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Transnational Public-Private Partnerships as Learning Facilitators:
The Case of Global Governance on Mercury
Yixian Sun
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Paper presented at ECPR General Conference 2015, Montreal
[Please do not circulate without permission of the author]
Abstract
The article examines Transnational Public-Private Partnerships’ (TPPPs) impacts on the
formation of intergovernmental regimes in order to fill a gap in the scholarship of
environmental governance. Drawn from theories of institutional interaction and social
learning, I construct a theoretical framework inferring that TPPPs can contribute to regime
formation by providing useful knowledge to facilitate policymakers’ learning. Building on
data from various sources such as UNEP documents, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, and elite
interviews, my empirical study use qualitative methods, including process-tracing, content
analysis, and counterfactuals, to analyze the UNEP Global Mercury Partnership’s (GMP)
influence in the negotiation of the Minamata Convention on Mercury. The findings show
that, through technical and scientific information based on expertise of participants in the
UNEP GMP, this partnership played a critical role in negotiations of several issues by not
only accelerating consensus-making processes, but also changing the nature of agreements in
the convention.
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In the last two decades, many changes have occurred in global environmental politics, of
which a remarkable dimension is the involvement of new actors, embedded in a complex web
of transnational relations (Biermann and Pattberg 2012). Indeed, various actors make up the
system of global environmental governance in “a messy, non-linear, non-hierarchical and
intertwined fashion”, although our understanding of how these intricate interactions among
different actors have created such a system remains incomplete (Najam et al 2004, 24).
Improving understanding of global environmental governance thus requires researchers to
look at, not only many governance mechanisms through which state and nonstate actors can
interact, but also the linkages between these mechanisms.
Transnational Public-Private Partnerships (TPPPs) form an eminent mechanism of
state-nonstate interaction, which has proliferated since the early 2000s as an innovative tool
for filling a range of functions for effective governance.1 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)
can be defined as “agreements for collaborative governance” between public and nonstate
actors, which “establish common norms, rules, objectives and decisions-making and
implementation procedures for a set of policy problems” (Andonova 2010, 25–26). The term
“transnational” refers to PPPs involving actors in different countries. With the unique
features of being voluntary, non-negotiated, and multi-stakeholder, environmental PPPs are
designed and promoted to reduce the deficit left by intergovernmental arrangements
(Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2008; Börzel and Risse 2007; Hale and Mauzerallm
2004). Rather than replace states’ actions, PPPs are often seen as a complementary tool of
governance, as they work in parallel with intergovernmental regimes in many issue areas
(Andonova and Levy 2003; Andonova 2010). By bringing various types of nonstate actors
into their decentralized networks, TPPPs are expected to generate benefits for
intergovernmental regimes, such as diffusing knowledge and learning, breaking deadlocks in
1 Hereafter, the terms “private” and “nonstate” use interchangeably.
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state-led initiatives, enhancing the problem-solving capacity of international institutions, and
providing a more inclusive and legitimate form of international policymaking (Falkner 2011).
However, existing research has rarely empirically tackled the questions of “the
comparative advantages of each type of institution, their interaction and their combined
effectiveness” (Andonova and Levy 2003, 30). To fill this gap in the literature, this article
investigates TPPPs’ effects on intergovernmental regimes in order to tackle the question:
How can TPPPs contribute to the development of intergovernmental regimes? Answering
this question requires treating TPPPs as an explanatory variable to examine the casual
pathway through which they generate outcomes at the intergovernmental level. Hence, my
analytical framework draws from literatures on regime effectiveness and institutional
interplay. Building on this framework, my empirical study focuses on impacts of the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Global Mercury Partnership (GMP) on the
negotiations of the Minamata Convention on Mercury.
The article argues that knowledge diffusion by TPPPs can contribute to the formation of
intergovernmental regimes in helping policymakers to understand the scope of the problem
and identify appropriate policy responses. My case study demonstrates that the UNEP GMP
not only accelerated the process of reaching consensus in negotiations, but also changed the
nature of the agreements in the final convention. To enhance its validity, my study
triangulates data and compares different partnership areas for within-case studies. While the
principal aim of this study is to illustrate a pattern of interplay between two types of
governance mechanisms, my analysis also indicates some critical conditioning factors and
thus put forward some policy recommendations.
The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews existing literature on PPPs
and explains my analytical framework, building on research from the fields of institutional
interplay and social learning. After discussing my methodology, the third section briefly
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traces the formation process of an international mercury regime. A detailed analysis of the
UNEP GMP’s influence on the negotiation process comprises in the fourth section. I discuss
in the fifth sections various conditioning factors discovered through my empirical analysis
and the final section concludes.
TPPPs providing usable knowledge for intergovernmental regimes
PPPs as a hybrid governance mechanism
Scholars of environmental politics often conceptualize TPPPs as a special form of
transnational governance, defined by three common features: pursuing public goods, steering
a particular constituency, and being recognized as authoritative (Andonova et al 2009;
Bulkeley et al. 2012). In terms of sources of authority, TPPPs are generally located in the
middle ground on a complex continuum between public and private governance (see Figure
1), driven by “the deliberate pooling of authority, competences, and resources from both the
public and private spheres” (Andonova 2010, 28; also see Andonova et al 2009; Bäckstrand
2008; Börzel and Risse 2007).
Figure 1. Continuum between public and private governance
Two features of TPPPs are worth noting. First, led by voluntary cooperation around a
common purpose, their authority of governance is negotiated across public and private
spheres, instead of being granted through delegation, market mechanisms or moral
recognition. As voluntary governance mechanisms, TPPPs may thus have several potential
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benefits for problem-solving. From a legal perspective, a non-binding “soft” instrument may
allow states to gain experience through “learning by doing” and to avoid the risk of having
only “least-common-denominator” in international treaties (Victor 1998; Wirth 2007, 398).
Second, TPPPs form a special type of “networked governance” based on transnational
networks encompassing both public and private actors, which are interacting in decentralized
and flexible ways (Andonova et al 2009; Bäckstrand 2008; Bäckstrand et al. 2012). This
hybrid nature can also enable TPPPs to be more accountable, thus easily diffuse normative
expectations. In short, the reasoning above sheds light on some outstanding advantages that
TPPPs may have, but empirical research demonstrating how they provide such benefits in
global environmental governance is still missing.
