185657968 administrative-law-case-compilation-chapter-5-7

Chapter 5 (Rules of Procedure), Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 | Admin Law Cases | Dean Roy 2D 2012

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click here for freelancing tutoring sitesCHAPTER 5

RULES OF PROCEDURE

1. MENDOZA v CSC

FACTSPetitioner Orlando Mendoza was a Senior Revenue Inspector in the Office of the Treasurer of Tarlac. In a letter dated March 10, 1989, respondent Jose Macapinlac, the then incumbent mayor of Tarlac, ordered petitioner to explain why no administrative and criminal charges should be filed against him for falsification of realty tax receipts and unauthorized collections of real estate taxes. The return card showed the letter-complaint was received on March 17.

Respondent Mayor, not having received any answer, rendered a letter-decision dated April 6, 1989, dismissing petitioner from service. The return card showed that this was received on April 11.

According to petitioner, he only found out about all this around the 3rd week of April. He then asked for a reconsideration. According to the mayor, he didn’t act on the reconsideration because, while it was dated April 18, 1989, it was filed only on July 4, 1989.

MSPB set aside the letter-decision and reinstated the petitioner to his former position, CSC reversed, holding that petitioner’s appeal to the MSPB was filed out of time and that at any rate, petitioner was accorded due process

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ISSUEW/N petitioner was deprived of due process of law HELDNO. It was shown by evidence that the letter-complaint was addressed to the Office of the Mun. Treasurer (petitioner’s office) and that it was received by someone in that office. It is a common practice that letters addressed to an official or employee in a government office are received by an employee assigned to handle mail matters.

It is true that appeals to the CSC shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision,” such party being the respondent in the admin case. However, in this case, when the respondent mayor appealed the decision of the MSPB to the CSC, petitioner never questioned its propriety and preferred to defend the correctness of the decision, Likewise, petitioner failed to raise this question before the SC.

These inactions are considered waiver on petitioner’s part to question the authority of the CSC to review the decision of the MSPB.

A law limiting the right to appeal to the respondent in the administrative case is a rule of procedure, not of substantive law. Failure to invoke timely a rule of procedure in favor of a party constitutes a waiver thereof.

2. MANGUBAT v DE CASTRO

FACTSMayor Carlos Quizon of Cebu City instituted a case against the petitioner Florencio Mangubat before the Municipal Board pursuant to RA 557 (empowers the city boards of councils to investigate misconducts or incompetency of members of the city police, which could lead to the latter’s removal)

Hearings were conducted. Petitioner was required to submit his memorandum which was never filed. However, before the case could be decided, the Charter of Cebu City was approved, and the name of the Mun Board was changed to City Council of City of Cebu. Sec 30 provided that it would now be the city fiscal who has authority to investigate such cases.

Meanwhile no decision was rendered by the City council. The city mayor then forwarded the said admin case to the city fiscal for reinvestigation. A reinvestigation was conducted, mostly on the basis of the records and testimonies before the Mun Board and finding no prima facie evidence, it recommended the dismissal of the admin case. However, no resolution was issued by the City Fiscal to this effect, neither was there an order to the same effect issued by the Mayor. Subsequently, the City Atty of Cebu again transmitted the records of the case to the City mayor, invoking Sec 26 of RA 4864, and recommended that final action thereon be made by the city board of investigators. The chairman of the latter board without further investigation, forwarded the records to the Police Commission. The latter rendered its decision finding petitioner Mangubat guilty of grave misconduct and violation of law and ordered his dismissal. ISSUEW/N petitioner was deprived of due process when the police commission took over the case rendering judgement without conducting its own investigation HELDNO. Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. Otherwise stated, where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.

The records show that the case at bar was exhaustively heard both in Mun Board and in the Fiscal’s office, with both parties afforded ample opportunity to adduce their evidence and argue their causes.

The respondent commission cannot be bound by the findings of the city fiscal, much less was it prohibited from making findings of its own on the basis of the records which both the Commission and the Board of Investigators considered sufficient for purposes of rendering a decision. Neither was the Board’s discretion not to conduct a new investigation foreclosed by such findings.

There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

1. RABAGO v NLRC

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FACTSAce Bldg Care and the Phil. Tuberculosis Society entered into a K under which the former would provide the latter with janitorial and allied services for a stipulated consideration. Subsequently, however, a new K was awarded to another company which then took over from ABC.The 41 janitors ABC had earlier detailed to PTS filed a complaint with the NLRC against both ABC and PTS for unpaid wage differentials.Moreover, in this case, the complainants were awarded with service incentive leave with pay on the basis of their affidavits establishing the length of their stay. ISSUEW/N the affidavits are hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross examination HELDUntenable. The rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. It is also worth noting that ABC has not presented any evidence of its own to disprove the complainant’s claim.

2. MACEDA v ERB

FACTSOn the outbreak of the Persian Gulf Conflict, private respondent oil companies (shell, petron and Caltex) filed with the ERV their respective application on oil price increases. This was granted.

Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional increase for lack of prior hearing. This was dismissed pursuant to sec 8 of EO no 172 which gives the ERB authority to increase provisionally without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceedings. It was also stated that the ERB was not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

In the same order authorizing the provisional increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the 2nd hearing. The next hearing was postponed on written notice of petitioner.

Subsequently, the oil companies filed another application to further increase the prices of petroleum products. Hearing for the presentation of evidence-in-chief commenced with the ERB ruling that the testimonies of witnesses would be in the form of affidavits, and the procedure for taking them would be to “present all the evidence of all the applicants first before the opposing parties would be given the opportunity to cross examine said pieces of evidence.” ISSUEW/N the order of proof deprived petitioner his right to finish his cross-examination each of the witnesses of the big 3 oil companies and hence denied him due process HELDNO. The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced our of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper. Such a relaxed procedure us especially true such as the ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative not quasi-judicial function. As such admin agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings.Moreover, while the government is able to justify a provisional increase, these findings are not final and it is up to petitioners to demonstrate that the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase PARAS; dissenting:The ERB has absolutely no power to tax which is solely the prerogative of the Congress. This is what the ERB is precisely doing by getting money from the people to ultimately subsidize the ravenous oil companies. PADILLA, dissenting:Any increase, provisional or otherwise should be allowed onlky after the ERB shall have fully, determined, thru bona fide and full-dress hearings, that is absolutely necessary and by how much it shall be effected.2 proposals to Congress:A. to do away with the present scheme of allowing provisional increases of oil products because usually if not always these provisional increases are permanent when fixed.B. All decisions and orders of the ERB should be expressly made by Statute to the President SARMIENTO, Separate opinion:Phil oil prices today have nothing to do with the law on supply and demand, if they had anything to do with in recent years.

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Now, oil pricing is a question best judged by the political leadership and oil prices are political, rather than economic decisions.

FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

1. DADUBO v CSC

FACTSPetitioner Lolita Dadubo, Senior Accts Analyst and Rosario Cidro, Cash Supervisor of the DBP were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In the morning of August 13, 1987 Erlinda Veloso authorized representative of the Tius, presented an undated withdrawal slip for 60K. This was encahsed.

After banking hours, a 2nd withdrawal slip, also for 60 K, was presented by a Feliciano Bugtas Jr. also an employee of the Tius. Veloso did not know about this. No posting of this amount was actually made because the passbook was not presented. While the withdrawal slip was dated 8/13, all other supporting docs were dated 8/14 this being a withdrawal after banking hours.

The ff day, prior to the payment of the 2nd withdrawal, Veloso presented another undated withdrawal slip for 60 K, which was handed to Dadubo. Cidro paid Veloso the amount corresponding to the 2nd 60K, on the thought that it was such 2nd

withdrawal that Velosos was trying to collect.

It turned out that the 3rd 60K, that was handed to Dadubo was not paid by the bank to Veloso.

Dadubo and Cidro were then found guilty by the DBP of dishonesty and embezzlement of bank funds, due to the unposted withdrawal of 60K. Dadubo was dismissed from service. This was because of petitioner’s action in changing the entry date in the ledger in the course of her reconciliation which she was advised not to do. MSPB affirmed

CSC reversed and reduced Dadubo’s penalty to merely 6 mo suspension. However, upon MR of the DBP, the CSC reversed its own decision and affirmed the earlier findings of the DBP as to Dadubo’s guilt. However, such resolution did not state clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it was based. ISSUEW/N the petitioner was deprived of due process when she was not sufficiently informed of the charges against her.

