Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00003886
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(COFN-C1270, IDA-45020 TF-57303 TF-57845)
ON A
IDA CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.0 MILLION
(US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
FOR A
MARKET ORIENTED SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE PROJECT
September 28, 2016
Agriculture Global Practice
Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Exchange Rate Effective March 31, 2016
Currency Unit = Angolan Kwanza (AOA)
AOA 160.54 = US$1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADI Agriculture Development Institute
ADP Agricultural Development Program
CDD Community Driven Development
CMC Community Multimedia Center
CSA Climate Smart Agriculture
DPA Direção Provincial da Agricultura (Provincial Directorate of
Agriculture)
EDA Estação de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Agricultural Development
Office of ADI at the Municipal Level)
EMRP Emergency Multisector Recovery Project
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFS Farmers’ Field School
FM Financial Management
FMR Financial Management Report
GoA Government of Angola
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEPE Gabinete de Estatística Planificação e Estudos (Division of
Statistics Planning and Studies)
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IPM Integrated Pest Management
LICUS Low Income Country Under Stress
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MINAGRI Ministry of Agriculture
MIS Monitoring Information System
MOSAP Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project
NDP National Development Plan
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
O&M Operations and Maintenance
PAD Project Appraisal Document
iii
PAPAGRO Programa de Adquisição de Produtos Agropecuários (Program for
Acquisition of Agriculture Products)
PDO Project Development Objective
PHRD Japan Policy and Human Resource Development Fund
PISC Project Implementation Sub-Committee
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PPISC Provincial Project Implementation Sub-Committee
PPIU Provincial Project Implementation Unit
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SADCP Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization
Project
SOE Statements of Expenditure
TOR Terms of Reference
TTL Task Team Leader
UN United Nations
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele
Practice Manager: Dina Umali-Deininger
Project Team Leader: Aniceto Bila
ICR Team Leader: Melissa Brown
iv
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project
Contents
A. Basic Information ........................................................................................................... v B. Key Dates ....................................................................................................................... v C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................... v D. Sector and Theme Codes ............................................................................................... vi
E. Bank Staff ..................................................................................................................... vii
F. Results Framework Analysis ........................................................................................ vii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ........................................................................ x
H. Restructuring (if any) .................................................................................................... xi
I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................... xii
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 12
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 24
6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 26 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 27
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 28
Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 47
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 48 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 57
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 60 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 61 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 66 MAP .................................................................................................................................. 67
v
A. Basic Information
Country: Angola Project Name:
AO-Market Oriented
Smallholder
Agriculture Project
Project ID: P093699 L/C/TF Number(s):
COFN-C1270,IDA-
45020,TF-57303,TF-
57845
ICR Date: 09/16/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF
ANGOLA
Original Total
Commitment: XDR 18.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 12.95M
Revised Amount: XDR 13.00M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Ministry of Agriculture
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
IFAD
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 11/28/2005 Effectiveness: 06/30/2010 09/20/2010
Appraisal: 05/06/2008 Restructuring(s):
02/15/2013
09/15/2014
12/15/2015
03/15/2016
Approval: 07/31/2008 Mid-term Review: 02/25/2013
Closing: 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately
vi
Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Agricultural extension and research 9 9
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 60 60
General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 8 8
Irrigation and drainage 9 9
Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry 14 14
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Rural markets 50 50
Rural policies and institutions 10 10
Rural services and infrastructure 40 40
vii
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director: Elisabeth Huybens Michael Baxter
Practice
Manager/Manager: Dina Umali-Deininger Karen Mcconnell Brooks
Project Team Leader: Aniceto Timoteo Bila Aniceto Timoteo Bila
ICR Team Leader: Melissa Brown
ICR Primary Author: Melissa Brown
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to increase agricultural production through
provision of better services and investment support to rural smallholders in selected
comunas and municipios of the Recipient's provinces of Bie, Huambo and Malange.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 :
Percentage of agricultural production increase based on crop production
index of participating smallholder farmers
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
100 (base year)
25%
10%
66%
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
This indicator attained 560%. Project restructuring in February 2013
revised targets. The crop index provides an aggregated measure of the
increase in crop production (volume). The baseline year was 2011/12 and
the crop index was measured annually.
Indicator 2 :
Number of clients who have adopted and improved agricultural
technology promoted by the project.
Value
quantitative or 0%
20,000
32,300
viii
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target exceeded by 155%. The project was set to reach a rate of at least 40
percent (20,000 farmers). The project reaching 32,300 farmers (61.5%).
Indicator 3 :
Number of clients who adopted an improved agricultural technology
promoted by project – female.
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
0
10,000
13,621
Date achieved 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
The number female farmers that adopted technology was determined
based on sample 461 farmers that adopted technology and determined that
42.7 percent were female and 57.3 percent were male.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Number of smallholder farmers that benefitted from training.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0
126,000
50,000
54,982
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Number of farmers trained was combined at project Restructuring in
February 2013. The adjusted target number was fully achieved.
Indicator 2 :
Participating smallholder farmers in the Project areas who belong to farm
organizations.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
20%
50%
100%
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Fully achieved - all project beneficiaries are members of associations.
Indicator 3 : Number of smallholder farmers in associations that benefit from grants
ix
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
and completed their activities under the Project’s agricultural investment
component.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0
7,200
8,000
12,344
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
The indicator attained 154%. This indicator was downgraded from
outcome indicator to intermediate indicator in Feb. 2013 restructuring.
Indicator 4 : Ratio of smallholder farmers’ organizations to an extension officer.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
8
associations/extension
officer
12
12
associations/exten
sion officer
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
The indicator attained 100%. The policy of the ADI is to have 3
technicians per commune. At the project commencement, in 2011/2012,
there were 61 technicians in the project target area. Currently, there are 91,
amounting to an increase of 50%.
Indicator 5 :
Increase in average yield of major crops (maize, cassava, beans and
potato) of participating smallholder farmers. - MAIZE
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0.4 t/ha
0.6 t/ha
0.66
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target exceeded by 10%. Final value measured in impact evaluation
survey.
Indicator 6 :
Increase in average yield of major crops (maize, cassava, beans and
potato) of participating smallholder farmers. – CASSAVA.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
10.0 t/ha
11.0 t/ha
18.1
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target exceeded by 65%. Final value measured in impact evaluation
survey.
Indicator 7 : Increase in average yield of major crops (maize, cassava, beans and
x
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
potato) of participating smallholder farmers. – BEANS.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0.3 t/ha
0.4 t/ha
0.45 t/ha
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target exceeded by 13%. Final value measured in impact evaluation
survey.
Indicator 8 :
Increase in average yield of major crops (maize, cassava, beans and
potato) of participating smallholder farmers. – POTATO.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
4.0 t/ha
5.0 t/ha
7.1 t/ha
Date achieved 12/31/2011 09/30/2014 03/31/2016
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target exceeded by 42%. Final value measured in impact evaluation
survey.
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 11/30/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00
2 05/29/2009 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00
3 12/10/2009 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00
4 05/21/2010 Unsatisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 0.00
5 02/08/2011 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.30
6 07/07/2011 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 0.30
7 10/02/2011 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 0.30
8 05/01/2012 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 0.52
9 01/11/2013 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.23
10 07/09/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.31
11 04/06/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.26
12 11/01/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.68
13 05/12/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.03
xi
14 11/06/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 18.72
15 03/30/2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 19.23
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
02/15/2013 N MU MS 4.66
(i) partial cancellation of the
IDA Credit in the amount of
US$10 million; (ii) adjust
results indicators and targets;
(iii) reallocated Credit
proceeds; and (iv) increase
IDA credit percentages of
disbursements made
under Category 4
09/15/2014 S S 14.44
Extension of closing date
September 30, 2014 to
December 31, 2015
12/15/2015 S S 18.93
Extension of closing date
from December 31, 2015 to
March 31, 2016
03/15/2016 S S 19.23
Amendment of IFAD credit
closing date from June 30,
2016 to March 31, 2016
xii
I. Disbursement Profile
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1. At the time of appraisal Angola was considered a Low Income Country Under
Stress (LICUS), largely because of the after-effects of the 40 year civil war following
independence from Portugal in 1975. The civil war, which only ended in 2002, resulted
in the death of 750,000 Angolans, displacement of about 4.5 million, and 450,000
refugees. The country’s physical and social infrastructure was devastated and Angola had
some of the world’s worst human development indicators, weak governance, and fragile
human and institutional capacity.
2. At the same time, Angola was (and remains) one of Africa’s most resource-
rich countries, with tremendous economic potential, endowed with mineral resources
and large stock high potential agricultural land. Prior to independence, agricultural and
food production was high and the country was a major exporter of maize and coffee.
Smallholders in the Central Highlands, the agricultural heartland of Angola, were firmly
embedded in the market economy and were the main producers for both local and export
markets. During the war agriculture fell to an almost subsistence level in most areas.
3. The Project was designed to respond to objectives of Angola’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy (PRSP), which highlighted rural development with a focus on the
improvement of food security and the re-vitalization of the rural economy. The PRSP
called for: (i) the strengthening of the production capacity of the traditional sector,
particularly food crops and fisheries; (ii) the re-launching of rural commerce; (iii) a
sustainable development of natural resources; and (iv) the reorganization of the legal
framework and public institutions. Basic underlying principles outlined in the PRSP were
a focus on smallholders; the importance of community participation; the concentration of
planning, implementation and monitoring at the municipality level; complementary
activities with donors, the private sector and NGOs; specific targeting of women,
including access to land; and HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting concern.
4. Both the World Bank’s Interim Strategy for 2007-2009 and International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Country Strategy Update of 2008/09
identified the need for interventions to restore productivity and revive economic
activity in rural areas. IFAD’s strategy focused on two pillars: reduction of rural
poverty, and creation of a conducive environment for private sector development. The
World Bank’s Interim Strategy focused on three main areas: (i) strengthening public
sector management and institutional capacity; (ii) rebuilding critical infrastructure and
support delivery of public services for poverty reduction; and (iii) promoting growth of
non-mineral sectors.
5. The rationale for Bank and IFAD involvement in the project was based on a
recognition that that improving agricultural productivity and competitiveness
would help to both reduce rural poverty and promote economic growth. The goal of
2
the Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Program (MOSAP) was to enable
smallholders to increase their productivity and competitiveness and to benefit from
improved access to market by focusing on the establishment of rural-urban commercial
market linkages. MOSAP was also seen as a way to build on work started under the
Bank’s Emergency Multisector Recovery Project (EMRP), which was designed to help
reestablish institutional capacity of Angola’s two agriculture research centers and rural
extension services in Malanje and Bie and in phase two was to invest in feeder road
rehabilitation in the MOSAP areas.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
6. The project development objective was to increase agricultural production through
provision of better services and investment support to rural smallholders in selected
comunas and municipios of the Recipient’s provinces of Bie, Huambo and Malange.
7. The original key indicators selected to measure the progress towards achieving the
PDO were: (i) increased agricultural production of participating smallholder farmers
based on crop index; (ii) improved smallholder access to market through contractual
arrangements with agribusinesses or traders; (iii) improved smallholder vulnerable
groups access to market with secured access to market through contractual arrangements
with agribusinesses or traders; and (iv) communities and/or associations that benefited
from grants and completed their sub-projects under agricultural investment support
component.
1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators
8. The PDO was not revised during implementation, however, project indicators were
revised during a February 2013 restructuring, which also included a partial cancellation
to the Credit. Three PDO level indicators and two intermediate indicators were dropped
based on the need to strengthen the focus on the PDO which was more narrowly focused
on the improvement of agriculture production. The following PDO indicators were
dropped:
(i) Percentage of participating smallholder farmers with secured market access
through contractual arrangements with agribusinesses or traders;
(ii) Percentage of participating smallholder vulnerable groups with secured access
to market through contractual arrangements with agribusinesses or traders;
(iii) Percentage of communities and/or associations that benefited from grants and
completed their subprojects under agricultural investment support component.
9. The first and second indicator were dropped as they were judged not relevant to
the PDO and the third was changed to intermediary indicator. The restructuring also
introduced a new core PDO indicator:
(i) Target clients who have adopted and improved agricultural technology
promoted by the project (disaggregated by gender).
3
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
10. Primary beneficiaries. The primary target group for MOSAP were smallholder
farmers who would benefit from technical assistance to form or strengthen smallholder
groups and associations, manage productive agricultural investment activities funded
through the second component, and improve agricultural and marketing skills. The
project originally intended to target 126,000 farmers to be direct project beneficiaries in
25 comunas within 12 municipios located in Bie, Huambo and Malanje. Each farmer was
assumed to represent a single household of five members. Project interventions were
designed to target smallholder farmers who cultivated between 1 and 2 hectares of land
under rain-fed conditions with the potential for expanding the size of their holdings to 2.5
hectares. Following restructuring the target number of direct beneficiaries was scaled
down to 50,000 farmers.
11. The three provinces included in the project area were heavily affected by the civil
war. The project area included the past headquarters of the União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) movement and portions of the population had
been displaced.
12. Indirect beneficiaries. The Project was also designed to generate benefits for
government institutions and service providers, particularly at the decentralized level.
Government institutions including the Ministry of Agriculture and its Agricultural
Development Institute (ADI), as well as local municipalities received training in
introducing or strengthening participatory processes that support project implementation,
focusing on building skills of staff in institutions involved in the project, and
improvement of office space and accommodations for extension officers. For private and
non-governmental agricultural service providers, benefits included: (a) strengthening the
capacities of private sector agencies, NGOs and CBOs to support smallholder groups and
associations to prepare development plans and investment proposals (sub-projects) for
funding under component two; and (b) strengthening the managerial and business
capacities of local micro-enterprises that support farming activities (small processors,
craftsmen and local traders).
1.5 Original Components
Component 1: Capacity Building (Total Financing: US$11.26 million; of which IDA:
US$3.42 million; IFAD: US$3.2 million; PHRD Grant: US$4.0 million and GoA:
US$0.64 million)
13. The objective of the first component was to strengthen the technical, institutional,
managerial and marketing skills of smallholders and their organizations, as well as of
services providers and other stakeholders involved in agricultural production and value
chains, to more effectively operate in a market-driven environment and to prepare for the
agricultural investment support opportunities under component 2. This was to include
investments in the following three areas: (i) building and strengthening capacities of
smallholder groups and associations through the provision of training and information;
4
(ii) capacity building support in the form of information, training, and hardware
investments (office, equipment, transport) for to IDA offices at central and local levels as
well as local government; and (iii) strengthening the capacities of private and non-
governmental agricultural service providers through the provision of training.
14. Expected results under this component were: (i) improved technical skills of
beneficiary stakeholders involved in agricultural production; (ii) improved participation
of smallholder farmers in farm organizations; (iii) improved community capacity to
prepare agricultural investments support opportunities; and (iv) improved government
capacity to support smallholder farmers in the project area. The component was also
designed to take a gender and vulnerable group sensitive approach to capacity building.
Component 2: Agricultural Investment Support (Total Financing: US$29.34 million;
of which IDA: US$23.46 million; IFAD: US$2.85 million; and Beneficiaries: US$3.03
million)
15. The objective of the second component was to improve the productivity,
competitiveness and market access of 24,000 smallholders in the project area (later
revised to 8,000 with partial cancellation and increased focus on service delivery). This
component was designed to provide demand-based support, in the form of matching
grants, to rural communities and smallholders groups, for small-scale agricultural
infrastructure, production, processing and marketing sub-projects. The design at appraisal
distinguished between three different types of sub-project investments: (i) public goods
or community assets such as small-scale irrigation, drinking water, dip-tanks, stores, spot
improvement of feeder roads; (ii) productive assets that had an element of multiplication
(seed, livestock) within communities or groups; and (iii) productive investments that
were primarily capital investments in items such as tractors, animal traction equipment
(ploughs), sprayers, pumps, grain mills, oil presses, milk chillers, and transport (ox-cart,
trailer).
16. The sub-projects were to be screened for technical, financial, social and
environmental feasibility, before approved for funding. Matching grant ratios and funding
ceilings initially required 10 percent beneficiary contribution. Rural communities/villages
were eligible to receive support, provided that the sub-project proposals result from a
community-level participatory planning exercise with a cross section of the population,
including women and youth. Smallholders groups or associations were also be eligible
for support, provided that they were either registered or informally recognized by the
local community and authorities, that they had a democratic structure and have the ability
to keep records.