Moreover, research on environmental governance points out the various governance
functions fulfilled by TPPPs, including information sharing, capacity building, and rule
setting (Andonova et al 2009; Börzel and Risse 2007). While scholars often accept that
transnational governance are able to improve the performance of the overall governance
system (Biermann 2004; Falkner 2011), research has not yet engaged with retrospective
examinations of the manners in which hybrid or private governance instruments have assisted
traditional intergovernmental regimes or with the appealing question about the conditions
under which intergovernmental regimes can benefit from new governance mechanisms. To
address such questions, my analysis relies on a common thread in previous theorizing, which
states that knowledge constitutes a key asset of TPPPs (Andonova 2010).
Given that TPPPs and intergovernmental regimes coexist in several issue domains,
research on TPPPs’ influence at the intergovernmental level can also expand the scope of the
original “regime complex” theorizing, which only focused on regimes established by states
(Keohane and Victor 2011). While recent developments in studies on regime complexes have
incorporated transnational governance mechanisms by mapping them onto the overall
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governance system, still no research has “assess[ed] the effectiveness, normative impact, and
distributional consequences of these diverse schemes and activities” (Abbott 2012, 580).
Even if recent studies on private authority have tried to fill such a gap by analyzing linkages
between public and private rules (Auld and Green 2012, Green 2013), the impacts of hybrid
governance on intergovernmental regimes, such as TPPPs, remain largely untreated in the
literature.
Interaction between TPPPs and intergovernmental regimes
Drawing on the conceptualization of regime formation as a process of policy learning, the
question of whether TPPPs contribute to making intergovernmental regimes turns on
examining the extent to which they can be conducive to the related learning process.
Although learning may not necessarily lead to regime formation, this analytical lens is
capable of illuminating the impacts of TPPPs on the related negation process. In short, I
argue that TPPPs can facilitate the learning of policymakers by providing usable knowledge
on environmental challenges facing them.
As noted above, this framework draws upon research on regime effectiveness, which
treats regimes as an explanatory variable of international outcomes. Studies show several
indirect and direct ways in which international regimes affect state behavior, such as lowering
transaction costs and altering the interests or preferences of major countries (Haggard and
Simmons 1987, 513-514). More specifically, Haas’ (1989) theorizing of epistemic
communities focuses on learning triggered by international regimes and that led to policy
convergence among states. A helpful means identifying the various interpretations of regime
effectiveness is to differentiate among three levels of effects: the output level, concerning
collective knowledge or norms prescribing behavior; the outcome level, where the behavioral
changes of relevant actors occur; and the impact level, where the effects on the ultimate
governance target can be observed (Underdal 2004).
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Taking into account the effects that many international regimes may generate, I draw
on Gehring and Oberthür’s (2009, 129) theory of institutional interplay, which differentiates
between institutions at the macro-level and actors at the micro-level; and by focusing on two
levels of analysis, the authors suggest a causal mechanism of institutional interplay through
which actors transfer influence from the source institution to the target institution.2 In the
following study, TPPPs are the source institution and intergovernmental agreements are the
target institution. A simplified causal mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The causal relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables
Since the formation of an intergovernmental regime is generally seen as a
decision-making process before actors change their behaviors, the influence from the source
institution on the target institution can be seen only at the output level. In other words, the
process of regime formation “can hardly be systematically influenced other than by
knowledge and obligations generated by another institution” (Gehring and Oberthür, 2009,
145). Because of being voluntary and non-binding, TPPPs should influence the formation of
intergovernmental regimes mainly through cognitive interaction which relies on the power of
knowledge. This type of interaction consists of four steps: first, the source institution
generates certain knowledge, which can be new scientific or technical information or
experiences from previous governance structures; next, actors within either the source
institution or target institution feed this knowledge into the decision-making process of the
target institution; then, the knowledge changes the preferences of actors relevant to the target
institution; and finally, the modification of actors’ preferences influences the collective
2 In their theory, the term “institution” is equivalent to “regime”, but refers only to formally-negotiated
arrangements by states.
transnational public-private partnership
learning of policymakers
intergovernmental regime
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negotiation process (Gehring and Oberthür, 2009, 133). In short, this model of cognitive
interaction constitutes a solid basis for analyzing TPPPs’ effects on the formation of
intergovernmental regimes.
TPPPs facilitate learning in regime formation
To further clarify this process of interaction in which knowledge plays a critical role, it is also
necessary to draw upon the theory of social learning. Learning is a dynamic process, which
refers not only to “the acquisition of new information about the environment”, but also “the
acceptance of new and innovative ways of drawing linkages between causes and effects and
means and ends” (Adler and Haas 1992, 385). With respect to public policy, learning is
reflected by alterations or innovations in policy, implying improved understanding beyond
mimicking or copying behaviors, as embodied by an ability to draw lessons about policy
problems, objectives or interventions (Heclo 1974; May 1992). Thus, the
knowledge-intensive, diffuse character of global environmental management emphasizes the
need for attention to the role of learning as an “agent of change” (Clark et al 2001, 6).
This concept of learning contains two key elements: actors – including “learners” and
“teachers”, and knowledge to be learned. As mentioned earlier, international regime
literatures often emphasizes the role of epistemic communities as would-be teachers in the
learning process. Bounded by shared beliefs in the verity of particular forms of knowledge,
epistemic communities consist of, for example, officials or experts from different
governments, IOs, research institutions and advocacy groups; research also demonstrate that
such communities can be empowered by regimes, and thereby promote the formation of
consensual knowledge among policymakers of different states, which in turn leads to regime
development (Haas 1989; Haas 1992).
Consequently, one can infer that TPPPs are capable of enhancing the influence of
epistemic communities for two reasons. First, by bringing together experts from different
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stakeholder parties, this new governance mechanism can facilitate the creation or expansion
of epistemic communities, and thus enable knowledge diffusion, in particular when such
diffusion needs to “tap into multiple levels of expertise” (Andonova and Levy 2003, 20).
Second, TPPPs also establish political arenas different from traditional intergovernmental
ones for the activities of epistemic communities. In being less formal and more flexible but
still involving public actors, the related new arenas can help epistemic communities to
influence more easily governmental policies.