HELDNO. While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as possible their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. The standard of due process that must be met in admin tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.

The petitioner had several opportunities to be heard and to present evidence that she was not guilty of embezzlement but only of failure to comply with the tellering procedure.

Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was the prerogative of the admin body, subject to reversal only upon a clear showing of arbitrariness. It is true that petitioner was charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank and not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement.

The constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law upon which the decision is based applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the CSC.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW

1. CORONA v CA

FACTSPresident Aquino issued AO No. 25 creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability, which, mandated the Department Secretary to be directly responsible to the President in eradicating graft and corruption in his Department and the agencies attached to it. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is an agency attached to the DOTC. Pursuant to said AO, DOTC Secretary Reyes issued an Office Order creating the Administrative Action Board (AAB), which was to act, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate measures in administrative cases in the department.

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An administrative charge against District Manager of the Manila Port Bungubung was filed in the AAB for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Another was filed by Secretary Reyes with the AAB against Dinopol, then Manager of the Davao Port. Both Bungubung and Dinopol question the jurisdiction of the AAB over the administrative cases filed against them. They claim that it was the General Manager of the PPA who has proper jurisdiction.

ISSUEW/N the AAB and/or the DOTC Secretary have jurisdiction over the administrative cases filed against Bungubung and Dinopol whose ranks are below that of the Assistant General Manager.

HELDYES, however, the AAB’s and/or DOTC Secretary’s jurisdiction are only appellate jurisdiction. The CA is correct in ruling that the PPA Charter (PD No. 857) which provides that the General Manager shall appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Managaer, a special law, prevails over the Civil Service Law which vests upon Department heads jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters on disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction, a general law. The former is also a more recent enactment than the latter, and must therefore take precedence. Also, the power of review by the Office of the President has been repealed by PD 1409. As a consequence, the DOTC Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, can no longer exercise jurisdiction over PPA personnel, due to the creation of the Merit Systems Board in the CSC.

The DOTC Secretary’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by the PPA Charter and Civil Service Law which give him only appellate jurisdiction. Verily, it is the PPA General Manager who has the power to investigate its personnel below the indicated rank. Thereafter and in case of an adverse decision, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Secretary, else, he may appeal directly to the CSC. Therefore in this case, the submission of the complaints to the AAB was premature. It was discretionary on the part of the employees to elevate the case to Secretary Reyes; only then could AAB take jurisdiction.

The DOTC Secretary has no power to initiate proceedings against subordinate officials of the PPA; otherwise, the result is an absurd spectacle where he acts as complainant-initiator of a case which later he will review. What the law aims is that the aggrieved party should not be one and the same official upon whose lap the complaint may eventually fall on appeal. No man can be litigant and judge at one.

2. DEL CASTILLO v CSC

FACTSPetitioner, an employee of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was assigned as a watcher in the Optometry Licensure Examination. Two other watchers wrote the CSC saying that they’ve seen petitioner answering the test papers submitted by an examinee.

He was correspondingly charged by the PRC Commissioner for grave misconduct. The Commission found him guilty, and dismissed him from the service. On appeal to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), the PRC resolution was set aside and he was exonerated of the charge. The PRC appealed to the CSC, which granted. MR was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner, in particular, alleges that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in entertaining PRC’s appeal from MSPB’s decision. He reasons that the decision of the MSPB exonerating him became immediately final and executory. According to him, this was violative of Sec 17(a) of PD 807 which provides that the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over the MSPB’s decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges.

ISSUEW/N petitioner’s contention is correct.

HELDYES. Section 37 (a) of PD 807, or the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides that the Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than 30 days, or fine in an amount exceeding 30 days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. None of these instances are attendant in this case. As a matter of fact, petitioner was exonerated by the MSPB of the charge against him.

Moreover, interpreting the above provision, it was held in Mendez v. CSC, that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of the law.

Said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.

The conclusion is that in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is not one of those covered by or is less than those enumerated above, the decision of the disciplining authority (MSPB) shall be final and appealable.

RES JUDICATA AND REOPENING OF CASES

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1. VDA FISH BROKER v NLRC

FACTSPetitioner VDA Fish Broker (VDA), a duly licensed fish broker, is engaged in the business of selling fish. It engaged the services of private respondents, among others, as batilyos to arrange the fish in the baňera, including emptying or filling the same or pulling or dragging them in or out of the designated area. In 1984, a complaint for non-payment of service incentive pay, emergency cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, legal holiday and premium pay for rest day and holiday was filed against petitioner by the Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Batilyo-NFL. The latter was represented by its President Bula; the complaint was also signed by Salac; both are private respondents here. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit, saying there’s no employer-employee relationship between VDA and the batilyos. Another complaint, in 1984, was filed by Salac and Bula against VDA for illegal dismissal and for recovery of damages Labor Arbiter again dismissed on the same basis. He explained that they were independent contractors, and as such, are not employees. In fact, they offer their services to other fish brokers. On appeal to the NLRC, this was reversed. An order for reinstatement was issued. Petitioner now assails this in certiorari claiming that the previous case ruling – that no employee relationship existed – constituted a bar to the present suit. The OSG likewise adhered to this res judicata theory.

ISSUEW/N the Labor Arbiter’s ruling constituted res judicata on the present suit.

HELDYES. The SC has several times applied the concept of res judicata to administrative decisions. It is well-established that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. As to the NLRC’s claim that such cannot apply here because the causes of action and issues in the two cases are different, this, too is untenable. The issue of employer-employee relationship is crucial in the determination of the rights of the parties in both cases. Moreover, there are, in fact two different concepts embraced by the principle: (1) bar by former judgement – where there’s identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action, and (2) conclusiveness of judgment – while there’s no identity of cause of action, judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to the matters actually and directly controverted and determined in the first. It is undisputed that the factual issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship had been determined with finality in the earlier case. Private respondents have allowed this so by not appealing from it. Hence, this should be deemed conclusive on the subsequent case. To ignore this principle would result in a situation where the same administrative agency would have diametrically opposed conclusions based on apparently similar circumstances. Else said, this would mean that respondents would have dual or conditional status: that of employees for the purpose of reinstatement, but of independent contractors for purposes of entitlement to service incentive leave pay, etc.

2. SY HONG v COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

FACTSAppellants seek to set aside the warrants of deportation issued against them by the Commissioner of Immigration. The lower court, applying Ong Se Lun v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, held that they should first abandon the Philippines before seeking permanent admission thereto because they have previously accepted the status of temporary visitors in entering the same.

ISSUEW/N appellants’ acceptance of the status of temporary visitors constituted a bar to their application for permanent admission here.

HELDYES. It’s undisputed that prior to February 1940, they were admittedly permanent residents of the Philippines. However, it’s also true that they were unable to return here within the period of validity of their special return certificates, and gained admiision on May 1948 only as temporary visitors. They have, thus, lost their right to reentry as permanent residents. Due also to the circumstances that they’ve been admitted as temporary visitors or non-immigrants, and the period for their temporary sojourn has expired, they are the proper subjects of deportation. Corrections made in the status of aliens from temporary to permanent residents, by the subsequent Commissioner, are illegal and against public policy.

CHAPTER 6

1. MASANGKAY v COMELEC

FACTSPetitioner was charged with contempt before the COMELEC for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of COMELEC’s resolutions which mandated that said act should be done in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized

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representatives of various parties. He was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan, tasked to take charge of the receipt and custody of official ballots, etc. as well as of their distribution to the municipalities. The Commission found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to 3 months imprisonment and a P500 fine. He assails the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the COMELEC the power to punish acts of contempt against said body, on the ground that it infringes on the principle of separation of powers. In other words, he contends that even if he can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of COMELEC to impose such disciplinary penalty.

ISSUEW/N COMELEC has the power to punish for contempt in the exercise of ministerial functions.

HELDNO. While the COMELEC has the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections, is not a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution. It is merely an administrative body which can exercise quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of its ministerial functions, the Commission cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. The exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative/ministerial function is invalid.

Here, the resolutions of COMELEC merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia.

CHAPTER 7

JUDICIAL REVIEW OR RELIEF AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

1. FIRST LEPANTO v CA (231 SCRA 30)

FACTSBOI granted petitioner’s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles”. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petitioner for review with the CA. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Petitioner says that the CA has no jurisdiction as it is vested exclusively with the SC within 30 days from receipt of the decision pursuant to the Omnibus Investments Code and therefore, Mariwasa has lost its right to appeal. Mariwasa counters that whatever inconsistencies that the Omnibus Investment Code and the Judiciary Reorganization Act have been resolved by SC Circular 1-91.

