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Trotsky's Analysis of StalinismThomas M. TwissPublished online: 19 Nov 2010.
To cite this article: Thomas M. Twiss (2010) Trotsky's Analysis of Stalinism, Critique: Journal ofSocialist Theory, 38:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/03017605.2010.522119
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Trotsky’s Analysis of StalinismThomas M. Twiss
From 1927 until 1940 Leon Trotsky consistently characterized Stalinism as a radical
departure from Leninism. However, during these years his analysis of Stalinism
underwent a substantial evolution. Initially, Trotsky defined Stalinism in terms of
a variety of undemocratic practices the leadership had substituted for Leninist norms, but
also in terms of a pattern of economic and international policies that deviated to the
right of Leninism. Trotsky associated both aspects of Stalinism with the phenomenon of
bureaucratism, understood as the growth of bourgeois influence within Soviet political
institutions. When this understanding was challenged by the radical shifts in Soviet
economic and Comintern policy of 1928�1933, Trotsky adjusted his analysis of Stalinism
to emphasize the autonomy of the Soviet bureaucracy. However, at the same time he
continued to insist upon the essential correctness of his earlier views. The result was
a growing distortion in Trotsky’s interpretation of reality, and an increasing incoherence
in his analysis of Stalinism. Ultimately, two major events led Trotsky to revise his
analysis of Stalinism fundamentally: the disastrous failure of Comintern policy in
Germany in 1933 and the wave of repression following the Kirov assassination in 1934.
Together, these events impelled Trotsky to redefine Stalinism in terms of a political system
characterized by the bureaucracy’s high degree of autonomy from social classes. This view
received its fullest expression in Trotsky’s classic work The Revolution Betrayed. In this
and other later works Trotsky provided a complex and nuanced account of the origins of
Stalinism and of its relationship to Bolshevism.
Keywords: Trotsky; Trotskii; Stalinism; bureaucracy; Soviet
An appropriate starting place for considering the relationship between Stalinism
and Leninism is a reexamination of the views of Leon Trotsky on the subject.1 Of
1 This article is based on a paper presented on 14 November 2009 at a panel discussion of the topic ‘Did
Leninism Lead to Stalinism?’ at the national conference of the American Association for the Advancement of
Slavic Studies, and on Thomas Marshall Twiss, ‘Trotsky and the Problem of Soviet Bureaucracy’ (PhD
dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2009), http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-04222009-112811/.
Many other works have been devoted to Trotsky’s views on Stalinism and/or Soviet bureaucracy, including Perry
Anderson, ‘Trotsky’s Interpretation of Stalinism’ in Tariq Ali (ed) The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on 20th Century
World Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 118�128; Siegfried Bahne, ‘Trotsky on Stalin’s
ISSN 0301-7605 (print)/ISSN 1748-8605 (online) # 2010 Critique
DOI: 10.1080/03017605.2010.522119
Critique
Vol. 38, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 545�563
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course, Trotsky was one of the first to discuss the phenomenon of Stalinism; and he
addressed that subject more extensively and systematically than anyone else has ever
done. Furthermore, the influence of his thinking on that question has been
profound. This was noted in 1958 by the political philosopher John Plamenatz who
asserted, ‘As an indictment of Stalinism, Trotsky’s account of Soviet Russia is
formidable. So much so, indeed, that some version or other of it has been adopted
by nearly all of Stalin’s more plausible critics.’2 Similarly, in 1988 historian Henry
Reichman observed that ‘it is Leon Trotsky’s critique that continues to shape key
elements of what many scholars*including some otherwise hostile to Marxism*regard as Stalinism.’3 Even since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Trotsky’s most
important work on Stalinism, The Revolution Betrayed, continues to be cited
frequently in academic literature.4
From 1927 until his death in 1940, Trotsky consistently argued that Stalinism
represented a radical departure from Leninism. However, over the course of these
years his analysis of Stalinism and of the related phenomenon of Soviet
bureaucracy underwent a substantial evolution. This article will sketch the
development of Trotsky’s thinking on these questions, and will conclude with
some general remarks on his understanding of Stalinism and of its relationship to
Leninism.
Russia’, Survey, 41 (1962), pp. 27�42; Peter Beilharz, Trotsky, Trotskyism and the Transition to Socialism (Totawa,
NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987); Martin Krygier, ‘‘‘Bureaucracy’’ in Trotsky’s Analysis of Stalinism’, in Marian
Sawer (ed) Socialism and the New Class: Towards the Analysis of Structural Inequality within Socialist Societies,
APSA Monograph No. 19 (Sydney: Australasian Political Studies Association, 1978), pp. 46�67; Martin Krygier,
‘The revolution betrayed? From Trotsky to the new class’, in Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier (eds)
Bureaucracy: The Career of a Concept (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), pp. 88�111; David Law, ‘Trotsky in
Opposition: 1923-1940’ (PhD dissertation, University of Keele, 1987); David W. Lovell, Trotsky’s Analysis of
Soviet Bureaucratization: A Critical Essay (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Michael M. Lustig, Trotsky and Djilas:
Critics of Communist Bureaucracy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Robert H. McNeal, ‘Trotskyist
Interpretations of Stalinism’, in Robert C. Tucker (ed) Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1977), pp. 30�52; and Emanuele Saccarelli, Gramsci and Trotsky in the Shadow of
Stalinism: The Political Theory and Practice of Opposition (New York: Routledge, 2008).2 John Plamenatz, German Communism and Russian Marxism (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1954),
p. 303.3 Henry Reichman, ‘Reconsidering ‘‘Stalinism’’ ’, Theory and Society, 17:1 (1988), p. 67.4 A search of the ISI Web of Science databases (Social Sciences Citation Index, Arts and Humanities Citation
Index, and Science Citation Index) on 20 June 2006, revealed 51 citations in scholarly literature for all English
language editions of The Revolution Betrayed during the years 1992�2006. By way of comparison, there were
52 citations for Trotsky’s The History of the Russian Revolution; 22 citations for all English language editions of
Roy Medvedev’s Let History Judge, and ten citations for all English language editions of Stephen Cohen’s
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A search of the OCLC WorldCat database on 6 June 2006 turned up 1,151
library holdings of all English language editions of The Revolution Betrayed, indicating this is a popular title for
libraries according to the ‘brief test’ methodology devised by Howard White. See Howard White, Brief Tests of
Collection Strength: A Methodology for All Types of Libraries (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 123�129.
546 T. M. Twiss
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Stalinism and Bureaucratism, 1926�1927
It seems that Trotsky’s first written use of the term Stalinism was in an oppositional
declaration written on 28 June 1927.5 At that point the Joint Opposition, consisting
of the supporters of Trotsky, Gregory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, had been locked in
a party struggle for more than a year with backers of Stalin and of the moderate wing
of the party leadership. In his statement of 28 June, Trotsky responded to an
escalation of rhetoric against the opposition by Stalin who, challenging the loyalty of
the opposition, had spoken of an alleged ‘united front from [British foreign secretary]
Chamberlain to Trotsky.’ Here, Trotsky described this and the earlier accusations that
the opposition wanted to ‘rob the peasants’ and ‘to cause a war’, as ‘slogans of
Stalinism [stalinizm] in its fight with Bolshevism, in the person of the Opposition.’6
In other statements over the next few months he and the opposition clarified more
precisely what they meant by Stalinism, defining it in terms of two distinct types of
policies and doctrines that they saw as differing dramatically from the policies and
doctrines of Lenin.