With respect to the knowledge to be learned, it has to be “usable”, in terms of
accuracy and political tractability for its users – policymakers (Haas 2004, 116). Since
learning usually occurs without coercion, learners must be willing to accept related
knowledge. Indeed, in order for scientific information to become influential, its potential
users must see it as “salient, credible as well as legitimate” (Clark et al 2006, 15). Salience
requires related knowledge to capture the interests of potential learners so that they cannot
ignore it; credibility concerns the use of several standard procedures, including data
reliability, methods, and the validity of inferential claims; and legitimacy implies overcoming
distrust and beliefs that the information is being used to pursue the self-interests of its
providers. These three factors determine the level of authority of any knowledge, and only
authoritative knowledge can influence policy outcome.3
Taking such reasoning into account, it can be inferred that the hybrid nature of
TPPPs may be conducive to enhancing the authoritative status of the knowledge they
provide. On one hand, knowledge from PPPs can gain more “civic legitimacy” by involving
nonstate stakeholders; on the other hand, the support of international organizations can also
increase the credibility of knowledge from TPPPs (Clark, Mitchell, and Cash 2006, 16).
Moreover, for TPPPs that works closely with their intergovernmental counterparts,
3 This argument is drawn from Parson’s analysis on the importance of scientific assessments for the ozone
problem, which states: “the authoritative status of assessments s crucial to being influential”. See Parson 2003,
8–9, 266–267.
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particularly when the members of the two bodies overlap, it is probable that the knowledge
generated by the former are highly salient for policymakers in the related intergovernmental
arenas.
Yet, the occurrence of learning does not necessarily lead to regime formation. Therefore,
it is crucial to examine how this can happen – a question that needs to be addressed by
considering the underlying causes of regime change: power, interests, and ideas (Hasenclever
et al 2000; Young 2010, 183). The effects of learning in regime formation processes are
mainly reflected by the function of usable knowledge, which raises policymakers’ awareness
about certain problems and helps them to identify the necessary objectives and means
(Dimitrov 2003). Accordingly, learning may not only change state interests in
intergovernmental negotiations, but even spread certain social norms through a “logic of
appropriateness” so that states change their ideas about certain issues in seeking to “fulfill the
obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or
group” (March and Olsen 2008, 689).4
Besides the interests and ideas of states, powerful states maintain many resources to
direct the course of regime formation. Hence, the support of powerful actors should be a
precondition for TPPPs to facilitate learning in regime formation by enabling policymakers to
reevaluate certain interests or accept certain norms. By contrast, if powerful actors are not
interested in forming an intergovernmental regime, they may try to change the process of
learning in accordance with their preferences. Figure 3 illustrates this causal pathway for the
influence of TPPPs on intergovernmental regimes.
Figure 3. Pathway for the influence of TPPPs on intergovernmental regimes
4 For an example of learning related to the policy on carbon sinks, see Green 2013.
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Empirical study: the case of global mercury governance
Methodology
In order to uncover the causal mechanisms inferred above, we need to examine issue areas
where TPPPs exist alongside the related process of establishing an intergovernmental regime.
Global mercury governance makes for a good case study, as the UNEP Global Mercury
Partnership (GMP) was working in parallel with an Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee (INC) from 2010 to 2013 to prepare a global legally binding instrument on
mercury. My analysis is twofold. First, I use a longitudinal design, focusing on a single case
in order to eliminate the interference of problem structures in small-N comparative studies
across issue areas (Mitchell 2006). Moreover, this case can be further expanded for a
within-case comparison, as the UNEP GMP comprises several partnership areas and each of
these can be seen as a public-private partnership. Therefore, I subsequently use a comparative
analysis across partnership areas to show the variation in the effects of TPPPs on
intergovernmental regimes.
My research relies on qualitative methods, including process-tracing, content analysis
of documents and interviews, and counterfactual analysis. I begin by tracing the process of
regime formation to examine how the Convention was created. Next, I further analyze each
point of progress to identify whether the related progress was mainly driven by the learning
of policymakers, and if this is the case, whether such learning was triggered by the
Partnership. To sort out the true effects of TPPPs, I rely on historical counterfactuals, by
focusing on the proximity of events, to identify the casual relationship between knowledge
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provided by TPPPs and the change of states’ interests or idea, (Fearon 1991, Biersteker 1993).
Data triangulation is also used to enhance the validity of my analysis: in addition to the
documents of UNEP, other stakeholders, and secondary sources as Earth Negotiations
Bulletin and academic publications, I conducted intensive interviews with fourteen important
practitioners from different organizations who participated in the negotiations of the
Minamata Convention and the UNEP GMP. The interviews were semi-structured and
anonymity was guaranteed.
The formation of an intergovernmental regime on mercury
This subsection details briefly the formation process of the Minamata Convention: a
chronological table of the evolution of regime formation is showed in Table 1. While the
risks of mercury to human health and the environment have been acknowledged for many
centuries, as of the early 2000s, no comprehensive international arrangement existed to
address this issue, and many countries and regions were still lacking stringent measures
(Selin and Selin 2006). With the growing concern of some countries, in February 2001, this
issue was first put on the agenda of the UNEP Governing Council (GC), which approved a
US-led proposition to undertake a comprehensive scientific assessment of global mercury
pollution (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2001).
The Global Mercury Assessment Report was presented at the UNEP GC-22 in 2003; it
concluded that mercury and cycles globally so that national or regional action by itself was
not sufficient to tackle the issue (UNEP Chemicals 2002). Accordingly, the EU, Norway and
Switzerland strongly argued for a legally binding instrument to tackle the problem of mercury
pollution; however, this proposal was opposed by the US, Australia and New Zealand, which
advocated immediate voluntary action (Eriksen and Perrez 2014; Andresen et al 2013). Due
to the confrontation between the two blocs, the final GC-22 decision was a compromise that
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Table 1. Chronology of important events in the establishment of the international mercury regime
Time Events
Feb. 2001, UNEP GC-21 Initiating a global scientific assessment of mercury and its compounds
Feb. 2003, UNEP GC-22 - Appealing for national, regional and global action to reduce or eliminate the release of mercury or its compounds
- Setting the objectives for international action
- Inviting the submission of governments’ views on medium- and long-term actions
Feb. 2005, UNPE GC-23
- Calling for developing partnerships between governments, IGOs, NGOs and the private sector
- Deciding to assess the need for further action on mercury at the UNEP GC-24
Sept. 2005 Identifying five priority partnership areas
Feb. 2007, UNEP GC-24 - Urging governments and other stakeholders to continue and enhance their support of these partnerships
- Establishing an Ad hoc Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to review and assess different options
Nov. 2007 First OEWG meeting
Dec. 2008 Second OEWG meeting
Feb. 2009,UNEP GC-25 - Agreeing on the elaboration of a legally binding instrument
- Forwarding the overarching framework of the UNEP Global Mercury Partnership to the UNEP GC
Oct. 2009 A working group meeting to prepare for the INC
June 2010
INC1
Jan. 2011
INC2
Five INC sessions
Oct.- Nov. 2011 INC3
June -July 2012 INC4
Feb. 2013
INC5
Oct. 2013
Adopting the final text of the Minamata Convention
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries, opening the Convention for signature
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only “urge[d] all countries to adopt goals and take national actions” and leave the consideration
of different options including “a legally binding instrument, a non-legally instrument or other
measures or actions” to the next UNEP GC (UNEP 2003, 47).
