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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014: THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIC AND EUROSCEPTIC MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE

FINAL REPORT

Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia

Open Society Initiative for Europe

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Final Report

Workshop “European elections 2014:

the rise of xenophobic

and eurosceptic movements in Europe”

Held in Barcelona, January 17th, 2014

At the premises of the Open Society Initiative for Europe

C/Elisabets 22-24, 08001 Barcelona

Published by:

Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT)

In cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE)

Summary of Conference by:

, Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia

Publishing accomplishment by:

Ara Llibres, SCCL

www.arallibres.cat

Supported by:

European Journalism Centre

European Journalists Association of Catalonia

European Parliament’s Information Office in Barcelona

We would like to thank all the participants from different European countries.

This final report is the result of their contributions, expertise, insight

and different perspectives which has provided us with informed and balanced

analysis and exceptionally rich and diverse content.

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The Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT) aims to foster

dialogue and build relationships between the citizens of Catalonia

and the rest of the world in order to promote peace, democracy and

understanding. We also seek to contribute to debates on the main global

challenges by encouraging the active involvement of Catalan society

in the mutual exchange of ideas and best practices in key sectors.

This includes raising awareness of European Fundamental Rights and

International Human Rights through conferences and other forms of

mutual exchange of ideas and best practices. With this aim, DIPLOCAT,

in cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for Europe, and with the

support of the European Journalism Centre, the European Journalists

Association of Catalonia and the European Parliament’s Information

Office in Barcelona, invited specialists from media, academia and the

European institutions to analyse the rise of xenophobic and Eurosceptic

movements in the context of the European Parliament elections in May

2014. Participants from different European countries came to Barcelona

this January and openly debated proposals for concrete actions to be

taken before and after the elections. Thanks to their expertise, insight

and different perspectives, the result of their informed and balanced

analysis was exceptionally rich and diverse.

The Open Society Initiative for Europe provided the ideal setting for the

event at their headquarters in Barcelona.

The results of the debate are summarized in this report, which we

present as a lasting account of the content produced during the event.

It will amplify the results with stakeholders from the EU institutions,

organisations and media specialising in the fields of human rights and

integration who have the power to listen and act.

We would like to thank all participants and institutions for their support

and for making possible what can be seen as an initiative for a democratic

future of peaceful coexistence for all European citizens.

Albert Royo

Secretary General

Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia

FOREWORD

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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014:

THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIC AND EUROSCEPTIC MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE

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5INTRODUCTION 7

WORKSHOP SESSIONS 9

1. The European Parliament and populism 9

2. Xenophobia: The next major threat to Europe? 14

3. Controversy: Is the press to blame? 18

CONCLUSION 24

APPENDIX 26

I. Biography of all participants in alphabetical order 26

II. Workshop programme 35

TABLE OFCONTENTS

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© Enric Muñoz, 2014

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The 2014 European Parliamentary elections are being used by political

groups as a political opportunity for self-affirmation and to increase

their influence in European decision making. It is probable that populist

movements will win more seats in these elections than ever before.

It is important to understand the possible consequences for European

policies and for the European Parliament as an institution. This can only

be achieved by investigating who these movements are, what relationship

they have with the European Union, and what moves people to vote

for their parties. Before being able to determine how to address the

concerns of their adherents and of society in general, one needs to focus

on the threats and perceptions of threat by voters which can have an

impact on elections. Different types of populism, Euroscepticism and

xenophobia must be distinguished for conclusions to be reached on

how to change either the perceptions or the situations that make voters

vulnerable to populist, if not racist, ideas. In this analysis, the attitudes of

the different actors, including European institutions and MEPs, national

politicians and the press, to populist movements are as decisive as their

field of action in addressing the roots of the problem, and in changing

the perceptions of society in general and of voters in particular. The

European economic crisis and related policies must also be included as

components in the scheme.

This report includes the contributions from all participants who investigated

these topics throughout the workshop. The sessions separately addressed

each of the three pillars - the European institutions, society and media

- with introductions by experts, to then examine and combine them

with the experience and different backgrounds of participants from

institutions, academic circles and media. The experts integrated their

fields of expertise, and voiced their expectations from the other pillars.

This interaction uncovered transcending links between the areas of

politics, society and media, in which the actors and their needs are

interrelated. The analysis led to identifying a structure for correlation

between the European Union and national politics, society, crisis, voting

behaviour and media reporting, which makes clear the requirements and

responsibilities of all partners in the endeavour of European democracy.

The outcomes are recommendations for concrete actions on how to

keep the European values of diversity, tolerance and inclusiveness at

the centre of European politics.

INTRODUCTION

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© European Union, 2014

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Forecast

The European Parliament is the democratically elected institution

of the European Union, and the next elections taking place in May

2014 are the first to be held after the Lisbon Treaty. It can be

foreseen that more populist MEPs will win seats in the European

Parliament. According to the participants, in the existing Parliament

there are approximately 55 populist MEPs, and forecasts show

that this May, up to 100 populist MEPs could win seats. Overall,

these groups tend to stand for giving fewer powers to the EU,

re-nationalising competences, also renationalising borders and

immigration.

Estimated impact of populism

Whichever of the possible scenarios materialises - one new

populist group, several smaller groups disconnected from the

biggest group, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

or, reflecting the current situation in the European Parliament, a

bulk of non-attached groups on the radical right – the question is

whether decision-making on social issues such as immigration will

change. In the workshop it became clear that while these MEPs

can be disruptive to Parliamentary procedures, they do not have

the critical mass to block decisions. According to the analysis of

experts on the panel, direct influence on the European Parliament as

an institution from populist groups can be expected to be limited,

as fragmentation amongst the different extremist nationalists

impedes concerted actions as one united front.

However, there are several problems related to a rise in extremism

in the European Parliament which will determine their real

practical impact.

Adhesion to European values

Xenophobic and racist rhetoric does not coincide with European values

and rights and could, if strong enough, change the identity of the European

Parliament. The openly xenophobic discourse of some populist MEPs is

opposed to EU values of diversity and multiculturalism.

Looking at voting on immigration and ethnic minority rights, it has been

proven that populist parties are the most likely to vote against these

measures. A higher ratio of populist MEPs in the European Parliament

could lead political discourse away from European core values. It is not

expected that this change would also lead to a change in the resulting

laws proposed, as overall populist MEPs are not forecast to attain a

WORKSHOP1. The European Parliament and populism

European Parliament’s hemicycle, Brussels

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majority or to form a substantial group. However, there remains the

probability that legislation would be different with a higher number of

populist MEPs, and this could lead to a shift in the core values of social

cohesion across EU borders.