ISSUESW/N Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.

HELD1

YES. B.P. 129’s objective is providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench and the bar. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote. Although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which is prohibited under the Constitution. These simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

2. FIRST LEPANTO v CA (237 SCRA 519)

FACTS

1 The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular

does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein.

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This is a MR of the previous case. Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, § 2 of the Constitution.

ISSUESSame issue as in the first FIRST LEPANTO case.

HELDYES (as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus Investment Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3by granting in § 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. 4The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, § 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BPBlg. 129, § 9.

3. LIBORO v CA

FACTSPetitioner is a practicing lawyer who was assessed with P14,009.84 deficiency tax in 1980. His protest was denied by the CIR, which he filed a NOTICE of appeal (instead of a petition for review) with the CA then two days later filed for a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review which was denied2.

In G.R. No. 105368: Petitioner CIR rejected the argument of private respondents3 that they were not liable for donors tax of P263,032.66 each for their contributions to the campaign chest of Sen. Edgardo J. Angara when the latter ran for the Senate in the 1987 elections, on the ground that a political or electoral contribution is not a gift within the contemplation of the National Internal Revenue Code. The CTA affirmed the decision to which the CIR filed a motion for extension to file a petition for review for 15 days. It was granted but its subsequent motions for extension were denied as the first motion granted was non-extendible.

ISSUESW/N a party can file a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on decisions from the CTA and other quasi-judicial agencies under Circular 1-91.

HELDYES.From the rules mentioned in a previous ruling4, it is clear that the prohibition against granting an extension of time applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The reason is that only the filing of the notice of appeal is required to perfect an appeal and nothing more. However, it is different in a petition for review where the pleading is required to be verified. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal, requires careful preparation and operose research in order to put up a persuasive and formidable position.

Circular 1-91 now provides that an appeal from the CTA or other quasi-judicial agencies to the CA is only by petition for review and not mere notice of appeal a corresponding motion for extension of time to file a petition for review should likewise be granted. There is indeed no reason why a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review pursuant to Circular No. 1-91 may not be filed. Generally then, a non-extendible period of 15 days may be granted unless there are compelling reasons which may warrant the allowance of a longer period. Thus, ubi eadem ratio, ibi eadem legis dispositio.

2 The court said that there is nothign in the SC circular permitting an extension of time to file a petition for review3 Manuel G. Abello, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz4 Lacsamana v. CA states that The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days . If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the

movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review.

xxx xxx xxx6) Period of Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. — Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases . . . .

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Considering however that the procedure enunciated herein may work injustice to petitioners or those similarly situated if given retroactive application, as procedural statutes are accorded, in view of the absence in Circular No. 1-91 of an express provision regulating motions for extension of time to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and other quasi-judicial agencies, this Court resolves to give prospective application to the rule herein adopted.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

WHERE REVIEW IS NOT GRANTED BY STATUTE1. MACAILING v ANDRADA

FACTSPetitioners claim possession while petitioners claimed a sales application over a bigger parcel of land including the 4 parcels of land occupied by the former. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiff’s favor but the Dir. of Lands reversed. The appeal to the Sec. Of Agri. & natural resources reversed the DoL’s decision. An MR was denied saying that it has become final and executory by the SANR and was appealed to the Office of the Pres. The Office of the Pres. Reversed the decision granting it again to the defendants. The petitioners instituted an ordinary civil action to have the decision of the SANR declared final & executory.

ISSUESW/N the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the decision of the SANR.

HELDIn the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available. Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.

Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board, Officer or person whose acts are in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced."

The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof provides: 12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.—The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt by the interested parties.

Section 13 following reads:13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.—After a decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final, no motion or petition for reconsideration of such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.

And Section 14 is to this effect: "Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable timebut in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding was taken."

Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956 — within 30 days from their receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They merely contend that their appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's decision "had long become final and executory." By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion."5

5 In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615). 10 We do not doubt that even the Office of the President subscribes to the above rule. As aptly remarked by Justice Malcolm in Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 527:

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2. DABUET v ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS

FACTSA meeting was held between petitioners (laborers) and the respondent company where Mr. Eric Mentha, the company's general manager, allegedly berated the petitioners for writing said letter and called the letter and the person who prepared it as "stupid." The counsel for the labor union filed a case (via affidavit) for grave slander against Mr. Mentha. The company filed a complaint for perjury against petitioners alleging that their affidavit contained false statements.

The respondent company suspended the petitioners based on breach of trust and filed with the NLRC a petition for clearance to terminate their employment. The arbitrator found that the petitioners' dismissal was without justifiable cause, but that there was no unfair labor practice committed and directed that petitioners be paid separation pay. NLRC affirmed but ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners with two (2) months salary as back wages. Both parties appealed to the Secretary of Labor who set aside the decision of the NLRC and entered another one ordering the payment of severance pay only. The petitioners appealed to the Office of the President and found the company guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of the petitioners with back wages but reversed its decision after an MR. It ruled that, while the petitioners' dismissal was not for just and valid cause, no unfair labor practice had been committed. Consequently, it directed that petitioners be paid only separation pay in an amount double those awarded by the compulsory arbitrator and Secretary of Labor.

ISSUESW/N the SC has jurisdiction to hear the case

HELDYES. Although Art. 223 of the Labor Code. expressly provides that decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the Office of the president, does not provide for review of the decisions Of the Office of the President by the Supreme Court. The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, may review decisions of the Office of the President on questions of law and jurisdiction, when properly raised. This does not mean judicial supremacy over the Office of the President but the performance by this Court of a duty specifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution, 12 as part of a system of checks and balances.

3. LUPANGCO v CA

FACTSOn or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

Examinees preparing for the board exam filed before the RTC of Manila an injunction to prevent PRC from enforcing said Resolution.

ISSUEW/N the RTC may pass upon the validity of a regulation or rule promulgated by PRC?

HELDYES. PRC and RTC are not co-equal bodies. PRC is not like the SEC, whose orders (SEC) may be questioned directly to the Supreme Court. there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court.

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. ...

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What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).

4. BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION v ALFONSO

FACTSPHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC. (College), a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine. In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. Thereafter 4 other surveys were conducted by different groups, albeit the same findings. DECS therefore ordered the closure of the College.Unable to obtain relief from the administrative agencies, the College filed before the RTC an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the decision. The RTC granted the Petition.ISSUEW/N the RTC may prevent the closure order by DECS.

HELDNO. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do so. The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court. Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc.

5. ALMINE v CA

FACTSOn December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tabaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her Riceland. The Minister of Agrarian Relation denied petitioner’s application.Aggrieved, Almine appealed to the CA.

ISSUEW/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case?

HELDYES. A perusal of the law reveals that questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent

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jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.

FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF REVIEW

1. AGUINALDO v SEC

EXCEPTIONS TO DOCTRINE OF FINALITY

1. PT&T v COA

FACTSPetitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT & T, for short) was granted on June 20, 1964, under Republic Act No. 4161. Under the said franchise, the petitioner is required to pay a franchise tax of one and one-half per cent (1-1/2 %) on all gross receipts from business transacted thereunder.

Under the provisions of a subsequent law, Republic Act No. 5048, in the event of "any competing individual, partnership or corporation, receiving a similar permit or franchise with terms and/or provisions more favorable than those granted under Republic Act No. 4161, or tending to place PT & T at any disadvantage, then such term or terms and/or provisions shall ipso facto become part of the terms and/or provisions of Republic Act No. 4161, and shall operate equally in favor of petitioner PT & T as in the case of said competing individual, partnership or corporation. "

On June 17, 1976, Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. (DOMSAT for short) was granted by Presidential Decree No. 947 a franchise to operate "as a carrier's carrier”. DOMSAT paid a franchise tax of ½% on all gross receipts.

COA upon examination of its books found that petitioner had a franchise tax deficiency. PT&T on the other hand argued that since DOMSAT was paying only ½% then it too must pay only at the same rate. In a letter dated August 26, 1980, the Commission found petitioner's contention without merit and reiterated its previous stand that petitioner's franchise tax should be computed at the rate of 1-1/2 %.

Petitioner then appealed directly to the SC to review the letters set by COA.

ISSUEW/N the SC has jurisdiction to review the letters by COA to PT&T.

