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Structuralism, Language, and LiteratureAuthor(s): Sanford Scribner AmesSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 89-94Published by: on behalf ofWiley The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/428706Accessed: 11-08-2014 13:29 UTC

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2/7

SANFORD SCRIBNER

AMES

Structuralism anguage

n d

iterature

STRUCTURALISM

attempts

to set

up

a

grid

or control on

any

situation or field

of

study

in

the effort

to

make

it

intelligible,

on the

assumption

that its

elements are

naturally

arranged

in a

system,

however elusive. Rob-

ert

Champigny

has noted that the

structur-

alist method can

be

applied

to

anything:

kinship

systems,

social

customs,

trivial

pop

phenomena,

or

to

any study

of

man

in

general.l Jean Piaget

sees structure as a

sys-

tem

of transformations

maintaining

or en-

riching itself by different combinations of

its own

elements,

without

reference

to

any-

thing

outside

its

borders. Structure then ex-

ists in its own

right, independent

of

human

formalizing

or

theorizing.

While a structure

is

formed of

elements,

these

are

subordinate

to

the

laws of

the

system

which

confer

prop-

erties

of

the

whole distinct from

those of

the elements. In

sum,

a

structure has

the

three

characteristics of

totality,

transfor-

mation,

and

self-regulation.

2

The tantalizing thing about structural-

ism

is

the

idea that

men's

thinking

tries

to

get

at what

is

independent

of

them,

unex-

pressed

and

unknown,

which has

been

there

all

along,

yet

must be latent

deep

down in

everyone,

since men

belong

to the one

world

there

is;

unless

they

are to be

located

on one

side of

a

dualism.

Piaget

recognizes

that

structuralism has

recourse to

some-

thing

like the forms of

Plato

and like-

minded

philosophers,

though

also

includ-

SANFORD CRIBNER MES

is assistant

professor

of

French

at

the

Ohio

State

University.

ing

empiricists

who

appeal

to

syntactic

or

semantic forms.

This takes for

granted

that

the

signifying systems,

in which men

live,

seek

to

rest

upon patterns underlying

their

thought.

The hidden

patterns

supposedly

enable

men to

participate

in a

language

whose

origins

escape

them.

Alternative to

the

notion of a

concealed

reality,

never

certainty

approached

or

reached

like Kafka's

castle,

is the

concep-

tion of

reality

as

pragmatically

constructed

on the basis of admittedly limited and fal-

lible

experience.

Such

reality,

empirically

arrived

at,

will

differ in

the

traditions of

different

cultures,

the

methods

of

different

scientists, artists,

and

philosophers.

But the

world-wide

spread

of

the same

technologi-

cal

processes

and

scientific

discoveries tends

to overcome

differences

in

culture and even

in

language,

as

modern

art,

music, movies,

literature,

simultaneously

come to

universal

attention. A kind

of contractual

agreement

forms as to what is real. This is clearly not

final but in

constant

flux.

Science,

relying

upon hypothesis

and

test,

is

open

to new

breakthroughs

and

theories,

requiring

more

or

less revision of what

had been taken

for

granted.

As

there has

been

general

rejection

of

eighteenth-century

rationalism

and

the con-

ception

of man

as

primarily

a

reasoning

being,

so there is

considerable

resistance to

science in

favor

of all kinds of

irrational-

ism,

mysticism,

occultism,

astrology,

and

psychedelic

experience.

Structuralism com-

bines

rationalism with

a

pseudo-scientific

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3/7

90

romanticism.

Thus it is

the

faith of

Claude

Levi-Strauss that elaborate

grids

or

systems

may

begin

to reveal

an

underlying

struc-

ture,

though

it

continues to be elusive.

In

his

autobiography

Tristes

Tropiques,

he

says

he

has a neolithic

mind,

because

he

admires so-called

primitive

cultures

and

languages.

He is in

awe

of their

sophistica-

tion,

and feels that civilization has

impover-

ished life

by discrediting

experience

which

does not fit a

rigid

standard of what is

sanely

thinkable.

Here Levi-Strauss

is akin

to

Benjamin

Lee

Whorf with his

passionate

interest

in

languages differing

drastically

from standard

average European

lan-

guages, involving

an

understanding

of the

environment quite remote from that of

Western

culture.

