An Archetype for European Security

Lt Col Ramon MartinezU. S. Air Force National Defense FellowGraduate School of International Studies

IIniversity of Miami

April 27, 1993

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AN ARCHETYPE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

.:SUMMARYThis paper examines the causes and solutions to the problem of

military security in Europe. Specifically, the thesis is that amodified North Atlantic Treaty Organization using a "ResilientDefense" strategy serves as a transitional scheme while aFederation for European Military Security is a desirable, feasible,and long term scheme for resolving the problems of uncertainty anda just peace in Europe.

Presenting empirical data compiled by noted warfare researchanalysts, this paper discusses general trends associated with war.Next, presented and discussed are the following proposed militaryschemes: i) end all alliances while nation-states maintainmilitary forces only at the necessary level for defending itspolitical sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) a NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization using a "Resilient Defense" strategyto manage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization irony; 3) theWestern European Union; and 4) the Pan-European Army. Although notan exhaustive list, these four schemes are paradigmatic of a'.multitude of proposed schemes.

'Proposing a thought experiment, derived is a method evaluating.any proposed military scheme. Imagining an original position whileimposed restrictions under a veil of ignorance, the principles ofliberty, truth, and equality are selected in devising a desirableand feasible scheme. Lastly, a Federation for European MilitarySecurity is selected as the scheme promoting development within thecontext of an uncertain European future while maintaining a free,

..secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.

The views and opinions expressed in this document representthe personal views of the author ottly, and should not in any way beconstrued to reflect any endorsement or confirmation by theDepartment of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or any jother agency of the United 6tates Government.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

An Uncertain Europe.. 1

A Scientific Analysis of War.. 2

International Wars.. 2

Alliances..... .12

'Polarization........ .15

Systems of Power.. 19

The Reliability of Alliances.. 19

Major Power Intervention.. 21

Universalist and ParticularistPolicies.. .... .22

Factors and Consequences of War............ 26

'.Population and Revenue.. 26

The Distribution of Powerand Growth Rate.. ..... 28

Summary of the Scientific'Analysis of War.. .. 28

End Alliances.. 30

The North Atlantic TreatyOrganization.. .32

The Western European Union.. 37

The Pan-European Army ................ 39

The Original Position and the..'Federation.. .41

Conclusion.. ...46

AN iTN('F.RTAiN F.iTRnPF.

In a short span of time, Europe has witnessed a myriad ofchanges. While the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is replacedby the Commonwealth of Independent States, East and West Germany

'.:achieved reunification. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved and the4Baltic Republics are independent. Czechoslovakia is granted avelvet divorce and Yugoslavia is fragmented and consumed by brutalarmed conflicts between powerfully irreconcilable ethnic groups.With innumerable changes rapidly occurring in Europe during the1990s, it is not clear what national military security policyPresident Clinton's administration should develop for this region.This paper intends to display that both short and long termpolicies can be coherently developed to provide for a relativelypeaceful Europe.

The mutable conditions currently manifested in Europe suggesta dynamically complex process introducing immense uncertainties inEuropean military security. Since these alterations import risks,they pose a danger within the region. Europe presently consists ofestablished and stable democracies and constitutional monarchiesalongside new and fragile democracies. Federationalism andnational and ethnic affiliation claim foreground attention as a.prevailing political principle of legitimacy; political and`economic concerns fluctuate between integration and disintegration;and military security structures experience vicissitudes ofsupranational, national, and multipolar networks.

These changes, although filled with uncertainties and danger,provide the context for challenging Unites States' and Europe'sforeign policy makers to use their imagination in developingmilitary security schemes that adequately deal with the uncertaintyof a European future, while maintaining a free, secure, just, andrelatively peaceful Europe.

The issue confronting policy makers is whether the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can perform this function well.In approaching this issue, some general trends will be identifiedusing compiled empirical data concerning wars in Europe. Next,four proposed military schemes for resolving this issue will bepresented and discussed. Then, proposing a thought experiment todetermine whether all security schemes for Europe have beenexhausted, a method for deciding which military scheme to implement

provided. Finally, deriving certain principles from thisthought experiment, a different military security scheme emerges.

Upon analyzing the empirical data and the dynamically complexphenomenon of European security, it is possible to developalternatives that may appear contradictory. Each alternative hasa kernel of truth and struggles to dominate the foreground ofreality; however, if we momentarily step back and look at the

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background, a new picture emerges and each truth gains meaning inrelation to the picture. It is the thesis of this paper that NATOshould be modified and treated as a transitional military scheme,and that a desirable and feasible cooperative security structurecan be developed for resolving the long term .problems ofuncertainty and a just peace in Europe.

A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF WAR

As a preliminary to analyzing the four proposed Europeanmilitary security schemes, it is best to present empirical datacompiled by noted warfare research analysts. The objective is toidentify and briefly discuss some regularities of behaviorassociated with international war, particularly European wars.Then, we will test the proposed military security schemes with theexisting data to reveal their meaning.

A plethora of empirical war studies have been generated;therefore, to properly analyze the proposed schemes, we must focusour attention on Europe. Due to the availability andcomprehensiveness of the compiled empirical data, with fewexceptions, the time-frame is limited to the period of 1815-1980.

INTERNATIONAL WARS

We begin the study using data compiled by historian MelvinSmall and political scientist J. David Singer on the "Patterns inInternational Warfare, 1816-1980.° I Table 1 presents dataregarding systemic and extra systemic wars. Systemic wars are

`those fought between legitimately recognized members of aninternational system, and comprising a population of at least'500,000.2 Extra-systemic wars are those fought between members ofthe international system against independent or colonial entitiesrwhich did not qualify for membership in the system.3 Inter-statewars have at least one major power actively participating with each'side sustaining at least 1,000 battle-connected fatalities.°

~ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Patterns In InternationalWarfare, 1816-1980," in International War: An Anthology, ed. M.Small and J. D. Singer (Pacific Grove, CA., 1988), pp. 28-30.

z Ibid., p. 27.

3 Ibid.

° J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, ~~CapabilityDistribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1829-1965," in TheScientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez Iand M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 43.

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TABLE 1 International War, 183i~-19$O (C4ntinuedJ'

Battle Nation3dame crf --~Wat Deatha Months

Pacific:11879-1883) 4610 6.ABrikish-Sulu {1$79)I 7~fl 84.4Franca~ndochinese (1882-1$84)I 70iQ 35.0Mandist:(1882-1685)C 33q 24.11S.zno-French {I884-1885)' h7 D 95.t7C"entxal American (1885):: 1C1~.~ 102.5Serbo-Bulgariam (1885)T 84;5 99.4S.ino-Sapanese (1894-1895) 42;5 53.5.E`ramco-klac~agasaan (1894-1895) 63>{7 ?Z.0Cuban (1895-1895)C 22<0 ?7.Q~tala-Ethippiarc-.:(1895-189b)2 58:9 68.0P'irat Philippine (189{x-1898)C 8415 37.L3fi>reco-Tyrl~ish I1897) 84;5 82.5.Spanish-,~Lnerican (189~)< 53,'5 75.t#Sacnn~ Philippine {1899-:-14D2yC; TD<~ 22.0.Boex (1899-1902}C 29.fl 92.138wrer Rehellieni,(19Dtf) _ 79id 66.x:I15,nden(1903~C 84,5 92.0Kusso-Japanese (1904 5405) 11.:0 2b.0G'~r7tY'a3 llrttex.i.can (19Db).: 1(14!5 &6.6.cen~rai 11merican {19D7) 104::5 $2.5Spanish lHorAccan {1909-].910J 5~;.~ 49.5Z'~a10-Turkish {1911-1912) 33.Q 36.0:Fi.t~st .14a~ka~ {x,912-7.413;) 17.:0 43. p;Seaand Balkan (1913) 18 0 88.0:World War Z (1914-1918); 2 f1 3.0':Russian Nationalj.ta.e$ {1917-1421aC 22.:0 25.!3::Itusso~Pa2ish {1914-320} Y3.5 23.QtlunJdzian-A2lies (1919): 48.;5 ~~~~Greco-Turkish (1919-1922 ~2;U 1~.0Itfffian_:~1921-i9~6)C 26.:6 14.x:.Druze {1925,592?)C 72.;5 39.0S.ino-Soviet (1929) 78.:0 7G.0:`:Manchurian (1931-1933) 19,:0 31,DChaacr { 29321935 ) 11 b 17.0Ita10-Ettf.iopiarlI1935-1~33ft) 330 59.0;Sirto-~Tapar~ese (1937-1541 ~ "~.0 14. bChanykrafen~ (1938) 91.0 192.5:.Nomoha~ {1939) 270 £,4,~iWoz~ld Wad I3 (1939-1~1AS} 1 ;0 1.,0Russo-~`innish (1939-19AC?~ 1C.'~ ?9.4E'xanao-Thai (1940-1941).'. 9fi.:-5 40.0::Indonesian (1945-19+15jC, 96.5 4Q. D'+Indochinese (1945-1954)c 15.D 11,0';Madagas~a~ I1947-1948)C; 9~.:Q 42.0`

