Leila Zahraoui Ankara UniversityProf.Dr. Çağrı Erhan Transforming the Transformer: Turkey between EU and the Middle East 21 dicembre 2015

The crisis of the “Turkish model”

Abstract: The so-called “turkish model" was called into question as a possible role model for

the Arab countries affected by the riots of 2011. This reignited the debate on the importance

and promotion of the Turkish model. Turkish model is the result of a long political, economic

and social changing process. The combination of modernism and traditionalism, secularism

and Islamism, and its dual Western and Eastern orientations is unique to Turkey.

The aim of the current paper is to provide an analysis of the conceptual debate on Turkey’s role

as a model. Describe the different stages of its popularity, focalizing on the Arab Spring.

During the 2000’s Turkey emerged with new foreign perspective aimed at multiplying relations

in the fields of tourism, economy, energy and regional security. This new strategy increased the

positive opinion of Turkey in the Arab world and also the possibility for the EU to increase its

policy in the Middle East. The good relations with all the neighbors and its global powers,

based on policies of zero-problems, are ending quickly.

In fact, in the conclusions I analyze the Turkey's changes in the international arena: the new

isolation and Erdoğan's authoritarianism; evident during Gezi-protest in 2013. They made

stagger the concept of Turkish model. Is Turkey still a model country for the middle east?

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What is the “Turkish model”?

First, we must aim for what is in reality the “Turkish model”. What is it made from and what is its vocation??The answers are not as simple as the questions, because it’s not possible to point out to any singular Turkish Model. Turkey is a combination of modernism and traditionalism, secularism, and its Western and Eastern orientations. Turkey became also influence and was used as a model for its geopolitical location, moderate Islam and its historical imperial inheritance. This lack of clarity in the definition of the turkish model is also given by different perceptions of what the model is or should contain. The different perceptions of the model shape the features of the model. The broad characteristics of the model, permit at the authorities, from very different countries, to speak and refer to the model from disparate aspects. Naturally it depends on different historical periods, different actors and also different actors’ vocations; as it’s analyzed in the following section. Despite the difficulties in defining objectively the model, I try to explain the main characteristics, which more than often form the basis of explanations on the Turkish Model.

The first important aspects of the Turkish experience is secularism and democratization. Generally in almost all the Arabic countries the Sharia is accepted as the main source of legislation. But Turkey is one of the few states in the Muslim world that has openly embraced and strictly enforced the principle of secularism. The most commonly cited characteristic of Turkish model is “Islam is compatible with democracy”. Secularism in Turkey is the result and the cause of Atatürk's reforms carried out mainly in the years 1922 - 1935 . Effectually an amendment in 1928 1

removed the declaration that the “Religion of the state is Islam”. The importance of this characteristic can be understood when one takes into consideration the significant place that Islam occupies in the social and political realms of the Arab world. Thus, Turkey became a peculiar actor who managed to reconcile Islam and Democracy. In an interview in May 2003, former leader of the AKP, Recep Tayyp Erdoğan said: “ Before anything else, I’m a Muslim […] I have a responsibility to God, who created me, and I try to fulfill that responsibility, but I try now very much to keep this away from my political life, to keep it private […] A political party cannot have a religion, only individuals can” . 2

1 Özgüç Orhan, “ The Paradox of Turkish Secularism”, Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013

Deborah Sontag, “The Erdoğan Experiment,” The New York Times, May 11,2003.2

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What is believed to make Turkey special is that it sets an example not so much through what it does, but through what it is . The slow and complicated transition to 3

secularism and the adoption of democratic practices make Turkey unique in the Middle East basin. Turkey’s political reform process goes back to the constitutionalist movement in the nineteenth century. The ideas of reform led to the adoption of a constitution in 1876 and the opening of the first parliament in 1877 .4

It is relevant to mention the unique interplay between secularism and political Islam in the past four decades, it is of great importance for how the model is thought today and, in a way, is equivalent to the Justice and Development Party. Secularism and democracy have also become the most debated elements of the Turkish Model. Despite the promotion of the Turkish model in the Middle East is commonly based on the coexistence of Islam and democracy, there are also other important features that make Turkey a place of interest. Firstly the civil-military relations, then the free market economy and the bond with the West. The marginal role of military is another key feature of the Turkish model. Unlike many Arab countries the turkish army never had an officer who stayed in power for decades like Nasser or Mubarak. But since the 1930s, the military’s influence over Turkey’s politics has extended beyond national defense and security issue. The role of the military in Turkish politics is the central question in the country’s European Union membership process, indeed under the AKP government, the power of the army in Turkish politics has dramatically diminished since 2002 . Civil-military relations have 5

been redefined. The power of the National Security Council (NSC) has been restricted. With the modification of the Article 118 of the constitution, the role of the NSC was diminished. Furthermore, the transparency of the defense expenditures has been enhanced, and the function of the military court has been limited. Turkey's challenge today is to replace the checks-and-balances function of the military with fully democratic institutions that are able to counterbalance executive power.

