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click here for freelancing tutoring sitesCase Study Analysis: Briefly identify Hewlett-Packard's ‘strategic agenda’, i.e. what are the fundamental questions  and problems that concern organizations and their successful development”  (2002). Overview of the Company             Hewlett Packard is the world's leading producer of test and measurement instruments and the world's third largest computer company. It has become a major player in the personal computer market, and at in a 1999 survey was the sixth biggest in terms of market share, having moved up from fourteenth largest in 1992. It is also the second largest player in the computer workstations market, and holds the dominant position in the laser printer business. The company was the only major computer manufacturer which remained profitable during the recession. The corporation employs 96,200 staff worldwide, of which 20,200 are employed in Europe and 2,000 in the UK (in the UK Computer Systems Organization). Underpinning the Hewlett Packard culture is the HP Way, developed by founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, which emphasizes clearly stated and agreed overall objectives but gives people the freedom to work towards these goals in ways they determine best for their own areas of responsibility (1999).           The HP Way is probably best illustrated from a number of words and concepts extracted from Hewlett Packard’s own publications. These are love of the product, love of the customer, innovation, quality, open communication, commitment to people, trust, confidence, informality, teamwork, sharing, openness, autonomy, responsibility ( 2001). 

Other pillars of the HP Way include an emphasis on selecting individuals on the basis of their creativity and their enthusiasm, and the need for cooperation between organizational levels. A sophisticated performance management process and clear organizational values, together with a single status culture, has brought strong identification with the company on the part of employees.    Hewlett Packard breaks up units that grow beyond a certain benchmark. Hierarchy and status are taboo. Even the company president only reluctantly took that title. Any "perks" or status symbols are immediately dispensed with. The plants are periodically polled anonymously to ensure that the company lives up to its ideals (1992). The organization has traditionally had a decentralized structure, but with the growth of the computer business a more centralized approach was taken to reflect the systems nature of the business.    Background of the Case Study        Mark Hurd is credited to be one of the forerunners who tried to turn around a sprawling, $90 billion technology company, following years of lackluster performance. One year after he took the job as chief executive officer at Hewlett Packard, following the forced departure of the flashy but flawed Carly Fiorina, Mr. Hurd has started to revive the fortunes of a legendary Silicon Valley firm. The new chief executive is an understated operations geek, the type of manager that excels at HP, the epitome of an engineering-driven company. “Vision without execution is nothing,” he says. “Whenever anyone asks me about vision, I get very nervous. You've got to be able to tie it back to strategy; you've got to tie accountability to things.” Mr Hurd prefers to stand when he talks rather than sit; he wears crisply knotted ties while his managers are allowed open-collared shirts. At 49 years old, his hair is cropped short and every strand is perfectly in place, as one might expect from a man who spent the past 25 years ascending the ranks of a century-old business in Dayton, Ohio called NCR—originally National Cash Register. When Mark Hurd joined Hewlett-Packard, what he found was a firm spread thin with many units losing money and propped up by the sales of printer-ink cartridges. Its activities spanned both the consumer and business market, selling everything from high-end software to flat-panel television screens. Yet instead of shedding business units, Mr. Hurd has decided to (in his words) “double down” on his bets, and simply do more of the same, but better. Over the past year he has reorganized HP into three main divisions: enterprise computing and services; general tech hardware (such as PCs, handheld devices and the like); and imaging and printing. The company hopes to capitalize on trends such as computing on

