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The Agreement on Agriculture, entered into by WTO Member Countries in 1995, would be coming up for review at the end of this year. The full text of the Agreement is available on website address www.wto.org/ wto/legal/finalact.htm. Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) points the way to further negotiations on agriculture. As a run up to the same, the WTO Committee on Agriculture has instituted a process of analysis and information exchange wherein informal papers are presented by various member countries highlighting implementation problems as well as areas of the agreement which need amendment, modification and further clarity. While Article 20 mandates further negotiations, there is neither a fixed agenda nor a timetable for the same, which could probably mean that this process would simply be the beginning which could last for some years. These negotiations may cover several issues depending upon the position of different groups of countries. The Agreement on Agriculture contains provisions in following three broad areas of agriculture and trade policy: a) Market access envisages tariffication of all non-tariff barriers (that is removal of quantitative restrictions and export and import licensing). b) Domestic support measures or subsidies are disciplined through reduction in the total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) and area of export subsidies is also a trade concern for India as these measures affect the export of developing countries, rendering them uncompetitive when compared to subsidised exports of the developed countries. Further, they also result in distorting the world prices of agricultural commodities and thereby adversely affecting those developing countries which are net importers of foodgrains. The Uruguay Round and the subsequent negotiations in services had not yielded significant returns to the developing countries, particularly in regard to market access in terms of movement of natural persons and hence, there was need to remove the existing imbalances in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) taking into account the interests of developing countries.
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WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture Issues and Concerns for India
Yogesh Bandhu
Workshop on WTOU.P. Academy of Administration & Management, Lucknow
August 28th , 2012
AoA : From GATT to WTO
The original 23 GATT countries were among over 50 which agreed a draft Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO). The Charter was intended to provide world trade disciplines and also contained rules relating to employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment and services.Although, in its 47 years, the basic legal text of the GATT remained much as it was in 1948, there were additions in the form of "plurilateral" - voluntary membership - agreements and continual efforts to reduce tariffs.
The GATT was established on a provisional basis in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic cooperation - notably the "Bretton Woods" institutions now known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The Tokyo Round – A First Try at Reforming the Trading System
Subsidies and countervailing measures Technical barriers to trade Import licensing procedures Customs valuation Government procurement Anti-dumping Bovine Meat Arrangement International Dairy Arrangement Trade in Civil Aircraft
Conducted between 1973 and 1979 with 102 participating countries
4
The WTO and Agreement on Agriculture
•GATT - Inefficiency of Policies, Trade Tensions and Disputes
•Punta del Este Declaration (1986)
•Uruguay Round Negotiations (7.5 years)
•Agreement on Agriculture
Agriculture in GATT… Exemptions on Import Restrictions, Domestic Support, Export Subsidies
Market Access Difficult
WTO covers areas well beyond GATT
Textile and Agriculture Services Intellectual
Property Rights Investment
Basic Principles of WTO Protection to domestic industry through
tariffs. Binding of tariffs. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment. National Treatment
Three Pillars of the AoA
Market Access Domestic Support Export Competition
S&D, Peace Clause, Commitment to Reform, NFIDC Decision
Domestic Support:
Three Categories of Domestic Support
“Green Box” “Blue Box” “Amber Box”
Product Specific
Non-Product Specific
De Minimis Provisions
(AMS)Aggregate
Measurement of Support
Green Box
Art. 6.2
Blue Box
Amber Box
Categories of Domestic Support
Subject to
Reduction Commitments
No/Minimal Effects on Trade
or Production
Development Programmes All other support
Production Limiting
ProgrammesDe minimis
8
Green BoxNo, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on
production
Assistance Provided through publicly funded government programme
Not involving transfers from consumers
Not resulting in price support to producers