Turkey’s large free-market economy is increasingly driven by its industry and service sectors, but a significant number of people still work in agriculture. The 1983 marked the beginning of a new era of free-market economy in the history

Sinan Ülgen, From ispiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East", Carnegie Endowment for 3

International Peace (December 2011), p. 1.

Maliha Benli Altunisik, “The Turkish model and Democratization in the Middle East”, Volume 27, Numbers 4

1-2 Winter/Spring, p. 51.

Çağrı Yıldırım, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations” 5

in balkanalysis.com

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of the Turkish Republic . Since that time Turkish economy is a positive feature that 6

compose an example for the others countries. The government became the predominant actor in the political market and sustained democracy, the free-market economy also coupled with liberal foreign investment legislation, attracted foreign investor to invest in Turkey. The complementation of a Customs Union with the European Union at the end of 1995 took trade liberalization a step further. Turkey is the 17th largest economy in the world and in less than a decade, the per-capita income in the country has nearly tripled . It has a powerful industrial base 7

geared toward exports and a large domestic market with increasing levels of purchasing power. Turkey’s achievements and future potential have been a source of inspiration for other emerging markets. An important role in the economic development of Turkey is represented by the relations with the European Union. The EU is Turkey’s largest economic partner, accounting for around 40 percent of Turkish trade. The relations between EU and Turkey focus on economic cooperation, in particular in the modernization of the Customs Union and energy relations. The crucial importance of European markets for the Turkish economy shows how the relationship with the West, particularly with Europe, is a positive aspect of Turkish identity.

Indeed, the last, characteristic of the Turkish Model is Turkey’s close connection with the West. The ideological roots of this reconcilement go back to the Kemalist vision of

Westernization , the reflections of which are visible in the history of Turkish foreign 8

policy and Turkey’s position in the international arena. The ideology of Atatuk addition to secularization and democratization, provides a westernization and a extended modernization. Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe (CE) since 1949, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952. It has also started its negotiations for accession to the European Union (EU) in 2005. The relations with Europe and European institution are influential regarding to the promotion of democracy. This link with the West offers an advantage to Turkey that other countries have not.

Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in The 1990s, New Yotk, 19956

The information about the economy situation are take from “The World Bank” website7

Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration,” p. 7.8

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The relevance of “Turkish model”

There have been several times in history and in different locations where Turkey was presented as a model. The relevance of Turkish model on the history has undergone many stages of popularity.

The importance of Turkey and the screening of its model dating to the immediate aftermath of World War II. One country in the Middle East that was firmly against Soviet communism and in peace framework. Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, this meant the beginning of a new strategic relation with the West. After the collapse of Soviet Union, with the end of the Cold war, Turkey came to light as a model. Following the downfall of the “Russian empire”, in Caucasus and Central Asia there was a vacuum of power and in this sense, Turkey and Iran have been underlined as rival powers. Accordingly the turkish role and its aim of influence, was very important for the relevance of the new state, recognized quickly these newly independent states, and offered them some example. Its advocates hoped that it would be capable of persuading the transition to democracy in the newly independent republics of that area. The majority of these territories were still occupied by Turkish peoples, thus for this reason and for the common culture can be easy for Turkey to give an example. In the competition for the vacuum power, between Turkey and Iran, the West was seen as supporting Turkey . The Western fear of the Iranian regime can aspire the new 9

republic, it has led to chose the Turkish Model as an instrument for Western policy, put it forward as an ideal model and it became popular .10

In June 1992, Mme Catherine Lalimiére, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe declared that: “Turkey provided a valid model for the development of many a newly independent country in Asia” . During this era, this was the first time the 11

phrase Turkish Model was used. Facing political uncertainty in the Middle East, Turkey represented “as an ideal Muslim democracy and a model of development especially for Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan” . 12

9 The Economist, 25 February, 1992, p.70

Idris Bal, The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics, Perceptions- Journal of International Affairs 3, 10

no. 3, September-November 1998; available from http://sam.gov.tr/wp- content/uploads/2012/02/IdrisBal.pdf.