the move, and the growing demand for printing, including sophisticated commercial printing.             Clearly-defined corporate values, vision, and strategic planning are the key elements in the remarkable growth achieved by Hewlett-Packard. For nearly half a century, revenue and earnings have grown at a consistent rate of 20% per year, propelling HP from a small manufacturer to the ranks of the leading multinationals (1997).             The first strength of Hewlett Packard’s planning process is vision. Their strategic planning is guided by a clear vision of what Hewlett-Packard is and where the company heading. This broad sense of direction focuses the company’s many product groups and divisions. It helps explain the sustained success Hewlett Packard had since their inception.             This vision is communicated in several ways. In part it reflects what they call the "HP Way." These are a set of five values enunciated by their founders. They are: (1) trust and respect for individuals, (2) commitment to high level achievement and contribution, (3) uncompromising integrity, (4) teamwork, and (5) flexibility and innovation.             Hewlett Packard’s planning is also guided by more specific long-range goals. These are called Hoshins. Hoshin is a Japanese word meaning "a shining piece of metal that points the direction," in other words--a compass (1997). These Hoshins are not hollow pronouncements. They're deeply felt business objectives that cascade down through the organization. Each business unit translates the Hoshin into terms that reflect its own mission.             The second strength of Hewlett-Packard’s strategic planning is that it's decentralized. Hewlett-Packard has nearly 112,000 employees in 110 nations. Their marketing reaches even more places. Hewlett Packard sells over 87,000 products and services in 250 countries. No central office could manage detailed projections for all these far-flung units, thus the need for decentralization. The results of this decentralized approach have been impressive.             Their product divisions are fully functioning global businesses with their own research and development, marketing, administration, sales and support. They form the nucleus of Hewlett-Packard, and are the primary drivers of its growth and profitability. So Hewlett Packard’s planning is multi-business.             The third strength of Hewlett Packard’s strategic planning process is that it emphasizes innovation. This commitment shapes all the company’s plans and their devotion to research and development. And it's been one of the keys to the company’s success in the rapidly changing world of high technology.             The next and fourth strength of Hewlett Packard’s planning process is that it is responsive to the needs and expectations of their customers. This quality, like the others already mentioned, is crucial to the company’s success. The company believes that they

will continue to grow only if they go beyond simply satisfying the needs of their clients and work to delight them.             The fifth strength of strategic planning at Hewlett Packard is that it is constant. It's driven by the calendar and by events. And this too has been a secret of the company’s success. As a result of this approach the company is always in a planning mode. Hewlett Packard reinforces this planning process by measuring, at each stage, the progress made toward their objectives. They also reinforce this planning by linking employee compensation -- and other regular activity -- to results. Analysis and Discussion             In each and every line of business, the entrepreneurs compete with each other is the sale of their products or services. Thus, we can see that competition is basic in a system. This is seen in the case of Hewlett Packard. The institution of free public enterprise implies freedom on the part of any entrepreneur to enter any field of business and to compete with those already established therein for the favor of the buyers in the market.           Competition is a risk that the company has to face. What the company needed to do was to implement the right strategies to be able to overcome this competition. In the case of Carly Fiorina, she wasn’t able to guide the company to overcome this risk, as well as many others. Risk is always present in private enterprise. Of greatest importance is the risk of complete failure – of bankruptcy – in which case the entrepreneur stands to lose all of his investment. In the case of the sole proprietorship or partnership he may possibly also lose his personal property and savings ( 2001). This is one risk that a company would never want to face. All other risks that are not properly managed would eventually lead to this. If Hewlett Packard was not able to make a good turnaround, it would have started to go bankrupt, or at least one of its branches would have.           This risk is apt to be greater when a new business is being launched than after it is well established. A similar danger exists, however, when an old concern fails to keep abreast of the times and loses out to newer, more wide awake competitors (2001). Herein we see again the role of competition in bringing a business up or down. And Mr. Hurd has brought Hewlett Packard up – from his reorganization of the company to integration, this new chief executive has definitely played his cards right.           At all times a firm must be aware of the risks that are inherent in competition – chances for loss through shifts in the price level, changes in style and fashion, and the appearance of substitutes on the market that sometimes render present models obsolete. Consumers could switch from an ordinary printer to a three-in-one printer although the ordinary printer is still a new one and has no defects. Also, consumers could switch to a cheaper printer of another competing brand but with the same quality. There is always a risk involved in the use of substitutes for materials formerly used.

