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ICRAF (World Agroforestry Centre) presentation to International Fund for Agricultural Development, end-May, 2011 on Rewards for Environmental Services / Payments for Environmenal Services
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ADVANCES IN PAYMENTS/REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES :
EXPERIENCES FROMREWARDS FOR, USE OF AND SHARED INVESTMENT IN
PRO-POOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES SCHEME (RUPES)AND
PRO-POOR REWARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN AFRICA(PRESA)
AND WAY FORWARD
Delia Catacutan, Sara Namirembe, Beria Leimona & Meine van-Noordwijk
Presentation Outline
• Our challenge • Synthesis of RUPES 1: Proof of concept• Activities and outputs in RUPES 2 and PRESA:
Proof of practice• Conclusions• Way forward
ICRAF’s 3 major networks of action research and learning sites on RES and climate change issues:
Pro poor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa (2008 – 2011) covering 8 sites in 5 countries (Tanzania, Kenya, Guinea, Uganda & Malawi)
Rewards for, Use of and Shared Investment in Pro-poor Environmental Services schemes in Asia (2002-2012) covering 12 sites in 8 countries (China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal, India, plus Thailand and Cambodia - upcoming)
Global partnership devoted entirely to research on the tropical forest margins with 12 benchmark sites in the Amazon, Congo Basin and Southeast Asia
Bac Kan
RUPES SITES IN ASIA
PRESA Sites
ConceptsEnvironmental services are a collection of biophysical
outcomes that are the consequence of proper management of natural resources with considerable impact on human beings and wide natural processes.
Rather than control and command environmental policies, the concept of PES attempts to harness market forces, including the global community to increase positive economic and environmental outcomes.
Redirecting development pathways towards environmental
integrityPositive incentives are needed to reward rural poor for the envirponmental services they can/do provide
Free and prior informed consent
Efficiency Fairness
Balancing act is needed
But PES actors are highly heterogeneous-- policy-makers and regulators and private sector as ES buyer, intermediaries, and local communities as ES providers have different knowledge, perceptions and ambitions which they all use to justify their individual actions.
And PES is knowledge-intensive!
Initial interest
Effective increase
in ES
Signed contract
Exte
rnal
inve
stor
s an
d re
gula
tors
:le
arni
ng c
urve
Learning curve for local stakeholders (actors) of land use change
Smooth implemen-
tation?
Efficient + Fair reward systems require a two-way learning curve
Negotiations
RES mechanisms differ from ‘command & control’ Conditional: a “performance” basis for the rewards/payments
rather than an entitlement based on nominal entities
Voluntary: engagement of both ES providers and beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through free choice at the individual level
RUPES 1 Synthesis
Knowledge and understanding of context: Realistic: RES schemes are based on scientifically sound
assessment of relationships of land use changes and ES provision.
Pro-poor: RES schemes must consider multiple dimensions of poverty
Context
Mechanism
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) or Co-Investment in Environmental Stewardship
Co-investment and shared responsibility for stewardship, with a focus on “integrative livelihood assets” (natural + human + social capital) rather than only financial can be expected to provide future flows of ES
Current findings show that per-capita financial transfer from PES remain small
Collective actions, social mobilization and secure land access are main components and can act as conditional RES and reduce poverty
Outcomes &Impacts
+
=
CES: Commoditized Environmental ServicesDirect interaction of ES providers & beneficiariesRecurrent monetary payments based on supply and demandNo explicit poverty targetActual ES delivery & direct marketability
COS: Compensating for Opportunities Skipped Paying for accepting restrictionsAchievement of a condition or effortPoverty target added with certain conditions
CIS: Co-Investment in (landscape) StewardshipEntrust the local resource management Full trust of management plan & local monitoring with high social capital flexible contract , broad sanctions
van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010)
Replicable tools for assessment, negotiation and design of R/PES schemesRapid Hydrological Assessment (RaHA)Rapid Carbon Stock Assessment (RaCSA)Rapid Biodiversity Appraisal (RaBA)Participatory Landscape Appraisal (PaLA)Rapid Tenure Assessment (RaTA)Reverse auctionsOthers (visit:http://www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/projects/tulsea)
• Efficiency principleRealistic: causal pathways to enhance ES are clear, real opportunity + implementation costs are offset, or
benefits outweigh the costs Conditional: performance-based contracts, agreed
MRV system for monitoring, reporting and verification• Fairness principle Voluntary: meets the Free and Prior Informed
Consent standards; willingness to accept responsibilities
Pro-poor: at minimum not increasing inequity, attention to gender balance
RUPES 2 – Rewards for, Use of and Shared Investment in Pro-poor Environmental Services
Goal: Rewards for provision of environmental services flow to poor people in an Asian context.