In part, when Trotsky and the opposition spoke of Stalinism in 1927 they were
referring to various undemocratic practices the leadership had substituted for
Leninist norms, especially within the party regime. Thus on 4 August 1927, Trotsky,
with a dozen other opposition leaders, signed a statement to the Central Committee
and Central Control Commission which noted the radical difference between the
‘profound party spirit and methods’ of Leninism and those of ‘Stalinism’.7 In this
period Trotsky and the opposition identified a number of specific policies related to
the regime that they explicitly contrasted with the policies of Lenin. These included
the increasing selection of party officials by appointment rather than election; the
selection of economic workers on the basis of their support for the leadership
majority rather than for their skill or initiative; the increasing independence of the
Secretariat from the control of the Politburo; restrictions of the right of all party
5 The basis for this conclusion is a computer search for the term stalinizm in two collections of opposition
documents, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR. 1923�1927, and Arkhiv L. D. Trotskogo on the website of
Yury Felshtinsky, http://www.felshtinsky.com/index1.html. In the first of these collections, Felshtinsky included
‘practically all the documents of (Trotsky’s) archives from 1923�27 which relate to questions of internal policy
and the struggle for power in the Soviet leadership.’ In the second, he included additional documents from the
archives for the years 1927�1940*the volume for 1927 dealing primarily with the Chinese revolution. Robert
McNeal has suggested that ‘The Declaration of the 83 and Our Tasks’ dated 27 April 1927 was perhaps the first
occasion on which Trotsky spoke of Stalinism. McNeal explains that Trotsky wrote there ‘of the errors of the
‘‘Stalinist group’’ and of an approaching crisis ‘‘in its Stalinist sense’’ ’. Robert McNeal, ‘Trotckij and Stalinism’, in
Francesca Gori (ed) Pensiero e azione politica di Lev Trockij: atti del convegno internazionale per il quarantesimo
anniversario della morte, vol. 2 (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1982), p. 378. In fact, according to a note by Trotsky, this
statement was probably written by Zinoviev. The term stalinizm does not appear there; rather, the term used was
stalinskii*sometimes translated as the adjective Stalin and sometimes as Stalinist. See Iu Fel’shtinskii (ed)
Kommunisticheskaia oppositisiia v SSSR, 1923-1927, vol. 3 (Moscow: TERRA, 1990), p. 82. Furthermore, the term
stalinskii had been used by Trotsky at least as early as June 1926. See Fel’shtinskii, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 237.6 Fel’shtinskii, op. cit, vol. 3, p. 214.7 Fel’shtinskii, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 49; Leon Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1926�27), ed. Naomi
Allen and George Saunders (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1980), p. 266.
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members to appeal their differences to the party through the party press and at party
meetings; limitation upon the right of party members to familiarize themselves with
all conflicting viewpoints within the party; the use of distortion and slander against
political opponents instead of a comradely discussion of differences; the forcing of
party members to vote under threat of repression for the positions of the Central
Committee; and the actual repression of party dissidents by political reassignment,
exile and termination of employment.8
Also in this period Trotsky asserted that Stalinism was largely defined by a pattern
of economic and international policies and doctrines that deviated to the right of
Leninism. In a speech to the Central Committee on 23 October 1927 he observed that
the political line of the leadership had shifted in recent years ‘from left to right: from
the proletariat to the petty bourgeois, from the worker to the specialist, from the
rank-and-file party member to the functionary, from the farmhand and the poor
peasant to the kulak, from the Shanghai worker to Chiang Kai-shek, [etc.]’ In that,
he asserted, ‘lies the very essence [sut’] of Stalinism.’9
As far as economic policy was concerned, Trotsky and the opposition contrasted
both the industrial and agricultural policies of the current leadership with Lenin’s.
Thus, in its 1927 Platform the opposition observed that Lenin had supported the
‘proletarian course’ of developing industry in order to enable the cities to boost
agricultural productivity and encourage small farmers to adopt large-scale collective
farming. In agriculture Lenin had advocated that the Soviet state rely upon the poor
peasant, while reaching an agreement with the middle peasant and continuing its
struggle against the kulak.10 In contrast, the Stalin�Bukharin leadership had rejected
the acceleration of industrialization as a means of transforming agriculture, and had
placed its bets upon the ‘‘‘economically strong’’ peasant, i.e., in reality on the kulak.’11
Similarly, Trotsky and the opposition denounced the leadership majority for its
rightist deviations from Leninist international policy, especially in Britain and China.
In a statement written in July 1926 the opposition noted that, although Lenin had
supported temporary blocs with opportunist labor leaders, he had advocated
breaking with them whenever they betrayed the proletariat. In contrast, during this
period the Stalinists had insisted upon maintaining an alliance with the opportunist
leaders of the British Trades Union Congress, even after they had betrayed the British
general strike of 1926.12 Additionally, in May 1927 Trotsky observed that Bolshevism
always had required a clear ‘political and organizational demarcation [of the party of
the proletariat] from the bourgeoisie’, and a ‘relentless exposure of the bourgeoisie
from the very first steps of the revolution.’ Instead of this, during the upsurge in
China of 1926�1927, Stalin and his supporters had pursued a Menshevik course,
attempting to maintain a united front with the Chinese bourgeoisie by adapting the
8 Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), p. 82, 166, 233, 236, 247, 248, 294, 352, 353, 358, 441.9 Fel’shtinskii, 4, p. 221; Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), p. 442.10 Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), p. 309, 310, 322.11 Ibid., pp. 104, 310, 322.12 Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on Britain (New York: Monad Press, 1973), p. 256.
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policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to those of the Chinese capitalists,
and even subordinating the CCP organizationally to the bourgeois Guomindang
party.13
Regarding doctrine, the theory that for Trotsky most clearly typified Stalinism was
the theory of socialism in one country. In a speech to the Fifteenth Party Conference
in November 1926, Trotsky noted that Lenin had believed ‘the joint efforts of the
workers of several advanced countries are needed for the victory of socialism.’ Against
this, Stalin had affirmed the ‘possibility of completely constructing socialism by the
efforts of a single country.’14 For Trotsky, this theory again revealed the conservatism
of Stalinism in relation to both economic and international policy. As far as domestic
economic policy was concerned, it rationalized an isolationism that artificially
retarded Soviet economic development; regarding international policy, it exposed a
deep pessimism in the prospect of world revolution.15
As Trotsky viewed it during this period, both the undemocratic and the politically
conservative characteristics of Stalinism were simply expressions of the two different
sides of the bureaucratism that he saw as increasingly pervasive in Soviet institutions.
