A Common Wealth: Building Gulf-CIS ties

Sponsored by

A Common Wealth: Building Gulf-CIS tiesA report by The Economist Intelligence Unit

Pantone 303 (C=100, M=11, Y=0, K=74) - RGB (R=0, G=63, B=95)

CMYK (C=17, M=38, Y=81, K=5) - RGB (R=202, G=153, B=74)

1 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2016

A Common Wealth: Building Gulf-CIS ties

Contents

About this research 2

Executive Summary 3

Chapter 1: The CIS: A fragmented landscape 5

Chapter 2: The CIS and the Gulf 9

Chapter 3: Gulf-CIS commerce: Sector analysis 15

Chapter 4: Navigating the business environment 21

Conclusion 22



About this research

“A Common Wealth: Building Gulf-CIS ties” is an Economist Intelligence Unit report, commissioned by Dubai Chamber. It examines trade and investment between the Gulf countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and maps the existing and potential role of Gulf-based investors in the CIS region. The findings are based on desk research and interviews with experts, conducted by The Economist Intelligence Unit.

The Economist Intelligence Unit would like to thank the following experts who participated in the interview programme (listed alphabetically):

l Prasad Abraham, CEO, Al Hilal Bank Kazakhstan

l Yury Barmin, Middle East consultant, Russian International Affairs Council

l Jean Claude Farah, president, Middle East, Africa, APAC, Eastern Europe & CIS, Western Union

l Ghaith Al Ghaith, CEO, flydubai

l Theodore Karasik, senior adviser, Gulf State Analytics

l Abdul Jaleel Al Khalifa, CEO, Dragon Oil

l Gerald Lawless, CEO, Jumeirah Group

l Robin Mills, CEO, Qamar Energy

l Jahed Rahman, director of hospitality & leisure, Aldar Properties

l Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, chairman, DP World

The Economist Intelligence Unit bears sole responsibility for the content of this report. The findings and views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor. Iain Douglas authored the report and Melanie Noronha was the editor. Additional research was provided by David Dalton.



Executive summary

As regional groupings reliant on hydrocarbon exports, with large Muslim populations, the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) share several similarities. While flows of trade and investment between the two regions have been hampered by complexities in geography and geopolitics, there are more extensive links than is generally realised. The downturn in oil prices since mid-2014 presents challenges for both regions, but there is room for increased co-operation.

This report reviews the economic and business climate of the CIS, examines its links with the GCC and maps the engagement between the two regions in key sectors.

Key findingsBilateral relations between GCC and CIS states are well developed. In recent years there has been an uptick in high-level diplomatic visits in both directions, as well as legislative alignment in the form of treaties on investment protection and double-taxation agreements. This builds on a long history of commercial connections, particularly with the region’s Muslims, and provides the bedrock for increased investment activity in the future.

Key bilateral pairings for trade and investment include the UAE and Russia, Abu Dhabi and Kazakhstan, Dubai and Turkmenistan, and Qatar and Tajikistan. This is led by close relationships between heads of state and high-profile investments, such as the Abu Dhabi Plaza in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana, the oil field development in Turkmenistan by Dubai’s Dragon Oil, and Qatar’s Diar Dushanbe project in the Tajik capital. Trade between the regions is dominated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Russia and Ukraine.*

Gulf transport and logistics companies, particularly low-cost airlines, are playing a vital role as regional connectors. Gulf transport firms are linking CIS countries that were previously closed off to the Gulf states. Combined with onward flights from key cities in the Gulf, these airlines are connecting the CIS with other parts of the world, such as Asia and Africa.

The development of a north-south trade corridor should facilitate more physical trade. Trade opportunities have so far been limited by geographical challenges, as many CIS countries are landlocked and overland transport infrastructure extending to the Gulf is weak. In addition, both regions have largely focused

* Ukraine is currently in the process of withdrawing from the CIS.



on hydrocarbons resources. Opportunities for greater trade exist in agriculture—primarily wheat—and aerospace and defence.

Gulf firms are engaged in the hospitality, retail and real-estate sectors in the CIS. This includes direct project investments from public- and private-sector companies as well as co-investment from the Gulf’s sovereign wealth funds. Investment in hotels shows the most promise, focusing on leading cities such as Baku in Azerbaijan and Astana in Kazakhstan for the luxury segment, and smaller CIS cities such as Almaty in Kazakhstan for the four-star segment.

Sizable opportunities may emerge in the coming years with privatisation programmes in the CIS, particularly in Kazakhstan and Russia. Cash-strapped governments, especially those negatively affected by the fall in global commodity prices which began in 2014, will look to raise funds through a sale of assets to the private sector. Recent devaluations of CIS

currencies may make these assets more attractive to investors. However, these opportunities are likely to materialise slowly.

While the economic slowdown in the region has reduced the number of CIS tourists in the Gulf, it has increased migration. Fewer job prospects in their home countries have led some CIS migrants to turn to the Gulf states, where the currency is pegged to the US dollar, in search of better economic opportunities. This is reflected in an increase in remittances from the Gulf to CIS countries.

The CIS is undergoing an expansion in Islamic finance. Recent and planned laws, including in Russia, should facilitate Islamic banking operations in the CIS. Gulf banks have been involved primarily in an advisory capacity, but new entrants will need to take a long view of their investments.



The CIS: A fragmented landscape1Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have been caught between Russia and the rest of the world. In 1993 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established with a charter—a loose association of 11 Eurasian states, all former republics of the Soviet Union. Its role is largely political, as a forum for regional dialogue. However, nine of its members signed a free-trade agreement in 2011, with the exception of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. There are closer ties between some countries through various organisations and treaties, but other bilateral relations are complicated by long-standing border disputes dating back to the Soviet era.

As a result, there have been some changes in the CIS membership over the last decade, with Turkmenistan downgrading its status to associate membership in 2005 and Georgia withdrawing in 2008, after a brief war with Russia. Ukraine is currently in the process of withdrawing from the organisation in view of Russia’s annexation of its Crimea region in 2014, after which it resigned as rotating chair of the CIS.

