Ussif Rashid Sumaila (r.sumaila@fisheries.ubc.ca)Jackie AlderHeather Keith

Fisheries Economics Research UnitSea Around Us ProjectFisheries CentreUniversity of British Columbia

The cost of being apprehended fishing illegally

OECD IUU Fishing Workshop, April 19-20, 2004

Global picture of IUU Global picture of IUU incidenceincidence

Global picture of IUU Global picture of IUU incidenceincidence

Key elements of costKey elements of costKey elements of costKey elements of cost• Detection likelihood; – depends on enforcement & regulation;

• Amount of fine;

• Cost of avoidance; – depends on regulations & budget

allocated to activity;

• Impact on fishers’ moral and social standing in society.

• Detection likelihood; – depends on enforcement & regulation;

• Amount of fine;

• Cost of avoidance; – depends on regulations & budget

allocated to activity;

• Impact on fishers’ moral and social standing in society.

Perception of risk of IUU fishing by fishers

Perception of risk of IUU fishing by fishers

Costs and benefit aspects of risks inherent in IUU activity

Costs and benefit aspects of risks inherent in IUU activity

Vessel /

Gear Country

Arresting Country

Fishery Expected Revenue (USD)

Expected Penalty (USD)

Total Cost (USD)

Total Cost / Expected revenue

Deterrence fine when

Ø=0.2

Spain (longline) Australia Patagonian toothfish

504 000 87 000 526 091 1.04 0.75

Russia (pots) Japan Crab 38 256 1 483 31 131 0.81 5.8

Mexico

(bottom trawler)

Mexico Shrimp 22 060 1 091 16 428 0.74 6.2

China

(bottom trawler)

Russia Alaska pollack

8 818 234 4 539 0.51 19.4

Norway (longline)

Mauritius Patagonian toothfish

352 000 480 000 786 667 2.23 0.38

Case 1: Namibian fisheriesCase 1: Namibian fisheries

• … from

‘IUU Fishing Paradise’

• … to

‘IUU Fishing Hell’

– IUU fishing before independence– IUU fishing after independence

• … from

‘IUU Fishing Paradise’

• … to

‘IUU Fishing Hell’

– IUU fishing before independence– IUU fishing after independence

Case 2: Patagonian toothfishCase 2: Patagonian toothfish

• … high price of fish - the main attractor to IUU fishing;

• … also, the low detection likelihood - large area to patrol and few resources for the number of vessels fishing is a driver.

• … high price of fish - the main attractor to IUU fishing;

• … also, the low detection likelihood - large area to patrol and few resources for the number of vessels fishing is a driver.

Case 3: Northwestern AustraliaCase 3: Northwestern Australia

• … poverty among IUU fishers - the main driver of IUU fishing;– despite a high probability of getting caught

and severe penalty the need to generate an income is stronger;

– the alternatives to IUU fishing require even more (hard) work for much less economic benefits.

• … poverty among IUU fishers - the main driver of IUU fishing;– despite a high probability of getting caught

and severe penalty the need to generate an income is stronger;

– the alternatives to IUU fishing require even more (hard) work for much less economic benefits.

Summary resultsSummary resultsSummary resultsSummary results

• IUU fishing is widespread spatially;

… but fewer IUU activities in the northern hemisphere.

• Current fine levels are not high enough to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing. – Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being

apprehended, current fines need to be increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to serve as a deterrence

• IUU fishing is widespread spatially;

… but fewer IUU activities in the northern hemisphere.

• Current fine levels are not high enough to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing. – Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being

apprehended, current fines need to be increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to serve as a deterrence

Summary resultsSummary resultsSummary resultsSummary results

• … the probability of detection must be well above 0.2 for current fine levels to serve as a deterrent;

• Outside of EEZs there is no social driver constraining IUU fishing.

• … the probability of detection must be well above 0.2 for current fine levels to serve as a deterrent;

• Outside of EEZs there is no social driver constraining IUU fishing.

Summary resultsSummary resultsSummary resultsSummary results

• From case studies– Namibia

• it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly;

– Patagonian toothfish • when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is

high, a much higher detection probability and fine level are required to stop the activity;

– Northern Australian • when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence

models are not capable of explaining and providing solutions to the IUU problem.

• From case studies– Namibia

• it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly;

– Patagonian toothfish • when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is

high, a much higher detection probability and fine level are required to stop the activity;

– Northern Australian • when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence

models are not capable of explaining and providing solutions to the IUU problem.

Way forwardWay forward

• Enrich Sea Around Us project database to: – Further develop world incidence maps;– Expand the empirical work presented in table 1;

• More effort at determining the prevailing detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots;

• Extend the deterrence model so it can capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers are very poor .

• Enrich Sea Around Us project database to: – Further develop world incidence maps;– Expand the empirical work presented in table 1;

• More effort at determining the prevailing detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots;

• Extend the deterrence model so it can capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers are very poor .

Thanks for Thanks for your attentionyour attention

Thanks for Thanks for your attentionyour attention