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The following data from table 2 displays selected nationalperformances in total international war participation and, in boldprint, identifies the nine nations comprising the major powersduring 1815-1980.

i) France, 1815-1940 and 1945-1980: 22international wars, 14 systemic wars

2) England, 1815-1980: 19international wars, 7 systemic wars

3) Russia, 1815-1917 and 1921-1980: 18international wars, 13 systemic wars

4) Turkey/Ottoman Empire: 18international wars, it systemic wars

5) Italy/Sardinia, 1860-1943: 12international wars, 11 systemic wars

6) China, 1950-1980: 11 internationalwars, 10 systemic wars

7) ...Spain, 10 international .wars, 5systemic wars

8) Japan, 1895-1945: 9 internationalwars, 9 systemic wars

9) United States, 1899-1980: 8international wars, 7

systemic wars

10) Austria/Hungary, 1815-1918: 8international wars, 6 systemic wars

11) Greece: 7 international wars, 7systemic wars

12) .Germany/Prussia, 1815-1918 and 1925-1945: 6 international wars, 6systemic wars

Table 2 reveals major powers have a propensity to become jinvolved in international war. The major powers place five of the [first six positions and nine of the twelve in total internationalwar participation. Corroborating the propensity hypothesis,political scientists Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz adduceadditional evidence on "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816- E

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Yet, while reverting to a pre-nineteenth century alliance patternand experiencing a dramatic increase in minor power conflicts, thetwentieth century has been characterized by a balance of powersystem. Since empirical data shows alliance formations aregenerally followed by war, then the hypothesis that the balance of'power maintained peace is highly suspect. Attempting to save thehypothesis, balance of power theorists contend polarized alliancesystems are associated with war. These polarized alliance systemscontribute to the difference between nineteenth and twentieth

''century alliance-war correlation. Balance of power theoristscenter the debate on whether multipolarity or bipolarity isconducive to a peaceful world.

POLARIZATION

'The classic polarity debate focuses on two sides of the samecoin, the balance of power theory. As the proponent of thebipolarity theory, Kenneth N. Waltz avows bipolarity provides thenecessary conditions for a peaceful and stable world.14 Waltzreasons that an international nation state system, dominated by twosuperpowers with their respective blocs of allies, provides a greatdegree of certainty about the consequences of foreign policy.Additionally, Waltz proposes that since two superpower blocs deter'attacks against each other, facilitate crisis management incontrolling ally deviations, and inhibit misjudgments by reducingthe amount of international actors, the international .systemcreates stability by introducing certainty.

Countering with the thesis that multipolarity is conducive tostability, Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer claim an increasingnumber of interacting international actors generate a great degree

i of uncertainty.ls Since multiple interactions are both complex anddiverse, foreign policy makers would have to render cautious,deliberate, and rational decisions. As support, Deutsch and Singeraver that multipolarity introduces intermediaries as mediators,arbitrators, and offer neutral meeting grounds. Thus, introducingconflict reducing agents, multipolarity fosters a congenial'atmosphere for managing crises. Lastly, Duetsch and Singer claimmultipolarity is a more desirable international system becauseincremental international agents divert .attention .and expend`resources for each nation-state.

14 Frank Whelon Wayman, "Bipolarity and War: The Role ofCapability Concentration and Alliance Patterns Among Major Powers,1816-1965," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A TextReader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992),p. 186.

~s Ibid., 186.

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Attempting to clarify the classic polarity debate, FrankWhelon Wayman asseverates the concept of polarity has differentmeanings in different contexts. Essentially, the polarity debatexevolves around the differences in the power nation-states wieldand the set of relationships developed in the international system.iIllustrating that power concentration and alliance (cluster)'configuration are conceptually distinct, Wayman .provides thefollowing definitions:

Definition 1: A system is power bipolar when capabilities are`so distributed that two dominant hostile powers are morepowerful than other actors to a degree that give the dominantpowers autonomy in self-defense.16

Definition 2: A system is power multiaolar when capabilitiesare more evenly distributed than in the .power bipolarcountries, and when .hostility is high."

Definition 3: A system is cluster bibolar when most or all ofthe states in the system are tightly packed into two politicalclusters, with high mutual hostility, and very few or nostates play intermediate or cross-cutting roles. In theperfect form of tight cluster bipolarity, the members are allmutually closer to each other than any of them are to anymember of the other cluster.1e

Definition 4: A system is cluster multipolar when the statesare more evenly distributed throughout the space, with manyopportunities for intermediaries and .many cross-cuttingloyalties to moderate hostility.19

Using historical data between 1919-1975, Wayman provides table8 further explaining the conceptual distinctions.Z°

As seen in table 8, the European state system was power andcluster multipolar during 1919-1939. During 1941-1945, with Alliedand Axis powers juxtaposed, the European state system reflectedcluster bipolarity but contained power multipolarity. The Cold Warperiod of 1948-1955 manifested both power and cluster bipolarity.The period of detente evinced power bipolarity and clustermultipolarity during 1965-1975. .Concluding power bipolarity and

~a Wayman, p. 181.

17 Ibid.

is Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid, p. .182.

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general war; however, in contrast to the twentieth century, wars:..were low in magnitude, severity, and duration. In discussing thedifferences between the nineteenth and twentieth century, J. DavidSinger, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey present some enlighteningmaterial.

SYSTEMS OF POWER

In their article entitled, "Capability Distribution,Uncertainty, and Major Power, 1820-1965," Singer, Bremer, andStuckey claim two power systems operated during the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries.''' The preponderance of power system operatesunder the assumption "there will be less war when there is: (a) apreponderance of power concentrated in the hands of a very fewnations: (b) change, if any, toward greater concentration; and (c)a relatively stable rank order among, and intervals between, themajor powers."25 In contrast, a parity and fluidity power systemassumes "there will be less war when there is: (a) approximateparity among the major nations; (b) change toward parity ratherthan away from it: and (c) a relatively fluid power hierarchy."26

Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey discover that the preponderance ofpower system is associated with high magnitude war in thenineteenth century and the parity and fluidity power system is

`associated with less war. Additionally, finding that the.:preponderance of power system is associated with less war in thetwentieth century, the parity and fluidity power system isassociated with high magnitude war. Since high magnitude war is.associated with specific power distributions in wars fought duringthe nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckeyconclude that power distribution influences the type of war thatwill be fought and is not a cause of war.

THE RELIABILITY OF ALLIANCES

The findings produced in the Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey studyxeveal a dramatic change between the nineteenth and twentiethcentury regarding the effect of the concentration of power in theinternational system. Alan Ned 5abrosky provides an explanation ofthis change in his article entitled, "Interstate Alliances: Their

?^ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, pp. 37-66.