The closest ties are between Russia and Belarus, which formed a loose confederation—the Union State—in 2000, with a joint parliament,

notional common citizenship and a customs union. At various times other CIS states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, have expressed interest in joining the Union State. There have also been suggestions, mostly from Russia, of a deeper integration, with Belarus joining the Russian Federation itself.

More recently, in 2010 Kazakhstan formed a customs union with Russia and Belarus, which paved the way for the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015, along with two new joiners, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan is currently the most likely candidate for expansion of the EEU; but, its accession has been hampered by border disputes with Kyrgyzstan. Further expansion of the EEU is unlikely, given Ukraine’s and Moldova’s desire to join the European Union instead and other states’ concerns about Russian influence and competition. As Yury Barmin, a Middle East consultant at the Russian International Affairs Council, a Moscow-based think-tank, explains: “There are lots of disputes now because companies from Russia are flooding the other countries with their products. For countries like Tajikistan, their economies are just too weak to join the EEU now, and they don’t have much to gain from the Union.”



The macro economyThe CIS countries are diverse in size, wealth and economic structure. Broadly, they can be categorised as oil-exporting and oil-importing nations, the former comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Russia is the dominant economy by far, representing 72% of the estimated total regional GDP of US$5trn in 20151. This compares with the GCC’s US$3trn. In terms of GDP, Ukraine’s economy is comparable to that of Qatar, Azerbaijan’s to Oman and Turkmenistan’s to Bahrain.

1 Expressed in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) to avoid distortions caused by recent currency devaluations.

Gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita for GCC and CIS countries, 2015 estimates

3,584Russia

63

Turkmenistan

176

Uzbekistan

20

KyrgyzRepublic

18

Moldova420

Kazakhstan

329

Ukraine

23

Tajikistan26

Armenia

174

Azerbaijan

164

Belarus

$20,000 - $40,000

GDP/capita($ PPP)

Nominal GDP($bn PPP)

$10,000 - $20,000

Above $80,000

$40,000 - $80,000

$5,000 - $10,000

Below $5,000

1,654Saudi Arabia 615

UAE

171

Oman

268

Kuwait

64

Bahrain

333

Qatar

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Figure 1



In general, the oil and gas producers have the highest GDP per capita; the exceptions are Belarus, which lacks oil but is wealthier as a result of its industrial base and close links to the Russian economy, and Uzbekistan, which remains poor despite its hydrocarbons. All of the CIS countries are considerably poorer relative to the GCC states—the average GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in the CIS states is US$22,000, barely half the level of that of Oman, the GCC country with the lowest GDP per capita, and one-third of the GCC average. The gap was wider when oil prices were higher.

Aside from hydrocarbons production, important areas of economic activity include manufacturing and agriculture. The smaller and poorer economies in the region are highly dependent on remittances from migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan, similar to the relationship of the Middle Eastern oil-importing countries to the GCC.

This reliance on Russia has become more evident following a recent series of economic and political crises. The combination of falling oil

prices and Western economic sanctions from mid-2014–the latter in reaction to the annexation of Crimea–triggered a decline in the Russian rouble, which intensified in late 2014 and eroded its foreign-exchange reserves, forcing a sharp rise in interest rates. This currency turbulence spread to the wider CIS region via lower remittances and cheaper Russian goods outcompeting local products. “If Russia sneezes, the whole CIS is going to catch it. If the rouble is strong, you are going to find the whole CIS region is stronger,” notes Jean Claude Farah, president for the Middle East, Africa, APAC, Eastern Europe & CIS at Western Union, the US financial services and communications company. Low oil prices have pushed most of the hydrocarbon producers, with the exception of Turkmenistan, into fiscal deficits that will persist for some years.

The knock-on effect has been a series of currency devaluations, notably of Kazakhstan’s tenge and Azerbaijan’s manat–both of which have been devalued twice since the start of 2014. All CIS currencies have declined against the US dollar since the start of 2014, ranging from 16% for Armenia to 66% for Ukraine as of end-2015.

Source: Bloomberg.

Major CIS currencies against US$(Indexed, end-2014 = 100)

Figure 2

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110BelarusAzerbaijanUzbekistanUkraineKazakhstanRussia

Jan16

DecNovOctSepAugJulJunMayAprMarFebJan15

DecNovOctSepAugJulJunMayAprMarFebJan2014



The Economist Intelligence Unit expects that 2015 will have seen the peak of the regional crisis, with Russian GDP contracting by 3.8% and dragging down the economies of its closest partners, particularly Belarus. Ukraine’s economy has suffered even more as a result of the conflict. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where production

expansion in the hydrocarbon sectors will have delivered relatively strong growth in 2015, are notable exceptions. Looking ahead, the outlook for growth remains stable across most of Central Asia on the back of plans to boost investment, despite weakness in Russia.



Relations between the two regions have strengthened in the post-Soviet era, drawing on deep-rooted historical ties. An important component of the relationship has been a shared Islamic identity, not only in Central Asia and Azerbaijan but also in Russia. An increasing number of CIS Muslims also visit Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage.

Cultural similarities with Central Asian people, not least a shared love of falconry, have also contributed to close relations between the political elite in both regions, out of which a number of commercial initiatives have evolved. According to Jahed Rahman of Aldar Properties, an Abu Dhabi-based development company, “Emiratis love going to Kazakhstan primarily because of falconry, and also it’s a Muslim country with similar kinds of culture and traditions.” Looking in the other direction, Theodore Karasik, senior adviser at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, explains: “The Central Asian states have an affinity with the GCC states because both areas have a transregional identity based on tribes, clans and religion. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Central Asia and Azerbaijan wanted to emulate the GCC. This identity issue helps bond them together.”2 As some of the investments discussed later in this report indicate, there are particularly close

The CIS and the Gulf 2relations between Abu Dhabi and Kazakhstan, Dubai and Turkmenistan, and Qatar and Tajikistan, among other bilateral pairings.