In part, Trotsky employed bureaucratism (biurokratizm), or occasionally bureaucracy
(biurokratiia), to refer to the growing alienation of the institutions of power from the
Soviet masses. Thus, for example, in the spring of 1926 Trotsky asserted that the
‘unlimited domination of the party apparatus’ constituted the ‘essence of bureaucracy
[sushchnost’ biurokratii].’16 At the same time, according to Trotsky and the
opposition, bureaucratism also involved the increasing subordination of Soviet
institutions to alien (non-proletarian) class interests. The 1927 Platform asserted,
‘The question of Soviet bureaucratism is not only a question of red tape and swollen
staffs. At bottom it is a question of the class role played by the bureaucracy, of its
social ties and sympathies, of its power and privileged position, its relation to the
NEPman and the unskilled worker . . . etc.’17
As Trotsky explained it, the simultaneous growth of these two aspects of
bureaucratism and Stalinism could be traced to major shifts that had occurred in
the relative strength of social classes within the Soviet Union, especially since the
onset of Lenin’s final illness. In June 1926 Trotsky argued:
‘The fundamental cause of bureaucratization must be sought in the relationsbetween classes. . . . The bureaucratization of the party . . . is an expression of thedisrupted social equilibrium, which has been and is being tipped to thedisadvantage of the proletariat. This disruption of the equilibrium is transmittedto the party and weighs upon the proletarian vanguard in the party.’18
13 Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on China (New York: Monad Press, 1976), pp. 168�169. See also p. 161, 164,
223�225, 257.14 Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), pp. 155, 157.15 Ibid., pp. 161�162, 183.16 Ibid., p. 65; Fel’shtinskii, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 233.17 Ibid., p. 341; Fel’shtinskii, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 139.18 Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), p. 68.
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Trotsky argued that, by the early 1920s, the Soviet proletariat was exhausted by the
exertions of revolution and civil war and demoralized by the inevitable gap between its
expectations and the realities of revolutionary power. Consequently, the proletariat had
retreated into passivity. Meanwhile, the restoration of market relations under the New
Economic Policy, though essential for economic recovery, had promoted the growth in
size and economic influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements, which had
become increasingly self-confident. This shifting in the relation of class forces had
exerted a rightward pressure upon the apparatuses of all the major political and social
institutions of Soviet society. Under this pressure, the party leadership had adopted
policies beneficial to these alien elements, and this in turn had contributed to the
further disruption of class equilibrium. At the same time, in order to implement its
rightist policies, the leadership had been compelled to resort to undemocratic practices
and repression, especially against the revolutionary, proletarian section of the party, the
opposition. Consequently, the party found itself trapped in an enormous vicious circle:
shifting class forces had engendered rightward lurches in policy and increasing
repression, all of which had further disrupted the class balance.19
As Trotsky perceived it in 1926�1927, the Stalinist current that had been brought
to power by this process was ‘centrist’ in nature, occupying a position midway
between the revolutionary proletarian position of Leninism and the complete
opportunism of the party right. Thus, the centrism of Stalinism demonstrated
both the extent and the limits of the leadership’s break with Leninism. The danger,
however, was that new defeats of the proletariat or the opposition might weaken the
resistance of the Soviet working class even more, resulting in a further shift of power
to the right within the party, and possibly even bringing about the restoration of
capitalism. Trotsky described the most likely path of such a restoration as
‘Thermidor’, after the 9th of Thermidor, Year 2 in the French revolutionary calendar
(27 July 1794), the date when Robespierre was overthrown. As he defined it in the
summer of 1927, Thermidor was ‘a special form of counterrevolution carried out on
the installment plan . . . and making use, in the first stage, of elements of the same
ruling party*by regrouping them and counterposing some to others.’20
The goal of the opposition, then, was to block capitalist restoration, and to
reinstitute the proletarian policies of Leninism. The opposition’s strategy for doing
this was explicitly reformist. As Trotsky reasoned in December 1927, since power had
‘not yet been torn from the hands of the proletariat’, it was still possible to rectify the
‘political course, remove the elements of dual power, and to reinforce the dictatorship
[of the proletariat] by measures of a reformist kind.’21 Furthermore, since any
attempt to establish a second party would have set the opposition on the road of
revolution, the opposition was obliged to conduct its struggle within the limits of the
19 See, for example, ibid., pp. 69�72, 76, 96, 103�104, 122, 166, 170, 206�208, 233, 241�242, 246, 254�255,
295, 299, 306, 355, 378, 390�391, 403, 407, 445, 452, 474.20 Ibid, p. 263. Alternatively, Trotsky noted, it was possible there could be a ‘decisive and sharp overturn
(with or without intervention).’ Ibid., p. 260.21 Ibid., p. 489. See also ibid., pp. 267, 476.
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Communist Party. Thus, at the fifthteenth Party Conference in November 1926
Trotsky explained, ‘Those who believe that our state is a proletarian state, but with
bureaucratic deformations . . . these must use party methods and party means to
combat that which they hold to be wrong, mistaken, or dangerous.’22
Stalinism and the Left Turn, 1928�1933
Trotsky’s analysis of Stalinism and Soviet bureaucratism in the late 1920s was elegant
and insightful, and it seemed quite plausible at the time when it was first articulated.
However, as Isaac Deutscher has noted, it ‘fitted the realities of later years less well.’23
In late 1927 Trotsky predicted that if the opposition were crushed and if no major
proletarian upsurge occurred, the most likely results would include the disintegration
of the centrist current, the conquest of power by the party right, the shifting of the
party’s economic and international policies further to the right, and the probable
restoration of capitalism.24 In fact, the opposition was beaten decisively at the end of
1927 and thousands of oppositionists, including Trotsky, were exiled to remote
regions of the Soviet Union. However, instead of moving to the right, the party
leadership initiated a policy shift that Trotsky and the opposition perceived as left in
nature. Beyond that, instead of dissolving, the Stalinist current emerged triumphant
in a power struggle with its moderate opponents. Then, without any evident increase
in proletarian or oppositional activity, in 1929�1933 the leadership appeared to veer
even more sharply to the left, adopting industrialization and collectivization targets
and Comintern policies that were so radical they fell entirely outside of the
framework assumed by Trotsky’s analysis. Finally, despite these shifts, the leadership
continued to deviate ever further from the Leninist norms of workers’ democracy as
Trotsky and the opposition understood them.
From exile, Trotsky denounced the policies of the Stalin leadership in the early 1930s
just as sharply as he had criticized those of the late 1920s. Now, however, he found
himself in the unaccustomed position of criticizing leadership’s policies from the right.
Thus, he ridiculed the ‘bureaucratic adventurism’ of the industrialization targets of the
first Five-Year Plan, the ‘naked bureaucratic violence’ of the dekulakization campaign,
and the economic irrationality of wholesale collectivization.25 Furthermore, he
condemned the ultra-leftism of the new Comintern line, especially in Germany, where
he repeatedly warned that the Communist rejection of a united front with the Social
22 Ibid., p. 163. See also ibid., pp. 267, 293, 401.23 Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, Trotsky: 1929�1940 (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 93.24 For these predictions, see ‘At a New Stage’ in Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), pp. 488�509.25 For admissions by Trotsky that the opposition was criticizing the latest policies of Stalinism from the
‘right’, see Trotsky, Writings (1930), 66, 96, 169�170. For Trotsky’s criticisms of the excessive industrialization
targets of the first Five-Year Plan, see, for example, Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1929) (New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1975), p. 402; Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1930) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975),
pp. 115, 116, 124, 130, 147; Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1930�31) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973),
pp. 98, 100, 182�183, 230; Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973),
pp. 66, 261. For Trotsky’s criticisms of dekulakization and collectivization, see for example, Trotsky, Writings
(1929), p. 360; Trotsky, Writings (1930), pp. 109�110, 136, 173, 200�201, 203; Trotsky, Writings (1932), p. 270.
