By

Samin VossoughiRad

&

Solomeya Shiukashvili

The security dilemma, is a term usedin international relations and refers to a situationin which actions by a state intended to heightenits security, such as increasing its militarystrength or making alliances, can lead other statesto respond with similar measures, producingincreased tensions that create conflict, even whenno side really desires it

The security dilemma

“A structural notion in which the self-help attemptsof states to look after their security needs tend,regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurityfor others as each interprets its own measures asdefensive and measures of others as potentiallythreatening”

The essential and intractable problem that results fromthis state of affairs is known as the security dilemma:

Assume that a particular state seeks only to survive bypursuing a status quo policy (which necessitates themaintenance of power)

This state’s possession of power – no matter how much thestate tries to assure others that it is for defensive purposesonly – must necessarily result in fear/suspicion on the partsof othersMain reason: The same tools that are used for status quoand prestige policies are used for imperialist policies

Absent any enforceable guarantee against the use of forcefor expansion – and anarchy precludes the enforcement ofany guarantee – the realist worldview stipulates that theglobal community is fraught with arms races and theconstant threat of both imperial and preventative war

Thus, war is likely to occur even when political “reasons” for war – like revenge,

but even territorial disputes, etc. – are absent!

Although actors may know that they seek acommon goal, they may not able to reach it

Even when there is a solution that is everyone’sfirst choice, the international case is characterizedby 3 difficulties not present in the Stag Hunt

Even if the other state now supports the statusquo, it may become dissatisfied later

In order to protect their possessions states seekto control resources or land outside their ownterritory

States tries to increase its security decrease thesecurity of others

There is no solution that is in the best interest of all the participants

The stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperationThe stag hunt differs from the Prisoner's Dilemma in that there are two Nash equilibria: when both players cooperate and both players defect. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect

CC CD

DDDCDefect

Cooperate

DefectCooperate

There is no solution that is in the best interest of all the participants.

CC CD

DDDCDefect

Cooperate

DefectCooperate

Decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability they feel, which can differ from the actual situation.

Two dimension are involved in the subjective security requirements:

people can differ about how much security they desire

perception of the threat

Defecting not only avoids the danger that a state will be exploited, but brings positive advantages by exploiting the other

To encourage the other state to cooperate, a statemay try to manipulate them. It can lower theother’s incentives to defect by decreasing what itcould gain by exploiting the state

An increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others

Defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones

Defense or the offence has the advantage

Definition of advantage over each other

Arms races

Is it better to attack or defend

How strongly the security Dilemma operates

The intensity of the security dilemma

"very intense".

"intense”

"not intense“

"doubly safe" Offence has the advantage

Defense has the advantage

Offensive posture is not

distinguishable from defensive

one

Offensive posture is

distinguishable from defensive

one

Double dangerous

Double stable

Security dilemma, but the

requirements may be

compatible

No security dilemma, but aggression possible. Status-quo states have other choices. Warning

given.

Evidence of the security dilemma can be found in the earliest examples of IR, as illustrated by Woodruff’s introduction to Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian Wars

Greece, 3rd Century BC: Athens and Sparta dominate

Two very different city-states

Athens: Sea-faring, commerce-based, democratic, home of the “new thinking”

Sparta: Land-based, self-sufficient, oligarchic, military ethos

Despite all these differences, there seem to be very few political reasons to go to war

Thucydides’ only answer: the Peloponnesian Wars were caused by Athens’ rise to power, and the fear that that power caused for Sparta – no more, no less

Main factors which determine whetherthe offense or defense has theadvantage

The technical capabilities of a state andits geographical position are twoessential factors in deciding whetheroffensive or defensive action isadvantageous.

"Preventative war“

"Preemptive war“

The deterrence model: by Paul K. Huth

Preventing armed attack against a country'sown territory ("direct deterrence")

Preventing armed attack against the territory ofanother country ("extended deterrence")

Using deterrence against a short-term threat ofattack ("immediate deterrence").

the balance of power

Thank You for Attention!!!