Diplomatic linkages have increased between the two regions in recent years, as illustrated in Figure 3. However, Russia is the only CIS country that has embassies in all GCC countries and also hosts ambassadors from across the GCC. On the GCC side, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have the most extensive diplomatic links with CIS. Even where there are no embassies or non-resident ambassadors, there are still diplomatic initiatives, and delegations bringing together chambers of commerce.

Relations with Russia have been complicated by geopolitical tensions, most recently over the civil war in Syria. This, however, has not prevented trade, investment and visitors flowing in both directions. A resolution to the Syrian crisis and co-operation in areas of shared concern would create a more conducive environment for commerce between the GCC and Russia.

As it stands, the closest business ties are those between Russia and the UAE. Mr Barmin of the Russian International Affairs Council explains that “at about the same time as the Soviet Union collapsed, the UAE started developing into a

2 RAND, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Future Persian Gulf Security, 1992.



business hub, and so in the 1990s people began visiting the UAE, first for leisure and then [for] setting up business.” Kuwait and Bahrain also have relatively good diplomatic relations with Russia. During 2014-15 there was a noticeable uptick in visits by Gulf leaders to Russia—including the emir of Kuwait, the king of Bahrain, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia—amidst efforts to both boost economic ties and advance diplomatic efforts related to Syria.

Investment promotionEconomic relations are underpinned by periodic governmental visits, including at the highest level, often focused on developing trade and investment. Discussions have focused on petrochemicals, real-estate investment and plans for additional flight routes.

Noteworthy aspects of co-operation are investment protection and double-taxation

treaties. There is now an extensive network of such agreements, many only recently ratified, which should support future commerce. Belarus has been the most proactive CIS country in developing commercial treaty relationships with GCC countries and has a full slate of both kinds of agreements, followed by Russia and Uzbekistan. On the GCC side, Kuwait and the UAE have been the most proactive. While there are no bilateral trade agreements, Russia and six CIS countries are members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), alongside the GCC. Overall, the number of treaties in place with CIS countries is more extensive than with many other regions with which the GCC conducts greater volumes of trade and investment.

Despite having the requisite treaties in place, this has not yet translated into high levels of investment activity. The Central Bank of Russia recorded only US$37m in net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from the GCC in 2014,

Diplomatic representation Top triangle indicates presence of GCC embassy/consulate/non-resident ambassador in the CIS state,while bottom triangle indicates CIS presence in the GCC

Figure 3

Armenia

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

Ukraine

Turkmenistan

Tajikistan

Russia

Moldova

Embassy Planned Non-residentambassador

Sources: Foreign ministry websites for most countries; third-party listings.



mainly from the UAE, down from a peak of US$49m in 2013.3 FDI from Russian companies in 2014 was higher at US$165m in the UAE alone, although this was down from a one-time spike of US$902m in 2007.

These data probably do not account for Gulf investments in the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), a state-owned entity established in 2011 to channel local and foreign capital into growth companies and infrastructure projects. Gulf sovereign wealth funds have made the lion’s share of commitments to RDIF, totalling at least US$19bn.4 These include commitments from the Kuwait Investment Authority, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), Abu Dhabi’s Department of Finance and the Mubadala Development Company, and the Qatar Investment Authority. Bahrain’s Mumtalakat has not committed funds, but it has a co-operation

agreement under which its CEO sits on RDIF’s advisory board.

Despite sizable commitments, it is unclear how much has actually been invested so far. Kuwait Investment Authority appears to automatically invest alongside RDIF, with a 5% share in projects, but the other Gulf funds determine in which projects they will participate. Mr Barmin says that “[pledging to RDIF] is just a way of showing good relations and suggesting that they may do business in the future”, and in the case of partnerships with Saudi Arabia he adds that nothing will happen until there is a resolution to the Syria conflict.

Yet the intent to secure funds from the Gulf remains. In 2014 RDIF launched an Arabic version of its “Invest in Russia” website to encourage investment from the region. The site’s catalogue lists only a few private sector investors from

Bilateral investment promotion and double-taxation agreements Top triangle represents investment protection agreement; bottom triangle represents double-taxationagreement.

Figure 4

Armenia

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

Ukraine

Turkmenistan

Tajikistan

Russia

Moldova

Ratified agreement Signed agreement, not ratified

Sources: World Bank; International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); UNCTAD; Kluwer Arbitration;Treatypro.com; government websites. Where sources differ, the most recent is assumed to be correct.

3 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation

4 Russian Direct Investment Fund: Partnerships



the Gulf, including Alshaya of Kuwait, a retail franchise operator.

Elsewhere in the CIS, data on investment flows to and from the Gulf are limited, although money is clearly flowing given the major projects underway, such as the UAE’s investments in hydrocarbons in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The central bank in Belarus recorded inward FDI of US$42m from the UAE in 2014, up sharply from the previous year, but little from elsewhere in the GCC.5

Portfolio investments into the CIS on public record6 include just one small holding, of copper miner KAZ Minerals by Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. However, a much larger investment was made by Qatar Investment Authority in the majority state-owned Russian bank VTB in 2013, reportedly buying US$500m in VTB’s capital-raising round.7 GCC funds are also likely to have exposure to the Russian economy through the purchase by AGC Equity Partners, a UK-based firm representing Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds, of US$175m in Russian power company OJSC Enel, alongside RDIF.

Looking ahead, there may be fresh investment opportunities in the CIS given a wave of privatisations, for which the region is looking in part to the GCC for capital. In November 2015 Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, announced details of long-discussed privatisation plans, including the sale of 25% (or greater) stakes in companies such as KazMunaiGas, Kazatomprom, Kazakhtelecom and the national rail company, Kazakhstan TemirZholy, with up to 800 state-owned firms potentially up for sale.8 Abdul Jaleel Al Khalifa, the CEO of Dubai’s Dragon Oil, highlights privatisation in Kazakhstan as an interesting point of access to the hydrocarbons sector in the CIS.