17. Expenditures under this component were subject to a disbursement condition that
stipulated that subprojects would only be financed once a number of performance triggers
were met, including: (i) at least 30 qualified service providers and public agents were
certified and equipped under the project’s Capacity Building program; (ii) the baseline
survey had been completed; and (iii) the administrative capacity of Provincial Project
Implementation Units were in compliance with Bank fiduciary requirements.
5
Component 3: Project Management (Total Financing: US$8.75 million; of which IDA:
US$3.12 million; IFAD: US$2.15 million; and GoA: US$3.48 million)
18. The third component provided financing for project management and M&E
activities. The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) was responsible for project
implementation and had delegated ADI to be accountable for the management and
oversight of the project. At the specific request of MINAGRI, a Project Implementation
Unit (PIU) was established within the ADI framework and the Director General of ADI
to be the executive level public manager of the project. The PIU included a Project
Coordinator, a financial manager, a procurement specialist, communication specialist and
an (ADI-staff) accountant, as well as a monitoring and evaluation officer. At the
provincial level, MINAGRI was to establish three Provincial Project Implementation
Units (PPIUs) within ADI, to conduct the operational management of the project. Each
PPIU was to include a Provincial Project Coordinator, a financial accountant, a
procurement office, communication specialist and a monitoring and evaluation officer. A
team of three technical staff, including an agronomist, an agribusiness specialist and a
rural infrastructure specialist, was to be based at provincial level (one based in each
province), and was to be supplemented by short term consultants according to needs.
1.6 Revised Components
19. Reallocation among components and reduction in the scale of component 2. The fundamental design and the implementation arrangements for the project components
did not change during the implementation period, however adjustment was made to the
scale of the activities to accommodate the partial cancellation of the credit and
reallocation of funding toward greater investment in capacity building and project
management. Reallocation of additional resources to component 1 and 3 was significant –
143 percent and 154 percent of appraisal estimates – and were driven in part by higher
than expected costs associated with service provision and project coordination and
management in the Angolan context. The consumer price index in Angola was 161 by the
end of 2015 (2010 = 100) –a 61 percent increase over a five year period. In contrast,
appraisal cost estimates allocated only 5.6 percent for additional price and physical
contingencies over the project life.
Components Appraisal
(USD millions)
Actual
(USD millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Component 1: Capacity Building 11.26 13.70 143
Component 2: Agricultural
Investment Support
26.31 7.74 26
Component 3: Project Management 8.75 11.61 154
Total Baseline Cost 46.32 33.05 67
20. Another factor in reallocation occurred due to delays in starting the agricultural
investment support activities under component 2, which were only initiated in 2013 and
6
left limited time for implementation. The reduction in scale in component 2 resulted in a
revision to the target number of beneficiaries and productive investment sub-projects.
The original targeted of 126,000 farmers at appraisal stage was reduced to 50,000 to
reflect this change.
1.7 Other significant changes
21. Extension of closing date. The closing date was extended for a total of 18 months
beyond the original closing date.
22. Summary of restructuring. Changes to the project were captured in four Level
Two restructurings:
(i) The first restructuring took place in February 2013 with the objective to
partially cancel the IDA Credit in the amount of US$10 million in line with a
requested by the Government of Angola on December 31, 2012, to match the
project’s implementation capacity more realistically with the time available to
complete Project activities prior to the Closing Date of September 30, 2014.
(ii) The second restructuring took place in September 2014 and the main objective
to extend the project Closing Date for a period of 15 months, from September
30, 2014 to December 31, 2015.
(iii) A third restructuring was processed in December 2015 to extend the project
closing date for a period of three months, from December 31, 2015 to March
31, 2016.
(iv) In March 2016 the project was restructured to advance the Closing Date of
IFAD co-financing Loan Agreement from June 30, 2016 to March 31, 2016
and to match the IDA and PHRD Co-financing closing dates.
7
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
23. The project preparation and design were affected by the larger country
context, which led to delays in approval and impacted availability of technical staff.
While the initial identification mission took place in 2005, Board approval occurred only
in mid-2008. The project had a relatively long preparation period prior to approval due to
a number of factors. Angola’s country reclassification and shift away from concessional
borrowing terms in 2007 led to a review of all proposed lending in the country by the
Ministry of Finance. This led to delays in the final negotiation of the credit for MOSAP
on hard IDA terms. The uncertainty around terms of the Credit also led to a halt in the
processing of project preparation funds, which had been proposed to initiate key
preparatory activities and finance the initial core set of coordination and fiduciary staff of
the PIU. In addition, legislative elections, which were held in September 2008 and
represented the first elections since 1992 and the outbreak of the second phase of the civil
war, also affected availability of key Government counterparts during final stages of
preparation and declaration of effectiveness.
24. Design drew on lessons learned within the country and in other Community
Driven Development (CDD) and smallholder agricultural development projects. The
design of the project took into account lessons learned from the implementation of the
Transitional Support Strategy from 2003-2005 and the first Interim Strategy from 2005-
2006, as well as from IFAD’s experience in implementing projects in the rural sector
from 1991-2007. The core of project design centered around the need to re-capitalize
smallholder producers and re-activate market linkages to support broad-scale and
sustainable agricultural production among smallholder farmers who comprised the
majority of the population. Following the end of hostilities many returnees in the
proposed project area were engaged in farming but had little access to services, markets
or improved technologies. At the time of appraisal it was estimated the agriculture sector
had re-absorbed 4.4 million people following the end of the civil war. The project’s
design focused on technical training, producer organizational development and
community driven development modalities in order to address the need for increased
productivity and expansion of cultivated land.
25. Project design relied up on earlier background analyses which demonstrated that
continued economic growth for Angola, as the country emerged from post-conflict period,
would have to be based on supporting a diversified economy in which agriculture could
play a small but important role. Other projects supporting smallholder production
emphasized the need to support the development market linkages and coordinated value
chain interventions.
26. Implementation capacity was considered a major risk to the project and
efforts were made to reduce project complexity and address capacity constraints.
Although Government ownership for the Project was considered to be strong particularly
within MINAGRI, implementation experience from previous Bank and IFAD projects
8
indicated that implementation capacity was extremely weak and that substantial technical
support would be required through technical assistance and supervision. Implementation
capacity risk was rated substantial. At the start of preparation, extensive discussion took
place around the capacity within MINAGRI and ADI at central, provincial and municipal
level to implement project activities. Design was adjusted to simplify and reduce the
number of sub-components and institutional arrangements put in place to bring in
technical and fiduciary staff and contract service providers to provide key technical
services.
2.2.1 Implementation
27. Delays in effectiveness and implementation led to a slow start. The project was
declared effective 26 months after Board approval in September 2010. At the time, the
average time for project to become effective in Angola was 19 months. Initially delays
were caused by the length of time required to approve the financing agreement within the
Council of Ministers, delays in the provision of the legal opinion, finalization of the
project’s operations manual, and hiring of key fiduciary staff. Lack of implementation
capacity in MINAGRI, compounded by weak leadership within the PIU contributed to
slow progress, which was reflected in low ratings of implementation progress assigned by
the supervision team beginning soon after Effectiveness (implementation progress was
consistently rated Unsatisfactory or Moderately Unsatisfactory).
28. Implementation under the second component was also affected by delays in
meeting disbursements conditions. This included establishing the baseline values for key
performance indicators and finalizing the data collection needed to guide sub-project
investments. The baseline survey was as a disbursement condition for the second
component and delays occurred in launching the selection process for a specialized firm
to conduct the planned surveys and undertake the socio-economic profiling of farmers’
organizations needed to design further investments. The baseline study was completed in
January 2013, meaning disbursements under the second component took place two years
after Effectiveness. Similarly, detailed procedures for funding sub-projects under
Component 2, including criteria and procedures for the preparation, appraisal/approval,
and implementation of each of the three financing windows under the Project were also
disbursement conditions and were submitted for Bank clearances only in December 2012.
29. Availability of service providers was at times challenging but ultimately drove
implementation under the Project. The project experienced challenges in mobilizing
service providers due to initial contracting delays but also due to the supply and quality
of available providers from civil society and the private sector. The number of qualified
service providers able to work in Angola were not as numerous as anticipated. The
challenge of the overall business environment in Angola, which was characterized by an
extremely high cost of doing business and barriers to entry in terms of difficulty
obtaining work visas – made it difficult to attract qualified international service
providers.
9
30. Service providers were contracted for a range of activities including building and
strengthening capacities of smallholder groups and associations; government institutions
to support smallholder production and marketing; and private and non-governmental
agriculture services providers. Service providers brought a range of skills and perspective
that would have likely not been available within MINAGRI, particularly at the
decentralized levels.
31. Although start-up was slow, effective project management turned around an
underperforming project and implementation in the latter years was effective.
Implementation improved significantly after the Government took action by appointing a
new Project coordinator at the end of 2011. From that point onward, the project started to
make progress, and as a result disbursements increased from US$0.3 million in February
2012 to about US$4.2 million by December 2012 and near total disbursement by project
end. The change in project management was likely one of the more significant factors
leading to a satisfactory rating and near full disbursement of the remaining Credit.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
32. Although initial M&E implementation was unsatisfactory due to the
significant delays in commissioning the baseline assessment, the overall M&E
system was sound. The project’s monitoring and evaluation systems were designed to be
focused on data collection and reporting on key performance output and impact
indicators, including targeted data collection, surveys, participatory assessments and mid-
term and final evaluations. Relevant data was gender-disaggregated. Two evaluations of
project output and impact indicators were planned at mid-term and at completion. The
project was to finance M&E costs, including the mid-term review and project completion
review.
33. Although finalization of the baseline assessment was later than expected the
project focused on improving the M&E system and several activities were undertaken to
ensure effective implementation in terms of M&E design and implementation
arrangements. These included: (i) convening workshops with various stakeholders to
build consensus and also included building capacity and common understanding of the
M&E issues; and (ii) training of M&E provincial officers in Monitoring and Evaluation
Systems: Design. On training workshops were held in each province for Estação de
Desenvolvimento Agrário (EDAs- Agricultural Development Offices of ADI at the
Municipal Level) field staff to: a) expose participants to the principles of participatory
monitoring and evaluation; b) jointly design and develop participatory tools for internal
monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of FFS as an approach for up scaling
adoption of technologies; and c) impart participants with analytical and reporting skills
for participatory measurement and evaluation. A total of 75 participants attended the
workshop;
34. The relationship between project design and impact evaluation was seen as a
good practice. The project contracted a service provider to carry out an impact
assessment of the project that included establishing a baseline in 2012 and a follow up in
10
2015. The development of baseline data also was used to set project targets and included
a review of the M&E framework and reformulation of targets to be achieved by the
Project. Each year the PDO indicators were collected to monitor progress and adjust the
actions when progress appears to be stalling. An independent assessment was done in
2015 to review progress on the Matching grants (subprojects) implementation; processes
involved, track the performance, provide specific recommendations for SADCP). The
methodology was robust (described in Annex 5) and efforts made to rigorously capture
yield data and achieve a representative sample.
35. The M&E unit (national and provincial level) conducted routine monitoring and
supervision of the execution of project activities, regularly reviewing implementation
progress. Data collection efforts were carried out at municipal level by EDAs
decentralized units and reported to the provincial level for consolidation.
36. The M&E unit helped to disseminate program results through bi-annual and annual
conferences with stakeholders. The project also prepared success stories through
newsletters, annual reports, brochures, press releases, and video.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
37. Safeguards. There were no major negative environmental social impacts and
conflicts anticipated as a result of project implementation, however it was acknowledged
that sub-projects may generate negative environmental or social impacts. The project
triggered OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. An
Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared in 2008 as part
of the design of MOSAP and was updated in July 2012 to include several mitigation
measures that had not been finalized in 2008.
38. The ESMF included a screening checklist which was subsequently included in the
project’s Operational Manual for subprojects and which required an environmental and
social screening assessment be conducted for each sub-project and that corrective or
mitigating measures be identified. The screening checklist was used in implementation
and applied by technicians of EDAs, with the support of municipality administrations.
Approval of subprojects, both by municipal governments and the provincial
subcommittees, generally followed established procedures and were based on verification
that the subproject has no environmental impact, or in the case of adverse and significant
impact, contained measures or actions to mitigate or prevent these impacts.
Implementation of the plans were intermittently followed and not always reported on,
however, and supervision missions noted there was a lack of technical capacity on
environmental management.
39. Safeguard compliance was rated moderately satisfactory for most of the
implementation period and no land acquisition and loss of livelihoods, either temporary
or permanent has been recorded. The overall recommended Safeguards rating in ICR is
also moderately satisfactory.
11
40. Financial Management. The Project was guided by a comprehensive financial
management (FM) manual; and financial management report (FMR) based reporting was
generally timely and accurate; though the project used statement of expenditures (SOEs)
as a basis for disbursement. The financial management (FM) arrangements of the project
including accounting, reporting, budgeting and staffing, internal controls and external
audit were assessed to be adequate and acceptable to the Bank through the life of the
Project. Such assessments were conducted on a regular basis during the FM
implementation support missions. Project activities were periodically reviewed by the
Internal Auditors. The audit reports were considered timely and were satisfactory in
terms of scope.
41. Initial delays in the project led to an unsatisfactory rating which was upgraded to
moderately satisfactory following improvement in fiduciary capacity. Delays in
disbursements led to a moderately satisfactory rating for the remainder of implementation.
The overall recommended FM rating in ICR is also moderately satisfactory.
42. Procurement. The Procurement activities of the Project were led by a team of five
staff, two at PIU level and three at PPIU level, who followed the World Bank
procurement procedures and the Project Procurement Implementation Manual. The
procurement management, in general, which included the leading of procuring
consultants, works and goods, reporting, and external audit were assessed to be adequate
and acceptable to the Bank in the course of the Project implementation period. The
assessments were conducted on a regular basis both by the Bank’s procurement staff,
from both country and regional levels, during their support missions to the project. A key
challenge noted by the project, both at PIU and PPIU levels, related to the limited
knowledge of the World Bank procurement procedures among most of local providers of
goods and services, which led to the need for greater oversight on the part of the PIU and
PPIU procurement team.
43. Project procurement activities were periodically reviewed by the Bank’s
procurement staff from both Country and regional level and an external procurement
audit was carried once. Initial delays in the project led to an unsatisfactory rating which
was upgraded to moderately satisfactory following improvement in fiduciary capacity.
Delays in disbursements led to a moderately satisfactory rating for the remainder of
implementation. The overall recommended procurement rating in ICR is also moderately
satisfactory
12
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
44. Despite its slow start, the project was perceived by Government and
stakeholders as contributing significantly to agriculture capacity development,
institution building and knowledge transfer in the three provinces where it operated.
It became one of the more visible projects for agricultural development in the Central
Highlands and at the request of the Angolan Government, the Bank prepared a follow up
project - The Smallholder Agricultural Development and Commercialization Project
(SADCP) – which was approved by the Board on July 5, 2016.
45. SADCP will scale up the geographic scale of MOSAP to reach additional
beneficiaries in more municipios and comunas within the same three provinces: Bié,
Huambo, and Malanje. Additionally, the project will include rehabilitation of 1,000 ha
of smallscale gravity-fed irrigation schemes as a pilot program for smallholders. Building
on lessons learned from MOSAP, the SADCP strongly emphasizes capacity building,
institutional development, and sustainability by strengthening MINAGRI’s capacity for
statistics, policy analysis, market information, irrigation development, and agricultural
extension. Also building on lessons learned, the SADCP aims to mainstream
environmental considerations and climate smart agriculture (CSA) practices into the
project design through investments in more efficient use of water resources, promotion of
soil conservation techniques, and integrated natural resource management.
46. At the request of the Government and based on MOSAP’s successes, IFAD has
initiated the design of a Smallholder Agriculture and Marketing Access Project
(SAMAP) - a MOSAP Follow-up Project. The SAMAP will be implemented in two
neighboring provinces of the recently approved WB-SADCP. Discussions between the
two institutions are pointing out towards harmonizing as much as possible SAMAP with
SADCP and ensuing co-financing.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
47. The focus on smallholder agriculture was relevant to the country’s post-
conflict food security, and poverty reduction priorities. During the civil war
agricultural production declined significantly and the country relied on commercial food
imports and food aid. In 2000/01 some 420,000 tons of cereals were imported on a
commercial basis and an additional 330,000 tons were received as food aid. By 2005/06
commercial imports had risen to 780,000 tons and food aid had decreased to 60,000 tons.