~s Ibid. , p. 64. iiE

ze Ibid. 'r

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Throughout the entire period, empirical data manifest that 61%of alliance constituents are disposed to remain neutral when amember country becomes embroiled in war. Although displaying a 66%neutrality rate in the nineteenth century, the 1900-1945 eradisplays the lowest neutrality rate of 56~. While table 11exhibits this era containing the highest alliance violation,Sabrosky adds "the apparently greater willingness of states inalliances to take sides in a war was not necessarily beneficial totheir alliance partners."30 The 1946-1965 era indicates a 76$neutrality rate. Demonstrating an unwillingness to get involvedeither alongside of or against their allies during the post 1945war performance opportunities, Sabrosky infers that a 76%neutrality rate reflects a diminished importance and support ofalliance networks, which coincides with the degeneration of thebalance of power system in that same post 1945 period.31

Sabrosky discloses additional information on the reliabilityof alliances. Ascertaining that both major/major power alliancesand minor/minor power alliances are generally reliable, major/minorpower alliances are frequently violated. Clarifying his findings,Sabrosky avows that a major power intervening to assist a minorpower acts as a contagion mechanism.

MAJOR POWER INTERVENTION

Corroborating yet adding to Sabrosky's analysis, Randolph M.Siverson and Joel King demonstrate that "a nation having analliance with a belligerent is five times more likely to become'involved in war."'Z Expatiating the two previous discourses, ManusI. Midlarsky states that combining major/major power conflicts withmajor/minor power conflicts have historically demonstratedinstability within the international system during the twentiethcentury.33 Uniting the two distinct sets of conflicts mutuallyconnects each discrete conflict issue into a grand conflict issue.Since the grand conflict issue prevents compromise over discreteissues, .conflict resolution is exacerbated, if not almost

so Ibid. , p. 178.

31 SabroskY, p. 197.

3Z Randolph M. Siverson and Joel Kinq, "Alliances and theExpansion of War," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A TextReader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992),p. 168

33 Manus 2. Midlarsky, "Preventing Systemic War: CrisisDecision-Making Amidst a Structure of Conflict Relationships," inthe Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. jJ. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 215.

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impossible.

Supporting and amplifying the hypothesis that alliances act asa contagion mechanism, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremeraffirm that 1816-1965 witnessed eight wars involving major powerinterventions.34 While three wars experienced only one major power':intervention, only two wars comprised two major powerinterventions; however, the severest, largest, and longest wars:involved major powers intervening on both sides of the war. Thesethree wars were: (1) World War I, 1914-1918; (2) World War II,1939-1945; and (3) the Korean War, 1950-1953.

Although major power interventions remained low during thenineteenth century (the Crimean War and the War of ItalianUnification being the exceptions), Yamamoto and Bremer demonstratetwentieth century major powers manifested a proclivity to intervenein war. A major power's initial decision to intervene increasesthe probability of other major powers intervening. Since a majorpower's decision encourages other major powers to follow, Yamamotoand Bremer infer opposing major power interventions expand war andincrease the severity, size, and duration of war. However, history'illustrates major power intervention on only one side rapidly endswar.

Summarizing the previous analyses, once a major power havingan alliance with a belligerent major or minor power decides tointervene in war, then it is highly probable other major powerswill intervene. Furthermore, knowing that a major powerintervening to assist a minor power expands war, destructive warsoccur when major powers intervene on both sides of a war.Combining resources, coordinating strategies, maintaining amultipolar power distribution with equal power between thebelligerents, and sustaining an increasing polarization ofalliances into two blocs, creates large, severe, and long wars.These general wars commonly occurred during the twentieth century.

ITNIVER5ALIST AND PARTICULARIST. POLICIES

Although most of the studies reviewed propound politicalrealism, one cannot conclude political realists' practices producepeace. Not attributing war to the immutability of native forcesfixed in the human constitution, political realists accuratelyreveal that war is a function of social institutions. Thepractices of the political realist exhibit a process by whichnational leaders, concerned with establishing security, develop and

34 Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremer, "Wider Wars andRestless Nights: Major Power Intervention in Ongoing War," in theCorrelates of War: II, Testing Some Realpolitik Models, ed.J. D. Singer .(New York, 1980), II, p. 226.

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execute foreign policies which subsequently threaten the securityof foreign nations. The actions and reactions of foreign anddomestic nations generate conditions ripe for a war. As the notedAmerican philosopher, John Dewey, aptly states, "History does notprove the inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs andinstitutions which organize native powers into certain patterns inpolitics and economics will also generate the war-pattern.i3s

Global history has marshaled evidence showing major power warshave been eschewed during certain epochs. Major powers haveestablished and applied rules of behavior organizing constructiverelations among themselves. Reviewing these epochs providesconsiderable knowledge in establishing social institutions and

.;practices generating the peace paradigm.

Adducing empirical evidence, Peter Wallensteen identifies two,predominant major power policies implemented in different periodsduring 1816-1976. Table 12 illustrates universalist andparticularist policy periods which organized major power relationsduring 1816-1976,36

Wallensteen defines universalist policies as ~~concerted'efforts among major powers to organize relations between themselvesto work out acceptable rules of behavior (general standards).j37Table 12 reveals four universalist policy periods. Exhibiting fourparticularist policy periods, Wallensteen defines them as "policieswhich emphasize the special interest of a given power, even at theprice of disrupting existing organizations or powerrelationships."38 Illustrating distinct policy patterns, table 13provides significant revelations concerning both major and minorpower relations.39

Table 13 shows that ten major/major power wars transpiredlduring particularist periods. No major/major power wars occurredduring universalist periods. Clarifying these findings,

3s John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1930),p. 115.

36 peter Wallensteen, ° Universalism vs. Particularism: On theLimits of Major Power Order," in The Scientific Study of Peace andWar: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York,1992), p. 232. [Contributing author in an edited work]

3~ Ibid., p. 230.

3a Ibid.

s9 Ibid., p. 234.

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Wallensteen asserts, "the record suggests that the pursuit of such

confrontations in general and among the major powers inparticular.j40 Although universalists and particularist periods

'account for few major/minor confrontations escalating intomajor/minor powers wars, 38.5 and 61.5% of major/minor warsoccurred during the universalist and particularist periods,respectively. These findings suggest universalist policiescoordinated constructive and cordial relations among the majorpowers; however, universalist and particularist policies encouragedinterventions against minor powers.

Universalist policies were generally established after majorpower wars. Major powers devised universalist policies to:maintain their status as the victors of war; inhibit defeated majorpowers from recovering; and coordinate major powers' foreignpolicies. Wallensteen avers universalist policies provided theadded benefit of installing friendly regimes and creating newconstitutions in the vanquished countries. Thus, universalistpolicies reduced the threat of friendly and vanquished countries'domestic policies and created a perceived notion of certainty.

When major powers accept certain rules of behavior as bindingand act according to those rules, history shows there are periodswith an absence of major/major power wars. Differences among majorpowers are reconciled without force and the autonomy of the majorpowers are recognized, respected, and maintained. Wallensteen's

'study reveals universalist policies have been successful indeveloping cooperative foreign relations and implementingreconciling mechanisms for major powers. Although universalistperiods redirected major power efforts toward increasingintervention in minor power affairs, this does not conceal the factthat universalist policies were partially applied. Instead ofdeveloping cooperative international relations and usingreconciling mechanisms for all nations, the major powers intendedto establish a world order specifically benefiting the majorpowers. Refusing to alter existing arrangements, universalist

'policies assigned minor powers a subordinating relation to majorpowers. Thus, while preventing major/major power confrontations,'universalist policies attained limited success.

Universalist policies did not recognize nor respect theautonomy of minor powers. Excluding minor powers in globalsecurity issues, the threat and use of force persisted as thepreferred method of attaining foreign policy goals. Predicatingthe term discrete universalist policies, major powers devisedpractices establishing constructive relations amid the prevailingpowers and collectively benefitted. Using discrete universalistpolicies, prevailing major powers regulated a specific world orderbased on accepted rules guiding their relations; however, minorpowers and defeated major powers were relegated particularist

ao Wallensteen, p. 246.

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policies. Since, in many instances, major powers divided or'controlled vanquished powers, they unfairly distributed burdens andbenefits, and excluded non-predominating powers in global securityissues. Therefore, the non-predominating powers concluded the.:arrangements were unjustified. Not being privy to thearrangements, the non-predominating powers initiated unilateralactions invariably resulting in war.