Meanwhile, similar plans have been echoed in Uzbekistan. In late 2015, Saudi Arabia was invited to the International Investment Forum in Tashkent, which was designed to present the

privatisation programme to foreign investors.9 Plans for privatisation exist in Russia too, as Mr Barmin explains: “Given a lack of cash, Russia is keen to sell stakes in companies including Rosneft, Gazprom and its electrical power companies.”

The push to privatise, resulting from the economic hardships in the CIS, might create opportunities for GCC investors, but they will need to look carefully at how the companies are structured and how profitable they are. Many due for privatisation have sizeable debt burdens. Yet some of these opportunities may prove interesting to Gulf funds or state-owned companies which already have strong bilateral relationships with the relevant CIS country. The free-floating tenge in Kazakhstan and now the float of the manat in Azerbaijan—which was announced by Azerbaijan’s central bank in late 2015—mean that Gulf investors operating there are, for the first time, exposed to exchange-rate risks, but the sharp devaluation of CIS currencies in 2014-2015 may make assets considerably more attractive to newcomers.

Modest trade flowsTrade flows between the GCC and the CIS are modest, totalling US$8bn in 2014. Almost all of this trade is between a few country pairs, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Russia and Ukraine, as well as the UAE with Turkmenistan (which may largely relate to Dragon Oil). These five sets of bilateral flows, both imports and exports, made up 83% of total trade between the two regions.

The low level of trade is partly because both regions predominantly export hydrocarbons, and there is a degree of geographical isolation owing to weak or non-existent road and rail networks. Physical trade routes may improve as plans are implemented to develop a “north-south corridor”. In 2011, on the initiative of the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, the Ashgabat Agreement was signed between Uzbekistan,

5 National Bank of the Republic of Belarus

6 Bloomberg holdings data by source country on the Russian, Kazakh and Ukrainian stock markets

7 Reuters, “Qatar Sovereign Fund Buys Stake In Russian Bank VTB”, May 2013.

8 Financial Times, “Rule of law risks weigh on Kazakhstan’s privatisation”, November 2015.

9 Arab News, “Saudi Arabia invited to Uzbek investment forum”, October 2015.



12 Doha News, “Russia plans to export halal chicken to Qatar by year-end”, March 2015.

Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman and Qatar to develop a trade corridor, including road and rail links. Qatar appears to have pulled out, but others signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2014 to further the plan, and Kazakhstan is reportedly interested in joining.10

The opening up of the Iranian economy would facilitate transport infrastructure development as well as trade liberalisation. Other initiatives aimed at developing trans-Eurasian infrastructure, such as the Asian Highway Network of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), as well as efforts to link Russia and India,11 should also ease the transit of goods from the CIS to the GCC, creating the potential for higher trade flows in the future.

Although trade flows are small, there are some encouraging trends, including a growth rate of 20% over five years (2010-14), although this followed a sharp fall during the global financial and economic crisis in 2009. GCC trade growth with Russia was particularly strong, averaging 31% over five years and 17% over ten years. Some notable high average growth rates over the past

five years are Saudi Arabian exports to Ukraine (up by 90%), UAE exports to Russia (69%) and UAE imports from Kazakhstan (45%).

Trade includes food and manufactured goods from the CIS and petrochemicals from the GCC. Trade in food has the greatest potential for growth, particularly as trade routes improve, given that the GCC is almost entirely dependent on imports and that Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are all major wheat exporters. Saudi Arabia has long been one of the largest purchasers of Russian wheat, moving to first place in March 2015 with 28% of shipments, despite Russia’s introduction of a 15% export levy to mitigate domestic food price inflation. Russia also started exporting halal chicken to Qatar and the UAE in late 2015.12 Prasad Abraham, the CEO of Al Hilal Bank Kazakhstan, singles out agriculture as an important sector for the Gulf: “The arable land in Kazakhstan is greater than France and Belgium combined, and some Gulf countries have shown interest under the banner of food security.”

Aerospace and defence also have promise. Russian civilian helicopters are used extensively

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

Regional trade flows(2014, US$ bn)

Figure 5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Export from GCCImport to GCC

OtherUAE-UkraineUAE-TurkemistanSaudi-RussiaSaudi-UkraineUAE-Russia

10 Uzdaily, “Kazakhstan joins to Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman corridor”, February 2015.

11 Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, “International North-South Transport Corridor: Re-energising India’s Gateway to Eurasia”, August 2015



across the Gulf, and there are a number of companies in the region providing servicing and support for them, notably in Sharjah. There have been some small Russian defence exports to the UAE and Oman. Potential deals have been part of ongoing discussions in recent years, including between Saudi Arabia and Russia regarding the purchase of T-90 tanks, Iskander missile launchers, helicopter gunships and air defence systems.

Growing migration to the Gulf The number of CIS citizens residing in the GCC for study or work, particularly in Dubai, is considerable. The Russian Business Council in Dubai estimates that there are up to 100,000 Russians living in the city. Mr Karasik of Gulf State Analytics says: “There are many CIS migrant workers in department stores, restaurants and hotels catering for the Slavic speakers who visit Dubai. Usually they are from Ukraine, as young

people have been travelling for work given the situation there.”

Data from Western Union suggest that there has been an increase in CIS workers in the GCC in recent years as a result of economic hardship at home. Mr Farah explains: “When the crisis hit the CIS, people wanted to check for jobs in areas that were not hit so hard, and a natural destination was the Gulf, where the currency is pegged to the dollar.” As a result, it is no surprise that remittances from the Gulf to the CIS are growing at a double-digit rate, mainly to Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Western Union’s data further suggest that CIS migrants are better placed economically in the Gulf than in other parts of the world—the average transfer payment from the GCC is US$600, almost double the global average.

Average remittance value per transaction, 2014 (US$)

Global to CIS

Saudi Arabia to CIS

UAE to CIS

Global to Russia

Saudi Arabia to Russia

UAE to Russia

323

857

572

660

991

831

Source: Western Union.