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Democrats was leading to a Nazi victory.26 At the same time, he also attacked what he
perceived to be the party leadership’s continuing deviations from the Leninist norms of
proletarian democracy, including its repression of oppositionists to its left and right,
and the growing concentration of power in the hands of Stalin and his closest
supporters.27
However, even while criticizing Soviet economic policy and Comintern policy from
the right, Trotsky continued to insist upon the essential correctness of his earlier analysis
of Stalinism and Soviet bureaucratism, and to attempt to utilize it to understand what
was happening. His efforts to do so resulted in a series of statements and predictions
that seem deeply misguided. In 1928 and 1929, Trotsky’s perception of a necessary link
between the leadership’s violations of proletarian democracy and its conservative
policies inclined him to doubt the seriousness and reliability of the turn.28 At the same
time, his theory led him to conclude that to the extent a turn had occurred, it had been
brought about by oppositional pressure,29 and also to predict repeatedly that, unless
oppositional or proletarian pressure increased, the leadership would soon shift back to
the right.30 In the following years Trotsky’s theory continued to distort his perception of
events. For example, it led him to reaffirm that proletarian or even oppositional
pressure was responsible for the leadership’s shift to the left;31 it inspired him to endorse
the leadership’s assertions that collectivization represented a spontaneous movement by
the peasantry;32 it induced him to accept at face value the validity of the charges in the
specialist show trials of 1928, 1930 and 1931, and to attribute the excesses of the
industrialization and collectivization campaigns to capitalist sabotage;33 and it impelled
26 For Trotsky’s criticisms of Comintern policy in Germany during this period, see Leon Trotsky, The Struggle
against Fascism in Germany (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), pp. 1�139.27 Trotsky, Writings (1930), pp. 23, 79, 80, 145, 157�158, 206, 232, 253, 255�256, 257; Trotsky, Writings
(1930�31), pp. 61, 63, 118�123, 217; Trotsky, Writings (1932), pp. 15, 18, 38, 65, 68, 124; Leon Trotsky, Writings
of Leon Trotsky (1932�33) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), p. 107.28 See, for example, L. Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1928�29) (New York: Pathfinder Press,
1981), pp. 91�92, 114, 128, 138, 139, 149, 153, 303, 363; Leon Trotsky, The Third International after Lenin (New
York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 299�301; Trotsky, Writings (1929), pp. 135�136, 200, 202, 327, 359�360, 376�377; Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969), p.
134.29 Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 78, 98, 106, 258, 306; Trotsky, Third International, p. 273; Trotsky,
Writings (1929), pp. 200, 229, 251, 280, 281, 367; Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky: Supplement (1929�33)
(New York: Pathfinder Press, 1979), p. 19.30 Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 99�100, 159; Trotsky, Third International, pp. 291�292; Trotsky, Writings
(1929), pp. 136; 201; 398.31 See Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 78, 98, 106, 147, 154, 161, 258, 262; Trotsky, Third International,
pp. 165�166, 258, 273; Trotsky, Writings (1929), pp. 229, 251, 280, 281, 367; Trotsky, Writings (1930), pp. 106,
136; Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), pp. 103, 215, 227; Trotsky, Writings (1932�33), p. 49.32 Ibid., pp. 108�109, 110�111. See also ibid., pp. 132, 179; Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), p. 84.33 See Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 96, 115, 141, 149, 218, 330; Trotsky, Third International, p. 293;
Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), pp. 66�69, 112, 192�195, 198, 200�201, 206, 216, 219, 307.
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him to warn repeatedly that the leadership was about to veer back to the right and
institute a Thermidor.34
Nevertheless, there were times when Trotsky appeared to be at least partially aware
that the understanding of Stalinism and bureaucratism he had articulated in the late
1920s was inadequate for comprehending the realities of the early 1930s. Thus, during
this period Trotsky introduced into his analysis a number of implicit and explicit
adjustments, all of which tended to emphasize the autonomy of the bureaucracy in
relation to social classes. Increasingly, he identified the fundamental problem of
Stalinism not with the disease of bureaucratism (biurokratizm) infecting the
apparatuses of the political organizations of the Soviet Union, but with a social
formation*a combined party-state bureaucracy (biurokratiia)*that had usurped
power.35 In this period he frequently attributed the extremes of Soviet economic and
Comintern policy to such subjective factors as the panic, excitement or sheer
stupidity of the leadership or bureaucracy, rather than to class pressure.36 While
continuing to characterize Stalinist policy politically as ‘centrist’ or ‘bureaucratic
centrist’, Trotsky began to redefine the range of positions typical of centrism, so that
now he sometimes described it as vacillating between opportunism and ultra-leftism,
rather than between opportunism and Marxism.37 Finally, in the same period,
Trotsky tended to explain the worsening of the regime not by a shifting balance of
34 For Trotsky’s repeated warnings about a new turn to the right, see Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 139,
173�175, 274, 314, 316, 318�320, 321�328, 334�335, 337, 338, 363; Trotsky, Writings (1929), pp. 49�50; Trotsky,
Writings (1930), pp. 114, 116, 123, 138-139, 174, 204; Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), pp. 51, 61, 221, 285; Trotsky,
Writings (1932), p. 276; Trotsky, Writings (1932�33), pp. 46, 49, 75, 80, 102�103; Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon
Trotsky, Supplement (1929�33) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1979), p. 25.35 See, for example, Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), p. 295; Lev Trotskii, Pis’ma iz ssylki, ed. Iu. G. Fel’shtinskii
(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo gumanitarnoi lituratury, 1995), p. 225; Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 313, 315;
L. Trotskii, ‘Krizis pravo-tsentristskogo bloka i perspektivy’, in Lev Trotskii, Arkhiv v 9 tomakh: tom 4 , ed. Iu.G.
Fel’shtinskii http://www.felshtinsky.com/books/trotsky/Arhiv%20Trotskogo_t4.doc; Trotsky, Challenge (1928�29), pp. 391, 392; L. Trotskii, ‘O filosofskikh tendentsiiakh biurokratizma’, in Trotskii, Arkhiv v 9 tomakh: tom
4; Trotsky, Writings (1929), p. 48, 77; L. Trotskii, Chto i kak proizoshlo? Shest’ statei dlia mirovoi burzhuaznoi
pechati (Paris: H. Vilain, 1929), p. 42; L. Trotskii, ‘Pis mo rabochim SSSR’, Biulleten’ Oppozitsii, July 1929, p. 4;
Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), p. 86, 115; Al’fa, ‘Uroki kapitaliatsii’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, February� March 1930,
p. 6; Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), pp. 58, 62, 63, 215, 286; ‘Blok levykh i pravykh’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii,
November�December 1930, p. 25; ‘Chto dal she? (k kampanii protiv pravykh)’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, November�December 1930, p. 23; L. Trotskii, ‘Problemy razvitiia SSSR’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, April 1931, p. 7; ‘Novyi zigzag i
novye opasnosti’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, August 1931, p. 6; Trotsky, Writings (1932), pp. 66, 275; L. Trotskii
‘Otkrytoe pis’mo Prezidiumu Tslk’ a Soivza SSR’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, March 1932, p. 3, L. Trotskii, ‘Sovetskoe
Khoziaistro v opasnosti! (Pered vtoroi piatiletkoi), Biulleten’ oppozitsii, November 1932, p. 9.36 Trotsky, Writings (1930), pp. 106�107, 111, 136�137, 179; Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), pp. 91, 215;
Trotsky, Writings (1932�33), p. 97; Trotsky, Writings: Supplement (1929�33), pp. 24�25.37 Trotsky, Writings (1932), pp. 223; 228; 326; Trotsky, Struggle against Fascism, p. 215. For definitions of
centrism in this period that utilized the old formula, see Trotsky, Writings (1929), pp. 232�233; Trotsky, Writings
(1930), pp. 236; 237; Trotsky, Struggle against Fascism, p. 211.
