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Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control David Etue VP, Corporate Development Strategy SafeNet, Inc.

Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

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Whose cloud is it anyway? Exploring data security, ownership and control as presented at ISSE EU 2014 Forget the geeky analysis of cloud security; risk is driven by people involved and the approach to adoption. Cloud security conversations often focus on technical risk from other users of the cloud’s pooled resources, or vulnerabilities in the application and virtualization layers. The more important conversation is likely around data control, ownership, and identity management as the resource pooling and abstraction to address risks from cloud users, cloud administrators, law enforcement, intelligence agencies and a pantheon of adversaries. In all these organizations there is an increase in the latest technologies that could possibly jeopardize security. There are trends with using unsecure cloud services and bring your own devices that often make these organizations vulnerable to risks. In today’s technological world it is not a matter of if the data will be compromised but when it will be compromised and what these groups can do to protect the data when this happens. This discussion will tackle the complex issues around data ownership and control. If data is destiny, then too many people are in charge of your fate. We discuss how to get it back.

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Page 1: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Whose  Cloud  Is  It  Anyway?  Exploring  Data  Security,  Ownership  and  Control  

David  Etue  VP,  Corporate  Development  Strategy  

SafeNet,  Inc.  

Page 2: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Cloud  and  VirtualizaFon  Are  Changing  the  Way  IT  is  Managed  and  Consumed  

Agile.  Now.  

On  demand.  Simple.  Secure?  

Page 3: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Cloud  Benefits  Are  Being  Realized…  •  80%  of  mature  cloud  

adopters  are  seeing:1  –  Faster  access  to  infrastructure  

–  Greater  Scalability  –  Faster  Time  to  Market  for  Applica=ons  

•  50%  of  cloud  users  report  benefits  including:1  –  BeAer  applica=on  performance  

–  Expanded  geographic  reach  –  Increased  IT  staff  efficiency  

1-­‐  RightScale  State  of  the  Cloud  Report  2014  

Page 4: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

…But  Cloud  Benefits  Are  Driven  by  Sharing  

Page 5: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

And  Security  and  Compliance  Are  Not  the  Biggest  Fans  of  Sharing…  

Page 6: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Leading  Inhibitors  to  Cloud  AdopFon  

451  TheInfoPro  2013  Cloud  Compu7ng  Outlook  –  Cloud  Compu7ng  Wave  5  

Page 7: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Security  and  Compliance  Concerns  With  Shared  Clouds  

How  Do  You  Maintain  Ownership  and  Control  Of  Your  Informa7on  In  A  Mul7-­‐Tenant  Environment?  

Data  Governance  Lack  of  Visibility    

•  Can  you  track  all  of  my  data  instances?    Backups?  Snapshots?    

•  Am  I  aware  of  government  requests/discovery?  •  Do  you  new  when  data  is  copied?  

Data  Compliance  Lack  of  Data  Control  

•  Who  is  accessing  my  data?      •  Can  I  illustrate  compliance  with  internal  and  

external  mandates?    •  Is  there  an  audit  trail  of  access  to  my  data?  

Data  ProtecFon    Risk  of  Breach  and  Data  

Loss  

• Are  all  my  data  instances  secure?  • Can  I  assure  only  authorized  access  to  my  data?  • Can  I  “pull  the  plug”  on  data  that’s  at  risk  of  exposure  or  who’s  lifecycle  has  expired?  

Page 8: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

New  Risks  Driving    Cloud  Security  Challenges  

•  Increased  AAack  Surface  •  Privileged  Users  •  Ability  to  Apply  Security  

Controls  •  Control  (or  there  lack  of)  

Page 9: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

New  Risk:    Increased  ASack  Surface  

Page 10: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

New  Risk:  New  DefiniFon  of  Privilege  

Page 11: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

New  Risk:    Ability  to  Apply  Security  Controls  

Security  Management  &  GRC  

IdenFty/EnFty  Security  

Data  Security  

App  Sec  

CSA Cloud Model

Host  

Network  Infrastructure  Security  

Security  Controls  Mapping  and  Sized  by  Budget  

Source:  Control  Quo;ent:  Adap;ve  Strategies  For  Gracefully  Losing  Control  (RSA  US  2013)  by  Josh  Corman  and  David  Etue.      

Page 12: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

New  Risk:  Ability  to  Apply  Security  Controls  

Most  organiza7ons  are  trying  to  deploy  

“tradi7onal”  security  controls  in  cloud  and  virtual  environments…but  were  the  controls  even  effec7ve  then?  

Page 13: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Amazon EC2 - IaaS

The lower down the stack the Cloud provider stops, the more security you are tactically responsible for implementing & managing yourself.

