische Monatshefte 42 (1986) 8: 26; Fritz Plasser and Peter Ulram, "Abstieg oder letzte Chance der OVP?" Osterreichische Monatshefte 46 (1990) 7: 14; Gerfried Sperl, "Die Partei unter kraftigen Moderisierungsdruck," Das Parlament, 28 August 1992, p. 17.

30. Joachim Hofmann-Gottig, "Die Neue Rechte: Die Mannerpartei," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B41-42, 6 October 1989, p. 26; Ursula Feist, "Rechtsruck in Baden-Wurttemberg und Schleswig-Holstein," in Protestwahler und Wahlverweigerer: Krise der Demokratie?, ed. Karl Starzacher, Konrad Schacht, Bemd Friedrich and Thomas Leif (Cologne: Bund, 1992), p. 74. Roth, "Die Republikaner," p. 35.

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areas characterized by a high percentage of persons with not more than primary education and predominantly working-class status and deteriorating living (particularly housing) conditions. Similar developments may also explain the party's significant gains in the industrial areas of Stuttgart in 1992.31

Like the Republikaner, the Vlaams Blok has increasingly attracted working-class voters with lower levels of education, a significant number of whom come from areas (e.g., in Antwerp) characterized by deteriorating quality of life, even if the party has increasingly also gained ground in middle-class areas.32 These findings suggest that Republikaner and Vlaams Blok have established themselves in new electoral niches, opened up by the process of social fragmentation and bifurcation. This process is particularly pronounced in new service centers like Frankfurt or Antwerp where economic and socio-cultural change has split the city in two: one dominated by finance, banks, and business services, by culture, and the new middle classes, and one characterized by confined living spaces, limited life chances and the con- stant threat of material deprivation.33

The FPO and the Lega Nord appeal to a significantly more heterogeneous constituency. Particularly the FPO has attracted better educated voters, with a significant segment coming from the upwardly mobile middle classes.3 However, the FPO has increasingly also attracted voters with modest levels of education, reflected in a growing support from skilled and unskilled workers. One study suggests that the FPO gets support from three distinct

31. Hennig, Die Republikaner im Schatten Deutschlands, pp. 214-15; Horst W. Schmollinger, "Die Wahl zum Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin am 29. Januar 1989," Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen 20 (1989): 319; Feist, "Rechtsruck in Baden- Wurttemberg und Schleswig-Holstein," p. 73.

32. Marc Swyngedouw, "Het Vlaams Blok in Antwerpen: Een analyse va de verkiezingsutilagen sinds 1985" in Extreem rechts in West-Europa, ed. Hugo de Schampheleire and Yannis Thanassekos (Brussels: VUB-Press, 1991), pp. 93-114; Swyngedouw, Waar voor je waarden, pp. 27-28, 36.

33. Hans-Gerd Jaschke, "Nicht-demokratische politische Partizipation in der sozial polarisierten Stadt," in Protestwdhler und Wahlverweigerer, p. 99; Ronald Commers, "Antwerpen: Eine europaische Stadt driftet nach rechts," in Rassismus in Europa, ed. Christoph Butterwegge and Siegfried Jager (Cologne: Bund, 1993), pp. 135-43.

34. Plasser, "Die Nationalratswahl 1986," p. 8.

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social groups: younger, upwardly mobile, white-collar workers who have an above-average level of education and are welfare state-oriented; the growing segment of dynamic, younger, market- oriented white-collar workers and self-employed people with above average education; and predominantly skilled, blue-collar protest voters.35

Similarly the Lega Nord has managed to attract support both from blue-collar workers and the self-employed. The percentage of voters with higher levels of education has increasingly come to prevail over those with lower levels of education or none at all. At the same time, the party has managed to attract voters both in former Christian Democratic areas characterized by a medium- high level of development, and in former Communist areas characterized by a low level of development.36

These findings suggest that both FPO and Lega Nord have been significantly more successful than their counterparts in Ger- many and Flanders to pursue a catch-all strategy. In view of the Lega's rapid rise to dominance in Northern Italy this is hardly surprising. By contrast, both Republikaner and Vlaams Blok have gone through a process of proletarization which has considerably narrowed the pool of potential supporters, except in regions and areas with strong working-class presence. What remains to be analyzed is whether and to what degree the divergent social bases of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe find reflection in the political programs these parties espouse.