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class forces, but in terms of the conscious effort by the bureaucracy, or by the Stalin
group within the bureaucracy, to advance its own interests.38
Thus, in the early 1930s Trotsky portrayed the bureaucracy at various times as
highly responsive to external class pressures and as relatively autonomous in relation
to all social classes. These two apparently contradictory evaluations created a
conceptual tension that ran throughout Trotsky’s writings during the years 1928�1933. They both appeared, for example, in Trotsky’s general characterizations of
Stalinism in late 1930 and early 1931. In November 1930 Trotsky explicitly explained
the incompleteness of Stalinism’s break with Leninism in terms of the position it
occupied between conflicting class forces. However, at the same time, he described
Stalinism as conducting an active struggle on both sides:
Stalinism grew out of the break with Leninism. But this break was never a completeone, nor is it now. Stalinism conducts, not an episodic, but a continuous,systematic, organic struggle on two fronts. This is the inherent character of a petty-bourgeois policy: at the right of Stalin, the unconscious and conscious capitalistrestorationists in varying degrees; at the left, the proletarian Opposition.39
More clearly, Trotsky’s two evaluations of Stalinism and bureaucracy were uneasily
combined in Trotsky’s April 1931 ‘Draft Theses of the International Left Opposition
on the Russian Question’:
The zigzags of Stalinism show that the bureaucracy is not a class, not anindependent historical factor, but an instrument, an executive organ of theclasses. . . . The bureaucracy, however, is not a passive organ which only refracts theinspirations of the class. Without having absolute independence . . . the rulingapparatus nevertheless enjoys a great relative independence.40
A New Understanding of Stalinism and Bureaucracy: 1933�1940
To a large degree, this conceptual tension was resolved in the following years.
Although the left turns of 1928�1933 had compelled Trotsky to introduce repeated ad
hoc modifications to his earlier theory, he had not abandoned it. That was about to
change. Over the course of the years 1933�1936 he revised virtually every aspect of his
theory, dramatically emphasizing the autonomy of the Soviet party-state bureaucracy
in relation to social classes. The event that sparked this revolution in Trotsky’s
thinking was not some new shift to the left by the Soviet leadership; rather, it was
Hitler’s consolidation of political power in Germany in early 1933.
Trotsky and his opposition had advocated reform of the All-Union Communist
Party, the Soviet state, and the Comintern since the late 1920s. However, in the spring
of 1933 Trotsky blamed the ultra-left policies of the German Communist Party
(KPD) and the Comintern for Hitler’s victory*in Trotsky’s estimation the greatest
38 See, for example, Trotsky, Writings (1930), pp. 80, 86, 206, 230-231, 259-260; Trotsky, Writings (1930�31),
p. 217; Trotsky, Writings (1932), p. 250; Trotsky, Writings (1932�33), p. 104; Trotsky, Struggle against Fascism, pp.
214, 221�222.39 Trotsky, Writings [1930�31], p. 66.40 Ibid., p. 215.
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disaster to befall the international working class movement since the voting of war
credits by European Social Democratic parties at the outset of World War I. Just as
the Bolsheviks had broken with the Second International at the outset of World War I,
Trotsky now broke with the KPD and then the Comintern.41 Yet it was contradictory
to break with the Comintern without breaking with its leading party; and once Trotsky
had abandoned his attempts to reform the AUCP(b), it was clearly inconsistent to
retain a reform perspective for the Soviet state. Consequently, by the beginning of
October 1933, Trotsky was calling for the creation of a new revolutionary international
and a new communist party in the Soviet Union, and for the use of force to compel
the bureaucracy ‘to yield power into the hands of the proletarian vanguard.’42
Thus began a chain reaction that quickly toppled other major aspects of Trotsky’s
previous orientation. For years, Trotsky had asserted that one important reason for
defining the Soviet Union as a workers’ state was the fact that it could still be
reformed. While continuing to argue that the Soviet Union remained a workers’ state,
he now quietly dropped this criterion*retaining only the arguments that the
property forms remained those established by the Bolshevik Revolution, and that no
counterrevolutionary civil war had yet triumphed.43 Trotsky’s call for the use of force
also suggested a new appreciation for the relative autonomy of the bureaucracy. This
immediately found expression in Trotsky’s provisional acceptance of the term
Bonapartist to describe bureaucratic rule.44 In this period Trotsky also abruptly
stopped speaking of Thermidor, probably in large part because he had concluded that
such an independent bureaucracy would not be pressured easily into restoring
capitalism.45 Finally, in December 1933 Trotsky’s enhanced perception of the
bureaucracy’s autonomy prompted him to sketch a new account of how the
bureaucracy had utilized its function as mediator of social antagonisms to attain such
a high degree of independence.46
Building upon these changes, Trotsky introduced a second round of theoretical
revisions in 1935, all of which further emphasized the autonomy of the bureaucracy
in relation to social classes, and the autonomy of the Stalin group in relation to the
bureaucracy. On 1 February, Trotsky fundamentally revised his previous under-
standings of both Thermidor and Bonapartism, applying both terms to the Soviet
Union. It is likely that the event most immediately responsible for Trotsky’s complete
41 See Trotsky, Writings (1932�33), pp. 137�139; Trotsky, Writings (1933�34), p. 22. For another explanation
of Trotsky’s break with the Comintern, see J. Arch Getty, ‘Trotsky in Exile: The Founding of the Fourth
International’, Soviet Studies, 33:1 (1986), pp. 24�35. For an exchange on this question, see Thomas Twiss,
‘Trotsky’s Break with the Comintern: A Comment on J. Arch Getty’, Soviet Studies, 39:1 (1987), pp. 131�137;
J. Arch Getty, ‘Reply to Thomas Twiss’, Soviet Studies, 39:2 (1987), pp. 318�319.42 Trotsky, Struggle against Fascism, p. 430; Trotsky, Writings (1933�34), pp. 20; 118.43 Trotsky, Writings (1933�34), pp. 102�104.44 Ibid., pp. 107�108.45 On Trotsky’s dropping of Thermidor in this period, see Law, ‘Trotsky in Opposition: 1923�1940’, pp. 289,
291; David S. Law, ‘Trockij and Thermidor’, in Francesca Gori (ed) Pensiero e azione politica di Lev Trockij, vol. 2,
p. 440; David Law, ‘Trotsky and the Comparative History of Revolutions: the ‘‘Second Chapter’’ ’, Sbornik, 13
(1987), Study Group on the Russian Revolution, p. 8.46 Trotsky, Writings (1933�34), p. 167.
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acceptance of the term Bonapartism was the wave of repression unleashed by the
leadership following the Kirov assassination in December 1934. For Trotsky, the
Bonapartist features of the party regime were more apparent than ever before: ‘The
domination of the bureaucracy over the country, as well as Stalin’s domination over
the bureaucracy have well-nigh attained their absolute consummation.’47 However,
since in France Thermidor preceded Bonpartism, in order ‘to remain within the
framework of the historical analogy’ it was necessary for him to revise his use of that
term as well. Now Trotsky insisted that the significance of Thermidor in both
revolutions was not a change in property forms, but the transfer of power to a more
‘moderate and conservative’ layer, composed of ‘better-to-do elements.’ In the Soviet
Union this had happened in 1924 with the shift of power to the bureaucracy.