Participation in the European construct

The nationalistic anti-EU discourse that appeals to Eurosceptics is in

favour of limiting the powers of the European Union, including those of

the European Parliament, and could challenge the federal construct of

the EU as such. The attitude observed in populist groups is to disturb,

act as opposition to the system from within but without participating

in policies, because that would make them seem part of the system.

MEPs, who do not adhere to EU norms and values have little incentive

to be constructive, which in itself can be disruptive: extremist parties

are not interested in process but in its obstruction, which, if practised

by a larger number of MEPs, could even undermine the legitimacy of

the European Parliament. Populists have been observed to use EU

funds to build national networks instead of adding value to the EU

construct.

Contamination of political debate

A related problem is that MEPs from moderate right-wing parties are

buying in to populist ideas due to the political advantages of these new

potential allies.

Would mainstream parties cooperate with populists? Even if the populists

do not form one strong group, moderate parties could be more willing

to engage with them when they are more numerous. The EP system of

passing legislation by forming alliances between groups or individuals

could make populist MEPs more important if they became necessary or

helpful for obtaining the critical amount of votes for legislation, even if

they do not belong to one of the major groups. The more populist MEPs

there are in the EP, the more power they could have to broker alliances

and arrange voting majorities. This could lead to MEPs of different groups

supporting populist ideas in their draft laws to attract these allies, or

taking on board their rhetoric in debates.

Moderate groups would also have more incitement to copy extremist

ideas in order to impede extremist efforts to steal susceptible moderate

voters. The more these ideas are expressed in the EP, the greater the

risk of the general political discourse being contaminated.

Legal barrier

Given these predictions, the European Parliament should take seriously

the possible consequences of a rise in populist MEPs, and act against

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the loss or change of European values. To do so, the putting into place

of legal instruments to combat xenophobic discourse was mentioned.

If it is a European concern that all new member states adhere to norms

and regulations, and as such, to the values of Europe, then why should

there not be commitment to European values from the European

political party elite? As well as letters of commitment, there could be

an ethical code on the limits of discourse against racism allowing for

active measures against homophobic individuals within political parties.

Finally, if there was a law against xenophobic and homophobic

discourse, this could eventually be extended to parliamentary and/or

media discourse in the member states if brought to the attention of a

European legal organ.

Regulating speaking and question time

As a second step, actions against attitudes obstructing the functioning

of the EP were proposed. If there was a regulated speaking time, and a

limited time for questions per MEP, all political opinions would have the

chance to be heard, but no disproportionate visibility and little deviation

from the initial topic would be possible. Questions could be regulated

in accordance with European values.

The EP’s image, including all MEPs

The attitude of MEPs in distancing themselves from the European idea,

while acting from within, could be amended by strong emphasis on

specific activities involving all groups and unattached MEPs in favour of

European values (such as activities against xenophobia and for diversity),

which should be openly attributed to the whole of Parliament. It is not

possible to distance oneself from the European activities which one

forms part of, if it is communicated that these activities take place.

Analysis of the vote

One can discuss ideas on how to anchor fundamental rights within the

European Parliament. However, it must be emphasised that all MEPs

have been democratically elected, and that their voters should be taken

seriously. If voters send a message of protest, this message should be

acknowledged, taken into account, and responded to.

If EU institutions take positions which have a negative effect on voters´

lives, the European elections are the one moment when they can express

their frustration, and at that moment, voting itself is an important political

act as a reaction to a political EU. To be able to respond, one needs to

get to the root of the protest vote by understanding the different types

of Euroscepticism.

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Euroscepticism

The rational part of Euroscepticism can be attributed to a democratic

deficit within the EU, and/or to an identity problem of European

democracy. Whether it is the lack of a positive impact of the EP on the

life of the individual, or the lack of visibility of this positive impact, few

people actually know whether and how the EP influences a citizen’s

life. And whether it is the lack of democratic influence of the EP on the

EU institutions, i.e. if it allows citizens’ concerns to be heard, or only

a lack of knowledge of its democratic influence, few people actually

know much about the role of the EP. If the EP is the guardian of EU

values, not many people are aware of this.

To solve this problem one needs to talk about what is right, and deal

with what is wrong in an objective and critical way. This may involve

changing specific policies or procedures, or a democratic reform of the

institutions and treaties to give credibility to the EU project, perhaps by

more accountability of the EP to citizens after elections and during the

term, or more direct or indirect influence of the citizen on the activities

of other EU institutions, or by other measures.

Europhobia

The lack of credibility of the EU project has less rational, more emotional

roots, which lead to the conclusion that “the monster EU is not working,

or not working in our interests”, more often supported by Europhobe

populist voters. When the EU as a construct is too distant, and voters

feel it is unresponsive to control mechanisms they know, it can easily

be perceived as taking over citizens’ lives in an uncontrolled way.

Feelings of insecurity can result in reverting to one’s own borders and

turning on an abstract culprit.

In response, national mainstream parties must work with their MEPs to

find agreement on good arguments for supporting the EU, and to actively

combat its bureaucratic and distant image. The EU can challenge the

“comforting” nationalism of the populists with the same use of positive

symbols and ideologies to show when and how the EU is acting in

favour of the individual, using the same will to reach out to citizens for

direct contact with voters. On a larger scale, including the EU as part

of the national political landscape in national education systems would

make it part of the heritage adopted by the individual, and encourage

identification. This could include showing existing democratic links of

the MEP with the citizen, as well as national influence in the Council of

Ministers. Bringing the EP to the voter should be supported by specific

programmes funded by the EU Commission.

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Xenophobia

Even if xenophobic MEPs do not seem to influence overall political

functioning, the European Parliament needs to take the sentiment of

xenophobia seriously, to protect the fundamental rights inherent in the

concept of the European Union. By taking responsibility for countering

Euroscepticism and the raising of frontiers against strangers, so defending

the European values of diversity, and by making sure these are reaching

citizens, the EP plays its part in countering xenophobia. Europe may

have fewer opportunities than local, regional or national levels to provide

feelings of security and belonging, but that does not mean this should

not be a concern for European institutions.

Debate of the participants at the OSIFE premises in Barcelona

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Roots of xenophobia

When debating the causes of xenophobia it became clear that

although feelings of xenophobia within societies have existed

throughout history, most of the time they do not come to the fore.

The causes of xenophobia can be found in the emotions of fear,

aggression and hatred present within society, combined with the

feeling of insecurity. There are different situations of instability

leading to insecurity, such as feelings of being excluded from or

let down by society (including the state, politics, the education

system), or the instability of marginalised stratum of society (lack

of self esteem, resources). If a part of society finds itself in a similar

situation of loss of identity and references, e.g. due to radical

changes in conditions, this can give rise to a desire for conservation

of the old, combined with a permanent sense of insecurity.

Protest votes

These categories are not an automatic target for xenophobic rhetoric. In

some countries, xenophobic voters are well educated youngsters with

fears of losing their jobs and identity, and in distrust of the political elite.

