Book Reviews from the Georgia Guardsman

Professional DeveloPment Bookshelf: Reviews of books that teach us about ouR cRaft

By Maj. John H. Alderman IVPublic Affairs OfficeGeorgia Department of Defense

We can learn a lot from taking a little time to analyze battles and asking ourselves what decisions, or technology, or logistics, or

personalities were key to victory... or defeat. But military history books that describe these battles share the common challenge of reaching the right level of detail for a quick study.

Too little detail and you get what amounts to a dictionary entry of places and people; too much detail and it’s hard to cover a lot of ground while drawing broader conclusions.

100 Decisive Battles gets the mix just right. Each battle gets a few pages, and Davis describes the historical setting and results of each one in crisp, entertaining prose. For every battle he includes a short, precise description of why that battle is important, a description of the battle itself, and then an explanation of the results and effects. He then offers his references for further reading. Most battles include maps, and some have illustrations.

Throughout, his analysis is spot on. More than once,

I found myself thinking of even familiar battles in a new way because Davis had given them more, or different, context than I had seen before. The results sections extended my understanding of the battles and helped me fit them together – making the book’s chronological order even more useful.

There are some surprise inclusions and exclusions of battles; but narrowing it down to 100 battles over the course of 3,500 years of history had to be tough. More important is that the battles span both time and place, and each of the battles was decisive in its own way.

So, for example, Davis covers the battle of Crécy but not the more famous battle of Agincourt – because Crécy is more important strategically and Agincourt basically repeats the tactics used at Crécy.

Overall, 100 Decisive Battles serves as both a thorough grounding in the most important battles and tactics of history – and as a great general reference on the subject. It is broad enough to teach us how to think about maneuver, logistics, and decision-making, yet specific enough to give us useful examples.

I don’t think it’s too strong a statement to say that this book should be on the bookshelf of every professional military officer.

Professional DeveloPment Bookshelf: 100 Decisive Battles from ancient times to the Present

June 2010 | 18


What can Guardsmen learn from a business executive’s handbook written half a century ago? Lots, actually.

First published in 1967, The Effective Executive is business guru Peter F. Drucker’s close look at how executives operate and how they can improve themselves in order to improve their organizations. Rather than a focus on managing people, it’s really about managing one’s self.

Executives, Drucker writes, mainly contribute by affecting their organization’s ability to perform and obtain results. By “executive” he generally means business executives. But his working definition – people who are expected to get the right things done – sounds a lot like the basic definition of a “leader.”

While it is more obvious that this book would be great for battalion commanders and chiefs of staff, I found its lessons very useful – decisive even – as a Troop Commander, and figure the lessons would apply to thoughtful leaders from squad level, up.

For example, Drucker has a healthy appreciation for decentralized decision-making. Leaders must make decisions, not just carry out orders. Executives must focus their efforts and time on what other people need and can use to make the organization successful. Meetings should be held only for a purpose.

Essentially, executives do two things: provide a

vision and make decisions. And the key is making the right decisions. If executives make decisions that others can make, or that they can make unnecessary by issuing policy, they are wrong, Drucker contends.

Perhaps the best-known example from this book is Drucker’s observation that a well-run factory is a quiet factory. If he visited a factory where everything was dramatic, and people were rushing about excitedly making things happen – it would be less well-run than a quiet factory where good planning, solid policies and thorough systems and procedures had made things…quite regular.

“A recurrent crisis,” he writes, “should always have been foreseen.” So the job of the leader, then, is to anticipate problems and provide training, equipment, systems or decisions to keep problems from developing.

A major takeaway is that, whatever his rank, a leader acts like “top management” when she focuses on what she can do to serve the needs of the entire organization – from whatever position she’s in. And that is a lesson we could all do well to keep in mind.

Throughout, the prose is lightened by illustrations and observations from business and the military. After all, military leaders make tough decisions all the time, and the high stakes of our field means we have to get things more right more often than most business leaders – or we face more awful consequences.