measures freely used as long as they meet Annex 2 criteria
can be introduced new, and/or modify old, programmes
continuous obligation to ensure that all programmes are, and remain, Green
9
Green Box – Scope
General services
research
pest and disease control
training
extension/advisory services
inspection
marketing and promotion
infrastructural services
Public stockholding for food security
Domestic food aid
Direct payments
decoupled income support
income insurance and income safety-net
relief from natural disasters
structural adjustment assistance
producer retirement
resource retirement
investment aids
environmental programmes
Regional assistance programme
s
10
Policy-Specific “Decoupling”
Amount of payments not linked to:
In any year after the base period
Type of production
Volume of production
Domestic prices
International prices
Factors of production
11
Blue Box
Exempt from Reduction of Direct Payments Under Production Limiting Programmes if:
based on fixed area and yields; or
made on 85% of base level of production; or
livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head
12
Article 6.2 (Development Programmes Exempt from Reduction)
Examples of notified Article 6.2 programmes e.g: • Bangladesh – 2% interest rebate for repayment of loan on
schedule• Thailand – Farming input assistance programme• Brazil – Production credit; Investment credit; Debt rescheduling
investment subsidies generally available to agriculture
input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource poor producers
support to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops
13
Amber Box – Current Total AMS
Non-product-specific support
For example Market price support Non-exempt direct payments(e.g. loan deficiency payments,
grants, compensatory payments) Other non-exempt measures
All product-specific EMS For example Water subsidies Fertilizer subsidies Crop insurance Subsidized credits
Product-specific support
+
Current Total AMS
Any form of domestic support not included in either the Green or
Blue Boxes or under Article 6.2
De minimis
Export Subsidy:
Prohibited Otherwise subject to reduction commitments
Value of Subsidy
By 36% over 6 years for developed countries By 24% over 10 years for developing
countries No reduction for least developed countries
Quantity of Export
By 21% over 6 years for developed countries by 14% over 10 years for developing countries No reduction for least developed countries
15
Export Subsidies
Article 1(e): Subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9
Legal Framework General prohibition under Article 3.3 of the AoA,
except:• If listed in a Member’s Schedule – subject to reduction
commitments (volume and budgetary outlays)
• Roll-over provisions (now expired)• S&D: Article 9.4 - subsidies for marketing and internal
transport (during the implementation period – now expired)
Anti-circumvention provisions
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Subsidy Coverage - Article 9.1 Direct subsidies contingent on export performance
Sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-commercial stocks at prices below domestic market price
Payments on exports financed by government action (including producer financed subsidies)
Subsidies to reduce cost of marketing, including handling, upgrading, international transport and freight
Favourable internal transport and freight charges on export shipments
Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products
17
Subsidy Circumvention – Article 10 Other forms of export subsidies
Export credits, insurance and guarantees
develop internationally agreed disciplines
but ... negotiations with no result - OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export
Credits does not cover agriculture
Food aid
specific criteria, Food Aid Convention, FAO
but ... is it always genuine aid or dumping?
Market Access:
Reduction of Tariffs By a simple average of 36% over 6 years for developed
countries By a simple average of 24% over 10 years for developing
countries Ceiling bindings & reduction commitments)
Minimum Access Not less than 3%, rising to 5% by 2004 for developing
countries Not less than 3%, rising to % by 2004 for developing
countries Quantitative Restrictions Variable Levies Minimum Import Prices Discretionary Import Licensing NTMs Maintained Through STEs
Voluntary Export Restraints Similar Border Measures
Tariffication of Non Tariff Barriers (NTB’s)
Prohibition not to maintain, resort or revert to:
BUT Annex 5 – Special Treatment
19
TIERED FORMULA
Tariff escalation (list) Tropical products (list)
Minimum average cut (Developed)
SVE flexibility
Maximum average cut (Developing)
LDC flex
SENSITIVEPRODUCTS
SPECIALPRODUCTS (Developing)
RAMs SP flexibility
SVEs SP flexibility
Commodities
MARKET ACCESS
SSG
SSM (Developing)
LDC products
VRAMs and small low-income RAMs flexibility
RAM flexibility
Preference Erosion
20
Uruguay Round Reduction Commitments
Developed Developing
Time period 6 years (1995-2000) 10 years (1995-2004)
