The Human FactorDisaster risk reduction

is about people

David AlexanderUniversity College London

HUMANCONSEQUENCES

OF DISASTER

“ORTHODOX” MODEL

PHYSICALEVENT

HUMANVULNERABILITY

“RADICAL CRITIQUE” (K. HEWITT et al.)HUMAN

CONSEQUENCESOF DISASTER

HUMANVULNERABILITY

PHYSICALEVENT

1983-2017:The relative failure of the radical critique.

The continuing primacy of hazards studies.

Is technology a source of vulnerability?Have we created a 'technofix' culture?

Is it an outgrowth of the hazards paradigm?

Implicit axiom: thesolution to the failure

of technology ismore technology.

• algorithms and software

• robots

• unmanned aerial vehicles

• telecommunicationinstead of face-to-face.

Are we filtering out the humanity out ofemergency planning and management?

With thanks to Gianluca Pescaroli

Basichumanneeds

• they can go into unsafe spaces

• they can carry diverse forms ofsensor and be of various sizes

• they can be connected tonetworks and remote sensing

• they cannot really think, see and feel.

Can urban search and rescue (USAR)really be accomplished by robots?

The procedure:-1. Find a problem2. Simplify it to bare bones3. Invent an algorithm4. Hey presto!

Example:-1. How to optimise the distribution of

relief goods after a disaster.2. Where to put distribution centres.3. Apply a fuzzy analytical

hierarchy process.4. Problem solved (?).

• Missing or inadequate scenariosfor the impact of the disaster.

• Magnitude and frequency issuesgive different exigencies.

• Do field commanders want to usethe algorithm, are they able todo so, and would it help them?

• We don't construct warehouses inthe emergency phase of a disaster.

• Route blockages are commonand somewhat unpredictable.

A chasm has opened betweenfield practice and new algorithms.

Humanitarian logistics: an increasinglypopular field in which many researchersdo not understand the essence of theproblems they are trying to tackle.

Redundancy• physical: more equipment• human: other ways of doing things

How much redundancy can we afford?• human redundancy - as much

as we can think and devise• technological redundancy –

only a few systems are inthe 'high reliability' class.

• telecommunication alternatives (cellnet ACCOLC, Bluetooth, pager, etc.)

• paper, pencil and aperson who can run fast

• procedures that favour autonomousoperations (i.e. do without a common operating picture).

For example, radios stop working

Conclusions

The technofix culture is anoutgrowth of the hazards paradigm:we should emphasise vulnerability!

• Are robots and dronessimply red herrings?

• Should we discouragethe algorithm makers?

• Do we need better humanitarianlogistics or none at all?.

A DRR that is about peopleis labour intensive:• machines and algorithms don't

answer back - but they do foul up• machines are cheaper than salaries

(capital expenditure is easier toauthorise than revenue expenditure)

The curse of emergency preparedness:capital expenditure overshadows revenue

expenditure (an unsustainable'one-off' culture).

Alan H. Barton, sociologist, Columbia University

1969-70

Charles E. Fritz, 1921-2000,sociologist, Chicago University

The 'therapeutic community',if it exists, does so undervery difficult circumstances:fear, uncertainty, frustration,grief, sadness, disorientation...

Sergio Pirozzi, Mayor of Amatrice

Amatrice, 7th October 2016

Thank youfor listening!

www.slideshare.net/dealexanderemergency-planning.blogspot.com