Operation Bridgeguard 2006

Project Paper Bradley W Yates April 2006

Operation Bridgeguard 1 of 40

1. INTRODUCTION

Operation Bridgeguard, or Bridgeguard 3 (BG3), is the National Rail assessment and strengthening/reconstruction (or permanent mitigation) programme for public road-over-rail ‘overline’ bridges. This was instigated by the UK Government’s reaction to adopting the European Council Directive 85/3/EEC12 , under the European Union (EU), that Member States must accept articulated vehicles and drawbar-trailer combinations with 5 or more axles weighting up to 40 Tonnes (T – Metric) for international journeys on UK roads by 1st January 1999.

The applicable assessment code at that time was the Department of Transport (DoT), Roads and Local Transport Directive, Departmental Standard BD 21/846 and Advice Note BA 16/845, which cover certain types of structures. Where assessment involves a degree of engineering judgement, such as an acceptable method of assessing arch structures based on the modified ‘MEXE’17 analysis which was the product of a research programme led by Pippard21, initially used for military purposes, but after the 2nd World War was adapted for civil use. The loading criterion for assessment was in accordance with the maximum gross vehicle and axle weight allowable under the Statutory Instrument SI 1576/198230.

However, the BG3 Programme did not commence at this time, due to considerable debate and negotiation with regard to funding this national enhancement programme, which went on through the rest of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, until the DoT issued instructions to all ‘English’ Local Highway Authorities (LHA), stating they were expected to fund all assessment work starting from 1994/95 through use of money supplied through the Transport Supplementary Grant17.*

Upon receiving this instruction a small few LHA’s commenced assessment work in 1993. However, this was a false start due to further debate and negotiation with regard to the position of the ‘Railway’, being only legally liable to provide and maintain this infrastructure to a capacity of 24 tons (t – Imperial). Which represented the level of loads under the Motor Vehicles ‘Construction and Use’ Regulations 196928 at that time, and under Section 117 of the Transport Act 1968 (S 117/68)27, or as permanently weight restricted upon completion of the original ‘Operation Bridgeguard’, or Bridgeguard 1 (BG1) Programme by 31st December 1968; stating, the ‘Railway’ was obliged to maintain unrestricted bridges to the standard of 24t, in accordance with the Ministry of Transport Technical Memorandum (Bridges) No. BE 4/6716, and Statutory Instrument 1705/197229. These principles were accepted by the LHA’s in the end and adopted into a national agreement for a joint venture framework contract (JVFC) in 1996. The programme was now finally in a position to commence in earnest.

Had BG1 been completed, in which public funding was available, the ‘Railway’ would have been obliged to maintain all bridges to the standard of 24t14. **

This report will take a retrospective look at the issues, which have caused delay to the BG3 programme. Such as; changes to the above mentioned codes and directives, including changes in ownership of the national rail network infrastructure, and my involvement in determining; the current status and close-out of the; assessments, risk assessments of sub-standard structures and implementation of interim mitigation until strengthening/reconstruction (or permanent mitigation) has been agreed and accomplished, including determining the likely challenges ahead and provide a forecast estimate the final cost and completion of this programme.

* These instructions did not cover Scotland and Wales17.

** Bridgeguard 2 (BG2) was to be a programme of assessment and strengthening/reconstruction of railway Accommodation and Occupation ‘overline’ bridges during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, but due to the withdrawal of the allocated funding, never eventuated14.

Bradley Yates, Bridgeguard 3 Coordinator, Structures Engineer, Network Rail, South East Territory, Civil Engineering, Structures, Waterloo, London, England, UK.

OOPPEERRAATTIIOONN BBRRIIDDGGEEGGUUAARRDD

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this report is to illustrate the processes and functions with respect to the Bridgeguard 3 (BG3) Programme involving the inspection, assessment, protection and enhancement of Network Rail owned public road-over-rail bridges as a result of the UK Government’s agreement to allow 40T/44T Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) for international journeys on UK roads.

The report outlines the origins of BG3, from the initial European Council Directive and the UK Governments decision to undertake a risk management exercise to address the situation of allowing unchecked increases in HGV’’s since 1968 from 24T to 38T, through the challenges faced and ahead in order to close-out this massive enhancement operation.

Covering issues which caused delay in commencing the enhancement scheme, along with management and financial obligations by the stakeholders, the general impact of 40T/44T HGV’’s on bridges and safety responsibilities. Requirements will also be discussed with respect to inspections and working in the railway environment. Moving on to explain the assessment process, interim mitigation requirements, feasibility studies for works options such as permanent mitigation, which may involve permanent protection and/or strengthening or reconstruction. Then will examine the roles and responsibilities of the BG3 Coordinator plus a walking through a case study to illustrate the labyrinth of related tasks and decisions involved from receiving an assessment result through to a permanent solution that is acceptable to all stakeholders, both economically and in a practical sense relating to transport, environment and public interactions.

Finally, the current expenditure and status will be scrutinized in order to predict a date and cost of completion of the National BG3 Programme based on, and extrapolated from, the progress of the South East Territory.

KEYWORDS Operation Bridgeguard; Bridgeguard 3; Network Rail; public road bridges; road-over-rail bridges; ‘overline’ bridges; Bridge: inspection, assessment, protection, strengthening; Asset: infrastructure, enhancement, management



2. MANAGEMENT The BG3 programme, and its principles, was finally settled and a national JVFC agreement signed on the 1st of April 1994. Later that year British Rail (BR) privatised and was then taken over by a private company, Railtrack PLC (Rt PLC) in 1995, after successful negotiations with the County Surveyors Society (CSS)14.

Rt PLC was to manage the assessment phase under the Civil Engineering Directorate for project management. Procurement and commercial requirements pursued via their Major Projects Division (MPD), with final Technical Approval Authority (TAA) being from each of their Zone Structures Divisions22.

All assessment reports to be in accordance with BD 21/93 and ‘reviewed’ by Rt PLC appointed Consultants. The majority of assessment work being carried out by the LHA’s, or their appointed Consultants. The remainder to be completed by Rt PLC appointed Consultants.

However, LHA’s are expected to manage and install interim ‘temporary’ mitigation measures upon receipt of ‘sub-standard’ results (less than 40T) and maintained until a permanent solution has been agreed and implemented to ensure the safety of infrastructure and the general public25.

Permanent solutions to be managed by either Rt PLC or the LHA depending on the whether the result of a liability assessment either ‘passed’ or ‘failed’ to achieve Rt PLC’s legal liability in accordance with S 117 / BE 4 / SI 1705. That is, if ‘passed’, the LHA to propose and lead the ‘agreed’ permanent solution to meet the LHA’s aspirations, of either, strengthening or reconstruction to achieve 40T, and/or impose permanent mitigation. This liability assessment also determined the level of contribution by either party for funding the permanent scheme25.

3. FINANCE The initial BD 21/93 assessment work was to be funded by the LHA’s, as it had been agreed not appropriate for the ‘Railway’ to fund an enhancement policy to aid the transportation of freight by road14.

Any additional assessment analysis and/or investigations, including interim

mitigation, to be funded by the LHA’s until the assessment result has been finalised, at which time a S117/BE4/SI1705 liability assessment is carried out, once the BD 21/93 assessment has been concluded and if the final result does not achieve 25/26T, or greater, HA loading capacity.

Rt PLC to fund all the necessary S117 / BE4 / SI1705 liability assessments to determine not only the level of contribution for any additional BD 21/93 assessment work and interim mitigation measures, but also funding of feasibility studies and future strengthening, reconstruction or permanent mitigation works options25.

In addition, the LHA is also entitled to claim back 50% of the inspection costs associated with the initial BD 21/93 assessment if the S 117 / BE 4 / SI 1705 result ‘failed’ to achieve Rt PLC liability obligations25.

4. PROGRAMME On the basis of accepting the EU directive in 1985, the decision to assess road bridges for 40T loads was initially agreed in 1988, which if commenced without delay, would have allowed at least 10 years completing assessments, strengthening and potentially achieving the 1st January 1999 time scale14.

The ‘Railway’ owns approximately 6,500 public road bridges which require assessment in accordance with BD 21/93 within in the BG3 programme22. At a total estimated cost of £42M, of which approximately £27M worth to be delivered by Rt PLC and funded by the LHA’s. Of which an estimate of 10% of structures would require some form of permanent mitigation, and an estimate of 10% would require some form of strengthening or reconstruction, at a total estimated cost of £195M to Rt PLC. This left approximately 60% of the costs being funded by the LHA’s14. Rt PLC was required to fund all S 117

/ BE 4 / SI 1705 assessments for these 10% of structures failing liability expected to cost £3M, and funding for feasibility works options would require an additional cost of approximately £13M, with financial contribution from the LHA’s, plus installation and maintenance of interim protection measures of approximately £26M, again with financial contribution from the LHA’s22.

Hence, the total cost for the BG3 programme is estimated to be in the region of £276M, of which £102M is expected to be funded by Rt PLC, see Appendix C, Table C.1.

Structures that were strengthened or reconstructed in accordance with BS 5400 between 1975 and 1995, prior to the JVFC being accepted in 1996, did not required assessment25.

This reduced the number of structures to 5,500 being assessed under the JVFC22 and thus, revising the assessment cost estimate to £39M.

However, due to previously low construction estimates, inflation and general increases in welfare, material and resource costs, the revised permanent mitigation costs climbed to £539M.

Consequently raising the total cost for the BG3 estimate to around £578M, of which £224M being funded by Rt PLC, see Appendix C, Table C.2.

In 1996, the European Parliament adopted a revised European Council Directive 96/53/EEC13 increasing the maximum allowable weight from 40T to 44T for 6 axles.

Negotiations on the national strengthening agreements commenced in 1997 and money was identified for strengthening in the 1999 Rt PLC business plan20.

Also at this time, the Transport Committee issued a report to the House of Commons in Session 1997-98 suggesting that the assessment and strengthening of the nation’s bridge stock will not be complete by 1999 and more likely to take at least until 200515.

Since the UK was given 10 years to ensure that its bridges were ready for the introduction of 40T Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV’s), the Government’s response to this slow progress was disappointing15.