Figure 6



Gulf-CIS commerce: Sector analysis3Connecting cities: Aviation and logistics GCC airlines are playing a pivotal role in connecting the CIS region with the wider world. There are direct flight links with the capitals of all CIS countries (with the exception of Chisinau in Moldova), as well as a number of other regional cities. Five of the Gulf flag carriers fly to Moscow and/or St Petersburg in Russia; Qatar Airways has flights to Baku in Azerbaijan, and Etihad to Astana and Almaty in Kazakhstan. Russia’s Aeroflot serves the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and some CIS airlines also fly into the Gulf, providing direct links to Dubai or Abu Dhabi.

However, the major connectors of the regions are the UAE’s low-cost airlines. Air Arabia has five routes to Armenia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia, but flydubai is dominant, serving 19 destinations across the CIS. This includes nine Russian cities not served by other links, such as Kazan, Rostov-on-Don and Yekaterinburg, as well as ten destinations in other CIS countries, including the only links to Tajikistan and Odessa, Ukraine’s fourth-largest city. As a result of this network, flydubai, combined with onward flights from Emirates, connects many CIS countries with the rest of the world, particularly Africa and South Asia.

Air links are vital for tourism— “very much the lifeblood of the hotel industry”—according to Gerald Lawless, CEO of Jumeirah Group, a Dubai-based international luxury hotel chain and part of Dubai Holding. Tourism, in turn, is the gateway to business, he explains, as it “opens up a country for leisure, [but] you might see the place also as a business opportunity.”

Aside from the scheduled routes, there are many chartered flights linking the CIS and the GCC. Moreover, there has been talk of a joint-venture (JV) between the Chechen Republic in Russia and a Bahraini businessman to start an airline linking Grozny, the Chechen capital, with the GCC.13

Gulf logistics firms are also active in ground transport, facilitating trade flows. The most significant presence is Dubai’s DP World in Kazakhstan, where, in a move away from its core marine expertise, the port operator is managing a new freight route marrying ancient Silk Road trading routes with modern demand, linking China to northern Europe. According to Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, the chairman of DP World, a 42-day journey from China to Europe by sea has been shortened to 13 days via Kazakhstan. DP World’s involvement began in 2013 and includes support for Aktau port, Kazakhstan’s main cargo and bulk terminal on the Caspian Sea, and the development of the Khorgos Special Economic

13 The Moscow Times, “Chechnya to Launch Airline With Bahrain”, November 2013.



Zone and Inland Container Depot, located on the opposite side of Kazakhstan.

An area of growing interest is the Russian Far East, which is being boosted by industrial development, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals. DP World previously had some exposure to this region through a 25% stake in the largest container terminal at Vostochnaya port. It sold this stake for US$230m during a phase of debt consolidation in the aftermath of the global financial crisis,14 but is now showing renewed interest in the region, particularly after a Russian initiative to create 15 free ports in the Far East. In September 2015, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem met with the Russian president Vladimir Putin, in Vladivostok to investigate opportunities. Mr Barmin explains: “The northern sea route in the Artic is now free of ice half the year, so it’s a good time to invest, as this is a much shorter route to Europe than through the Mediterranean.” Another port operator, Gulftainer of Sharjah, signed an agreement in 2011, in the presence of Mr Putin, to invest US$275m in Ust-Luga Port Company, which operates a terminal near St Petersburg.15

Agility, a GCC logistics firm, has operations not only in Russia and Kazakhstan but also Ukraine and Turkmenistan, offering freight forwarding and industrial logistics. Its projects have included the relocation of an entire cement plant from Germany to the Urals region of Russia and the delivery of 420 rail cars from Spain to Astana in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, CIS exporters are interested in the logistical capabilities of the GCC to serve other markets. Mr Karasik of Gulf State Analytics comments: “The UAE is increasingly acting as a hub for CIS countries to get to Africa. The Russians are opening up a foreign trade office in Abu Dhabi that will be responsible for the push into Africa, and they want to build a transit hub for this in the UAE.”

Fuelling engagement: the energy sectorThe hydrocarbons sector lies at the core of most

CIS and GCC economies and has witnessed the most engagement between the two regions. There are two significant GCC oil projects at present in the Caspian Sea, both originating from the UAE; Russian companies operate upstream in Saudi Arabia and Sharjah; and oilfield service firms are active in both regions. Finally, there is technical collaboration at the governmental level, and periodic discussions about market strategy have become prominent since the downturn in oil prices. Mr Rahman of Aldar Properties points out that with the UAE and Kazakhstan, for example, “there’s been a lot of collaboration, both at the government level and the corporate level between KazMunayGas, the state oil company, and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.”

Dubai government’s Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) acquired a majority stake in Dragon Oil in 1998, inheriting the company’s development of the Cheleken field in Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea territory. This marked the first Gulf investment in the CIS hydrocarbons sector. It is ENOC’s only upstream investment and has proved to be a shrewd one. Production at the time of acquisition was only a few thousand barrels per day (b/d) and oil prices were low, but production has since increased dramatically, surpassing 100,000 b/d in 2015. Dragon Oil’s CEO, Abdul Jaleel Al Khalifa, outlines the scale of the operation as follows: “We’ve invested nearly US$5bn since 1999 and employ about 1,800 staff in the country, 93% Turkoman, with another 3,000-4,000 contractors providing direct support.” He attributes part of the initiative’s success to localisation efforts. ENOC bought out the other shareholders in a £4bn (US$5.87bn) offer for the remaining 46% of stock in September 2015, a plan that had been in the works since 2009. Robin Mills of Qamar Energy points to the success of Dragon Oil, suggesting its structure as a private company contributed to this, “given its technical competence, backed up by political support [from ENOC] but not political interference.”