With large numbers of persons displaced, and many farming systems and agricultural
value chains destroyed by the war, social stability in the project area was a key concern.
Ensuring stability, a minimum level of food security, and better integration of rural based
populations within the national economy were of critical long term political importance.
48. The project continued to be relevant to the country’s priorities and the
objectives of agricultural commercialization and diversification of the economic
13
base. The project continued to be relevant to the country’s current development priorities
around expanding and diversifying the export base, which remains dominated by the oil
sector (which currently accounts for around 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and, 95 percent of total export value). Following a fall in the price of oil in 2014 and a
significant drop in oil revenue the Government of Angola initiated a crisis plan that
placed a strong emphasis on agriculture as an immediate way to increase domestic
production and reduce imports.
49. Angola’s National Development Plan (NDP) 2013-17 and the Medium-Term
Agricultural Development Program 2013-17 (ADP) also place a strong emphasis on
agricultural productivity and diversification. The overall objective of the ADP is to
promote the sustainable transformation of subsistence agriculture to a commercial
orientation, with the aim of achieving food security in the country. Similarly the Bank’s
Country Partnership Strategy for FY13–16 was aimed at: (a) deepening diversification
for inclusive growth; (b) enhancing the quality of decentralization for services delivery;
and (c) building human resources capacity.
50. A CDD approach was an effective way to ensure project beneficiaries had a
say in determining project activities to meet their needs. Angola faces a number of
challenges that impact social development and economic growth. The civil war resulted
in a virtual collapse of market-oriented production and infrastructure suffered from
widespread destruction of roads, bridges and warehouses. A community demand-driven
(CDD) approach was seen as an important mechanism to support pro-poor agriculture
programs for smallholders, and target income and employment generating activities for
rural households in a way that empowered communities. Lessons learned from countries
emerging from conflicts such as Angola provided examples of channeling investments to
grass-roots level when institutional capacity was limited. The adoption of a community
CDD approach could ensure that project beneficiaries had a say in determining the
project activities that best meets their needs and could be sustained.
51. The project helped facilitate a harmonized framework among donors for
supporting smallholder agriculture in Angola. The project offered a framework to
attract and work with other development agencies active in smallholder agriculture in
Angola. The International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) agreed to support
the project and work within the same framework to reduce possible duplication and
improve the impact of development assistance. The Bank’s involvement led to the
mobilization of additional donor support through Poverty and Human Resources
Development (PHRD) grant. The project was also seen as a way to consolidate gains of
the EMRP and of other IFAD programs in the same provinces. The EMRP helped
reestablish institutional capacity of Angola’s two agriculture research centers and of rural
extension services in Malanje and Bie while the second phase supported the rehabilitation
of some 500 km of feeder roads in Malanje and Bié, most of which were located in the
same comunas and municipios selected by project.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
14
52. The degree to which the PDO is achieved is based on assessment of the main inter-
related outcomes articulated in the project design – increased agricultural production,
improved access to productive assets, and improved capacity of farmers to increase
productivity and access markets.
Increased agricultural production of participating smallholder farmers
53. The main PDO indicator on agricultural production was considered fully
achieved. The primary PDO indicator for the project measured changes in agricultural
production among beneficiaries. The original end of project target at appraisal stage was
a 25 percent increase in the crop index. This was subsequently revised in the 2013
restructuring to a 10 percent increase. Analysis of the baseline survey and end of project
survey estimated the crop index – an aggregated measure of the increase in crop
production across four commodities –showed positive trend in real terms and by 2015
was 166 (or 66 percent), exceeding the overall project target of 10 percent.
54. The crop index was constructed based on yield data collected for maize, cassava,
bean and potato production in a baseline survey in 2012, annual follow up surveys in
2013 and 2014 and a final end of project survey in 2015.
Figure 1. Crop Production Index
Source: MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report
55. Yields among farmers increased among both project and non project beneficiaries
during implementation. While the project surveys showed relatively small increases in
the control group of non-project beneficiaries, difference in difference analysis was also
conducted to capture the net increase in yields among project beneficiaries discounting
for the overall yield increase experienced by all farmers. This net increase (the
difference-in-difference number – or DD in the table below) showed the highest net
increase in yield occurred in maize – where the net increase for project beneficiaries was
0.14 t/ha (or 33 percent higher than baseline yield values) followed by potato at 1.27 t/ha
(32 percent higher than baseline), beans at .06 t/ha (20 percent higher than baseline) and
cassava 2.19 t/ha (13 percent higher than baseline). These are all still above target levels
established by the project.
15
56. Although positive, gains in agricultural production in absolute terms are
modest. While the project realized gains in production that exceeded targets in
percentage terms, the very low baseline levels of production mean that absolute gains
were small in some cases. The net increase in production of maize averaged only 142
kg/ha and average yields post-project were still relatively low compared to potential. It
should be noted, however that this level of gain is sufficient to allow a household of five
to cross the threshold for subsistence production (with average per capita maize
consumption in the region assumed to be 80 – 100kg/person/year based on FAO
estimates).
Table 1. Mean Crop Yields across Control and Target Populations (t/ha)
Source: MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report
57. The targets for adoption were considered fully achieved. The adoption
indicator was added in the 2013 restructuring and established an end of project target of
40 percent. Based on the baseline and end of project survey the project has achieved an
adoption rate of 62 percent at the end of the project. Adoption was defined as whether
the farmer applied the full package of improved farming practices and which commonly
included: (i) seed selection, (ii) sowing/seed placement; and (iii) right plant spacing for
the crops promoted by the project (maize, cassava, potato, and bean). For cassava,
selection and planting of cuttings were also included. Adoption rates were calculated for
each crop and aggregated for an overall adoption rate. Individual rates ranged from a low
of 47 percent for beans to a high of 72 percent for cassava.
16
Figure 2: Adoption rate for improved farming practices
Source: MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report
58. Beneficiary coverage. In terms of beneficiary coverage the project provided
training to over 50,000 smallholder farmers organized in groups or associations of which
about over 22,000 farmers were on 726 farmers’ field schools. Additional training
outside the farmer field school methodology brought the total number of farmers
benefitted from training to 32,300. In addition, the project trained more than 210
technicians. At the time of the ICR all farmer field schools were considered functional as
training continued up to the closing date of the project which coincided with the end
harvest period for the 2015/16 season.
59. Training covered a range of topics including agricultural techniques and
diversification of crops (maize, beans, cassava, potato, and vegetables), crop husbandry,
methods of production and conservation of potato, seed multiplication and marketing
channels. Farmer fields schools followed a three cycle curriculum that culminated in
graduation and movement towards cooperative development and more advanced
agribusiness training. By project end more than 100 of the 726 farmer fields schools had
graduated from the third cycle and nearly 250 completed the second cycle.
Improved access to productive assets
60. The project financed 257 sub-projects and exceeded targets for beneficiary
coverage. The project financed sub-projects in 12 municipios in the form of matching
grants for production, processing and marketing related assets. Sub-projects primarily
focused on animal traction, mechanization, improved seeds and fertilizer, grinding mills,
and small scale irrigation pumps. Sub-projects covered a 12,354 smallholder beneficiaries
against an initial target of 8,000. There was no target established for number of sub-
projects at the time of appraisal.
Table 2. MOSAP Sub-Projects
Type of Sub-project
Animal traction Mechanization and seeds Mills
17
Province
Approved Financed Approved Financed Approved Financed
Huambo 92 86 0 0 0 0
Bié 28 28 33 33 17 17
Malanje 4 4 76 76 13 13
Total 124 118 109 109 30 30
Source: MOSAP
61. The majority of sub-projects were considered operational at the time of the ICR
mission and the functionality of sub-project investments were assessed as part of the
project’s M&E systems. By the time of the ICR mission 90 percent of sub-projects had
been completed and the remainder were still under the final stages of delivery or
construction. Of the project that were completed around half of all sub-projects were fully
operational and another third were operational with some minor deficiencies in
management or maintenance. Relatively few of the completed sub-projects (5 subprojects
or about 2 percent) were considered non-operational and only one sub-project had been
abandoned.
62. Beneficiaries have noted, however, that implementation and procurement of sub-
projects could have been more decentralized to allow the menu of options available for
sub-projects to be more diversified and operations and maintenance arrangements could
have been better identified. In some cases field visits identified challenges in
maintenance arrangements, particularly with grinding mills which require more complex
and sustained O&M.
Table 3. Sub-Project performance Malanje Huambo Bié Total
Total subprojects financed 93 86 78 257
Completed and fully operational 55 32 45 132
Completed and operational with weaknesses 34 45 16 95
Completed and not operational 3 0 2 5
Still under finalization 0 9 15 24
Dropped 1 0 0 1
Source: MOSAP
Improved capacity of farmers to access markets
63. The project supported market oriented training and technology adoption to
increase farmers’ long term capacity to engage in markets. The core of the project
focused on improving the productive capacity of smallholders and to enable farmer to
better develop market linkage and market orientation. The selection of commodities as
well as the capacity building and training provided to farmers were driven by a market
orientation and the opportunities to increase marketable surplus. The selection adoption
of commodities – maize, cassava, bean and potato – represented a move towards
increased commercialization as many have both food security and cash crop potential.
18
64. Farmer institutional development was an important element of capacity building in
addition to building technical knowledge and skills. For smallholders, better access to
markets is often achieved through greater farmer organization which can facilitate
learning and exchange of experience, economies of scale in marketing, and provide an
entry point for service delivery. The project generated a clear benefit in farmer
organizational development compared to non-project beneficiaries. The project supported
726 farmer field schools and trained nearly 52,000 farmers. Evidence from baseline and
end of project evaluation indicates the Project changed farmer perceptions around the
utility of joining farmers associations, which were seen to provide little benefit.
65. Training on marketing and commercialization formed a core part of the farmer
field school curriculum and is the main focus of the training in the third year cycle. It is
expected that as farmer organizations become more mature, they will serve as a tool for
increased group marketing. Already some associations have explored higher level
organizational development and have registered as cooperatives in order to put in place
more coordinated output marketing and access to credit.
Table 4: Percentage of Farmers who are Members of a Local Association
2012 Baseline 2015 end of project
Survey
% Change
Project target area 27.9 87.7 212
Control 17.7 35.0 98
Source: MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report
66. Investments in productive assets – particularly mills – represented a step
towards greater value addition and commercialization. Project investments in small
scale maize and cassava processing represented a step towards greater market integration
and value addition. Investments in animal traction and mechanization will allow
associations to build on the initial successful technology testing phase supported by the
project and scale up production in coming seasons.
67. The project could have developed an additional focus on input market access
to complement sub-project investments and training, however, this may be
appropriate for the second phase. While project beneficiaries increased production of
all commodities (maize, bean, cassava, and potato), the availability of inputs was often
cited as a constraint. Seed and fertilizer were provided in limited quantities as part of sub-
projects but broad access to inputs is extremely limited within the project area. Increased
production will be limited so long as improved seed, fertilizer and other inputs are not
available. The project did provide training to 90 service providers and agro-dealers within
the project area and in in the last year of the project was able to source more seed locally
from the more mature farmers’ organizations. Greater attention to linkages to supply
chains and input markets, however, may have been useful.
3.3 Efficiency
19
68. Appraisal stage economic and financial analysis estimated the project would
extend capacity building, including group formation and strengthening, as well as basic
agricultural and or marketing knowledge to 126,000 smallholder farmers out of which,
some 40,000 smallholders would benefit from more intensive participatory farmer group-
based agricultural extension support and an estimated 24,000 smallholders would benefit
directly from productive investment subprojects.
69. The ICR economic financial analysis follows the same logic as the appraisal stage
analysis and assess the quantifiable financial and economic benefits generated by
increased production and productivity among project beneficiaries. Data collected
through the project’s baseline survey and impact provides evidence on yield increases
and changes in total production at the farm level among both beneficiary and control
populations. Ex ante economic and financial analysis of the follow on SADCP project
provided an updated baseline of farm and crop production models for farmers in the
project area and have been used in the ICR analysis as average production models at
MOSAP project end.
70. The project’s economic rate of return is calculated at 13 percent based on a
relatively conservative calculation of net benefits related to the value of increased
production observed at project end. This level is higher than the opportunity cost of
capital and therefore indicates the project generated a positive rate of return. It is lower
than appraisal ERR estimates of 21 percent, however, which were based on a shorter time
period for project implementation, lower costs of for service provision and goods, and
larger beneficiary coverage.
71. The ICR rate of return calculation also likely represents a lower estimate of the
project’s rate of return as additional benefits would be expected from income generated
through productive assets such grinding mills, higher value crop production under
irrigation sub-projects, and spillover effects among non-project beneficiaries. The
project’s investment in capacity building is also difficult to quantify and higher positive
returns are likely when if the planned second phase is included in the analysis.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Satisfactory
72. An important outcome of the project is that farmers in the project target areas have
demonstrated the potential to raise crop productivity beyond historically low levels as
long as they are provided with the appropriate supportive infrastructure and incentives.
Starting from a very low base, the project achieved its core objective and generated
benefits that will serve as a foundation for further commercialization.
73. The project is rated satisfactory based on an assessment of the relevance of the
project to Angola’s post conflict, economic and poverty reduction goals, satisfactory
achievement of its stated development objective in raising agricultural production and
evidence of the generally positive impact generated by the project, all within a
challenging country context.
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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
74. Poverty. The project’s design was poverty focused given its focus on raising
production and ultimately incomes among smallholder farmers. Poverty data remains
extremely limited in Angola making any assessment of poverty impact difficult. Rural
poverty across Angola is currently estimated to be 58 percent compared to 30 percent in
urban areas. At the time of appraisal extreme poverty within the project area was
considered significant and in 2005 it was estimated that 68 percent of the population
central highlands were classified as food insecure. Detailed analysis on poverty impacts
was not undertaken as part of the project, however the baseline level of production
captured in project surveys indicate that many beneficiaries were operating at basic levels
of subsistence production. The demonstrated increases in yield experienced by project
participants while modest, indicate that project interventions have likely contribute to
greater food security.
75. Gender. The project was successful in targeting and supporting female
participation in training and as members of farmers associations. While there were gender
imbalances in farmer associations leadership, with men usually being in a leadership
position and women being the bulk of the members in the groups – the project was
generally well balanced in terms of gender. In total 43 percent of farmers participating in
project activities were women. Farmer field school participants were an estimated 56
percent female. Design and planning of farmer field school activities made it possible for
women to participate more in the planning of agricultural activities together with their
male counterparts.
76. Sub-project investments also had clear gender impacts in that many focused on
introducing labor saving technologies –such as grinding mills, animal traction, and
irrigation pumps. Beneficiaries cited positive gender impacts around such investments
and a reduction in time required to take on tasks.
77. Literacy training. Early in the preparation period it was determined that the low
levels of educational attainment among project beneficiaries presented a challenge to
provision of technical training. As a result, the project included and ultimately expanded
training under the first component to include literacy skills in a selected number of farmer
associations. Basic literacy skills allowed more farmers to participate in farmer field
schools and generated additional benefits beyond the project.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
78. Farmer organizational development. A key achievement of the project was to
strengthen farmer associations to empower farmers and develop organizational and
leadership skills needed to exercise ownership over project decision-making processes
and outcomes. Very few farmers had previous experience in associations and in many
cases, the implementation and management of sub-project or training activities
represented something new, which required a learning and adaptability. The project also
21
supported a few exchanges between associations, which provided a model for joint
learning and the potential for greater collective action in the future. Organized networks
of farmers’ organization also provided Government with an entry point in providing
support in the sector.
79. Because eligibility for project activities required farmer association membership,
there is a risk that associations may not be sustainable. MOSAP associations, however,
have demonstrated good group cohesion, which is expected to ensure longevity and the
follow on project is expected to support further institutional development and value
addition to collective activities.
80. Extension agents and EDAs. The project contributed to revitalization of service
delivery through EDAs in participating municipios. EDAs, which represent the lowest
administrative level in the extension system, had generally suffered from under-
investment and under-staffing. Project investments in infrastructure (housing, offices and
transport) allowed new staff to be posted to the EDA level and increase the outreach ratio
for extension staff to number of farmers reached. The project built capacity of extension
agents and provided training in technical skills as well as the principles of community-
organizing and group management skills in order to help facilitate farmers associations
and communities. These changes are expected to be sustained in the follow on project
with staff and operational costs gradually absorbed in to the Government budget.