�Mitcham Goods Yard Bridge, Mordon



5. SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The ‘Railway’ has an excellent safety record with particular respect to bridges and, along with Central and Local Government organisations, are satisfied that this will not be jeopardised by the introduction of 40/44T HGV’s20.

This statement is supported by prudent asset management, as structures are routinely examined throughout the year, formally examined on an annual basis, and are given a detailed inspection every six years. By using the results and findings of these inspections, and historical records, recommendations are made for maintenance, protection, strengthening or reconstruction to ensure that safety is adhered to, and structures are maintained ‘fit-for-purpose’ at all times.

The assessment reports are undertaken by civil engineering consultants who had tendered for a number of bridges, including LHA ‘in-house’ resources or consultancies, and made responsible for employing contractors who supply rail safety personnel, plant and equipment for bridge inspection work.

All consultants are given a complete site safety risk evaluation for each bridge. Risk evaluations are obtained through liaison with, and provision of information from railway staff and contractors, with expert knowledge of railway safety requirements and in conjunction with reference to the Railway Group Standard GE/RT/8000: Rule Book26.

All individuals undertaking inspections must have undertaken, and have passed a Personal Track Safety (PTS) course and carry a valid PTS ‘Sentinel’ Card at all times whilst working on or near the railway and wear appropriate Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).

All Inspections for Assessment (IA) require ‘touching-distance’ surveys and in order to do this from track/soffit level require Possessions or Blockades, called ‘Green Zones’, under the responsibility of a Controller of Site Safety (COSS) in which there are no train movements, with the only exception when an Engineering Supervisor’s (ES) has been allocated to the work site for movements of

engineering trains or on-track plant, which are made at walking pace.

The responsibilities of a COSS is to make sure each person in the site inspection group has the correct certification, make sure a safe system of work is in place and inform the group about site specific hazards. For example; limited sight conditions, limited clearances, poor underfoot conditions, noise from sources adjacent to the site and other local features, which may affect the safe system of work.

The COSS will also make the group aware of generic hazards, including but not limited to; hazards associated with access and egress, overhead and/or aboveground electrification lines, underground services, overgrown vegetation, scrap material and other trip hazards, particularly when working at night.

Other risks people need to be aware of are hazardous substances. Such as; oil, grease, lubrication and effluent from trains, dust and asbestos, working at heights or near water, falling objects, manual handling, vehicle and plant safety, as well as, live traffic hazards.

Furthermore, these types of environments are susceptible to contact with pigeon and bat faeces and ‘leptospirosis’ or Weil’s disease where exposed to rats, bat or cattle urine where in contact with canal, river, or drainage and sewage outlets.

These hazards are also relevant with regard to working on or near the roadway.

Reconnaissance inspections are initially undertaken, with details from the track Sectional Appendix and Hazard Directory information to confirm access arrangements, equipment required, identify site specific safety hazards and risks with respect to the required inspection.

This information is required to produce bridge inspection Site Safety And Condition (SSAC) Reports and Risk Minimisation (RIMINI) Possession Planning Reports in order to develop a COSS Record of Arrangement and Briefing Forms which outline the safe system of working, hazards, emergency procedures and associated method statements as necessary.

Working on the track, and the road for that matter, is a high risk business. Attaining a safe system of work requires in-depth knowledge of the railway and highway environments, a clear understanding of the rules and the ability to appropriately apply them.

Getting it wrong is not an option and safety is the number one priority at all times.

This has been exemplified through the inception of the Health and Safety at Work (HSW) etc. Act 19742, of which most sections came into force in 1975, but some were not effective until 1978. In more recent times, this has been enhancement by the implementation and enforcement of the Construction (Design and Management) (CDM) Regulations 199434, which came in March 1995 along with the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 199535, and came into force on April 1996. To date, there have been no reported fatalities, major injuries or incidents with respect to work associated with the BG3 Programme.

6. HGV WEIGHTS ON BRIDGES

The forces transmitted to a bridge by a HGV are dependent on its total weight and how the weight is distributed via the axles.

Generally, spreading the load evenly to avoiding very heavy individual axles reduces ‘static’ or ‘point’ loadings. Consequently, national regulations on weights and dimensions of vehicles specify not only maximum weights but also maximum axle weights and minimum spacing between axles2, see Appendix A, Illustration A.1.

A further factor to reduce ‘dynamic’ or ‘impact’ loadings on a bridge is the efficiency of the vehicle’s suspension

Queens Road Bridge, Hastings



in preventing large axle loads from being transferred to the structure by a moving vehicle. Vehicles fitted with a suspension system consisting of soft springs and good dampers reduce the impact considerably4.

Hence, the loading caused by 44T vehicles on 6 axles with road friendly suspension, with a 10.5T axle weight limit and minimum axle spacing, would cause no more loading than most 38T vehicles on 5 axles, with a 10.5T axle weight limit which were already allowed, and considerably less than the 40T vehicles on 5 axles, with a 11.5T axle weight limit which were to be allowed from the 1st January 19994, see Appendix A, Illustration A.1.

In addition, the greatest loading for a given length of vehicle is produced by certain types of 32T vehicles at 8.5 metres (m) in length already in use, as the number of these ‘nose-to-tail’ on a bridge would produce a higher total loading than fewer 44T vehicles, at 10.5m long, occupying the same given distance4, see Appendix A, Illustration A.2.

Therefore, there is no reason why 44T HGV’s with 6 axles should not be permitted in line with the requirements and specifications for 40T HGV’s and no need for any additional assessment.

7. ASSESSMENT The purpose of assessment is to determine the capability of public road highway bridges to carry the imposed 40/44T Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW) loadings.

Nominal loads for assessment are derived from design loads contained in BD 377, as amended, and requirements defined in SI 1998/311133, and reduced loadings in BD 216, as amended, see Appendix B for tables.

The criteria for assessment of public road highway bridges are defined in BD 21, as amended, using simplistic methods of analysis. Such as, simple statics, simply supported members and strip analysis for ‘flat’ deck structures. Along with BA 165, as amended, for a simple method of load distribution and a simple empirical model of modified ‘MEXE’16 method

for assessment of arches.

The assessment should take into account all historical record information including use, condition, maintenance and repair, in conjunction with full use of partial safety factors. These calculations and assumptions are considered to be conservative and do not make use of any residual, characteristic strength of the materials used or the form of construction.

Following an assessment that fails to achieve 40/44T Assessment Live Loading (ALL), BA 7911 should be used to appraise whether the structure is monitoring appropriate and can remain without any mitigation measures until further detailed assessment, works are carried out to achieve full strength or increased to the desired capacity.

Consequently, if the structure is considered not monitoring appropriate, owing to the brittleness of the materials or shear failure modes which cause sudden and catastrophic failure; then, weight limits, lane width restrictions, and/or protection of the footways/verges shall be applied, in any combination as appropriate, or in deed partial or complete closure of the structure, in order to protect the structure and safe guard the general public, and road/rail users, until a permanent solution is agreed and implemented.

However, if deterioration or the conditions of the elements are of concern, or a weight limit is requested above the BD 21 result, then the bridge shall be monitored at enhanced intervals of no more than 6 months in accordance with BD 50/938, BD 54/939 and BD 63/9410.

Further detailed analysis may be undertaken where it is considered a

substantial increase will be achieved,

or the failure is only marginal, to meet the LHA capacity aspirations.

Significant achievements are usually gained from more detailed distribution of ‘grillage’ or ‘non-linear’ finite element analysis and/or ‘buckling’ analysis using software packages such as SuperStress, Leap5 or LUSAS for ‘flat’ slabs and using actual or worst credible strengths attained from material testing, as well as, use of analysis for particular consideration of U-frame stiffness modelling. Bridge capacity enhancements can also be gained through the application of ‘Vehicle Swept Path’ analyses.

For arches, modelling through use of ARCHIE, ARCHIE-M, MULTI or diaphragm analyses, and inspection to confirm backing type and depth of fill, provides significant benefits.

Where marginal failures have occurred, or to further improve the above detailed methods, review of the partial safety factors, conditions and pavement factors, impact, volume and speed of traffic and particular element characteristics, such as restraint or resistance to lateral-torsional buckling, can achieve enhanced results.

If the initial assessment, or detailed analysis, does not achieve 40/44T ALL, then a Section 117 Assessment Report (S117 AR)27 is undertaken to determine the ‘Railway’s’ legal live load bearing liability and contribution to fund previously undertaken assessment work, interim measures and for any future permanent solutions.

The ‘Railway’s’ legal live load bearing liability is undertaken in accordance with SI 1705 for the elements which failed to achieve 25/26T to BD 21, and calculated in accordance with BE 4/67 or BS 153 for footway loadings25 and other relevant standards as required.

For unrestricted bridges the live loading capacity used is 24t Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW).*

For weight restricted bridges the live load capacity is as ‘historically’ weight restricted under Sections 1, 6, 12 or 17 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967, and preceding Acts of 1930, 1933 and 1960, when SI 1705 came into force, and Rt PLC’s liability remains at the level of prohibition, as long as the prohibition remains

* 24 tons (Imperial) = ~24.38 tonnes (Metric)

�London Road, Mitcham (Station Signal Box in foreground)



continuously in force, whether in the same or altered form, until the bridge is reconstructed. This is also applied to bridges listed in Schedule 3 of SI 1705 which were under consideration for imposition of a prohibition at the time the Act was drafted.

For ‘flat’ decks, all elements are analysed simplistically by idealising simply supported members and manual methods with loadings applied using ‘simple statics’22.

Pre-stressed and pre-cast bridges are not referenced in BE 4/67. However, S 117 assessments should have also referred to CP 114, CP 115 or CP 116 as required, as these were in practice at the time of SI 170522.

Composite structures are also not referenced in BE 4/67. But, CP 117 code of practise was in use at the time of SI 1705 and should have been referred to in S 117 assessments22.

Post-tensioned bridges are also not referenced in BE 4/67 and methods for assessment under S 117 need to be agreed as no referenced is made.

Jack arches, hogging plates and tie-rods are assessed qualitatively under BE 4/67.