Whorf was

fascinated

by

the

capacity

of

the

Hopi

language

of Ari-

zona to make distinctions

ignored

in

Eng-

lish. He

said,

And

every language

is a vast

pattern-system..

in which are

culturally

ordained

forms and

categories by

which the

personality

not

only

communicates,

but

also

analyzes

nature,

notices or

neglects

types

of

relationship

and

phenomena,

channels his

reasoning,

and builds

the

house of his

consciousness. 3 He was struck by what he

called

the

premonition

in

language

of a

vast,

unknown world.

It

seemed

to

Whorf

as

if

the

personal

mind ... were in the

grip

of a

higher,

far

more intellectual

mind

... . 4 He came

to

assume

an

intellectual

structure beneath

or above

linguistic

rela-

tivity,

making possible

a

brotherhood of

thought

which

in the future could over-

come

the

gulfs

between

widely

variant

ways

of

speaking

and

thinking.

Peter Caws declares that structuralism's

great

contribution

has been ... to claim

once

again

for intellect

a

territory

we

had

all

but abandoned to

the absurd.

6

This

sug-

gests

that our real brother is not

the alien-

ated

worker of Marx or

the

fragmented psy-

che of Freud but

the

noble

savage

of Rous-

seau's vision who

has been buried

within us

under

layers

of

excessively

civilized

reason-

ableness,

mistakenly

taken to be Man.

Levi-

Strauss is

impressed

by

the

intransigent

re-

fusal of

the

savage

mind to allow

anything

human (or even living) to remain alien to

it.

6

Too much resistance to the absurd in

SANFORD SCRIBNER AMES

the

concept

of Man as the embodiment of

reason has left

unexplored

whole territories

which remain alien. The structuralist effort

is to work out

systems

making

sense of

much that had been

rejected

as

fanciful.

Michel Foucault

quotes

in

the introduc-

tion

to Les Mots

et

les

choses a

passage

from

Borgds (not

identified but from the

novel

L'Alepha):

This text cites

a certain Chinese

encyclopedia

where

it

is written

that animals are

divided into:

a) belonging

to

the

Emperor,

b)

embalmed,

c)

tame,

d) suckling

pigs, e)

mermaids,

f)

fabulous,

g) dogs running

free,

h)

included

in the

present

classification,

i)

which

behave like

madmen,

j)

innumerable,

k)

drawn on camelskin with

a

very

fine

brush,

1)

et

cetera,

m)

which have

just

broken

their leg, n) which from a distance look like

flies.

Foucault

comments:

In our

astonishment

at this

taxonomy

what

strikes us with sud-

den

force,

what,

because of its

setting,

is

presented

to

us

as the exotic charm of an-

other

system

of

thought,

is the limitation of

our own: the stark

impossibility

of

thinking

such

things.

7

Foucault

predicts

that the rational con-

ception

of

Man will

disappear

like

a

face

drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.

8

This is

not

to

be taken as

a

depressing pos-

sibility

but

rather

as

marking

the liberation

of

men,

permitting

them to

exist more

fully

in

the

world,

free from

bondage

to narrow

reason. Men

are still

here,

facing

the same

problems,

with freedom to invest

the sense

of

their

being

in

the

world,

rivaling

the

enterprise

of their

unfettered distant

ancestors,

joining

in

the

infinite

possibili-

ties of

la

pensee sauvage.

The title of L6vi-Strauss'swork on struc-

tural

anthropology,

La

Pensee

sauvage,

should not

be translated

as

savage

or

primitive

thought

but

rather as

untamed

thought

or natural mind.

For

him,

men

have been involved in

the

activity

of

mak-

ing

the world

intelligible

all

along;

but

it

is

only

in

relatively

recent times that

they

have become

separated enough

from their

linguistic projections

to ask Who is talk-

ing?

and

To whom is

talking

or

writing

addressed?

We are so bent on

making

sense and making ourselves understood that

we

define

madness

as

the

non-signifying,

the



4/7

Structuralism,

Language,

and

Literature

unthinkable.

But

overemphasis

on rational

Man

may

obscure

a

somnolent,

persistent

chance

that we

may

not be forever

exiled

from non-rational

insights

into our

strange

being in the world. What we have called

insane

may

not be

unhealthy.

It

may

be the

divine

madness of

Plato,

the

inspiration

of

art. Foucault would

rediscover

and

reap-

praise

madness.

Roy

McMullen calls

it:

Not the

ignoble

sickness seen

by

clinical

eyes,

but madness as

an ancient kind

of

in-

tuitive

breakthrough-knowledge,

with the

animal

shamelessness,

violent

truthfulness,

poetic

license,

and

holy

aura it had for our

ancestors retained

in scores

of Western liter-

ary

and

pictorial masterpieces.