           The appearance of innovative competition in the past couple of decades has markedly enhanced the risk aspects of entrepreneurship in all economic areas. Two other factors are noteworthy as contributors to risk. These are automation, which involves the substitution of mechanical for human effort with a frequently resulting reduction in cost; and electronic data processing through the use of computers, which permits of the assembling and use of large amounts of vital information by management.           With the proliferation of technology-oriented businesses, it is appropriate to first take a look at the distinguishing characteristics of this type of enterprise. First is the nature of technology itself, as an asset of the business and also as a vital ingredient of the product delivered. The second characteristic relates to the various options available for profitable utilization of the technology assets, and the role that these options can play in the development of an effective strategy for the business ( 1998). These two characteristics differentiate technology-driven businesses from others, such as retail establishments, restaurants, various service providers, and so on. The failure to recognize these very real differences can serve to limit the potential for success in these businesses. This is not so a problem with Hewlett Packard as the company knows that it is a largely technologically driven company. For those companies unable or unwilling to utilize either or both of these factors, the risk of falling behind competitively may be serious. Good thing Hewlett Packard is already utilizing these. It is really a must for companies to be technologically adept.           Technology is one of the most accessible assets available to the entrepreneur. In addition to the obvious approach of inventing the technology oneself, there are many outside sources, such as other businesses, colleges and universities, government agencies, and individuals. There are also, it should be added, a multiplicity of methods for tracking down technology from these other sources, including catalogs, trade shows, agents, and both for-profit and nonprofit institutions. It is also worth noting that while these assets are not usually available on a no-cost basis, the financial terms for access can be very attractive, with little or no up-front payment required in some cases (1998).           Probably the most common application of technological assets is to serve as the basis for the captive manufacture of a product for sale. In some cases, this involves a new product; in others, it involves a new, and presumably better, way of manufacturing an existing product. In either case, commercialization of the technology will yield financial benefits, either through sales of a new product, in the first instance, or through higher margins on sales of existing products, in the second instance. While both may entail technological risk, the new product option will also involve market risk. Nevertheless, this is the most common entrepreneurial approach to the commercialization of technological assets (1998).           

Increases in technology have resulted in increased skill levels for some practices and processes, and deskilling in others. At Hewlett Packard, engineers must move from repairing individual personal computers and printers to working on networks, a significant jump in skill level (1999).           In an increasing number of instances, especially in this global economy, technological assets are finding use as "trading chips" in joint ventures or strategic alliances. Consider, for example, the case of an entrepreneur seeking to utilize a new technology on a worldwide basis. In one's home country the technology can be applied as discussed in the preceding paragraphs; however, in an area of the world where the company does not now operate, the approach is considerably more complex. One approach that has been taken by some entrepreneurs is to develop a joint venture with an organization that already has a market position in the area in question. The technology owned by the entrepreneur will serve as all or part of the equity contribution to the joint venture, and the partner's market position will account for another portion of the equity in the venture. This, of course, is only one example of joint ventures (JVs) or alliances wherein an effective business strategy entails the use of technology instead of financial assets (2001). Advances in technology have therefore dramatically altered the basis of competition in many industries, most especially that which deals with technology. The rate of technological change--that is, the introduction of new technology such as 'personal computers, cellular phones, fibre optics, the Internet, massive databases, LANs (local area networks), artificial intelligence, virtual reality, satellite transponders and teleconferencing' --has shortened product life cycles and development cycles (1999). This is so true in Hewlett Packard wherein products become obsolete only in a manner of months. Consumers then are always looking for something new. What is bought six months ago could be considered by the consumer as obsolete and therefore would need a new replacement. This is not questionable since at the rate technology is driving change in our society, it is virtually everyday that new products are invented. The speed of technological diffusion--the rate at which technological information is absorbed into the industry--is also increasing, encouraging copying and increased competition in the form of 'me too' players. These issues have large implications for organizations which are technology-intensive, such as Hewlett Packard.           In many large companies with diversified product lines, Hewlett-Packard included, the concept of decentralization has been extended to the point where each product line becomes the basis of a more or less semi-autonomous division. In such a situation the responsibility for designing, producing, and selling its product line and of making a profit is given to the division management. The General Motors Corporation, General Electric Company and IBM are just some of the companies that follow this practice.           