Political Program: Neo-liberal and Authoritarian Populism

FIGHTING THE POLITICAL CLASS The rise of radical right-wing populism has coincided with a

profound disaffection with established politics. It is hardly sur-

35. Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Alfred Grausgruber, "The Decline of 'Lager Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria," West European Politics 15 (1992) 1: 40-41.

36. See Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e simpatizzanti dell Lega Lombarda;" DOXA, "La novita delle 'proiezioni DOXA '92': Il sondaggio all' uscita dai seggi," Bolletino della DOXA 46,14 April 1992; Paolo Natale, "Lega Lombarda e insediamento territoriale: un' analisi ecologica," in La Lega Lombarda, ed. Renato Mannheimer (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991), p. 108; Diamanti, La Lega, pp. 98-99; Statera, Come votano gli Italiani, pp. 62f.



prising that the radical populist right has quickly adopted this issue. They present themselves as the main advocates of the concerns of ordinary citizens while promoting a fundamental renewal of the established order. They owe much of their success to their skillful translation of popular disaffection with politics into poignant attacks on the palazzo (Lega Nord), its corruption and inefficiency, and against the arrogance of the "political mafia" (Vlaams Blok) who dismiss the views of the common people while enriching themselves at their expense.37 In view of the series of political scandals which have erupted in Spain, France, Germany, and particularly Italy, these charges are hardly unfounded. In the face of a system sustained by clientilism, favoritism, and close ties between the political class and organized crime, it is hardly surprising that Umberto Bossi's assertion that only with him Italy will have "honesty, cleanness, transparency, and above all TRUE DE- MOCRACY" has had growing appeal.3

In addition to charging the established parties with unrespon- siveness and corruption, particularly the Republikaner and Vlaams Blok accuse them of having sold out the national interest: the betrayal of Flemish separatism or the sellout of German interests in the lost Eastern territories. In addition, both parties charge the established parties with seeking to establish a multicultural society which promotes the extinction of the cultural identity of the indigenous people and threatens their very survival.39

NEO-LIBERAL POPULISM If FPO and Lega Nord differ in their analysis of the causes of the

current sociopolitical impasse from Republikaner and Vlaams Blok, they also differ from them in terms of the remedies they propose. For FPO and Lega Nord the remedy lies in a radical neo- liberal program. This program calls for the reduction of some taxes and the outright abolition of others; a drastic curtailing of the role of the state in the national economy together with large-scale privatization of the public sector and particularly the state-

37. Vlaams Blok, "Zeggen wat u denkt", Deume, no date, p. 9. 38. Umberto Bossi in Lega Nord Centro Sud, no. 62-68,1-7 March 1992, pp. 1-2. 39. Die Republikaner fir Baden-Wiirttemberg: Landtagswahlprogramm '92,

Stuttgart, 1992, p. 2; Vlaams Blok, Uit Selfverdediging: Verkiezingsprogramma 1991, Brussels, 1991.

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controlled media; a general deregulation of the private sector; and a restructuration and professionalization of the public sector. The main beneficiaries of these measures should be small and medium- size enterprises. Both parties expect these enterprises to play a dominant role in the further development of advanced Western societies, particularly if new technologies allow them to compete effectively with larger enterprises.40 In the Italian case, the Lega has also proposed to divide the country into three largely autonomous macro-regions within a loose Italian federation and even threatened with secession. However, with growing success at the polls and growing charges that the Lega sought separatism rather than federalism, Bossi increasingly abandoned the notion of a "North- ern Republic."41

AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM

Although also Republikaner and Vlaams Blok have cautiously moved toward espousing neo-liberal economic principles, their economic ideas are of only peripheral significance for their political program.42 Instead they promote an authoritarian, xenophobic nationalism as a basis for political renewal. This includes a strong emphasis on law and order, a return to traditional values, and an end to the confrontation with the past (the Holocaust in the German, collaboration in the Flemish case). In the case of the Vlaams Blok this program includes the demand for full indepen- dence for Flanders with Brussels as the capital, recuperation of all lost Flemish territories and unification of all Flemings, and a federation with the Netherlands in a united Europe of regions. In the case of the Republikaner it includes the continued questioning of the finality of Germany's territorial losses in the East.43 But most important, authoritarian nationalism means the promotion of xenophobia, if not racism.

40. Giulio Savelli, Che cosa vuole la Lega (Milan: Longanesi and Co., 1992). 41. Bossi with Vimercati, Vento dal nord, chap. 13; Umberto Bossi and Daniele

Vimercati, La rivoluzione - La Lega: storia e idee (Milan: Kupfer and Sperling, 1993), chap. 4.

42. Die Republikaner fir Baden-Wirttemberg, p. 15; Vlaams Blok, Uit Zelfverdediging, p. 25.

43. Vlaams Blok, Manifest van het rechtse Vlaams-nationalisme: Grondbeginselen, Deure, no date, pp. 6-7, 15-16; Die Republikanerifur Baden-Wiirttemberg, p. 19-20.

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"Save the welfare state: expel false refugees! Eliminate unemployment: stop immigration! Fight against crime: deport foreign criminals!" These slogans promoted by the Republikaner reflect and express growing concern that the unrestricted influx of East- ern European and especially non-European political and economic refugees is adding to an already overburdened welfare state, creating unemployment, and augmenting crime rates.44 Both the Republikaner and the Vlaams Blok have been quick to exploit these concerns to mobilize voters against an alleged "invasion" of economic refugees. At the same time they have started to appeal to latent fears that as a result of the growing influx of foreigners, Western Europe will lose its ethnic and national identity. Particu- larly in response to the growing visibility and assertiveness of Muslims in Western Europe both parties call on Western European societies to "meet the Muslim challenge" in order to prevent Islam from achieving "religious world domination."45 In order to contain and reduce the number of immigrants both parties demand drastic administrative and executive measures including hermetically closing the borders, ports and airports to illegal immigrants, the immediate eviction of refugees not recognized as political refugees, and the eventual return of all immigrants and refugees to their home country.46 At the same time they promote pro-family policies (e.g., a strict ban on abortion) in order to arrest and reverse Western Europe's demographic decline.

BETWEEN THE POLES: LEGA NORD AND FPO

Xenophobia and a return to authoritarian values play a subor- dinate role in the programmatic conceptions of FPO and Lega Nord. In line with their generally libertarian convictions neither party has been prepared to endorse restricting a woman's right to have an abortion.47 The situation is different in regard to immigra-

44. For the Vlaams Blok see Annemans and Dewinter, Dossier Gasdarbeid; for the Republikaner see especially Republikanerfiir Baden-Wirttemberg, pp. 4-14.

45. Die Republikaner, "Deutsche Biirger wehrt Euch!" leaflet, 1992; Die Republikanerfiir Baden-Wirttemberg, p. 19; for the Vlaams Blok see Filip Dewinter, Immigratie: De Opplossingen, Merksem, no date, pp. 8-9.

46. See Fr6deric Larsen, "En Belgique, l'extreme droite s'installe dans les coulisses de pouvoir," Le Monde Diplomatique, no. 455,8 February 1992, p. 8.

47. FPO, Osterreich politisch erneuern: Programm der Freiheitlichen Partei Osterreichs, FBW Informationen, 6/89, paragraph 195.