In others, people voting populist have lost out in economic transitions, or

feel nostalgia for an idealised past. It is clear that disappointed or unstable

parts of the population tend to feel unrepresented by mainstream parties.

Protest votes for populist parties are an outlet by which to criticise the

establishment and their policies, and/or offer alternative identities for

honest people against the corrupt and selfish elites.

Anti-racial radicalisation and leadership

All categories can become receptive to scapegoating, in the form of

identifying specific persons or abstract constructs to blame for the

unstable or less favourable situation they find themselves in. Opinions

radicalise when the search for a scapegoat is permitted by society.

Statistics show that there is no uniform condition for the receptiveness of

societies to xenophobic ideas and their permissiveness towards extremism.

Openly xenophobic movements were found to be more prominent in

eastern and southern Europe. While similar racially exclusive parties exist

across northern and western Europe, the extent of radicalism in politics

and society in general was seen to be lower where the social fabric

seems solid enough to prohibit voicing of racially exclusive thoughts.

It then depends on how radicalism is used, stirred, or channelled and

calmed over time.

When strong political leadership coincides with any of the above

WORKSHOP2. Xenophobia: the next threat to Europe?

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factors that condition susceptibility to xenophobia, it can be decisive

in legitimising or de-legitimising radical opinions within society. When

eloquent populist politicians use the receptiveness of society at a given

moment, the way that mainstream politics reacts (adopts ideas, uses

them against political opponents, or distances itself and denounces) has

great influence on whether racist tendencies are absorbed and accepted

(or not) into mainstream rhetoric, and as such into society itself.

Anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments

Immigrants, representing the unknown and personally unrelated, are

an easy and specific scapegoat, serving to materialise fears and explain

insecurity. As this is an emotional reaction, reality does not necessarily

correlate with it, i.e. as witnessed in some countries, there need not

be many immigrants in a society to find xenophobia. For the majority

of voters of populist parties with xenophobic tendencies, the radical

aspect is part of the identity distinguishing them from the mainstream,

and instrumental in their aim of confronting the mainstream. People

factually against the mixing of races only make up a small fraction of

their adherents.

The European political establishment as an abstract constellation is

another target available for channelling negative emotions, without

antagonising voters who would not adhere to socially unacceptable

racist vocabulary. The concept of Euroscepticism is less stigmatised

than xenophobia and homophobia, whilst also offering strong values

of identification with nationalist and anti-foreigner projections. Populist

parties in some societies are more easily legitimised where they can seize

votes from Europhobes, (convinced of their nationalist, anti-European and

anti-international sentiments, perceiving the EU as an evil, anonymous,

foreign control construct, opening the door to threats from abroad),

and Eurosceptics, (identifying with populism to send protest warnings

to get rid of an EU that they perceive does not represent them and has

strong systemic and conceptual flaws).

Economic instability

In countries in which the political climate favours using xenophobic

political arguments, economic instability can give reasons for the use

of racist ideology. Economic instability can trigger feelings of insecurity

of the individual and real instability of parts of society. This can create

receptiveness for radical discourse. There is however no proof of an

automatic connection between economic condition and the dynamics of

racism and xenophobia. In some countries such as Greece, the European

economic crisis could be seen as one of the factors that enhanced a

xenophobic climate, making parts of the population vulnerable to political

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abuse. In other countries such as Spain, or even more so Latvia, which

have also suffered difficult economic crisis, there has been less growth

in xenophobia or the political use of racist ideas. In countries like France

and Great Britain, support for populist movements peaked when the

economic situation was most stable.

Denouncing xenophobic discourse

The responsibility of mainstream politicians is not to exploit fears, not to

embrace xenophobic discourse to win votes and thereby help extremist

thoughts to be legitimised, and to distance themselves openly from

xenophobic rhetoric through a proactive, integrative discourse.

Their role is also to take citizens’ fears into account, and take the threat

of populist parties to divide society seriously, even if the political impact

of those parties might, depending on the country, be negligible.

Active integration

National politicians should address the feelings of insecurity of parts of

society through integrative actions to avoid losing these citizens, who

do not feel represented by society, to extremism. Where populists give

an alternative to the sense of belonging to mainstream society, it is the

responsibility of mainstream politics to offer such a sense within an inclusive

society. This implies giving identity, actively combating exclusion and

vulnerability. Some social movements are not only politically motivated

but create, have fun, share humour: in short, give positive alternatives to

a negative identification with society. Funding such initiatives through

social programmes should be a major concern of politicians.

The integration of diversity measures into all parts of society, i.e.

Second session, at the OSIFE premises

in Barcelona

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education, administration, political party representation should be a

concern, as should be the reinforcement of the basic pillars of society such

as education, to give a platform for an informed society to distinguish

between political traps and realities.

In more general advice to governments, the allocation of social housing

and school training was mentioned as practical support against social

exclusion, as well as a new globalisation settlement involving social

globalisation, e.g. environmental protection.

Identification with European values

Education and political discourse should be used to explain and rectify

the attribution of fears to immigrants. If politicians combat fears related

to immigrants and install tolerance, they will also combat the fear that

populist politicians use when pointing to Europe as a liberal entry port

for foreign evil.

Furthermore, if through education and government programmes, a

sense of belonging and inclusion can be given, this can also serve to

convey the social values of diversity, tolerance, peaceful co-existence

and inclusion. Solid roots for society’s values can lead to feelings of

affinity with European values, when social values coincide with those

of the EU. By counteracting xenophobia, a society can also provide the

basis for a European identity.

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Eco crisis and image of the EU

During the seminar it became clear that when there is crisis, the

weak points become a real vulnerability. With the current economic

crisis, the existing problems have been exacerbated.

It could be witnessed that European values such as solidarity,

multiculturalism, diversity, integration suffered, and support

for Europe weakened. When the EU has no human image within

European societies, only the economic regulations and interests

prevail. Which leaves the EU vulnerable for being blamed for

anything. The EU was often projected as inefficient, inexistent

and shallow, slow, bureaucratic, as well as abstract and working

independently.

During the economic crisis this coincided with economic

destabilisation of whole parts of population, and political

destabilisation and even humiliation of political elite – provoked

by strong external pressure on mainstream parties for political

decisions and spending cuts. The EU as guardian of European

values had no visibility then, activities of EU institutions were not

perceived to consider social impact, on the contrary, their related

destabilisation was seen to have laid the grounds for extremism.

EU institutions had become fragile, associated only with rigid and

draconic economic restrictions. The EP as the institution with most

direct democratic legislation is then bearing the brunt of these

often nationally motivated policies, feeling the consequences of

the EU population’s anger with openly Eurosceptic votes.

