Models of Civil Protection: The Italian Case Modelli di Protezione Civile: Il Caso Italia

David Alexander University College London

Caveat lector: this 2010 publication is based on self-assessment.

The theoretical

stuff (la roba teorica)

Vulnerability Hazard

An asset is not vulnerable unless it is threatened by something

A hazard is not hazardous unless

it threatens something

RISK Extreme events

Elements at risk

Resilience

Exposure

Organisational systems: management

Social systems: behaviour

Natural systems: function

Technical systems:

malfunction

Vulnerability Hazard

Resilienc

e

Emergency

isolation

The Phases of Disaster

needs to be shortened needs to be lengthened

preparation for the

next event

warning and

evacuation

recovery and reconstruction

repair of basic

services

emergency management and rescue

isolation

impact

needs to be strengthened Risk reduction and disaster mitigation

Armed aggression on the part of states

Civil defence

Natural disasters

Civil protection

"Homeland security" (civil defence) Armed aggression on the part of

groups of dissidents

"Generic" disasters

"Civil contingencies" (resilience)

Civil defence

Hazard

Vulnerability

Threat

Exposure

Risk

Response

Mitigation Protection

Civil protection

Civil Defence Civil Protection

Instability threats

Enhanced natural hazards

Complex hazards

Natural hazards

Evolving strategic situation

Large technological

hazards

Evolving climate change

'Na-tech' (hybrid) hazards

Major geophysical

events

Civil contingencies

Resilience

management

The risk environment

Business continuity

Civil protection

Civil defence

DRR

Knowledge of community vulerability

Knowledge of hazards and their impacts

Knowledge of coping

capacity and resilience

Disaster Risk

Reduction

• civilian vs military command structure

• command function principle versus support function principle

• centrism versus devolution.

Some dilemmas

Disaster risk reduction

Incident management

Population (community) protection

Plans, procedures, protocols

Human and material resources

Hazard forecasting, monitoring,

etc.

Broader scope and outcomes

Changing objectives of emergency management

Civil Protection

Disaster Management

Resilience

Civil Contingencies Management

Disaster Risk Reduction

Hierarchical divisions

National, regional, local, etc.

Geographical divisions

Catchments, jurisdictions, areas, etc. Organisational

divisions

Police, Ambulance, Fire, etc.

Functional divisions

Government, healthcare,

commerce, etc.

Division and

integration

Organised

Spontaneous

Established

Kinship groups

Individual citizens

Disaster subcultures

Emergent groups

Citizens' organisations Charitable

NGOs

Some public stakeholders in disaster response

Schools

Workplace groups

Governance: democratic participation in decision

making

Livelihoods: diversity

and security

Hazards and risks: disaster

preparedness

RESILIENCE: managing risks

adapting to change securing resources

Uncertain future:

long-term trends climate change capacity to adapt

Organisation Resources

Self-organisation

Imposed organisation

Volunteerism

Community disaster planning

Laws, protocols, directives

Standards, norms, guidelines

Community resources

Governmental resources

Donations

International resources

Military Civilian Armed Civil administration forces Volunteers (civil society) Emergency services (army) [residual role] Civil defence Civil protection Command and control Co-ordination and co-operation Chain of command Autonomy

Locus of control

Locus of collaboration

(support)

Tension of opposites

Command function principle

Support function principle

Spectrum of alternatives

Harmonisation from above (national or regional levels)

Organisation and growth from below (local level: municipalities, volunteers, etc.)

Central control

Devolution

The natural tendency from above subordinate control repress restrict

The less than natural tendency from above

harmonise negotiate

support accommodate

act autonomously empower enable liberate The natural tendency from below

conform cede

comply submit

The less than natural tendency from below

The pressures of devolution and centrism

Global Supernational National

National

Regional

Local

Disaster relief as a barter market for resources

DONATE

REQUEST

ALLOCATE

DEMAND

Local incident Local response A

Threshold of local capacity

Small regional

incident Co-ordinated local response B

Threshold of intermunicipal capacity

Major regional

incident

Intermunicipal and

regional response B

Threshold of regional capacity

National disaster

Intermunicipal, regional

and national response C

Threshold of national capacity

International

catastrophe

Ditto, with more

international assistance C

Around Italy in 80 disasters (giro d'Italia in 80 disastri)

Earthquakes: • Belice Valley, Sicily, 1968 • Friuli, NE Italy, 1976 • Irpinia-Basilicata, S. Italy, 1980 • Umbria-Marche, central Italy, 1997

Floods: • River Arno, 1966 (Florence), 1991-3 • Versilia, W. Tuscany, 1996

Landslides: • Valtellina landslide dam, N. Italy, 1987 • Sarno, Campania, S. Central Italy, 1998

Industrial hazards: • Seveso dioxin incident, Lombardy, 1976

Forgotten disasters: • Balvano 1944: world's worst rail disaster • dam collapse and mudflow at Val di Stava, Lombardy, 1985: 264 dead • etc., etc.