81. ADI and MINAGRI. The project provided a useful framework for ADI to deliver
technical services and support to farmers which had in the past been relatively ad hoc and
constrained by both resources and service delivery models. The framework of farmer
association development, technical training and learning coupled with investment in
productive assets were perceived to be much more effective than previous efforts. The
project became popular at the provincial and municipal levels as a result of its grass roots
impact in communities. ADI has expressed interest in incorporating many aspects of the
farmer field school approach and farmer training more broadly in the country.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts
82. Testing of alternative extension methodologies. One byproduct of the project
was the testing of variety of extension methods and the scaling up of the farmer field
school methodology in particular. Given the capacity constraints within the public
extension system the project utilized a number of service providers to fill gaps in
institutional capacity. This involved local and international NGOs as well the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), which had developed specialized expertise in farmer
field schools. The use of the farmer field school approach in the project was expanded
over time and by the end of the project 726 farmer fields schools had been launched.
83. Originally started as tool for learning integrated pest management in Asia, the
farmer field school approach evolved into a group-based learning process characterized
by participatory learning approaches carried out over multiple seasons. Studies of impact
are varied in their findings on the effectiveness of the approach. Because the project
22
likely represented one of the larger scale uses of farmer field schools in Africa, the
project could have (and in its second phase should plan for) more systematic and rigorous
impact assessment on the approach.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
84. Beneficiary and stakeholder consultations were held as part of the closure of
MOSAP and preparation for the follow on project with a focus on taking stock of
implementation experience and to identify lessons learned. Stakeholder perceptions of
positive and negative aspects are summarized the table below.
Table 5: Stakeholder perceptions on project implementation and impact Positive impacts or implementation experiences Negative impacts or implementation
experiences
Reducing the time spent on some essential
activities of farmers (grinding corn, cultivation of
farms);
Increase in the cultivated area;
Introduction of more effective cultivation
techniques, and thus increasing productivity and
product quality;
Development of associations, consolidation of
associations;
development of planning capacity of the
associations (project planning, feasibility simplified
calculations of viable alternatives analysis,)
Stimulation of other farmer associative
initiatives, and the emergence of new projects;
Development of cooperation activities between
associations;
Increase in negotiating capacity with public
authorities, improving the knowledge of the resources
and the limits of the bodies involved;
Better market knowledge, is the amount of
production (input suppliers, equipment, animals) or
downstream (marketing channels, transport,.
Lack of previous experience with
associations in villages ;
Shortcomings in the field of technical
staff
Slow pace of project implementation
in the early years and highly limited time to
reach the goals after the changes introduced in
2013;
Difficulties arising from the incipient
network equipment providers ( grindings ,
motor pumps ) , animals, inputs
(seeds, fertilizers ) , and limits of programs
Government supply of these inputs ;
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Substantial
23
85. Overall risk to the development outcome is considered substantial – although
approval of the follow on project SADCP could be expected to provide a mechanism to
mitigate some of the risks to development outcomes.
86. Institutional risks. Institutional risk is considered between moderate to substantial.
There are risks around integrating project successes into the larger institutional structures
of Government. The project increased the technical and operational capacity of
MINAGRI and ADI to better manage programs and improved systems, manuals and
technical training within the institution at provincial and municipal level. The project
created potential for ADI to continue to support interventions around improving the
productive capacity of small farmers even after project closing. One challenge, however,
will be in adapting models and approaches developed largely outside its systems by
external service providers into its own structures over the medium to long term. Strong
leadership within ADI and in the PIU was critical to achieving project success but may be
more difficult to replicate if personnel changes take place. The current low revenue
environment which has reduced government budgets will also likely impact ADI’s ability
to support future service delivery.
87. Risks to productivity gains at farm level. Risks at farmer level are twofold: at the
production level and at marketing level. Farmers in the project had shown potential to
adapt, adopt, and innovate, provided that they receive timely and adequate support. By
demonstrating the efficacy and value of project activities and building awareness at both
the national and local levels of the benefits of project interventions, there is a high
likelihood of maintaining production levels achieved beyond the life of the project.
Although access to inputs were a challenge, increased capacity has been demonstrated
through community seed multiplication but bears further monitoring.
88. A major risk to sustaining project achievements will be whether investments in
improving capacity and skills can be leveraged into greater commercialization and profits
for farmers. This will be influenced by Angola’s larger social and economic context,
which presents a difficult environment for smallholder farmers to boost production
significantly. The country’s weak supply chains and high margins at the retail level favor
cheap agricultural imports and result in low producer prices for smallholder farmers. In
such an environment, yield and production increases by smallholder farmers may not
always result in improved incomes.
89. Environment and Social development risks. Environmental risks are considered
low. Project investments in sub-projects have been largely small scale and created no
cumulative negative impacts. Maintenance plans have been put in place as part of the
sub-project training. Social development risks are also considered low, as larger country
risk around potential conflict and violence are minimal and the project’s use of farmer
association and community institutions have created ownership over project activities are
considered sufficient.
24
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
90. MOSAP was the first agricultural development project supported by the World
Bank in Angola. Considerable effort went into design of the project, building
relationships with counterpart institutions and understanding a complex country and
sector environment. Delays experienced in approval and effectiveness affected project
startup although there may have been few options to avoid them. Effectiveness and
disbursement conditions led to extensive delays but reflected a desire to put in place the
minimum conditions needed to ensure sound implementation capacity was in place. At
times the two year delay reinforced each other - in some cases conditions had to be met
twice (recruitment of staff had to be done twice when in some cases recruited personnel
were no longer available once other conditions had been met).
91. Engagement with IFAD on project design also took place and both the IFAD
program document and the Bank’s Project Appraisal Document (PAD) were consistent
and well aligned. Nonetheless, additional efforts was required to align World Bank and
IFAD funding, which required amending/harmonizing financing agreements.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Satisfactory
92. The Bank undertook regular supervision with task team leader (TTL) and staff
based within the region in neighboring countries. The team displayed flexibility and was
proactive in addressing implementation bottlenecks. Potential restructuring was discussed
early on when it became clear the time available for implementation was lapsing. The
team was pro-active in engaging Government on possible cancellation of the credit and
adjusting results framework.
93. The supervision and mid-term review process allowed for course corrections and
adjustments to design. Supervision was candid in ratings of project shortcomings and
constraints. The project was rated unsatisfactory at the start due to delays in establishing
implementing capacity and revised upwards when performance improved. Development
of implementation modalities for sub-project and service provision for training took time
to finalize and were reviewed in detail during early supervision missions. Supervision of
the IFAD funds proceeded smoothly and supervision was often undertaken as joint-Bank-
IFAD missions.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
25
94. The satisfactory rating is based on a greater weighting for quality of supervision.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
95. Although achievement of project development objectives would not have been
possible without the relatively strong ownership over the project, particularly at
provincial and municipal government levels, the 26 month delay in effectiveness had a
negative impact on the project. While lack of familiarity with Bank modalities
contributed to some delays others were due to factors within the control of Government.
Government counterpart funds, which were originally anticipated at US$4.4 million at
appraisal were US$2.1 million by project end.
96. Larger policy and institutional issues also impacted project performance,
particularly as they related to improving the competence and incentive structure for
government staff, at lower levels; the accuracy and timeliness of government statistics to
allow for more informed decision making; and the ability of senior government staff to
address structural constraints through informing and promoting agriculture sector policy
dialogue. Angola’s overall business environment also affected project performance.
Timely entry visas for consultants, contractors and Bank staff to support implementation
of the project were difficult to obtain and led to higher costs and implementation delays.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
97. Implementing agency performance is rated moderately satisfactory. While the
project took some time to fully launch resulting in an initial unsatisfactory rating for the
project, project coordination did improve and remained satisfactory for the remaining
project period. A key factor in the change was replacement of key project staff that
provided the needed boost to manage and coordinate project activities.
98. The PIU oversaw project implementation by PPIUs and performed central
functions while PPIU implementation units provided main frontline implementation
support. The project had a reporting system based on monthly and quarterly progress
reports prepared. Progress reports were prepared for submission to the Bank and were
provide on a timely basis throughout the project implementation period.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
26
99. Overall borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory based on a balance
of the moderately satisfactory ratings for Implementing Agency performance and
moderately unsatisfactory for Government performance.
6. Lessons Learned
100. MOSAP was successful in reaching women, although more needs to be done
to ensure that women play an equal role in farmers’ organizations and influence
project investment decisions. Women had only limited influence on the choice of
subprojects, an issue that will need extra attention under the proposed project. Women’s
participation in farmers’ organizations was lower than that of men and women usually
had a secondary role, with only a few occupying leadership positions. More women could
be encouraged to get training as FFS facilitators and become community leaders, for
example by arranging training sessions to favor women’s participation.
101. The Farmer Field School (FFS) approach to agricultural extension was
effective in enhancing smallholder farmers’ capacity to generate and use new
knowledge and adopt improved agricultural practices and technology. Although the
performance of FFS needs to be evaluated in more depth, it was considered to be the
appropriate extension methodology and was found to be an effective platform for farmer
organization and empowerment, where smallholder farmers with a common interest can
gain increased production, productivity and access to market. This platform served an
important role for farmers both in terms of social and technical support. Farmers who
participate in the first phase of training of trainers become Master Farmers who facilitate
or replicate the training to new farmers, thus achieving an increase in the number of farm
families with strengthened capacities. The chances of effective FFS network to grow, can
be strengthened with greater focus on farmer-driven network development. In order to
build on best practice of using farmers as extension agents whilst ensuring their
sustainability post project, it is recommended that SADCP and SAMAP projects, should
facilitate farmer promoters to become agricultural input suppliers at the village level.
Within SAMAP, and SADCP outstanding farmers should be able to earn service fees in
delivering technological advices to their client farmers.
102. A capable and internationally experienced service provider will be required to
help farmers’ organizations develop and implement investment proposals, especially
for value chain investments. The use of small, local service providers to assist farmers’
associations in the preparation and implementation of MOSAP subprojects was
problematic because of their limited technical and organizational capacity. Improving the
quality of technical and commercial assistance and making it available to a much larger
number of beneficiaries will require recruitment of a highly capable and internationally
experienced service provider who will also train the local NGOs and private sector
subcontractors with whom they will work.
103. Financing demand-driven subproject investment proposals promotes their
sustainability. The modalities for preparing and implementing demand-driven
27
subprojects under MOSAP were generally successful, with over 70 percent of subprojects
judged sustainable by the independent evaluation. The key elements of success were (a)
creation of ownership through community participation in all stages of subproject
preparation and implementation, as well as direct community contributions (cash or in
kind); (b) farmers’ organizations’ commitment to engage in operation and management
(O&M) before disbursement of project contribution; (c) training of farmers’
organizations and assistance with establishment of user rules and cost-sharing
agreements; and (d) awareness raising and encouragement for farmers’ organizations to
identify and contract the technical assistance they need.
104. Procurement, FM, and M&E teams need to be involved in the early stages of
project design. During MOSAP implementation, the project had difficulty finding local
qualified professionals to effectively undertake the fiduciary and M&E functions. The
lack of qualified procurement staff was in part responsible for the delayed start of project
implementation. While hiring was possible within a reasonable period, the selected
consultants were not familiar with World Bank procedures.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
105. Borrower comments generally concur with the ICR and highlight the following
three lessons that will be incorporated in SADCP: (i) improved farmer organization
through groups or associations increased provision of assistance to smallholders and their
access to inputs, but continued assistance is required for increased sustainability; (ii)
development of smallholder capacity is key for increased sustainability; and good
communication and (iii) participatory planning was key for smooth implementation. Full
comment are contained in Annex 7.
(b) Cofinanciers
106. Comments from IFAD on the draft ICR have been incorporated into the final text
including planned follow up financing to MOSAP through a new planned operation
SAMAP. Full comments are found in Annex 8.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
N/A
28
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Component 1: Capacity Building 9.59 13.70 143%
Component 2: Agricultural
Investment Support 29.45 7.74
26%
Component 3: Project
Management 7.56 11.61
154%
Total Baseline Cost 42.45 33.05
Physical Contingencies 0.25
Price Contingencies 2.50
Total Project Costs 49.35 33.05 67%
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Borrower 4.12 4.40 107%
Local Communities 3.03 0.00* N/A
International Development
Association (IDA) 30.00 18.17
61%
International Fund for Agriculture
Development 8.20 6.27
76%
JAPAN: Ministry of Finance - PHRD
Grants 4.02 3.61
90%
Sub-Total (w/o local community
contribution) 46.34 32.45
Total 49.37
*not measured
29
(c) Detailed breakdown by financier1
Table 1.1 At Appraisal
Categories IDA % IFAD % PHRD % Gov % Total %
Component 1
(1.a) Consulting services and training 0.62 7% 3.2 38% 4 47% 0.64 8% 8.46 100%
(1.b) Goods and works 2.8 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2.8 100%
Component 2 Matching grants 23.46 89% 2.85 11% 0 0 0 0% 26.31 100%
Component 3
Goods, consulting services,
training& operating costs 3.12 36% 2.15 25% 0 3.48 40% 8.75 100%
Total 30 8.2 4 4.12 46.32
Table 1.2. February 2013 with the Cancellation of US$10 million
Categories IDA % IFAD % PHRD % Gov % Total %
Component 1
(1.a) Consulting services and training 0.62 7% 3.2 38% 4 47% 0.64 8% 8.46 100%
(1.b) Goods and works 8.26 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 8.26 100%
Component 2 Matching grants 8.00 89% 2.85 11% 0 0 0 0% 10.85 100%
Component 3
Goods, consulting services,
training& operating costs 3.12 75% 2.15 25% 0 1.50 0 6.77 100%
Total 20.00 8.2 4 2.14 34..34
1 The following tables are sourced from the individual restructuring papers and there are some minor difference with the overall summary of project costs in the annex due to of the differences in the exchange rate between SDR and USD at time of calculation.
30
Table 1.3. September 2014
Categories IDA % IFAD % PHRD % Gov % Total %
Component 1
(1.a) Consulting services and training 0.62 7% 3.2 38% 4 47% 0.64 8% 8.46 100%
(1.b) Goods and works 7.70 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 8.26 100%
Component 2 Matching grants 6..78 89% 2.85 11% 0 0 0 0% 10.85 100%
Component 3
Goods, consulting services,
training& operating costs 4.90 75% 2.15 25% 0 1.50 0 6.77 100%
Total 20.00 8.2 4 2.14 34..34
Table 1.4. December 2015
Categories IDA % IFAD % PHRD % Gov % Total %
Component 1
(1.a) Consulting services and training 0.31 5% 1.56 5% 4 90% 0.64 0% 6.51 100%
(1.b) Goods and works 7.70 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 7.7 100%
Component 2 Matching grants 6..78 20% 4.29 80% 0 0 0 0% 11.07 100%
Component 3
Goods, consulting services,
training& operating costs 5.21 75% 2.35 25% 0 1.50 0 9.06 100%
Total 20.00 8.2 4 2.14 34..34
31
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1 - Capacity Building
1. This component was designed to strengthen the technical, institutional, managerial
and marketing skills of 50,000 smallholders and their organizations, as well as the skills
of services providers and other stakeholders involved in agricultural production and value
chains, to allow them to operate more effectively in a market-driven environment and
prepare for the agricultural investment support opportunities under Component 2. This
component was also designed to strengthen the capacity of the Agricultural Development
Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture at local and central level by providing periodic
training and means (such as offices, equipment, transport, and housing for extension
officers at the municipal level) to be able to assist smallholders in the Project area.
2. The Project developed six training modules that were used by the service providers
to deliver training programs for smallholder farmers. The Government also contracted the
FAO to provide training of smallholder farmers through the Farmers’ Field School.
Summary of Component 1 outputs
3. Overall, the project achieved the following results: (i) training of 54,982
smallholder farmers in community organization and leadership, organization of
production and agricultural techniques for maize, beans and Irish potatoes, and cassava;
of which over 22,000 farmers through FAO Farmers’ Field Schools; of which 1,497
graduated as facilitators and 96 as community leadership, and about 2,252 benefitted
from literacy and agribusiness; (ii) training of 210 Government technicians in community
leadership, agronomic, extension methods among others; (iii) construction of 24 staff
houses and 8 offices; (iv) provision of equipment to local agricultural offices to improve
assistance to smallholders that included 13 vehicles and 40 moto-bikes; and (v) creation
of a database of associations, service providers, and EDA technicians.