9

Interrogation

of

the

mentally

ill,

those

who

can no

longer cope,

reveals

the

star-

tling

limitation of

common

language

as

communication.

Jacques

Lacan,

the

leading

French structuralist

psychologist,

says:

...

psychoanalysis

has but

one

medium: the

word of the

patient....

10

Man

appears

to

the structuralist

as an uncertain

refer-

ence,

or,

to

put

it

more

drastically,

an

ab-

sence.

The

attempt

to

apprehend

him out-

side his

speaking, writing,

and

representing

seems doomed to failure. What is unex-

pressed

is

assumed

to exist as

latent lan-

guage

until

it comes to

light

in

expression.

Then

what comes

through

must have been

imminent

in

everyone's

pensee

sauvage.

Through

the

juxtaposition

and

superim-

position

of

texts,

languages,

and cultures we

have

the best chance of

understanding

what

it means to be men.

We are like archaeolo-

gists studying

the

remains of

bygone

human

life. We

put

a

grid

over

languages,

cultures,

and individual testimony, spoken or writ-

ten,

and invent new

semiological

relations

to

interpret

what we find. We cannot

bring

former

life back

any

more than we can seize

the absent

author or

speaker

talking

to us.

It is

always

too

late,

even

eyeball

to

eyeball

in direct

confrontation,

to

bring

forth

what

is

never there

except

as created in

the

signi-

fying

activity

of

language.

It is

possible

to learn more about

a lan-

guage

than those

speaking

it

are aware of.

We are all a little like Monsieur Jourdain

discovering

that

he had been

speaking

prose.

We

know much more about some

91

past

cultures,

myths,

customs,

and

arts

than

their

possessors

had the means to

grasp.

For

the

structuralists

what we

usually

mean

by

knowing

ourselves

or

others,

in the

present

or the past, misses the point that knowing is

doing.

Although

we start out as archaeolo-

gists,

we end

up

as fellow artists or creative

analysts,

joining

our

predecessors

in

ques-

tioning

and

creating

the world

according

to

our

representations

of it.

If

the traces

of

past

activities are to make

any

sense,

they

must make it to

the

living.

While

the

past

is

steadily

constructed

and

reconstructed on

the basis of the

present,

the

past

can be

experienced only

here and now. When the

notion of

complete

and irrevocable

history

is

given

up,

then each of us

in

turn is the

other to whom

the world with its train of

past cultures must

appear.

When we detect

or create structures of

relationships

that our

ancestors could not have been aware of in

their

languages, myths,

or

literatures,

it is

we

who

must

struggle

with

the

questions

which

they

raise.

Questions

about the

application

of struc-

turalism

to

the

world, life,

or

reality

in

gen-

eral come to a most

interesting

focus

in

lit-

erature. It is frequently charged that struc-

turalists

get

more out of a text or a

myth

than

could be there

according

to

empirical

evidence,

the

history

of a

period,

the life

and

times of an author or

artist.

The

challenge

of

structuralism to tradi-

tional

academic

literary

criticism has been

eloquently

put

by

Roland

Barthes,

who

is

generally

regarded

as head of the

school

known

as

La

Nouvelle

critique.

He is cur-

rently

director

of

a

seminar on the sociol-

ogy of signs, symbols, and representations

in the Ecole

Pratique

des Hautes Etudes

in

Paris. Like other

structuralists,

he is en-

gaged

in

creating

and

bringing

into

the

open

what

they

suppose

to be the anterior

language

which

makes communication and

literature

possible.

His concern

is not with

a

message

but with

what

system

or

structure

makes

messages

available.

In

his

view,

the

critic chooses a

critical

language appropri-

ate to the

work

in

hand and

to his

ap-

proach, to impose as a grid over the text,

enabling

him to

develop

one

of

the

possible

senses

out

of an

unknown

number. The



5/7

92

critic

builds a model

over the text and

then,

in

exhaustive

ransacking

of unities and rela-

tionships,

accounts for

all the

signifying

ele-

ments in

the work in

terms of his construct.

The critic, in front of a work, is analogous

to men

trying

to

understand the world.

Work and world

ask to be

projected

and

given

depth

by

human

structuring

activity.

The

job

is to

make a valid

model.

What

matters is not

what

critical

language

is im-

posed,

but the

rigor

with

which it is

ap-

plied.