The rationale behind this practice is that these companies have become too large and their product line too varied for a centralized management to supervise satisfactorily. Each division therefore acts as though it were an independent company.           All large companies, however, do not look with favor on such a practice of division within the organization. Other large companies favor the adoption of a functional type of control structure. With this sort of arrangement, a company’s physical operations may be dispersed, but the managerial control for all of its different operations is centralized. This means that a single sales force sells all of its different products and manufacturing plants are directed from the home office.           Such an arrangement focuses the responsibility centering on the president of the company. In a large company, this does not sound very good. This concentration of responsibility may overburden the chief executive with supervisory duties, leaving him too little time for creative thinking and acting. It also tends to create a shortage of potential managers because of the centralizing authority at the top.           What has contributed much to the success of Hewlett Packard when Mr. Hurd took over? Mainly it is his decision making process that has helped the company survive and prosper despite increasing competition. He all but made the right decisions for the company. In the past few years a number of things have come into being that have brought the decision-making process into a sharper focus. Form the purely mechanical side, the rapid and extensive development of high-speed computers and data processing procedures have added immeasurably to the quantity of information available to the executive (2001). This would specifically enable Mr. Hurd to base his decisions on far greater amounts of relevant data than ever before. By having vast amount of information regarding a certain matter, Mr. Hurd would be able to analyze and pick the right choice, thus making correct decisions which are for the good of the company.           The ability to make correct decisions in business has long been recognized as a prime attribute of successful management and there is therefore a need for inquiry into the decision-making process. With the growth of large corporations, with their vast resources in the areas of finance, productive capacity, and manpower, and the increased tempo of competition, the possible consequences of unwise decisions, both on the companies involved and on the economy generally, have served to focus attention on further research and studies on the topic (2001).           Hewlett Packard is seen by practitioners and academics as a people management benchmark, yet there are still concerns raised about integrating the rapidly changing business imperatives with the human resource systems to create a measure of continuity and consistency (1999).           Hewlett Packard could be described as having a unique 'cultured' soft model of human resource management, in that HR considerations were an intrinsic part of the corporate

strategy and management style, rather than being grafted onto it. This created a situation where HRM permeated the culture of the organization, and the whole way in which people operated, becoming 'owned' by everyone, not the HR function itself--'the ownership of managing people and practicing the HP Way (which is already described in the previous paragraphs) is a line management-owned function' (senior manager). For instance, the Managing Director articulated the six key processes for the organization as 'customer focus, planning process, order generation, product generation, order fulfillment, people fulfillment'. The emphasis placed in this model on development, fulfillment, and quality is indicative of the soft model. In Hewlett Packard, people considerations were seen as a fundamental component of the business strategy itself. According to the case study, by making managers and the sales force more accountable and by encouraging cross-selling, the firm has increased the amount of extra products it sells alongside its hardware. The business strategy employed by Mr. Hurd focuses not only on processes but on people as well. This proved to be suited well to the company and its employees.           An important factor concerning the implementation of performance management processes is the degree of change the organization is undergoing and the experience of change the organization has had. At Hewlett Packard, operating in the computer business for twenty-five years has given the firm a long history of change management and a decentralized management style, which has resulted in a flexible performance management system, able to cope with changing circumstances. With this continuity and consistency, the expectations of employees remain relatively stable. The enduring culture, exemplified by the HP Way, also provides continuity in terms of values which in turn reinforce desired behaviours (1999).           A number of factors appear to have contributed to this turnaround that is happening to Hewlett Packard under the management of Mr. Hurd. Apart from market changes, new product launches, and cost-cutting measures, the level of bureaucracy within the company was also attacked. A company that had been started by entrepreneurial engineers, advisers urged that it had become too centralized. In addition, new ideas were being squashed if they appeared too unorthodox. Hewlett Packard’s response was to return to a decentralized structure that gave freedom back to the individual business units. This decentralization arguably helped one business division to take off in business terms and capture a significant proportion of a new product market ( 1999).           The achievements of an organization are the result of the combined efforts of each individual in the organization working toward common objectives. These objectives should be realistic, should be clearly understood by everyone in the organization, and should reflect the organization's basic character and personality ( 1992). These sentences clearly mirror what is happening at Hewlett Packard under Mr. Hurd as chief executive.