Salesforce - SaaS

Google AppEngine - PaaS

New  Risk:  Control  (or  there  lack  of)  

Source:  Control  Quo;ent:  Adap;ve  Strategies  For  Gracefully  Losing  Control  (RSA  US  2013)  by  Josh  Corman  and  David  Etue.    “Stack”  by  Chris  Hoff  -­‐>  CSA    

Page 14: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

And  Not  Just  The  TradiFonal  “Bad  Guys"  

Sensi=ve  Data  in  

the  Cloud  

Adversaries  

Government  Discovery  

Cloud  Administrators  

Auditors  /  Regulators  

Page 15: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

So,  Whose  Cloud  Is  It  Anyway?  Model   Private  Cloud   IaaS    

in  Hybrid  /  Community  /  Public  Cloud  

PaaS/SaaS  

Whose  Privilege  Users?   Customer   Provider   Provider  

Whose  Infrastructure?   Customer   Provider   Provider  

Whose  VM  /  Instance?   Customer   Customer   Provider  

Whose  ApplicaFon?   Customer   Customer   Provider  

Government  Discovery  Contact?   Customer   Provider   Provider  

Page 16: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Geographical  ConsideraFons?  

16  

Cloud  Region  Loca=on  

Cloud  Provider  

Headquaters  

-­‐  US  Court  Decision  with  Serious  ImplicaFons:    IN  THE  MATTER  OF  A  WARRANT  TO  SEARCH  A  CERTAIN  E-­‐MAIL  ACCOUNT  CONTROLLED  AND  MAINTAINED  BY  MICROSOFT  CORPORATION,  13  Mag.  2814    -­‐  A  Sober  Look  at  NaFonal  Security  Access  to  Data  in  the  Cloud  -­‐  A  Hogan  Lovells  White  Paper    (covers  US,  EU,  and  EU  member  country  legislaFon  and  case  law)  

Page 17: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Making  it  Your  Cloud:      Key  Enablers  to  Cloud  Security  

Encryp=on  (and  Key  Management)  

Iden=ty  and  Access  Management  with  Strong  Authen=ca=on  

Segmenta=on  

Privilege  User  Management    

Detec=on  and  Response  Capabili=es  

System  Hardening  

Asset,  Configura=on,  and  Change  Management  

Page 18: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

EncrypFon:  Un-­‐Sharing  in  a  Shared  Environment  

Page 19: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Clouds  Love  Crypto!!!*  

*with  good  key  management…  

Page 20: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Cloud  EncrypFon  Models  Type  of  EncrypFon   DefiniFon   Also  Called:  

Service  Provider  EncrypFon  with  Provider  Managed  Keys  

Encryp=on  performed  by  the  cloud  service  provider  using  encryp=on  keys  owned  and  managed  by  the  cloud  service  provider  

•  Server  Side  Encryp=on  •  SSE  

Service  Provider  EncrypFon  with  Customer  Managed  Keys  

Encryp=on  performed  by  the  cloud  service  provider  using  encryp=on  keys  owned  and  managed  by  the  customer  

•  “Customer  provided  keys”    

•  SSE-­‐CPK  

Customer  Managed  EncrypFon  with  Customer  Managed  Keys  

Encryp=on  performed  by  the  customer  using  encryp=on  keys  owned  and  managed  by  the  customer  

•  “Client  side  encryp=on”  (for  object  storage  and  client-­‐server  environments)  

Page 21: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

How  Do  You  Apply  Security  Controls?  

Security  Management  &  GRC  

IdenFty/EnFty  Security  

Data  Security  App  Sec  

CSA Cloud Model

Host  

Network  Infrastructure  Security  

Security  Controls  Mapping  and  Sized  by  Budget  

Source:  Control  Quo;ent:  Adap;ve  Strategies  For  Gracefully  Losing  Control  (RSA  US  2013)  by  Josh  Corman  and  David  Etue.  

Page 22: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Need  to  Focus  “Up  The  Stack”  

Security  Management  &  GRC  

IdenFty/EnFty  Security  

Data  Security  App  Sec  

CSA Cloud Model

Host  

Network  Infrastructure  Security  

Virtualization, Software Defined Networks, and Public/Hybrid/Community Cloud Forces

a Change in How Security Controls Are Evaluated and Deployed

Page 23: Whose Cloud Is It Anyway? Exploring Data Security, Ownership and Control

Data  Centric  Security  =  Agility!  

Security  Management  &  GRC  

IdenFty/EnFty  Security  

Data  Security  App  Sec  

CSA Cloud Model

Host  

Network  Infrastructure  Security