HELDNO. The letters issued by COA are not final rewards, order or decisions that can be the subject of an appeal. COA merely expressed an opinion. Section 1 Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. How appeal taken. — An appeal from a final award, order or decision of the Public Service Commission, the Court of Tax Appeals, and the General Auditing Office, shall be perfected by filing with said bodies a notice of appeal and with the Supreme Court twelve (12) copies of a petition for review of the award, order or ruling complained of, within a period of thirty (30) days from notice of such award, order or decision.

Then too, respondent Commission cannot render a "final order, decision or award" on the question of whether petitioner should pay 1-1/2% or 1/2% of franchise tax. This is not a matter falling under its jurisdiction. Rather, it is a matter for resolution by the Bureau of Internal Revenue whose decision may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.

DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT/PRIMARY JURISDICTION

1. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v CA

FACTSPetitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of five coal blocks (collectively called Giporlos Area).

With the objective of rationalizing the country’s over-all coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp (MMIC). The Giporlos and Bagacay area should be awarded to MMIC.

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Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned to MMIC all its rights in the two coal blocks.

Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the MoA with damages against MMIC before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the MoA was finalized.

RTC ordered the rescission of the MoA. CA held that BED has the power to decide controversies in the exploration of coal blocks. Hence, this petition

ISSUEW/N the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the MoA concerning a coal operating contract.HELDNO, because of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.It applies where claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

Said doctrine applies to the case at bar, since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts involves technical determination by the BED. The RTC does not have the competence to decide matters concerning exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. It behoves the courts to stand aside even when apparently, they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

2. RCPI v NTC

FACTSPrivate respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities. The respondent NTC provisionally approved the case and set it for hearing. Later, NTC issued a notice of hearing; however, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (PT&T) and other companies were not included in the list of affected parties.

This prompted PT&T along with other petitioners to move for time to file an opposition or reply to said application, alleging that neither PLDT nor the NTC informed them of the existence of this provisional authority.

ISSUEW/N NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing a provisional authority in favour of PLDT, without prior notice to petitioners.

HELDNO, besides the facts that: (1) “the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally...” (Sec 16 of the Public Service Act); and (2) the impossibility for the respondent Commission to give personal notice to all parties affected.

A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of administrative officials who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the NTC.

3. VIDAD v RTC

FACTSA group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held a strike to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget. A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional Director Teofilo Gomez warning that failure to resume classes would result to administrative charges. The order was not heeded, thus administrative complaints were filed.

Another group of school teachers, who were administratively charged, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete a complaint for injunction, prohibition, and damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction against afornamed DECS officials, which was granted by the court.

DECS moved for a motion to dismiss while the school teachers moved to strike out the appearance of the Sol. Gen. Both motions were denied. Both parties filed with the SC petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. Four other cases, raising like issues, were consolidated.

ISSUE

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W/N the RTC should have dismissed outright the said cases.

HELDYES. The court cases and the administrative matters are closely interrelated. While no prejudicial question arises where on is a civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, it behoves the court to suspend its action on the case before it pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with administrative body of special competence. In this case, there is no cogent reason to deviate from the rule.

4. SAAVEDRA v DOJ

FACTSOwners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI) and respondent Gregorio Ramos, sold their shares of stock to petitioner Saavedra. A Memorandum of Agreement, which contained an automatic rescission clause, was executed to evidence the transaction. Petitioner withheld payment for the reason that sellers failed to comply with their warranties, however the balance was deposited in escrow to be released once the warranties were complied with.

Petitioners filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for damages against private respondent alleging that he (petitioner was the President and principal stockholder of the company. Respondent questioned petitioner’s capacity to sue in behalf of PPI claiming that petitioner ceased to be its president when the sale of PPI stocks was automatically rescinded.

After executing a document entitled “Rescission of MoA”, Ramos filed a case with the SEC praying that the rescission be declared valid and legal. During the pendency of the case in SEC, private respondent filed a criminal case for perjury against petitioner alleging that petitioner perjured himself when he declared in the verification of the complaint that he was the President of PPI.

In his answer, petitioner contended that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission were still pending unresolved in the SEC, there was no basis to charge that he asserted a falsehood in claiming to be President. Despite this, Provincial fiscal found a prima facie case for perjury against him. Petitioner sought a review with the DOJ, which also upheld the finding of probable cause for perjury.

ISSUEW/N DOJ should have deferred the proceedings since the issue was still pending with the SEC.

HELDYES. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal having been placed within its special competence. In such cases the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to resolution of that question by that administrative tribunal, much less can the Provincial Prosecutor arrogate to himself the jurisdiction vested solely with the SEC. That the issues of ownership and auto rescission are intracorporate, the Provincial Prosecutor clearly has no authority to rule on the same.

5. FREEMAN v SEC

FACTSFreeman, Inc. (FREEMAN) was granted a loan by Equitable Banking Corp. (EQUITABLE). When FREEMAN failed to pay, EQUITABLE instituted a collection suit which included Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman Inc., who signed as co-maker. Saw Mui, Ruben Saw, and the other respondents (pls refer to the original for complete list of names), filed an answer in intervention which was denied all the way up until the SC. The collection case was terminated when the parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the court; however, FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian, failed to comply with the judgment.

A writ of execution was issued. 2 parcels of land belonging to FREEMAN were sold at public auction where the highest bidder was one of the petitioners, Freeman Management and Development Corp (FREEMAN MANAGEMENT). Before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties, private respondents (Mui, Saw, and the other Chinese people), filed a petition a petition with the SEC seeking dissolution of FREEMAN, and reconveyance of the properties.

On motion of private respondents, the SEC Hearing Officer issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent consolidation of ownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties.

ISSUE

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W/N SEC, being a coordinate body with the RTC, could not interfere in the proceedings held therein and neither could it review the issues passed upon by the said court.

HELDNO, SEC could not interfere.The doctrine of non-interference dictates that the judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. The SEC is the co-equal of the RTC. As such, one would have no power to control the other.

In this case, judgement was already rendered by the trial court approving the compromise agreement. A writ of execution was issued against the defendants to enforce the judgement and 2 properties of FREEMAN were sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT as the highest bidder. After a judgement has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all. Hence, the properties sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are now considered excluded from the assets of FREEMAN and can no longer be the subject of the SEC proceedings. SEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a writ of injunction enjoining FREEMAN MANAGEMENT from consolidating its ownership.

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

1. FERNANDO v STO TOMAS

FACTSPetitioners were Mediator Arbiters in NCR. In a Memorandum Order, issued by Labor Secretary Confessor, 7 Med-Arbiters were reassigned to different departments, like the Bureau of Labor Relations, and Appeals and Reviews Unit. 3 of them complied immediately. However, the rest asked for a reconsideration stating that there reassignment was made without their consent and was tantamount to removal without just cause. Respondent Secretary clarified that it was merely an assignment, and not a transfer, as they erroneously alleged. Petitioners still refused to comply, so the Labor Secretary asked them to explain why they shouldn’t be administratively sanctioned for gross insubordination.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the Merit Systems and Protection Board of the CSC. Petitioners averred that their reassignment was unconstitutional, and that as quasi-judicial officers, they cannot be transferred or reassigned except for grounds provided by law; and the law provides that pending their appeal to the CSC, their transfer or reassignment should be held in abeyance. The CSC found their reassignment valid and legal, thus dismissing their appeal for lack of merit. Labor Secretary then issued another order preventively suspending the petitioners for 1 year for gross insubordination.

ISSUEW/N the CSC (and not the MSPB) has jurisdiction to review on appeal the Memorandum Order of the Labor Secretary?W/N the Petitioners have a right to file a Petition for Certiorari to their dismissal by the Labor Secretary?

HELDNO. A Resolution was issued on July 1, 1993, directing the abolition of the MSPB to streamline the operations of the CSC. decisions in administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil service appealable to the Commission, including personnel actions, shall be appealed directly to the Commission and not to the MSPB, and those cases which have been appealed or brought directly to the MSPB shall be elevated to the Commission for final resolution. Petitioners’ appeal was only perfected last July12, 1993 when the resolution was already in effect, hence their appeal was considered filed before the CSC.