FACTORS AND. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Analysts are concentrating on war's economic consequences andthe distribution of power. Since most wars occur because opposingbelligerent powers anticipate different results in realizing theirgoals by conducting war, then what factors are critical inrealizing the goals of war? Once war ends, what is the long termimpact on the power of the states involved? Discerning thecritical factors and the long term consequences of war provides apractical organon for reducing war and diminishing its effect.

POPULATION AND REVENUE

Stephen Rosen investigates the conditions associated withtriumphant war termination. Using Singer and Small's list ofinternational wars, Rosen determines that the side attaining the

.'lowest population percentage loss won 30 out of 40 (75~)international wars.' Table 13 illustrates that countriesinitiating war with larger populations than .their .opposing'countries won 27 out of 30 (90~) cases.42

Although 18 (600) cases show defeated powers losing morelives, victorious powers had larger populations and sustainedhigher population losses in 12 cases (40%). Population loss ratesderive their importance because of the population size ofbelligerent nations. Presumably a nation maintaining a largerpopulation may lose more lives yet become victorious.

Selecting wealth as measuring a nation's destructivepotential, Rosen divulges government revenue is the definitivefactor in winning war. Presenting in table 14 a "Summary of Dataon Correlates of War Performance," Rosen shows that revenueprovides 79~ (31 out of 39 cases) probability of victory.43Nations possessing wealth and lower population loss won 26 out of

41 Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," inThe Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A.Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New york, 1992), p. 266.

az Ibid., p. 267.

a3 Ibid. '~ P. 271. 4

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1'~~ DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND GROWTIi RATE

A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler investigate the distributionof power in the international system after World War I and II .44Organski and Kugler use gross national product to measure nationalcapabilities. They find all 18 nations involved in World War I orWorld War II returned to their prewar national capabilities withintwenty years.

Organski and Kugler ascertain that following an end to warvictorious and neutral nations are minimally affected in the nearfuture, but defeated nations incur severe short-term losses. Inthe long run, victorious and neutral nations display a period ofslow recovery and attain a prewar growth rate, but defeated nationsmanifest the phoenix factor. Exhibiting and maintaining an acutelyaccelerated recovery period, defeated nations renew their expectedprewar growth rate and typically surpass victorious nations within18-20 years. Thus, the distribution of power and the growth ratereturn to a pattern as if war had never been initiated. Two worldwars have not significantly . altered national growth .nor thedistribution of power.

Organski and Kugler claim that nations receiving the mostUnited States foreign assistance after World War II experience theworst recovery rates.45 Although a victorious nation may inhibit'a defeated nation's recovery, their findings suggest recovery andforeign assistance are independent. Their claim contradicts thehypothesis stating recoveries of defeated nations are a result ofvictorious nations providing substantial foreign assistance.

Si:fNIMARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF WAR

The purpose of this research is to find, present, and explainsome regularities of behavior associated with international wars,particularly European wars. Ea the quest to devise a desirable andfeasible military security scheme, reviewing a multitude of

':statistical research on war provides the opportunity to identifythe factors associated with war and peace. Attempting to providean integrated explanation of the current knowledge of war, this

';paper uses that cumulation to test the proposed European military`security schemes.

'Studies on the patterns of international warfare, 1816-1980,

44 A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kuqler, "The Cost of Major Wars:The Phoenix Factor," in The Scientific Study of Peace and War: AText Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan .(New York, 1992),PH. 279-305.

as organski and Kugler, p. 303.

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` reveal that international wars are neither increasing nordecreasing. Although international wars remain a constant humanactivity, major powers exhibit the highest propensity to engage ininternational war. Major powers maintain the greatest number ofenduring rivalries and display the highest incidence of extraregional rivalries. Since over half the nations comprising theinternational system avoided international war, one can safelyconclude it is highly probable international war is not endemic tothe entire system.

Research shows that alliance formation suggests nation statesanticipated war because of underlying political, economic,diplomatic, social, and military events. Empirical evidenceillustrates that the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries andthe twentieth century manifested alliances being followed by warwithin five years. Appearing as an aberration, the nineteenthcentury exhibits a negligible amount of alliances followed by war.Contrasting with the alliance followed by war phenomenon, few warswere preceded by alliances. Thus, data shows alliances are not acause of war.

Although political realist theorists contend balance of powerI rsystems are associated with peace, twentieth century wars are,.'characterized by balance of power systems. Disclosing power

concentration and alliance (cluster) configuration are conceptually`distinct and statistically independent, adduced evidence exhibitstwentieth century war is associated with alliance bipolarity whilecluster multipolarity is followed by peace. The twentieth century

characterized by two world wars of great magnitude, severity,and duration, and delineated by a multiple distribution of powerpolari2ed into two alliance blocs. The nineteenth century is

1 depicted without general wars.

"Identifying two distinct power systems operating in thenineteenth and twentieth centuries, the international system'sdistribution of power influences the type of war to be fought, butis not a cause of war. In the twentieth century balance of power

`;systems are associated with high magnitude wars, but parity andfluidity systems are associated with less war. The converserelationship occurs in the nineteenth century.

Research illustrates major/minor power alliances are the most:frequently violated alliances. Additionally, combining major/majorpower conflicts together with major/minor power conflictshistorically exhibits marked instability during the twentiethcentury. Major powers intervening to assist minor powers act as acontagion mechanism. Since a major power's decision encouragesother major power to follow, opposing major powers assisting minorpowers increases war's severity, size, and duration.

War is a function of social institutions; however, historyprovides testimony illustrating major powers using universalist

29

policies avoided major/major power wars. Established after;major/major wars, universalist policies coordinated constructiveand cordial relations among the major powers. While particularistpolicies emphasize the special interest of a given power,universalist and particularist policies encouraged and produced'major power interventions. against minor. powers.

Employing discrete universalist policies, major powers created' practices intentionally benefiting the prevailing powers, unfairlyextending burdens to the vanquished major powers, and assigning

'minor powers subordinating relations. Since defeated major powersand minor powers considered these practices unjustified, theyinitiated unilateral actions using particularist policies.

Economic and demographic factors are the principal elementscontributing to winning or losing wars. While government revenueand lower population loss rates are two essential elements, totalgovernment revenue is the decisive factor in winning wars.

World wars do not alter the long term impact of economicgrowth and the distribution of power. Defeated nations manifestthe phoenix factor. They renew their expected prewar growth andsurpass the victorious nations within 18-20 years.

'This paper has identified and discussed general trendsassociated with international war, particularly European wars.Next, this paper will present and discuss four proposed European

'..military security schemes. Then, this paper uses the generaltrends associated with war to test the proposed military securityschemes and reveal their meaning.

END ALLIANCES

Proposing to end all European alliances, the first schemerecommends each nation-state maintain military forces only at thelevel necessary for defending its political sovereignty andterritorial integrity. This scheme identifies the necessary'functions of the state as providing security for its citizens,;upholding its legal authority, and preserving a shared perspectiveon a particular way of life.

This scheme assumes a European future with no militarysecurity threats nor rivalries. Shortly after the termination ofthe Napoleonic War and the Congress of Vienna settlement, Europeconformed to this proposed scheme during 1820-1825, called theunipolar period. Wayman states, "a system is unipolar if none ofthe states in the system are hostile enough to each other to inducemutual fear and aggressive designs.j46 The Great Powers attempted

46 Wayman, p. 182.

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to establish a new international order based on the principles ofcompensation, legitimacy, and a balance of power. The Great Powerscompensated their expensive efforts through territorialaggrandizement. The Great powers restored and maintained the pre-Napoleonic rules of Europe by conveniently claiming the principleof legitimacy. Discouraging unilateral aggression amongthemselves, the Great Power maintained a balance of ,power....

Although the Great Powers did not wage war among themselvesduring the unipolar period, this paper has shown the Great Powershave intervened in minor power affairs. The Great Powers adoptedthe Troppau Protocol of October 1820 and declared they would notaccept revolutionary action as legally binding. They intervened inrevolutions occurring in Naples, the Piedmont, and Spain; however,When perceived as to their advantage, the Great Powers encouragedBalkan independence and intervened on behalf of the Greeks in theirrevolt against the Ottoman Empire. Identifying unipolar periods asextremely unstable and indubitably the most war prone, Jack S. Levyaffirms, unipolar periods exhibit the majority of general or

n na7hegemonic wars producing the highest duration and magnitude.