Idris Bal, “The Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War era”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.29, No.4, 1993. p.11

726

Idris Bal, The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics. 12

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Another important aspect in that promotion is the economy. Turkey’s devotion to free market economy was a crucial feature of the model. The promotion of the model by Western countries was based on the idea that Turkish economy set a good example for these newly republics that needed to be integrated into the global market. That promotion of the Turkish model was, of course, served not only to Western countries, but it was also a great tool for the Turkish authorities. Thanks to its strategic significance in this world structure and its legitimacy. They offered military assistance, opened schools, sent religious personnel and books and encouraged for a common alphabet. Hence, the term Turkish Model has been used as a symbol for these principles: secularity, free market economy, cooperation with the West and multi-party system. The fame of the model in that time was kept by the West, hence its popularity decreased soon after this support ended.

A few years after the ‘fall’ of this version of the model, events of September 11, 2001, brought out a new set of model debates. The notion of turkish model reemerged vigorously during the “War on Terror” by US President George W. Bush. After the tragic events in America, the “International focus” was projected in the Middle East, especially for the muslim countries. The association of terrorism with Islam has re-defined the western policy towards the Middle East. From US perspective, the Turkish model was able to point to Turkey as a way of separating the War on Terror from any perceived war on Islam. On the other hand from Turkey perspective, the call to identify an example for the Middle East meant earn support for its join to the European Union and become a pivotal actor and an example too, in the region . 13

While the western attention was focused on the radical Islamic movements, Turkey represented the perfect result of Democracy and Islam. Furthermore the promotion of Turkey model could be an effective way to combat Islamic radicalism. During this time, a lot of statement, especially from America, recognized the importance of its place, its history and strength, most important, the cohabitation of laicism and democracy in a muslim majority country, the modernity and links to west. In March 2002, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, referred to Turkey as “a model for those in the Muslim world who have aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity”. National security advisor Condoleezza Rice described Turkey as “an excellent model, a ninety percent Muslim country that has great importance as an alternative to radical Islam” . 14

Dov Freindman, “The Turkish Model, The History of a Misleading Idea”, Center for American Progress, 13

August25, 2015

Bill Park, Modern Turkey: People, state and Foreign Policy in a globalized World, 14

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The newly elected AKP government, led by devout Muslims, played a central role in

that demonstration. The AKP's victory in the elections of 2002, has allowed to put in

evidence the encompass of a secular democracy upheld by a government led by

devout Muslims.

President George W. Bush, attending the Istanbul NATO Summit in June 2004, said "I appreciate very much the example that your country has set on how to be a Muslim country which embraces democracy, rule of law and freedom.” In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in January 2004, prime minister Erdoğan referred to Turkey’s role in contributing to the devilment and dissemination to the Islamic world of universal values such as human right, the rule of law and good governance. 15

The support for the turkish model, from US strategy in the Middle East, was, in truth,

tied into its planning for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The US government has

acted for one main aim: Turkey had to actively collaborate with US in the invasion of

Iraq operation. Like during the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey, in the beginning, promised to

let US use its bases, overflight rights, and other logistical support for the Iraq War. But

on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament voted to refuse the United States military

the permission to invade Iraq from the north of Turkish soil. The government

reversed the decision in response to widespread opposition from both the public and

parliament. This change of direction has changed the relations between Turkey and

America in a negative way, but at the same time, this event and many others, changed

the perception of Turkey in the Middle East. That argument will be examined in the

follow section.

Bill Park, Modern Turkey: People, state and Foreign Policy in a globalized World, 12715

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The perception of Turkey in the Middle East

Turkey’s image in the Arab world has dramatically increased during the first decade of the 21st century, due to diverse reasons. The rise to power of the AKP can be regarded as a fundamental factor explaining the increasingly positive image of Turkey in the Arab world. It has developed from the tradition of Islamism, but at the same time its ideology is firmly in favor of "conservative democracy". AKP leadership during the latter half of the 2000s, prioritized the establishment of closer economical, social and political relations with the Arab World. Turkey’s popularity enhanced significantly with Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoglu’s “Zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. This policy let to increased regional cooperation on issues such as tourism, health, education and transportation, including the establishment of visa-free regimes with up to 58 countries . 16

This strategy revealed Ankara’s new ambitions for the Middle East, not only as a regional player but as a “model” for a political system able to combine the rule of a Islamic party with democratic process. Hence, this strategy aimed to normalize the relations with neighbors or at least to minimize the problems with them as much as possible.