It’s not the simplest manual on leadership, but it is one of the very best. I first read this book when I was a young lieutenant, and the ideas in it completely changed the way I approach leadership. I wish I had read it sooner.


July 2010 | 20


The perennial trick to understanding a given battle or campaign is matching the detail of written description to the visualization of a map

illustration. The West Point Atlas of War series spans centuries of warfare in a simple, effective manner that supports both close reading and general browsing. First published in the 50’s under the auspices of Gen. Esposito at the Military Academy, many of the maps are available online.

The books are harder to find, but if you’re lucky, you can still pick up reprints at larger bookstores. The most recent reprint included separate volumes on the American Civil War, World War I, and the European and Pacific theaters of World War II. The latter is the one that most opened my eyes.

Just as Paul Davis’s 100 Decisive Battles (featured in this column this past June) perfectly balances scope and detail, so too does The West Point Atlas. For each battle or campaign, a map of the area of operations (and sometimes area of interest) is set with a concise description of the action. Sometimes, the two are perfectly matched; sometimes, the maps may only illustrate the decisive part of the action.

Throughout, the prose is lively and appropriately detailed, a good read that balances analysis with reporting in some pretty neat ways. So, for example, sometimes the narrative is explicit in its condemnation or praise for a commander’s decision. At other times, facts are presented

in such a way that a student of history can draw his or her own conclusions about the action. Rather than feeling uneven in its treatment, it keeps the atlas interesting and makes it more a tool of instruction.

The maps are beautiful. Perfectly scaled and illustrated, there is enough detail to give the reader some terrain to analyze to help see how commanders’ decisions were shaped – similar to the utility provided by staff rides.

The maps are rarely unclear or cluttered, with a clear and concise black-and-white color scheme. Another nice detail is the inclusion of local place-names, which give a feel for what the commanders may have seen on the ground. Unremembered places like Catherine’s Furnace, Barber’s Point, and Todd’s Tavern show up next to the names we know well only because a battle took place a little farther down the road.

The atlas maps and descriptions are probably best at teaching an understanding of the higher-order decisions that shape wars. The volume on the Pacific Theater, for example, was the first book that really helped me fully visualize and understand the division-level maneuver that surrounded or supported some of the smaller-scale (or seemingly unconnected) battles with which I had previously been familiar.

Ultimately, a robust appetite for and understanding of the various factors which have affected major battles and campaigns in the past allows any commander to better contextualize any challenges faced by his or her own unit. The West Point Atlas of War series effectively puts salient facts and mitigating factors into a visually and intellectually compelling format that makes it easy for commanders to make use of the lessons hard-learned in battles past.


August 2010 | 20


A science fiction book? On the Professional Development Bookshelf? You better believe it! Right up there on the shelf next to Starship

Troopers.Ender’s Game is the story of a young boy becoming

a leader under unique and trying circumstances. Set in the relatively near future, the novel spins a fairly straightforward tale. Earth has been attacked by aliens twice, and now the planet is desperately trying to prepare for the rematch they know is coming. So, they are selecting and developing leaders at very early ages and pouring everything into the hope that one of them will be, essentially, perfect.

Like all good fiction, this storyline is about developing character and solving problems. In this case, how does a society select and develop leaders? What makes a good combat leader, and how does a trainer pull that out of a candidate for leadership? What does that candidate go through as the transformation takes place?

That selection and development process forms the core of the novel. Card takes us inside two minds: one shaping a leader through direct counseling and by indirect situational challenges; the other, Ender, growing into that leader as he is poked and prodded along. Then,

as he becomes a leader and starts shaping teams, we see it all over again from a different angle.

Ender’s Game really becomes an exploration of the methods – a philosophy, really – of training junior leaders. Ender is thrown into a real maelstrom of experiences and people, and he encounters different attitudes toward command, leadership, followership, and decision making. He has to handle superiors less talented, and subordinates more talented, than he is.

Most useful to us as readers are the lessons Ender learns about how those without power can influence those in power through example, or counsel, or even direct challenge. The parallels to be drawn by a new lieutenant – in charge but inexperienced – are clear. The same could be said for junior NCOs.