For arches, reference is made to the ‘MEXE’ method of analysis22.

Substructures, foundations, spandrel walls, columns and piers are assessed qualitatively under BE 4/67.

Footways, verges and jack arches that do not carry highway loadings

should only be assessed for self-weight only, unless crowd loadings were considered at the time of construction. However, footways constructed after 1955 will require assessment to BS 15322.

Completion of the assessment phase should take between 2-3 years from completion of an inspection for assessment, which includes additional detailed, liability and interim measure assessments.

Once the assessment stage has been exhausted, either through analysis or agreed review, the LHA will confirm its load bearing aspirations and subsequently define the cost sharing criteria and permanent solutions to be investigated within a Feasibility Study (FS), identifying appropriate and economic works options to achieve the LHA’s long term objectives.

8. STRENGTHENING / RECONSTRUCTION

There are five probable outcomes as a result of a ‘sub-standard’ (less than 40/44T) assessment result22.

1. The bridge fails to achieve the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and a permanent weight limit is invoked in accordance with the BD21 result. The ‘Railway’ is to fund all associated costs.

2. The bridge fails to achieve the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA require the capacity to meet the ‘Railway’s’ liability. The ‘Railway’ is to fund all associated costs.

3. The bridge fails to achieve the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA require a capacity higher than the ‘Railway’s’ liability. The ‘Railway’ and the LHA jointly fund the associated costs. Should reconstruction be necessary to achieve 40/44T ALL, the LHA is required to fund only 5% of the necessary costs.

4. The bridge achieves, or exceeds, the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and a permanent weight limit is invoked in accordance with the BD21 result. The LHA funds all associated costs.

5. The bridge achieves, or exceeds, the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA require the capacity higher than the BD21 result. The LHA funds all associated costs.

‘Work’ referred to in these scenarios is defined as; weight restriction, width restriction, resurfacing, realignment (horizontal/vertical), footway/verge protection, strengthening or reconstruction of part, or whole, of the structure.

LHA may wish to take over ownership of structures in order to be more in

control of their highway network. The ‘Railway’ would also encourage this to reduce unnecessary assets of the railway network, plus reducing liability and maintenance, unless there is a commercial incentive and investment not to do so. However, this scenario rarely occurs due to the obvious issues that arise.

There are four model works agreements relating to these scenarios where the LHA partially or entirely fund fully relating to ownership and maintenance liabilities22.

A. The bridge fails to achieve the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA requires the capacity higher than the ‘Railway’s’ liability. The LHA carry out the work and take over ownership and maintenance responsibilities.

B. The bridge fails to achieve the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA requires the capacity higher than the ‘Railway’s’ liability. The LHA carry out the work, but the ‘Railway’ retains ownership and maintenance responsibilities.

C. The bridge achieves the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA requires the capacity higher than the ‘Railway’s’ liability. The LHA carry out the work and take over ownership and maintenance responsibilities.

D. The bridge achieves the ‘Railway’s’ obligations and the LHA requires the capacity higher than the ‘Railway’s’ liability. The LHA carry out the work, but the ‘Railway’ retains ownership and maintenance responsibilities.

There are also some rare cases where the LHA retains/gains ownership, but the maintenance responsibilities remain with the ‘Railway’.

Strengthening options include, but definitely not limited to; replacement of defective elements, addition of plates to increase the cross-sectional area, additional of stiffener plates over the bearings, addition of angles and/or stiffener plates to eliminate lateral-torsional buckling and/or bracing frames for structures with steel elements.

Repair of defects, replacement of defective elements or installation of carbon fibre reinforced plates to increase strength of concrete or cast iron elements.

�

Sandilands Tunnel, Croydon



Replacement of the backing ‘fill’ with a structural material, repointing, stitching, and/or installation of reinforcement rods or ties, horizontally or vertically, for arch structures.

As well as, installing concrete reinforced slabs or steel plates over the entire deck, or just over affected areas for any applicable type of structure.

Completion of works should occur within 2-3 years from completion of an assessment, which includes feasibility, possession planning and design of the agreed option.

9. BRIDGEGUARD 3 COODINATOR

The BG3 Coordinator is responsible for accepting assessments, as the Technical Approval Authority (TAA) on behalf of the ‘Railway’, then notifying the relevant LHA of the assessment results, requesting proposals for interim measures and/or long-term aspirations, as required.

Suitability and appraisal of interim measures are undertaken and reviewed periodically, until either assessed out or a permanent solution has been implemented.

Agreeing or proposing where further detailed analysis and intrusive investigation work, and what types, are of value in pursuing in either attaining the ‘Railway’s’ legal liability, achieving the LHA aspirations or where likely to significantly reduce/minimise the scope of necessary interim mitigation or permanent works.

Liaise with the LHA’s, Department for Transport (DfT), Transport for London (TfL) and London Bridge Engineering Group (LoBEG) regarding programming and progress, status of work, costs, technical and liability issues, as well as, changes to codes of practice and ‘best’ practises with respect to assessment, interim measures and strengthening or reconstruction work.

The main objective is to facilitate the closeout of the assessment programme and management of interim mitigation.

This involves, encouraging the LHA to undertake and complete outstanding initial assessments, implement and review interim mitigation until further assessment and investigation work is finalised, facilitate the pursuit of feasibilities for permanent solutions based future maintenance, whole life costing economic analysis, and progression of suitable and agreed works options.

10. CASE STUDY The name of the bridge and the LHA shall not be identified, as the purpose of this case study is not to single out a LHA or Consultant for any particular motive, which might be construed as deliberate delay tactics. There are others examples that would be more appropriate for that. But, to address processes, resources, approval and decision making issues by all stakeholders, which have in effect delayed solutions being implemented by more than 10 years from provision of a completed BD 21/97 Assessment Report (AR), as opposed to the 2-3 years from initial expectations.

This is a typical scenario and not an isolated case where substantial strengthening is required to achieve the LHA aspirations of 40/44T capacity. This case study describes the key factors, apart from the delay of some LHA’s in completing assessment reports, which are causing delay to the closeout of the BG3 programme.

The AR was undertaken with respect to the findings of the inspection undertaken on the 26th April 1998 and in accordance with the standards detailed in the BD 21/97 Approval in Principle (AIP) issued July 1998 and approved on 10th March 1999.

The BD 21/97 AR was issued in January 2000 and approved on 30th November 2001.

The structure is a single span, half -through plate-girder bridge constructed in 1894, with concrete abutments and wing-walls. The parapets are formed by the upper portions of the outer girders with a clear span of 11.65m and a skew of 48o, see Appendix F.1-4 for historical plan, elevations and sections.

The bridge consists of 2 No. main outer girders, with 13 No. transverse riveted girders spanning from abutment to a main outer girder, with only 1 No. central girder spanning between the main outer girders.

The transverse riveted girders are constructed of steel, with wrought iron hogging plates and tie-rods backfilled with plain concrete under the carriageway, and wrought iron camber plates beneath the footways.

Two of the original transverse riveted girders have been replaced with rolled universal girders, as well as, a number of hogging and camber plates have been replaced with cast-in-situ concrete slabs.

The bridge carries an unclassified (urban) two-way road, carriageway width of 6.05m with 1.80/1.90m wide footways on each side, and 9.75m between parapets, which are 2.44m deep. The bridge also has a 4t (Imperial) weight limit with a permitted speed of 30mph. However, the traffic is high flow with a poor surface condition.

The Inspection for Assessment (IR) was carried on under a T3 possession of the line for engineering work on 26th April 1998 and access to the underside of the bridge deck was achieved by use of mobile scaffolding and ladders from track level.*

An overall condition factor of 1.0 was used in consideration of individual defects, section losses at critical sections of the longitudinal and transverse beams, taken into account from the inspection.

The deck was analysed as a number of single span, simply supported girders, see Appendix F, Drawings F5-6. The deck is heavily skewed with

* A T3 Possession is where arrangements are made to block the line completely from normal passage of trains. The only authorised equipment, plant or engineering trains are allowed to pass through this type of possession at walking pace, as arranged with the Engineering Supervisor.

Wickham Market Bridge, Wickham



the transverse girders typically spanning between an abutment and a longitudinal main outer girder. Live load was applied using two methods: simple ‘statics’, using real vehicle single axles specified in BD 21/97 Appendix D, to determine the limiting vehicle, and; simple ‘distribution’, using single axles applied in accordance with BA 16/97 Chapter 2, to determine the limiting factor and assessed rating and engineering judgement is used to arrive at the final assessed rating should the two method give rise to differing results, as well as; BD 56/96 and ‘L-frame’ idealised structure for analysis of the longitudinal girders.

The main outer girders were assessed as having 3T Allowable Live Loading (ALL), limited by the bending capacity at mid-span due to the effects of Uniformly Distributed Load (UDL) together with a Knife Edge Load (KEL). The likely reason for failure is the effective length used in calculating the bending resistance. This is low as a result of the lack of restraint and lack of stiffness due to slenderness of such deep girders with narrow flanges. However, the beams are capable of withstanding the full effects of footway live loading at Ultimate Limit State (ULS).

Also, one of the transverse girders, the one which spans centrally across the deck, from outer girder to outer girder, was found to have an assessed rating of 0T (Dead Load Only), limited by bending at mid-span due to the effects of axle loading. The likely reason for this failure is due to section loss from corrosion. The remainder of the transverse beams were rated at 3T ALL, limited by bending at mid-span due to the effects of axle loading. The likely reasons for these failures are due to the inadequacy of section sizes for the current loading requirements. However, the beams are capable of withstanding the full effects of footway live loading at ULS.

The hogging plates beneath the carriageway areas were assessed as having a rating of 0T DLO, limited by the load intensity the effects of axle type loading. The hogging plates beneath the footway areas were also assessed as having a rating of 0T DLO, limited by the load intensity of

Accidental Wheel Load (AWL) effects. The hogging plate tie-rods located beneath the carriageway and footways were themselves capable of sustaining 40/44T ALL. However, the connections were rated at 0T DLO. These elements are rated at 0T DLO due to the connection details are not in accordance with current design standards, which result in reduced loading capacities in comparison to current standards. However, this is a theoretical result and in practise have a high capacity than the designated 0T DLO.