Market accessTariff reduction 36% average, 15%
minimum24% average, 10% minimum
Domestic supportTotal AMS reductionDe minimisS&D exemption
20%5%
13.3%10%
Article 6.2 (investment, input and diversification subsidies)
Export competitionExport subsidy reductionS&D exemption
36% value, 21% volume 24% value, 14% volumeArticle 9.4 (transport and
marketing subsidies)
No reduction commitments for LDCs (least-developed countries)
Notification Obligations
Members bound to notify changes in Market Access, Export Subsidies and Domestic Support
India notifies AMS
Product Specific for 19 crops Non product specific: Fertilizer, Irrigation
Electricity and seeds Green Box Special & differential , provisions for low income/
resource poor farmers
India’s Commitments Market Access
No tariffication; ceiling bindings of 100% for primary commodities 150% for processed agricultural products 300% for edible oils
Domestic Support
Price Support for 19 productsAMS is negative by a large margin and below De Minimis
Export subsidy
India does not have these.No commitments
23
Doha Negotiating Mandate Comprehensive negotiations aimed at:
• substantial improvements in market access
• reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies
• substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support
S&D - integral to negotiations and outcome
Non-trade concerns to be taken into account
24
TIERED FORMULA
Developed countries
Threshold/Tier/Band (tariffs)
Cuts
0-20% 50%
20-50% 57%
50-75% 64%
>75% 70%
The Tiered Formula
Overall Minimum Average cut of 54%
25
Developing CountriesSVEs RAMs*
Threshold/Tier/Band
(tariffs)
Cuts(2/3rds Developed
cuts)
Cuts Cuts
0-30% 33.3% 23.3% 25.3%*
30-80% 38% 28% 30%
80-130% 42.7% 32.7% 34.7%
>130% 46.9% 46.9% 38.9%
THE TIERED FORMULA
Overall maximum average cut of 36%(Venezuela 30%, S&D for Bolivia & Suriname)
*No cuts if tariff less than or equal to 10%Very recent RAMs and small low-income RAMs with economies in transition exempt from reduction commitmentsLonger implementation period, 10 years
26
Special Agricultural Safeguard
Developed countries – reduce coverage to 1% of schedule tariff lines on 1st day of implementation
Remaining SSG coverage eliminated after 7 years
Developing countries – reduce coverage to 2.5% on 1st day of implementation
SVEs – reduce coverage to 5% of tariff lines over 12 years
27
Other Market Access Elements Tariff escalation (the problem of higher tariffs on processed products
than on raw materials, which hinders processing for export in the country producing the raw materials).
Commodities – inter alia, if tariff escalation not eliminated, Members to engage with commodity-dependent producers to find satisfactory solution
Tariff simplification- conversion of complex tariffs to their ad-valorem equivalents
Tariff quotas• reductions in bound in-quota tariff rates• tariff quota administration)
LDCs – inter alia, duty- and quota-free access for at least 97 percent of products at a tariff line level
Cotton market access - duty- and quota-free for cotton exports from LDCs
28
Domestic Support
Main issue – size of reductions
Green BoxProduct-specific
limits Cotton
de minimisOverall trade-distorting
domestic support
Amber Box/AMS
10% VoP(Avg 95-00)
Blue Box
S&D
29
Reductions in OTDS Tiered reduction formula – higher cuts for higher
levels of OTDS
Developed Countries with high relative levels of OTDS in the second tier (≥ 40% of Value of Production) to undertake additional 5% effort (Japan)
Minimum overall commitment
Tier Threshold (US$ billion) Cuts
1 > 60 (EC) 80%
2 10-60 (US and Japan) 70%
3 < 10 (all other DDC) 55%
30
Reductions in OTDSSpecial & Differential Treatment
Developing Countries reduction2/3rds of Developed Countries cuts in
the third tier (37%)BUT Developing Countries exempt from OTDS
reductions if:don’t have Amber box commitments;NFIDCs ;very recent RAMs and small low-income
RAMs with economies in transitionvery recently acceded Members
31
Product-Specific AMS Limits
Current situation:
Total AMSNew product-specific
AMS limits
sugar
beef
dairy
rice
wheat
dairy
beef
rice
wheat
sugar
limit
Beef limit
Rice limit
32
De minimisDeveloped Countries Reduce by at least 50% but more if necessary to meet
OTDS
Special and Differential Treatment Reduce by at least 2/3rds of Developed Countries but more
if necessary to meet OTDS commitment RAMs with de minimis of 5 percent reduce by at least 1/3rd
Developed Countries reduction Longer implementation period
(i) Developing with no Final Bound Total AMS;(ii) Developing with AMS but which
allocate almost all that support to subsistence and resource poor producers;
(iii) NFIDCs as list in G/AG/5/Rev.8;(iv) Very recently acceded Members;(v) Small low-income RAMs with
economies in transition
Exempt from reductions
33
Blue Box Additional criteria – expansion of policy coverage to
include direct payments that do not require
production Overall cap on Blue Box – 2.5% of average total
value of agricultural production, 1995-2000 (i.e.