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tion. In fact, the Lega's initial success stemmed in part from the party's open hostility toward immigrants from southern Italy. However, Bossi's attempt to extend the Lega throughout Italy, led the party to drop their anti-Southern diatribes and focus instead on the "invasion of blacks and Arabs" which by the late 1980s was gaining growing attention in Italian society. The Lega called for a "rigorous control of immigration" by allowing only those to immi- grate into Italy who had prove of a job and of housing. However, by 1992, the Lega relegated the question of immigration to the margins of its political program.48 There is, however, a notable exception: like other populist parties the Lega has shown growing hostility to Muslim immigrants, going so far as to brand Islam the main threat to Western civilization.49

In the case of the FPO the development has been reverse. Originally the FPO justified their opposition to immigration with arguments which resembled those of the Lega. Although Austria had a duty to show solidarity with the rest of the world, solidarity could only be guaranteed if immigration remained within reason- able limits. While the FPO recognized the right to asylum, it demanded strict measures against abuse by economic refugees and, at least in the case of Vienna, home to a large immigrant population, a complete immigration stop. At the same time, nationalists in the party attacked the notion of a multicultural society in Austria, "the results of which are not cultural cross-fertilization, but tremendous human misery and large economic damage."50 By 1992, the FPO sharpened its tone. The party presented a compre- hensive anti-immigrant program which, in addition to the usual anti-immigrant measures, called for completely halting immigration until a solution had not been found for the growing problem of illegal immigration, lack of housing, and unemployment.51 With these demands the FPO was seeking to exploit growing hostility

48. Vittorio Moioli, I nuovi razzismi: Miserie efortune della Lega lombarda (Rome: Edizioni Associate, 1990); "Programma della Lega Nord," Lombardia Autonomista, 5 March 1992, p. 9; Bossi with Vimercati, Vento dal nord, pp. 143-50.

49. See the interview with Umberto Bossi "Meglio gli Usa che i barbari," II Sabato, 24 July 1993, p. 34; and the position of the mayor of Monza, quoted in M. G. Cutuli, "Monza: I cento giori che sconvolsero la citta," Epoca, 29 June 1993, p. 19.

50. FPO, Heimatsuche; Andreas Molzer, "Tragodie der Multikultur," Neue Freie Zeitung, no. 20, 13 May 1992, p. 7.

51. FPO, Osterreich zuerst, Vienna, 1992.

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toward foreigners in Austria, even if that meant moving closer to the extremist end of the political spectrum.

EXPLAINING PROGRAMMATIC SHIFTS

Surveys suggest that the programmatic shifts of the Lega and the FPO on immigration came in response to shifts in their electoral basis. With growing success in northern Italy the Lega Nord experienced a growing influx of better educated middle-class voters less likely to support an outrightly xenophobic party. This is reflected in polls which indicate the low importance immigration had for Lega supporters. Thus in 1990, 81 percent of Lega voters in Milan said they voted for the Lega out of opposition to inefficiency and bureaucracy in Rome, but only 26 percent to defend Lombardy against an excessive number of immigrants and foreigners. Similarly in 1992, two-thirds of Lega Nord voters said that taxes paid in the north should be spent in the region, but only 19 percent said they thought non-European immigrants could not integrate easily because they were different from Italians.52

Whereas the Lega Nord has increasingly appealed to middle- class voters, the FPO has been attracting a growing portion of the blue-collar vote. In the Viennese election, 35 percent of skilled workers voted FPO; 20 percent of its overall support came from blue-collar voters. This trend continued in the local elections in Graz in 1993, where the FPO was particularly successful in working-class neighborhoods. At the same time a growing number of voters said they voted for the FPO because of its stance on the immigration question (41 percent in the Viennese election). By the end of 1992, almost three-quarters of FPO supporters agreed with the party's proposals to reduce the influx of immigrants into Austria.53 This suggests that the increase in working-class supporters found expression in a considerable hardening of the FPO's position on immigration. The defection of the FPO's liberal wing is likely to diminish the party's appeal to middle-class voters, thus making it more dependent on working-class support and, with it, on the immigration issue.