Following Thermidor, Trotsky explained, in both counties. Bonapartism had involved
the consolidation of the revolution through the ‘liquidation of its principles and
political institutions’, and a struggle against both the counterrevolution and the
‘rabble.’48
Trotsky’s revision of position on Thermidor and Bonapartism quickly led to other
changes as well. By redefining the rise of the bureaucracy as a fundamental transfer of
power, the new position gave added significance to the term caste, which Trotsky used
to characterize the dominant social formation.49 His increased emphasis upon the
active role of the Bonapartist regime replaced the largely passive role suggested by his
previous analysis of bureaucratic centrism, a term Trotsky now explicitly dropped,
noting, ‘As the bureaucracy becomes more independent, as more and more power is
concentrated in the hands of a single person, the more does bureaucratic centrism
turn into Bonapartism.’50 Finally, Trotsky’s argument that Thermidor was, though
47 Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1934�35) (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), p. 169.48 Ibid., pp. 173�174, 181.49 It seems that Trotsky’s first references to a bureaucratic caste in the Soviet Union appeared in early 1929
when he was beginning to stress the autonomy of the party-state bureaucracy. Trotsky, Writings (1929), pp. 77;
118; L. Trotskii, ‘Bor’ba bol’shevikov-lenintsev coppozihsii) v SSSR, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, 1�2, July 1929, p. 4;
Leon Trotsky, La Revolution Defiguree, Rieder: Paris, 1929, p. 10.) Available translations of the 1927 Platform of
the Opposition incorrectly contains three passages with the term caste used in reference to the Soviet bureaucracy.
In fact, in all three passages the term used in the Platform was sloi (layer), not kast. See Iu. Fel’shtinskii, comp.,
Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia, vol. 4, p. 151. Trotsky used the term periodically over the following years.
However, following his revision of position on Thermidor and Bonapartism, he suddenly began using caste
more frequently and insistently, and in ways that more clearly suggested a class-like degree of autonomy. See, for
example, Trotsky, Writings (1934�35), p. 156, 170; L. Trotskii, ‘Vse stanovitsia postepenno na svoe mesto’,
Biulleten’ oppozitsii, February 1935, p. 12; L. Trotskii, ‘Robochee gosudarstvo, termidor i bonapartizm (istoriko-
teoreticheskaia spravka), Biulleten’ oppozitsii, April 1935, pp. 4�5.50 Trotsky, Writings (1934�35), p. 180. Trotsky used the term bureaucratic centrism just a few more times. See
Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on France (New York: Monad Press, 1979), p. 121; Trotsky, Writings (1935-36),
p. 145. Perhaps on these occasions he used it out of habit, or because Bonapartism did not clearly indicate where
Stalinism stood on a left�right continuum, and he was only beginning to perceive Stalinism as fully opportunist.
However, on 3 October 1937, Trotsky admonished ‘some comrades’ for continuing to use the term bureaucratic
centrism*a characterization he judged to be ‘totally out of date’. He explained, ‘On the international arena,
Stalinism is no longer centrism, but the crudest form of opportunism and social patriotism. See Spain!’, Leon
Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1936�37), ed. Naomi Allen and George Breitman, New York: Pathfinder Press,
1978, p. 478.
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not a social counterrevolution, a counterrevolution of sorts, suggested to him the
possibility of a revolution that was not a social revolution. Thus, on 1 January 1936
Trotsky abandoned the ‘forcible reform’ position he had held since October 1933,
explicitly calling for a ‘political revolution’, which he subsequently described as
a ‘violent overthrow of the political rule of the degenerated bureaucracy while
maintaining the property relations established by the October Revolution.’51
Trotsky’s new understanding of Stalinism and the Soviet bureaucracy received its
fullest expression in his major work, The Revolution Betrayed, completed in 1936.
Although during the mid to late 1930s Trotsky continued to use the term Stalinism to
refer to Soviet policy orientations and doctrines that he saw as deviating from
Leninism, in The Revolution Betrayed he defined it more broadly as a political system
characterized by a high degree of autonomy of the bureaucracy from social classes.
‘Stalinism,’ Trotsky explained, ‘is a variety of the same system’ as Caesarism and
Bonapartism. Each of these systems had entered ‘the scene in those moments of
history when the sharp struggle of two camps raises the state power (that is, the
bureaucracy), so to speak, above the nation, and guarantees it, in appearance,
a complete independence of classes*in reality, only the freedom necessary for
a defense of the privileged.’ The distinguishing feature of Stalinism was that it was
based upon ‘a workers’ state torn by the antagonism between an organized and armed
Soviet aristocracy and the unarmed toiling masses.’52
Trotsky offered two explanations for how the extreme autonomy of the Stalinist
bureaucracy had emerged: one functional, and one historical. Since 1933 he had argued
that the bureaucracy had been called into existence to fulfill the necessary function of
mediating between social classes. Now he described the same function in distributive
terms. He argued that in the context of a backward society in transition from capitalism
to socialism, a state or bureaucracy was required to defend the inequality in the
distribution of scarce resources that was necessary for economic development.53 Of
course, he noted, ‘in establishing and defending the advantages of a minority,’ the
bureaucracy ‘draws off the cream for its own use. . . . Thus, out of a social necessity there
has developed an organ which has far outgrown its socially necessary function.’54
Trotsky’s second explanation, which was political and historical in nature, in many
ways resembled the account he had provided in 1926 and 1927. Again, he spoke of the
exhaustion of the working class after their exertions in the revolution and civil war,
their disappointment when these failed to translate into an improvement in their own
standard of living, and their demoralization in the face of a series of defeats of the
international revolution; again, he referred again to the ‘extraordinary flush of hope
and confidence in the petty bourgeois strata of town and country’ aroused by NEP.
51 Trotsky, Writings (1935�36), pp. 358�359.52 Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and where is it going? (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1937), p. 278; Lev Trotskii, Chto takoe SSSR i kuda on idet? (Paris: Edite’ par la IVe
Internationale Rouge, 1972), pp. 210�211.53 Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, pp. 52�60, 112�113.54 Ibid., p. 113.
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However, in contrast to his earlier analysis, Trotsky portrayed the bureaucracy, not
alien class elements, as the most immediate beneficiary of these processes. In this
period the bureaucracy ‘began now to feel itself a court of arbitration between classes’
and ‘its independence increased from month to month.’ Furthermore, rather than
viewing the Stalinist leadership as having been pushed passively to the right by the
NEPman and kulak, he now described the Stalinist bureaucracy as having actively
utilized these class elements, ‘relying more and more boldly upon the kulak and the
petty bourgeois ally in general,’ in its struggle with the opposition.55
An additional aspect of Trotsky’s historical account worth noting is his discussion
of the role that various practices initiated in Lenin’s time had played in contributing
to the development of Stalinism. One had been the extreme closeness, bordering at
times on fusion, of the party and state apparatuses. According to Trotsky, in the first
years of the revolution this had already done ‘indubitable harm to the freedom and
elasticity of the party regime.’56 Another had been the banning of oppositional
parties. Initially, Trotsky now asserted, the Bolsheviks had hoped to preserve ‘freedom
of political struggle within the framework of the Soviets.’ However, during the civil
war alternative parties were outlawed, one after another, in ‘an episodic act of self
defense,’ a measure Trotsky now admitted was ‘obviously in conflict with the spirit of
Soviet democracy.’57 Finally, in 1921, at the time of the Kronstadt revolt, the 10th
Party Congress responded to the growth of ‘underground oppositional currents’
within the party itself by another innovation*the banning of opposition factions
within the party. Trotsky described this practice too as ‘an exceptional measure to be
abandoned at the first serious improvement in the situation’, and observed that
initially the Central Committee applied the rule very cautiously. However, he noted
that this measure ‘proved to be perfectly suited to the taste of the bureaucracy.’58
The high degree of autonomy of the bureaucracy was also stressed in Trotsky’s
discussion of Stalinist policy in The Revolution Betrayed. His general estimation of
Soviet policy, which had shifted back to the right in a number of areas, was even more
critical than it had been in the past. Considering an even broader range of issues than he
had in previous years,59 in The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky again attempted to
demonstrate the divergence of Soviet policy from previous Bolshevik practice and/or
from an ideal socialist policy. In each case, Trotsky conceded that part of the deviation
had been necessitated by the backward and transitional character of Soviet society.