reduction from 5% vop to 2.5%) but if BB more than
40% of trade-distorting support, reduce by level of
AMS cut Product-specific limits Special and Differential Treatment Blue box cap at 5% of the average total value of
agricultural production, either over the period 1995-
2000 or 1995-2004 Flexibilities with respect to determining the
product-specific limits
34
Final Bound Total AMS
10% value of Ag. production
Higher of: avg. Blue Box payments
OR5% val. Ag. prod
Base OverallOTDS
Lower Blue Box Limit
Reduced AMS
Reduced de minimis
Tiered reductions
Tieredreductions
Final OverallOTDS
Reductions in Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support
+
+
S&D for Developing Countries
35
Green Box – ProposalsPossible amendments to Annex 2, including: expand coverage of para.2 to specifically cover the special needs of developing country Members Additional flexibility when accounting for the acquisition of stocks for foodstuffs for food security purposes under para 3 tighten provisions related to base period update (paras. 6, 11 & 13) fine-tune eligibility criteria in para 8, base periods and an allowance for payments in the event of destruction of animals or crops to control/prevent pest and diseases exempt developing country Members from the condition that disadvantaged regions must constitute a clearly designated contiguous geographical area with a definable economic and administrative identity
36
Export Competition
Parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2013
Food AidMain issues – definition of safe
box, monetisation
Exporting STEsMain issue – monopoly powers
Export creditsMain issue -self-financing
Export subsidiesMain issue – phasing
Special and differential treatment
37
Export Subsidy Elimination
Developed Country Members
Developing Country Members
Elimination End of 2013 End of 2016(no reductions for LDCs)
Budgetary Outlays
50% by the end of 2010 and remaining
by end 2013
Equal annual instalments
Quantity levels
Standstill at actual average 2003-05 levels – not to be
used to new markets
Equal annual instalments
Article 9.4 NA 2021(5 years after the end-date for elimination of export subsidies)
38
Export Credits – Key Elements Forms and providers subject to disciplines Maximum repayment term: 180 days Must be self-financing:
When premium rates charged over a previous 4 year (6yrs for Developing Countries ) rolling period are adequate to cover the operating costs and losses of the programme during the same period
Still subject to provisions of other Agreements, including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)
If an export subsidies within the meaning of Item (j) of Annex I of the ASCM, also deemed not to be self-financing
Repayment period between 360 & 540 days for LDCs and NFIDCs. Additional time in exceptional circumstances
39
Agricultural Exporting State Trading Enterprises (STEs)
Provisions applicable to any exporting STEs meeting the definition set out in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII
Elimination of: Export subsidies Government financing of STEs Government underwriting of losses Monopoly powers – except if have small share of
trade, so-called de minimis S&D – provisions for Deveoping Countries, including
SVEs and LDCs to maintain or use monopoly powers
40
What is at Stake?
To preserve flexibility in domestic support policies to ensure food and livelihood security.
To create opportunities for a meaningful expansion of agricultural exports.
Tariff reductions – continued reform process with a high level of ambition
Improved possibility for developing countries to increase trade with developed countries but also other developing countries
Flexibility for developing countries to protect their sensitive sectors Reduction of trade-distorting domestic support and elimination of
export subsidies for improved competition, both on domestic and international markets
No new concessions for LDCs but duty- and quota-free access for 97 percent of tariff line
India’s Objectives
As a S&D measure, developing countries to be allowed to maintain appropriate levels of tariffs
Developing countries to retain flexibility for public stock holding and public distribution of food grains
Use of special safeguard in the event of a surge in imports or a decline in prices
Measures for poverty alleviation, rural development and employment to be exempt from AMS.
Primary agricultural commodities like jute, rubber, coir and primary forest produce which provide employment and livelihood to many to be covered by AOA.
Exemption to developing countries from any obligations to provide minimum market access.
Historical low tariff bindings to be rationalised commensurate with bindings on similar category of products under the Uruguay Round.
Negative product specific support to be allowed to be adjusted against positive non-product specific support.
Proposal:
Suitable accounting of all trade distorting support in the AMS calculations
Elimination of all forms of export subsidies including export credits, guarantees, insurance etc. by developed countries.
Flexibility available to developing countries under ASCM to be preserved in AOA
Peace clause not to be extended for developed countries
Down payment by way of 50% reduction in trade distortion and tariffs by developed countries by the end of 2001
Retaining and strengthening the existing S&D provisionsTo achieve meaningful market access it is proposed to seek:
Substantial reduction in tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation by developed countries
Eventual abolition of TRQs Transparent administration of TRQs with preference to
developing countries in the interregnum
Proposals Continued….
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