A minor theme explores the power of rhetoric: Methods to shape thoughts and action with words and ideas. In fact, we come to see the ability to communicate effectively as the leader’s best tool.

Card is a fantastic storyteller. His characters have an edge to them, and project a peculiar kind of reality. So, although the book is practically a manual on leadership, it never feels like one. In fact, it is plenty enjoyable just to read as a space yarn. But that would be to miss the point.

So, if you need a change of pace, or prefer to learn by example and consideration, give this novel a shot. You will probably immediately see why it has been on the Marine Corps Reading List since its inception.


September 2010 | 20

By Maj. John H. Alderman IV Public Affairs OfficeGeorgia Department of Defense

This slim little volume on logistics is so brilliant that it would be tempting to read the first short essay or two, declare yourself Enlightened, promise never

to load your Troops down with extra gear again, and move on.

Famed historian Col. S.L.A. Marshall’s basic premise is: “No logistical system is sound unless its first principle is enlightened conservation of the power of the individual fighter.”

In other words, don’t weigh down your folks with unnecessary stuff.

Marshall’s famous studies of the great mass of gear we ask our troops to carry into combat have affected generations of leaders. Staff gets much of the blame: To

mitigate their fears of every possible contingency, all sorts of extra equipment is added to the basic combat load.

Because Marshall also believes that “In war, all effort, all policy, should be directed toward speedier delivery of a greater volume of a more efficient fire at the decisive point,” this study of logistics is all about the intersection of logistics and leadership. For him, strategic leadership marshals resources effectively; tactical leadership motivates and inspires subordinates by doing the same.

Some of Marshall’s ideas are challenging and practically unthinkable. Send troops into combat with little food or ammunition? Are you kidding? Yet, as Marshall writes, “the Soldier with only five clips in his pocket but spring in his gait is tenfold stronger than the

man who is foundered under the weight of ammunition he will never use.”

And if you accept his basic premise, then you should give careful consideration to this new equation of risk assessment. What might we gain in mobility in exchange for accepting the risk of having fewer reloads?

At its core, The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation is about the creation and preservation of combat power so that it can be used at the decisive point. And that proves a pretty good model for leadership in general.

Soldiers manage their fuel and ammunition to maintain pressure on an enemy; pilots manage energy to maintain superior position in a dogfight; managers balance the need for information against the cost of distracting their people from their daily tasks by holding too many meetings.

Marshall illustrates his points with vignettes from various wars to keep things interesting. Along the way he makes some pithy observations on decision making, the psychology of combat, staff work, maneuver, and morale.

Another valuable inclusion in the book is straightforward leadership philosophy that ties everything together: “The ability to command the loyalties of your men, to learn to think rapidly and resolutely in their behalf while teaching them to do likewise, and to strive always to avoid wasting their force and energy so that it may be applied in strength at the vital time and place - that is leadership of the highest possible caliber.”

Whatever their position or duty, leaders are responsible for managing resources to accomplish missions. So, Marshall’s approach will prove useful in its relentless focus on necessary things, of unencumbering subordinates, and maximizing operational effects.


“economy of foRces opeRates in the spheRe of supply just as Relentlessly as it does in its application to the stRiking foRces.”

October 2010 | 20


Anyone who has ever fenced, or wielded a close-combat weapon, or studied martial arts understands how a weapon can serve as an extension of the

body. This understanding entails a comprehension of the relationship between action and reaction, vulnerability and the strike.

Knowledge of these things proves useful whether employing a tank platoon, or a light infantry battalion, or a fighter aircraft. But these are lessons which can be learned more immediately (and perhaps easily) with a close-combat weapon.

Probably, it is for this reason that Miyamoto Musashi’s The Book of Five Rings – collected here with Yagyu

Munenori’s Family Traditions on the Art of War – has survived through the ages as a key text of the martial arts.

The translator, Thomas Cleary, refers to these as “texts on conflict and strategy,” meant to be useful in all walks of life. Both authors, too, stress repeatedly that the “martial arts” are meant to be applied in all situations.