For

Barthes,

traditional

literary

criti-

cism is a

mixture of science and

magic.

The

assumption

has been

that,

if we know

the

life and

times of an author

we

can,

accord-

ing

to

conventional

psychological,

bio-

graphical,

and historical

data,

discover

what

contributing

factors

were transformed

into

literature. Inventions or

transforma-

tions of

reality

which

cannot be

accounted

for are

assigned

to the

creative

powers

of

Racine,

Proust,

whoever

it

might

be-in

short,

to

magic.

Barthes

maintains that this

magical

ap-

proach

cannot

begin

to

exhaust the

possi-

bilities of a

work.

This

ignores

the

prob-

lems raised

by

the

transformation

of

lan-

guage into literature. For Barthes, litera-

tures exists as a

meta-language,

a

parasitical

language,

which

cannot

denote

the real but

only

suggest

it.

Literature

doubles

reality.

Barthes

says

that

literature is ...

deprived

of all

transitivity,

condemned

ceaselessly

to

signify

itself at

the moment when it

wants

only

to

signify

the

world. Literature

then is

an

immobile

object, separated

from the

world which is

in

process

of

realizing

itself.

... In

sum,

literature does not

permit

the

world to walk, but allows it to breathe. 11

The

opposite

of

literary

is

transitive lan-

guage,

used to

change

the

world. For a

me-

chanic

a car is

not the

advertiser's

image

of

prestige,

success,

or

sex,

but an

object

to be

worked on for a

livelihood. The

language

of

the

mechanic,

the

scientist,

or

the revolu-

tionary,

used

in

his

occupation,

is

not

myth-

ical

but

practical

designations

for action

upon

the world. In

the classical

period

of

French

literature,

language

was

felt to

be

transparent,

as

Boileau

put

it.

What was

clearly conceived would be clearly ex-

pressed,

with

varing

degrees

of

ornamenta-

SANFORD SCRIBNER AMES

tion.

For

the

classical

writer,

to continue

Barthes's

metaphor, language

walked with

the

world and with

universal consciousness.

David Funt

amplifies

the classical

idea:

The traditional view of literature sees the

subject (mind)

as a

plenum

which

expresses

itself

in

the medium of words.

...

If

the

language

is

sufficiently

transparent

and

if

the reader's

literary

vision is

adequate,

he

ought

to

perceive

the secret of the

work

which

lies

in the

subject

hidden behind

the

language.

Another

way

(the

critic's)

of deci-

phering

the

author's

secret

is to

circumvent

the work

itself

and to

study

the author's life

and

environment.

12

For Barthes

also the

subject

exists as an

absence, but his blank silence makes

possi-

ble a

plurality

of

senses,

a

multiplicity

of

creative-critical

interpretations.

Language,

as we know

it in modern

times,

is no

longer

transparent

but dense and

opaque,

each

word a realm of

signs

with life of its

own.

Barthes seems to be

saying

that

literay

lan-

guage

cannot walk with

the world

except

in

bad

faith,

by assuming

that words

are

empty

and

neutral vehicles filled

by

a

spe-

cific or universal

reality

or idea

which

they

designate. When the signification of lan-

guage

is

seen to be

limited,

having

a

kind

of

necessity

or

essential

quality

that

de-

forms its

factual

content,

the result is

myth.

For

example,

white stands

for

purity,

red

for

danger.

If the

meta-language

of

literature is to

avoid

becoming myth,

and

escape

the doom

of

pretending

to mirror a

reality

it

cannot

change,

then a

subject

which

in fact is ab-

sent must

appear

as a

question,

a

proposal.

Literature must provoke the maximum res-

onance

in

what Maurice

Blanchot

calls

l'espace

litteraire

around it.

Barthes ob-

serves: One could

say,

I

believe,

that

litera-

ture is

Orpheus climbing

up

from the un-

derworld.

As

long

as it

goes

forward,

while

knowing

that it is

leading

someone

(the

reality

which is

behind),

it

pulls

little

by

little

away

from

the

unnamed,

breathing,

walking,

and

directing

itself

toward

clarity

and

sense.

But

as soon

as

language

turns

around toward what it

loves,

there is

no

longer anything in its hands but a named

meaning,

that is to

say,

a

dead

meaning.

13



6/7

Structuralism,

Language,

and Literature

Barthes declares

that,

for

literature to

sig-

nify only

itself when

it wants

to

signify

the

world

(which

is

always

in the

making),

de-

scription

must be left

open,

written in

am-

biguous terms,

which

will let

the

meaning

leak

through (fuir).