14 Reuters, “DP World sells stake in Russian firm for $230 million”, October 2012.

15 Gulftainer, “$275 million port deal for UAE’s Gulftainer”, November 2011.

16 Reuters, “Russia’s Rosneft in talks with Mubadala on east Siberian fields”, August 2015.



Meanwhile, Mubadala Petroleum of Abu Dhabi has been engaged in exploration since 2009 in Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea N-block acreage, in partnership with state-owned KazMunayGaz. There were discussions in 2015 between Mubadala and Rosneft, the Russian state oil company, when Mr Putin met with the crown prince of Abu Dhabi regarding the joint development of two fields in eastern Siberia.16 According to Mr Barmin, the Russian oil firms are cash-strapped, which is why they are looking to sell stakes.

Aside from operators, services companies have also been active. UAE-based Petrofac Emirates completed a US$3.4bn development project of Turkmenistan’s Galkinish gas field, the second-largest in the world, building a 10bn-cu metre/year gas-processing plant and employing 14,000 people at the peak of construction. Other oil services firms that have developed to serve the local market in the GCC might consider opportunities in the CIS, and according to Dragon Oil’s Abdul Jaleel Al Khalifa, there is considerable local demand for such companies.

The success of Dragon Oil is not universal, however. The experience of Kuwait Energy, a private firm which in 2014 sold off its assets and licenses in Ukraine and Russia, lends insight into the GCC’s limited involvement in the CIS. As Mr Mills explains: “The CIS is a very challenging region for oil and gas investors in general, and not many companies have done well out of it.” The CIS sector is structured differently, with many private and quasi-private producers in comparison with the national oil companies that dominate the GCC landscape, and technical differences abound. Mr Mills illustrates this with one example: “Technically, [Russia’s] wells are different from Middle Eastern wells, given the cold weather in Siberia and mature fields, which makes it hard to shut them down and start them up again.”

Conversely, there has been more interest from CIS companies to participate in the GCC

hydrocarbons sector. Russia’s Lukoil won a gas exploration and development contract for Saudi Arabia’s vast Empty Quarter in partnership with Aramco, Saudi’s national oil company.17 Meanwhile, Rosneft has been exploring for gas in Sharjah since 2010 in a joint venture with Crescent Petroleum, but is considering exiting after drilling has proved unsuccessful.18 It is also on the shortlist for participation in the new Abu Dhabi onshore consortium.19 It is up against Western and Asian majors and “might still get a share of it”, according to Mr Mills. Other Russian firms have sought to make investments in the GCC, but without success. This is most likely owing to the paucity of opportunities for new entrants in recent years, given the superior positions of Western oil majors in the region and the interests of Asian countries which, unlike CIS companies, are also important customers for Gulf oil and gas.

Beyond operators, Russia’s Stroytransgaz, an oil and gas contractor, built a technically challenging 240 km gas pipeline to transport Qatari gas from Abu Dhabi across the Hajjar Mountains to Fujairah, completed in 2011 for US$418m.20 It also built a 217 km oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia from the Sheiba field and has had a relationship with Saudi Oger, a local construction company, since 2002.21

With some Gulf countries facing a shortage of gas to meet domestic power demand, they are exploring new sources of gas from the CIS region, particularly Russia.22 However, the viability of these options is in question, given considerable sailing distances and closer options such as Qatar, one of the world’s largest exporters of gas.

Other areas of energy and industry have also recently seen co-operation between the GCC and CIS. In particular, the drive to develop nuclear power in Saudi Arabia and the UAE has given rise to technical co-operation agreements with Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom.23 Qatar and Kuwait have co-operation agreements but no current plans to develop nuclear plants. Kazakhstan may have

17 Reuters, “Russia’s Lukoil to drill for tight gas in Saudi desert”, May 2014.

18 The National, “Rosneft considers exiting JV with Crescent in Sharjah”, May 2015.

19 The National, “Remaining bidders weigh tough terms for stake in Abu Dhabi’s prime oilfields”, February 2015.

20 The National, “Stroytransgaz wins Dolphin contract”, July 2008.

21 Pravda, “Saudi Oger and Stroytransgaz ready for cooperation in Saudi Arabia”, 2002.

22 Gazprom, “Gazprom and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation sign Memorandum of Understanding”, November 2015.



a role to play as the world’s largest exporter of uranium. The UAE has been a major donor to the development of an international low-enriched uranium bank in Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom, the state-owned nuclear holding company, also produces silicon, and in 2015 became a strategic shareholder in Qatar Solar Technologies to supply raw materials for its solar-cell manufacturing facilities in Doha.24

Developing Islamic financeGCC banks have been expanding internationally in recent years as they seek to allocate surplus capital to growth markets and service growing commercial links between the GCC and regions such as the Middle East, Africa and South-east Asia. One area of particular interest in the CIS is Islamic finance, given that the region has an estimated 82m Muslims, more than twice as many as the GCC.25 Many Central Asian countries have a Muslim majority, although Russia with 17m Muslims, who represent only 12% of its population, has more Muslims than the other countries, with the exception of Uzbekistan.

However, Islamic finance has been slow to develop in the CIS, possibly because of Soviet secularism and limited support in the banking sector.26 There is also a need to educate the population about Islamic finance, given broad misconceptions. Mr Abraham of Al Hilal Bank Kazakhstan says that “among consumers there are mixed reactions, with some believing that Islamic banking is free because you don’t charge interest.”

There has been a greater focus on Islamic banking over the past few years, in part because of a desire to attract capital from the Gulf, but also due to concerns about the stability of conventional banks in the aftermath of the 2009 global financial crisis, which pushed four of Kazakhstan’s banks into default. Gulf banks, as well as some from Malaysia, have played a role in encouraging the development of Islamic finance in the CIS, alongside efforts from the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private

Sector (ICD), an affiliate the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank, in which the Gulf countries are major shareholders and which has a regional hub office in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan was the first CIS country to introduce legislation to regulate Islamic banks in 2009. This provided an opportunity for the establishment of Al Hilal Bank Kazakhstan,27 a subsidiary of Al Hilal Islamic Bank owned by the Abu Dhabi government. It is still the only Islamic bank in the country, although amendments to the legislative framework that facilitate the conversion of an existing conventional bank should result in a second—Zaman Bank—with support from the ICD. According to its CEO, Mr Abraham, “higher minimum capital requirements for banks since the 2008 crisis, together with the need to take a longer-term view of the market, may have discouraged other entrants from abroad, including in conventional banking.” He also notes that even in Dubai it took over a decade for the second Islamic bank to open. Interestingly, he explains that only about 30-40% of their customers, who are mainly corporate, pick the bank for religious reasons: “The others come to us because of our pricing or liquidity and stay with us for the service.”