This approach truly makes these works of conflict philosophy more than strategic thought (or even business method) alone. The end result Miyamoto and Munenori would have us reach is more a state of mind – a way of approaching problems, martial or otherwise – with a proper balance of focus and openness, of passive and aggressive physical and mental states.

Of course, this also means the book is not always easily

approachable. Much of it reads like a book of aphorisms; some of it is repetitive and mystical, a little too Eastern for many readers.

For these reasons, this is a book best savored. You’ll want to have enough time to reflect on what you read – but not so much time that you lose the threads of the major themes running throughout the works. I recommend as interactive an experience as you can manage: Discuss it with others, or capture your thoughts and reflections in the margins of your book as you read. Agree or disagree, your reactions matter and, if captured, can help you better understand and develop your own philosophy of conflict.

Some of the lessons will be more challenging. “‘Mountain and sea’ means that it is bad to do the same thing over and over again,” writes Musashi. Yet, on reflection and in context, understanding the need to match

tactics to the situation at hand, and not repeat stale tactics – these are things with which we can identify.

Other lessons will be clearer immediately. “When you strike a blow, do not keep your mind on where you hit; after striking, bring your mind back to observe your adversary’s condition,” writes Munenori. Students of maneuver – and many pilots – will recognize this admonition against “tunnel vision” from early in their training.

The bottom line is that if one approaches this book with an open mind, and a willingness to apply somewhat abstract lessons to today’s situation, The Book of Five Rings may help you reach “the next level” in your strategic thinking.


“the peRfoRmance of an expeRt seems Relaxed but does not leave any gaps. the actions of tRained people do not seem Rushed.”

January 2011 | 20


Watching the A-Team as a kid, it never occurred to me how odd it was that although Hannibal and the boys traded hundreds of bullets with each

week’s bad guys, practically no one was ever hit. Sure, tires were hit. Drums of gasoline were hit, and fireballed into the air. Makeshift welded contraptions were hit. But not people.

As ridiculous as this now seems, perhaps the show was more realistic than we think. At least, that’s a conclusion one might reach after reading On Killing, a psychological tour de force by former Ranger and paratrooper Dave Grossman.

Grossman’s book thoroughly explores the psychology of humans killing other human beings: What it takes,

mentally, as well as the costs, psychologically. Reasons why it is hard to kill, and the things we do to make it easier. The reaction most people have to killing, and what can be done to ease the difficulties that often later result.

Even in the Army we don’t seem too eager to talk about it in such blunt terms – unless we are boasting, or talking about blood making the grass grow. Both can be useful; but neither is a particularly effective way to improve ourselves professionally. And we should be honest: While Peace may be our Profession, killing is our business. Army or Air, and especially on today’s battlefield, any of us entering a combat zone had best be prepared to kill.

Grossman builds off of previous studies (particularly

those of S.L.A. Marshall) which revealed that, historically, the vast majority of Soldiers (and pilots) in combat either never pull the trigger, or miss that target, even at pretty close ranges. The historical examples aren’t perfect (certainly there are exceptions!) but they’re there.

He demonstrates, in part, that humans and animals alike have powerful urges not to kill members of their own species. Grossman explores why, and the training that has been implemented in the last century to help correct that deficiency.

Grossman goes on to help us understand why and how combatants do kill, a model based on the demands of authority; group absolution; predisposition of the killer; distance from the victim; and the attractiveness of killing the victim. And he explores what happens later, the visceral reaction most people have to killing, even if they are willing to do it in the first place.

Finally, he turns his attention on society – on the TV

shows, movies, and video games that desensitize us to killing and to death not at all unlike military training meant to make us more comfortable with killing. Is that a good idea for our society?

On Killing reminds us that this subject is worth considering, and perhaps even discussing with our fellow Guardsmen. Certainly these considerations can affect how we prepare ourselves and our units for combat. It certainly did both for me.

As for those of us who have never been to combat, and perhaps never will – these days, many around us have. Reading this book is also a great way to help us understand them better.