Table 2.1 Component 1 outputs
Intermediate indicator for
component 1
Targets Actual Percentage
Number of smallholder farmers
that benefited from training
50,000 54,982 110
Percent of participating
smallholder farmers in the project
areas who belong to farm
organizations
40 100 250
Ratio of smallholder farmers’
organizations to an extension
officer
12 12 100
32
i) Capacity Building for Farmers and Community Mobilization and
Sensitization
4. MOSAP hired four service providers to build capacity among farmers and local
services providers and to provide training for local government personnel.
5. Smallholder farmers were trained on improved production technologies for major
crops (maize, cassava, beans and potato) and management practices. Demonstration plots
were also established to make the farmer aware of the benefits of new technology and to
show the farmers how to practically use the new technology. As a result, a portion of the
trained farmers adopted the new technologies in their farming land area. A total number
of 54,982 smallholders farmers in Associations out of a target of 50,000 were trained in
all project areas, with around 42.4 percent of them being females. The training focused
on, leadership skills, finance management skills, farmers field schools, operation and
maintenance of mills, agribusiness, illiteracy, and business planning and processes.
6. One of the main activities of the first subcomponent was the use of farmer field
school (FFS) methodology developed by FAO. Farmer field school methodology aimed
to build farmers’ capacity and promoted adoption of better practices, and consequently
improve farmers’ lives in terms of agricultural outcomes, health, environment and
empowerment. A total of 726 FFS were created in three provinces, comprising of 22,432
farmers’ members, 66 trained extensions facilitators and 307 trained farmers facilitators.
7. FFS were formed either from existing farmer’s groups/associations or from scratch
through community mobilization activities, in which problems were identified and
possible solutions floated. The FFS group sizes range from 25-30 farmers. The groups
elect their own leaders; developed their own norms and rules and met once every week
from 8.00 am-12.00 pm. The FFS is run for 30 learning weeks on grants provided by
FAO. The farmer led field schools receive backstopping from EDA extension workers
from time to time. During the learning period an exchange visit was organized for the
group members. The participants of FFS also receive a certificate at the end of the 30
learning weeks.
8. The group members perceived that the farmer field schools have contributed to
creating strong farmer-based structure at the grass root level. It also developed farmer’s
capacity to understand the activities they are carrying out. However, strong facilitation
skills were required for the success of the FFS in addition to monitoring and evaluation
systems. On sustainability, it was perceived that the development of FFS networks could
help sustain the process of learning. The farmers also felt that FFS has helped to bring
Ministry of Agriculture extension workers closer to farmers as previously they were not
frequenting the locality.
9. The following were perceived by farmers to be the main components of a field
school:
Presence of a study field;
33
Payment of registration fees;
Committed members;
Willingness to learn;
Presence of trained facilitator;
Norms and rules;
Capable leaders; and
Clearly set objectives.
10. Extension workers felt that FFS has helped make them reach more farmers. The
FFS has contributed to building up a close working relationship with the extension
workers as some of the farmers had started looking for services by frequenting EDA
offices. The extension workers also perceived that their roles had gradually been
changing to that of a facilitator instead of being a teacher.
11. However, they recognized that there were some conflict with their present work
description and the demands of FFS as they were required to attend to implement other
extension methodologies of the EDAs besides the FFS. Currently, the EDA Office has
allocated five or six FFS to an extension worker.
12. The integration of FFS with a subproject helped to rationalization of resources of
EDAs, as well as, to take advantage of the best way the knowledge being taught in FFS
could be applied to implement subprojects, mainly crop production subprojects.
ii) Strengthening capacities of relevant government institutions
13. The project provided support to departments within the Ministry of Agriculture to
improve the capacity of the public sector to provide core public services required to
support enhanced smallholders’ to improve their productivity and product quality.
14. The project has expanded activities with a focus on intensively increasing the
quality of support to beneficiaries (farmers and extension workers). This was being done
by working EDAs offices in municipalities, improving the quality of support to the
beneficiaries, increasing the number of front level staff like Farmers Field Facilitators,
who interact directly with the beneficiary farmers and extension workers.
15. At municipality level, a total of 88 government extension workers including,
veterinary field who were designated to directly support the farmers were provided
training on improved production technology and management training.
16. Identified topics included refresher training on improved agricultural practices that
project was working on; how to reach and interact with target farmer associations/groups
(facilitation skills); incorporation of gender and diversity aspects into extension activities
(FFS); participatory rural appraisal formation, governance and leadership of smallholder
farmers associations/groups and health, environmental and nutrition messages.
34
17. The smallholder farmer associations were linked to the respective extension
worker through FFS and subprojects. The extension workers provided training to the
farmer groups. In this way, an enhanced extension service relation had been developed.
18. The project provided motorcycles to extension workers and to farmers’ facilitators.
In order to increase outreach smallholder farmers in remote communities, the project
constructed and equipped offices and residences for extension workers.
19. The 3-day workshops on agricultural policies was conducted for the benefit of the
central ADI, MINAGRI and other stakeholders. The aim was to give general notions
about the role of farming family on rural development and present known and validated
methodologies, by the international agencies of the United Nations, that enable partners
to obtain intervening concrete tools for their works in their regional and rural realities.
20. Training of ADI Staff on M&E. The FAO M&E expert has provided training to the
field staff on FFS data collection method and quality measures in gathering information
using the project introduced revised templates.
iii) Strengthening capacities of private and non-governmental agricultural service
providers.
21. As a means to develop a private avenue for increasing farmer access to extension,
the MOSAP Project also developed capacity of input retailers and local service providers
who conducted business with project beneficiaries in order to strengthen or increase their
capacity to provide extension services. Assistance included business planning and
processes and leadership skills. 90 service providers were trained.
Component 2 - Support to Agricultural Investment
22. This component was designed to provide demand-based support, in the form of
matching grants, to 10,000 smallholder farmers organized in groups, for small-scale
agricultural infrastructure, production, processing and marketing sub-projects. The key
results expected from the implementation of this component include: (i) enhanced
agricultural productivity and (ii) enhanced access to agricultural markets.
23. Component 2 was designed to be implemented after capacity building activities
supported under Component 1 had been initiated, to ensure that capacity exists at local
level to implement sub-projects successfully. For this reason, and given the delays
incurred in implementing the capacity building activities supported under Component 1,
only in February 2013 farmer’s associations started preparing the sub-projects, with
support from the Agricultural Development Office of Agricultural Development Institute
(EDA) and the service providers. The main activities carried out up to date include: i)
provision of financial resources to 257 sub-projects involving over 12,354 smallholder
agricultural farmers; that involved (a) provision of seeds for potatoes; maize, beans and
fertilizers; (b) support in provision of assistance for mechanized land preparation
covering over 1,500 ha and (c) provision of animal traction. This resulted in: (i) Increased
35
agriculture productivity in most crops supported under the project, (ii) increased agro-
processing of cassava; and (iii) increased income of beneficiary farmer as repotted on the
beneficiary assessment undertaken in the project.
Table 2.2 Component 1 outputs
Intermediate indicator for Component 2 Targets Actual Percentage
Number of smallholder farmers financed under
agricultural investment component
10,000 12,531 125
Number of smallholder associations that benefit
from grants and completed their activities under
the Project’s agricultural investment component
8,000 12,344 154
Average yield for major crops participating
smallholder farmers:
Maize 0.6 0.77 128
Cassava 11 18.2 165
Beans 0.4 0.47 117
Iris potatoes 5 6.9 138
Subprojects details
24. Implementation began in late 2012. Part of the delay in the implementation of
Component 2 is related to the delay in the start of training activities under the first
component only started in March 2012; and the other was related to the disbursement
conditions for component 2. The disbursement conditions were: (i) At least 30 (10 in
each province) service providers and certified public officers appointed under the Project
Training program; (ii) The basic survey completed; and (iii) the administrative capacity
of the Provincial Project Implementation Units are consistent with the fiduciary
requirements of the Bank, as certified by World Bank. These conditions were met by the
end of July of 2012.
25. Although project activity was limited between 2010 and 2012 some activities
around Institutional Development, dissemination of information around the project and
community mobilization activities took place with associations and local authorities.
During this time he operating procedures of the subprojects and conducting technical
training seminars of EDAs in "Developing Productive Subprojects of MOSAP" was
prepared.
26. EDA technicians supported small producers to develop their proposals for funding
and in consultation with communal administrations to determine the relevance of such
associations, and environmental safeguards ensured. Municipal administration/CMCS
also gave its opinion to ensure coordination with the Project MOSAP. Subprojects made
with budgets ranging from $50,000 to $100,000, an amount which included the 10
percent community contribution. Sub-projects were evaluated and approved by the
provincial and national Subcommittees.
36
Table 2.3 Eligible types of sub-projects Sub-Project Types Examples
High public interest and / or public use Agricultural infrastructure of small-scale
processing - Grinding mills
Equipment forms the dominant component Animal traction equipment, plows, sprayers.
Agricultural mechanization
Potential for further production and redistribution Animal traction
Improved agricultural technologies Inputs
Table 2.4 Subprojects prepared, approved and financed by year
27. A total of 335 subprojects were prepared in which the vast majority (68 percent)
were prepared and financed in 2013. Almost all developed subprojects were funded (97
percent). Of the 257 subprojects financed, 46 percent subprojects were animal traction,
42 percent of mechanization and seeds and 12 percent of mills. Reduction the number of
new subprojects occurred after the first and was considered due to the fact that the more
effort was given in the first year to the preparation of proposals, due to delays in the
project implementation of activities, which were soon balanced out in the last two years.
Tracçãoanimal
Mecanização e
sementesMoagens Total
Aprovados 124 109 30 263
Financiados 118 109 30 257
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Nú
me
ro
Subprojectos financiados por tipo
Ano Prepared Approved Financed
2012 54 2 0
2013 227 221 152
2014 48 16 81
2015 6 24 24
Total 335 263 257
37
28. Types of subprojects varied by province. The vast majority of livestock projects
(animal traction) were requested by small producers of Huambo and Bié, areas with a
history of animal traction usage.
Table2.5 Type subprojects financed by province
Provincia
Tipo de subprojectos
Animal Traction Mechanization and seeds Mills
Approved Financed Approved Financed Approved Financed
Huambo 92 86 0 0 0 0
Bié 28 28 33 33 17 17
Malanje 4 4 76 76 13 13
Total 124 118 109 109 30 30
Project beneficiaries Summary
29. The following table presents a summary of the beneficiaries of the subprojects
reaching a total of 12,354 beneficiary families. Taking into account an average of 5
people per family in the Project area, it is estimated that the project directly benefited
approximately 60,000 people.
Table2.6: Number of beneficiaries by type of subproject
Province
Subproject type Total
Animal Traction Mechanization and
seeds Mills
Huambo 3396 - - 3396
Bié 1530 1438 1034 4002
Malanje 199 3959 798 4956
Total 5125 5397 1832 12354
Table: Subproject Data
Província Municípios Número de
subprojectos
Famílias
beneficiárias
Numero
de Ecas
Técnicos das
EDAs
Bié
Andulo 22 1001 107 9
Catabola 16 756 104 8
Camacupa 23 1398 80 8
Chinguar 17 847 71 6
Subtotal Bié 78 4002 362 31
Huambo Bailundo 42 1517 51 6
38
Londuimbali 27 1434 55 6
Mungo 17 710 58 2
Subtotal Huambo 86 3661 164 14
Malanje
Caculama 19 992 32 8
Cacuso 23 1238 46 9
Malanje 13 701 23 7
Kiwaba Nzoji 22 1144 28 7
Kalandula 16 881 67 11
Subtotal Malanje 93 4956 196 42
Total Geral 257 12619 722 87
Table 2.7: Subproject expenditures (USD) Tipo 2013 2014 2015 Total
Mills
Huambo 37.800,00 0,00 1.850,37 39.650,37
Bié 323.798,20 270.806,25 113.947,09 708.551,54
Malanje 195.253,09 2.447,25 126.055,69 323.756,03
Total parcial 556.851,29 273.253,50 241.853,15 1.071.957,94
Reprodução Natural
Huambo 486.995,82 322.659,61 197.495,23 1.007.150,66
Bié 123.202,75 186.271,82 424.246,67 733.721,24
Malanje 68.239,17 274.531,72 115.839,59 458.610,48
Total parcial 678.437,74 783.463,15 737.581,48 2.199.482,37
Inovação Tecnologica
Huambo 274.555,74 310.042,39 598,07 585.196,20
Bié 557.723,46 422.432,88 45.252,28 1.025.408,62
Malanje 1.321.160,89 451.595,37 16.605,66 1.789.361,92
Total parcial 2.153.440,09 1.184.070,64 62.456,01 3.399.966,74
Total Geral 3.388.729,12 2.240.787,29 1.041.890,64 6.671.407,05
Operation and maintenance of subprojects
30. The project tried to put in place systems to support the preparation and analysis of
productive enterprises as well as systems for the provision of technical assistance for
maintenance and operation of investments and development of viable business plans.
Municipal EDAs were required to have technicians directly responsible for monitoring
and evaluation in order to continue to monitor and evaluate the continuity of subprojects
especially those who were operating regularly, the subprojects running and operating
with weaknesses.
31. Subprojects supporting mills and/or other recurring source of regular cash flow
were targeted for monitoring of income, account services, account opening, deposits and
39
expenses as a way of ensuring that the services of the mills were for all members instead
of benefit a few people within an association. For the maintenance, mills were
encouraged to create a spare parts store sales for the mills, with direct connection to
Sotecma, whose location and supply could provide a response to demand for maintenance
services of existing in the province in general mills. Training for technicians to service
mills were also discussed.
32. For livestock, the Veterinary Provincial Services was tasked with support for the
herd of animal traction cattle introduced by the project in line with their mandate for
provision of livestock animal health services in rural communities. A protocol of
performance between the IDA, Services veterinarians, municipal administrations and the
beneficiary communities was signed to facilitate service delivery. The EDAs were to
identify in rural communities, staff experienced in livestock training for animal traction
to increase the cultivable area by animal traction in rural areas, given that the actual cattle
introduced by the project is not the current area prepared.
Sub-project status and sustainability
33. An estimated 90 percent of the financed sub-projects were already completed at the
ICR stage, of which 51 percent are in full operation. Among the remaining 9.4 percent
were in the final stages of completion, while only 2.0 percent have stood or abandoned.
Table 2.8: Status of Sub-projects
Malanje Huambo Bié Total
Subprojects financed 93 86 78 257
Subprojects completed and operating normally 55 32 45 132
Subprojects completed and operating with deficiencies 34 45 16 95
Completed and non-operational 3 0 2 5
Still under execution 0 9 15 24
Abandoned 1 0 0 1
34. Factors that influenced positively the implementation of subprojects:
• The strategy of giving the associations the identification, implementation of sub-
projects has created real opportunities for empowerment;
• Functional organizational leadership in existence at both the Association and the
monitoring level of the project;
• Technology Adoption through field schools, replicating in their own lessons
learned;
• Existence of a system to account on revenues acquired through meetings between
the members and the subproject management group;
• Supervision and support of sub-projects by the technicians of EDAs.
40
35. Sub-projects completed and operating with deficiencies include some examples
mechanization subprojects. In some cases communities did not fulfill their obligations
clear the area, a situation that affected the mechanization of work. Mechanized service
providers in the province also had limited capacity to meet increased demand during
growing seasons. For mill subprojects, the main constraint is the weak organizational
leadership of the association and the management group, changing the operators of mills
and / or inefficient operators. As well as the constant interference of some community
leaders.
Component 3 - Project Management
36. This component was designed to support Project management to use the funds in
accordance with the objectives and procedures and monitoring and evaluation. The main
activities carried out to date include: (i) project management including preparation of the
procurement plan to procure all goods, works and equipment for the project; (ii)
preparation of the mitigation measures for the sub-projects; (iii) verification of all
indicators intermediary indicators; (iv) completion of three surveys on outcome indicators
(baseline, 2013 and 2015 and end line data); (v) completion of the audits; and (vi) sub-
projects, (vii) organization of training for staff, including for monitoring and evaluation,
the project had produced two databases: Monitoring Information systems (MIS), training
database for Government staff, and Database on farmer Field Schools.