Contradistinguishing the unipolar period, the 1990s arecharacterized by a monopolar power system. In a speech broadcastedby CNN, President Bill Clinton asseverated, "We are the world'sonly superpower."'$ Presently, the United States represents thismonopolar power system with its status as the world's only militarysuperpower. Possessing nuclear weapons, France, Great Britain, andRussia have the ability of unduly influencing the behavior ofnation-states not possessing nuclear weapons. Thus, without thenuclear umbrella of the United States, non-nuclear European nation-states remain unprotected and the transatlantic link is notpreserved. This scheme disregards the fact the United States ishistorically, politically, and culturally tied to Europe, andsustains vital economic and military interests in Europe. WithoutUnited States involvement, Europe will maintain a highly unstablemultipolar power and alliance configuration.

This scheme does not adequately address national rivalries,military threats, nor social, ethnic, and economic deterioration.Maintaining a military force is a function of: a) the size of theterritory, population, and revenue; b) lines of trade andcommunication; c) natural resources; d) technological capacity; e)perceived threats; and f) the extensiveness of national politicalobligations. Considering these factors, European major powerswould still maintain large military forces. For example, Russiandefense requires maintaining a large military force while BeNeLux

a~ LevY~ P. 356.

48 President Bill Clinton, CNN, television network, 23 April1993.

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defense requires small military forces.

Table 4 illustrates Europe has supported 12 enduring regionalrrivalries with 185 disputes and seven extra-regional rivalries with98 disputes. Since history suggests continued European rivalriesand wars, neither unipolarity nor necessary military force levels

inhibit war without universalist policies. Unfortunately,discrete universalist policies historically redirect major powerefforts toward increasing intervention in minor power affairs;therefore, it is highly probable minor power leaders will respondto long term security issues by augmenting their military powerthrough alliances. These alliances will: lead to a multipolardistribution of power; tighten the alliance configuration;encourage particularist policies among minor powers; increasesecurity threats; escalate arms; and prepare nations for war.Crises will escalate into a large, long, and severe war. Withmajor powers sustaining negligible long term impacts through thephoenix factor, minor power conditions scarcely improve.

This military security scheme aptly captures the notion thatstate must remain independent, equal, secure, and control its own

.;possessions to perform its function well. States are not to beacquired, controlled by other states, nor interfered with in theirinternal affairs. Maintaining large armed forces increasesinsecurity and produces arms escalation. Accumulating a:prohibitively large national debt diverts resources and burdenscitizens during peace and war. This scheme lacks universalistpolicies constructively regulating relations amid all Europeanstates. Confidence building measures need to be developed.Technology must be shared and verification procedures are needed toextend warning time. Lastly, a forum encouraging cooperation anddialogue is needed to establish and direct these practices. Thesecond scheme proposes the North Atlantic Treaty organization isthe relevant forum.

TIIE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGA1vIZATION

Taking effect on August 24, 1949, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) is an alliance formulated to preserveinternational peace, justice, and security, and promote thestability and well-being of independent, sovereign, and democraticstates. Assigned this mandate, as an inter-governmentalorganization, NATO attempts to peacefully settle internationaldisputes, and refrain from threatening or using force in any wayinconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. In the eventit cannot deter war, NATO countries treat an attack against any ofits member countries as an attack against all. In accordance withArticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, each membercountry reserves the right to exercise individual and/or collectiveself-defense to restore and maintain peace, justice, and security.Fostering cooperation instead of competition among its members,

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'NATO established mechanisms eliminating conflicting internationaleconomic policies, and promoted political, economic, and militarycollaboration. Thus, the intent of the alliance is: i) convincingcommunism it could not feasibly attain its goals; 2) containingWest Germany; and 3) ensuring the United States abandonedisolationism by maintaining a transatlantic link.

Committed to defending the territorial integrity of eachmember state, NATO uses the strategy of flexible response andforward defense. NATO developed this strategy during a dividedEurope containing a threatening Warsaw Treaty Organization andoffensively oriented Soviet armed forces. This strategy requiresdeterring war or transgression by deliberately linking conventionalwar with an escalating nuclear war. Positioning defensive forcesalong the length of the inter-German border, NATO forces would usedeep-strike weapons extending a zone by which Warsaw Treaty andSoviet second echelon forces would be attacked, disrupted, anddelayed in East Europe before engaging the main NATO defensiveforces; therefore, NATO strategy manifested an offensive defense.

Impelled by dramatic social, political, and economic"imperatives, the European security landscape is radically altered.One must determine whether NATO still provides the necessaryframework for establishing peace, justice, and security, .duringthis perplexing epoch.

'Under the tutelage of former Soviet President MikhailGorbachev, the former Soviet Union acquiesced in 1990 to a unitedGermany with NATO membership. The key to persuading the SovietUnion relinquishing its prohibition was illustrating that anisolated united Germany was unpredictable and more dangerous to

'European stability than a united Germany within NATO. Assuaging1Soviet apprehension, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposedto: "limit German forces to 370,000 within three or four yearsafter reunification;49 "refrain from producing, holdin~, orcommanding atomic, biological, and chemical weapons;i 0 and"contribute tens of billions of Deutsche marks to further theeconomic reconstruction of East Germany and the Soviet Union."slAfter the Soviet Union agreed to drop its veto, President Gorbachev'and Chancellor Kohl agreed to negotiate removing 360,000 Soviet .troops out of Germany.

With a reunified Germany, dissolved Warsaw .Treaty

49 Charles Lane, Melinda Liu, and Elizabeth Tucker, "A BitterHomecoming,° .Newsweek, (July 30, 1990), p. 26.

so Ibid.

sl Scott Sullivan, "Can Germany be Contained?," Newsweek,(July 30, 1990), p. 28.

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forces. "SZ

National security issues will be primarily resolved throughpolitical means. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachevaverred, "The character of contemporary weapons leaves no countryany hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technicalmeans, for example by building up a defense system, even the mostpowerful one. The task of ensuring security is increasingly apolitical problem, to be resolved only by political means."s3

The impacts of Russian crises remain tenuous at best. IfRussia perceives itself surrounded by hostile powers, then it will

1 likely justify a siege mentality; it will subsequently initiate anarms build-up and be coupled with nationalistic fervor. SinceRussian troops are within Russian territory and tables 1 and 2reveal Russia has a propensity to engage in European wars, then

i;NATO's new roles are reassuring West European nations and deterringRussian aggression against the democratically elected governmentsof Eastern Europe.

French independence from the NATO integrated military commandsignificantly contributes to instability during a multipolar powerand alliance configuration. As depicted in tables 1 and 2, Frenchbellicosity is illustrated by its greatest propensity to engage ininternational wars and its historical role in minor powerinterventions. Maintaining nuclear and conventional forcesindependent of the NATO integrated military command conjoined by

'their bellicose propensity serves as an intimidating nationalinstrument for influencing the behavior of European nations. Since`France has the highest propensity for engaging in internationalwars and interventions, NATO's additional role is minimizing Frenchbellicosity and ensuring French commitment to European defense.

Confronted with the NATO irony, NATO~s military threat issignificantly abated yet altered. In an article entitled "Is NATOSo Successful It Deserves to Die?," Fen Osler Hampson asserts,"NATO's strategy of forward defense that is based on the scenario`of surprise attack across a front that no longer exists and in aworld in that total surprise is no longer possible, is neither

sZGeneral Makmut Gareyev, "Novaia Voennaia Politika," KrasnaiaZvezda (February 8, 1988), p. 1, english translation found in SNelson Drew and others, The Future of NATO (New York, 1991), p. 27.

s3 Mikhail Gorvachev, Address to the Twenty-Seventh CommunistParty Congress, S. Nelson Drew and others, The Future of NATO:Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment, (New York,1991). pp. 26-27.

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Organization, demised Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, emergingCommonwealth of Independent States, and French independence of NATOintegrated military command, NATO is confronting the NATO irony:Russian troops are deployed within a NATO member state; NATO's newpurpose is deterring Russian aggression against the democraticallyelected East European governments; and NATO~s additional purpose isminimizing French bellicosity while ensuring French commitment toEuropean Defense.