Immigration as scapegoat

If diversity of the society is not integrated as a positive value into

the mainstream political discourse, it is easily another weak point,

depending on the strength of the social tissue and integrative

politics of the governments over time. If politicians and / or press

then pursue internal political strategies of blaming immigrants,

xenophobia becomes mainstream. Stereotypes were evoked

when talking about the crisis. Fears were awakened in European

societies hit by the crisis. In some countries it was witnessed

that immigrants were made the scapegoat for the bad economic

situation the population is suffering. Especially when the social

tissue was weakened by real economic instability, the feeling of

insecurity, of not being valued, left out of society could be used

politically to stir the protests against scapegoats, either actively

or passively.

WORKSHOP3. Controversy: Is the press to blame?

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The role of the press

Without independence, the press can be one more player in a game

of using scapegoats and stereotypes to explain the political problems

that are causing real instability within society. This is especially the case

when financing of the media is correlated with political parties or specific

industries, subsidised by governments, or cut off from substantial self-

financing such as advertising. The media can be used for sending messages

for political purposes; by politicians, or conversely, as an instrument of

pressure of the owners, to present items on the government agenda.

Figures prove that where the press is less free, there is a correlation

with more populist views.

Some European countries have been identified as having a partisan

press, playing a huge role in strengthening anti-EU views. While the

Eurosceptics were offering persuasive arguments and trendily diffused

them with social media, good arguments for recreating European ideas

during the crisis were missing, and the EU institutions themselves

seemed voiceless. In other cases, passive non-analysis by the media of

catchy material prepared for journalists was the problem. Immigrants

as scapegoats or exclusive nationalism are strong political and media

tools to attract attention. Even without being actively partisan, media

backed xenophobia when accepting and publishing this kind of material

uncritically.

A free press and funding

If media is independent and responsible, it can critically deal with political

arguments, distinguish itself from political parties and business, and

publish verified analysis. If its creative independence is limited due to lack

of financial independence, moral responsibility for not using stereotypes

also falls on the source of funding. With independent financing, the press

has the conditions for taking full responsibility for the consequences of

its reporting.

Balanced reporting

In practical terms, this means that the more the press can act without

connection to political power, the better it can analyse the forces behind

economic downturn, crisis and the measures to be taken, and can make

unilateral ethical decisions to avoid using scapegoats, be it immigrants

or the EU. This may entail holding the EU responsible for applying rules

and scant social consideration in economic decision making, for creating

conditions for the vice of fascism. It may entail criticising national

economies for strategic planning failures or for lack of rigidity and

structure. But it may also entail analysing that immigrants did not cause

the economic crisis, or that it was not an “ungoverned” EU causing social

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unrest, without member states influencing its decisions via the Council.

If balanced reporting includes criticism, it is not credible to have

unconditional campaigns in favour of the EU institutions as “the way we

are now is the only way that works”. Depending on the situation and the

political climate, this can be undemocratic as well as counterproductive,

when criticism strengthens the image of extremists and creates rejection

by their voters.

One-sidedness can work in favour of populists also when it comes

to xenophobia. Immigration can be a topic which deserves a factual

discussion, with acknowledgement of the fears present within parts of

the population, while avoiding entering into emotional populist polemics.

De-emotionalising discourse

Whoever the source of the information is - politicians, business or press

- whether politically motivated or meant to create catchy information to

sell news, and whatever the opinion towards immigration and foreigners,

two things can be raised. Firstly, that hatred can be countered with

tolerance, and secondly, that it is possible to avoid playing with emotions

of fear, or stigmatising groups “that are not like us”. There is a need for

the press to de-emotionalise the political discourse, and furthermore,

to openly denounce the political instrumentalisation of fear and hatred.

At the same time, the press can acknowledge fears in society in a way

that disconnects them from dangers of foreign intervention and from

immigration as a threat to security.

Humanising, from parties to individuals

The press has several difficulties to face when writing about xenophobic

politicians.

First: It is easy to be singled out by adherents of a xenophobic movement

as part of the establishment that the movement identifies itself against.

Criticising adds credibility and public visibility to the movement, and

normalises it as just another mainstream party. The act of inviting a

democratically elected party to speak in public automatically makes

the media speak for this party.

Second: Writing about xenophobic politicians with disrespect can turn

against their voters’ political will and credibility. This in turn stigmatises

these voters as outsiders who make unacceptable choices, and thus

possibly reinforces their isolation in their extremist opposition to political

society.

While stigmatising voters may not work, unmasking responsible political

individuals as irresponsible antisocial human beings may. The choice

could be taken not to give them the floor, but to show up this reality,

while conveying the sense that they are unworthy of identifying with.

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The press can humanise and individualise, move away from reporting

on groups, to focus on the individuals in these groups. Talking about the

faces identified with ideologies turns anonymous people into individual

human beings, who are responsible for their acts.

In conclusion, what if one treated xenophobes as “antidemocratic”,

immoral human beings who actively attack parts of the population?

What if one referred to the evil of fascism, Islamophobia etc., instead

of just another legitimate party, explaining the consequences for the

outcast individual? While at the same time referring to their voters as

having been misled by a legitimate-seeming disguise masking inhuman

activities?

Social values and the individual

If EU and member state politicians adopt a social discourse and social

initiatives take place, the press can transmit their message and support

it with interesting and attractive journalism. In parallel or independently,

it can assume a social role, extending its function as a mirror of society

to embrace the responsibility of creating public opinion.

If today values of individualism, consumerism and self-interest have

become predominant, these values prejudice immigrants in times of

crisis. The press can revert to traditional European social values by

focusing less on business and economics, and more on the image of

society and social activities. To counter xenophobia and to support an

inclusive society, the press can transmit concrete examples of integration

success stories, giving a human face to the label of foreigner, be it at

local, national or EU level.

Positive, accessible and clear news with human examples of the integration

of immigrants from the neighbourhood can create understanding, when

showing a rich, multicultural social life, when reflecting the happiness of the

development of identity or problem-solving work by civic organisations,

and when amplifying the voices of individuals who are normally silenced.

Didactic reporting on the fears of society can help to destroy polemic

topics proactively, countering sensationalist reporting and exaggeration.

When the press addresses insecurities within society whilst cutting the

amalgam with immigration, it can make credible social news. e.g. by

showing how immigrants experience the same problems (fear of theft,

instability, unemployment), by underlining the beneficial role of immigrants

for society, their positive economic contribution to welfare systems,

and by reminding that in times of a healthy economy, immigrants were

invited to join the work force.

The EU and national authorities should encourage quality journalism

by financing media that espouses ethics of balanced and researched

news production which install tolerance and understanding in society.

DiploCat_6.indd 21 24/03/14 10:18

22

They could do so by stepping up EU and national awards for inclusive,

representative and responsible reporting. To fund those who pass on

vital messages for inclusive societies.