The abutments, wing-walls and foundations were qualitatively assessed, and as there were no significant signs of distress or defects observed, were considered adequate in accordance with BD 21/97.

A Section 117 Assessment Report (S117 AR) was then undertaken by another Consultant to determine the ‘Railway’s’ legal live loading bearing liability in accordance with SI 1972/1705 for the elements which failed to achieve 25T to BD 21/97, which is calculated in accordance with BE 4/67 and other relevant standards detailed in the BE 4/67 AIP, both documents were issued in April 2003 and approved 6th May 2003.

For unrestricted bridges the live loading capacity used is 24t Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW). However, this particular structure has a 4t weight limit and in accordance with this ‘historical’ weight limit imposed under the Road Traffic Act 1960, Section 41, of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967, and subsequently the live loading used was 4t GVW.*

All elements were analysed as simply supported members by manual methods with loadings applied using simple ‘statics’. The hogging plates and tie-rods were assessed qualitatively, as these elements are not covered in BE 4/67. The footways, substructure and foundations are not assessed under BE 4/67. Also, the footways do not require assessment to BS 153 as the structure was constructed before 1955.

The only elements, which failed to achieve the S117 AR, were five of the centrally located ‘longer’ transverse beams limited by bending at mid-span.

A Complementary Review (CR), or Sensitivity Analysis (SA), was undertaken by the same Consultant as the S117 AR and was completed in November 2003.

The purpose of a CR/SA was to identify any reserve strength or cause of the initial lack of capacity in the elements failing BD 21/97, and thus, identify any potential consideration for further analysis to improve the overall capacity. A more sophisticated grillage analysis of the deck could have been undertaken at the time, but is was claimed that it would not give significant improvements in the load carrying capacity of the bridge, which was stated by the original Consultant in the BD21/97 AIP.

The scope of the work was to estimate the capacity of the edge girders assuming some partial restraint of the compression flanges to enhance resistant to ‘lateral-torsional’ buckling and the transverse girders, assuming parts of the hogging plates assist in supporting the girder sections, as well as, considering composite action between the girders and the surrounding concrete and the tie-rods to recommend any benefit in undertaking a Non-Linear Finite Element Analysis (NLFEA) to enhance the current capacity of this bridge.

The assessment had conservatively assumed that k4, which is a factor that allows for warping stiffness and is defined in Clause 9.7.2 of BD56/96, is equal to 1.0. By assuming a lower value for k4 and assuming partial effectiveness, of semi-rigid transverse beam connections, in ‘U-frame’ action, the capacity of the main girder could be raised to 7.5T + G1FE ALL. In addition, due to inherently conservative calculations and assumptions, in consideration of the bearing stiffeners at the supports, a reduced effective length for ‘lateral-torsional’ buckling the main girders are likely to achieve 40/44T ALL.

If the hogging plates and the surrounding concrete are considered to contribute to an increase in area for the tension flange of the transverse girders, then the capacity is increased to 3T ALL.

Using Current Information Sheet (CIS) 35, for assessment of metal hogging

* 4 tons (Imperial) = ~4.06 tonnes (Metric)



�Weight Restriction Sign

Temporary and Permanent Weight Restrictions for substandard bridges.

plates, the plates under the carriageway are rated at 7.5T ALL, but this does not apply to the footway. The footway hogging plates could be rated at 40T ALL in consideration of composite action with the concrete infill slabs. However, the strength of the concrete and the bonding would need to be confirmed.

It is overly conservative to consider the tie-rods as 0T DLO due to the connections only, as this does not take into account any restraint offered by the hogging plates and the concrete infill slabs, which would result in a rating of 40/44T ALL.

Hence, a Non-Linear Finite Element Analysis (NLFEA) was recommended to be viable option and likely to achieve a substantial increase in the current overall loading beading capacity of this structure.

A NLFEA AIP was completed by the same ‘other’ Consultant in September 2004, and approved on 2nd November 2004, 2 months later.

The bridge was modelled using ‘LUSAS’ with ultimate limit state stress loading conditions, see Appendix F, Drawings F.7-8.

The NLFEA raised the capacity of the edge girders from 3T to 7.5T ALL, using heavy traffic and poor surfacing conditions, limited by ‘lateral-torsional’ bucking due to the slenderness of the main girders.

The central transverse girder, spanning from outer girder to outer girder, was still limited to 0T DLO due to bending at mid-span, and no increases to any of the other transverse girders or associate elements due to distribution of load, were not mentioned. Also, the

hogging plates and the tie-rods were still rated as 0T DLO with no additional comments to substantiate any of the additional analysis, or comments involving any engineering judgement.

There were no supporting comments to substantiate the marginal increase in capacity, in respect of the recommended substantial increases previously proposed; no comments were made to address this, other than stating that the NLFEA confirmed the outer girders were susceptible to lateral torsional bucking. Consideration to the slenderness of the edge girders should have been identified and taken into consideration

in the CR/SA, see Appendix F, Drawing F.8.

The NLFEA concluded in January 2006 with the recommendation of undertaking a Feasibility Study (FS) to consider strengthening options for the edge girders, suggested that initial studies indicated a favourable option would be to strengthen by adding edge angles to the top flanges of the edge girders to achieve 40/44T, and undertake a feasibility study to consider other strengthening options for the other elements. The NLFEA was approved on 23rd February 2006.

However, considering this Consultant’s track record of recommendations with this structure, along with them neglecting to comment on the other elements that require strengthening, a ‘second’ opinion and alternate consultation would have been advisable prior to undertaking the FS.

The BD 21/97 AIP was issued in July 1998, but not signed until March 1999; 8 months delay.

The BD 21/97 AR was issued in January 2000, but not signed until December 2001; almost 2 years delay.

A further period of 12 months went by until the S 117 AIP & Report were issued in April 2003.

From completion of the CR/SA, 12 months went by until the NLFEA AIP completed and approved.

Then, a further 2 years elapsed until the NLFEA was completed and approved.

In total, accumulative delays of up to 3 years were associated with Rt PLC / NR in not approving documents in a timely fashion; and further delays between Rt PLC / NR and the LHA in agreeing and instructing work, adding up to another 3 years.

Now, considering it should only take approximately 2-3 years from instruction of a FS, through the design phase, until implementation of a works option; a period of some 9 years have past since the initial BD 21/97 AR was completed until implementation of an option to achieve 40/44T ALL capacity; 11 years since the inspection for assessment was undertaken, provided the FS is instructed and undertaken in 2006, this year.

Inclusive within this delay period, 3 years may be associated to the Consultant’s recommendations for further assessment work, and lack of engineering judgement by both, RT PLC / NR and the LHA in progress this work.

If a FS was undertaken upon completion of the S117 AR in 2003, we could be carrying out strengthening, or reconstruction, work in 2006, this year.

Furthermore, if the BD 21/97 AR was approved in a timely manner along with the S117 AR, that is both completed and approved in 1999, work could have been implement in 2003 and we could have had a 40/44T ALL capacity bridge for 3 years, instead of ‘maybe’ having a full capacity bridge in 3 years from now.

One very important aspect has been overlooked during this process, at least on a formal basis, which is the appraisal for interim measures in accordance with BA 79/98 upon completion of a failed BD 21/97 AR to protect the structure until a permanent solution is implemented.

Fortunately, the saving grace with this structure is that it has an existing 4t weight limit ‘historically’ in place. However, the signage actually relates to axle weights and actually relates to 8.13T GVW with 2 axles, and therefore a weight limit sign of 7.5T would comply to current standards and regulations. In general, fortunately most ‘drivers’ will likely relate the 4t limit to the overall vehicle weight anyway.



Upon review in accordance with BA 79/98, the main carriageway elements are monitoring appropriate, due to the types of materials and failure mechanisms not being brittle or sudden in nature. Conservative calculations and assumptions along with reserves in strength and design factors of safety, an enhanced monitoring regime would be acceptable, focusing on the sub-standard elements, to substantiate allowing a weight limit of 7.5T, above the BD 21/97 AR result, and not closing the bridge from vehicular access.

However, since it has been over 6 years since the BD21/97 AR had been completed, and at least another 3 years until a permanent solution is implemented, the current weight limit should be replaced with a 3T sign in accordance with current regulations and to justify further continuation of the enhanced monitoring to allow a mitigated use of the bridge, as the structure is not subject to any adverse or accelerated deterioration, at this stage.

11. PROGRESS Within the National Programme …

By the 1st January 1999, the number of structures reduced even further from 5,500 to 5,187 as bridges that were either weight restricted under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 (and preceding Acts of 1930, 1933 and 1960) when SI 1705 came into force, or listed in Schedule 3 of SI 1705, were removed from the scheme unless the LHA Local Transport Plan (LTP) now required these structures to have 40/44T capacities.

Also, if it was established that a tunnel was of bored construction or the depth of cover (or overburden) is greater than 7 metres, no assessment was required, as the effect of live loading as a proportion of the loading reduces with depth, and it is reasonable to assume that the highway loading may be ignored23.

By the 1st January 1999, the number of completed assessment reports received by Rt PLC was approximately 1,050 (20%) and the assessment programme predicted to be complete by 1st January 200220.

Within the South East Territory…

By the 1st January 1999, the number of bridges in the South East Territory (SET) was in the region of 1,100 and the number of completed assessment reports received by Rt PLC was approximately 220 (20%).

Some works had commenced prior to the national works agreements being finalised and by the 1st January 1999, approximately 15 (1.4%) structures had been strengthened or reconstructed and 20 (1.6%) have been partially strengthened and/or permanent mitigation installed.

Currently; by the 1st January 2006, the number of bridges in the South East Territory (SET) is 1,097 and the number of completed assessment reports received by NR is now approximately 1064 (97%), see Appendix D for flowchart.

In total, 364 (34%) of structures so far have failed to achieve 40/44T ALL capacity for all elements of which; 87 (8%) of structures have ‘failed’ to achieve the ‘Railways’ liability obligations.

Some 122 (11%) require substantial strengthening or reconstruction to achieve 40/44T ALL capacity of both the carriageway and the footways/verges.