 Conclusion             Organization means that management endeavors to achieve its objectives by directing the efforts of the people under its supervision. This procedure is a necessity whether it be a large or a small company. This has been taken seriously by Mr. Hurd as chief executive of Hewlett Packard. While the success of a Hewlett Packard may be attributed to many other causes, the skills with which Mr. Hurd directs and manages the organization is one of the major factors in the positive end result.             Probably the most foremost responsibility of management at all levels, but especially top management – that of Mr. Hurd, is the making of decisions. In many, if not most, instances, the decisions that chief executive officers have involve the making of choices between two or more alternative courses of action. The company therefore rests on whether Mr. Hurd will choose the right decision or not. Thankfully, Mr. Hurd has enough experience and perhaps plenty of references that enabled him to make the right decisions and helping Hewlett Packard succeed

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The Space Shuttle Challenger DisasterA failure in decision support system and human factors managementby Jeff ForrestMetropolitan State CollegeINTRODUCTIONThis article discusses the environmental and human decision making factors that were associated with the launching of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986. Shortly after launch, the Shuttle exploded destroying the vehicle and all crew members. The cause and contributing factors that lead to the Challenger tragedy are explored in detail. Focus is placed on NASA's use of a group decision support system (GDSS) meeting to make the decision to launch.Examples are included that show how contributing factors such as multiple priorities and demands influenced NASA from operating in a responsible and ethical manner. Proof that NASA used a flawed database in its GDSS and how it mismanaged the GDSS meeting is also offered. Finally, the inability of each GDSS member to vote anonymously on the decision to launch is discussed as a critical factor that, had it been allowed, probably would have prevented the Challenger tragedy.THE SHUTTLE 51-L MISSION

Environmental Factors- Societal ImpactsThe Space Shuttle Challenger 51-L was the 25th mission in NASA's STS program. On Jan. 28, 1986, STS 51-L exploded shortly after liftoff, destroying the vehicle and all of its seven crew members.The STS 51-L mission was to deploy the second Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and the Spartan Halley's Comet observer. Paramount to this mission was crew member S. Christa McAuliffe - the first Space Shuttle passenger/observer participating in the NASA Teacher in Space Program (cf. [1]). Ms. McAuliffe would have conducted live educational broadcasts from the Shuttle and transmitted them to classrooms throughout the world.The loss of life and the unique position that symbolized Christa McAuliffe as the first civilian working as a teacher in space had a profound impact on society and its attitude toward NASA and the U.S. Space programs.As this article will explore, the tragic decision to launch STS 51-L was based on long term contributing factors and the use of a flawed group decision support system that was further aggravated by its related mismanagement. The outcome of this action created costs to society in terms of life, resources and public mistrust. NASA subsequently experienced years of setback for its related scientific research and operations.BACKGROUNDHuman Factors - Contributing to a TragedyAlthough the destruction of the Shuttle Challenger was caused by the hardware failure of a solid rocket booster (SRB) "O" ring, the human decision to launch was, in itself, flawed. The resolution to launch was based upon faulty group decision support information and further aggravated by the related mismanagement of that information. However, as in most transportation accidents, there are usually other contributing factors that help to create an environment leading to mistakes and failures. Therefore, a brief review of the contributing factors leading to the Challenger destruction is in order.Environmental Factors - Demands on the Space ShuttleThe process of "selling" the American public and its political system the need for a reusable space transportation system began in the late 1960's. Conceptually, the Space Shuttle was introduced during the crest of the successful Apollo mission. Unlike the Apollo mission, the Space Shuttle was approved as a method for operating in space, without a firm definition of what its operational goals would be ([2] pg. 3). Here is the first contributing factor. The Shuttle was developed as a utility without a firm application. Therefore, support for such a project, both politically and economically, was