Working together to give the EU a human face

To change voters’ perceptions of the EU the press can give credible

arguments to pro-Europeans to combat low voter turnout by delivering

interesting and attractive news.

Problem number one: How to interest readers in something that has a

distant image and does not automatically encourage the citizen to feel

involved? For the press which thrives on stories which the reader can

relate to, but depend on the existence of positive events to talk about,

this is a problem. The result is that often, the press is reluctant to publish

on European issues, saying that “it would lose readers, as the public is

not interested, that it is too risky to focus on the EU”. If then Brussels is

blamed, the public believes it, because it has not been told otherwise.

This gap must be closed if the press is to reach the people who will be

voting. However, if communication is about institutions, norms and rules

of procedure, the effort will remain huge.

Problem number two: The EU is seen as a bureaucratic shell, in which

laws are made and passed on to the member states, allegedly with

funds to help implementation. It has very low visibility for its concrete

initiatives, especially in the social sphere. Market events are higher on

the (communications) agenda than social initiatives. This makes the

outcome of social initiatives less representative than market liberalisation

and financial measures. Concrete results could be given to the press by

implementing member states, if national politicians pass the praise for

the good result to the EU.

Problem number three: Well-balanced news items based on facts, which

are de-emotionalised, can be dry and unattractive to readers. Press and

politicians face the same problem of the sensationalist social rhetoric

of some Eurosceptics and populists, and pro-Europeans being unable

to counter on the same level.

The EU needs to be touchable to be interesting, needs to be wrapped

in information on the specific benefits of the EU for citizen, and needs

to be presented together with examples. This way the press can use the

same techniques of proximity as the populists, but in inclusive ways, to

reach out directly to voters.

Pro-Europeans within the EU and national politics need to work together

with the press to give the EU a positive discourse, supported by the

mainstream parties in the European Parliament, at national and local levels.

This facilitates the developing of identity campaigns and awareness-

raising on concrete and customised European projects, with individuals

DiploCat_6.indd 22 24/03/14 10:18

23

who benefit from the EU, so that readers in the different EU member

states can relate to the information. To give pro-European media the

ammunition to be more outspoken and to make a strong case, this could

involve national politicians linking the EU to the national context and

including the EU in their campaigns.

Specific initiatives could involve the provision by the EU of material

from individual projects or results within the member state, to support

national news media in raising support for important initiatives such

as the EU elections. Moreover, independent organisations could be

included in the project of giving EU money for good EU coverage in

national newspapers and TVs, with the aim to fund those who can pass

the message. This common effort should pre-empt the prediction that

the only voters who will vote massively are the anti-Europeans, and

challenge the impression that only the “antis” have good arguments.

Presentation of one of the speakers, at the OSIFE premises in Barcelona

DiploCat_6.indd 23 24/03/14 10:18

24

European democracy has an identity problem, as people do not know

and/or do not identify with it. This opens the door to Eurosceptic

criticism and facilitates the entry of populists. The situation seems

more worrying for EU societies than for EU institutions. The EP as

an institution may not change with these elections, but certainly the

debate on European values, and of law-making proposals, may be

influenced by the increase of populist MEPs in the EP. At national level

the EU is not strongly present, whether the cause is a mis-perception

or the lack of real communication, a flaw in democratic structures or

EU policies, or simply a lack of interest in politics.

Xenophobic populism can gain influence when its ideas are made

acceptable within that society. With economic crisis, a society can

be (but need not be) at risk of becoming more susceptible to this

kind of abuse.

Taking fears within society seriously; abstaining from the exploitation

of fears as a political tactic and from sensational reporting; openly

denouncing the use of fear; not adopting the populist rhetoric proposed

by political individuals or groups: these are all measures for preventing

xenophobic ideas from infiltrating mainstream politics and changing

society’s perception of this discourse. They are valid for the EU institutions,

national politics and media. Any responsible counter-action such as

social inclusion should first analyse the causes of these perceptions,

acknowledging the voter’s choice as a form of protest, or a feeling of

not belonging to mainstream society.

Without conscientious communication at EU level and at national

level, the European institutions will not be able to reap the benefits

of integrative activities favouring European values. Communication in

proximity to citizens and voters is effective, letting readers identify EU

activities with their own interests and environment. National parliaments,

civil society and media have a great influence in transmitting messages.

Their importance must be reflected transversally in programmes, to

support their positive influence on the European construct.

Only far-reaching cooperation of all actors involved can succeed in

stemming the rise of populism and Euroscepticism in the European

Parliament and in reinforcing this institution as the democratic guardian

of human rights of the European construct. The risk of diminishing the

European idea, which stands for inclusion, solidarity and the sharing

of common cultural and political roots, must be taken seriously on

all political and societal levels, in a shared effort for the peaceful

coexistence of all members of European society.

CONCLUSION

DiploCat_6.indd 24 24/03/14 10:18

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014:

THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIC AND EUROSCEPTIC MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE

DiploCat_6.indd 25 24/03/14 10:18

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SERGI BARRERA

Sergi Barrera is a journalist and press officer at the Information

Office of the European Parliament in Barcelona since September

2008. Previously he was press officer of the Secretariat for

the EU and the Delegation of the Government of Catalonia

to the EU (2007-2008) and former President of the Young European

Federalists (JEF Europe) in Catalonia (2008-2009).

LILA CABALLERO

Lila Caballero is head of projects at Counterpoint and the

project manager and senior researcher on the Recapturing

Europe’s Reluctant Radicals project. Ms Caballero holds a

PhD in Government and an Msc in Comparative Politics from

the London School of Economics. During her postgraduate studies she

focused on the underlying power dynamics of institutions, which are

deeply rooted in culture and traditions. At Counterpoint she has been

able to continue exploring the “hidden wiring” and cultural complexities

of European institutions, mainly through her work on populism. Ms

Caballero has authored, co-authored and commissioned various pieces

on the hidden wiring of populism within the Reluctant Radicals project,

and often writes short pieces on current events for the Counterpoint

website.

TERESA CARRERAS

Teresa Carreras is President of the Association of European Journalists

of Catalonia (APEC). She is also professor of journalism at the Faculty

of Communication Sciences at the Autonomous University of Barcelona,

and at the Tecnocampus Mataró-Maresme, which forms part of the

Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Furthermore, she is correspondent

for the weekly El Siglo, and is director of The Independent news agency

for gender topics. Previously Ms Carreras worked as a journalist for

Spanish TV (TVE) for twenty five years; from 2001-2004 she was editor

in chief of TVE in Barcelona, and correspondent in Brussels from 1989

to 2008.