At the time of this writing, Russia maintains ten divisionsdeployed in a reunified Germany; however, President Boris Yeltsinasseverated Russia will withdraw its troops from German soil by theend of 1993.

Emerging democratic governments, free market economies, andEast European nationalism dissolved the political cohesion betweenEast European nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States,particularly Russia. The demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organizationcreated East European demands of Russian troop withdrawals. While

.'maintaining 2.7 million troops, Russia completed troop withdrawalsfrom the Czech Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, and Hungary.Russia is presently withdrawing troops from Poland, and willwithdraw troops from the Baltic Republics after completingwithdrawal from Germany. This indicates the .end of Russianhegemony in Eastern Europe.

Russia is focusing inward to rebuild itself after experiencing`political, economic, and social turmoil. The Commonwealth ofIndependent States is fragmented and many member states aredisplaying antagonistic behavior toward Russia. Russia, therefore,is using troop withdrawals to protect its political sovereignty andterritorial integrity..

Russia has eliminated the threat of a surprise attack on NATO.Russia's troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe has removed,Operational Maneuver Groups, Independent Tank Regiments, andassault crossing units. The military front is at the Russian'border; this increases the warning time of an impending Russian'attack and logistically impedes sustaining Russian offensivecapabilities against West European nations.

The Russian military changed its doctrine from theinevitability and subsequent winning of international war to itsprevention. General Makhmut Gareyev asseverated, "What is new hereis the fact that, whereas military doctrine used to be defined asa system of views of the preparation of war and the waging of war,its substance is now based on the prevention of war. The tasks ofpreventing war is becoming the supreme goal, the nucleus ofmilitary doctrine, the basic function of the state and the armed

34

strategically necessary nor politically viable.j54 The premisesestablishing forward defense are no longer true. Given the NATOirony is associate with decreasing defense budgets and forcereductions, NATO must establish a new strategy to remain relevant'for European military security. The authors of the book entitled,"The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain`Environment," claim a "Resilient Defense" strategy appropriatelymanages the NATO irony within the presently imposed political andfiscal constraints.

Providing conventional stability in Europe during this epoch,Resilient Defense is a strategy providing NATO the capability of:defending Europe with a 50 percent NATO force level reduction;'however, through early detection and reaction to belligerentadvances and additional reserve reinforcements, NATO can deter anddefeat a belligerent nation. Using force on force maneuvers andrelying on rapid reserve forces mobilization and deployment, thisstrategy presents a defensive defense. Since NATO forces would'maintain a defensive orientation and not present a credibleoffensive threat, Resilient Defense countervails an unstablemultipolar power and alliance configuration.

Using light and maneuverable military forces, ResilientDefense conducts defensive operations in forward, maneuver, andrear area belts. As envisioned by the authors, the first, second,and third belts are described as followed:

The first belt is a modified area:defense with a depth of approximately 50'.kilometers. Once the Soviets complete thewithdrawal of their forces from easternGermany, this belt could be extendedsignificantly eastward. It is designed tomeet the initial thrust of an enemy attackwith sufficient combat power to canalizethe enemy and force him to reveal his mainaxes of attack. No token force, this firstbelt has the capability to inflict seriousflamage and cause attrition in enemy forces,thereby requiring them to commit theirsecond echelon forces. In some sectorsthis could involve delaying tactics similarto those employed in a covering forcemission, or mobile defense techniques, ouchas repositioning to subsequent defensivepositions, but it is fundamentally an areadefense throughout the depth of the belt.The defense would have to accept enemy mainforce attacks, but should hold theshoulders of any penetration, in essencepositioning the enemy .force far

54 Fen Osler Hampson, "Is NATO So Successful it Deserves toDie?," ed. W. F. Danspeckgruber (Boulder, CO, 1991), p. 246.

36

The second belt, with a depth up to150 kilometers from the front, containshighly mobile counterattack forces. Themission of the forces in this belt is toblunt the penetration by severing theattacking force's logistical support,destroying its combat forces, rejecting the

.'attack, and restoring the defensive line.

The final belt consists of rear areasecurity forces, theater combat servicesupport, and operational reserves.ss

Since France and Russia maintain nuclear forces outside theNATO structure, deterring war would still require a flexibleresponse strategy. Until nuclear weapons are significantlyreduced, nuclear deterrence remains an element of NATO strategy.

Without the United States link to European security, excludingmonopolar power system provides the necessary conditions for

creating a regional multipolar power and alliance configuration.Table 8 reveals the European state system manifested multipolarpower and alliance configuration system in the period after WorldWar I and before Hitler's pinnacle as the Fuhrer of Germany. Thishighly unstable international system lead to World War II.

NATO provides a frame work for ensuring security during thisrapidly changing European environment. Although NATO can provideEuropean security in the short term, NATO does not address futureEuropean security needs and challenges. While NATO is coordinatingpolitical and military activities among member nations, Eastern'Europe and Russia are painfully experiencing political, economic,social, and military upheaval in their transition to democracy.Without universalist policies constructively regulating relationsamid all European states, NATO lacks the comprehensive mandate forrealizing European security. Maintaining restricted membership,NATO does not provide a forum for encouraging cooperation anddialogue among all European nations. Thus, maintaining a modifiedNATO is provisional until a new scheme can help define, develop,and maintain a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN iTNION

The resuscitation of the Western European Union (WEU) appearsas the appropriate forum for providing a free, secure, just, andrelatively peaceful Europe. Adopting its "Platform on EuropeanSecurity Interests" in October 1987, the WEU declared to defend thesignatories at its borders. .The WEU promotes the strategy of

S. Nelson Drew and others, "The Future of NATO: Facing anUnreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment,".(New York, 1991),pp. io6-io7.

37

'posing an unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation. It employs ar mix of nuclear and conventional forces in developing a coherentEuropean defense structure.

The WEU provides the benefit of including France in Europeansecurity structure. France wishes to remain independent from U.S.military domination in Europe and refuses to participate in theNATO integrated military command. The WEU reassures and displaysFrench commitment to defending Europe, particularly Germany.Additionally, since the WEU is designed to coordinate Europeansecurity policies the WEU could check French national interests.

Reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, the WEU attempts toestablish a particular European order by solely coalescing theinterest of its small membership. Since it contains lessmembership than NATO, the WEU does not adequately address themilitary security issues of Europe in general nor all of WesternEurope.

Despite the fact troops were deployed under the auspices ofthe WEU to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, troopemployment was decided on an independent and sovereign nation-state'basis. Since the WEU does not plan, coordinate, or direct militaryoperations, each signatory must still decide when militaryengagement is appropriately justified. The WEU is simply a forum'for expressing and coordinating signatory views on .Europeanmilitary security.

Since the WEU contains British and French nuclear forces, theWEU would provide nuclear deterrence without the U.S. link;however, the WEU, with its limited membership, would become aBritish and French dominated forum. The smaller member states andnon-WEU states (except possibly Russia) would be unable toadequately protect or pursue their national interests under thethreat of nuclear blackmail. Bjorn Moller states, "although astronger WEU would lead to genuine change by creating a trulylindependent European deterrent, the resulting multipolarization inthe West might also promote nuclear proliferation and destabilize'the entire international system."sb

In summary, the United States would provide a monopolar power';system in a multipolar European alliance configuration. Historydemonstrates that without a monopolar power system, Europe woulddevelop into a multipolar power system and a tightening of themultipolar alliance configuration would trigger an arms race. Anarms race would develop into a bipolar alliance configuration. TheWEU's limited membership and nuclear emphasis promotes acompetitive instead of cooperative European .military security

sb Bjorn Moller, "A New Security System for Europe?," ed. W. F.Danspeckgruber, (Boulder, CO), p. 255.