The SC did not deem it appropriate to rule on the merits of the order issued on July 26, 1993 by respondent Secretary preventively suspending petitioners for ninety (90) days, as well as her subsequent order dated October 25, 1993 finding petitioners guilty of insubordination and imposing on them the penalty of suspension of one (1) year. Evidently, petitioners, in asking the SC to resolve the issues thereon in their present recourse, have overlooked or deliberately ignored the fact that the same are clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

On the first aspect, petitioners allowed the 90-day period of preventive suspension to lapse without appealing from the Order of July 26, 1993. In fact, the investigation which necessitated such suspension has long since been concluded and thereafter resulted in the condemnatory Order of October 25, 1993. Hence, they are now clearly estopped from invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court in a belated attempt to seek redress from the first Order.

Secondly, as stated earlier, the Order dated October 25, 1993 imposing a punitive suspension of one year on herein petitioners cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Presidential Decree No. 807 and Executive Order No. 292 explicitly provide that administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days are appealable to the Civil Service Commission.Not having fully exhausted the remedy available to them, petitioners cannot resort to their present judicial action which is both premature at this juncture and proscribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Further, there was no finding of any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which could be applicable to the instant case, nor have

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petitioners essayed any submission on that score.

2. BAGUIORO v BASA

FACTSPetitioner Pacita Baguioro was the Elementary Head Teacher and Respondent Romeo Espinosa was the Elementary School Principal in a school in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. They were both considered for promotion to the position of General Education Supervisor I in the said Division when the same became vacant.

The Division Promotion Board decided in favor of the petitioner and recommended appointment to said vacancy. Hence, the Regional Director decreed petitioner’s appointment to the contested position. Respondent moved for its reconsideration. The Regional Director reversed himself and declared respondent better qualified; consequently, the latter was appointed to the contested position.

Petitioner appealed to then Minster of MECS. Because of the delay in the disposition of her appeal, petitioner filed a petition for Quo Warranto with Mandamus and Damages against the MECS Director with the RTC. This was dismissed on the ground of prescription. The Minister of MECS affirmed the decision favoring petitioner. The MECS Regional Director then appointed her to said position.

In the meantime, respondent filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The SC dismissed it for lack of merit. After the finality of the SC decision, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for quo warranto. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the issue is already barred by res judicata. The RTC denied the motion. Petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUEW/N the the Petition for Certiorari should be dismissed due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

HELDYES. First, the SC found that such action was already barred by res judicata. Second, the respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies provided by law to set aside the promotion extended to petitioner. In this regard, the complaint fails to state a cause of action. A dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action. What respondent should have done was to appeal the decision of the MECS Minister to the MSPB, then if the decision was still not in his favor, he should appeal to the CSC.

3. ROSARIO v CA

FACTSPursuant to the “Land for the Landless Program” the City of Manila undertook to subdivide and award lands of the former Teresita Estate in Sampaloc, Manila. Lot 3 was further subdivided into 3-A, 3-B and 3-C. Private Respondent Cruz was the original lessee or 3-A and 3-C, which he constructed residential houses on. He then sublet the house on 3-A to petitioner. Availing the city’s “Land for the Landless Program”, both parties filed with the City Tenants’ Security Commission for the award of the lands they live in. 3-A was then awarded to petitioner, and 3-C was awarded to Cruz. Cruz, however, assailed the award to petitioner, stating that petitioner merely has a secondary preference, as he was only a lessee of Cruz. Petitioner counters that based on social justice and his uninterrupted possession of the land for 32 years, he has a preferential right to purchase said land. After Investigation by the City Tenants’ Security Commission, they revoked the award to petitioner and gave it to Cruz instead.

4 years after, petitioner filed an action for “Quieting of Title” with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint stating that petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies, as he was required to appeal the decision of the City Tenants’ Security Commission to the Office of the President before seeking judicial review. Having filed the appeal late, the decision became final and executory. 15 days after petitioner received the decision of the RTC, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petitioner for Review with the SC. However, apparently changing his mind, he filed a Motiion for Reconsideration instead, which the Respondent Judge denied for having been filed late. Petitioner appealed with the CA, and was likewise denied.

ISSUEW/N the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies shall deny the petitioner the right to question the award of the land to Cruz?

HELDNO. The lower courts dismissed the complaint of the petitioner for not being able to first exhaust all administrative remedies. However, the only effect of non-exhaustion of remedies is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which can be a ground for a motion to dismiss. Although, if a motion to dismiss on this ground is not invoked in time, it shall be deemed waived; and based on equity the court shall take cognizance of the case.

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It appears that Cruz failed to file a motion to dismiss on this ground. Thus, where the equities warrant in an extraordinary situation, the court shall entertain petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari.

With regard to the award of the land, the Program was intended to give preferential right to – first, the bona fide tenants, second, the occupants, third, to private individuals. As proven by petitioner, he has been living on said land for an uninterrupted period in good faith of at least 32 years. Thus, to dismiss petitioner’s appeal is to deny him justice and equity. Therefore, the SC awarded 3-A to Rosario (petitioner).

4. ROSALES v CA

FACTSThe Don Bosco Technical Institute posted the list of honor students for the graduation of its elementary department. Rommel Rosales, a student of Grade 6, candidate for graduation and likewise candidate for Valedictorian, reported to his parents that he was not listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the name of Conrado Valerio. The parents of Rommel demanded a re-computation of the grades of their son and filed a formal complaint with the Director of Bureau of Private Schools against the school claiming anomalous ranking of pupils for the grade school with a request for a review of the computations made by the school. The rector of the school dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had lost its validity since the same was filed on the eve of the commencement exercises of the school, in violation of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools. Subsequently, the Director of Private Schools rendered a decision holding that Rommel Rosales was the rightful valedictorian.

Rosales then filed a complaint for damages in view of the failure of the school to graduate him as valedictorian of his class. Respondent school prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that their MR was granted and the Director of Private Schools had reconsidered and set aside his decision declaring Rommel Rosales as valedictorian. Petitioner averred that said MR was mysteriously filed, there being no original copies of the same in the Office of the Director of Private Schools which would show the date of filing thereof. It appears that there was indeed an MR filed by respondents and that the Director had indeed set aside his former decision. It also appears that petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Education which appeal was still pending at the time of the filing of their complaint in court. The TC granted the Motion To Dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA affirmed.

ISSUEW/N the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case.

HELDYES. The civil action for damages was premature as it was shown that an appeal to the Secretary of Education was still pending. The finality of the administrative case which gives life to petitioners’ cause of action has not yet been reached. This was still pending as evidenced in the certificate issued by the agency trying the same. The court a quo was thus correct in acting upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondents on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.When an adequate remedy may be had at the Executive Department of the government but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government . If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the court. A MR or appeal is curative in character on the issue of alleged denial of due process.

APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT1. FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS v INCIONG

FACTSThe herein petitioner Federation of Free workers is a labor organization registered with the DOLE. It is the certified collective bargaining agent of the Allied Sugar Centrals Co. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an across the board increase of P60 in their existing monthly emergency allowance. The decree also authorized the Secretary of Labor to issue the appropriate rules necessary for its implementation. Sec. 6 of the implementing rules promulgated by the Secretary provided for an application for exemption from the payment of the above increase, provided that the application be made within 30 days from the effectivity of such rules. This entitles private corporations to be exempt if they are in financial difficulty. Subsequently, after the effectivity of the rules on May 1, 1977, the private respondent, Allied Sugar, was about to pay the increase, but attempt to do so was short-lived. It decided against the payment and the plan was therefore aborted. However, it applied for the exemption only on September 22, 1977, or 100 days after the effectivity of the rules. Its reason was that it had suffered substantial losses during FY 1974-75 and 1975-76. The application was approved effective for one year. The approval stated that it was final and unappealable. The petitioner filed with the Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the approval of the exemption, some

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of the grounds of which was that the respondent was not in unsound financial condition, and that the application was made beyond the prescribed period.

Subsequently, respondent filed another application for exemption for the next year. This was granted, the approval also reciting that the same is final and unappealable. The petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari. The respondents argue that the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies available before it. It stated that the rulings of the respondent Acting Secretary of Labor can still be elevated to the President for review.

ISSUEW/N the case should have been appealed first to the OP

HELDNO. First, this view is traversed by the fact that, as stated by the respondent Acting Secretary in approving both applications, such approval is final and unappealable. Second, in the absence of constitutional provision or statute to the contrary, the official acts of department Secretary are deemed the acts of the President himself, then it would be absurd for the president to review his own act. Under the presidential type of government, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the executive department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Exectuive are performed by and through the executive departments and the acts of the secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. EXCEPT:

1. In cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person;2. The exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally; or3. The Chief Executive disapproves or reprobates the act of the alter ego.