52. Renato Mannheimer, "Chi vota Lega e perch6," in La Lega Lombarda, p. 144; Renato Mannheimer, "Gli elettori e simpatizzanti della Lega Lombarda," no page.

53. See Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, "Exit Poll GRW Wien "91," mimeo, Fessel + GFK Institut, Vienna, 1991; SWS survey, FB288, November/December 1992.

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POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL AGE The recent dramatic rise in support for radical right-wing

populist parties in Western Europe has obscured the fact that these parties are far from representing a homogeneous phenomenon. In fact it is possible to differentiate between two party families in terms of the social basis of their support and their programmatic focus. National populist parties tend to appeal to voters with lower level of education, working-class status, from areas characterized by a lower quality of life. Reflecting the anxieties and resentments of this clientele, national populist parties tend to emphasize law and order, traditional moral values, and radical opposition to immigrants and refugees. Besides the Republikaner and the Vlaams Blok the only other significant party which belongs to this group is the French Front National.

Neo-liberal populist parties tend to appeal to voters with higher level of education and mixed social status. Reflecting the aspirations of this clientele these parties tend to stress individual- ism and a market-oriented liberalism while placing less emphasis on immigration. The Lega Nord, the Swiss Tessin League, the Scandinavian Progress parties and the Swedish New Democracy party belong to this group. Among those parties which place equal emphasis on both a neo-liberal economic and an anti-immigrant program are the FPO and the Swiss Automobile party.

The composition of their electoral basis and their programmatic evolution suggest that these parties reflect and respond to emerging postindustrial political conflicts. One such conflict is over the future role of the state. Its main opponents are better educated public sector employees in the human-oriented services who support continued state intervention in the economy and state-sponsored redistributive policies and private sector employees who privilege private initiative and efficiency and seek to curtail and restrict the role of the state. Politically this conflict pits Green and other left-libertarian parties against neo-liberal populist parties. In northern Italy, for example, it finds expression both in the rise of the Lega Nord and the concomitant gains of its left- libertarian counterpart, La Rete (the Net).54

54. See Giulio Savelli, "E adesso serve una Lega nel Centro-Sud, L "Independente, 22 June 1993, pp. 1-2.

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A second conflict is over the question of what obligation society has to those sectors of the economy which technological progress and global competition threaten with obsolescence. Its main opponents are workers and employees in the "sunshine sectors" of the economy, primarily interested in wage increases, a shortening of the work week, and greater autonomy at the work place and workers threatened by rationalization who seek job security.55 Politically this conflict pits the established political parties not only against national populist parties, but potentially also against neo-liberal parties. A third conflict pits advanced against more backward regions. Both national and neo-liberal populist parties have emerged in some of the most prosperous and affluent regions of Western Europe, expressing both a new regional assertiveness and a growing regional egoism. Important representatives are the Lega Nord and the Vlaams Blok.56 In Germany, the Republikaner's German-nationalist programmatic has so far prevented them from exploiting growing conflicts between West and East Germans. Increasing support for political parties which appeal to these sentiments portends rather ill for the future of European integration.

The transformation of advanced West European societies thus creates profound sociopolitical tensions which have given rise to new political formations. To dismiss these formations as mere expressions of political protest not only fails to confront the dramatic reality of economic, social, and cultural change, but also dismisses their relevance for political renewal. If their past electoral history is any indication, radical right-wing populist parties are hardly a flash in the pan. Rather they are a reflection and expression of the ambiguities that characterize the postindustrial age.

55. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, "Gesellschaftliche Desintegrationsprozesse als Ursachen von fremdenfeindlicher Gewalt und politischer Paralysierung," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B2-3/93, 8 January 1993, pp. 7-8.

56. Luca Ricolfi, "Politica senza fede: l"estremismo di centro dei piccoli leghisti," II Mulino 42 (1993): 53-69.

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Two faces of radical right wing populism betz