For example, the relations between Turkey and Syria has always been complicated but it began to improve with the signing of the Protocol of Adana on October 20, 1998. Under Erdoğan, these relations continued to improve with mutual visits. Turkish support for Syria during the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, and a 2007 memorandum of understanding between the two countries creating conditions for cooperation in the fields of politics, security, economics, energy, and water resources. 17

Furthermore, despite the historical rivalry with Iran, Turkey, during this time, was also closer to Tehran. While serving as a non permanent Security Council member, Ankara voted against U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 of June 2010, which imposed serious sanctions on Tehran in various spheres.

The combinations of this policy and the occurrence of three important decisions in the international framework increased the positive view of Turkey in the Arab world.

Sandrin, P. "The Arab Spring and Calls for a Turkey-EU Foreign Policy Dialogue", in Political Reflection, 16

Vol.2, No.4, 2012. p. 34

"Syria Economic and Trade Relations," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, accessed 17

Sept. 21, 2012.

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Three events during the last decade had shaped contemporary Turkish-Arab relations and the recent model debates. It is not still clear why turkish government took the decision, contrary to what it promised, to leave US troops using Turkish territory to attack Iraq from the north. The rejection clearly did damage the traditionally close Turkish-US relationship, but on the other hand, this decision put Turkey from another perspective regarding the Arab states. The refusal of the bill, furthermore, symbolizes the independent sovereignty of Turkey, maybe from this time the Arab world doesn't associate Turkish policy in the Middle East with a US policy. The second event was derived from new policy towards Israel state. AKP's government started a real word war with the Jewish state. The heated discussion was originated during Erdoğan's speech at the Davos Economic Forum in 2009, the denouncing of cruel acts from the Israeli military, added more prestige to the Turkish image. The defense of Palestinian people was included into "zero problems" strategy. Turkeys and Israel difficulty relations become complicated after the Israeli raid of the Flotilla Mavi Marmara which was carrying humanitarian aid to the besieged Gaza Strip on 31st May 2010. All this development, served to accredit the Turks in the eyes of the Arab. Hence, during this period the public opinion about Turkey has a positive perception. The change of Turkey's image and the positively incline of the people of the region, are made more evident in a poll conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, or TESEV . The study sheds light on general trends in the 18

region perception of the Arab Spring and the region’s future, as well as the role of Turkey. The TESEV research taken in this session is conducted in year 2009 and the taken states in question are: Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. According authors of the survey and analyzing the poll, for the purpose of the assay, three results are important: First, support for Turkey’s role in conflict resolution was high among respondents; the second was that Turkey’s relations with the Middle East war not seen as a barrier to EU membership. On the contrary, the Arab world supported Turkey’s membership; finally a hight percent of respondents was agreed with the concept of Turkey being a model for Arab states. Analyzing the data, specifically, on the question of the influence of Turkey on the Middle East, the 77% of interviewed, in the region as a whole, supports the idea that Turkey should play a bigger role in the Arab World. It seems that the region accepts positively the new active policy that Turkey has been pursuing in the region. As I said

Mensur Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, “THE PERCEPTION OF TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE 18

EAST”, Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2013.

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before, one new turkish goal, under "zero problems" strategy, was to perform a mediatory role in conflict. Specifically, on the question, “Turkey should play a mediatory role in resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict”, the 79% of the interviewed has gave their positive answer to the question. In Palestine that percentage was 89%, meaning that nearly 9 out of 10 Palestinians thought that Turkey should assume a mediation role. As regards the perception of the Arab countries for Turkey as a whole, and so, if Turkey can be a model for Arab countries, the 61% of respondents believe that Turkey can be an example for the Middle East. Syria and Palestine stand out as the two countries that thought that Turkey could be a model for the region with 72% and 73% of participants respectively responding positively. The 63%, instead, turns out to be the average of the region, of those who believe that Turkey is a successful example of the coherence between Islam and Democracy. Again, Syria (72%) and Palestine (74%) were the most supportive of Turkey, with Lebanon (68%) at the third place. Once again the adoption of democratic procedures with the coexistence of the religious factor in politics and Turkish society, allows it to improve its image in Arab countries and provide an example for those countries with strong instability. The survey was conducted in 2009, back when the Arab Spring wasn’t started yet and the policy of zero problems was still active.