A

writer's

language

can be

creatively

completed

in

various

worthwhile

con-

structs. In structuralism a

positive

situation

is

one

in which an

ongoing,

unceasing

con-

quest

of the

intelligible

is

possible

in the

practice

of the

signifying

activity. Language

is

not innocent or neutral. When

it

pre-

tends

to be universal and

transparent,

when

it

aspires

to be

exclusive,

it

becomes

mythi-

cal.

David Funt, in discussing this problem

with

reference to

Barthes,

shows

that

the

supposed

neutral

universality

of classical

literary

language

was in fact the

property

of

a social

class,

namely,

the

rising

bourgeoi-

sie. After

1880,

perhaps

beginning

with

Flaubert,

writers

became aware

of different

ecritures or

ways

of

writing

available to

them.

They began

to choose their

languages

consciously.

Flaubert is mentioned

by

Funt

as

deliberately

choosing

the

language

of the

bourgeoisie, while Sartre took that of the

Left,

and

Camus came as close as

possible

to

the absolute

neutrality

of l'ecriture

blanche.

Taking

the

conscious

responsibility

of mak-

ing

a

choice,

which cannot

be

avoided in

any

case,

is to

recognize

the

multiplicity

of

ecritures which are not

mutually

exclusive.

A

writer,

deliberately

choosing

one or an-

other

for

his

purposes,

will

be aware that

it

is

one

of

many

possible approaches

to

the

world. This

gives

him

the

advantage

of

turning into foils the possibilities not

chosen.'4

Literature for Barthes

would seem to be

an

open-ended sign language.

Neither the

author,

the

content,

nor the literal charac-

ter of

the

language

is of

primary

interest,

but rather

the

Eurydice

that

literature can-

not turn

back to or

even name. The

signifi-

cation of

literary

structure can be ana-

lyzed

in

the creation

of

logical

models

which

try

to

grasp

how

writing

transforms

language

and

points

toward an

unexpressed

proto-language. Literature is not the text

itself but its

fissures of

ambiguous

song

93

which

keep

coaxing

Eurydice

from the

un-

derworld.

Though

we

may

never see

her

face,

we know

she

is alive in the sketches

and

models we make of

her,

prompted

by

what the internal structure of

a

work

pro-

poses

as absence. This absence

justifies

in-

ventive

criticism,

since there is

no fixed

ori-

gin

or

point

of reference for

a creative

work.

Such

an

approach puts

life and

dyna-

mism into both literature and

criticism.

Racine's

Andromaque

and

Phedre are

not

stuck in their creator's mind back in

the

seventeenth

century. They

are created

anew

for each

age

and each critic. When we

rigorously

apply

contemporary

critical lan-

guages

to

Racine,

we see new

dynamics,

new interrelations in his works, new signs.

Our

Phedre and

Andromaque might

be un-

recognizable

to

Racine, but,

without

life

of

their

own,

could

they emerge,

could

they

be

conjured up again

and

again

in

different

forms

by

different

spells?

This seems to be

the

idea behind

Barthes's controversial

book,

Sur

Racine.

Applying

his

approach,

let

us see if there

is life now in Racine's

signifying

activity,

so that we can

fit

his

creations

into

the

present

where alone

they

can come to life.

Thinking

of

literature as

proposal

or

sign

to be

completed,

soliciting

further creative

activity,

almost

putting

criticism on

equal

footing

with the

work,

is

exciting.

We are

no

longer

groping

in

the

dust

for

clues to

reconstruct

the truth. We

recognize

that

linguistic

constructions have a

timeless life

of

their own. The

silence around them can

resonate with new

significance.

Then

the

study

of

literature calls

back

again

those

ageless ladies, Eurydice, Phedre, and Andro-

maque,

to come down

the

runway

in

hith-

erto

unimagined

costumes.

McLuhan has

suggested

that

the French

have

overemphasized

the structuralist

sys-

tem which

made French

style.

He thinks

more stress

should be

put

upon

content,

making

for

richness and

variety, though

ob-

scuring

underlying

structures. He

says:

...

it would

be

interesting

to

study

literature as

a

struggle

between

self-immobilizing

themes

and

structures and

the

pull away

from such

themes toward a greater variety of response

to the world and

to

language.