The court affirmed the approval of respondent’s exemption even though the application was made beyond the prescribed period. It gave such period a liberal construction and stated that, an employer who is distressed immediately before the lapse of the 30 day period is no different from one who becomes distressed immediately after the said period, as in the case of private respondent.

2. TESORERO v MATHAY

FACTSPetitioners, who were consumers of Davao Light and Company(DALIGHT), opposed the inclusion of some of properties of DALIGHT for reappraisals by Board of Energy(BOE). Such opposition stems from the effect that a higher appraisal corresponds to higher rates which the consumers have to pay.

As culled from the records, DALIGHT filed with BOE the application for the approval of sound value appraisal of its properties in December 1979 in the amount of P339M. The appraisal report was made by TAMSPHIL but upon inspection of BOE of the physical existence of the properties, the appraisal was disqualified because of the discrepancies found.

In June 1982, Dalight again filed another application for appraisal of its properties in the amount of 302M which was conducted by Asian Appraisal Co.. The appraisal was opposed by the petitioners but eventually was approved by BOE but only in the amount of P 282M as the fair and reasonable value of properties. 17 days after receipt of order of approval of appraisal report, an MR was made by the petitioners but was denied by BOE. Apparently, the order of denial of MR was not received by petitioners and the latter prayed for hearing to be conducted and a resolution be rendered on the MR. Subsequently, BOE issued an order informing them that the motion had long been denied and furnished the petitioners with copies.

Hence the petition for certiorari.

ISSUES1. W/N certiorari is the proper remedy.2. W/N administrative remedies should have been exhausted first before resort to judicial bodies.

HELDCertiorari is not the proper remedy since PD 1206 creating the BOE provides for an appeal to the Office of the President (OP) within seven (7) days from receipt of notice of its decision or orders. Thereafter, under Judiciary Reorganization Act, final decisions, orders are reviewable by the IAC.

It must be noted that after the receipt of the questioned decision (approval), 17 days have lapsed before an MR was made thus, the decision had already become final and executory. Be that as it may, The Court in the broader interest of justice to give due course to the petition for certiorari although the proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant such recourse and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval. In this case 70,000 consumers will be affected and it is appropriate to consider the petition on merits rather on technicalities.

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With regard to the second issue, in this case no. The exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exception among which is that where the question is purely legal. In the case at bar, the bone of contention is not the factual determination of the appraisal of properties but the legal determination of the properties covered by the reappraisal. Among the objected covered properties are those not related to the production of power such as the administration of bldg and an airplane, properties not owned by DALIGht, nad motor vehicles falling under the Employees Car Plan.

Hence, the court adjusted the BOE’s decision and reduced the appraisal of covered properties to 122M.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION

1. AQUINO-SARMIENTO v MORATO

FACTSPetitioner requested the records officer of MTRCB to be allowed to examine the board’s records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. The voting slips are the basis for banning or cutting the films accordingly. The records officer advised petitioner to secure a prior clearance from Morato(MTRCB chairman) to gain access to the records.

Morato, denied the request arguing that the voting slips were private and personal in nature. This stance was opposed by petitioner arguing that the records are public in character. A board meeting was held to address such issue andboard resolution 10-89 was issued declaring the voting slips to be private and personal. Subsequently, Morato ordered some deletions on the movie “Mahirap ang Magmahal” despite the initial classification of the Review Committee that it is R-18 with no cuts. Morato cited MTRCB resolution 88-1-25 which allegedly gave the MTRCB Chairman the power to downgrade a controversial film already reviewed by the committee. The matter was brought to the attention of the Executive Secretary and the Office of the President. Sec. of Justice opined that Morato was not vested with that powers but did not opine on the constitutionality of resolution 10-89. Hence, this petition. Respondent moved to dismiss the case for failing to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE1. W/N the case should be dismissed for failing to exhaust all possible administrative remedies.2. W/N the two resolutions are valid (sub issue to admin topic)

HELD NO.The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed to resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law.The rationale is to give the proper authorities the ample opportunity to act and correct its errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial intervention is not necessary. Nonetheless, it is not absolute for it admits of exceptions such as 1) when no administrative review is provided by law, 2) when the only question involved is one of law, 3 where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppels, 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitraty and oppressive, 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant, 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impracticaland unreasonable; and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies.

In this case, the issue raised is one of law hence the doctrine of exhaustion is inapplicable. The records show that petitioner adhered to the administrative processes by referring the issue first to the Executive Secretary and to the Office of the President.

Resolution 10-89 is invalid because it is against the constitutional right to information. W/n the purpose of the examination of the public records are unlawful is not the biz of the recording officer but of the legislature to devise of ways to prevent it.

In the second resolution, a reading of PD 1986 does not vest to Morato as chairman the authority to reverse or overrule a decision rendered by the Review Committee.

2. MADRIGAL v LECAROZ

FACTSPublic respondents, Gov. Lecaroz et. Al., abolished Petitioner Madrigal’s position as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the provincial Engr. Due to lack funds of the province and the position was not essential.

Petitioner appealed to the CSC where it was held that the removal of petitioner from service was illegal. Petitioner then sent a letter to the Provincial Board for the implementation of the CSC resolution but the Board refused to execute arguing that the position was already abolished and instead ordered the appropriation of back salaries.

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Petitioner then filed a petition in the CFI praying for the relief of mandamus and damages against public respondents for the restoration of his abolished position, reinstatement and payment of back salaries plus damages. CFI dismissed the case on the ground of laches because 4 years and 20 days elapsed before the action for mandamus on the ground of illegal dismissal was made.(Note: the case was filed only after 4 years and 20 days because, petitioner availed of remedies in the CSC first)

ISSUEW/N the action lodged before the CFI is barred by laches.(to state it differently, W/N an action for mandamus just like quo warranto is considered abandoned if not filed within a year when the cause of action accrues despite the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.)

HELD YES. The fatal drawback of petitioner’s cause is that he came to the court out of time. A cause of action arising from illegal dismissal should be instituted before the courts within one year from its accrual. Although the law speaks only of quo warranto, it is also applicable to an action for mandamus with the intent of effecting a reinstatement because by reason of public policy, there should be a limit to the period to interpose such action since title of public office should not be subjected to continued uncertainty. This one year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy.

The argument that administrative remedies should be exhausted first before any action before the judicial bodies is misplaced in this case. It is fundamental that if the issue involves only pure questions of law, the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply since it cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative body. In the present case, only pure question of law is involved – w/n the abolition of petitioner’s position was in accordance with law. Thus, petitioner should have done away with the administrative remedies.

3. PIANAGA v CORTES

FACTSPetitioner, purchased a parcel of land from Bonifacio in Antique. Subsequently, private respondent caused a technical survey of his land covered by an OCT which allegedly includes the northern portion of petitioner’s land. The land was surveyed but over the vehement opposition of the petitioner. The latter lodged a protest with the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the annulment of private respondent’s OCT. by virtue of the protest, an investigation was commenced by the Bureau of Lands.

In the meantime, petitioner filed before the CFI an Injunction for Preliminary Injunction with damages against private respondent for attempting to oust him in the area of controversy by means of force and intimidation. He also prayed that said injunctive writ be made permanent. In so doing, he stated in his complaint that there was case filed by him before the Bureau of Lands for the particular area of controversy.

The CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground of prematurity because to act upon the complaint would be tantamount to nullifying the OCT of private respondent and since there was a pending investigation in the Bureau of Lands hence there was no cause of action for lack for exhaustion of all possible remedies.

ISSUEW/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.

HELDNO. The matters involved in the case filed before the Bureau of Lands(BOL) and CFI are different. The former refers to the ownership of the land while the latter only pertains to the possession of said land. Thus, the decision the trial court may render will not encroach on the primary jurisdiction of the BOL. Hence the doctrine of exhaustion is inapplicable.

4. U.P. v RASUL

FACTSDr. Felipe Estrella, public respondent, was appointed as the Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) in August of 1989 and should serve as such until 1992. However, in 1987 UP President Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents recommending the reorganization of key positions in UP Manila. This was approved by the Board.

Among the key position which would be affected was that of Dr. Estrella wherein his position was abolished and in its stead UP PGH Medical Director was to be effected. The new director would come be nominated by the Nominating Committee.

Dr. Estrella, filed a case immediately before the court without appealing to the Board of Regents to prevent his removal arguing that this go against his security of tenure.