41
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
Appraisal stage assumptions
1. Appraisal stage economic and financial analysis was based on analysis of the
anticipated financial returns to farmers participating in the project and the overall
economic rate of return generated by increased crop production. It was assumed the
project would extend capacity building as well as basic agricultural and or marketing
knowledge to 126,000 smallholder farmers out of which, some 40,000 smallholders
would benefit from more intensive participatory farmer group-based agricultural
extension support (farmer field schools) and an estimated 24,000 smallholders would
benefit directly from productive investment subprojects.
2. The project was expected to increase crop production as a result of: (a) higher
productivity per unit of labor and land in the crop and farm models as applied to
smallholders with project as compared to smallholders without project; and (b) an
increase of the cropping intensity (i.e. area cropped) for smallholders with project as
compared to without project.
Table3.1: Cropping pattern of farm models
Beneficiary type Area in ha (Huambo/Bie model) Yield ton/ha, year 3 with project
Maize Beans Potato Total Maize Beans Cassava Total
Without project 1.20 0.15 0.15 1.50 0.50 0.30 2.50 2.80
Capacity building
& sub-projects
1.80 0.25 0.25 2.30 1.50 0.40 7.50 3.10
Capacity building
w/FFS
1.60 0.20 0.20 2.00 1.00 0.35 5.00 3.00
Capacity building
- basic
1.20 0.15 0.15 1.50 0.65 0.32 3.25 2.90
Table 3.2: Financial profitability of the farm models (Huambo/Bie model)
With/out project Without
project
Capacity building
& sub-projects
Capacity
building w/FFS
Capacity
building - basic
Net income in
US$
118 1 009 445 205
Increase in
income in US$
0
890
327
87
Increase in
income in %
0
755
277
73
Net income per
day in US$
1.5
6.4
3.7
2.6
Increase in
income per day in
US$
0
4.9
2.2
1.1
Increase in
income per day in
%
0
326
147
73
NPV in US$ 5 037 1 897 524
FIRR in % 156 217 9 101
42
3. The appraisal stage analysis showed high financial rates of return to increased crop
production and an Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of 21.1 percent.
Table 3.3: Total estimated impact on production
Groups of Products
Annual production
w/o the project - mt
Annual production
with the project - mt
Increase
%
Cereals (maize) 63 000 148 300 135
Pulses (beans) 5 198 7 458 43
Tubers (potatoes) 35 438 86 419 144
Roots (cassava flour) 88 200 111 850 27
Table 3.4. Net income Total Project
(126,000 families)
W/o Project
US$ per year
With Project
US$ per year
Increase
%
Gross production value 62 165 000 111 061 000 78
Production Costs 29 478 000 40 795 000 38
Net financial Incomes 32 687 000 70 266 000 115
ICR Economic and Financial Analysis
4. Approach. The ICR economic financial analysis follows the same logic as the
appraisal stage analysis and assess the quantifiable financial and economic benefits
generated by increased production and productivity among project beneficiaries.
5. Data collected through the project’s baseline survey and impact evaluation is
sufficient to undertake a basic economic and financial analysis. The baseline and impact
evaluation data provides evidence on yield increases and changes in total production at
the farm level among both beneficiary and control populations. Ex ante economic and
financial analysis of the follow on SADCP project provided an updated baseline of farm
and crop production models for farmers in the project area and have been used in this
ICR analysis as average production models at MOSAP project end. The sample size of
the impact evaluation is considered to be sufficient to generate a reliable picture of
production impact and average production values.
6. Outputs achieved by project completion stage. MOSAP beneficiaries
experienced higher average yield increases across all crops targeted by the project.
Annual surveys and the final impact evaluation also assessed increases in overall
production due to both increased yield and expansion of area under cultivation. Because
farming systems and production patterns differed across provinces data remains
disaggregated for purposes of the economic and financial analysis. While beans and
potato were grown across all three province cassava was promoted in Malanje, a drier
area where maize was less viable.
43
Table 3.5 Yield levels achieved Beneficiary
type
Yield ton/ha, baseline Yield ton/ha, year 3 with project
Maize Beans Potato Cassava Maize Beans Potato Cassava
Target 0.43 0.28 3.37 15.4 0.52 0.37 5.20 15.0
Control 0.43 0.30 3.99 16.4 0.66 0.45 7.10 18.2
Source: MOSAP Impact Evaluation Report
Table 3.6 Average production in target and control beneficiaries
Beneficiary
type
Average production per farmer –
baseline (tons)
Average production per farmer –year 3
with project (tons)
Maize Beans Potato Cassava Maize Beans Potato Cassava
Malanje
Target na 0.06 0.87 14.9 0.06 1.05 20.4
Control na 0.04 0.39 6.4 0.05 0.48 8.6
Huambo
Target 0.59 0.24 0.7 na 0.83 0.42 1.59 na
Control 0.62 0.20 0.9 na 1.08 0.26 3.02 na
Bie
Target 0.51 0.15 0.6 na 0.77 0.36 1.28 na
Control 0.36 0.11 0.4 na 0.55 0.18 0.90 na
na= data not available or production level negligible
Source: MOSAP Impact Evaluation Report
7. Only the incremental production generated by project beneficiaries is used in the
analysis in order to capture the portion of production increases that can be attributed to
MOSAP rather than the general rise in production experienced by both project and non-
project beneficiaries. In most cases both target and control groups increased production
although MOSAP beneficiaries increased production to levels higher than the control
group. Table 3.7 shows the “before and after” change in production within the target
group (project beneficiaries) and control populations as well as the net change
experienced by the target group above the control. These amounts are then applied to
beneficiary population within the provinces to generate an overall picture of the total
volume of incremental production generated by the project.
44
Table 3.7 Net production attributable to MOSAP interventions
Beneficiary
type
Net increase in production per farmer
(end of project average production minus
baseline average production)
(tons)
Incremental production per farmer
beneficiary attributable to MOSAP
(target group net increase in production
minus control group net increase in
production)
(tons)
Maize Beans Potato Cassava Maize Beans Potato Cassava
Malanje
Target na 0 0.18 5.5 na 0 0.09 3.3
Control na 0.01 0.09 2.2
Huambo
Target 0.24 0.18 0.89 na 0.24 0.12 0.89 na
Control 0.46 0.06 2.12 Na
Bie
Target 0.26 0.21 0.68 Na 0.07 0.14 0.18 na
Control 0.19 0.07 0.5 na
na= data not available or production level negligible
Source: calculated based on MOSAP Impact Evaluation Report
Table 3.8: MOSAP Beneficiary coverage # benefitting
from Sub-
Projects
# benefitting
from FFS
Total # benefitting from
project: Sub-projects, FFS
or general
training/extension support
Total # of farmers
in project area
comunes
Malanje 4,956 5,703 17,786 49,864
Huambo 3,661 5,491 14,705 47,787
Bie 4,002 11,238 22,491 103,134
12,619 22,432 54,982 200,785
Source: MOSAP Project Reports, MOSAP PAD
8. Economic rate of return. The stream of net income generated by the project is
calculated by applying the cost of production and current output prices to the incremental
production levels generated from the data above. The value of family labor is included to
incorporate the opportunity cost of labor. Because the productivity for both maize and
beans are low and labor costs are high, this latter calculation renders economic benefit
positive only for potato and cassava. Nonetheless, the stream of net benefits remains
positive and the net economic value of production is used to calculate the rate of return.
Table 3.9: Economic Value of incremental MOSAP Production
Maize Beans Potato Cassava
Total volume of
incremental annual
production
Malanje (tons) 0 0 1,601 58,694
Huambo (tons) 3,529 1,765 13,087 0
Bie (tons) 1,574 3,149 4,048 0
Total incremental
production (tons) 5,104 4,913 18,737 58,694
45
Average farmgate
price/kg (AOA) 26 92 61 20
Variable Production
Cost /kg (family labor
not valued) AOA *
25.7 53.7 18.0 3.0
Variable Production
Cost / kg (family labor
valued) AOA *
55.3 129.5 33.0 9.3
Net value of
production
Net Economic Value
of production (family
labor valued) AOA
-149,464,386 -185,017,421 528,683,550 650,861,568
Net Economic Value
of production
(USD)**
-931,010 -1,152,469 3,293,158 4,054,202
* Variable production costs estimated from updated farm budgets developed under SADCP baseline
scenario ** March 2016 official exchange rate: 160.5 AOA/USD
Table 3.10: Net benefit stream generated by MOSAP
9. The project’s economic rate of return is calculated at 13 percent based on a
conservative calculation of net benefits related to the value of increased production
observed at project end. This level is higher than the opportunity cost of capital and
therefore indicates the project generated a positive rate of return. It is lower than
appraisal estimates, however, which were based on a shorter time period for project
implementation, lower costs of for service provision and goods, and wider beneficiary
coverage.
10. The ICR ERR also likely represents a lower bound estimate of the project’s rate of
return as additional benefits would be expected from income generated through
productive assets such grinding mills, higher value crop production under irrigation sub-
projects, and spillover effects among non-project beneficiaries. The project’s investment
in capacity building is also difficult to quantify.
Table 3.11 Economic Rate of Return and NPV ICR stage Appraisal stage
ERR 13.1% 21.1%
NPV $5,347,126
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017-30
MOSAP
Disburseme
nts (USD)
300,000 26,344 3,339,512 11,346,389 7,090,182 5,789,532 3,362,857
Net value of
production
(USD)
5,263,880 5,263,880
Net income
stream
(USD)
-
300,000 -26,344 -3,339,512 -11,346,389 -7,090,182 -5,789,532 1,901,023 5,263,880
46
Efficiency in achieving other project outcomes
11. The efficiency of service delivery and capacity building was not assessed but the
project’s indications are that despite the challenges of Angola’s high cost environment
made cost effectiveness was prioritized to the extent possible through the use of
competitive service providers and in the case of FAO, some cost-sharing for service
delivery of farmer field school technical assistance.
47
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Arbi Ben Achour Consultant GSU11
Slaheddine Ben-Halima Consultant GGO05
Serigne Omar Fye Consultant GENDR
Luisa Moises Matsinhe Senior Executive Assistant AFCS2
Domingas de Fatima Rego
Pegado Program Assistant AFMAO
Franco Russo Senior Operations Officer GED02
Daniel Liborio Da Cruz Sousa Consultant GFADR
Joao Tinga Financial Management Specialist GGO13
Supervision/ICR
Pedro Arlindo Agric. Economist GFA07
Andrew Osei Asibey Consultant SACKB
Cary Anne Cadman Senior Environmental Specialist GEN02
Antonio L. Chamuco Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07
Meseret Kebede Senior Program Assistant LEGES
Mohinder S. Mudahar Consultant GWA01
Domingas de Fatima Rego
Pegado Program Assistant AFMAO
Joao Tinga Financial Management Specialist GGO13
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY05 77.79
FY06 190.35
FY07 407.48
FY08 176.03
Total: 851.65
Supervision/ICR
Total: 0.00
48
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results
(MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report: Executive Summary)
Objectives of the final evaluation
1. As the Market Oriented Smallholder Project (MOSAP) draws to an end, the
Project’s Management Unit (PMU) commissioned an end-line study, which would assess
and document the final project outcome in 2015 against the baseline values of 2012. It is
essentially a comparison of pre- and post-project intervention.
2. The study also intends to identify promising practices; challenges faced during
implementation and how those were overcome and addressed. As the final monitoring
and evaluation exercise, the report combines the annual performance indicator
monitoring together with the impact evaluation of the project. The study includes
qualitative and quantitative approaches with a variety of primary data sources including
participatory methods, which were the main focus on the identification and classification
of promising and best practices.
3.
4. The project's development objective is to increase the agricultural production
through provision of better services and offer investment support to rural smallholder
farmers in selected districts of Malanje, Huambo, and Bié provinces. The outcome
performance indicators that reflect the impact the project aims to produce, include, (i)
40% of the target smallholders adopting a set of improved agricultural technology
promoted by the Project; and (ii) an average increase of 10% of smallholder agricultural
production in the target areas. Thus, the report focuses on four key project indicators: (i)
percentage of project beneficiaries who have adopted an improved agricultural
technology promoted by the project; (ii) average yield of the main crops (maize, cassava,
beans and potato) of participating smallholder farmers; (iii) percentage increase in
agricultural production based on the crop index for the project area; and (iv) the
promising and best practices (PBP) promoted by the project.
Methodological overview
5. The methodology employed in the survey was developed with the view of ensuring
that the dataset structure for key project indicators is consistent with the baseline survey.
The current survey therefore applied the sample frame of 1,500 smallholder farm
families, distributed in proportions corresponding to the size of the intervention per
province as follows: 48% in Bié, 32% inMalanje and the remaining 20% in Huambo. The
total sample was divided into 30 clusters, spread in 25 wards (comunas) in the project
target areas and 25 areas identified as the control. Splitting the sample between target and
control areas has enabled the application of the Double Difference method of impacts
evaluation.
6. The data for this assessment was collected through a combination of quantitative
and qualitative methods, so as to provide the most accurate reading of the indicators. The
49
data quality concerning accuracy, reliability and validity was assured by a team of senior
agriculturalists with a vast experience in administration of field surveys.
7. Adoption rate in the context of MOSAP is defined as the proportion of beneficiary
farmers applying a given set of recommended, improved farming practices (IFP) per crop
during the growing season. A farmer was considered an adopter in Year 1, 2, and 3 if he
or she was found applying all three of the following practices grouped together in a
bundle, that comprise the technology adoption indicators: (i) seed selection; (ii) seed
placement i.e. the right amount of seeds per hole or the correct placement of cassava
cuttings on the ridge; and (iii) the proper plant spacing, both between and within rows.
8. Crop yield and production data were collected through a combination of cutting
and weighing methods together with the farmer reported harvest. The combination of the
two methods is justified because it balances off the drawbacks of either one.
9. A set of qualitative data collection instruments was used primarily for the
identification and classification of promising and best practices, promoted by the project.
These include focus group interviews with farmers organized in associations, and the
Discussion Oriented Self-assessment (DOSA) conducted together with the project’s
office and field staff.
Key project achievements
Adoption of improved farming practices – technologies
10. The project’s target was set to reach a rate of at least 40% adoption of improved
agricultural technology among project beneficiaries. The objective was met successfully,
in quantitative terms, reaching 61.5% adoption at the end of the project.
11. The adoption of maize seed selection practices has been reportedly high since the
first year of implementation. The final survey results show a 97.5% rate of adoption for
seed selection in Huambo and Bié, but it reaches universal levels in Mungo and
Londuimbali. In Bié, the districts of Chinguar and Andulo fall behind by only one
percentage point. All other districts reported seed selection adoption rates well above
85%. Maize planting (sowing) produces very little adoption with only one in five farmers
reporting the adoption of the recommended practices.
12. The adoption of cassava farming practices includes: the selection of the right size
of cutting; placing the cutting on the ridge in the right position; plant spacing, both within
and between rows; ensuring that the cutting has the right number of nodes; and checking
its humidity content. On average, only one in three farmers applied the correct plant
spacing. The adoption rates for the size of cassava cuttings is also low (37.9%),
indicating variations on the type of vegetative material available for planting. The
number of nodes has been adopted by a reasonably high proportion of farmers (59.6%).
The data shows that the humidity content and mode of planting are quickly adopted by
farmers, with the adoption rates situated above the 90% mark.
50
13. The adoption of seed selection practices on beans has reached almost universal
rates in all three provinces, but sowing and plant spacing fall below the average target of
40% in Huambo and Bie. Farmers in Malanje have done better on bean sowing rates
(47.2%), but plant spacing is below 6% adoption in all the districts.
14. The adoption of improved potato farming practices shows a clearly distinct and
rather unusual pattern. As with the other crops, the adoption of seed selection practices
has reached universal levels in a significant number of districts, particularly in Malanje.
Potato planting methods have reached high rates of adoption in all three provinces with
figures ranging from 64% in Bié to 91.1% in Malanje. The adoption of plant spacing
practices in potato production is less problematic that in the other three crops. In Malanje,
nearly 30% of the farmers have adopted the right spacing, whereas rates of 42.8% and
48.5% have been reached in Huambo and Bié respectively.