However, in each case he also attributed a major portion of the reaction to efforts by the
bureaucratic caste to maintain and enhance its own power and privileges.
55 Ibid., pp. 89�92.56 Ibid., pp. 95�96.57 Ibid., p. 96. Trotsky first touched upon this in an article in August 1934 in which he asserted that the
‘bureaucratization of our soviets’, was ‘a result of the political monopoly of a single party.’ (Leon Trotsky,
Writings of Leon Trotsky: Supplement (1934�40) [New York: Pathfinder Press, 1979], p. 524.)58 Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, p. 96.59 Aside from economic, international and regime policies, in The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky also discussed
Soviet polices related to women and the family, youth, culture, nationalities and the military.
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In his discussion of economic policy, Trotsky devoted special attention to the issue
of inequality. In light of the low level of social productivity and the transitional
character of the society, he again noted that at least some degree of inequality was
unavoidable. Even under Lenin the Bolsheviks had been forced to recognize this*especially with the introduction of NEP. Likewise, in 1935 the Stalinists had been
compelled by necessity to retreat from planned distribution to the market.
Additionally, the Stalinists had found it necessary to reintroduce piecework, which
they did in their Stakhanovist campaigns.60 Nevertheless, Trotsky concluded that the
extreme inequality that had developed within the USSR in recent years was
unnecessary from an economic standpoint, and was introduced only to feed the
privileges and reinforce the power of the bureaucracy. For example, the ‘flagrant
differences in wages, doubled by arbitrary privileges’ of Stakhanovism were not
designed to promote productivity. Rather, they were employed by the bureaucracy to
introduce ‘sharp antagonisms’ into the proletariat in accordance with the maxim
‘Divide and rule!’61
Similarly, in the international sphere Trotsky recognized the legitimacy of
compromises dictated by necessity, while condemning what he viewed as unprin-
cipled concessions by the Stalinist leadership. According to Trotsky, ‘no serious
revolutionary statesman would deny the right of the Soviet state to seek
supplementary supports for its inviolability in temporary agreements with this or
that imperialism.’62 In fact, he recalled that under Lenin the Soviet government had
concluded a whole series of treaties with bourgeois governments.63 However, he
observed that in Lenin’s time it would never have occurred to any member of the
Soviet government to characterize any imperialist powers as ‘friends of peace’, nor to
suggest that communist parties support with their votes any bourgeois govern-
ments.64 Yet that was exactly what the Soviet government, and even the Communist
International, had done in connection with the Soviet entry into the League of
Nations in 1934 and the Franco-Soviet pact of 1935. By painting up the episodic allies
of the USSR, Trotsky observed, the Comintern had become ‘a political agent of the
imperialists among the working classes.’65 However, in contrast to his analysis in the
late 1920s, Trotsky did not directly attribute these rightward shifts of Soviet
international policy to external class pressures, but rather to the evolving perspectives
of the bureaucracy, acting in its own interests:
Having betrayed the world revolution, but still feeling loyal to it, the Thermidoreanbureaucracy has directed its chief efforts to ‘neutralizing’ the bourgeoisie. For this itwas necessary to seem a moderate, respectable, authentic bulwark of order. But in
60 Ibid., pp. 115, 81.61 Ibid., pp. 125, 127�128.62 Ibid., p. 198.63 Ibid., pp. 187�188.64 Ibid., p. 188.65 Ibid., pp. 193�196, 198.
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order to seem something for a long time, you have to be it. The organic evolutionof the ruling stratum has taken care of that.66
Perhaps the greatest Stalinist departures from Bolshevik expectations and practice
for Trotsky were in the area of the Soviet party-state regime. Trotsky recalled that
Lenin had anticipated in 1917 state compulsion beginning to die away immediately
after the revolution. For Trotsky, the contrast between this vision and the actual state
headed by Stalin could not be more striking. Instead of dissolving in a system of mass
participation, the bureaucracy had ‘turned into an uncontrolled force dominating the
masses’ and had ‘acquired a totalitarian-bureaucratic character.’67 Party and soviet
organizations had been subjected to ‘continual purgations’ to prevent the expression
of mass discontent; the bureaucracy’s political enemies had been convicted in court
by means of forgeries and confessions exacted under the threat of firing squad;
oppositionists had been expelled from the party and then arrested by the ‘tens of
thousands’ and sent to exile, prisons and concentration camps, where hundreds had
been shot or had died of hunger strikes or suicide.68 (All of this was before the first
Moscow trials and the initiation of the ‘great terror.’ One year later Trotsky observed,
‘The present purge draws between Bolshevism and Stalinism not simply a bloody line
but a whole river of blood.’69) Meanwhile at the summit of the system, there had been
a growing concentration of power in the hands of Stalin, and his ‘increasingly
insistent deification.’70
Again, for Trotsky, a part of the continuing existence of state compulsion had, since
the civil war, been necessary to defend inequality in the distribution of scarce
resources. As Trotsky explained, ‘The justification for the existence of a Soviet state as
an apparatus of compulsion lies in the fact that the present transitional structure is
still full of social contradictions, which in the sphere of consumption . . . are extremely
tense, and threaten to break over into the sphere of production.’71 However, for the
most part, the growing use of force was designed to defend and advance the interests
of the bureaucracy as a caste: ‘To make sure of its power and income, it spares
nothing and nobody.’72 Even the enormous concentration of power in the hands of
Stalin was a ‘necessary element’ of this regime. Stalin had been appointed as ‘an
inviolable super-arbiter,’ to mediate the conflicts within the bureaucracy itself.73
Of course, The Revolution Betrayed was not Trotsky’s final word on the question of
Stalinism. Until his assassination in 1940 Trotsky continued to comment upon
developments in Soviet policy and within the USSR, to propose demands for the
66 Ibid., p. 192.67 Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, pp. 51�52, 108.68 Ibid., pp. 279�283.69 Leon Trotsky, Stalinism and Bolshevism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p. 17.70 Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, p. 277.71 Ibid., pp. 111�112.72 Ibid., p. 277.73 Ibid.
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coming political revolution, to revise previous political assessments, to defend aspects
of his theory against critics, and to introduce modifications into his theory.74
Nevertheless, despite these various applications, innovations and adjustments, in all
of his writings on the USSR after August 1936 Trotsky based his analysis, in
a fundamental sense, on the theory of Soviet bureaucracy codified in The Revolution
Betrayed.