The stalemate remained at the meeting of the UNEP GC-23 in 2005. Having deep
reservations for a legally binding agreement, the US, Japan and Australia called for a partnership
approach. The EU, Norway and Switzerland were not against the development of TPPPs as such,
but argued that this approach must be complementary to a legally binding instrument (Earth
Negotiations Bulletin 2005). As a compromise, the UNEP GC-23 only urged governments,
international organizations, NGOs and private sector actors to develop and implement
partnerships based on the objectives previously identified (UNEP 2005). According to this
mandate, five priority partnership areas were determined in late 2005. In 2007, the bargaining at
the UNEP GC-24 meeting led to a two-tiered arrangement. On one hand, the UNEP GC-24
decided to establish an Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) of governments, regional
economic integration organizations and stakeholder representatives to assess different options,
including a legally binding instrument, so that the GC-25 could make a decision. On the other,
this GC also urged governments, the UNEP and other stakeholders to strengthen and develop
partnerships addressing the issue of mercury pollution; in particular, the UNEP was requested by
the GC-24 to develop an overarching framework for the UNEP GMP, identifying partnership
goals and operational guidelines (UNEP 2007).5 Since then, the UNEP Chemicals Branch
5 The term “United Nations Environment Programme Global Mercury Partnership” first appeared in a mandate
made by the UNEP GC-24 in 2007. Before 2007, while several partnership areas were identified and conducted
some activities, they were not considered as a part of a larger “Partnership”
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(hereafter “UNEP Chemicals”) has been designated as the secretariat to coordinate the UNEP
GMP’s activities. Accordingly, the UNEP GMP was instituted with a well-defined structure and
coherent goals in different areas around 2008-2009, while the number of the partners and scope
of activities was gradually expanded.
At the end of 2008, after two OEWG meetings, the situation remained uncertain. The
tipping point at the intergovernmental level occurred at the GC-25 in 2009, because of the new
position of the US, led by the Obama administration.6 With unreserved support from the US for
a legally binding instrument – a dramatic change surprising many other governments – an
agreement to elaborate a global legally binding instrument on mercury regulation was soon
reached and the GC-25 requested the establishment of a preparatory INC (Earth Negotiations
Bulletin 2009).,
The negotiations started in June 2010 and was organized into five meetings with seven to
nine months between each. Having identified key areas of agreement and contention at the INC1,
delegates made some preliminary agreements at the INC2 on issues such as the management of
mercury storage, the reduction of primary mining and mercury use in artisanal and small-scale
gold mining (ASGM); however, they left the issues of mercury-added products and atmospheric
emissions unaddressed. The INC3 confirmed an article on ASGM and provisions about the
issues of storage, waste, and contaminated sites (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2011b).
6 Author’s interviews with two UNEP officials, Geneva, September 11, 2013 and May 20, 2014. For a detailed
analysis on the change of the US position, see Andresen et al. 2013.
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Three clusters of contentious issues were deferred to the last two INC meetings: the
regulation of the use of mercury in products and industrial processes; control of atmospheric
emissions; and financing and compliance. Final consensus on these issues was reached during an
overnight meeting on the last day of the INC5, and several flexible regulatory measures were
established. In short, the new convention covered the whole life cycle of mercury and set a range
of targets, such as a ban on new mercury mines and the phase-out of existing ones; the phase-out
and phase-down of many mercury-added products and mercury used in some manufacturing
processes; control measures for air emissions, waste management and the regulation of ASGM
(Selin 2014). The Convention opened for signature in October 2013; to date, 128 countries have
signed and twelve countries have ratified.7 While the formation of the Convention was far from
easy, its establishment with widespread support demonstrates that policymakers from different
countries gradually improved their understanding of the mercury pollution and necessary
solutions.
The influence of the UNEP GMP in the negotiation process
The process described above reveals that the UNEP GMP was unable to exert important, if any,
influence on the formation of an intergovernmental regime before 2009, for two reasons. First,
without a governing body, this TPPP had neither well-defined objectives nor operational
guidelines until the end of 2008, and only started to undertake formal activities in 2009. Second,
as shown by Figure 4, the partnership originally had only a very small number of constituencies,
7 Data on the official website of the Minamata Convention,
http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Countries/tabid/3428/Default.aspx, last accessed May 25, 2015.
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and its network was quickly expanded after countries had agreed to negotiate a new convention.
In fact, with the concern that a strong partnership can render a treaty unnecessary, countries
advocating a legally binding instrument were reluctant to lend their support to the partnership
before 2009.8
Figure 4: Number of the UNEP GMP’s official partners
(Sources: UNEP 2009, 2010b, 2012, 2013b)
Yet this TPPP still interacted in an active way with the intergovernmental negotiations from
2009 to 2013 as the number of its participants and activities significantly increased. Indeed,
several channels existed for the UNEP GMP to influence the negotiation process, and its
influence was particularly important during the first three INC meetings mainly devoted to
helping negotiators understanding the nature of the problems and feasible solutions. For instance,
at the request of the INC Secretariat, the UNEP GMP organized a series of technical briefings on
the day before the negotiations for each of the first three INC meetings; each session centered on
an important issue to be negotiated and invited experts involved with the UNEP GMP to give
8 Author’s interviews with a UNEP official, Geneva, May 19, 2014; a former negotiator for Nigeria, Geneva, May
27, 2014; and phone interview with a negotiator for Switzerland, Bern, May 27, 2014.
0
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20
30
40
50
Februray 2009 October 2009 July 2010 July 2012 July 2013
Governments
IGOs
NGOs
Others
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presentations and answer questions.9 More in-depth analyses for each partnership area are
showed below.