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“Turkish model” and Arab Spring

Toward the end of 2010, the international community was caught off guard in the face of a wave of revolutionary movements throughout the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. These movements have been referred to as the “Arab Revolutions”, “Arab Uprisings”, or most commonly as the “Arab Spring”. The protests took place all over the region and resulted in the overthrowing of long time dominant dictators such as Zine El Abiding Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Mummer Gaddafi of Libya. This was not the first time that the Arab peoples rebelled in the face of such injustice; these people’s movements of 2010 were similar, in some ways, to the Arab Revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. The core of these revolutionary movements are the rebellions against the social injustices, financial inequalities and political oppressions that have been prevalent in many Arab countries for decades. A general demand for democratization and freedom. Thus, despite its shortcomings, the Turkish democratization process, along with recent transformations, distinguishes Turkey from other states in the region. Indeed, during the early stages of the Arab Spring, the international community's attention was focused on Turkey and, as in previous years, on his example of democracy in a precarious and undemocratic region. In a context that is so turbulent, where some even speculated a fourth wave of democratization, Turkey could play a key role. The Turkish policy response to the events of the Arab Spring has broadly focused on four main principles: support of popular demands for political and economic freedom, condemning the regime’s violent response to the protests, a preference for non violent transitions based on negotiation and the principled rejection of external military intervention . 19

The Arab Spring has been regarded by a large majority of the international community ad having the potential off being an important step towards future changes for a more politically democratic system. Even the Arab people seem attracted by the lure of Turkey. Kemal Kirisci talks about a “demonstrative effect” of Turkey while trying to explain why a demand among the Arab public for the “Turkish model” emerged . According also to the previous analysis TESEV’s 2009 study that 20

collects data and shows a positive image of Turkey's new foreign policy.

Bali, A. (2011). “A Turkish Model for the Arab Spring?”, in Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 3, No. 19

1-2. p. 36

Mesud Hamza Hasgur, “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East in the last decade: The cases of Egypt 20

and Tunisia”, B.A Fatih University, 2013.

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The reference to the model turkish, occurred from different actors and points of view, in dissimilar and sometimes even conflicting ways . 21

Actors as diverse as US Foreign Minister, Hillary Clinton, the former Chairman of the

Egpytian armed forces, Hussein Tantawi, the leader of the Ennahda Movement of

Tunisia, Rashid al-Ghannushi and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Emphasis has been made on Turkey’s demographic figures, democratic and modern

political structure, relative political stability and social and economic welfare and the

rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) especially for many arab

countries who want political Islam.

In the Arab world the Turkish model and its merits have also been intensively debated

by policymakers and thinkers since first months of 2011. As indicated by Mohamed

Hussein Tantawi, chairman of Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, "The

Turkish experience is the closet experience to the Egyptian people. Turkey is the

model to inspire from" . 22

According to Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the leader of Libya's National Transitional Council,

"Turkey's democratic structure is an example to Libya and the other countries that

experienced the Arab Spring. Libya will look to Turkey as a model for its own political

and democratic structure" . 23

“Turkey is a model country for us in terms of democracy,” said Rachid Ghannouchi,

leader of Tunisia's Ennahda Party in October of 2011, at the height of the Arab

Spring uprisings that shocked the Middle East and North Africa . He indicated that 24

Turkey could be a role model since there exist many similarities between the country

and Tunisia like a model that combines Islam with modernity.

As remarked before, also United States has sought to promote the Turkish model. In

this regard the declaration of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is important: “I

Sinan Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration - Turkey in the New Middle East.” The Carnegie Papers, 21

Washington DC

Sinan Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration - Turkey in the New Middle East.” The Carnegie Papers, 22

Washington DC, p. 3

“Turkey’s cultural influence is also increasing in the Middle East”. Today’s Zaman, 3 February, 2011, İstanbul. 23

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-234290-turkeys- cultural-influence-is-also-increasing-in-middle-east.html

Mohamed Elshinnawi, Would the Turkish Model Work in Arab Spring Countries?, Voice of America, online 24

journal, March 04, 2013

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think across the region, people from the Middle East and North Africa are seeking to

draw lessons from Turkey’s experience. It is vital that they learn the lessons that Turkey

has learned and is putting into practice every day” . 25

The U.S. government, as in previous eras, reverted to portraying Turkey as an essential regional example, but without specifying exactly what Arab revolutionaries might learn from the Turkish experience . 26

Also in Turkish political circles, Turkey's emulative effect is driven by a different and

complex set of arguments, but the performance of the AKP government has become

a central reference point for the ongoing debate about the compatibility of Islam and

democracy, especially as I said before for other arab parties.

