Content Overview
1. Introduction1. Vulnerabilities of satellites2. Space Debris
2. Ways forward1. Technical2. Diplomatic
3. Space Weapons
4. Conclusions
1. INTRODUCTION
Why is space is important to International Security?
Take Iraq:- Decision to go in based in part on Satellite reconnaissance and SIGINT- Entire Military Operation conducted from Florida via comms satellite- Military units, ships, tanks, planes and missiles guided by GPS
Modern military functions near impossible without satellites
PROBLEMS
- Vulnerabilities of critical satellites- Increasing density of space debris
1. INTRODUCTION
AIM
“Secure and sustainable access to and use of space and freedom from space based threats.” *
PRE-REQUISITS FOR GENERALS AND POLICY MAKERS
- Keplers’ Laws - Rocket Equation
* Space Security Index, http://www.spacesecurity.org
1.1. VULNERABILITIES
T1. Electronic warfare, such as jamming or spoofing of satellite communications; T2. Physical attacks on satellite ground stations; T3. Dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors; T4. Radio-Frequency (RF) weapons, e.g. High-Powered Microwaves (HPM);T5. ‘Heat-to-kill’ ground-based laser ASAT weapons; T6. Pellet cloud attacks on low-orbit satellites; T7. Attacks in space by micro-satellites; T8. Hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons; and T9. High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND).
1. Adapted from B. de Blois et al. International Security Fall 2004
1.2. SPACE DEBRIS
• Millions of pieces of man made debris• Debris >1mm can cause s/c malfunction• But SSN can only track objects >5cm !!• ~100,000 pieces that are *untrackable* today and yet
threaten s/c• Potential for going critical• NASA study: even if no new launches, debris continues to
rise
Chinese ASAT• 3000 debris >5cm• Increase of ~20%• Conjunctions up >30%
US ASAT • Less debris • Still increased risks
2. WAYS FORWARD
2.1. TECHNICAL1. Protection of satellites, Communication links and Ground Stations
2. Space Situation Awareness (SSA)
3. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
4. Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture
5. Space Traffic Management
2.2. DIPLOMATIC1. Treaties
1. Prohibit ASATs and other kinetic weapons- Space is a very transparent domain for kinetic events – for any ASAT event it is easy to (1) detect the event, and (2)
determine who was the perpetrator.
2. Orbital Space Debris- Chinese and US ASATs show that ‘guidelines’ are not enough
3. Space Traffic Management
2. Confidence Building Measures
Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)
ConceptDesign a new satellite architecture less vulnerable to threats
Current Architecture:• Few key satellites• Many in LEO• Each system in single orbital tier Many places of single point failures
MMCA Features1. Multi-tiered (several orbital altitudes) 2. Higher altitudes (where attack is harder and including terrestrial layers
where possible) 3. Constellations (disperse) 4. Modular 5. Networked 6. Micro-satellites
Same capabilities as the few key satellites do today Less vulnerable to attack Using Existing technologies Similar or lower cost
Transition Through replacement of existing system as it fails/is retired/becomes obsolete
Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)
Main functions of military satellites
1. Early Warning of Missile Attack– Early Warning of Missile Attack– Detection of nuclear explosions
2. Reconnaissance (Photo and Synthetic Aperture Radar)– Imagery Intelligence
3. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)– Listening to Communications (COMINT), Radar (ELINT), Telemetry of
missiles/rockets (TELINT)
4. Communications– Military-to-military communication
5. Navigation– Military navigational information– Rocket guidance
Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)
Example: Early Warning Satellites
Difference of MMCA:
• More satellites• Multiple layers (GEO
and MEO layer)• Smaller Infra-Red
telescope• Telescope and
other instruments split into two satellites
Example: Topsat bus (SSTL) or Spiralle (CNES)
SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
Collision avoidance:
Conjunction Analysis
Manoeuvre
SSO slots
12 altitudes42 planes>1000 slots minimumUp to 12000 slots max.
(Currently ~300 SSO Satellites in operation)
3. SPACE WEAPONS
Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?
Why relevant at all? - Some propose SW to reduce s/c vulnerabilities!
Questions:1. Can Space Based Weapons reduce Satellite Vulnerabilities?2. Can Space Based Weapons ensure continued Secure access to space?
Net Security Analysis:
Security Benefits Security Costs
1. Missile Defense2. Protecting Space Assets3. Prompt Global Strike4. Space Defense/Attack Capability (space
control)5. Secondary Security Benefits
1. Arms race --> bankrupting adversary2. Maintaining Aerospace Workforce3. Stable domination
1. Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets, asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed
2. Harming the Environment (space debris)3. Long-term impact on security; inability to
retract that system if destabalizing
6. SPACE-BASED WEAPONS
Example: Space Based Interceptor for Missile Defense
Advantages:- Potential to intercept missiles from rogue states
Disadvantages:- Technical Difficulty V. Large cost- Other nations may do asymmetric capabilities to negate
missile defense e.g. ASATs- Missile Defense is provocative for many nations (e.g.
Russia)
4. CONCLUSIONS
Satellites are important and yet vulnerable
Main ways forward that need more energy:
1. Technical1. Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture
2. Space Traffic Management
2. Diplomatic1. Treaty Prohibiting ASATs and other kinetic weapons
Space Weapons:In my analysis, Space based weapons reduce US security principally because of
relative technical ease of countermeasures.
MORE INFORMATION
1. Space Security Index -- annual review of military space developments “Military Balance for Space” -- www.spacesecurity.org
2. Space Traffic Management -- International Space University Study -- www.isunet.edu + small study team at NASA-Ames
3. US National Space Policyhttp://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default-file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20Policy%20--%20FINAL.pdf
4. W. Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space Assets: A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture”, Astropolitics, Volume 6, Issue 2 May 2008 , pages 154 - 199
QUESTIONS?
Category Specific weapons Past Use
Primary Task (secondary)
1. Space-to-Missile
1. Space-based Interceptor U Missile Defense (protection/control)
2. Space-based Laser (U) Missile Defense
(protection/control)
2. Space-to-Earth
3. Orbital Bombardment System (Long Rod Penetrator or Space-based Common Aero Vehicle)
Ground Attack (control)
3. Space-to-Space
4. Space Mine (Space-based ASATs/DSAT) (U) Control (Protection)
4. Earth-to-Space Ground-based ASATs (KK or pellet cloud)
Laser Blinding
Laser Dazzling
Radio-frequency (RF) weapons e.g. high-power microwave (HPM)
Radio communications jamming/spoofing
High Altitude Nuclear Detonation
5. Earth-to-Space-to-Earth
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
Key (U) = formerly under development but programme largely discontinued
= developed and tested
U= under development
TYPES OF SPACE WEAPON
1. HOW CAN SPACE-BASED WEAPONS EFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY
Security Benefits1. Missile Defense2. Protecting Space Assets3. Prompt Global Strike4. Space Defense/Attack Capability (space control)5. Secondary Security Benefits
1. Arms race --> bankrupting adversary2. Maintaining Aerospace Workforce3. Stable domination
Security Costs1. Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets,
asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed2. Harming the Environment (space debris)3. Long-term impact on security; inability to retract that
system if destabalizing