Outputs, impacts and
lessons
Singkarak•Community based- voluntary carbon market•Potential organic coffee •Environmental Education Centre•Agro-ecotourism•Integrated Lake Management with Ministry of Environment•Supported by FAO RAP – Assisted Natural Regeneration to combat Imperata grassland
Aceh •Contributing to Green-growth economy after recovery from tsunami•Coordinated by UNESCAP & WWF Indonesia
Sumberjaya• A performance-based reward for sedimentation reduction from HEP•Scale up to watershed level for collective financial reward•Selected as a best practice for a national GEF-UNDP project coordinated by MoF
Cidanau
• An activity-based reward for watershed ES from private companies•Financial reward for local infrastructure and smallholder business improvement•Extension and scaling up at provincial level • Supporting local intermediary: Communication Forum of Cidanau
Bungo•Rubber eco-certification •Improving the quality of smallholder rubber production •Supported by Bridgestone•Collaborating with Indonesian Institute of Ecolabeling
Kuningan •Local level rewards for watershed services•Supporting a local NGO: KANOPI•Policy advocacy RES between districts
Kapuas Hulu
•Scoping study on watershed hydrological function using RHA tool •Supporting the consortium WWF-CARE-IIED
Dieng•Scoping study on RES feasibility at a horticulture-rich but severely degraded watershed •Food security issue on potato farming•Supporting Safe Dieng NGO
Central Sulawesi• IFAD Investment Project site with Ministry of Agriculture•Collaboration with Mars Symbioscience Indonesia to improve the cocoa agroforestry and promote RES scheme for smallholders.
Lombok
•Community based- forest management•Gender study on role of women’s knowledge in increasing the sustainable NRM •Supporting a local NGO to monitor an established RES for providing good water quality for urban dwellers.
INDONESIA
PHILIPPINES AND VIETNAM
Bac Kan•Supporting the PDD of REALU projects•Developing RES scheme for forest ES•Improving existing ecotourism scheme
Bakun• Collaborating with Cordillera Highlands Agriculture Resource Management Project • HEP royalty benefit-transfer to local indigenous group
Kalahan
•Voluntary carbon market scheme by Ikalahan indigenous group in collaboration with FAO RAP•Supported by Mitsubishi company in developing carbon Project Identification Note•Potential bundling ES with watershed and biodiversity conservation •A best practice site for forest protection and NTFP marketing
Lantapan• A case study of water rights and conflicts• A sentinel site for Landcare• Supporting policy advocacy of RES , and RES design at district level
Loktak Lake Floodplain wetlands with unique floating lands called
phumdis i.e. thick mats of vegetation intermixed sediments Presence of Keibul Lamjao National Park for globally
threathened species of Brow Antlered Deer Construction of Ithai barrage of HEP converted a naturally
fluctuating lake into a reservoir Wetlands India and Loktak Development Authority :
restoration strategies
Shivapuri-Nagargun National Park (SNNP)• Managed by Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Conservation (DNPWC)• a major source of drinking water in Kathmandu (around 21% of
piped water) other services: HEP plant, irrigation, tourism• Two villages inside the park
Park-people conflict (wildlife, no access to forests)• Collaboration with ICIMOD
Kulekhani Watershed Hilly region watershed extends over 8 VDCs Community forestry – on hill slopes, intensive agriculture on
the slopes Hydropower station below – reservoir based 17% of hydropower in the country (92 MW) Government royalty collected from Hydropower generation
by NEA; 12% channeled back to the district Collaboration with ICIMOD
Tibet Plateau
Incentivizing improved management of both degraded and un-degraded grasslands.
Conditional on maintaining sustainable stocking levels on lands to which herders have legal use rights.
NEPAL
• The development of reward for ecosystem services schemes for grass land by the China’s State Council in 2007, China
• Ecological land use plan for Xishuangbanna Prefecture 2010, China
• The Indian National Environment Policy on the role of economic incentives for environmental conservation in 2006.
• The Indonesian Environmental Protection and Management focusing on economic instruments for ecosystem services: Act No. 32/2009 and regulations of the Ministry of Forestry on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Country (REDD).
• The Nepali Leasehold Forestry Policy in 2002: degraded forest is leased for 40 years (renewable) to groups of poor households as a resource base for their exclusive use.
• The draft of Philippines Climate Change Act of 2008 and a final review of Sustainable Forest Management Act (SFMA) in 2008.
• The Vietnamese Decision No. 380/QD – TTG: ES buyers should pay ES providers
National level impacts
Making a case forWatershed service rewards
Sara Namirembe
This programme is implemented by the World Agroforestry Centre, with funding from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the European Commission and the government of Finland. The views expressed in this presentation do not
necessarily reflect the views of the funders.
Focus
Can watersheds be managed sustainably through negotiated agreements between landowners in targeted hotspots and potential beneficiaries?
PRESA seeks to generate evidence on feasibility of rewards for environmental services (RES) through action research at local level to inform and influence actions at landscape and country levels
Analysis of watershed service payments
RES principle Issues
Realistic Hydrologically effectiveFinancially affordable
Voluntary Sellers willing to accept payment; Buyers willing to pay
Conditional Performance based contracts/agreements
Propoor Does no harmImproves the lives of the poor