not very strong. To gain political support it was sold as a project with a "quick payoff" (cf., [2]). Additional support was gained by offering the Shuttle program to the military as a means to increase national security and to industry as a tool to open new commercial opportunity. Scientists argued to the American people that the Shuttle would be an "American Voyage" ([2] pg. 10) with great scientific gain. Globally, the Shuttle was sold as a partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA) and as a means to improve national and social relations by combining peoples of different nationalities, races and sexes who would serve as crew members.The process used to develop economic, political and social support for the shuttle introduced the second contributing factor called heterogeneous engineering. That is, the Shuttle engineering and management decisions were made to meet the needs of

organizational, political, and economic factors as opposed to a single entity mission profile with specific goals ([2] pg. 9). Once functional, the Shuttle became exposed to operational demands from a multitude of users. The Shuttle now had to live up to NASA's promises. Coordinating the needs of political, commercial, military, international and scientific communities placed immense pressures on the Shuttle management team. First, political pressure to provide a reliable, reusable space vehicle with rapid turn around time and deployment seriously hindered the ability for effective systems integration and development. Secondly, it was not feasible to construct any complete management support systems (MSS) that could consider all of the factors associated with such a diverse group of environmental variables. Third, additional uncertainty and low NASA employee moral was created when the Reagan Administration pushed for the Shuttle to be declared "operational" before the "developmental" stage had been completed [2].After spending billions of dollars to go to the moon, Congress expected the Shuttle program to be financially self-supportive ([2] pg. 15). This forced NASA to operate as a pseudo commercial business. Therefore, the environment within NASA preceding the Challenger launch was one of conflict, stress, and short cuts [2].NASADecision Support System (DSS) - Environmental EffectsThe probability for disaster was growing higher as increasing demands were being placed on NASA just prior to the Challenger launch [2]. A false sense of security was felt by NASA officials, with twenty-four successful Shuttle missions to their credit. Just prior to the STS 51-L launch, NASA was an organization filled with internal strife and territorial battles([3], pg. 412). Mangers operated in an environment of "overload and turbulence" [3]. In short, NASA was characterized as having a "disease " ([3] pg.414) of decay and destruction.As incredible as it may seem, it would appear that NASA had no formal DSS program initialized for the Shuttle operations before the Challenger launch. Evidence is strong that decisions were made primarily by "satisficing" and conscious "muddling through." Specific characteristics of decision making at the time consisted of short cuts, compromise and operational heuristics ("operational heuristics; to cannibalize existing parts" as defined by Jarman and Kouzmin [3] pg. 414). In short, NASA was operating in a phase of semi-uncontrolled decision making while trying to serve the military, industry and international research organizations with a space vehicle that had been declared operational before completion of the developmental stage [4].NASA used decision making by default as its primary DSS. Its organizational boundary was highly political and open for manipulation by any entity that could exert political power. Upon declaring the Shuttle "operational," the Reagan Administration removed the motivation of NASA employees to manage and left them with the impression that decision making would be made by directive from political sources.The declaration of "operational" status was the critical turning point for NASA and its management of Shuttle operations. Complacency began to grow among employees and safety considerations were traded for time spent on keeping the Shuttle on schedule and "the client of the day" satisfied. This was the environment just before the launch of STS 51-L.THE DECISION TO LAUNCH