“ouR chants in basic tRaining... weRe not just meant to make us disdainful of the dangeR of ouR own deaths, but moRe willing to kill in combat, as well.”

March 2011 | 20


No one need tell Soldiers that stress can affect decisions. But what can we do about that?

Doctor Henry Thompson’s book, The Stress Effect, sets out to help leaders make better decisions despite (and perhaps even using) stress. “The trick,” he writes, “is to keep stress as an ally, not an enemy.”

A veteran Ranger and paratrooper, Lt. Col. Thompson has been into the sleep-deprived, ultra-high-stress combat that pushes Soldiers to their limits even as it demands superior-quality decisions with the highest of stakes. He has subsequently applied and refined his experience and

education as an esteemed organizational psychologist and leadership consultant in the corporate world. The result is a book uniquely useful to us Guardsmen, who must be successful in both arenas.

The Stress Effect examines the art and science of decision making, including different models people use, and the important differences between intuitive and rational decision making. It then looks at types of intelligence; the effects of emotions and stress on decision making; how to manage stress; and how to build resilience.

There’s a fair amount of science here – the chemistry of emotions, the anatomy of the brain – but this is well-balanced by practical application and illustrated by real-world examples, both civil and military. Not only does Thompson clarify complex concepts, he also condenses

vast areas of research (with references for further study).So this is a great resource for leaders trying to develop

themselves or their subordinates.The book is especially well-timed for Army Guardsmen,

explaining concepts of Resilience that underlie training implemented in the Army over the last year or so.

What I find most interesting about The Stress Effect is that while the concepts in each chapter can stand alone, they very effectively build upon one another. Explanations of stress, plus explorations of emotion and intelligence lead to the critical concept of Building Stress-Resilient Emotional Intelligence.

Emotion is key. It seems like we spend a fair amount of time urging young leaders to take the emotion out of decisions. This can be vital; but it’s also a little disingenuous.

Those emotions are markers and motivators. They can be enormously useful in motivating people, or understanding what motivates them – or in how they will respond to a decision. Understanding our own emotions can be vital in maintaining accurate situational awareness, especially in stressful situations.

The Stress Effect concludes with seven best practices to build stress resilience. Thompson’s ARSENAL system of Awareness, Rest, Support, Exercise, Nutrition, Attitude, and Learning provides a great roadmap to focusing our efforts and maximizing our effect.

For the growing and professional leader, The Stress Effect provides immediate effect on how we do business – as well as a system of systems from which we can further develop our own way of living.


“the tRick is to keep stRess as an ally, not an enemy.”

April 2011 | 20


Fighting a Counterinsurgency (COIN) with the massive resources of the United States behind you is daunting enough. But what if you had so many

constraints that you also had to manufacture your own weapons, including bombs that used super-bounce balls as shrapnel?

J.R.T. Wood’s Counter-Strike from the Sky is a superbly detailed historical account of a relatively modern counterinsurgency fought in the 1970s in the country of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under just these constraints. The resultant, curious mixture of old equipment, low technology, innovation, and daring airborne maneuver makes a thought-provoking solution to an age-old problem.

Wood’s book (some editions include a DVD as well) chronicles their weapons, strategy, armament, and tactics in a direct, matter-of-fact manner that seems characteristic of the British military. The last few chapters, a detailed historical account of the massive cross-border raid, Operation Dingo, is practically a book by itself, and clearly demonstrates the height of airmobile, deep-strike vertical envelopment tactics as exercised by the Rhodesians.

As a result of a widening guerilla war in which the insurgents were increasingly difficult to bring to battle, the SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry, as well as associated police and intelligence forces, developed a concept that came to be known as “Fireforce.”

Its genesis probably was the Battle of Sinoia in 1966, when their troops were first transported by helicopter into combat. The battle was disappointing: Weapons were ineffective; air and ground radios were incompatible; common practices such as a standard left-hand orbit for

helicopters had not been worked out; coordination between police and military forces was awful.