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environment. Europe manifests dynamically complex political,economic, and social conditions. Crises easily escalate into warin these conditions. The contagion of war will be nurtured withoutuniversalist policies constructively regulating relations among allEuropean states. As an alternative to three suggested schemes, JimHershberg proposes developing a Pan-European Army.s~

THE PAN-EUROPEAN ARMY

The Pan-European Army, whose primary mission is removingmilitary force from European political conflicts, would be

4 comprised of military forces from each European nation, Russia,Canada, and the United States. The integrated military force wouldbe deployed in each European nation; however, the composition of

'the integrated military force would meet or exceed the nationalmilitary force of each nation hosting the integrated army. ThePan-European Army, according to Mr. Hershberg, would be an

`effective security institution replacing antagonistic alliances,.'the Western European Union, and the monolithic NATO alliancepresently accepted by Canada, the United States, Russia, andGermany. The integrated military force would: i) secure national`borders by minimizing precarious military build-ups; 2) providerpro-democratic and anti-communist representation; 3) reduce themisapprehension of German unification by dispersing German militaryforces in Europe and subordinating German military forces under thePan-European Army infrastructure; 4) replace Russian occupationarmies and allow the former Warsaw Pact nations to join the rest of'Europe; and 5) ensure immediate and reliable mutual verification.sa

The Pan-European Army questions the right to politicalsovereignty and territorial integrity. As Michael Walzer contends,shared experiences and values, and the free cooperativerelationship of society lead to the creation of a state.59

'Relating these essential elements to society, a state is anassociation of human beings dedicated in a cooperative venture ofestablishing the juridical conditions of its society. This

'definition enables one to see that a state incurs moral obligationsderived directly from the consent of free, equal, and independenthuman beings united in the pursuit of a better way of life. Inparticular, the state has the obligations of protecting the freedom'and life of its members, and maintaining a just order. These

57 Jim Hershberg, "A Pan-European Military?: Combining BlocsCould Answer Everyone's Security Needs," The Washington Post, June17, 1990, Section D, p. 3.

'sa Hershberg, p. D3.

s9 Michael Walzer, "Just and Unjust Wars," .(New York, 1977)p. 54.

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obligations are not limited to each individual, but also to societyas a whole. As a result of its obligations, the moral standing ofa state is judged by how well it performs its functions with itsmembers, its society, and against the competing claims of otherstates.

The shared experiences and values, and the free cooperativerelationship of society require that an association with assignedbasic rights and duties be responsible and accountable to aparticular society. However, this association must occur in aparticular area of land with a boundary drawn explicitlydelineating this free association. Hannah Arendt claims, "To be acitizen means among other things to have responsibilities,obligations, and rights, all of which make sense only if they areterritorially limited."~ Thus, to perform its functions well,political sovereignty and territorial integrity are essentialelements for a state.

A state uses different means to perform its functions. As aninstrument of the state, the function of the military is using'force or the threat of force to preserve the highest human valuesof society, i.e., to preserve a way of life.b~ Thus, for societyto exist, it must be able to defend itself through the reasonableuse of force to: 1) protect the innocent from unjust attack; 2)restore rights wrongfully denied; and 3) reestablish a just order.Essentially, the military profession performs its function inresponse to a constituted authority within a delineated area topreserve a way of life. Sir John Winthrop Hackett states, "untilman is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, therequirement will persist for a capability which permits the orderedapplication of force at the insistence of a properly constitutedauthority. "62

Maintaining an integrated military force equaling or exceedingthe national military force of each hosting nation jeopardizes thepolitical sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. Anational military force is responsible and accountable to aparticular state and its society. The integrated military force isnot responsible nor accountable to the hosting nation; it isresponsible and accountable to the international organization'maintaining the force. Mr. Hershberg~s Pan- European Army does not`:clearly draw the line between, on the one hand, removing military

bo Hannah Arendt, "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy,"ed. and trans. by Ronald Beiner,(Chicago, IL., 1982), p. 44.

61 Malham M. Wakin, "War, Morality, and the MilitaryProfession,° ed. M. M. Wakin, {Boulder, CO., 1986), p. 8

62 Sir John Winthrop Hackett, "The Military in the Service ofthe State," ed. M. M. Wakin, (Boulder, CO., 1986) p. 105.

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force from European political conflicts, and on the other hand,permanently maintaining an integrated military force in anindependent nation-state. In the former case, you are trying tolcontain violence. In the latter case, you are occupying a nation-state.

"This then, is the weakness of the Pan European Army. Thedistinction between removing military force from European politicalconflicts and occupying a nation-state becomes an extremely fineline and is easily converted into a slippery slope argument. The;test of the rightfulness of the Pan European Army is to ask if eachnation constituting the integrated military force would agree:hosting it. Not only East European nations and Germany shouldagree hosting the Pan-European Army, but as constituents the UnitedStates, Canada, Russia, Britain, France and each West Europeannation should be willing to host the integrated military force.For if a nation-state is not willing to host the Pan-European Army,it is uttjust.

1'HE ORIGINAL POSITION AND TIIE FEDERATION

This paper presented four schemes providing European military:'security. However, presenting rebuttals to the schemes is merelyexpressing empty platitudes with nothing to offer in its place.Have we exhausted all measures of military security schemes forEurope? How do we decide which is the proper military securityscheme to institute in Europe? John Rawls in his book entitled, "A

`.:Theory of Justice," provides the initial response. It is the'military security scheme "that free and rational persons concernedto further their own interests would accept in an initial positionof equality as defining the fundamental terms of .theirassociation."63

'Amending Rawls' idea to incorporate our present theme, imaginehypothetical situation called the original position, in which

delegates of nations choose together, in one joint act, themilitary security scheme for :Europe. Assume we impose thefollowing restrictions:

1. Each delegate is responsible with making a rational'selection for an appropriate European military securityscheme;

2. Each delegate is responsible for maximizing the securityand/or welfare of a nation; however, each delegate doesnot know which nation he is representing;

63 John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice,° ,(Cambridge, MA., 1971),p. il.

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3. Each delegate does not know whether the nation he isrepresenting has been "dealt a high (rich, strong nation)or low (poor, weak nation) card;"~

4. .All delegates are 'equal and have the same rights in theprocedure for choosing the European military scheme; eachcan make pro~osals, submit reasons for their acceptance,and so on; ..s and

5. The delegates must reach a unanimous decision inselecting the European military security scheme.

In the original position the delegates accomplish their'selection under a veil of ignorance, thus, ensuring no nation isadvantaged or disadvantaged in selecting a military security system':through chance or the contingency of geographic or socialcircumstances. Since all the delegates are under similarcircumstances and unable to design military security schemesfavoring a particular nation-state, the delegates would arrive ata fair agreement because they would select a military security:scheme "which free and equal persons would assent to undercircumstances that are fair.p67

Assume the delegates in this bargaining game have a generalsense of humanity but know only that we live in smallerdistributive communities called nations. In an original positionand under a veil of ignorance, the delegates would agree to thefollowing principles:

a) ..Basic rights and duties apply equally to each nation andallow the most extensive liberty compatible with a likeliberty for all.ba That is, the policies and actions ofeach nation must coexist with the policies and actions ofall the other nations,69

b) Declarations of intent and action, and rules assigning

~ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Ethics,".(New York, 1986),p. 38.

bs J. Rawls, p. 19.

66 IY~1CI. ~ p. 12.

6~ Ibid., p. 13.

68 Ibid.. pp. 63-64.

69 Ibid., pp. 63-64.

42

l

I

rights and duties are to be publicly avowed.70

c) Burdens and benefits are to be arranged so that they areboth: 1) to the greatest benefit of the leastadvantaged; and 2) attached to offices and positions opento all under ..conditions of fair equality ofopportunity."

In developing a European military security scheme under a veilof ignorance, the delegates would realize that a cooperative systemboth fairly assigning rights and duties and distributing burdensand benefits would ensure each nation could achieve its own goals.After establishing the principles under which each nation wouldwillingly act upon, the delegates would promulgate the followingrules•

a) Each nation may maintain a military force, but only todefend its people, political sovereignty and territorialintegrity.

b) Each nation's military force is to manifest a defensivedefense force structure with a credible limited troop'1eve1 reflecting its mission of defending its people,..`political sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

c) Establish a Military Security Federation with the primarymission of planning for the collective self-defense of'Europe. Peace, containing violence, and the security ofEurope are its primary goals.

d) Each nation is to have only one vote with no veto powerauthorized to any nation.

e) ..Any plan or recommendation affecting the collective self-`defense of Europe requires a two-thirds majority vote.

f) No independent and sovereign nation may acquire anotherindependent and sovereign nation.

g) No independent and sovereign nation shall forcibly.interfere in the constitution and government of anothernation.