Indeed, The Prime Minister Erdoğan’s tour in Cairo, Tunis, and Tripoli in fall 2011 was intended to demonstrate that Turkey can play an influential role in nurturing Arab transitions. Emphasis has been made on Turkey’s demographic figures, democratic and modern

political structure, relative political stability and social and economic welfare.

Democracy promotion was never a primary objective of the renewed Turkish foreign

policy of the AKP. The focus of the government was rather on promoting economic

interdependence and political relations based on a notion of cultural affinity and a

shared Muslim identity . 27

The Associated Press 2011 25

Paul Salem, “Turkey’s Image in the Arab World”, TESEV Foreign policy program, p.626

Onis, Z., “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest”, in Social Science Research 27

Network

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Promotion of “Turkish model” during Arab Spring from European countries

As I remark also before, the West, in general, supports the Turkish country, it is an important state who has significant relations with Western countries and alliances with its organizations. From the EU view, the western orientation and what it includes: modernization, democracy and free-market, leads to promote the turkish image. Especially during its new strategy, Turkey has quite a lot to offer to the EU. It can contribute expertise and knowledge of the Middle East region. 28

It is a certain fact that relationship between Turkey and European Union have been, are and will be, so tangled. An instrumental relationship, where the two nations play to their advantage of the opportunities that the other actor can offer. Turkey-EU relations were initiated with the Ankara Agreement which was signed with the European Economic Community on September 12, 1963 and took effect on December 1, 1964 . The old relationships are compose by a mix of many different 29

components, interest and opportunity by both side that the actors want to exploit. Over the years, the EU has used Turkey for other interest. Turkey, thanks to its geo-strategic location at the borders of Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, has been able to play a role in world politics. Turkey’s contributions in this framework are not only due to its status as a candidate for the EU membership, but also its multilateral foreign policy aimed to support international and regional peace and stability. The Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated “The EU recognizes the growing influence of Turkey in the Middle East […] Turkey’s foreign policy in the region is a source of strength for Europe […] Our possible EU membership could give benefits to the EU expansion in the Middle East.” 30

Many observers in the EU see turkish's policy towards the middle east as an opportunity also for the EU itself. One should emphasize the commonality of interests and seek to explore the chances for EU-Turkey cooperation in region.Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the German Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2005, has said: “If Turkey joins the EU, the European peace model will also be a model for conflicts of the 21st century because we’ll have a challenge to overcome growing tensions between the countries with Muslim [majority] populations and the

Centre for European Reform Essay, “An asset but not a model:Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle East” 28

October 2004. p 4

See Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site29

Ahmet Davutoglu, “Stable Neighborhood Allow Turkey to Flourish Safely,” AI-Hayat, December 30, 2009.30

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West. And the message is that Europe does not want a clash of cultures because we are able to incorporate countries like Turkey.” 31

Indeed, during the three stages of popularity of “Turkish model” the EU played a fundamental role to promote the model in question. For our analysis, its important to remark the EU promotion of Turkey as model during “zero problems with neighbors” and especially during the first-periods of the Arab spring. With the Middle East in confusion, the EU aspire to play a role as a more active agent of global security. As a member of one and as an aspirant for membership of the other, Ankara stimulated the engaging with this new active EU policy. The fact that Turkey and the majority of the EU members share similar interests regarding some critical issues in the Middle East has also increased Turkey’s power of attraction in European eyes.

The promotion of turkish model during the Arab Spring was used effectively in the following roles: advocate for secularism and democratization; mediation in conflict and dialogue with opposition and good alternative to Iran theocracy. EU and Ankara have several opportunities to work together in supporting the emergence of a more democratic Middle East. Like after the Cold War with the newly independent republics of Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey could offer a good example of transition to democracy. Also important to emphasize the compatibility of the democratic regime with the presence of Islam in Turkish society and especially of Islam in politics. Presenting the AKP as a "model" and its "close" cooperation with the European Union could help moderate Islamist parties in other Arab countries.