KYRIAKOS CHATZISTEFANOU

Kyriakos Chatzistefanou is a journalist and film director. He has worked

for BBC World Service, The Guardian and several media organisations

in Greece and Cyprus. He co-directed the documentaries “Debtocracy”

and “Catastroika” and he is now finishing the documentary “Fascism

Inc”. He is the author of three books on current affairs.

APPENDIXI. Participants in alphabetical order

DiploCat_6.indd 26 24/03/14 10:18

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CARME COLOMINA

Carme Colomina is world editor at ARA newspaper and Associate Researcher

on European Affairs at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

(CIDOB). She also teaches International Journalism at Pompeu Fabra

University (Barcelona) and University of Vic. She is a frequent contributor

to various media as an analyst of European current affairs. She graduated

in Information Science from the Autonomous University of Barcelona and

postgraduated in European Union Studies from the Open University of

Catalonia. She has been head of international affairs and correspondent

of Catalunya Ràdio in Brussels. Ms Colomina has covered international

summits in some 20 countries and the war in Afghanistan in 2001. She has

worked as an adviser on various communication projects in the European

and Euro-Mediterranean sphere, and was head of Interregional Cooperation

in the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Catalonia.

JEAN COMTE

Jean Comte is a freelance journalist for Euractiv, and contributing

journalist to the website CafeBabel.fr, where he specialises in European

Affairs and the European institutions and their relations with European

citizens. He covered several of Commissioner Reding’s Citizens’ dialogues,

and also wrote about the European year of citizens and European

citizens’ initiatives. He contributes to several French newspapers,

such as Le Monde, Le Quotidien, L’Avenir, La Dépêche du Midi and

Paris Normandie. Mr Comte holds degrees in Philosophy from Paris

and Brussels University.

MARC GAFAROT i MONJÓ

Marc Gafarot is projects manager at the Barcelona Centre for

International Affairs (CIDOB). He holds a degree in Humanities from

the Universidad de Navarra, an MSc in European Studies from the

London School of Economics and an MA in Latin American Studies from

the University of Liverpool. As a journalist and political commentator

he has worked from London for Bloomberg LP, in Latin America for

Summit Communications and served as a Parliamentary Adviser at

the European Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg. Mr Gafarot has

also worked from Barcelona as Head of International Relations for

Fundació CATmón and for the English-written magazine Catalan

International View. He has written a book on Flanders and Federalism in

Belgium called “La mort de Bèlgica: La gradual i pacífica emancipació

flamenco” and he has co-authored “The Student’s Guide to European

Integration”. He collaborates with a number of Catalan publications

and has published works on Political Science, Nationalism, Immigration,

European and world politics.

DiploCat_6.indd 27 24/03/14 10:18

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FRANCESCA GUARDIOLA

Francesca Guardiola is Deputy Director General of the Secretariat

for Foreign Affairs, Government of Catalonia since September 2011.

Previously she was Head of the MP’s Services Section of the Parliament

of Catalonia from 2006-2011 and Head of Protocol at the Ministry of

Education of the Government of Catalonia from 2003 -2006. She holds

a BA in Catalan Philology and a Master’s degree in Cultural Management

from the University of Barcelona, and attended postgraduate courses

in Acting at the Arts Educational School in London.

DAVID KARVALA

David Karvala is one of the initiators and spokespeople of Unitat

Contra el Feixisme i el Racisme (UCFR), the broad antifascist and

antiracist movement in Catalonia founded in 2010. He grew up in

London, and participated in the Anti-Nazi League in the late 1970s.

For the last 20 years, he has lived in Barcelona, where he is an activist

in the anti-capitalist left and the social movements. He was one of the

spokespeople of Plataforma Aturem la Guerra, Catalonia’s antiwar

movement, from 2003-10. He edited and co-authored the book “No

Pasarán, aunque lleven trajes”. Forthcoming is a book analysing the

European far right, with a special emphasis on distinguishing between

populist and fascist parties.

PETER KELLNER

Peter Kellner is President of YouGov, an international opinion polling

organisation, in the United Kingdom. He was previously a journalist

and political commentator for the Sunday Times, Independent,

New Statesman, Evening Standard, BBC Newsnight, BBC election

programmes and Channel 4 News. As well as being a member of the

British Polling Council’s committee on disclosure, Mr Kellner has been

an adviser on polls and public opinion to the Bank of England, Foreign

Office, Corporation of London, National Westminster Bank plc and

Trades Union Congress. Mr Kellner is also a member of the Council,

National Institute of Economics and Social Research and a Trustee at

the Action on Smoking and Health, the Hansard Society and Upring.

In 2011 he was given a Special Recognition award by the Political

Studies Association for his work over four decades on opinion polls,

elections and political analysis, and named Chairman of the Year by

Quoted Companies Alliance (2006).

Amongst others, he is author of “Democracy: the 1,000-year struggle

for British Liberty, 2009” and “New Mutualism: The Third Way, 1998”.

He has an MA in Economics and Statistics from Cambridge University.

DiploCat_6.indd 28 24/03/14 10:18

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PÉTER KREKÓ

Péter Krekó is Director of Political Capital, a policy research and

consulting institute in Hungary. He graduated as a psychologist

specializing in social psychology and also holds a Master’s Degree

in Political Sciences. His main research interest is the social demand

for radical right movements and the social psychology of conspiracy

theories. As an assistant professor at Eötvös Loránd University, he

is delivering lectures on social and political psychology, including

intergroup conflicts and prejudices, the social psychology of political

radicalism, and the social psychology of conspiracy theories. He is the

author of numerous studies and articles on the radical right and the

demand for right wing radicalism, and regularly comments in domestic

and international media on these issues. He has been a consultant of

the Hungarian Anti-Racist Foundation. He is now a co-chair of the

Preventing Violent Extremism working group of the EU Radicalisation

Awareness Network, an umbrella organization that connects key groups

of people involved in countering violent radicalisation across the EU

and serves as an advisory board for the Commission.

XAVIER MAS DE XAXÀS

Xavier Mas De Xaxàs is foreign desk reporter at La Vanguardia. Since

2010 he has been covering the Arab world from Algeria to Yemen. He

was correspondent in the US from 1996 to 2002, and covered in 1989

the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. He then went

on to write about the Balkans, Russia and other European countries.

Moreover, he teaches writing at Ramon Llull University. Mr Mas de Xaxàs

is author of two books: “The American smile” (Mondadori, 2003) and

“Lies. A journalist’s trip to disinformation” (Destino, 2005).

ROSA MASSAGUÉ

Rosa Massagué is journalist at El Periódico de Catalunya, the daily

Barcelona newspaper, where she has developed most of her professional

career. She has been correspondent in London and Rome and has reported

as special envoy on conflicts such as Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the

Balkans. She is a senior analyst on international affairs, writing regular

columns for the print and on-line version of El Periódico, and is also

member of the Editorial board. Ms Massagué is a regular commentator

on radio and TV stations. She is the author of the book “El legado político

de Blair” (Catarata, 2007) and teaches International Journalism at the

Master in Journalism BCN_NY.