While 116 (11%) achieved 40/44T ALL carriageway capacity, but only required strengthening and/or permanent mitigation of the footways/verges.

To date, approximately 31 (3%) of structures have been strengthened or reconstructed, 30 (3%) have had some form of partial strengthening and/or permanent mitigation implemented on the carriageway and/or footways/verges, and 42 (4%) have had some form of partial strengthening and/or permanent mitigation implemented on the footways/verges only.

Currently, there are 261 (25%) of structures that require interim measures to be installed to protect the structure and mitigate risks until a permanent solution is agreed and implemented. However, 143 (13%) of these structures do not have any or acceptable/appropriate interim mitigation in place at this stage.

12. CHALLENGES Challenges of the past…

The initial agreement to assess was acknowledged in 1988, 4 years after the EU Directive was issued in 1984, and a further 8 years of negotiations went by until the JVNF was signed in 1996.

As a consequence, reducing the potential 10 years programme down to 4 years to achieve by the 1st January 1999.

As much as the principles were signed and agreed, as well as, the directive and commitment to fund this work by the National Government to the LHA’s, there was still an unwillingness of LHA to fund and progress the programme for the ‘Railway’ owned bridges, which also contributed in putting the scheme behind schedule.

Furthermore, the ‘Railway’ which had became privatised from the outset of this programme and was forced to adopt the scheme under sufferance, as it was actually in the business of making money from the railway and was not inclined to assist the highway network with this enhancement programme. Lengthy delay periods occurred between the TAA receiving and signing-off documents and further delays arose in agreeing and instructing the next step forward.

The decision of the ‘Railway’ to undertake S 117 AR’s on the basis of draft or initial BD 21 AR ‘failed’ results, as opposed to after any further assessment work had been finalised, was also caused for additional delay, due to the LHA’s encumbrance of undertaking or agreeing to further assessment work while debating the interpretations of the S 117 and BE 4/67 results. Which were often open to opinion and debate, when determining liability and subsequent contribution, to current and progression of further assessment work, as it was in the interest of the LHA’s to try and ‘fail’ achieving the ‘Railways’ liability and

Copnor Road Bridge, Portsmouth



conversely the ‘Railway’ trying to ‘pass’ it’s obligations.

Thus, raising the need for a more consistent approach to the national agreement, not just through guidance and technical notes produced by Rt PLC’s, which is only one point of view.

If ‘proper’ engineering judgement was made to progress further assessment work at the time, most of the arguments and delay would have been taken out of the picture, which would have save time and money by both parties, as well as, being closer to completing the programme objective.

Challenges at this stage…

Rebuilding relationships, confidence and cooperation with the LHA’s from the days of Rt PLC, as well as, more use of ‘sound’ engineering judgement and experience in decision making, without reliance been largely based on recommendations of Consultants, and often tactical for political leverage or delay purposes being adopted by both parties.

Major tasks involve reducing; the lengthy delay between the TAA receiving and signing documents, and hurdles in agreeing and instructing the next step forward. This should be done through technical and open dialog with the LHA’s to facilitate progress and move forward in a pragmatic and proactive approach, with emphasis on achieving their (LHA’s) aspirations, in a timely and economic manner. While adequately mitigating provisional risks associated with any resulting ‘sub-standard’ highway structures, without any unnecessary delay or debate on semantics or insignificant issues.

The overall assessment progress had been restrained largely due to insufficient funds being available when required. This had either been spent or allocated elsewhere, due to a variety of agendas and priorities by both parities. As a result, slow decision making and progression of an acceptable solution.

This was emphasised in the South East Territory by the fact that there are still 33 (3%) of structures remaining to be assessed, due to lack of resources and motivation of the LHA’s in question, and they were generally ignorant of their safety obligations. This is evident as an estimated 45 (4%) of structures still

requiring further detailed assessment work 6 years after exceeding the 1st January 1999 milestone. And, only 31 (3%) of structures have been strengthened or reconstructed to date of an estimated total of 125 (11%). As well as, only 72 (7%) have had some form of partial strengthening and/or permanent mitigation implemented, at this stage, out of an estimated total of 250 (23%). Not to mention the risk of having 138 (13%) ‘sub-standard’ structures which still do not have any acceptable or reasonable mitigation in place and therefore, much effort is expended in trying to encourage the LHA’s to respond to this matter in a responsible and timely fashion is required.

Challenges of the future…

Although much progress has been accomplished through the rebuilding of relationships, confidence and cooperation with the LHA’s, more use of ‘proper’ engineering judgement with the ‘big picture’ in mind is still required, as some LHA’s still base a lot of decision making on the reliance on recommendations of Consultants, or the results of S 117 Assessments, which often only attributes minor benefit, but by no means achieves the long term desired capacity, and is often for only tactical delay and political leverage, particularly with regard to liability, interim measures and permanent solutions. This often change depend on the liability to contribute to funding.

Fortunately though, this now only applies to a few LHA’s and is being pursued by the London Bridge Engineering Group (LoBEG) and the County Surveyors’’ Society (CSS) to progress with more determination.

Progress of further assessment and investigation work identified for

procurement via NR’s Major Projects and Investment (MPI) Division continues to be of hindrance in relation to processing commercial requirements, and is currently a major cause of delay in the South East Territory which needs to be addressed, along with their lack of finance and project management in raising invoices and addressing progress with LHA’s with respect to moneys owed for completed work, or paid upfront some time ago for uncompleted work yet to be progressed, which is of great cause of concern. As well as, the lack of ability to quantify exactly what has been already been spent on BG3 by NR and Rt PLC, and the fact that only some 31 (3%) of structures have been strengthened or reconstructed and 72 (7%) have had some form of partial strengthening and/or permanent mitigation implemented in 12 years since the programme officially commenced in 1996.

13. EXPENDITURE For the South East Territory Assessments…

The estimated cost of the 1064 initial BD 21 Assessments completed is approximately £7M, with £0.15M reimbursable from the ‘Railway’ regarding Inspection For Assessment costs relating to 87 (8%) of structures which ‘failed’ to achieve the ‘Railways’ liability to S 117 / BE 4 / SI 1705.

However, this does not account for further assessment and investigation work completed on 40 structures being £0.8M and formal interim measure appraisals undertaken on 40 structures being £0.4M, with £0.12M of these costs coming from the ‘Railway’. As well as, liability assessments on 212 structures being £0.53M and funded entirely by the ‘Railway’. This figure does not included associated costs for updating formal interim measure appraisal reports required periodically, as necessary, but not likely to increase cost significantly.

Thus assessment costs to date for the SET are approximately £8M, with £0.8M cost to the ‘Railway’, see Appendix C, Table C.4.

With 33 structures remaining to be assessed, the total assessment costs for the SET are estimated to be in the region of £8.5M, with £1M worth of

Brettal Lane Bridge, NW London



costs to the ‘Railway’, see Appendix C.5 for table.

At the current rate of assessing the remaining structures at approximately 3 (0.3%) structures per annum, the estimated completion date is somewhere in the region of 2016, see Appendix E, Graph E.1.

For the South East Territory Strengthening/Reconstruction…

With permanent works complete on 102 structures at an estimated cost of £61M, of which £28M (45%) coming from the ‘Railway’.

However, this does not account for, feasibility studies costing an additional £2.5M, or interim mitigation on 95 structures costing approximately £4M, of which £4.5M of these costs accountable from the ‘Railway’.

Thus, the interim and permanent works costs to date in the SET are approximately £67.5M, with £32M of these costs liable from the ‘Railway’.

With a prediction of another 273 structures requiring permanent works and 143 structures requiring temporary mitigation, the total works forecast for the SET is expected to in the region of £250M, with a value £120M coming from the ‘Railway’, see Appendix C, Table C.6.

At the current rate of implementation of permanent solutions, approximately 10 (3%) structures per annum, the estimated completion date is somewhere in the region of 2030, see Appendix E, Graph E.2.

For the National Assessment Programme…

...extrapolated and interpolation from the progress of the SET…

The estimated final cost forecast for the 5,200 initial BD 21 Assessments is approximately £34M, with £0.7M reimbursable from the ‘Railway’ regarding inspection for assessment costs relating to approximately 430 (8%) of structures ‘failing’ to achieve the ‘Railways’ obligations in accordance with to S 117 / BE 4 / SI 1705.

Also, further assessment and investigation work on approximately 240 (5%) of structures being about £2.4M and formal interim measure appraisals undertaken on 520 (10%) of structures of around £1M, with £1M paid by the ‘Railway’. Including, liability assessments required on

approximately 1,100 structures being £2.8M and funded entirely by the ‘Railway’. This does not included associated costs for updating formal interim measure appraisal reports required periodically as necessary, but not likely to increase cost significantly.

Therefore, the assessment costs for the National Programme are expected to be in the order of £40M, with £4.5M cost to the ‘Railway’, see Appendix C, Table C.7.

And at the current SET rate of completion, the estimated date for completing the assessment work is somewhere in the region of 2016+, see Appendix E, Graph E.1.

However, these predictions on the National Programme are extrapolated from the progress of the SET, which is somewhat more advanced than other Territories, and as such, is very much an over-optimistic prediction and more likely to be in the region of 2060+, see Appendix E.1 for graph.

For the National Strengthening/Reconstruction…

...extrapolated and interpolation from the progress of the SET…

With an approximately 1,800 structures requiring some form of permanent works at an estimated value of £1.07B with £480M (45%) coming from the ‘Railway’.

Plus, feasibility studies costing an additional £42.5M, and interim mitigation in the order of £71.2M, of which £80M (70%) of these costs are reimbursable from the ‘Railway’.

Therefore, the works costs for the National Programme are expected to be in the order of £1.2B, with £560M cost to the ‘Railway’, see Appendix C, Table C.7. This takes no account of inflation or rising costs in relation to

resources, materials, welfare and safety.

At the current SET rate of implementation of permanent solutions the estimated completion date is somewhere in the region of 2030+, see Appendix E, Graph E.2.