The death of Alfredino Rampi in a well at Vermicino, 1981: the "emotional birth" of modern Italian civil protection

Molise 2002 earthquake collapse of a school:

26 children killed.

In Italy 60,000 schools are attended by 6.6 million children: 18,000 of the schools (30%) are located in the country's main seismic areas.

Avaliable funds are insufficient for a complete retrofit.

70% of population lives in seismically active areas, 40% in the 2965 municipalities subject to moderate and high seismicity.

13.8% of homes are anti-seismic (but 35.3% of those in the main seismic zones).

There are now an estimated 10,000 cars in the city centre of Florence

Florence floods, 4-5 November 1966

Somma-Vesuvius Portici (pop. 80,000)

1631 pyroclastic flow

Few areas of the world have such complex and intractable

volcanic problems.

Etna: population on flanks 700,000 In 1993-4 lava flowed for 431 days.

Some emergency preparedness lessons:

• emergency planning is limited by physical, cultural and conceptual constraints

• a major eruption of Vesuvius would instantly be a national and European emergency

• the relationship between prediction and warning is absolutely critical here, especially with regard to timing

• the relationship between reference scenario and response is critical: wrong scenario equals inefficient response.

The practical stuff (la roba pratica)

What is welfare?

The provision of care to a minimum acceptable standard to people who are unable adequately to look after themselves.

But we also need to focus on what welfare is NOT...

Analysis

• registered • archived • forgotten • ignored

Vulnerability maintained. -

• utilised • adopted • learned

Disaster risk reduced

+

Lessons Past

events

The process of disaster risk reduction (DRR)

• magnitude 6.3, duration 25 seconds

• acceleration on hard rock 0.3g, on soft sediments 0.7-1.0g

• part of an earthquake swarm that has lasted many months

• the first earthquake with epicentre very near a major urban centre in Italy since 1915.

The L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009

• 308 deaths

• 1,500 injuries: 202 serious, 550 moderate, 750 light

• 67,000 homeless survivors

• 100,000 buildings seriously damaged

• 16 towns devastated, 33 damaged.

Impact of the L'Aquila earthquake

• c.21,000 people in tents for summer months, April-September 2009

• c. 22,000 people in hotels, some far away from L'Aquila

• rapid construction of transitional accommodation for 65% of survivors.

Government policy on shelter

• 4,600 apartments in 184 buildings on 19 sites

• €280,607 per apartment (€3,875 per square meter of living space).

C.A.S.E. - Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili

• €1,427 per base isolator @40 per bldg.

C.A.S.E. at Assergi - built on an unstabilised asbestos dump.

Lack of wastewater treatment facilities.

• standard prefabs without base isolation

• 54 sites, half of them in L'Aquila city

• 8,500 people accommodated.

M.A.P. - Moduli abitativi provvisori

• social fragmentation leads to depression, isolation and marginalisation

• total lack of services and transportation

• induced dependence on private transport without infrastructure improvement

• exclusion of single person 'families'.

Problems with CASE and MAP sites

• stagnation of reconstruction through lack of funds and planning

• political paralysis and intimidation by central government

• massive rise in unemployment

• local inflation, especially of house rents

• loss of basic services.

Problems with L'Aquila recovery policy

The L'Aquila recovery process is driven by short-term political expediency, leading

to the repetition of ancient policy errors, particularly lack of democratic governance

Organisation Resources

Self-organisation

Imposed organisation

Volunteerism

Community disaster planning

Laws, protocols, directives

Standards, norms, guidelines

Community resources

Governmental resources

Donations

International resources

Earth- quake

Political response

National

Regional

Local

Permanent reconstruction

Bad (functional problems)

Good (functionality maintained)

Elections

Public image of politicians

Amelioration

Political impact on reconstruction

Suff- ering

Reco- very Transitional

housing and settlement

Without participatory governance, disasters can open a Pandora's box

of irrational, debatable, deleterious, noxious and arbitrary consequences.