DiploCat_6.indd 29 24/03/14 10:18

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PETER MATJAŠI

Peter Matjaši is project coordinator for the Open Society Initiative for

Europe. His work focuses on the 2014 European elections. Before joining

the Open Society Foundations, Mr Matjaši was a project coordinator

at Avanti Europe. He has been active in the field of youth work for ten

years: as a volunteer with the European Volunteer Service in Barcelona, a

youth trainer and facilitator for the European Youth Forum, and a youth

representative and youth worker with the Young European Federalists.

He set up the English version of Le Taurillon webzine under the name

thenewfederalist.eu, serving as its first editor-in-chief. He graduated

in International Relations.

YASIR MIRZA

Yasir Mirza is the global head of diversity & inclusion at Guardian News

& media, and has overall responsibility for ensuring that on an editorial

level, the Guardian better reflects the values of independence and

inclusiveness, by not only ensuring a broader diversity of voices to be

heard within the papers and websites, but that the Guardian’s editorial

coverage accurately reflects the diverse societies we live in today. Mr

Mirza started out as a freelance consultant and trainer working for various

public and private sector organisations. He was involved in training

programmes for organisations using interactive theatre and forum

techniques, such as Augusto Boal’s theatre of the oppressed, as a way

to tackle organisational inertia by exploring the dynamics of power, and

using interventions to tackle “oppression” in all its forms. He has also

performed as an actor acting for various productions, been a TV presenter,

and has also worked with children from dis-advantaged backgrounds,

using theatre as a technique to build self-esteem, confidence, and self-

expression. He currently runs citizen reporting training with marginalised

voices in oppressed communities globally to help unearth their stories.

MARLEY MORRIS

Marley Morris is a researcher and consultant at Counterpoint on the

Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals project. He focuses on populist

parties and movements, political narratives, and the social and cultural

determinants of instability in Europe. His reports include “Recapturing

the Reluctant Radical: How to win back Europe’s populist vote” and

“Conflicted Politicians: the populist radical right in the European

Parliament”. He is also currently managing the “Rival Political Narratives”

project and is leading a series of populism “self-defence” workshops

on how to counter populist rhetoric in Europe. Prior to his work at

Counterpoint, Marley was at the Violence and Extremism programme

at Demos, where he contributed to the report “The New Face of Digital

DiploCat_6.indd 30 24/03/14 10:18

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Populism” and developed a well-being index for a study on ageing across

Europe. Marley has a Master’s degree in Mathematics and Philosophy

from Oxford University.

MILAGROS PÉREZ OLIVA

Milagros Pérez Oliva is a journalist and university professor. In 1982 she

joined El País as journalist, and is currently member of de Editorial team

and head of Opinion in the Catalan edition of the newspaper, after having

been Public Editor of the newspaper between 2009 and 2012. Moreover,

she collaborates as analyst with the Television of Catalonia (TVC / TV3)

programme “Bon dia, Catalunya”, the Catalunya Ràdio programme “El

Matí de Catalunya Ràdio”, the Cadena Ser radio programme “Hora 25”

and the Spanish TV (TVE) programme “El Debat”. In 2006 she was

awarded the National Journalism Prize (Government of Catalonia) for

her independent and critical journalist work on the subjects of public

health and epidemiology.

MONTSERRAT RADIGALES

Montserrat Radigales is international correspondent for El Periódico

de Catalunya. She was a political reporter for Avui (1977-83) and El

Periódico (1983-84) during the Spanish transition to democracy. She has

been London correspondent (1984-1990) and Brussels correspondent

(1992-1996). She has reported extensively on the European Union, the

Balkans and the Middle East. Ms Radigales worked for the Office of the

High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina as Head of Public

Affairs and spokesperson of the Supervisor of Brcko (1998-2000) and

for the Spanish Embassy in Sarajevo as Assistant and Advisor to the

Ambassador during the Spanish Presidency of the EU (2002). She

was awarded a Fulbright scholarship and holds a Master’s degree in

International Public Policy from the School of Advanced International

Studies (SAIS, Washington D.C.) of the Johns Hopkins University (1991).

She is a member of the board of the Association of European Journalists

of Catalonia (APEC).

RAÜL ROMEVA

Raül Romeva is Member of the European Parliament for the Group of

the Greens/European Free Alliance since 2004, and since 2009 one of

its Vice Presidents. He is member of the ICV de Iniciativa per Catalunya

Verds party’s Youth Development Group and National Council, and since

2004 Head of the Europe Group. Amongst his activities in the European

Parliament are reports on international arms trade and his contributions

as member of the InterGroup LGTB. Mr Romeva graduated in Economics

from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (1989), and received

DiploCat_6.indd 31 24/03/14 10:18

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his Doctorate in International Relations from this University in 2002.

Specialising in Foreign Affairs, he was research analyst in armed conflict

and post-war rehabilitation (UNESCO Centre of Catalonia, Intermón Oxfam

and the School for a Culture of Peace at UAB), as well as UN consultant

on post-war rehabilitation and disarmament, with responsibilities as

principal assistant to the UNESCO representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He is author of several books and articles, including “Pau i seguretat a

Europa” (1998); “Desarme y desarrollo” (2000); “Guerra, posguerra y

paz: pautas para el análisis y la intervención en contextos posbélicos o

postacuerdo” (2003),”’Bosnia en paz: lecciones, retos y oportunidades

de una posguerra contemporánea” (2003).

ALBERT ROYO

Albert Royo is Secretary General of the Public Diplomacy Council of

Catalonia since February 2013. He holds a BA in Political Science and

a Master’s degree in Applied Economic Analysis from Pompeu Fabra

University (Barcelona), as well as a degree in European Affairs from

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Moreover,

he is a lecturer of European and International Institutions at Pompeu

Fabra University and has taught European Affairs at the Diplomatic

School of Uruguay. Mr Royo has worked for the Government of Catalonia

as Secretary for International Cooperation (2005-2007) and for the

European Commission as press officer (2001-2013). As for his civil

society engagement, Mr Royo is the promoter of Horitzó Europa, a

non-governmental organisation which fosters debate about Europe in

Catalonia and about Catalonia in Europe.

WILFRIED RÜTTEN

Wilfried Rütten is Director of the European Journalism Centre. He has

worked in German public and private broadcasting as a reporter and

producer (ARD, RTL-Group) as well as in journalism education. Before

joining the EJC he was the head of school for digital television at the

University of Applied Sciences in Salzburg, Austria.