Again, these predictions made on the National Programme are extrapolated from the progress of the SET, which as previously mentioned is somewhat more advanced than other Territories, and more likely to be in the region of 2070+, see Appendix E, Graph E.2.

14. CONCLUSION In 1961, the Ministry of Transport thought it advisable to consult the ‘Railway’ on allowing 24t heavy continental vehicles passing over their 12,200 public road bridges.

The Ministry of Transport felt such a decision was in the best interest of the economy and agreed to provide full financial assistance, involving a sum of almost £7M, on the proviso that the programme was complete before the Transport Bill became law in 1969.

Thus became known as ‘Operation Bridgeguard’, due to the huge task or ‘mission’ of completing this immense assessment and enhancement programme in 8 years in order to avoid the having to contribute financially.

The assessment results indicated that 1,104 structures required some form of permanent works, of which 390 were accepted for permanent restriction and the remaining 714 structures scheduled to be bought up 24t strength capacity.

The average length of time from initial planning to completion of a road-over-rail bridge was estimated to be in the order of 4 years, and involved anything up to 22 separate stakeholders to be satisfied before construction could begin. The main tasks were to increase output of assessment and construction, as well as, reducing the completion period to about a quarter of the normal time.

So, to pilot a bridge scheme to completion from 4 years down to 1, meant something had to go.

The source of all problems, foreseeable and unforeseen, was essentially the concertina effect to the time scales.

Bishop’s Bridge, Paddington



Few of the problems encountered were technical, mostly they were down to delays in financial authorisation, programming around a working railway, competition with permanent way maintenance and divisional resources, the ruthless disregard of public authorities’ interests, leading to relationships and friendships being stretched to the limit, and in some cases causing irreparable damage, still felt to this day. Measures taken to get the job done were not always to normal standards, no time to improve traffic conditions, only to perpetuate long standing problems for another 100 years or more.

As the sum involved approached £7M in 1966, budget pressures to complete by 31st December 1968 was intense, so not to incur any cost to the ‘Railway’. This sum was used to reduce the ‘Railway’s’ overall debt, rather than a direct payment.

One could understand the pressure this caused and questions being raised to amend the Act to give adequate time. No additional time was granted, as the bridge clauses within the Act were not deemed important enough to amend.

In the end, work was not in fact completed on time, but considerable effort had been made.

Many similarities can be drawn from the original BG1 Programme with respect to the current BG3 Programme. ‘Operation Bridgeguard’ was seen as an endeavour against the rising tide of changing standards and opposed agendas, then and now. Unfortunately though, none of the lessons learnt, particularly with regard to government policy, programming and stakeholder cooperation, from the past was not seen to be taken into account or even considered.

Many issues delayed the commencement of the BG3 Programme, in particular the unwillingness of LHA’s to fund and progress the programme for the ‘Railway’ owned bridges which had put the scheme behind schedule by 6 years and has been the one of the major causes of delay in progressing interim and permanent works options.

The ‘Railway’ becoming privatised and subsequently forced to adopt and contribute to a national enhancement programme scheme, when actually being more inclined to make profit for

its shareholders. Lengthy delay between the receiving and signing assessments, along with delay in agreeing and instructing the next step, did not assist in moving forward.

The decision, or practise, of undertaking S 117 Assessments on the basis of draft or initial BD 21 ‘sub-standard’ assessment results added to the recipe for delay, progression was effectively put ‘on-hold’ while awaiting and then debating the S 117 and BE 4/67 results in a ‘tug-of-war’, as opposed to after any further assessment work had been finalised.

Insufficient funding, or not being available when required, due to a variety of ‘high-level’ agendas and priorities, by both parties, as well as, hindrances in processing commercial requirements for procurement of further assessment work, feasibility studies and subsequent works have caused progression to be held back.

Lack of engineering judgement with the ‘big picture’ in mind, and basing decisions wholly reliant on recommendations of Consultants has attributed too often to achieving only tactical delay and political leverage, particularly with regard to liability, interim measures and permanent solutions. This then often altered the aspirations of the LHA depending on their liability to contribute to funding, upon provision of S 117 assessment results.

A lack of finance management and raising invoices to LHA’s with respect to moneys owed for completed work, or when paid upfront some time ago for uncompleted work, and yet to be progressed, is of cause concern. As well as, the lack of ability to quantify exactly what has been spent on BG3 by NR and Rt PLC to date.

Assessment costs have risen from around £36M in 1996 to £40M, due to; inflation, further ‘detailed’ assessments, liability assessments and the addition of BD 79 Interim Measure Assessments.

Works costs have also risen from around £540M in 1996 to £1.2B, due to; feasibility studies, interim mitigation, and associated costs with enhanced safety requirements. Also, conservative estimates regarding scope of work and number of structures, not to mention inflation and increases in welfare, resource and material costs.

The BG3 Programme is a multifaceted project, with a variety of complex issues at each turn which require resolution and acceptance, involving interactions between many interested parities, organisations and also internally within each of these stakeholders.

In light of London winning the bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, governmental pressure, funding availability and priority is being given to addressing transport infrastructure issues which further assists moving the programme forward with a foreseeable end in sight, at least for high priority enhancements, predominantly in London.

However, based on the current SET rate of progress and implementation of permanent solutions, unless some considerable effort and satisfactory resources are allocated to this programme, undertaking a real ‘proactive’ approach by all stakeholders, the forecast completion date for the National Programme is extrapolated to be completed somewhere in the region of 2070+...

�

�Addiscombe Road Bridge, Croydon (Addiscombe Junction)



15. REFERENCES 1. British Rail, Eastern Region,

Chief Civil Engineer, Bridge Assessment Office. Operation “Bridge – Guard”, Eastern Region sub-Standard Overline Bridges carrying Public Roads, Schedule Relative to County Areas. York, B.214, November 1967.

2. Chapter 37 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, as amended under Section 46 under the Criminal Justice Act 1991.

3. County Surveyors’ Society, Bridges Group: Strengthening of Railtrack owned Highway Bridges, Guidance for Implementation. County Surveyors’ Society Guidance Report, March 1999.

4. Department of Transport, Paper. Lorry Weights: A Consultation document – Maximum Permitted Weight. London, 1997. (Author unknown).

5. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive, Advice Note BA 16/84, 93 and 97: The Assessment of Highway Bridges and Structures. 1984, 1993 and 1997.

6. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive, Departmental Standard BD 21/84, 93, 97 and 01: The Assessment of Highway Bridges and Structures. 1984, 1993, 1997 and 2001.

7. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive, Departmental Standard BD 37/01: Loads for Highway Bridges. 2001. (Formerly BD 37/88).

8. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive, Advice Note BD 50/93: Inspection of Post-Tensioned Concrete Bridges, Prioritisation of Special Inspection. 1993.

9. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive, Advice Note BD 54/93: Post-Tensioned Concrete Bridges, Planning, Organisation and Methods for carrying out Special Inspections. 1993.

10. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive,

Advice Note BD 63/94: Inspection of Highway Structures. 1994.

11. Department of Transport, Roads and Local Transport Directive, Advice Note BA 79/98: The Management of Sub-Standard Highway Structures. 1998 and Amendment No.1, 2001.

12. European Council Directive 85/3/EEC. 19th December 1984.

13. European Council Directive 96/53/EEC. 25th July 1996.

14. Jenkins A.H. and Walker K.J. “Operation Bridgeguard”. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers on 22nd March 1971, London. August 1971, Volume 49, pp. 577–580.

15. The Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Government response to first report of the Transport Committee. House of Commons, Westminster, London. Session 1997-98, Paragraph 87.

16. Ministry of Transport Technical Memorandum (Bridges) BE4/67: The Assessment of Highway Bridges for Construction and Use of Vehicles. January 1969 and as amended up to 11th November 1970.

17. Military Engineering Experimental Establishment: Classification (of Civil Bridges) by the Reconnaissance and Correlation Methods, Christchurch (MEXE), May 1963.

18. Network Rail. Current Information Sheets (CIS) 35: Assessment of Metal Hogging Plates Extension of Parameters used. October 2003.

19. Packman A. Bridgeguard 3: The Assessment and Strengthening Programme for Railtrack Owned Public road Bridges. Railtrack, Civil Engineering, Headquarters, London, 15th December 1998.

20. Packman A. and Teager K. PDB98199: Bridgeguard 3. Railtrack, Civil Engineering, Headquarters, London, 15th December 1998.

21. Pippard A.J.S: The Appropriate Estimate of Safe Loads on Masonry Bridges. Civil Engineer in War, Volume No.1, 385. Institution of Civil Engineers, London, 1948.

22. Railtrack. Bridgeguard 3 Manual. Issue 2, Civil Engineering, Headquarters London, March 1996, (Issue 1, January 1995).

23. Railtrack. BG3YORK/TUNNELS/1: Guidance on the Methodology for the Assessment of Tunnels forming part of the Bridgeguard 3 Assessment Process. Issue 2, Civil Engineering, York, April 2002. (Author unknown).

24. Railtrack. Railtrack’s Liabilities with Regard to Load Bearing Capacities of Overbridges. Civil Engineering, Headquarters. (Date and Author unknown).

25. Railtrack. Structures Engineers Technical Advice Notes SE/TAN/211100/9: Load–Bearing Liability for Highway Bridges: Section 117 (BE4) Assessment. Issue 2, November 2001.

26. Railtrack. Railway Group Standard GE/RT/8000: Rule Book, Published by Railway Safety.

27. Section 117 of the Transport Act 1968. January 1969.

28. Statutory Instrument SI 1969: Motor Vehicle (Construction and Use) Regulations 1969, January 1969.

29. Statutory Instrument SI 1972/1705: Highways, England and Wales, The Railway Bridges (Load-Bearing Standards) (England and Wales), Order 1972. 1972.

30. Statutory Instrument SI 1982/1576: Motor Vehicle (Construction and Use) Regulations 1982, Amendment No.7, 1st May 1983.

31. Statutory Instrument SI 1986/1078: Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986, 11th August 1986.

Queens Road Bridge, Hastings



32. Statutory Instrument SI 1986/3051: Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986, Amendment No.6, 11th August 1986.