Elsewhere in the region, Kyrgyzstan has Islamic banking legislation in place, and the first Islamic bank, Eko Islamik Bank, was formed by the conversion of a conventional bank in 2010, with a retail focus. An Islamic banking law is being drafted in Azerbaijan, where until recently limited Islamic banking services were available through an Islamic finance “window” at the state-owned International Bank of Azerbaijan, which had US$526m in Islamic assets at end-2014, a threefold increase from the previous year.

However, the window was closed in October 2015, seemingly in relation to plans to privatise the bank.28 ICD is also advising on the conversion of a bank in Tajikistan, which passed an Islamic banking law in 2014 but still needs central bank guidelines to enact it. In addition, the Tajik

25 Based on extrapolating from the Pew Centre’s estimates for 2010, using its growth rates.

26 Private Hochschule Göttingen, “Islamic Finance in the States of Central Asia: Strategies, Institutions, First Experiences”, 2013

27 http://www.alhilalbank.kz/en/alhilal/

28 Reuters, “Azerbaijan’s biggest bank closes Islamic banking department”, October 2015.

23 World Nuclear News, “Russia and Saudi Arabia agree to cooperate in nuclear energy”, June 2015.

24 QNA, “Kazakh President Meets Qatari Businessmen”, October 2015.



government has had discussions with Qatar, including a 2014 meeting between the president of Tajikistan and the chairman of Qatar’s Ezdan Holding, about launching a potential Islamic bank joint venture,29 although it is unclear if anything concrete is in the works. So far, there does not appear to have been much movement towards Islamic finance in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

In Russia, draft legislation was submitted to parliament in March 2015 but rejected by the Ministry of Finance in May. However, efforts are afoot to put a framework in place in 2016, motivated by current difficulties in accessing Western financing owing to sanctions.30 There has already been interest from Gulf banks, with reports that Bahrain’s Al Baraka Bank is looking for joint-venture partners in Russia.31

Gulf banks are involved in providing Islamic financing to the region. In 2013 the International Bank of Azerbaijan raised US$120m in syndicated murabaha32 financing, mainly from Gulf Islamic banks (including Barwa Bank in Qatar and Noor Islamic Bank in the UAE).33 Russia’s state-owned Vnesheconombank has also been considering a sukuk34 issuance and is being advised by Bahrain’s Al Baraka Bank.

However, GCC investors remain wary of CIS debt—many sovereigns and companies in the region are rated well below investment grade, a minimum requirement for GCC sovereign wealth funds. There may also be some trepidation given problems faced by conventional Gulf banks, as noted by Al Hilal Bank Kazakhstan’s Mr Abraham: “During the 2008 crisis two of the largest [Kazakh] banks became illiquid. Bondholders had to take some fairly significant write-downs, and many of the investors included GCC-based banks.”

Outside of direct investments, there are many lessons from the GCC for CIS countries aiming to develop their financial sectors, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The Dubai

International Financial Centre has been advising Kazakhstan on the development of a similar concept, the Astana International Financial Centre, which could become a regional hub for Islamic and conventional finance.35

Hospitality, retail and real estateGCC firms have been active in consumer-facing sectors in the CIS, drawing on expertise from Gulf markets in areas such as hospitality and retail franchises. In retail, one firm that stands out is Alshaya, a Kuwaiti firm that manages a wide portfolio of brands across Russia. It manages over 300 stores—including brands such as Starbucks, Mothercare and Next—spread across a number of cities. Recently it has begun expanding into other CIS countries, opening the first Starbucks in Azerbaijan in 2015, with plans to launch in Kazakhstan in early 2016.

However, other GCC retail firms have so far overlooked the CIS, focusing on the Middle East and Africa for expansion. Under current economic circumstances, others are unlikely to enter at this point in time as the depreciation of the Russian rouble and other currencies presents a challenge for firms selling imported brands, given reduced local consumer spending power.

In the hospitality sector, Dubai’s Jumeirah Group, which already manages a hotel in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, is developing a new hotel in St Petersburg, which will be its first in Russia. Its local rival, Rotana, is thought to be considering an expansion into Central Asia.

Jumeirah Group’s Mr Lawless explains that links between the UAE and Azerbaijan have facilitated the Baku hotel as “there are a lot of people in Azerbaijan who know Jumeirah, mostly because they come to the UAE”. Staff of CIS origin have had the opportunity to transfer to their home countries within the Jumeirah Group, such as the Baku hotel’s general manager, who had previously been working at Jumeirah’s hotel on Palm Island in Dubai.

29 Gulf Times, “Qatar planning to set up first Islamic bank in Tajikistan”, September 2014.

30 Islamic-Finance.ru, “Russia looks to lift first barrier to Islamic finance as crisis grows”, March 2015.

31 Sputnik News, “Two Islamic Banks Planning to Enter Russian Market - Bahraini Official”, March 2015.

32 A form of credit sale acceptable under sharia law, in which the intermediary retains ownership of the asset until the loan is paid in full.

33 AzerNews, “Azerbaijan enjoys opportunities to set up Islamic banking center across CIS”, February 2014.

34 A bond compliant with sharia law.

35 WAM, “DIFC Courts to advise on planned Astana International Financial Centre”, September 2015.



While luxury hotels have set their sights on cities such as Baku and Astana, the broader CIS market may offer opportunities for other hotel brands. “We would be able to look at developing our second brand venue, which is a contemporary lifestyle brand, more in the four-star bracket, rather than the luxury bracket,” says Mr Lawless. “So there is good potential for that within places like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan.”