Over time, lessons from Sinoia led to new training, equipping, and focus that transformed the force into a new weapon.

Scouts and intelligence teams maintained Observation Posts on likely or known areas of insurgent operations. Once enemy elements were spotted, small teams of light infantry (called “sticks”) were transported by helicopters (the French “Alouette” light utility aircraft) to the target area and dismounted onto blocking positions. Additional, larger sticks would be dropped by World War II-era Dakota aircraft in further blocking positions to box in the insurgents.

Practically simultaneously, gunship versions of the Alouette would circle overhead and begin destroying the enemy. Additionally, the (somewhat aging) Rhodesian Air Force would send in aircraft such as the Canberra, Hunter, or Vampire to provide close air support. In coordination with these fires, the sticks would sweep through and destroy the remaining enemy troops.

This fast-moving, hard-hitting combined arms force proved deadly. This Fireforce developed into an aerial ballet of fixed and rotary attack and transport aircraft, with intricate Command and Control necessary to maintain situational awareness and unity of command.

Modern warriors of both the Army and Air Guard have great lessons to learn here. The integration of air and ground elements of combat power are clear, as are the effects of unfettered innovation. The Fireforce is a great reminder that the best solution need not be as dependent on technology or the newest weapon system as on the intelligent use of weapons available.

A final note: get the edition with the DVD. It’s low-tech, but packed with personal accounts and video of the countryside to help you visualize the battles.


May 2011 | 20

June 2011 | 20


Mobile Armor. Light, fast, maneuverable suits with jump jets, guns, rockets, bombs, hand flamers, radar, IR goggles, heads up display,

commo suites, and a prototype Blue Force Tracker. That’s the hook for this book.

But there’s so much more going on.New members of the military have a tough time. They

must find their own place in an organization infinitely bigger than they are, even while learning skills, customs, regulations, culture, and people, all at once. Most are newly adult, too, further complicating things.

Finding one’s place in the organization is essentially what this book is about. I think that’s why it remains popular and is so often recommended to junior leaders.

The great science fiction makes it a fun read. The “Mobile Infantry” – future versions of Marines, Rangers, skirmishers, or Cavalry, depending on your taste – jump onto alien planets, maraud, dispatch bad guys with bombs and mini-nukes, get extracted, and head off to the next system. Good. Times.

We follow the protagonist through alternating memories of combat, Mobile Infantry enlistment, leadership training, and even high school. Through these experiences, Heinlein introduces and plays with all sorts of ideas. Why do we fight? Who fights? What’s the division of labor in a small

unit? How do we train officers? What’s the model for NCO/officer working relationships? What demeanor should a junior officer project?

So Starship Troopers isn’t just a romp through space – or a memoir of basic training. It’s more a series of philosophical discussions between characters that provide thoughts like this one to new officers:

“I gave you a talk on how rough it’s going to be. I want you to worry about it, doing it in advance, planning what steps you might take against any combination of bad news that can come your way, keenly aware that your life belongs to your men and is not yours to throw away in a suicidal reach for glory…and that your life isn’t yours to save, either, if the situation requires that you expend it.”

Anyone ever express that sentiment to you quite so clearly?

Some of these philosophical points are what make some people refer to this book as “controversial.” For example: In a free society, who gets to vote? In the book’s future, only Veterans – and not even current service members – get to vote. Other folks are free, but they don’t determine the course of government. His point, however, is one that ties selflessness and service to governance and society.

In fact, this is a good example of why leaders can re-read the book over time, finding new ideas in it that reward further reflection (as with Gulliver’s Travels, for example). Starship Troopers is a great work, not just because it is fun – but because it is instructive and provocative.

Final note: If you have had the misfortune of seeing the Verhoeven movie from the 90s which shamelessly uses the name of this novel, I recommend you banish it from your mind. In many cases it actually inverts Heinlein’s philosophies and erases the leadership lessons offered. The less said about it, and the sooner it is forgotten, the better.


“theRe aRe no dangeRous weapons; only dangeRous men.”

Education

Book Reviews from the Georgia Guardsman