In light of the close relations with Middle Eastern countries after the policy of zero problem, Turkey could be a suitable subject for mediating with Arab leaders. At the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the West found itself in a situation where its addresses in these post-Revolution countries were groups it had formerly dubbed as “fundamentalists”. Neither the US nor the EU had established any diplomatic or other formal relations with these groups. In this respect, Turkey stands out as an important actor as Ibrahim Kalın explains: “...Turkey’s policy of engaging various actors in the Middle East – repudiated by some as controversial, extreme and even terrorist – has played a significant role in bringing at least some of these forces into mainstream politics. Given the new political realities in Egypt, Tunisia and the Palestinian territories, as well as in Lebanon, Libya and elsewhere, the more important of these actors are no longer secret or illegal

“Turkey’s Entry into EU will Present Model Against Clash of Cultures,” Today’s Zaman, July 5, 2010.31

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organizations.” 32

Turkey may act as a mediator, as an ally of both the West and the Islamist movements like Ennahada and Muslim Brotherhood. Also Turkish diplomacy can play a key role in preparing the groundwork, as was when it initiated and helped to conduct the indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel, brokering talks between Fatah and Hamas, and Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Finally, during the Arab uprisings, the Western mind came back to the Islamic revolution that led to the emergence of Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the main goal of the “new” islamic state was the exportation of the revolution and the establishment of Islamic republics elsewhere in the Arab world. Certainly the situation had changed, but the West's fear of this possibility came back. So in front of this possibility, Turkey definitely offered a better alternative, a democratic and secular state.

İbrahim Kalın, Turkey and the Arab Spring, Today’s Zaman, 23 May, 2011. Project Syndicate, at http://32

www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/kalin2/English, last access on

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Conclusion

What I wrote until now, reflects the perception of Turkish model and its foreign policy during the early years of 2000 and the first-periods of Arab spring, but after, when the riots started to shape and change radically the governments in power, the Turkish model seems to lose its credibility and takes on an entirely different look. Two are the main causes of the change of image of Turkey in International arena: Turkish foreign policy pass “From zero problems” to “Zero friends” and the occurrence of widespread protests, this time on the Turkish soil, named Gezi protest in 2013. The Arab Spring forced Turkey out of this policy of non-interference. One of the commandments of "zero problems" was what Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu referred to as "equidistance" that is, the refusal to take sides in regional disputes . But 33

things went differently. By the summer of 2011, with the emergence of serious domestic opposition to the Assad dynasty, Turkish leaders sensed an opportunity for increasing the country's influence and dramatically changed their behavior toward Damascus. After an initial delay, Ankara froze the relations with Syria, began to criticize the regime, and lobbied for greater participation by Sunni Muslims in Bashar al Assad's government . 34

The concerns over Turkey’s policy in the Middle East were further exacerbated in the summer of 2013, following the destitution of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi by the military in Cairo. The relations between Turkey and Egypt during Morsi were very closed, the two leaders refers each other with positive words, Egypt was the centerpiece of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Arab world. The Turkeys unconditional support to the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, has caused significant problems when it was crossed by a coup that brought to power the General al-Sisi. Erdoğan referred to Sisi as “a tyrant” and accused the interim Egyptian government of practicing “state terrorism”. Erdoğan squabbled with Gulf monarchies for refusing to stand by deposed Egyptian President Mohamed Morsy, and started a war of words with Israel for having a hand in the coup that removed Morsy from power. Turkey’s positioning on the international stage, against the al-Sisi, was perceived in the Arabic press as a direct interference in Egyptian domestic affairs. During the previous period, as I wrote before, Turkey's image had a very positive perception. The pinnacle of Turkish popularity in the Arab world seemed not to

Piotr Zalewski, How Turkey went from “Zero Problems to Zero Friends, and lost its leverage everywhere, from 33

Foreign Policy journal, August 22, 2013

BBC News, Nov. 30, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-1595977034

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preclude certain concerns. The attention that Arab observers paid to Erdoğan’s and Davutoğlu’s grand strategy, was focused in part on the so-called “new Ottomanism” that was supposed to characterize it. The use of such expressions as “new Ottomans” tried to forget the Ottoman past in Arabs minds. Bashar al-Assad declared, in several interviews and speeches: “[Erdoğan] considers himself the new Ottoman sultan and thinks he can control the region the same way the Ottomans did before”, adding that Turkey’s strategy in the Middle East went “from zero problems to zero friends. ” 35

The Turkey's traditional problems with the Middle East, particularly the Arab world, were perceived as an obstacle for Turkey's role as a model. Turkey was considered a safety valve in the Middle East. But, at the same time, Michel Naoufal and other 36

Arab intellectuals toned down Arab fears of a new Turkish imperialism and characterized Turkey’s agenda in the region as a manifestation of soft power . 37