By mid-2009, seven partnership areas had been established: artisanal and small scale gold
mining (ASGM), mercury releases from coal combustion, mercury in products, mercury cell
chlor-alkali production, mercury waste management, mercury supply and storage, mercury air
transport and fate research. Another partnership area on emissions from the cement industry was
not added until July 2013, and therefore it is excluded from my analysis of the UNEP GMP’s
effects on the negotiations. However, after 2005, the UNEP also tried to create a partnership area
on mercury use in the production of Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM). While this partnership
area was not established in the end, the UNEP Chemicals conducted related projects, and thus I
do include this area in my analysis.10
Artisanal and small-scale gold mining
ASGM is the largest source (37%) of anthropogenic mercury emissions to the atmosphere and
the single largest demand for mercury in the world (UNEP 2013a). While it is imperative to
regulate the ASGM sector in an international convention on mercury, there was no substantial
discussion on ASGM at INC1, because many developing countries would not touch upon a
sector providing the livelihoods of 10-15 million miners worldwide.11
In fact, many
9 Author’s interview with a senior UNEP official, Geneva, May 20, 2014.
10 The activities on VCM are listed on the UNEP GMP’s official webpage, see see http://tinyurl.com/p2mh4f9.
11
Author’s Interview with a UNEP official, Geneva, May 19, 2014, and a UNEP consultant, Geneva, May 22, 2014.
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governments had banned ASGM, but the lack of both support to miners and awareness of related
health risks only created a black market and exacerbated the pollution.
The ASGM partnership area is co-led by United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and involves many
partners with invaluable expertise and experience in the sector. An important partner is the
Artisanal Gold Council, an NGO running a database of global mercury use in ASGM. Through
many UNEP documents and technical briefings, the data provided by this partner was crucial in
informing negotiators from different governments about the severity and locations of the
pollution, and led some countries to face the reality in this sector.12
With respect to solutions,
during the preparatory meeting and INC1, the partnership area put forward two methods based
on its partners’ experience: promoting mercury-free technologies and the formalization of the
sector (UNEP 2010a, 12-23). By suggesting the latter, the approach advocated by the UNEP
GMP differed from most previous discussions emphasizing negative aspects of ASGM;
accordingly it created an environment of “rational consideration” for governments to address the
ASGM issue.13
A critical event occurred between INC1 and INC2, which largely contributed to a broad
consensus on the ASGM issue at the INC2. In December 2010, the UNEP GMP convened a
Global Forum on ASGM in the Philippines, attended by more than 100 participants representing
seventeen governments and various IGOs and NGOs. By inviting governmental officials and
12
Author’s interview with a UNEP consultant, Geneva, May 22, 2014. 13
Author’s Skype interview with an official of NRDC, Washington DC, May 21, 2014.
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civil society organizations from countries facing the most challenges, this forum provided an
invaluable opportunity for stakeholders to reconsider the problems, discuss potential policies,
and share success stories through constructive dialogue (UNEP 2011a). According to one
participant, this meeting was “transformative”, since it might be “the first time that government
officials responsible for mercury and ASGM from different continents … came together to share
their experiences about the sector”.14
Therefore, the forum not only triggered governments’
interest in addressing ASGM in the next convention, but also helped different countries to
coordinate their position before INC2.
One month later, at the INC2, many developing countries began to openly express their
willingness to include an article to reduce mercury use in ASGM; this was major progress
compared to previous discussions at the intergovernmental level. Since UNEP officials would
not reveal the name of countries, I cannot identify exactly which countries changed their position
after the Forum. Yet all of my interviewees working on this issue emphasized the importance of
the Forum for reaching consensus in the later negotiations. More importantly, by comparing
discourse of developing countries in the first two rounds of negotiations, an evident change can
be seen: while developing countries like Tanzania or Honduras still expressed their difficulties in
restricting the ASGM sector at the INC1, the African group and Latin American countries both
strongly supported the reduction and gradual elimination of mercury use in ASGM at the INC2
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010, 2011a). After that, the negotiations on ASGM accelerated and
14
Author’s Skype interview with an official of NRDC, Washington DC, May 21, 2014.
21
21
the agreement on the related provisions was reached at the INC3, which required the parties to
develop a national action plan in line with each country’s socioeconomic context (Article 7).
In short, one can conclude that the UNEP GMP highly influenced the course of the
negotiations by a counterfactual analysis. First, developed countries did not use direct pressure
on this issue although countries like Switzerland and Norway supported the regulation of ASGM.
In fact, several negotiation documents showed that IGOs and NGOs were the main drivers, and
the UNEP GMP provided a legitimate platform for them to diffuse usable knowledge. Second,
the final provisions did not involve any new technologies in ASGM; rather, the agreement is
mainly indebted to the two methods suggested by the UNEP GMP. Therefore, this partnership
area changed the content of the convention by providing creative solutions. Third, it is very
unlikely that the domestic politics of developing countries would support tight regulation on
ASGM, since the sector is very important for rural populations in many countries. Thus,
information from international actors seems critical, and this can be reflected by the praise of the
UNEP GMP’s activities to promote ASGM by Nigeria (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2011a).
Fourth, the proximity of events tends to suggest that the consensus reached at the INC2 was
facilitated by the success of the Global Forum. Without this forum to coordinate developing
countries’ positions, the negotiations should have taken more time to reach an agreement on
related provisions.15
Mercury control from coal combustion
15
Another’s interview with a UNEP official, Geneva, May 20, 2014.
22
22
Mercury emissions were a highly contentious issue during the negotiations. Coal burning is the
second largest source of mercury air emissions (24%) and more than 85% of these emissions
come from power generation (UNEP 2013a, 9). Since 2009, this partnership area has been led by
the International Energy Agency Clean Coal Centre (IEA CCC), a research-oriented, non-profit
organization, having rich experience in mercury pollution management. Relying on the expertise
of its partners, this partnership area provided important technical information to negotiators.
The provisions about coal combustion have very clear targets – big emerging economies
contribute most to the coal used in power generation in the world. Accordingly, emerging
economies prefer voluntary measures, whereas many developed countries called for more
stringent regulation. To mitigate this conflict, the key issue lies in transferring related monitoring
and abatement technologies. Thus, the UNEP GMP spared no effort in helping these
governments to understand related technologies throughout the negotiations.
More specifically, this partnership area conducted several inventories and demonstration
projects on emissions reduction in China, Russia and South Africa from 2009 to 2011. Through
these activities, experts in the network of the UNEP GMP have taught their local partners how to
monitor emissions and “pass on knowledge on mercury behavior and control means”.16
As a
result, these countries were able to monitor their emissions, based on which they can adopt
control measures. Meanwhile, the partnership area developed a technical guidance document for
determining appropriate approaches to control mercury emissions in individual coal-fired plants.