Group Decision Support System (GDSS) - Situational AnalysisA group support system did exist between NASA and related developers of the Shuttle. Focus in this discussion will be placed on Thiokol - the subcontractor directly responsible for the development of the SRB "O" rings. The GDSS system between NASA and Thiokol consisted of same-time/different-place conference rooms equipped with a connected and distributed computer interface. Speaker phones with audio only were also available.On the evening of January 27, 1986, Thiokol was providing information to NASA regarding concerns for the next day's planned launch of STS 51-l. Thiokol engineers were very concerned that the abnormally cold temperatures would affect the "O" rings to nonperformance standards. The mission had already been canceled due to weather, and, as far as NASA was concerned, another cancellation due to weather was unthinkable ([4] pg. 23). Both parties were already aware that the seals on the SRB needed upgrading but did not feel that it was critical. Though the information provided by the GDSS (with an associated expert system) showed that the "O" rings would perform under the predicted temperatures, Thiokol engineers questioned their own testing and data that were programmed into the GDSS. Thus on the eve of the Challenger launch, NASA was being informed that their GDSS had a flawed data base.At this point, NASA requested a definitive recommendation from Thiokol on whether to launch. Thiokol representatives recommended not to launch until the outside air temperature reached 53º F. The forecast for Florida did not show temperatures reaching this baseline for several days. NASA responded with pressure on Thiokol to change their decision. NASA's level III manager, Mr. Lawrence Mulloy, responded to Thiokol's decision by asking, "My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" ([4] pg. 24).After this comment the Thiokol representatives requested five minutes to go off-line from the GDSS. During this period the Thiokol management requested the chief engineer to "take off his engineering hat and put on his management cap," suggesting that organizational goals be placed ahead of safety considerations [4]. Thiokol reentered the GDSS and recommended that NASA launch. NASA asked if there were any other objections from any other GDSS member, and there was not.Group Support System - Critical AnalysisThere is little doubt that the environment from which NASA and its affiliated developers operated provided an opportunity for significant human error. Nevertheless, NASA and Thiokol had a "golden" opportunity to avoid disaster during their GDSS meeting before the STS 51-L launch. The following factors are offered as potential explanations for what created the flawed GDSS and the associated mismanagement of its information:First, Thiokol was aware of the "O" ring problem at least several months before the Challenger launch. However, the goal was to stay on schedule. NASA was made aware of the problem but it was "down-played" as a low risk situation. Here is the first element of flawed information that was input into the GDSS. If NASA had been aware of the significance of the "O" ring situation, they probably would have given more credence to the advice of the Thiokol engineers' recommendations. However, the data transmitted during the GDSS meeting from Thiokol did say that it would be safe to launch for the forecasted temperatures. NASA was frustrated over the conflicting advice from the same source.

Second, the decision to delay a Shuttle launch had developed into an "unwanted" decision by the members of the Shuttle team [5]. In other words, suggestions made by any group member that would ultimately support a scheduled launch were met with positive support by the group. Any suggestion that would lead to a delay was rejected by the group.Third, all members of the GDSS felt that they should live up to the "norms" of the group. Although the Thiokol engineers were firm on their recommendation to scrub the launch, they soon changed their presentation of objections once threatened with the possibility of being expelled from the program (as suggested by a NASA administrator who was "appalled" at a company that would make such a recommendation based on the data available) [5].Fourth, Thiokol became highly susceptible to "groupthink" when they requested a break from the GDSS. At this point they became insulated, conducted private conversations under high stress and were afraid of losing potential future revenue should they disagree with NASA. All these factors are considered prime to the formulation of "groupthink" [5].Fifth, all parties were afraid of public and political response to another launch cancellation (there had already been six cancellations that year). Each party began to rationalize that past success equaled future success [5].Finally, the GDSS was seriously flawed. As already mentioned, the data base contained erroneous information regarding the "O" rings. Ideas, suggestions and objections were solicited but not anonymously. Individuals who departed from the group norms were signaled out as unwelcome members. An agenda was never defined and NASA was therefore surprised by the Thiokol presentation. Conflict management was avoided by NASA's domination of the entire meeting. NASA, at times, became very