Arabs still view Turkey’s contemporary grand strategy as being shaped by their Ottoman legacy. The Turkey’s foreign policy and struggles in the Middle East after Arab springs, seems a defeat. Its isolation does not help either the European foreign policy. In addition Turkey’s image in the Middle East and especially in the West, took a beating in the summer 2013 with the protests in Gezi Park. The demonstrations in Turkey took place to protest for the planned demolition of Istanbul’s Gezi Park. Despite the many debates and various statements against the authoritarianism of Erdoğan, the EU is criticized him of being ineffective, slow and overdue by both, the Turkish and the European population . 38

On the 2nd of June 2013, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton expressed her deep concerns about the course of protests and the police brutality underlining the necessity of a positive dialogue that was never pronounced by PM Erdoğan between all sides involved in these demonstrations . Erdoğan’s decision to put down the demonstrations with riot police, 39

Interview to President Bashar Assad in November 2012, available in https://www.rt.com/news/assad-35

interview-exclusive-syria-265/

Michel Naoufal is a Editor in Chief of the Lebanese newspaper Al Mustaqbal and an expert on Turkish-Arab 36

relations.

Jean-Loup Samaan, “The rise and fall of the “Turkish Model””, 13 December, 2013 available http://37

w w w. h u r r i y e t d a i l y n e w s . c o m / t h e - r i s e - a n d - f a l l - o f - t h e - t u r k i s h - m o d e l . a s p x ?pageID=449&nID=59474&NewsCatID=396

K. R. Lewis, “EU’s Response to violence in Turkey branded ‘too little, too late’”, 12 June 2013, https://38

kayleighroselewis.wordpress.com/2013/06/12/eus-response-to-violence-in-Turkey- branded-too-little-too-late/.

The European Union, Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on violence 39

in Turkey, A 295/13, Brussels, 2 June 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137372.pdf.

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tear gas and water cannons undermined his relationship with the European Union. In late June, in the midst of the post-Gezi crackdown, Brussels decided to postpone a new round of accession talks with Ankara. The postponement decision on the new chapter opening was a signal of EU profound unhappiness, but at the same time Turkey still is a pivotal state. According to Richard Youngs, “EU membership would reduce the risk of the country’s post-Kemalist foreign policy drifting off in more problematic, neo- Ottoman directions” and this also explains why the EU, despite all these recent negative developments keeps its firm relations . 40

Finally, the late-May demonstrations in Turkey itself, severely undermined the appeal of the “Turkish model” in the Arab world. AKP government was limiting the rule of law and freedom of expression, under the eyes of the protesters of the Arab Spring that only a few years before Erdoğan defended. The lost of credibility to the democratic Turkish model emboldened those who are most resentful of Ankara’s ambitions in the Middle East, including the historic Arab distrust of Turks dating back to the Ottoman Empire and the simple fact that they are not Arabs . 41

Its defeat foreign policy and a "malfunctioning" democracy, could explain the decreased positive perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East in the 2010-2013 period. While in 2009 and 2010, favorable opinion of Turkey in the Middle East in general was 75 and 85 percent respectively; in 2011 it decreased to 78 percent. Then it declined to 69 percent in 2012 according to TESEV's report . 42

According to TESEV's 2013 report, the percent regional weighted of respondents who thought that Turkey had a positive effect on the “Arab Spring” dropped to 37% in 2013 from 44% in 2012 and 52% in 2011. Always taking into consideration the latest survey of TESEV in 2013, when respondents were asked: “Why Turkey can not be a model?”, in 2013 were added as reasons: Intervention of the Turkish government with 14%, Attitude of the Prime Minister Erdoğan 9% and the 7% thought that Recent Gezi Park events/protests can be a problem for the Turkish model in the Middle East . 43

EU Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Policies, “EU’S RESPONSE TO GEZI PARK PROTESTS A 40

Reflection on EU’s effectiveness”,26 March, 2014

Madeleine K Albright,Stephen J Hadley,Senior Fellow Steven A Cook, “U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New 41

Partnership”, Independent Task Force Report No. 69,

See TESEV's 2009,2010,2011,2012 “Perception of Turkey in the Middle East” reports at: http://42

www.tesev.org.tr/en/publications.

See TESEV, “The perception of Turkey in the Middle East,” Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2013., Mensur 43

Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar

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Is Turkey still a model country for the middle east? In the light of recent facts,

Turkey should reinforce its democracy and rebuild its image in the Arab

countries, before try to be a model for other countries.

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