This document was introduced to negotiators by several technical briefings and a report
16
Author’s email contact with an environmental expert of the IEA CCC, May 28, 2014.
23
23
distributed at the INC2. According to an expert from the IEA CCC, activities in Russia and
South Africa succeeded in giving them “some optimism on how reducing mercury emissions
may be available”, and she emphasized that “the project work in China was a real eye-opener in
terms of showing how emissions are actually already far more under control than anyone thought,
and how existing and impending legislation could actually result in emission reductions within
the next decade”.17
Nonetheless, all of these activities were unable to accelerate the negotiations on mercury
emissions, and the agreement was only achieved at the end of the INC5. But by analyzing the
evolution of the negotiation process and interests of major countries, one can still find that this
partnership area was helpful for establishing a consensus among governments to address the
emissions issue. Such influence can be demonstrated by changes in the positions of major
countries in the negotiations. For example, since the INC3, China and India have no longer
attempted to avoid obligations for the “unintentional emissions” that they had being against in
the first two INC meetings (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010, 2011a, 2011b). In fact, an implicit
agreement to address emission issues in the Convention was reached among countries after the
INC2, and the debate then turned to the concrete regulation to be established.
Mercury-added products
Similarly, the regulation of mercury-added products caused such intense debates that the final
agreement was only made in the last minutes of INC5. The provisions concerned phasing out
17
Ibid.
24
24
various products (batteries, lamps, switches and relays, cosmetics and pesticides, and measuring
devices etc.) and phasing down dental amalgam. Yet this long debate mainly centered around the
approach to regulation – a negative list versus a positive list – instead of product categories
(Selin 2014). Indeed, a list very similar to the final agreement already appeared in a draft text
submitted at the INC3 (UNEP 2011b), and I will show below that this consensus on the products
to be regulated was driven by the activities of this partnership area.
The product partnership area is led by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and consists of some IGOs (e.g. World Health Organization) and NGOs (e.g. Health Care
without Harm) endeavoring to promote mercury-free products. A major contribution of this
partnership area was creating global databases on manufacturers of mercury-containing products
before the INC1, classified by product category, country, and region.18
Such information was
helpful for governments in identifying their problems and also for the INC Secretariat in
preparing the draft text.19
At the INC5, the partnership area also made a brochure listing
alternatives to mercury-added products to further urge negotiators to reach an agreement.20
Moreover, this partnership area conducted research on the economics of conversion to
mercury-free products. For instance, a project in China analyzed the social and economic
impacts of the transition towards mercury-free thermometers and sphygmomanometers, and
promoted exchange among different stakeholders (Chemicals Register Center of Ministry of
Environmental Protection 2012). According to one Chinese academic, these activities indeed
18
Available at the UNEP GMP’s website http://tinyurl.com/q65xyj5, last accessed May 25, 2015. 19
Author’s phone interview with a former UNEP official, Patagonia, June 10, 2014. 20
Available at http://tinyurl.com/p6j8w9r, last accessed May 31, 2015.
25
25
raised awareness among Chinese health regulators about the risks of mercury-added products.21
Likewise, the partnership area attempted to demonstrate the feasibility and benefits of phasing
out mercury-containing products in many other developing countries, in order to raise awareness
within the relevant medical communities.22
Finally, this partnership area also influenced debates
on dental amalgam, when some industry stakeholders were trying to remove this product from
the list in the late stage of the negotiations, emphasizing the shortcomings of available
alternatives. In response, the product partnership area made a strong counterargument by
diffusing scientific information and successful experience; the Partnership even initiated a
project in East Africa in 2012 to demonstrate the feasibility of introducing non-mercury dental
fillings.23
Ultimately, dental amalgam was regulated in the convention, although the provision
only required a phase-down.
In short, the analysis above shows the important role of the product partnership area in
identifying the products to be regulated. Additionally, for many developing countries, economic
interest in phasing out mercury-added products could be only generated if they had access to the
requisite knowledge, which the UNEP GMP played a major role in transmitting.
Mercury reduction in the Chlor-Alkali sector
The negotiations for mercury reduction in industrial processes were less arduous than those
dealing with/relating to emission and product issues. Since the mercury-cell chlor-alkali plants
are a major source of mercury demand, the UNEP GMP developed a specific partnership area for
21
Author’s email contact with a Chinese delegate participating in the negotiations, May 29, 2014. 22
Author’s Skype interview with an official of the US EPA, Washington DC, May 23, 2014. 23
Author’s phone interview with a former UNEP official, Patagonia, June 10, 2014.
26
26
this industry. The partnership area is also led by the US EPA and is involved an important
partner – the World Chlorine Council (WCC), a global industry association representing chlorine
producers. Taking advantage of their close link with the chlorine industry, the partnership area
was able to undertake and update a global inventory of mercury-cell chlor-alkali facilities, and
the data presented to delegates at the INC2 served as a basis for the negotiations.24
Moreover, this partnership area was trying to promote mercury-free technology through
information exchange and technical assistance, as many developing countries and economies in
transition were still lacking the technical information and financial investment necessary to
convert to mercury-free production. The partnership area conducted a study on the economics of
conversion to help stakeholders understand the related costs and benefits. It also launched several
projects assisting producers in reducing their mercury emissions and use. Their work in Russia is
a remarkable example, Russia had been unwilling to accept stringent regulation and, at the
country’s insistence, the final phase-out date was deferred to 2025 (Eriksen and Perrez 2014). To
incentivize Russia to tackle this issue, the chlor-alkali partnership area assisted Russian chlorine
producers until 2010 in upgrading plant processes and obtaining equipment to reduce mercury
consumption and releases (UNEP 2011c). As one project official estimated, the partnership
area’s work in Russia was important to “raise awareness [of local stakeholders]” and “build a
cooperative relationship between industry and government”, and thus “certainly helped the
negotiation process”.25
While it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Russia would have
24
Data downloadable at http://tinyurl.com/opydtfj, last accessed May 31, 2015. 25
Author’s Skype interview with a US EPA official, Washington DC, 23 May 2014.
27
27
embraced the phase-out provision without this intervention, one cannot deny the chlor-alkali
partnership area’s impact on generating interest among Russian stakeholders – both government
and industry.
However, to examine the degree of influence held by this partnership area, it is crucial to
take into account the remarkable decrease of mercury use in the chlor-alkali sector from 2000 to
2010 (UNEP Global Mercury Partnership Cholar-Alkali Area 2012). This decrease suggests that
the influence of the knowledge disseminated by this partnership area was only moderate in
achieving a consensus in the negotiations, because producers in many countries – such as many
in the EU and India – had been already aware of alternative technologies and the benefits of
adopting.