Factors influencing rates of adoption
15. Having a functional association with effective leadership has been a determinant
for the adoption of IFP, as well for the overall success of the project. Both the
quantitative and qualitative data provide supporting evidence for the fact that the
project’s strategy of organizing farmers in associations has enhanced the provision of a
comprehensive training package on Improved Farming Practices (IFP) as well as on
leadership skills.
16. This report shows the distinctive effect of the project, regarding reaching out to
farmers in the target areas through the associations. In 2012, not all farmers were keen to
participate in agricultural organizations – a behavior which seemed to be determined by
the perception of a lack of tangible benefits to be derived from the participation. The
situation has changed in the target areas over the last four years. The proportion of
villages with functional associations has grown from 44.5% in 2012 to 85.6% in 2015 in
the target areas. This is consistent with the percentage of farmers with association
membership, which rose from 27.9% in 2012 to 87.1% in 2015. This has had a positive
influence on the adoption rates which grew from 34% in 2013 to the current level of
61.5%.
17. A Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) model was used to identify key variables that had
a significant influence on the rate of adoption. Results have shown that, as in the previous
DTA model, the training provider is a strong determinant of adoption. It is found that
farmers who received training in Farmer Field Schools, in association with the local
Agricultural Development Stations (EDA) extension officers, were highly likely to adopt
the technology. Having previous knowledge of the improved farming practices was the
second-highest predictor of adoption. The results show that farmers who had some
knowledge of the improved agricultural practices before training were more likely to
become full adopters. The innovation factor was also found to be significant. Farmers,
who considered the IFP as an innovation to them, were highly likely to adopt the
prescribed recommendations. Farmer-to-Farmer extension is beginning to play a role in
51
adoption. Farmers who have received the training on improved farming practices from
other farmers (including FFS facilitators from a different village) had high adoption rates
with a significant predictive value for the model.
Crop Production Indicators
18. The crop production index is the key performance indicator, which provides an
aggregated measure of the increase in crop production in real terms. The 2011/12. The
three-year index trend shows a progressive increase in production of maize, cassava,
beans and potatoes. At the end of the project in 2015, the overall CPI was calculated at
166. However, CPI varied largely across individual crops.
Maize crop outcome indicators
19. The maize crop production Index at the end of the project is 142, which is
primarily attributed to production increases in Huambo and Bié. In Malanje, despite the
potential for high yields, maize cultivation remains limited to a few square meters per
farmer and the production is sold for the most part as green mealies. The Index for the
control areas is calculated at 102 representing a very modest growth from the year of the
baseline. The difference of 40 percentage points between the target and control areas
represents the impact of the project on maize production
20. Farmers in Huambo and Bié have not only recovered from years of poor crop
yields, but they have experienced growth in real terms. In 2012, the mean yield was
estimated at 0.43t/ha for farmers in both target and control areas. The current mean yields
are estimated at 0.75t/ha for Huambo and 0.77 t/ha for the province of Bié, an increase of
53.6%. The average yield in control areas is calculated at 0.52t/ha., an increase of 20.5%
over the same period. As a result, of the project’s intervention, farmers in the target areas
of Huambo and Bié have harvested on average 142kg more maize hectare than their
counterparts in the control areas – and this is the real impact of the project as far as maize
yield is concerned.
Cassava crop outcome indicators
21. Due to the self-commitment of farmers in Malanje, the cassava crop production
Index reached 151 at the end of the project. Farmers in control areas have also recovered
from poor crop years, yielding a crop Index of 130. This performance results in a 21
percentage point difference between the two areas, which considered the impact of the
project on cassava production. Although the impact is positive, this index level does not
reflect the full potential of cassava farmers in the target areas of Malanje. As a semi-
perennial crop, the project could not develop a comprehensive strategy to improve both
the yields and production to regional standards within the limited timeframe of the
project. And for the same reason, the efforts to improve cassava production was limited
to the target areas in Malanje province, whereas in Huambo and Bié the crop maintained
its marginal status for the entire life of the project.
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22. The final assessment data for cassava has estimated the yield of 18.2t/ha – a 10.9%
increase which was achieved only towards the end of the project. However, cassava
yields have fluctuated greatly during the project across all the target areas with the district
of Kiwaba Nzoji reporting a declining trend. A similar trend has been observed in control
areas with yields maintaining close to the baseline value of 15t/ha. Due to the
intervention of the project, farmers in the target areas have realized a real increase of 2.2t
of cassava per hectare on average.
Bean crop outcome indicators
23. The 2015 bean crop Index is calculated at 223, with farmers in Malanje
contributing the largest share of real growth. However, a bean crop production index of
166 in the control areas does indicate that farmers, in general, did make an effort to
increase their production. The difference in the crop production indexes between the two
areas is of 57 percentage points, representing in real terms, the impact of the project on
beans production.
24. It is irrefutable that the increase in bean production in the target areas is a major
consequence of the project’s intervention. The average area under cultivation per farmer
increased from 0.47 ha in 2012 to 0.64 ha in 2015. The previous monitoring and
evaluation reports indicate that many farmers became more seriously involved in bean
cultivation for the first time in 2013.
25. During the project, farmers in the target areas of Huambo and the Bié not only
recovered from the consecutive years of poor bean yields but they have also experienced
a reasonable increase in real growth. At the end of the project, the mean bean yield is
0.45t/ha, an increase of 46.9% from the base year. Without the project intervention – i.e.
in the control areas – the average bean yields is estimated at 0.37 t/ha, representing an
increase of 25.6% from a weak base year. As a result of the project, farmers in the target
areas have harvested on average 69.7Kg more beans per hectare than those in the control
areas.
Potato crop outcome indicators
26. Potato growers have realized the highest real growth, with a crop production Index
calculated at 394. This was also true for control areas where the Index is calculated at
576. Farmers in Huambo were largely responsible for the steep growth in potato
production in both areas. In fact, it is worth noting that the real growth of potato
production in Huambo is nearly twice as higher in the control areas as compared to target
areas – an outcome that was already predicted in the midterm monitoring and evaluation
performance surveys. The differential growth is 182 for the control areas, implying no
real impact of the project on potato production. However, the proportion of farmers
participating in potato production, as a result of the project, has doubled, contributing
further to the high volume of production recorded in the target areas. Even so, this was
not enough to outperform the good farmers in control areas who have brought large areas
under cultivation.
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27. On a rather positive note, potato yield in the target areas has grown from an
average of 3.9t/ha in 2012 to 6.9t/ha in 2015, whereas in the control areas yields have
grown from 3.2t/ha to 5.0t/ha over the same period. The overall differential impact of the
project is 1.3t/ha –an incremental growth that would not have been achieved without the
project.
Promising and Best Practices
28. Promising and best practices were identified through a combination of methods i.e.
the PBP Classification Scale and the Discussion-Oriented Self-assessment framework
(DOSA). The leading practices under review include: technical staff development;
staffing levels to ensure adequate monitoring of field activities; timely and participatory
planning of subprojects; women’s participation in project planning; delivery of extension
services through farmer field schools; and strengthening organizational capacity through
farmers training. The project’s model (design and implementation), though it is not a
practice as such, was also included in the PBP assessment.
29. The PBP classification scale ranges from 2 to 10 points, whereby a 2-point scale
means that a given practice is sufficiently innovative, and benefits have been identified.
The highest level of 10 means that a particular practice has reached full maturity, it is
deemed essential, and value has been proven.
30. As far as staffing requirements and project delivery are concerned, the PBP overall
classification is 7.9. This indicates that the project has made resources available for skills
development and enhance best technical practices. However, staffing levels were kept
low, to the point of compromising the practical implementation of monitoring and
evaluation activities. It did not reach the stage of a best practice but it is highly
promising, and it is close to maturity.
Another high-rank practice includes the provision of training to technical staff to enable
them to work more efficiently towards the strategic goals of the project. This practice
earned the classification of 7.0.
31. Staffing levels, to allow a timely monitoring of field activities, was largely
compromised during the project and therefore, the resulting PBP classification for this
practice is 5.5. Staffing levels have affected the monitoring of the utilization of inputs
distributed to farmers, a practice which is classified at 6.9. The monitoring of factors
hampering the adoption of the improved farming practices carries the lowest
classification score of 4.0.
32. On project programming practices, the classification of 8.1 was achieved for the
efficient delivery of extension services through farmer field schools. Participatory
identification and planning of projects were second with a classification of 7.0. The
practice of making project management decisions based on results from regular
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monitoring exercises began to develop late in the project cycle hence a low classification
of 5.1.
33. The creation of active farmers associations is considered an important practice of
the project, but it carries a low classification of 5.6. However, results of the focus group
interviews indicate that there is potential to advance into a best practice.
34. The implementation of the project through farmer’s associations has made it
possible for women to participate more in the planning of agricultural activities, together
with their male counterparts. The fact that women took seats in the subprojects selection
and approval committees, was considered as one of the best practices on gender
awareness, earning a PBP classification of 6.9. But the project did not go very far
regarding developing specific messages to improve women's farming practices, yielding a
low PBP classification of 5.5. Nonetheless, there is agreement that more female-headed
households had access to production resources than never before, a practice, which
produces a PBP classification of 6.6.
35. With a PBP classification of 8.5, it is agreed that the project’s design and
implementation model is sufficiently solid and consistent to be replicated in other parts of
the country.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the variations in the crop production index across districts, the project’s target
objectives were largely achieved. In fact, farmers have shown potential to reach higher
goals.
36. The first two performance evaluation surveys already provided an indication that
the project was on the right path to meet its target objectives. Looking at the 2015 crop
data, one could say that the project management team was conservative in setting its
goals – at least as far as crop production is concerned. Although smallholder crop
production is somewhat dependent on the rainfall distribution, these results indicate
clearly that this sector has the potential to reach much higher levels of production,
provided that farmers have the right commercial incentives. Farmer skepticism about
increasing crop production (cassava and potato in particular) beyond their current
marketing capability was also noted and documented. It suggests that any attempt to
increase the production of what is considered locally as a cash crop, with no provisions
for a secure market outlet, is likely to yield poor results.
The project has achieved a high rate of adoption given a four-year implementation
time frame. However, the regional pattern of adoption is highly pronounced, which
calls for a review of the current approach.
37. The adoption of farming practices of 61.5 percent is well above the project target
of 40%. However, one of the lessons that we take from monitoring the adoption rates
over the years is that the adoption of a given IFP is determined primarily by the weight of
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the crop in the farming system. This was very clear in the behavioral pattern of adoption
of maize and cassava IFP within Malanje and Huambo respectively. Therefore,
measuring the adoption rates for cassava in Huambo and Bié would make sense if the
project had a particular strategy to promote the production of this crop in the target areas.
38. A strategy to encourage the production of crops should go beyond the provision of
inputs; but include a service which supports the farmers to help them develop storage,
processing, and overall marketing strategies. Farmers need to understand the competitive
advantage of producing a new crop in order to adapt and adopt improved farming
practices. Since it was not the case, cassava kept its marginal status in a maize dominated
farming system, and vice versa. And this led to the second major lesson in adoption
indicators: unless the project has a comprehensive strategy to promote “foreign” crop
within a given farming framework, this crop should not be included in the training for the
adoption of IFP.
The adoption of some but not all of the IFP will be maintained in the years ahead.
39. The adoption rates for the IFP has shown a somewhat consistent pattern over the
past three years of project implementation. The 2015 final assessment data shows more
clearly that the adoption of seed selection techniques for all crops (including the selection
of cassava cuttings) has the potential to reach almost universal rates. It is most certain
that the newly acquired practices of seed selection will be maintained long after the
phase-out project stage. But the same cannot be said for the adoption of sowing (or seed
placement) and plant spacing practices.
The question regarding whether local farmers will be able to maintain the association
function after the project is complete, remains to be addressed. However, the presence
of strong leaders and the absence of multiple hierarchy structures at village level are
necessary conditions for the associations to remain functional
40. Perhaps the most important outcome of this project is that farmers in the project
target areas have demonstrated the potential to raise crop productivity far beyond the
historically low levels, as long as they are provided with the appropriate supportive
infrastructure and incentives. But the development of organizational and leadership skills
is as important as the supplying the production inputs to farmers. Effective membership
has grown substantially in the last three years in response to the increased supply of
production inputs – predicted in 2012. This type of supply-driven participation prompts
one to question the sustainability of the associations in the absence of the project.
41. The organizational and leadership skills training that farmers received in 2013
should continue, in order to reach members of the associations that did not have the
opportunity to participate. Refresher sessions could be introduced in Farmer Field
Schools (FFS) during the lean season. This may not be a sufficient condition to ensure the
associations continue to function, but a necessary element, reinforcing that the
association is not just a platform through which farm inputs are provided. In addition, the
number of members per association is critical for ensuring functional sustainability.
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Associations with strong leadership have limited the number of members to levels
between 30 and 50 and they have achieved better results than the larger associations. In
the event of a second project, MOSAP-2, these associations should be given an
opportunity to continue strengthening the internal organizational capacity and generate
the resources to enable further growth.
The relationship between project design and impact evaluation, developed by the
project is a lesson worth documenting and recommending for adoption across the
sector in Angola.
42. One of the most important attributes one of MOSAP, which deserves the
classification of a Best Practice, is the relationship the project has established between the
baseline survey and the post-project evaluation. The project implementation design took
into serious consideration the need to conduct a baseline study and an end of project
impact evaluation, which would assess, not only the performance of the impact indicators
over time, but it also attempt to provide answers to questions like what would the
productivity outcome of farmers in the target areas have been without a structured
intervention? This approach to project evaluation implies, in principle, that without the
intervention the impact of the variables (productivity and production) would be the same
for farmers in both control and targets areas. This dimension of evaluation is often taken
for granted in agricultural development projects in Angola. It is unquestionable that
MOSAP provides a valuable experience worth recommending for wide scale adoption in
the agricultural sector in this country.
The monitoring and evaluation of process, and impact indicators were one of the main
challenges of the project. Low staffing levels and reduced capacity to align the
planning and implementation of subprojects together with the M&E framework were
the main limitations, leading to an inadequate flow of data to inform programming
decisions.
43. The three years of field data collected from standard survey design does not
produce the best set of data for an accurate monitoring of crop productivity indicators.
The design methodology has to take into account the fact that the four crops promoted by
the project follow different growing cycles. Also, with the probable exception of some
areas in Malanje, most of the beans and potato crops are produced in two growing
seasons. Depending on the rainfall pattern, the crop grown in the two seasons produce
different yields, and much of the second season crop data is lost.
44. The 2015 survey provides more accurate estimates of potato yields because the
researchers made a unilateral decision to conduct the field data collection in two stages.
This approach is appropriate for the assessment of by-seasonal crops, but is not the case
with cassava, as the monitoring of production indicators poses a much greater challenge.
The fact that there is not a single cassava harvest season and uprooting follows specific
consumption and marketing needs, makes crop harvest estimates less accurate. Therefore,
the introduction of a cassava harvest diary needs to be introduced to improve
measurement of production indicators.
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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
(Report of stakeholder workshop in identifying lessons from MOSAP, translated from the
Portuguese)
1 Positive aspects of MOSAP
1. MOSAP was the first community investment project in the areas where it was
implemented and had several positive impacts:
• Increased the efficiency of using of time for productive purposes by reduction of
time spent on some activities such as grinding maize mail as the project provided
grinding meals;
• Increased in the cultivated area;
• introduction of more effective technologies of cultivation and therefore increase
the productivity and quality of the products;
• development and consolidation of associations;
• development of planning capacity of associations (preparation of project
proposals for funding, simplified feasibility studies among other activities);
• stimulated new development initiatives and emergency of new projects;
• emergency of some activities in cooperation with other associations
• increased capacity for negotiations with public support, improved responsibility
• improved knowledge of the market for acquisition of inputs and
commercialization such as PAPAGRO
2. In summary the project has achieved the following:
• increased income of the beneficiaries;
• increased the technical empowerment of the beneficiary farmers
• increased the capacity development of the associations and beneficiary farmers
• development of associations
• increased social capital
3. It will up to the SADCP project to capitalize and increase the positive impacts
achieved under MOSAP.