ISSUE

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1. W/N Dr. Estrella can be validly removed. (sub-issue)2. W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of all administrative remedies was observed.

HELD1. NO, the new position was substantially the same with a minor modification. The function was also substantially the same. Thus, the removal was done in bad faith. Furthermore, the UP charter only allows merger of colleges and units and not abolition. This is a legislative matter which should be resolved in Congress.

2. The doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute and admits of exceptions. In this case, the irreparable damage or injury on the part of Dr. Estrella which would be caused by the implementation of the reorganization is an exception to the rule. He must have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would be fruitless. Hence the doctrine of exhaustion is not applicable.

5. QUISUMBING v GUMBAN

FACTSEsther Yap has been appointed as district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools and was assigned in the district of Glan, South Cotabato. Few years later, agitation of teachers and citizens in the place led Lourdes Quisumbing to issue an order on Feb. 11, 1987 transfering Yap from Glan to Malapatan, while Crisanto Delamin would take her place in Glan. Yap ignored the orders, and filed a petition for preliminary injunction against Quisumbing et al. Petitioner filed an omnibus motion to dismiss, which was denied. Judge Gumban granted the writ of preliminary injunction, and denied the motion of reconsideration.

ISSUES1. W/N Yap may be transferred2. Whether there was failure to exhaust all administrative remedies

HELDYES she may be transferred. The period for the election has already lapsed, so the issue on the transfer in violation of the election ban has become moot and academic. Her spot was also a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a specific station, and may be moved to any station. Although it was an interlocutory order of a denial for a motion to dismiss, it can be resolved by the Court to avoid multiplicity of suits. Her status is considered as a district supervisor at large, without a permanent station, and her transfer was not whimsical, arbitrary or capricious. (in gist, she is the district supervisor in South Cotabato and may be transferred anywhere in South Cotabato, not having a permanent school/city/municipality)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fact rule and may vary upon the facts of the case. It does not apply where the question in dispute is a legal one, and the lower court may take cognizance of the case.

6. ESTUERTE v CA

FACTSOn September 19878, Ma. Beverly Tan, a junior Physician Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial Hospital, without justifiable reason shouted and humiliated Patria Esuerte, Head Nurse, Medicare Department of the said hospital. Esuerte complained to the chief of the hospital, Dr. Teodoro Motus, who asked Tan to explain what happened. Instead of explaining her side, also complained against petitioner. An action for damages was filed against Esuerte in Cebu. Petitioner filed for a motion to dismiss grounded on improper venue and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which the court denied. CA dismissed the certiorari filed by Esuerte.

ISSUE1. W/N there was improper venue2. W/N there was failure to exhaust all administrative remedies

HELD1. YES, there was improper venue. Although Tan is a legal resident of Cebu, and her parents also live there, she was employed in the hospital found in Bacolod City when the incident happened. She is a temporary resident in Bacolod, while petitioners were also living in Bacolod. The incident happened in Bacolod City as well. Even though temporary, her employment does not show when it will end. Justice is better served if the case is filed in Bacolod City.

2. NO, the case filed by Tan is a civil case, an action for damages, hence there are no administrative remedies available to her. Although an administrative case was filed against her by petitioners, the cause of action in an administrative case is different from civil case for damages. It is the government that is aggrieved in an administrative case, even if filed by private person. On the other hand, only trial courts may determine if a private person may be awarded for damages. The civil action may proceed independent of the administrative action.

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7. BRETT v IAC

FACTSJune Prill Brett was given the preferential right to explore, exploit, develop and lease the area covered by her MAMAKAR mining claims in Benguet. This decision was appealed by the Guilles to then Ministry of Natural Resources. Minister Pena dismissed the appeal. When a motion for reconsideration was filed, the case was already final and executory. Notwithstanding its finality, the Minister reversed itself and made the original decision void ab initio. Brett filed an appeal to the Secretary, however was unresolved, and filed for a preliminary injunction in the SC for lack of jurisdiction by the Minister. It was remended to the CA, which denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While pending litigation in the SC, Brett wrote a letter to the new Minister, Ernesto Maceda praying for the reinstatement of the original decision made by his predecessor. Maceda granted petitioner's prayer. Upon notification to the Guilles of said decision, they filed before the SC to declare such decision null and void, being without jurisdiction. They also filed the same with the CA. They likewise made an appeal to the Office of the President. The CA dismissed the case, since there was already an appeal in the Office of the President.

ISSUEW/N there was failure to exhaust all administrative remedies by BrettWhether the CA erred in dismissing the case pending appeal in the Office of the President made by the Guilles

HELDNO. Although an action for certiorari cannot be made substitute for an appeal, Minister Pena's lack of jurisdiction to reverse the original decision was a grave abuse of discretion on his part which is an exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Pena could not have reversed his former decision, and a special civil action was deemed proper.

There is then a difference between a decision to be questioned upon lack of jurisdiction, and a decision pending appeal to the Office of the President. Brett did not appeal to the Office of the President and used the power of the Courts to render Pena's decision null and void, reversing an already final and executory order. On the other hand, the courts cannot take cognizance of a case within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. The dismissal by the CA was proper.

8. DATILES v SUCALDITO

FACTSDatiles and Company has in its favor a fishpond lease agreement with 195.9959 hectares which lasts for 25 years. Petitioner then filed for an injunction case (civil case 1389) against Jesus Deypalubos and Daniel Cabdieza since the latter refused to vacate part of leased area. Deypalubos made a formal protest to the Bureau of Fisheries over 49 hectares which he was occupying. The court resolved civil case 1389 in favor Datiles which restored his possession and occupation of said area (which became final and executory). The barrio council of Batu, Slay Zamboanga del Sur submitted a resolution to the Bureau of Fisheries which requested that Mr Deypalubos be the occupant of 49 hectares he had since he was the one cleared and made improvements thereon, and for the leased agreement in favor of Datiles be reduced to 50 hectares in accordance to a certain presidential decree.

A memorandum was issued for Regional Director Guieb to make a formal investigation not touched upon in civil case 1389. Petitioners filed a petition for preliminary injunction against Guieb (special civil case 1426) since the investigation contains the same issues raised in civil case 1389. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, grounded on failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, which Judge Sucaldito granted.

ISSUE1. W/N there was failure to exhaust all administrative remedies2. W/N Guieb may proceed with the investigation

HELD1. NO. For prohibition to lie against an officer, administrative remedies must first be exhausted, since there is an assumption that the administrative body may amend the decision given on the matter. There must have been an order or act, more or less final, that is ripe for review and properly subject of an appeal to a higher administrative body for the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to operate.

In this case, there is no administrative order or act that can be appealed from. The Regional Director has not rendered any decision to be appealed from an investigation, which is the matter being prevented in this case. The administrative remedies that is available cannot be resorted to, which recourse made by petitioner to the court by way of a petition for prohibition is correct.

2. NO. The matters raised in the investigation to be made by Regional Director Guieb has already been resolved in civil case 1389 and has become final and executory. There remain no issues that is to be resolved in both protest made by Deypalubos

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and resolution made by the barrio council. The request to lessen the hectares leased that was based on a presidential decree cannot be entertained without stating the provisions of the decree. Guieb, having no issued to be resolved, has exceeded his authority and trying to make an investigation.

9. AQUINO v LUNTOK

FACTSPetitioner conducted an audit of Ludovico Peralta's accounts as Municipal Treasurer of Libmanan and found a cash shortage of P274,011.17. Petitioners seized private respondent's cash, books, and accounts and the latter was suspended. Private respondent requested for a reinvestigation and filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for restraining order and damages. Judge Luntok issued the TRO. On the last day of the TRO, Judge Luntok extended the efficacy of the TRO upon motion by Peralta. Respondent judge then ordered petitioner to return what they had seized, which Aquino filed a motion for reconsideration. On the last day of the extended TRO, private respondent filed for another motion for extension. The judge ordered petitioners to refrain from taking any actions against Peralta. Petitioners filed an original action for certiorari with the CA for preliminary injunction assailing the multiple TROs made by the judge. While the case in CA was pending, the judge approved the injunction requested by Peralta and issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction upon acceptance of the bond. The CA then dismissed the case, being moot and academic.

ISSUE1. W/N there was failure to exhaust all administrative remedies2. Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was void being issued beyond the first TRO

HELD1. NO. In this case, there is an urgency in the invocation of judicial intervention, being one of the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. There can be no better judge to determine the existence of such urgency but the trial court itself.