Vinyl Chloride Monomer production
Another manufacturing process frequently mentioned throughout the negotiations was the
production of VCM, a chemical used in the production of Polyvinylchloride (PVC) as catalyst.
Because of the nature of its raw materials, China is the only country using a significant quantity
of mercury in this process. Although the UNEP GMP failed to create a specific partnership area,
the UNEP Chemicals still addressed this issue by engaging different stakeholders and providing
financial assistance. With the support of the UNEP Chemicals, the Chinese Ministry of
Environmental Protection implemented a project from 2008 to 2011 investigating the level of
mercury use and its reduction status in the Chinese PVC sector, and analyzed the feasibility of
28
28
mercury-free catalyst.26
The participation of government agencies, the industry sector, research
institutions and foreign experts enabled this project to help the Chinese government in better
understanding the challenges facing the PVCs sector and potential feasible solutions. After the
end of this project, a critical change can be observed in China’s position in the negotiations: At
the INC2 and INC3, China had consistently emphasized the absence of feasible mercury-free
alternatives and called for “a practical approach [of regulation] on a voluntary basis” with the
possibility of exemption from regulation; however, at the INC4, the country openly expressed its
willingness to halve its mercury use in the VCM sector, and thus begun to support a phase-down
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Accordingly, it can be argued that this change
was partly driven by the UNEP project which helped the Chinese government to understand
more clearly the extent of the problem with mercury use before identifying a feasible target for
phase-down. Thinking counterfactually, while the Chinese government was interested in
restructuring the PVC sector and companies interested in promoting new technologies, without
the UNEP’s assistance, China would still have been unwilling to accept any quantitative target of
reduction.27
Therefore, the VCM project had indeed important influence in the negotiation
process.
Waste management
The partnership area of waste management is led by the government of Japan and its activities
mainly focused on providing technical information. In particular, this partnership area prepared
26
Author’s interview with a UNEP official, Geneva, 18 May 2014. 27
Author’s email contact with a Chinese delegate participating in the negotiations, May 29, 2014.
29
29
in 2010 a document on good practices for the management of mercury releases and shared it with
negotiators since the beginning of the negotiations. Without much contention on this issue in the
negotiations, governments soon agreed on using information provided by the Partnership as the
basis of the related provisions. Looking ahead, although the Partnership may largely contribute
to developing the guidelines required by the Convention, the influence of this area seems very
limited in the negotiation process, as the negotiations on waste and storage were “relatively
uncontroversial” (Eriksen and Perrez 2014, 207).
Mercury Supply
The UNEP GMP created a partnership area on mercury supply and storage in June 2009. Since
then, the activities of this area have mainly focused on primary mining, which is a major topic in
the negotiations. The only mercury mines currently active exist in Kyrgyzstan and China. Since
the mine in Kyrgyzstan is the only one known to export mercury to the global market, the
partnership area’s main activities concerned assisting Kyrgyzstan in closing this mine by
promoting more sustainable economic activities in the mining region. However, due to the
unstable political environment in the country, the project was unsuccessful and the mine is still
open.28
According to one UNEP official, the delegates of Kyrgyzstan were “quite silent” in the
negotiations and the country has not yet signed the Convention; instead, the provisions on
primary mining were based on the commitments made by the Chinese government which
28
Author’s phone interview with a negotiator for Switzerland, Bern, May 27, 2014; Skype interview with a US EPA
official, Washington DC, 23 May 2014.
30
30
requested a 15-year-period to close its existing mines.29
Accordingly, the Convention bans all
new mines and requires existing mines to be closed within 15 years. Since this partnership area
did not conduct any activity on China, this partnership area did not contribute to making the final
agreement in the negotiations.
Air transport and fate research
In addition to activities directly related to the reduction of mercury risks, the UNEP GMP also
created a partnership area on research of mercury itself to improve global understanding on the
transport and fate of mercury in the atmosphere. The partnership area of “air transport and fate
research” comprises more than 70 scientists from 12 countries. It contributed to developing the
Global Mercury Assessment 2013, a report issued at the INC5 to better inform policymakers and
call for their agreement. Some partners also attempted to develop a Global Mercury Observation
System. Nonetheless, this partnership area could only indirectly improve negotiators’
understanding of basic scientific information on mercury, rather than directly affect their
position.
To summarize, Table 2 compares different partnership areas’ influence on the negotiations. It
shows that the influence of the UNEP GMP relies mainly on its technical and scientific
information, which not only helped negotiators to identify problems, but also changed the
attitude of certain governments who were uncertain about the exact challenges and feasible
29
Author’s interview with a UNEP official, Geneva, 20 May 2014.
31
31
solutions. Such critical information was mainly based on the expertise of partners, which can be
seen as “one of the most distinctive advantages” of this UNEP GMP compared to other
international aid programmes.30
Moreover, as demonstrated by the cases of ASGM, coal, and
VCM, the Partnership’s activities can also send a normative message through technical
information, indicating that these issues have to be addressed in the Convention. All in all, while
information from the UNEP GMP was obviously not the only means of policymakers’ learning
in regime formation, without the support of this TPPP, governments “would face [a] difficult
time [in] having the technical information necessary for the creation of the Convention”, and the
negotiations wouldn’t have been successfully finished within four years..31
Table 2 Impacts of each partnership area on the negotiations
Partnership area Impacts on intergovernmental negotiations Level of
influence
ASGM
- Raise the issue and provide global data
- Recommend a two-fold solution: the formalization of the
sector and reduction of mercury use
- Propose flexible obligations
Very high
Coal Combustion - Convince governments that control measures are feasible
- Disseminate monitoring technologies High
VCM
- Raise the awareness of stakeholders
- Support research on the current status of mercury use and
development of alternative technology
High
Products
- Identify targeted products and manufacturers
- Disseminate information on economics of transition
- Call for action on dental amalgam
Moderate
Chlor-Alkali - Provide global data on mercury-cell facilities
- Disseminate information on economics of transition Moderate
30
Author’s interview with a UNEP official, Geneva, 20 May 2014. 31
Author’s interview with a senior UNEP official, Geneva, September 11, 2013; and phone interview with a former
UNEP official, Patagonia, June 10, 2014.