33. Statutory Instrument SI 1986/3111: Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1998, Amendment 1998.

34. Statutory Instrument SI 1994/3140: Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994.

35. Statutory Instrument SI 1995/3163: The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995.

16. OTHER TECHNICAL REFERENCES

RAILTRACK CODES OF PRACTICE

RT/CE/S/010: Technical Approval Procedures for Assessment of Bridges and Other Structures

RT/CE/S/016: The Assessment of Bridge Capacity

RT/CE/S/035: Assessment of Structures

BRITISH STANDARDS

BS 153: Steel Girder Bridges. Part 3a, 1972: Loads. Part 3b, 1958: Stresses. Part 4, 1958: Design and Construction.

BS 5400: Steel, Concrete and Composite Bridges.

Part 1, 1988: General Statement. Part 2, 1979: Specification for Loads. Part 3, 1982: Code of Practice for Design of Steel Bridges. Part 4, 1990: Code of Practice for Design of Concrete Bridges. Part 5, 1979: Code of Practice for Design of Composite Bridges. Part 6, 1999: Specification for Materials and Workmanship, Steel. Part 7, 1978: Specification for Materials and Workmanship, Concrete, Reinforcement and Prestressing tendons.

Part 8, 1978: Recommendations for Materials and Workmanship, Concrete, Reinforcement and Prestressing tendons. Part 9.1, 1988: Bridge Bearings. Code of Practice for Design of Bridge Bearings. Part 9.2, 1983: Bridge Bearings. Specification for Materials, Manufacture and Installation Part 10, 1980: Code of Practice for Fatigue. Part 10C, 1999: Charts for Classification of Details for Fatigue.

BS 5628: Code of Practice for use of Masonry.

BS 6779: Highway Parapets for Bridges and other Structures.

BS 8110: Structural use of Concrete.

BRITISH STANDARD CODES OF PRACTICE

CP 114, Part 2: The Structural Use of Reinforced Concrete in Buildings. 1969.

CP 115: The Structural Use of Prestressed Concrete in Buildings. 1969.

CP 116: The Structural Use of Precast Concrete in Buildings. 1969.

CP 117: Code of Practise for Composite Beams for Bridges. 1969.

HIGHWAYS AGENCY DESIGN MANUAL FOR ROADS AND BRIDGES

BD 2/89: Technical Approval of DTp Highway Structures on Motorways and other Trunk Roads.

BD 44/95: The Assessment of Concrete Highway Bridges and Structures. BD 48/93: The Assessment and Strengthening of Highway Bridge Supports. BD 52/93: The Design of Highway Bridge Parapets. BD 55/94: The Assessment of Bridge Substructures and Foundations, Retaining Walls and Buried Structures. BD 56/96: The Assessment of Steel Highway Bridges and Structures. BD 61/96: The Assessment of Composite Highway Bridges and Structures. BA 38/93: Assessment of the Fatigue Life of Corroded or Damaged Reinforcing Bars. BA 39/93: Assessment of Reinforced Concrete Half Joints. BA 44/96: The Assessment of Concrete Highway Bridges. BA 51/96: The Assessment of Concrete Structures Affected by Steel Corrosion Bridges. BA 52/94: The Assessment of Concrete Structures Affected by Alkali Silica Reaction. BA 55/94: The Assessment of Bridge Substructures and Foundations, Retaining Walls and Buried Structures. BA 56/96: The Assessment of Steel Highway Bridges and Structures BA 61/96: The Assessment of Composite Highway Bridges and Structures.

NETWORK RAIL CURRENT INFORMATION SHEETS

CIS 7: Earth Pressure Co-efficient. Issue 1, February 2000. CIS 13: Bridges Constructed after 1975. Issue 1, February 2000. CIS 14: BD21/97 Traffic Flow and Road Surface Categories. Issue 1, February 2000. CIS 15: Accidental Wheel Loading and Footway Loading. Issue 1, February 2000. CIS 16: Assessment of Piers. Issue 1, March 1999. CIS 17: British Rail Specifications. Issue 1, February 2000.

Wadden Junction in the centre of three power stations. The Epsom line is to the left and the Wimbledon line on the right. (Purley Way Bridge in the background.



CIS 18: Mechanism Analysis of Multi-Span Arches. Issue 1, March 1999. CIS 19: Condition Factors in Rigorous Arch Assessment. Issue 1, November 1999. CIS 20: Assessment of Skew Arches. Issue 1, March 1999. CIS 21: Technical Advice on Single span Arches with greater than D. Issue 1, April 1999. CIS 22: Assessment of Jack Arches, Metal Arch Plates and Ties in Metal Beam Bridge Decks. Final, March 2001. CIS 23: Use of BD 61 and BA 61 for Cased and Filler Beam Bridges. Final, June 2000. CIS 27: HB Capacity with MEXE. Final, May 2000. CIS 29: Clarification of Interpretation BD44 and BA 44 for Shear in Simply Supported Pre-Tensioned Beam Decks. Final, May 2000. CIS 30: Use of BD 61 for Composite Bridges with Shear Connection. Final, February 2002. CIS 31: Use of ARCHIE-M for the Analysis of Single and Multi Span Arches. Final, November 2001. CIS 32: Strength of Rivets. Issue 2, Final, March 2004. CIS 33: Con-Arches. Final, June 2003. CIS 34: Condition Assessment of Post-Tensioned Bridges. Final, April 2003. CIS 36: Edge Girder in Jack Arches – Assessment of Torsional Buckling Strength. Draft, February 2004.

COUNTY SURVEYOR’S SOCIETY

CSS Bridges Group Report No. ENG/1 95: The Assessment and Design of Unreinforced Masonry Vehicle Parapets. County Surveyors’ Society Guidance Note (Volume 1 of the Research Report).

CSS Bridges Group: Strengthening of Railtrack owned Highway Bridges, Guidance for Implementation. County Surveyors’ Society Guidance Report, March 1999.

LEGISLATIONS

Statutory Instrument SI 1975/1584: Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act Employers’ Health and Safety Policy Statements (Exception) Regulations 1975.

Statutory Instrument SI 1977/500: Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977.

Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996.

Statutory Instrument SI 1998/494: Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998.

Brettal Lane Bridge, NW London



AAPPPPEENNDDIICCEESS

APPENDIX A. Lorry weight limits (tonnes) for articulated vehicles and drawbar combinations in EC member states Page 17

A.1 Comparison of typical road wear effects of various large goods vehicles Page 17 A.2 Comparison of bridge loading of pre-1999 goods vehicles and post-1999

goods vehicles Page 18

APPENDIX B. BD21 evolution of loadings Page 19 B.1 BD 21/84 and BA 16/84 Page 19 B.2 BD 21/93 and BA 16/93 Page 20 B.3 BD 21/97 and BA 16/97 Page 21 B.4 BD 21/01 and BA 16/97 Amendment No. 2 Page 22

APPENDIX C. Finance budget evolution Page 23 C.1 National budget forecast estimate, 1988 Page 23 C.2 National budget forecast estimate, 1996 Page 24 C.3 South East Territory budget forecast estimate, 1996 Page 25 C.4 South East Territory budget estimate to date, 2006 Page 26 C.5 South East Territory budget estimate to complete, 2006 Page 27 C.6 South East Territory budget forecast to complete, 2006 Page 28 C.7 National budget forecast to complete, 2006 Page 29

APPENDIX D. Programme progress flowchart Page 30

APPENDIX E. Programme progress graphs Page 31 E.1 Initial BD 21 assessment progress Page 31 E.2 Permanent mitigation progress Page 31

APPENDIX F. Case study drawings Page 32 F.1 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Plan Page 32 F.2 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Cross Sections Page 33 F.3 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Cross Girder Elevation

& Section Page 34 F.4 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Transverse Girder Elevations Page 35 F.5 Inspection for assessment drawing 1998 – Plan Page 36 F.6 Inspection for assessment drawing 1998 – Elevations Page 37 F.7 Inspection for non-linear assessment drawing 2004 – Plan Page 38 F.8 Inspection for non-linear assessment drawing 2004 – Cross Girder Elevation

& Sections Page 39



APPENDIX A. Lorry weight limits (tonnes) for articulated vehicles and drawbar combinations in EC member states4

A.1 Comparison of typical road wear effects of various large goods vehicles

40 tonne artic 44 tonne artic

40 tonne artic (1999 onwards) 44 tonne drawbar combination

Key

Vehicles permitted prior to 1999 for intermodal transport, i.e. carrying containers to or from a port or rail terminal

Vehicles permitted prior to January 1999

Vehicles permitted from January 1999

Note: Numbers show typical weight per axle in tonnes.



A.2 Comparison of bridge loading of pre-1999 goods vehicles and post-1999 goods vehicles

Note: The loading on this bridge from existing vehicles at 192 tonnes is far higher than the loading from the 44 tonne vehicles at 176 tonnes.



APPENDIX B. BD21 evolution of loadings5, 6

B.1 BD 21/84 and BA 16/84

Axle Weights for Restricted Assessment Live Loadings and in accordance with the maximum gross vehicle and axle weight allowable under the SI1982/157630.

Maximum Axle Weight (Tonnes)

Vehicle Type Assessment Live Loading

(Tonnes)

Restricted Assessment Live Loading

(Tonnes)

Gross Vehicle Weight

(Tonnes) Single Axle Double Axle (per Axle)

Triple Axle (per Axle)

Vehicles

Level 1 - HGV 5 Axles

40.0 N/A 40.0 10.5 10.0 8.0*

5 Axles 38.0 N/A 38.0 10.5 10.0 8.0*

4 Axles 33.0 33.0 32.5 10.0 9.5 N/A

3 Axles 25.0 25.0 24.5 10.0 9.0 N/A

17.0 17.0 16.5 10.5 N/A N/A

13.0 13.0 12.5 9.0 N/A N/A Level 2 - HGV

2 Axles 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.0 N/A N/A

Level 3 - LGV 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.5 N/A N/A

Car / Van 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 N/A N/A

Public Service Vehicles

Group 1 10.0 N/A N/A 10.0 N/A N/A

Group 2 9.5 N/A N/A 9.5 N/A N/A


Fire Engines

Group 1 10.0 N/A N/A 10.0 N/A N/A


* Note: An Assessment for the 24 tonne 3 axle bogie (8 tonne axle) is only necessary for arches where ‘no axle lift-off’ conditions prevail.