15



7/7

94

Mikel Dufrenne

challenges

the

claim

of

structuralism

that

meaning

is

only

contex-

tual,

with no

reference

to

objects.

He

says

that,

after

dispensing

with

objects,

the

argu-

ment consists only in the relationships of

their

empty places

...

the

meaning

is

in the

relations,

not

in the terms

which

are related

... the

system

is

presented

and

deployed

according

to a

timeless

history

...

outside

human

initiative,

language

does

the

think-

ing

in

our

stead ...

in

short,

man

dies

that

the

system

may

live....

In structuralist

crit-

icism,

a work

is

considered

exactly

as

a

formal

system

is considered

by

the

logician:

the work is

taken

as

language

and

criticism

as

meta-language.

16

Dufrenne

says

that if the work is consid-

ered

an

autonomous,

closed

system,

a dis-

course

not

spoken

by

anyone,

the

conse-

quence

is

that a work is

not to

be

explained

by

reference

to its

author,

his

life and

in-

tentions,

or

by

the historical

context.

The

genesis

of

a work is

ignored.

The umbili-

cal cord is cut

which ties

a work to

the

writer

and

through

him to the

world.

17

It

is instructive

to examine

the

mechanism

of

objectified

thought,

but Dufrenne

holds

that structuralism cannot stand alone with-

out

leaving

problems

which it

does

not and

cannot

raise,

which

more

empirical

think-

ing

must take

up.

Works

cannot

be

signifi-

cant

in and for

themselves.

Their

meaning

must

be

for

someone,

by

referring

to the

world.

Champigny

adds

that structuralism

would be

more

interesting

if it could estab-

lish

a

hierarchy

of

aesthetic

accomplish-

ment,

showing

that some

patterns,

rhymes,

motives,

or sounds

are more

appealing

than

others. He thinks the hope of literary study

is to

assign

values.18

The

rejoinder

of structuralists

to

Duf-

renne

would

presumably

be

that,

while

lit-

erature

may

be

considered

a

closed

sys-

tem,

it

is a

system

of

signs

which

perpetu-

ally

solicit

the invention of

completions.

It

SANFORD

SeRIBNER

AMES

is

very

well to collect

facts

concerning

a

work's

author

and its

genesis,

if we

admit

that this

cannot

begin

to exhaust

the

possi-

ble

meanings

of a

work.

Empirical

data

may

be

reassuring

but cannot

be the

umbil-

ical cord

that

ties a

work to

the world.

There

is no

fixed

point

of reference

to

which literature

can

be

pinned,

no truth

that

can

plumb

it.

An author

sets

in motion

a

signifying

dynamism,

which is

a

question

launched

by

his

writing.

Barthes

says

that literature

merely

asks,

What

do

things signify?

He

thinks

that

literature

never

gives

the answer.

He

main-

tains that no

literature has

ever

answered

the

question

it

asked,

and that

this

makes

literature what it is: the frail language

which

men

place

between

the

violence

of

the

question

and

the silence

of the

missing

answer.

1

Robert

Champigny,

Lecture

at

Ohio

State Uni-

versity,

May

1970.

2

Cf.

Jean

Piaget,

Le Structuralisme

(Paris:

Presses

Universitaires

de

France,

1968), pp.

6-8.

Benjamin

Lee

Whorf,

Language,

Thought,

and

Reality (The

M.I.T.

Press,

1969), p.

252.

4

Ibid.,

p.

257.

6

Peter

Caws,

Structuralism,

Partisan

Review

35

(1968):

91.

B

Ibid.,

p.

90.

7Michel

Foucault,

Les Mots et

les

choses

(Paris,

1966), p.

7.

8

Ibid.,

p.

398.

9Roy

McMullen,

Michel

Foucault,

Horizon

(Autumn

1969),

11: 37.

10Jacques

Lacan,

Ecrits

(Paris,

1966),

p.

866.

U

Roland

Barthes,

Essais

Critiques (Paris,

1961),

p.

264.

David

Funt,

Roland

Barthes

and the

Nouvelle

critique, JAAC

26

(1968):

337-38.

18

Barthes,

p.

265.

14

Cf.

Funt,

p.

337.

15

Marshall

McLuhan,

Conversations

with Mc-

Luhan,

Encounter

(June 1967),

p.

232.

16

Mikel

Dufrenne,

Esthetique

et

philosophie

(Paris,

1967),

pp.

132-33.

7

Ibid.,

p.

133.

8

Champigny,

Lecture,

May

1970.