2. NO. Although a TRO really can't be extended, and must terminate upon expiration of the period, an injunction subsequently granted cures the defect by the extension of its enforceability. Although granted beyond the 20 day period of the original TRO, the injunction was issued upon following all the requirements needed (right to be heard and posting of a bond). Since there is no sufficient ground to dissolve the writ, it must be sustained, without prejudice to punishments that may be given to the judge.

10. SABELLO v DECS

FACTSSabello was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School, which was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students cannot pay their monthly tuition fees. The President of the Philippines, who was earnestly campaigning at that time, gave P2,000 aid for each barrio, P840 of which was allotted to cover up the salaries of high school teachers (as per proper resolution by the barrio council). Said barrio council authorized Sabello to withdraw the amount and deposit the same in the City Treasurer’s Office in the name of Talisay Barrio High School. However, this was a grave error on his part as it involved the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities.

Sabello and the barrio captain were charged for violation of RA 3019, where both were convicted to suffer a sentence of 1 year and disqualification to hold public office. With his appeal to the CA, the decision was modified by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of ½ of the amount involved. Being financially battered, Sabello could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the SC.

Sabello was granted an absolute pardon by the President, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With this, he applied for reinstatement to service, but he was reinstated to the wrong position of a classroom teacher and not as Elementary School Principal.

ISSUE1. W/N the Court should take this case into consideration despite the fact that this was filed by a non-lawyer, Sabello

(related to the topic of poverty)2. W/N Sabello should be reinstated to his former position

HELD1. YES. The Court deemed it proper to set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and

resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.

2. YES. As a general rule, the question of whether or not he should be reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly

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deprived of what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to him. It is no longer a matter of discretion, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.

The Court has previously held that absolute disqualification from office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. However, such would not entitle him to automatic reinstatement and should apply for reappointment to said office.

In this case, Sabello, after his absolute pardon, was reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by DECS. As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I.

11. ROCAMORA v RTC

FACTSIn order to impress Pope John Paul II, Rocamora, as Regional Director of MPH (Ministry of Public Highways), sought the widening of the road where the Pope would pass. This entailed however the expropriation of private respondent’s properties.

In 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against Rocamora et al with the RTC for specific performance (payment of the compensation due them, plus damages and attorney’s fees). They alleged that their properties had been taken by the government without payment to them, despite their repeated demands, of the agreed compensation—estimated cost of the improvements and the value of the land at the rate of P350 per sqm.

Rocamora answered that he had recommended such payment but the vouchers he had approved were not passed in audit by the other defendants. Representatives of COA averred that they could not approve the claims because they covered the value of the entire buildings and were not limited to the extent of the damage sustained by the owners. Moreover, they also argued that their decision had not yet been appealed to COA conformably to law and as required by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent-owners and ordered the payment to them of their respective claims for compensation as prayed for in their complaint plus attorney’s fees and damages.

ISSUEW/N the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case despite the respondent’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies

HELDNO. Generally, decisions of the administrative authorities must first be appealed to their superiors in the executive department before resort to judicial review may be permitted; otherwise, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The administrative superiors, if given a chance, can and will correct the mistakes of their subordinates, thus rendering judicial intervention unnecessary. In addition, administrative authorities are presumed to be experts in their respective fields of specialization and their decisions should, as a rule, not be disturbed by the courts of justice. These decisions are usually reviewable only in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are not accepted except only where is plain, speedy and adequate remedy available. By withholding action until the administrative remedies have been exhausted, the judiciary will be observing the doctrine of separation of powers and according deference to the acts of the coordinate department of the government.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible rule. Exhaustion is NOT necessary when inter alia there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine, where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievable prejudice the complainant, where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive, and where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts of justice. At least two of these are applicable in the case at bar.

In the first place, it appears that admin officers have sat on this case for as long as 9 months, with the matter apparently hibernating in the doldrums of the bureaucratic indecision and inaction. The complainants remained unpaid despite their repeated demands.

In the second place, the other issue raised was a question of law, to wit, the applicable criterion in the determination of the compensation to be paid the plaintiffs for the loss they had sustained. More specifically, the legal question presented was whether or not P.D. 76 should dictate the amount of the compensation to be paid the owners as against the price they negotiated with the Ministry of Public Highways. However, in view of the exceptions above, the complaint was not prematurely filed and could be validly admitted by the trial court despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

12. PALMA v DELA PAZ

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FACTSIn 1985, Nenita Palma-Fernandez was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (East Avenue Medical Center) by the Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus Azurin. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center entitled the position of the Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. Hospital Order No. 30 was issued designating Palma-Fernandez as Asst. Director of Professional Services.

In 1987, EO 119 (Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health) was promulgated. Hospital Order No. 22 was issued relieving Palma-Fernandez as Chief of Clinics and transferring her to the Research Office. Dr. Aguila was designated to her former position.

Palma-Fernandez, thereafter, filed a letter-protest with the Secretary of Health. Failure to secure any action on her protest, she filed an instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against Dr. de la Paz (Medical Center Chief), Dr. Aguila and the Secretary of Health.

ISSUEW/N the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the filing of this petition

HELDNO. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does NOT preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief. This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute is "purely a legal one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal." The questions involved here are purely legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of tenure and were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts.

There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-protest With the respondent Secretary of Health, with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission, but the same remained unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy. Besides, an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year period.

13. ADRISOLA v CA

FACTSFeliciano Salamanque was the owner of a Riceland in CamSur, with an area of 50 topones. In 1957 (according to Adrisola), but in 1975 (according to Salamanque), Salamanque mortgaged the land to Amando Pinoy.

In 1977, Adrisola filed a complaint with CAR for the recovery of the landholding with damages against Salamanque and Sabio, alleging that in 1973, Pinoy instituted him as tenant on the landholding under a 50-50 sharing arrangement (in 1976, they eventually entered into a lease contract).

Salamanque defended by saying that prior to 1975, the landholding was neither tenanted nor cultivated by an agricultural lessee and that he mortgaged said landholding to Pinoy subject to certain stipulations. In 1976, he eventually redeemed the Landholding and instituted Sabio as tenant. Thereafter, Adrisola filed a complaint for reinstatement against Salamanque and Sabio before the Department of Agrarian Reform Field Team, which declared Sabio as the recognized and rightful person to cultivate and occupy the land peacefully. Adrisola filed another case directly with the DAR District Office, which declared him as the rightful tenant of the Landholding. Salamanque and Sabio filed an MR which was still pending at that time Adrisola filed a suit for reinstatement before the CAR.

In 1979, CAR declared Adrisola as the bona fide tenant (later as agricultural lessee) and Salamanque as the lanholder-agricultural-lessor. On appeal with the CA, it reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint on the ground that Adrisola had no cause of action by reason of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the deed of mortgage between Salamanque and Pinoy contained a prohibition against the institution of a tenant.

ISSUEW/N Adrisola should have exhausted administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief

HELDNO. Where the question involved is essentially judicial, as the interpretation of a contractual stipulation, resort to courts can be had without exhausting all administrative remedies.

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The Court agreed with the Appellate Court that the stipulation in the deed of mortgage that the mortgagee Pinoy "is the one to transplant" on the Landholding is tantamount to a prohibition against the institution of a tenant. Although transplanting is merely one of the phases of farming and cultivation, it is evident that what was really meant was that the mortgagee himself was to cultivate the Landholding personally. That such was the intendment is shown by the fact that since 1957 when the verbal mortgage was constituted, it was the mortgagee, Pinoy, who had been cultivating the Landholding personally although through hired laborers, one of whom was petitioner. The requirement of personal cultivation was documented in 1975.

Petitioner’s alleged institution as tenant by Pinoy in 1973, and as agricultural lessee in 1976, was in violation of the mortgage contract, aside from the fact that the institution as agricultural lessee was apparently made in bad faith inasmuch as prior to the execution of the agricultural lease contract on August 18, 1976, and its registration on August 24, 1976, Salamanque had already notified Pinoy of his (Salamanque’s) intention to redeem the Landholding. The institution of tenancy having been prohibited, Pinoy, as the mortgagee, could not be considered as an "agricultural lessor" or a "legal possessor" within the meaning of Section 10 3 and 166(3) 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms (RA No. 3844) such that by reason of the redemption, Salamanque, would be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. It will have to be held, therefore, that the institution of respondent Sabio as the tenant by the landowner, Salamanque, was valid as within the latter's right.

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