B.2 BD 21/93 and BA 16/93

Axle Weights for Restricted Assessment Live Loadings and in accordance with the maximum gross vehicle and axle weight allowable under SI 1986/107831.



(Tonnes)


(Tonnes)




Vehicles

HGV 5 Axles

40.0 N/A 40.0 10.5 10.0 8.0*

5 Axles 38.0 N/A 38.0 10.5 10.0 8.0*

4 Axles 33.0 33.0 32.5 10.5 9.5 N/A

3 Axles 25.0 25.0 24.5 10.5 9.0 N/A

17.0 17.0 17.0 10.5 N/A N/A

13.0 13.0 12.5 9.0 N/A N/A HGV

2 Axles 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.0 N/A N/A

LGV 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.5 N/A N/A

Car / Van 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 N/A N/A

Fire Engines

Group 1 10.0 N/A N/A 10.0 N/A N/A





B.3 BD 21/97 and BA 16/97




(Tonnes)


(Tonnes)




Vehicles

HGV 5 or 6 Axles

40.0 or 44.0 N/A 40.0 or 44.0 11.5 10.0 8.0*

5 Axles 38.0 N/A 38.0 10.5 10.0 8.0*

4 Axles 33.0 33.0 32.5 10.5 9.5 N/A

3 Axles 25.0 25.0 24.5 10.5 9.0 N/A

17.0 17.0 17.0 10.5 N/A N/A

13.0 13.0 12.5 9.0 N/A N/A HGV

2 Axles 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.0 N/A N/A

LGV 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.5 N/A N/A

Car / Van 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 N/A N/A

Fire Engines

Group 1 10.0 N/A N/A 10.0 N/A N/A





Programme financial budgetary evolution B.4 BD 21/01 and BA 16/97, Amendment No.2




(Tonnes)


(Tonnes)




Vehicles

HGV 5 or 6 Axles

40.0 or 44.0 N/A 40.0 or 44.0 11.5 10.0 8.0*

4 Axles 33.0 33.0 32.5 11.5 9.5 N/A

3 Axles 26.0 26.0 26.5 11.5 9.5 N/A

18.0 18.0 18.0 11.5 N/A N/A

13.0 13.0 12.5 9.0 N/A N/A HGV

2 Axles 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.0 N/A N/A

LGV 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.5 N/A N/A

Car / Van 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 N/A N/A

Fire Engines

Group 1 10.0 N/A N/A 10.0 N/A N/A





APPENDIX C. Finance budget evolution

C.1 National budget forecast estimate, 1988

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges National Budget Forecast 'Railway' Contribution Estimate (Yr) 1988

No. 6,500

(£ / Structure) (Structures) (%) (£) (% of

forecast) (£)

Initial BD21 Assessments £6,000 6,500 100% £39,000,000 0% £0

Interim Measures BA79

Assessments - - - - - -

Further BD21 Assessments - - - - - -

Liability S117/BE4/SI1705

Assessments £2,000 1,300 20% £2,600,000 100% £2,600,000

50% of Inspection for Assessment costs for 'failed'

liability

£1,500 650 - - 10% £975,000

Assessment Subtotals: £41,600,000 £3,575,000

Feasibility Studies £10,000 1,300 20% £13,000,000 50% £6,500,000

Interim Mitigation £20,000 1,300 20% £26,000,000 50% £13,000,000 Permanent Mitigation £150,000 1,300 20% £195,000,000 40% £78,000,000

Mitigation Subtotals: £234,000,000 £97,500,000 Totals: £275,600,000 £101,075,000

Permanent Mitigation: 20%

F/wy only strengthened or protected (>40T C/wy) 5%

C/wy & F/wy strengthened

&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

5%

C/wy & F/wy Strengthened

/ Reconstructed (>40T C/wy &

F/wy)

10%



C.2 National budget forecast estimate, 1996

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges National Budget Forecast 'Railway' Contribution Estimate (Yr) 1996

No. 5,500


forecast) (£)






Assessments £2,500 1,100 20% £2,750,000 100% £2,750,000


liability

£1,625 550 - - 10% £893,750



Interim Mitigation £25,000 1,100 20% £27,500,000 50% £13,750,000 Permanent Mitigation £450,000 1,100 20% £495,000,000 40% £198,000,000





&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

5%



F/wy)

10%



C.3 South East Territory budget forecast estimate, 1996

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges South East Territory

Budget Forecast 'Railway' Contribution

Estimate (Yr) 1996 No. 1,100


forecast) (£)






Assessments £2,500 220 20% £550,000 100% £550,000


liability

£1,625 110 - - 10% £178,750

Assessment Subtotals: £7,700,000 £728,750

Feasibility Studies £15,000 220 20% £3,300,000 50% £1,650,000

Interim Mitigation £25,000 220 20% £5,500,000 50% £2,750,000 Permanent Mitigation £450,000 220 20% £99,000,000 45% £44,550,000





&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

5%



F/wy)

10%



C.4 South East Territory budget estimate to date, 2006

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges South East Territory to Date

'Railtrack / Network Rail' Contribution



forecast) (£)



Assessments £2,000 40 4% £80,000 50% £40,000

Further BD21 Assessments £10,000 40 4% £400,000 20% £80,000


Assessments £2,500 212 20% £530,000 100% £530,000


liability

£1,625 87 - - 8% £141,375






11% 12% 11%

F/wy only strengthened or protected (>40T C/wy) 116


&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

126



F/wy) 122



C.5 South East Territory budget estimate to complete, 2006

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges South East Territory to Date

'Railtrack / Network Rail' Contribution



forecast) (£)

Initial BD21 Assessments £6,500 33 3% £214,500 0% £0


Assessments £2,000 70 6% £140,000 50% £70,000



Assessments £2,500 20 2% £50,000 100% £50,000


liability

£1,625 3 - - 8% £4,397

Assessment Subtotals: £504,500 £144,397


Interim Mitigation £40,000 280 26% £11,212,000 70% £7,848,400 Permanent Mitigation £600,000 * 273 25% £163,980,000 45% £73,791,000



11% 12% 11%



&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

4



F/wy)

4

* Note: Permanent Mitigation – Reconstruction costs can vary from anywhere between £2-4M in contrast to installation of weight limit signs which can be as minimal as £4,000-£8,000..



C.6 South East Territory budget forecast to complete, 2006

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges South East Territory to Date 'Network Rail' Contribution



forecast) (£)



Assessments £2,000 110 10% £220,000 50% £110,000



Assessments £2,500 232 21% £580,000 100% £580,000


liability

£1,625 90 - - 8% £146,175






11% 12% 11%



&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

130



F/wy)

126



C.7 National budget forecast to complete, 2006

‘BG3’ Public Road Bridges National Budget Forecast 'Railtrack / Network Rail' Contribution



forecast) (£)



Assessments £2,000 521 10% £1,042,844 50% £521,422

Further BD21 Assessments £10,000 237 5% £2,370,100 20% £474,020


Assessments £2,500 1,100 21% £2,749,316 100% £2,749,316


liability

£1,625 426 - - 8% £692,900



Interim Mitigation £40,000 1,779 34% £71,159,891 70% £49,811,923 Permanent Mitigation £600,000 1,779 34% £1,067,398,359 45% £480,329,262

Mitigation Subtotals: £1,180,935,643 £559,805,360 Totals: £1,220,897,903 £564,243,019


11% 12% 11%



&/or protected

(<40T C/wy & F/wy)

616



F/wy)

597



Key

A / B Financial Liability A = No. BE4 ‘Pass’ Highway Authority to fund B = No. BE4 ‘Fail’ Network Rail to contribute /

fund TBC = To Be Confirmed Awaiting Section 117 (BE4)

Results

C/wy = Carriageway F/wy = Footway

APPENDIX D. Programme progress flowchart

BD21 Assessment Complete

1064

Mitigation Required

364

Interim Mitigation 31: TBC

Interim Mitigation 33: TBC

BD21 Assessment Not Complete

33

<40T C/wy & F/wy

248

BE4 Assessment Not Complete

31

>40T C/wy / <40T F/wy

116

BE4 Assessment Complete

116

Permanent Mitigation 47: 47/0

Interim Mitigation 69: 68/1

BE4 Assessment Complete

217

Permanent Solution

107: 64/43

Permanent Mitigation 110: 70/40

Complete >40T C/wy

& F/wy 700

Complete >40T C/wy

& F/wy Protected 42: 42/0



Pending 30: TBC

In Place 3: TBC

Pending 45: 45/0

In Place 24: 23/1

Pending 5: 5/0

Pending 23: TBC

In Place 8: TBC

Complete >40T C/wy

& F/wy Solution 31: 27/4

Pending 80:53/27

Pending 76:37/39

Complete <40T C/wy

& F/wy Protected 30: 17/13

Pending 36:27/9

In Place 41:23/18

Pending 29:14/15

In Place 47:23/24

South East Territory BG3 Structures

1097



APPENDIX E. Programme progress graphs

E.1 Initial BD 21 assessment progress

E.2 Permanent mitigation progress

Initial BD 21 Assessments

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

1984

1993

1998

2000

2003

2006

2032

2058

Year

No

. National (SET)National (Est.)SET

Permanent Mitigation

0200400600800

100012001400160018002000

1984

1993

1998

2000

2004

2016

2042

2062

Year

No.

NationalNational (Est.)SET



APPENDIX F. Case study drawings

F.1 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Plan



F.2 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Cross Sections



F.3 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Cross Girder Elevation & Section



F.4 Record drawing for Road & Rail Traffic Act 1933 – Transverse Girder Elevations



F.5 Inspection for assessment drawing 1998 – Plan



F.6 Inspection for assessment drawing 1998 – Elevations



F.7 Inspection for non-linear assessment drawing 2004 – Plan



F.8 Inspection for non-linear assessment drawing 2004 – Cross Girder Elevation & Sections