32
32
- Provide technical assistance to targeted countries
Waste Management Promote technical guidance on good practices Low
Supply and Storage Almost not Very low
Air Transport and
Fate Research Provide basic scientific information Only Indirect
Conditioning factors
In order to estimate the generalizability of my findings, the conditions enabling the UNEP
GMP’s influence need to be considered. From a policy perspective, understanding the role of
these conditions can shed light on the design of TPPPs and the management of the interplay
between transnational governance mechanisms and intergovernmental regimes. This section
analyzes four important conditioning factors: broad consensus on mercury risks; institutional
support from the INC; a high degree of institutionalization of the partnership area; and leadership
of the UNEP Chemicals and partnership areas leaders.
First, the mercury issue is much less controversial than some other environmental
problems, such as climate change. Therefore, before the negotiation started there has been
already a broad consensus globally about the risks of mercury to humans and the environment. In
fact, no country has ever argued that mercury is not a problem, and the only debatable question
concerns the best approach to be used and the pace at which mercury should be phased out.32
While this consensus does not imply that the related negotiations would be easy, it can partly
explain why policymakers were willing to accept the scientific and technical information
32
Author’s Skype interview with an official of NRDC, Washington DC, May 21, 2014.
33
33
provided by the UNEP GMP. In sum, by understanding this consensus on mercury risks as a
critical precondition for the UNEP GMP’s successful influence, one cannot infer TPPPs are
always helpful to the creation of intergovernmental regimes.
Second, the institutional context of the mercury negotiations was nontrivial for two
reasons. First, the INC meetings authorized by the UNEP GC provided important opportunities
for the UNEP GMP’s partners to communicate with negotiators and other stakeholders. The INC
often asked governments to submit some data and their views on the draft text while
governments also have to prepare their position for the negotiations. Accordingly, these elements
increased policymakers’ demands for useful knowledge on various issues related to the
negotiations and enabled the UNEP GMP to fulfill these demands. The second important
institutional consideration lies in the close relationship between the INC Secretariat and the
UNEP GMP. Since UNEP Chemicals – a very small branch within the UNEP – served as the
secretariat to both institutions, useful information generated from the UNEP GMP’s work could
be easily disseminated to the INC Bureau and other negotiators. In this respect, the UNEP GMP
succeeded in gaining strong support from the Chair of the INC Bureau, Mr. Fernando Lugris,
who often introduced activities of the partnership area into the negotiation process.33
Another important conditioning factor concerns the high degree of institutionalization for
the UNEP GMP, which mainly benefits from the overarching framework established in 2009,
which set up a Partnership Advisory Group (PAG) to annually review the progress of each
partnership area; this constituted an important platform for circulating information within the
33
Author’s email contact with an environmental expert of the IEA CCC, May 28, 2014.
34
34
network of the UNEP GMP and consequently for coordinating each partnership area’s efforts for
advancing the negotiation.34
Additionally, the UNEP GMP has required the registration of
members since 2009. This requirement has been conducive not only to information exchange,
but also to creating a sense of community among its members, which may generate a norm of
addressing the mercury issue.35
This finding tends to support a correlation between the degree of
institutionalization and the effectiveness of TPPPs, as demonstrated by previous large-N studies
(Bäckstrand et al 2012, 137).
Finally, support from UNEP Chemicals and the leaders of each partnership area was also
critical. That this PPP is managed by the UNEP indeed enhanced the UNEP GMP’s authority
and thus the reliability of its information. Meanwhile, beyond its neutral role as a broker for
intergovernmental negotiations, the UNEP actually intended to behave as a “facilitator”.36
Therefore, it strategically used the UNEP GMP as a tool to help negotiators reach consensus.
Additionally, the active engagement of some partnership area leaders was also helpful in
increasing the partnership’s influence. For instance, the final outcomes on ASGM and coal
combustion could not have been achieved without tireless efforts made by the related leaders.
In sum, these conditioning factors help us to explain why the influence of TPPPs was
particularly salient in the negotiations of the Minamata Convention. Given the broad consensus
among governments on mercury risks, three important lessons can be drawn regarding the design
and management of TPPPs. First, a close relationship between institutional bodies at the
34
Author’s interview with a UNEP consultant, Geneva, 22 May 2014. 35
Author’s Skype interview with an official of NRDC, Washington DC, May 21, 2014. 36
Author’s interview with a senior UNEP official, Geneva, September 11, 2013.
35
35
intergovernmental level and related TPPPs can substantially expand channels for knowledge
diffusion. Therefore, the involvement of intergovernmental organizations may lead related
TPPPs to contribute to the formation of intergovernmental regimes. Second, institutional
designers should pay more attention to strengthening PPPs’ institutional capacity, since the level
of institutionalization seems positively correlated to TPPPs’ effectiveness. Third, leadership by
actors with invaluable expertise can contribute to the success of TPPPs; thus it is worthwhile to
gain support from such actors in order to expand TPPPs’ constituencies.
Conclusion
TPPPs have the potential to provide benefits for traditional intergovernmental regimes. Yet
previous studies have rarely tackled the question of interaction between these two governance
mechanisms. This article aims to provide insights into the influence of TPPPs on the formation
of intergovernmental regimes.
Drawn from theories of institutional interaction and social learning, I construct an
analytical framework to infer a causal pathway through which TPPPs provide useful knowledge
to facilitate the learning of policymakers in the process of forming intergovernmental regimes.
Taking into account three underlying causes of regime change, the framework indicates that the
learning facilitated by TPPPs can contribute to regime formation by changing governments’
interests or ideas. My empirical analysis of the UNEP GMP uses data from various sources and
qualitative methods; it shows that this Partnership’s activities facilitated the negotiations of the
Minamata Convention by providing important technical and scientific information to
36
36
policymakers, particularly on the issues of ASGM, coal combustion, and VCM production. More
specifically, my analysis indicates that TPPPs can make important contributions to the formation
of intergovernmental regimes when they generate usable knowledge that is helpful to
policymakers in understanding the issues to be addressed and appropriate solutions. By
identifying four major conditioning factors, the article also draw some lessons for future design
and management of TPPPs.
In sum, the article argues that it is both possible and necessary to analyze linkages
between transnational governance mechanisms and intergovernmental regimes. Given the
complex picture of global environmental governance involving multiple types of actors,
researchers need to avoid isolating private or hybrid governance systems from public ones.
While the generalizability of the findings is limited, this pilot study aims at suggesting a new
research agenda and providing a useful analytical framework for further comparative research
across issue areas. For policymakers, this analysis can shed light on the strategic use of
transnational governance mechanisms to improve governance at the intergovernmental level.
37
37
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