2 Negative signs and delayed opportunities
a) Negative signs
4. MOSAP was executed under specific conditions which explain the negative points
mentioned below which are worth to register:
• Lack of previous experiences with producer associations in the villages;
• Lack of field technical team;
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• Slow start up of the project of the project and unable to achieve any result before
changes in 2013;
• Lack of services providers to supply goods such as grinding mills and water
pumps, animals and inputs such as seeds and fertilizers and limitation of the
government programs to complement the project with its own resources.
5. However, some of the project norms and strategies may have provided negative
signs and stimulate negative behavior which contributed to the difficulties observed by
technicians and leaders.
6. The associations had very little participation in the preparation of the sub-projects
and most instances was enough to present a desire (“we want grinding mill”), without a
requirement to full formulate the project with a budget, implementation timeframe,
objectives and targets, projection of revenues and costs of production. Could be said that
the association were not stimulated to do this exercise.
7. During the implementation of the sub-projects, the associations had very little
participation. For most items (inputs and equipment), meanly those that were procured at
the central level, the associations were not asked to look for their own suppliers, examine
different options for procurement, etc. In some cases the associations never got in contact
with the supplier, which create problems for maintenance when the equipment required
technical assistance which create complete dependence on MOSAP intermediation.
8. Also during implementation, the associations were not stimulated to organize and
take part on the utilization of resources and look for solutions that would decrease the
cost. This was lost opportunity to participate in the management of a project that would
have enable them to participate in the registration of revenues and learn that they have to
be accountable.
9. The project also had a very small menu of sub-projects which in some cases
limited the support that the community was looking for from the project. In most cases
the project had informed that the sub-project that they were looking for is not part of the
list of the sub-projects support by MOSAP.
10. In some cases the beneficiaries reduced the cultivated area due to difficulties in
obtaining seeds and fertilizers at competitive prices, or they had reduced productivity as
the inputs arrived late. In addition the distribution of seeds and fertilizers by the
government bringing dependency and insecurity: the associations were not certain if they
will continue receiving the inputs, not sure about the criteria used to determine the
quantities for each associations and even if they want to pay not sure how payment could
be made to government.
11. With the objective to help the associations, MOSAP made a tremendous effort to
resolve the problem faced by associations (repair of equipment, acquisition of spare parts,
mobilization of technical staff and suppliers to resolve the problem). In most cases the
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project effort was critical for the success of the investment. But there was no clear
guidelines in the project to the beneficiaries to solicit this support.
12. This form of support in Brasil is called “dar um jeitinho-- giving a favor” which in
general increase the recognition of the people responsible for the project but does not
increase the growth of the association.
b) Training: Some delayed opportunities
13. The training provided by MOSAP may have left some opportunities:
14. First there is some disconnect with various capacity building initiatives. In the
Farmers Field Schools there is training, at the startup of the project there were other
trainings and also many other trainings provided by private consultants.
15. It is difficult to understand the training provided at various stages with various
service providers, how they link together. It is difficult to understand from the project this
link and how it contributed to the consolidation of the associations.
16. On the other side, apparently the training is done using traditional training
methods, teaching, a trainer providing training without knowledge of the real difficulties
of the target group and without promoting exchange among the groups. In this way it was
lost an opportunity to create space for cooperation between associations for knowledge
exchange.
17. Last MOSAP paid for the transport of participants. While the groups are low
income this may create dependency and if not paid do not participate.
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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
(MINAGRI Comments)
1. The ICR reflects well the main challenges faced by the project since its inception
to completion, including the results achieved. We would like to add the following lessons
learned as will be important for the implementation of SADCP project:
2. Improved Farmers organization through groups or associations increased
provision of assistance to smallholder and access to inputs, but continued assistance
is required for increased sustainability. It is a known fact that effective membership in
the farmers organizations and associations has grown substantially in the last three years
in response to the increased project assistance specifically on access to production inputs
but the farmers associations seem to be still in development stage and much more work is
required, particularly to ensure that all the members see the association as theirs. Farmers
have begun to realize that the development of organizational and leadership skills is as
important as access to the production inputs. In addition, the presence of strong leaders
and the absence of multiple hierarchy structures at village level are necessary conditions
for establishing and mainlining functional associations.
3. Development of smallholder capacity is key for increased sustainability. The
development of new capacity was the key to the success and sustainability of the actions
supported by the project. It allowed the strengthening of small farmers associations,
incorporate technological innovations, start new activities, manage production units in a
more efficient way and helped to reach markets in better conditions, using, for such, new
capabilities that remain after the project end. The experience demonstrates that only
associations consisting of small strong and solid agricultural farmers can identify their
own problems and solve them and, on the other hand, no poverty can be reversed without
generating income in a sustainable manner
4. Good communication and participatory planning was key for smooth
implementation. Meetings organized by the project implementation team with different
stakeholders involved in the implementation of the project during the implementation of
the project proved to be valuable opportunities for reflection by the various actors on
their own experiences and learning. People involved could speak openly about their
concerns; raise problems and dilemmas they were facing; and discussions emerged.
Several meetings were undertaken in order to identify communication bottlenecks in the
documentation system. These meetings also helped identify who was responsible for the
different information flows and established necessary frequency and deadlines for report
submission. By discussing and planning for these issues, the documentation system was
more likely to operate smoothly. Also, promoting networking by exchanging knowledge
and information, thereby increasing cooperation among different organizations. The
sharing of the information makes all involved in the project realize their participation and
feedback is indispensable in making needed improvements.
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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
(IFAD Comments and Lessons Learned)
1. The two IFAD and World Bank missions held consultations and interactions to
learn more about MOSAP’s achievements and lessons that could serve in shaping the
SAMAP design and fine-tuning the design of SADCP. In addition, A VC meeting was
organized between the IFAD’s Country Director, Ms. Abla Benhammouche and the WB
Senior Agriculture Specialist, TTL, Mr. Aniceto Bila.
2. The implementation of MOSAP was slow initially, with field activities having
started around mid-2012, some 2.5 years after effectiveness. Nonetheless, its
implementation progress has been encouraging since February 2012, when a new
coordinator and project team was designated to take over the project coordination and
implementation.
3. A field visit was organized in the three provinces where MOSAP was
implemented, i.e. Malanje, Bié and Huambo. The field visit lasted full three days and
included meetings with IDA, Municipal Administrators, Director Provincial Department
of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Extension and a large number of beneficiaries
at several locations in different municipalities. These meetings and field visits were
extremely valuable in reviewing the achievements under MOSAP as well as drawing
important lessons for the current design of the IFAD’s financed SAMAP (follow up
project under preparation by IFAD).
4. The main achievements were noted in the strengthening of the capacity of famers’
groups and associations, the strengthening of IDA technical staff through provision of
training in Participatory planning, Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS) and support to
investment for farmers through provision of financial resources to 282 sub-projects
benefiting 14,439 smallholder farmers. The activities financed include: Animal traction;
support to mechanized land preparation; and agricultural processing mainly grinding
mills.
5. The main results include: Increased in productivity in most crops supported under
the project, increased agro-processing of cassava and increased income of beneficiaries.
6. The main challenges after the project completion remain with the lack of exit
strategy, poor maintenance of the equipment provided to producers mainly grinding
mills, lack of veterinary services in places where farm animals have been provided, weak
ownership with farm associations and therefore overall sustainability.
7. Looking forward, for the design of SAMAP and SADCP projects, important
lessons should be considered, based on the preliminary findings of the joint WB and
IFAD ICR mission. Based on the MOSAP impact assessment report, PCR and
discussions held with the MOSAP management team, the Government, IFAD, the World
62
Bank and other stakeholders, a number of important lessons learned emerged that are
particularly relevant for the design of the SAMAP and SADCP projects.
Lessons learned from MOSAP
8. Performance of the PCU. Effective project implementation requires good project
management and intensive supervision, including functioning and sound monitoring
evaluation system. MOSAP was not able to deliver until 2013, when the management
team was replaced. Managerial and organizational problems seriously undermine the
implementation of MOSAP. For this reason, building coordination and management
capacity is crucial for delivering services of value to the beneficiaries.
9. It is critical that contracts allow for regular review of performance and
opportunities for renewal or termination, according to performance. There has also been
insufficient collaboration and learning between projects and till recently, inadequate
follow-up and support from IFAD.
10. Special attention should be devoted to improved monitoring and evaluation
systems that facilitate and document progress towards sustainability. Effective M&E of
field operations supports sustainability in multiple ways. First and foremost, it identifies
strengths and weaknesses in project implementation, which makes possible needed
adjustments in response to changes in the operating environment. Second, it can highlight
potential linkages among individual project components that enhance the overall impact
of programme interventions. Finally, it can establish reliable indicators of project
sustainability, which is a critical step in gauging progress towards key benchmarks and
formulating effective exit strategy.
11. Opportunities for knowledge management and learning are lost when M&E is not
used as a project management tool. Overall, Project M&E systems was not used as
project management tools. While the project regularly tracked outputs (training,
infrastructure projects, agricultural demonstrations, FFS, etc.), they were not actively
engaged in tracking outcomes or impact of project activities. Thus opportunities for
knowledge management and learning were often lost.
12. Exit Strategy. Among the most common and detrimental findings regarding the
sustainability of MOSAP is the prevailing lack of an exit strategy in the design document
and implementation plan. SAMAP (MOSAP follow up project under preparation by
IFAD) and SADC should lay out a comprehensive exit strategy linked to IFAD’s Angola
COSOP and WB Country Strategy framework. The Exit Strategy should include
identification of institutional capacity-building needs, a description of benchmarks for
measuring progress towards project objectives, specific action plans for achieving the
benchmarks, and a reasonably flexible timeline within which benchmarks will be met. It
is also important that an exit strategy draw on a range of specific exit criteria. In addition,
in order to put SAMAP and SADCP in the path of sustainability, the designs should
incorporate context-specific risk management measures into all activities.
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13. Sustainability. Sustainability relates to the likelihood that the benefit streams
generated by the project would continue after the project closure. While the project
embarked on important initiatives there are a number of issues and concerns with regard
to sustainability. One of the main issues with sustainability is that the participatory
approach has not been mainstreamed into government's regular development planning
and budgeting processes: in other words, the efforts for identification of community
needs based on a bottom-up approach are undertaken only when there is a "project".
Furthermore, the rushed implementation in the latter years prevented MOSAP from
giving enough time and attention to consolidate their support to farmer organizations and
thus their sustainability. However, the seven year-period of implementation cannot be
considered a reasonable time frame to ensure the sustainability of all the results produced
by the project.
14. Despite the benefits and positive views by the communities as well as the
government staff, the participatory development approach has still remained "project-
centered" and has not been mainstreamed into government planning. in addition, a
number of institutional and technical factors influenced the sustainability of MOSAP
component 2 i.e. Agricultural Investments. Sustainability of sub-projects assisting
farmers with agricultural production, processing and marketing should be ensured by
promoting community ownership and by building capacity of farmer groups to operate
and maintain equipment prior to hand-over.
15. In order to improve the SAMAP sustainability, the temptation to focus solely on
the achievement of physical and financial targets should be avoided. As seen during the
field visit, this has led to a failure to promote community ownership and to the premature
granting of responsibility for equipment maintenance to beneficiaries. It is also important
that the design and implementation of sub-project investment in agriculture be based on
an analysis of the technical capacity of beneficiaries. This may help define capacity-
building needs that will ensure that beneficiaries are able to adequately operate and
maintain equipment’s once the project ends.
16. Capacity building. Institutional and organizational support is often mistakenly
equated with training. Training is a part of institutional and organizational support but
cannot be identified with it exclusively. Institutional and organizational support should be
understood as a complex set of different activities, including the provision of incentives,
equipment, infrastructure and training, and also the implementation of policy-dialogue
activities aime at promoting an enabling environment for broader institutional
innovations and organizational expansion to facilitate scaling up.
17. Within the SAMAP and SADCP capacity strengthening should be demand-driven,
gradual and dynamic. Flexibility should always be integrated into project design in order
to allow room for learning and adjusting to changing circumstances. Trained individuals
need good leadership, support tools, equipment and operational budgets to enable them to
perform within the established procedures (planning, reporting and accountability), rules
and by-laws. However, even a farmer association, that has acquired the ability to plan,
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implement and monitor its own development plan, may become frustrated and feel
abandoned in the medium run if no financing is available to implement the plan.
18. Farmer Field School (FFS). Although the performance of FFS needs to be
evaluated, they are considered to be the right extension methodology and it was found
that the Master farmers as well as some members of the associations have grasped the
techniques for different crops. FFS is an effective platform for farmer organization and
empowerment, where smallholder farmers with a common interest can gain increased
production, productivity and access to market. This platform served an important role for
farmers both in terms of social and technical support. Farmers who participate in the first
phase of training of trainers become the Master Farmers (FFS-MF) who facilitate or
replicate the training to new farmers, thus achieving a geometric increase in the number
of farm families with strengthened capacities.
19. The chances of effective FFS network to grow, can be strengthened if care is given
in the SAMAP and SADCP to farmer-driven network development. Furthermore, in
order to build on best practice of using farmers as extension agents whilst ensuring their
sustainability post project, it is recommended that SADCP and SAMAP projects, should
facilitate farmer promoters to become agricultural input suppliers at the village level.
Within SAMAP, and SADCP outstanding farmers should be able to earn service fees in
delivering technological advices to their client farmers.
20. Value Chain. SADCP and SAMAP projects, should support a demand pull
strategy for agriculture. In order for farmers to meet consumer preferences with higher
returns and improved household incomes, future initiatives should be value chain
anchored as well as production-oriented. By focusing on both production and
consumption, it is possible to work for a “double win” scenario where the emerging
global market is taken into consideration.
21. Therefore, future operations in Angola should support market linkages and value
chain approach. Marketing under the MOSAP project was touched upon very slightly,
mostly in connection with the component 2. Analysis of market opportunities should be
carried out before investing in production systems, and training on business and
marketing aspects should complement production-oriented training. Long-term success
requires not only improved on-farm productivity but also opportunities for farmers to
have access to, and compete in, output markets. SADCP and SAMAP projects need to
provide institutional support for various marketing activities at several levels, including
assistance to farmer groups, members of groups or entrepreneurs for establishment and
initial operation via credit of marketing associations of agricultural produce or purchase
of inputs, private small and medium scale processing plants, equipped with storage
facilities and quality testing. Development interventions that support market linkages and
the value chain approach can stimulate diversification and investments that would lead to
availability of market produce and the strengthening of rural enterprises. They would,
further, bring closer the rural entrepreneurs to the market and would contribute to the
development of efficient schemes that will incorporate technical support, financing,
management and quality control.
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22. Consolidation. There is a need to strengthen the MOSAP sustainability, through a
consolidation phase to be considered in SADCP and SAMAP projects. This phase should
include: (i) improving the capacity of farmer associations, to manage their own sub
projects, while continuing to strengthen and supervise the recently established FFS which
are at different stages. More advanced training in managerial competency should be
provided, to strengthen farmer technical capacity, managerial competence; marketing
skills and organizational structures.
23. The organizational and leadership skills training that farmers received should
continue, in order to reach members of the associations that did not have the opportunity
to participate. Refresher sessions could be introduced in Farmer Field Schools (FFS)
during the lean season. This may not be a sufficient condition to ensure that the
associations continue to function, but a necessary element, reinforcing that the
association is not just a platform through which farm inputs are provided.
24. In addition, Sub-projects that largely consists of equipment requires close
examination to increase sustainability. The SADCP and SAMAP should increase the
support to farmers in preparation of business and management plans to increase
sustainability of these investments.
25. All these activities are key to increase the sustainability of the project after closing.
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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents
1. Project Appraisal Document (July 2008)
2. Restructuring paper (February, 2013)
3. Operations Manual
4. IFAD Credit Agreement
5. Aide Memoire (October 2008)
6. Aide Memoire (October 2009)
7. Aide Memoire (Oct-Nov. 2010)
8. Aide Memoire May/2010)
9. Aide Memoire (August 2011)
10. Aide Memoire (Jan – Feb 2012)
11. Aide Memoire (June 2012)
12. Aide Memoire (April 2013)
13. Project Progress Reports (2010-2015)
14. Government ICR (2016)
Project and M&E studies
15. Baseline Survey (2012)
16. Resumo das Lições Aprendidas e Sugestões para o SADCP (2015)
17. End of Project Impact Evaluation Study (2015)
18. Relatorio Fnal do Acordo IDA/MOSAP/FAO (2016)
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MAP