Conclusion
An overall evaluation of Trotsky’s thinking on the question of Stalinism is well
beyond the scope of this article.75 However, a few general observations on Trotsky’s
analysis are in order.
First, although Trotsky consistently viewed Stalinism as a radical departure from
Leninism, during the period 1927�1940 his analysis of Stalinism changed repeatedly
in response to unfolding events. Therefore, at various times he offered significantly
different accounts of how Stalinism had arisen, different assessments of the
relationship between Stalinism and Leninism, and even different definitions of the
fundamental meaning of the term Stalinism. For example, as we have noted, in 1927
he identified the conservative policies of the leadership in the mid to late 1920s as
‘very essence [sut’] of Stalinism.’76 By 1930, following the left turn, he was noting that
the essence of Stalinism had changed from the previous period: ‘The concessions to
the private peasant economy, the contempt for the methods of planning, the defense
of minimum tempos, the estrangement from world revolution*this constituted the
essence [sut’] of Stalinism during the 1923�28 period.’77 Then, by April 1933 he was
beginning to redefine the essence of Stalinism in terms of the autonomy of the
apparatus: ‘The social agents of this system are a large bureaucratic stratum, armed
with enormous material and technical means, independent of the masses and
74 For sources that provide overviews of these developments, see Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast:
Trotsky: 1929�1940 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 331�336, 410�413, 458�477; Law, op. cit.,
vol. 1, pp. 192�195; 209�216; McNeal, op.cit., pp. 36�39.75 For an attempt at such an evaluation by a writer sympathetic to Trotsky, see Anderson, op. cit. Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, both Marxists and non-Marxists have commented upon the value of Trotsky’s
analysis for illuminating the dynamics of capitalist restoration there. See, for example, Chris Edwards, ‘Leon
Trotsky and Eastern Europe Today: An Overview and a Polemic’, in Marilyn Vogt-Downey (ed) The Ideological
Legacy of L.D. Trotsky: History and Contemporary Times (New York: International Committee for the Study of
Leon Trotsky’s Legacy, 1994), 156�165; Jim Miles, ‘Trotsky on the Collapse of the USSR’, in Vogt-Downey (ed)
op. cit., pp. 61�65; M. I. Voyeikov, ‘The Relevance of Trotsky’s Ideological Legacy’ in Vogt-Downey (ed), op. cit.
p. 6; Jim Miles, ‘How Trotsky Foretold the Collapse of the Soviet Union’, Bulletin in Defense of Marxism, 12:10
(1994�1995), pp. 29�31; Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 291; Alan Woods, ‘The Revolution Betrayed*a Marxist
Masterpiece’, London: Trotsky.net, 6 June 2001, http://www.trotsky.net/revolution_betrayed.html; Alan C. Lynch,
How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), p. 77.76 Fel’shtinskii, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 221; Trotsky, Challenge (1926�27), p. 442.77 Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), p. 91; ‘Uspekhi sotsializma i opasnoti avantiurizma,’ Biulleten’ oppozitsii,
November�December 1930, p. 2.
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conducting a furious struggle for self-preservation at the price of the proletarian
vanguard and its weakening before the class enemy. Such is the essence [sushchnost’]
of Stalinism in the world workers’ movement.’78 One of the strengths of Trotsky’s later
analysis was that it attempted to explain how and why this ‘essence’ changed over
time. The evolution of his thinking on these questions is a useful reminder of the
need to be clear about the time period and characteristics under discussion when one
speaks of Stalinism (and Leninism).
A second observation concerns the complexity of Trotsky’s analysis, especially in
later years. Trotsky is widely and correctly perceived as the quintessential advocate of
the position that Stalinism originated out of a radical break with Leninism.79
Trotsky’s statement that a ‘whole river of blood’ separated Bolshevism from Stalinism
is indicative. However, the sketch provided here clearly demonstrates that this was
not Trotsky’s complete analysis, and that his thinking on this question was actually far
more complex. Throughout the development of his views on Stalinism, Trotsky also
indicated areas of continuity and coincidence between Leninism or Bolshevism and
Stalinism, as well as other areas in which the two were not in conflict.
First, Trotsky recognized the obvious continuity in the name, symbols and some of
the personnel of the party. As he noted in the article ‘Stalinism and Bolshevism’ in
August 1937, ‘To be sure, in a formal sense Stalinism did issue from Bolshevism. Even
today the Moscow bureaucracy continues to call itself the Bolshevik party.’80
However, for Trotsky this continuity, in itself, was not particularly significant.
From 1926 through 1934 he even argued that a capitalist Thermidorian regime might
retain the name and symbolism of Bolshevism, as well as some of its leaders.
Second*and more significantly*throughout the years 1927�1940 Trotsky
recognized elements of continuity with Leninism in the Stalinist policies that
defended socialism in the USSR. In the years 1926�1934 this understanding was
contained in Trotsky‘s concept of bureaucratic centrism. Thus, in 1930 Trotsky
observed ‘Stalinism grew out of the break with Leninism. But this break was never
a complete one, nor is it now.’81 In later years, it was expressed in Trotsky’s
characterization of the USSR as a ‘degenerated workers’ state’ and in his view that out
of self interest the Stalinist bureaucracy continued, at least for the time being, to
defend social ownership of production.
Third, it should be noted that there were some Stalinist practices that, for Trotsky,
deviated from the ideal socialist policy, or even from previous Bolshevik practice, but
that in themselves did not constitute discontinuities. These were policies that Trotsky
recognized as dictated by necessity, such as the reintroduction of piece work in the
78 Trotsky, Writings (1932�33), p. 175; ‘Zaiavlenie delegator, prinadlezhashchikh k Internatsional’ noi Levoi
Oppozitsii (bol’sheviki-lenintsy), k kongressu bor’by protiv fashizma’, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, May 1993, p. 24.79 See, for example, Stephen Cohen, ‘Bolshevism and Stalinism’ in Robert C. Tucker, (ed) Stalinism: Essays in
Historical Interpretation, p. 5.80 Trotsky, Stalinism and Bolshevism, p. 17. For this reason, in the same work Trotsky acknowledged that
‘certainly Stalinism ‘‘grew out’’ of Bolshevism, not logically; however, but dialectically; not as a revolutionary
affirmation but as a Thermidorian negation.’ Ibid., p. 15.81 Trotsky, Writings (1930�31), p. 66.
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form of Stakhanovism, the Soviet entry into the League of Nations or the continued
use of state coercion. For Trotsky, even the opposition in power would have to resort
to such measures.
Finally, and most importantly, in his later writings Trotsky acknowledged that
some Bolshevik practices*which he characterized as unfortunate deviations from
true Bolshevism instituted in difficult times*had contributed directly to the rise of
the worst features of Stalinism. As he wrote in 1937, ‘It is absolutely indisputable that
the domination of a single party served as the juridical point of departure for the
Stalinist totalitarian system.’82 Another of these practices for Trotsky was the 1921 ban
on party factions.
Again, the purpose here is not to challenge the view that Trotsky fell solidly
within*and in fact, largely created*the discontinuity camp. Rather, the point is to
recognize that Trotsky’s position on this and related questions, especially in later
years, was complex and nuanced. In fact, this was a feature that has continued to
make his position so attractive.83
82 Trotsky, Stalinism and Bolshevism, p. 22.83 This point is related to Anderson’s regarding the ‘political balance’ of Trotsky’s interpretation of Stalinism.
See Anderson, op. cit., p. 124.
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