Public participation in decision making

Government paternalism

Inclusive outcomes

Social exclusion

Discontent

Satisfaction

Discontent

...or...

The orthodox approach: emergency response begins at the local level.

The Italian approach: in L'Aquila local administration was swept aside

and remained paralysed for a long time.

The Italian approach: overwhelming force, regardless of cost.

The orthodox approach: response should be proportional to the size of the emergency.

The Italian approach: there isn't one.

The orthodox approach: emergencies need an incident command structure.

The Italian approach: either supply it all from Rome or abandon the local forces to their own devices.

The orthodox approach: local self-sufficiency and autonomous

decision making must be encouraged.

The Italian approach: mind-boggling sums of money have been spent on transitional settlement, and so far very few funds have been allotted to reconstruction.

The orthodox approach: transitional settle- ment should not impede reconstruction.

The Italian approach: in L'Aquila no thought whatsoever was given

to this problem and the result is a high incidence of socio-psychological

pathologies among the survivors.

The orthodox approach: in transitional settlement the

social fabric should be preserved.

The Italian approach: the guidelines are incomplete and out of date, and the training has been foisted

onto the regional governments without providing any harmonising criteria.

The orthodox approach: guidelines, standards and norms should be issued

to ensure integrated disaster response and training.

The Italian approach: in less than a decade 600 ordinances have authorised

the expenditure of more than €10 billion, some of that on projects that had nothing to do with emergencies and

were not really useful at all.

The orthodox approach: emergency measures should be used when normal measures cannot be.

The Italian approach: disasters open a Pandora's box of bad practice.

The orthodox approach: disasters lead to improvements in safety and security.

The Italian approach: three municipalities out of 8,104 have taken this to heart.

The UN's Making Cities Resilient initiative has only one Italian signatory - Venice.

The orthodox approach: disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a comprehensive

process of creating resilience.

• 1980s Pastorelli era - aid to Irpinia

• 1990s Barberi era - aid to Albania

• 2000s Bertolaso era - misuse of ordinances

• Zamberletti era - a remarkable interlude.

Scandals:-

Conclusions

When the next disaster occurs... • firemen and military personnel will be in short supply • volunteers will be better trained and equipped than ever before • there are now trained emergency planners and managers • there is a national civil protection system

Will that be sufficient?

Paramilitary forces (National Guard)

Military forces

Police forces

Fire brigades

Public administrations

Civilian volunteer forces

PMF

MF

FB PA

CVF

PF

Italy

PMF

MF

FB PA

CVF

PF

UK

CVF

PMF

MF

FB PA

PF

USA

• Italian civil protection is democratic and well-organised at the local level.

• Much is known about hazards in Italy - so it ought to be, as they are the most dangerous in Europe.

• Despite the plethora of courses (1000 in Lombardy region alone), there is little effective training in emergency planning and management and no adequate standards exist.

Conclusions

• Disasters are excellent opportunities for corruption and theft of public money, largely because surveillance of, and controls upon, expenditure are relaxed.

• The concept of personal responsibility is not part of the civil protection culture.

• Italian civil protection responds to a logic of political short-termism.

Conclusions

The development of a viable civil protection system in Italy has been

impelled (rather selectively) by certain key disasters, but the system is incomplete and its maturity varies considerably from one jurisdiction

to another at all levels.

Great improvements have been achieved in the professionalism of emergency

planners and responders, but in a major event it is not clear whether this would compensate for the reduction in forces.

• separation of civil protection from single ministries and its attachment to the national Cabinet (Council of Ministers): non-binding EC national-level directive

• fusion of domestic civil protection and international humanitarian work: EC CP/ECHO Directorate.

Italian gifts to European civil protection

The recent Italian experiences of disaster illustrate the importance

of creating a locally-based emergency management system and of involving the population in the creation of resilience.

The Italian civil protection is sophisticated, well-developed and based on proper democratic principles.

Through the voluntary sector and growth of local structures, headed by elected mayors, it is well placed to tackle the main challenge of the 20th century in civil protection: the involvement of the general population in the maintenance of its own security.

2009->: Neoliberalism or more assistentialism? Vote garnering

versus economic stringency.

1908: Liberalism - the state is not a big source of disaster relief

1980: Assistentialism - the state is a major source of largesse.

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