assertive and intimidating. Considering NASA's attitude, no group member or individual was willing to be held accountable for any comment or decision [5].The setting for such an important GDSS meeting was also ineffective. Considering that a speaker phone and CPU modem was used, it was easy for NASA to down-play the personal opinions of the Thiokol engineers. If the meeting could have been held at the same place for all members, the outcome might have been different. At the end of the meeting NASA, very reluctantly, suggested that they would still cancel the launch if Thiokol insisted. No response from Thiokol was made and the NASA officials could not see the expression of "self-censorship" that was being communicated on the face of each Thiokol engineer [5].Perhaps the most significant flaw in the GDSS was when Thiokol requested a private five minute meeting with its own members. Up to this point Thiokol had stayed with its recommendation to cancel the launch. Once disconnected, Thiokol became an isolated member and the GDSS failed altogether. Once reconnected, Thiokol had changed its position and offered the go ahead to launch without any objection.CONCLUSIONSThe Critical Human Factor - Need for Voting ToolMany conclusions may be drawn as to the primary cause and contributing factors associated with the Challenger tragedy. It is the opinion of this author that regarding the GDSS and decision to launch the ability of each member to have voted anonymously was the key factor that would have maintained the integrity of the GDSS and the quality of the decision.

It has been shown that just after Thiokol's presentation to NASA, most of the GDSS group members were very concerned with the "O" ring situation and believed that the opinions expressed by Thiokol engineers were cause for serious consideration of launch cancellation [5]. However, only selected senior officials were allowed to vote their "opinion", which they did verbally and at the request of NASA. From the research conducted on this paper, the author believes that had a universal anonymous vote been conducted of the total GDSS membership, a decision to cancel the launch would have been made.The factors which lead to the Challenger incident can be traced back to the inception of the shuttle program. NASA and Thiokol failed to maintain a quality assurance program through MSS, as was initiated on the Apollo program, due to multiple source demands and political pressures. The GDSS used for the launch decision contained inaccurate data. Engineering members of the GDSS did not believe in the testing procedures used to generate the data components in the GDSS. And, the entire meeting was mismanaged.The decision to launch the Challenger Shuttle and its subsequent destruction had a major affect on society and the management of our space program. Challenger's unique mission and the death of Christa McAuliffe opened the door for discussion and research on how managers use DSS to make decisions that will affect public trust.AFTERMATHEthics and MSS/DSS - Human Factors ManagementA complete discussion of ethical decision making is beyond the scope of this article. However, the question of how NASA and Thiokol managed ethical considerations is central to the decision to launch the Challenger Shuttle and, therefore, deserves a brief overview.The first area of ethical concern is the area of information accuracy. The fact that both NASA's and Thiokol's managers had little regard to the concerns of Thiokol's engineers is very distressing. All members of the group made a decision knowing that the decision was based on flawed information. A second concern is that the decision made put safety last and operational goals first. Only one member of the GDSS expressed serious concern for the potential loss of life [5]. Additionally, open and free communication before and during the GDSS meeting was discouraged through such group dynamics as mind guarding, direct pressure and self-censorship [5]. Individuals who know of a situation that, unless acted upon with integrity might cause social harm, have a responsibility to contact any authority that will manage and control that situation in the best interest of the public ([4] "Whistleblowing, pg. 34).Human factors analysis and management science have begun to define the incorporation of MSS/DSS as a socially responsive way of conducting business ([6] pg. 826). This is especially true for government agencies and large public projects like the Shuttle program. It could be argued that GDSS technology had not evolved to the level of effectiveness that was needed to support the Challenger project. The success of the DSS used in the prior Apollo mission shows that this was not the case. In the Challenger program social and ethical decision making was discarded for the sake of cost, schedule and outside environmental demands.