MARINA TUNEVA

Marina Tuneva is lecturer at the School of Journalism and Public Relations

(SJPR) in Skopje, Macedonia. She has completed postgraduate studies

in Diplomacy at the University in Malta and is working on her PhD thesis

in the area of public relations and intercultural communication. As an

expert in public relations, diversity reporting, peace journalism and

intercultural communication, she has been actively involved in developing

educational programs and projects in these areas both in the country

and abroad. She is actively involved in the MEDIANE programme of the

DiploCat_6.indd 32 24/03/14 10:18

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Council of Europe and EU – Media in Europe for Diversity and Inclusiveness

on behalf of the European Journalism Training Association - EJTA. Ms

Tuneva has also taken part in the activities of the Council of Europe

aimed at development of training practices for journalists in the area of

diversity reporting. She is author of three publications: “Introduction to

Public Relations”; “Media, Citizens and Intercultural Communications”

and “The Diversity Reporting Handbook”.

RON VAN DOOREN

Ron van Dooren teaches politics at the Journalism department of

the Fontys University of Applied Sciences (Tilburg, the Netherlands).

His main subjects are the political system of the Netherlands and the

institutions and decision making process in the EU.

MARC VIDAL

Marc Vidal is foreign editor at the newspaper ARA. Previously he was

journalist at Catalunya Ràdio, the national public radio of Catalonia,

broadcasting and editing news from Barcelona and as correspondent

from Brussels. His main focus is on international news, especially on

European countries and EU institutions. He is member of the board

of the Professional Association of Journalists of Catalonia (Col·legi de

Periodistes de Catalunya). He also specialises in New Technologies.

ELINA VIILUP

Elina Viilup is Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International

Affairs (CIDOB). She has worked as an adviser for European Parliament’s

political and administrative management bodies, as well as a special

adviser of the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, where her

main dossiers included external aspects of energy policy, the Eastern

Dimension of the Union’s external policies, including EU’s bilateral

relations with its Eastern Partners and the Russian Federation, the

Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy, enlargement to South East

Europe, and parliamentary cooperation with multilateral parliamentary

assemblies (OSCE PA, PABSEC). She started her career as a consultant

and adviser in the area of EU communication policy and enlargement

issues at the European Commission Delegation in Tallinn, Estonia.

She holds a Master’s of Advanced European Studies in European

Politics, European Law, and Economics of European integration from

the University of Basel, Switzerland. She has further obtained a post-

graduate Diploma of International Relations and European Integration

from the Estonian School of Diplomacy. She has graduated in English

Language and Literature, and Public Administration of the University

of Tartu, Estonia.

DiploCat_6.indd 33 24/03/14 10:18

34

BALÁZS WEYER

Balázs Weyer is Chairman of the Editors’ Forum Hungary. Previously

he was editor-in-chief at the Hungarian news portal Origo.hu, which

he founded in 1998. During that time, he also participated in the expert

focus group for the European Commission, preparing the audiovisual

directive in 2006 and a board member of the Hungarian Association of

Content Providers between 2003 and 2010. He has been columnist and

editor at Magyar Narancs, Vasárnapi Hírek and managing director of

nationally broadcast news programme RTL Klub, and president of the

board for Tilos Radio. Mr Weyer has acted as President of the president

of the European Association of Community Broadcasters and Vice

President of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters,

Member of the Advisory Board of the Organisation of Free Radios

in Hungary, as well as of the Foundation for Quality Journalism. He

has authored and co-authored handbooks on investigative reporting

and media ethics for reporters, radio broadcasters, and economic

journalists. He studied communication sciences in Budapest and

ethnomusicology in Sheffield.

RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO

Ricard Zapata-Barrero is accredited full professor at the Department of

Social and Political Science of the Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona).

He is Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on

Immigration) and the Master Programme on immigration management

at Pompeu Fabra University. Currently Mr Zapata-Barrero is working

on research related to Governance and Diversity, addressing different

aspects of intercultural policies. Amongst others he directs the project

“Diversity: Municipalities and immigration: interculturality and the index

of Governability” (2012-14), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Innovation

and Science, and “Monitoring xenophobic political discourses: A pilot

study in Catalonia” (2012-2014), financed by Open Society Foundations.

Mr Zapata-Barrero founded the Intercultural Cities Network in Spain,

as expert of the intercultural cities program of the Council of Europe.

He is also member of several government advisory boards, and regular

contributor to media and policy debates. He is author of several books,

including “Diversity management in Spain: new dimensions, new

challenges” (Manchester University Press) (2013) and forthcoming

“The Politics of Immigration in Multi-level States” (co-edited with E.

Hepburn), Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave/MacMillan.

DiploCat_6.indd 34 24/03/14 10:18

08:30 h

Meeting at the premises of the Open Society

Initiative for Europe

09:00 h

Welcome of the participants and introduction

Peter Matjaši , Coordinator European Elections

Project, Open Society Initiative for Europe.

Albert Royo, Secretary General, Public

Diplomacy Council of Catalonia.

09:15 h

Xenophobia – The next major threat to Europe?

Peter Kellner, President YouGov.

Lila Caballero, Researcher Counterpoint.

Chaired by Peter Matjaši , Coordinator European

Elections Project, Open Society Initiative

for Europe.

10:30 h

Controversy: Is the press to blame?

Péter Krekó, Director Political Capital Institute

(Hungary).

Kyriakos Chatzistefanou, journalist with Greek

media, The Guardian and film director.

Xavier Mas de Xaxàs, Reporter La Vanguardia.

Chaired by Wilfried Rütten, Director European

Journalism Centre.

12:00 h

The European Parliament and populism

Raül Romeva, Member of the European

Parliament, Group of the Greens/European

Free Alliance.

Marley Morris, Researcher Counterpoint.

Chaired by Rosa Massagué, journalist

El Periódico and member of Association

of Catalan European Journalists.

12:45 h

Projections for the elections of the European

Parliament: Repercussions of xenophobia and

euroscepticism – scenarios and conclusions.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero, accredited Professor

of Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona),

Lila Caballero, Kyriakos Chatzistefanou,

Peter Kellner, Péter Krekó, Xavier Mas de Xaxàs,

Marley Morris and Raül Romeva.

Chaired by Albert Royo, Secretary General,

Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia.

13:55 h

Closing remarks

Albert Royo, Secretary General, Public

Diplomacy Council of Catalonia.

APPENDIX IIProgramme of the workshop17 January 2014

DiploCat_6.indd 35 24/03/14 10:18

Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia

Av. Diagonal, 418, 1r, 2a,

08037 Barcelona

www.diplocat.cat

@ThIsCatalonia / @diplocat_inst

In cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for Europe

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014: THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIC AND EUROSCEPTIC MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE

DiploCat_6.indd 36 24/03/14 10:18