In the original position, the delegates use their knowledge ofthe world in developing a cooperative practice. Instead offunctioning as a decontextualization or abstract theory, the

70 Immanuel Kant, "Kant's Political Writing," ed. Hans Reiss,(New York, 1983), p. 23.

~~ Arendt, pp. 48-49.

43

i

original position begins its inquiry in a particular contextcreating principles to evaluate established practices.

Witnessing the turbulent Thirty Years' War, the "Quest forCertainty" became the political, social, philosophical,theological, and military preoccupation of Europe; it is stillmanifested in the twentieth century. The Treaty of Westphaliaimposed a system based on stability and hierarchy from what wasperceived as a world of chaos. The treaty created the sovereign

1 nation-states system. In his book entitled, "Cosmopolis," StephenToulmin states, "Those who reconstructed European society andculture after the Thirty Years' War took as guiding principlesstability in and among the different sovereign nation-states, andhierarch within the social structures of each individualstates."Z Assuming immutable truths and universal laws underliethe world of appearances, the Europeans disregarded changing humanconditions and created an international system reflectingconformity and predictability. Thus, the four schemes seek

',preserving stability and permanence and realizing fixed goals.John Dewey avers, "Love of certainty is a demand for guarantees inadvance of action. Ignoring the fact that truth can be bought only

';by the adventure of experiment, dogmatism turns truth into aninsurance company. Fixed ends upon one side and fixed~~principles"-that is authoritative rules-on the other, are propsfor a feeling of safety, the refuge of the timid and the means bywhich the bold prey upon the timid. X73 Since the delegates areplaced in an original position under a veil of ignorance, thedelegates cannot lay claim to certainty; they must proceed from theassumption that the world is filled with uncertainty, ambiguity,and disagreement. Thus, the delegates create a practiceencouraging diversity and adaptability to evolving human problems.

Perceiving the world as if history had ended and attained aset of fixed relationships among nation-states, the four schemesomit the fact that Europe has a stake in the future of emerging'European nations, called non-state nations. Since the four schemeslimit membership to sovereign nation-states in a hierarchicalsystem, non-state nations upset the delicate balance of theinternational system. Thus, perceived as a threat, non-statenations are either disregarded, cleansed, or eradicated. DonaldDewey declares, "Common to all of them is the daily reality ofbeing enclosed within a state that, at best shares a contingenthistory and culture, and that, in the worst of cases, has sought to

n Stephen Toulmin, "Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda ofModernity," ..(New York, 199.0), p. 128.

73 J. Dewey, p. 237.

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overwhelm their history and eradicate their culture.i74

The four proposed schemes seek restoring the status quo antethe German reunification, Warsaw Treaty Organization demise, andSoviet Union dissolution. These schemes attempt legitimizing aworld order firmly entrenched in the international system; theyaccomplish little that would result in upsetting the nation-statesystem.

The delegates in the original position use the principles of'. liberty, truth, and equality to transform the practices of the oldinternational system. They establish a practice adapting tordiverse peoples, cultures, and traditions. By including allnations having a stake in the security and future of Europe, thedelegates address the issues of equality and the limits of power.Stephen Toulmin asseverates, "The task is not to build new, larger,and yet more powerful powers, let alone a "world state" havingabsolute, worldwide sovereignty. Rather, it is to fight theinequalities that were entrenched during the ascendancy of thenation-state, and to limit the absolute sovereignty of even thebest-run nation-states.j75

The original position forces the delegates not to judge a';practice in isolation from the rest of human life, but from therinterests of all those affected. In the original position thedelegates establish a practice providing fair treatment andopportunity for each nation, enabling each nation to develop withintheir own context, and creating a long term forum publicly'recognized for resolving conflicts in Europe.

The four proposed schemes extrapolate from present conditionsand postulate socio-politico-military and economic trendscontinuing unabated. The venerable philosopher, Immanuel Kant,once declared, "the imagination is the ability to make present whatis absent.j76 Upon imagining a hypothetical situation called theoriginal position, the delegates project the future and attend tonon-state nations as well in developing a military security scheme.Since extrapolating excludes the future and non-state nations, thefour proposed schemes' preoccupations with preserving stabilitydevises unadaptable schemes incapable of responding to evolvinghuman problems. Placed under a veil of ignorance, the delegatespursue justice, progress, and resolving conflicts through dialogueand not merely through the threat or use of force.

04 Donald Dewey, "The Hidden Nations of Western Europe," inGlobal Studies: Western Europe, ed. Dr. Henri J. Warmenhoven(Guiford, CT., 1991), p. 186.

~s Toulmin, Pp. 192-193.

~s Kant, p. 65. i

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When seeking to establish the appropriate military securityscheme, the delegates must determine both the desirability and'feasibility of each scheme. A desirable scheme identifies thosevalues or goals which will realize and maintain the conditionsnecessary for the well-being of its citizens. In the original:position, the veil of ignorance "identifies the most desirable ofthe alternative arrangements since it picks out the arrangementthat we would select under a regime of enforced impartiality."~A feasible scheme selects the option which efficiently andeffectively achieves its goals. With the constraints placed in theoriginal position, "the arrangement we would choose there, assumingthat we choose sensibly, must be one that would seem feasible inthe light of that general information."7e The most desirable and:feasible scheme creates a Federation for European MilitarySecurity. The federation is the long term military security.structure capable of dealing with the uncertainty of a European:'future while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relativelypeaceful Europe.

CONCLUSION

Intending to demonstrate that both short and long termpolicies can be coherently developed, this paper has discussed forfour schemes proposed for maintaining a relatively peaceful Europe...

Proposing to terminate all European alliances, the firstscheme recommends each nation-state maintain military forces at thelevel necessary only for defending its political sovereignty andterritorial integrity. Incorrectly assuming a European future withno military threats nor rivalries, history demonstrates this schemeis destabilizing, heightens the risk of conflict, and does notprovide a mechanism for avoiding war.

Confronted with the NATO irony, NATO's military threat issignificantly abated yet altered. With decreasing defense budgetsand force reductions, the Resilient Defense strategy countervailsan unstable multipolar power and alliance configuration; however,without universalist policies constructively regulating relationsamid all European states, NATO lacks the comprehensive mandate forrealizing European security. Thus, a modified NATO is provisionaluntil a new scheme defines, develops, and maintains a free, secure,just, and relatively peaceful Europe.

Declaring to defend the signatories at its borders, theresuscitated Western European Union uses the strategy of posing an

~ Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, "Rawls: A Theory ofJustice and its Critics," (CA., 1990), pp. 58.

~a Ibid., p. 20.

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unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation by using a mix of nuclearand conventional forces. Providing the benefit of including Francein a military security scheme of Europe, the Western European Unionchecks French national interests. Insisting on French and Britishdominated nuclear forces, excluding Russian, United States andCanadian membership, and containing less membership than NATO, theWestern European Union promotes a competitive military securityenvironment and does not adequately address the military securityissues of Europe.

Comprised of military forces from European nation-states,Russia, Canada, and the United States, the Pan-European Army'smission would be removing military force from European politicalconflicts. Maintaining a Pan-European Army questions the politicalsovereignty and territorial integrity of the participating nation-states. This particular concept of an integrated military force,ambiguates the distinction between the justification of containingviolence in political conflicts and the excuse of occupyingEuropean nation-states. If all nation-states of the integratedmilitary force are not willing to host the force on their own soil,then this institution is unjust.

This paper proposes a thought experiment to determine whethersecurity schemes have been exhausted, and provides a method for

deciding which military scheme to implement. Imagining an originalposition while imposed restrictions under the veil of ignorance,convention delegates would devise a fair European military securityscheme. Agreeing to comply to the principles of liberty, truth,and equality, the delegates select a desirable and feasible schemecalled the Federation for European Military Security. The'delegates establish a practice promoting development within thecontext of an uncertain European future, while maintaining a free,secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.

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