The hospitality sector sees visitors travelling from the CIS to the GCC as well, particularly to Dubai. On average, Mr Lawless claims that Russian nationals spend 25% more than guests from other parts of the world, including those from the GCC, the traditional big spenders.36

Dubai, with its network of flight connections across Russia and the CIS, is one driver of CIS demand for real estate. This has been high in recent years in view of sizable capital flight from the CIS region. Data from the Dubai Land Department typically place Russians among the main foreign purchasers of Dubai property.37 However, demand has been negatively impacted recently by the weak rouble.38

GCC investors have been involved in developing real estate in the CIS region. Prominent examples of mixed-use developments include Aldar Properties’ Abu Dhabi Plaza in Astana, Kazakhstan, and Qatari Diar’s Diar Dushanbe project in Tajikistan’s capital. Other real estate investments supported by Gulf funds and expertise include Kazan Smart City and a new university in Grozny—both in Muslim-majority regions of Russia—as well as a mosque in Tajikistan. Limited in number, many of these projects were envisaged at the government level and have materialised on the back of strong relationships between heads of state. “It helps that the number-one guys in each country are aligned,” explains Aldar Properties’ Mr Rahman, who emphasises the role governments in the CIS have to play in the future development of the real estate sector. “What we see is in line with a vision that the government has, whether it’s diversifying away from oil and gas, whether it’s bringing in leisure and entertainment venues for the local population, there may be slightly different avenues of getting to the final point, but the final point is ‘activating’ the region.”

36 Interview with The Economist Intelligence Unit for a previous report, August 28th 2014.

37 Dubai Land Department, “AED 53 Billion Worth of Dubai Real Estate Investments made by 20,000 Investors in H1”, August 2015.

38 CNBC, “Russians retreat from this key property market”, March 2015.



Navigating the business environment4A challenging business environment in the CIS has restricted the region’s economic growth. Although formal measures of the business environment, such as the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business Index”, record a positive trajectory, the region lags behind potential in some indicators that are vital to investors, such as securing electricity, dealing with construction permits and trading across borders.

Improving scores for enforcing contracts and protecting minority investors are encouraging, but may not reflect the reality of companies’ experiences. For instance, although Russia ranks fifth globally for enforcing contracts, the Financial Times argues that this rank reflects the letter of the law rather than its application, as Russia has “a history of tangling with foreign investors”.39

The rapid transition from state-planned to market economies in the 1990s created a challenging environment for governance, as state-owned enterprises were sold off and

government contracts were awarded before adequate systems for fair competition, transparency and accountability were in place. These problems have become entrenched in some countries that are either authoritarian or have overlapping business and political elites, as in the case of Ukraine’s powerful oligarchs. This has fuelled organised crime in some countries, particularly Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

Aside from the legal and bureaucratic framework, climatic conditions in some CIS countries pose operational challenges. Some parts of the CIS suffer extreme cold spells. Mr Rahman says that, regarding Aldar’s construction project, “for four months of the year you can’t actually build anything on the ground”. However, he thinks that lessons from the GCC about operating successful business and leisure destinations in difficult climatic conditions can be applied in the CIS’s cold, just “flip the climate equation; we worked around our climate issues, worked around how we get people into our countries. Let’s apply it.”

39 Financial Times, “Russia rises in World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ rankings”, October 27th 2015.



Conclusion

The challenging economic climate in the CIS nations may spur them to act more quickly to diversify their economies and sources of financing, implement structural reforms and privatise state-owned entities. All of this creates opportunities for participation by global investors, and particularly for Gulf-based investors, given existing diplomatic, cultural and commercial ties.

Until now the relationship has largely remained one of potential, rather than realisation. Commercial linkages have been developed through low-cost air travel provided by flydubai and Air Arabia connecting previously inaccessible markets in the CIS to the Gulf. The Jumeirah Group, followed by Rotana, are growing the presence of Gulf-based hotels in the CIS. Trade, however, has been modest, reflecting the geographical challenges and the duplication of resources in the core sectors of the GCC and many CIS states, although there is room for growth, particularly in food imports from the CIS as overland transport routes improve.

The prospects for investment by the GGC states in the CIS are more substantive than the other way round. Investments have already been made in some sectors such as hydrocarbons, logistics, hospitality and real estate. Much of that has been by state-owned Gulf firms building on bilateral diplomatic links, but there is potential for more involvement by private Gulf firms as well. This could be facilitated by the network of investment promotion and double-taxation treaties as well as diplomatic engagement.

An upcoming wave of privatisations, spurred by fiscal strains, could provide attractive opportunities for entrants, more so in light of recent currency devaluations in the CIS. Dragon Oil’s CEO, Abdul Jaleel Al Khalifa, advises: “The good deals that you could find today, you might not find in the future. If someone is smart and has the funds to invest in Central Asia, then it would be better to do it now.” However, new entrants need to weigh carefully both the terms of such deals and the local business environment, particularly in relation to concerns about governance and political stability.

While every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy of this information, The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. cannot accept any responsibility or liability for reliance by any person on this report or any of the information, opinions or conclusions set out in this report.

LONDON20 Cabot SquareLondonE14 4QWUnited KingdomTel: (44.20) 7576 8000Fax: (44.20) 7576 8500E-mail: [email protected]

NEW YORK750 Third Avenue5th FloorNew York, NY 10017, USTel: (1.212) 554 0600Fax: (1.212) 586 0248E-mail: [email protected]

HONG KONG1301 Cityplaza Four12 Taikoo Wan RoadTaikoo ShingHong KongTel: (852) 2585 3888Fax: (852) 2802 7638E-mail: [email protected]

GENEVARue de l’Athénée 321206 GenevaSwitzerlandTel: (41) 22 566 2470Fax: (41) 22 346 9347E-mail: [email protected]

DUBAIOffice 1301aAurora TowerPO Box 450056Dubai Media CityDubaiUnited Arab EmiratesTel: (971) 4 433 4208Fax: (971) 4 438 0224E-mail: [email protected]

Economy & Finance

A Common Wealth: Building Gulf-CIS ties